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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

VOL. V.—1906-1907

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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY

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VOLUME V

OCTOBER 1906—*JULY* 1907

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HIBBERT JOURNAL

CHURCH AND WORLD.

THE EDITOR.

In the *De Monarchiâ* of Dante we find a simple and attractive conception of the relation of the Church to the World. As the work of the Empire is to achieve the temporal happiness of man, so the mission of the Church is to guide him to the goal of his Eternal Good. In this conception Church and World are divided from each other by an almost visible line. The persons constituting the one are a group distinct from those belonging to the other; their attributes are contrary; their names and places are different, and no confusion of substance is possible between the two. Before the mental eye of Dante there lies a picture of objective facts roughly true to the ethical conditions of his day. As the Duomo of his native city stood forth amid the surrounding mass of human habitations, so the Ark of God rose in sublime contrast above the wilderness of the World. To Dante, as a thinker of the first rank in his day, it could hardly occur that any noble enterprise of the spirit could have its field outside the Church, or that any light could shine into the darkness but such as she was sent to kindle.

In our day, a simple formula of this kind is inapplicable to the facts. Before we can even make the experiment of applying it, Church and World must receive a meaning so different

from anything present to the mind of Dante that the terms lose their self-identity. The thinker of to-day will find it impossible to treat either Church or World as a simple and homogeneous unit. In the one case he will be perplexed by having to deal with churches instead of a Church, and the perplexity will become hopeless bewilderment when he has further to determine on which side the non-Christian religions are to lie: in the other, he will have to acknowledge that the World is composed of diverse elements ranging from the highest to the lowest in the moral scale. Each of the pair is too complex in moral structure to be characterised by any general proposition. You cannot say that one is good and the other evil without introducing qualifications which destroy the force of the epithets. Nor can any scrutiny, however impartial, find an *ethical* difference sufficiently marked to justify the opposition of the two. As we try first in this way and then in that to group humanity into the two divisions, we find, at each trial, that the ethical contrast becomes so attenuated that we can no longer assign distinct functions to either. Out of the facts of modern life, therefore, we cannot constitute the picture which seemed so true to mediæval thought. There is no single place of origin for the things of the spirit; no exclusive home for what is best in life; no privileged foundation of goodness and truth; no eminence where the virtues sit apart, like the gods on Olympus. And as these do not exist, it would be equally vain to look for their opposites. Now as then, no doubt, there is that in life which guides and that which needs to be guided to Eternal Good; but to call that the Church and this the World is to beg the question in dispute.

A similar difficulty arises when we turn to the distinction between theology and those other bodies of knowledge which are loosely gathered under the term "science"—a difficulty which reaches its height when the two are represented as *conflicting* powers. Changed conceptions of the relation of God to the World have obliterated the old line of

division between sacred and secular knowledge, as it seemed to exist, say, in the days of St Thomas Aquinas; and when, as often happens, the two are set at variance, as though the old line still divided them, a series of discussions begin of which we can only say that here loose thinking revels in its wildest debauch. We must ask, at the outset of the inquiry, what is and what is not theology. For if we are to take seriously the doctrine of the Universal Immanence of God, or the oft-quoted maxim that the service of man is the service of God, many branches of study once classed as profane must now be brought under a higher category. On the other hand, bodies of learning long deemed sacrosanct, and standing by right prescriptive on the steps of the throne where theology sits as Queen of the Sciences, seem, in the light of such ideas, to deserve no more than a minor office in some outlying province of her rule. Accepting these principles, as most of us do, we can scarcely deny that theology has a concern with the laws of Nature as well as with the Priestly Code; that the structure of society has a theological reference not less vital than the structure of the Hebrew language; and that the translation of a difficult passage of Hooker into Hellenistic Greek does not count for more in the kingdom of Divine Knowledge than the transformation of a slum into a decent neighbourhood. At a time when Bible study has become in certain of its departments little else than an inquiry into the psychology of an uncivilised race, while the whole universe is presenting itself in clearer light as the "garment of God," it seems surprising that the professional training of theologians should have so much to do with the first and so little with the last. It will be said, of course, that there is an historical reason for this; to which I might perhaps reply, that historical reasons are occasionally unsound. But waiving this, and granting that historical reasons account for the inclusion of the first, does it follow that they justify the exclusion of the second? The fact is that persons who talk of a conflict between theology and science, when they come to

specify the sciences with which theology is at odds, will learn to their surprise that no such sciences exist; that all science is a vital element in the religious interpretation of the world; that all knowledge is one; but that, if a distinction had to be made between the relatively useful and the relatively useless, certain branches of learning now inside the sacred enclosure would change places with others outside, on the ground that the latter have, and the former have not, a direct bearing on the religious needs of living men. They might even discover that, if any sciences are to be regarded as troublesome to religious belief, some of the chief offenders will be found inside and not outside the circle of studies commonly recognised as theological. At all events, the idea of an objective separation will again be found inapplicable to the facts.

In spite of these difficulties, the distinction between Church and World is still prominent, walking abroad, sometimes in the rigid armour of a theory, sometimes in the flowing raiment of a metaphor, but always with something menacing in its air. Roman Catholics and High Anglicans know well enough what they mean by the terms. But in quarters also where that view finds no favour the old division reasserts itself in altered words—haunting the scene of its execution like an ill-laid ghost. Evangelical Nonconformity can set the Church over against the World in language of tremendous import. "The great question," says Principal Forsyth, "is as to the reality of a holy God gracious in action *not to the Church alone but to society.*" The great fact is "a holy God *and a solidary ruined race.*" "In the message of *the whole Church to the great world* we must show that Christ in His saving act is identical with man's last reality of moral experience." And this "must be set forth *by the Church with a view to the world and not to the individual* merely." "Christianity appeals to that world and its actual case," . . . and "takes note of the world's moral bankruptcy and derangement by sin."[1]

[1] *Hibbert Journal*, July 1906. The italics are mine.

Whatever vagueness of metaphor may be found in these and similar utterances, there is no doubt that some kind of objective distinction between Church and World is vehemently maintained. And not only so; for here we have the portrait of the World painted from the point of view of the Church. According to the picture offered, the state of the World—by which, I suppose, is meant society at large *minus* the Church —is one of moral bankruptcy and ruin, and the mission of the Church is to retrieve this disastrous situation. In varied figures the Church appears as an oasis in a moral desert; as a solitary witness for righteousness in the midst of universal corruption; as an ark of refuge mercifully launched upon the wasting flood of the world's folly and sin.

The World of our day is in no mood to acknowledge the truth of this picture. The statement that the race at large is "lost" or "ruined" escapes criticism only so long as it is kept within the realm of vague generalities; but let the attempt be made to find the seat of this moral bankruptcy, or to rail off the solvent remnant from the rest of the race, and the charge will either evaporate, or be maintained by its supporters at the cost of their reputation for justice and good sense. The modern preacher who, in dealing with the World or the community, takes as his model the tone of Ezechiel's lamentations over Tyre or of Jonah's burden against the people of Nineveh is apt to forget the degree to which he as a member of the community, and his Church as a section of it, are responsibly implicated in the very sins he is denouncing, and that his pleadings are powerless except the public opinion of the wicked world rallies to their support. The sequel to such prophecy is not an immediate repentance in dust and ashes, but a swift repudiation of the charge and a resolve thereafter to leave that school of the prophets severely alone. No doubt there are multitudes of lost souls everywhere; but that is very different from saying that the *race* is ruined. If the race were ruined, no section of the race would be aware of the fact: in the words of Principal

Caird, "the proposition would be unintelligible unless it were false."[1] It may be terribly true that the sins of London are vaster in amount and deadlier in quality than those of any ancient city; but for all that London need not and does not regard herself as on the road to ruin. She is conscious of a growing effort to amend; believes herself in a way of slow but progressive improvement; relies on the integrity of her County Council; and, while acknowledging the evil in her midst, feels within her the stirrings of antagonistic power, and on that ground utterly refuses to confess herself a moral bankrupt. It is characteristic of all such communities that they do not despair of paying off the heavy debts accumulated from the errors and sins of the past; and it seems to me that the modern preacher will get a better hearing, and do better work, by encouraging this temper than by using language of an opposite tendency. Let us at least avoid a fatal collision with facts. If by "the World" we mean such things as parliamentary or municipal government, the great industries of the nation, the professions of medicine, law and arms, the fine arts, the courts of justice, the hospitals, the enterprises of education, the pursuit of physical science and its application to the arts of life, the domestic economy of millions of homes, the daily work of all the toilers—if, in short, we include that huge complex of secular activity which keeps the world up from hour to hour, and maintains society as a going concern—then the churches which stand apart and describe all this as morally bankrupt are simply advertising themselves as the occupiers of a position as mischievous as it is false. If, on the other hand, we exclude these things from our definition, what in reason do we mean by "the World"? Or shall we so frame the definition as to ensure beforehand that all the bad elements belong to the World, and all the good to the Church? Or, again, shall we take refuge in the customary remark that whatever is best in these secular activities is the product of Christian influence

[1] *Gifford Lectures*, ii. p. 75.

and teaching in the past? This course, attractive though it seems, is the most fatal of all. For if the World has already absorbed so much of the best the churches have to offer, how can these persist in declaring that the former is morally bankrupt? But, after all, there is little profit in discussing where the higher principles had their first origin. Let us rather ask, "Who is making the best use of them now?" *Then* we shall find that, in dealing with Church and World, we are handling a real distinction indeed, but one which lies far deeper than any of its current applications. This is nothing less than the difference between Right and Wrong, Reality and Falsehood—a difference which has no respect of persons, institutions, races or creeds, which cuts at right angles through each time-honoured classification of men, and may even divide the Household of Faith against itself.

The hypothesis of a lost and ruined race, on which so much of the churches' teaching is founded, and which, indeed, is needed to justify some of it, is felt by an increasing number of persons to be obsolete. This hypothesis carries us back to a time when the powers that make for righteousness seemed to have their scene of action exclusively within the Church; when as an agency for doing good she bore the competition of no rivals; when the things of the spirit were under her control; when all the virtues were as children in her school; when the greatest intellects were occupied in her concerns, the noblest characters inevitably drawn to her service, and the best forces of mankind, which now diverge into a thousand channels, concentrated upon the business she had in hand; when she professed to stand on the vantage-ground of unimpeachable moral superiority, and, conscious of her high position, could dictate her teaching to a morally bankrupt world. As political power was lodged in one group of persons, so there was another group, similarly separate from the mass of mankind, which held the reins of spiritual guidance, and this group was unquestionably the Church.

The relations of Church and World thus established have been completely changed, not by retrogression on the part of the Church, but by advance on the part of the World. Society has absorbed into its living tissue a large measure of that moral idealism of which the Church once seemed the solitary representative.[1] Hence the ethical absolutism implied in the first position, with the attendant claim to moral supremacy, has perished—perished *pari passu* with its political counterpart. In the modern world there is no more room for such assumptions than there is for the Divine Right of Kings. Deeply stamped on the higher thought of our time is the conviction that no institution less inclusive than society itself can assume the functions which mediæval theory claimed for the Church. The idea of a select portion of society charged with the religious interests of all the rest, and empowered not to *lead* only but *dictate*, is, I venture to say, an anachronism to sober thought. More and more widely is the truth coming home that unless the task once reserved for the Church alone be undertaken by the whole community it can never be accomplished; that unless society sets her own house in order, in disorder it will for ever remain. And what then? To say so much is but to enforce the World's need of the Church and to indicate her opportunity. As Constitutional Head, as the embodiment of the organising spirit of the common life, men are *seeking* the Church, and in that capacity are ready to endow her with higher and wider functions than she has ever possessed. They need her to voice the Purpose which, planted in the world from the beginning, makes it Divine—a Church begotten of the inner and perfect essence of the World, and belonging to it as universally as Reason belongs to humanity; a Church which shall deal with the World as Christ dealt with the sinner, continually revealing it to itself as *good*, until, by complete identifi-

[1] The point is illustrated by a concluding remark in Professor Alexander's *Moral Order and Progress*, where he suggests (p. 413) the question :—"Whether the difficulties in which Christianity is placed at the present day do not arise from the absorption of its highest idea into the conceptions and practice of morality."

cation with the deeper impulse of the creature, her message becomes the speech of the World's higher self, and her mission the reflection of the World's ultimate desire.

Nor is this a mere academic view of what ought to be. In some measure it is a picture of what is. No one who studies the social developments of this time will fail to see that the custody of the moral ideal has already passed beyond every species of ecclesiastical control and become a social responsibility, in which the churches share indeed, but share only as component elements in the universal kingdom of God. Wherever the eye may roam, it is arrested by the same spectacle—that of men hastening to organise themselves, in this way and in that, for the common good. In the heart of these great communities, which if their sins were counted would seem so wicked, we may see the birth of an impulse like the repentance of the Prodigal, a re-awakening of the better self, a home-born determination towards the right throwing itself into conflict with many forms of wrong. The very virtues are infected with a democratic spirit. Let those who cling to the oligarchic notion of a solvent Church and a ruined World study the social activities of any great town; let them take counsel with the leaders of any important social movement—say the Labour Party,—and they will discover that their formula is unworkable. They will see that the Church as a power external to the World is ceasing to exist, while a new Church within the World, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh, is slowly taking form. Between the two a new relationship is arising. So close is the union that, whether in bane or blessing, they share a common lot. All ethical contrast is abolished; both in guilt and in innocence they are one. If the World is bankrupt, the Church cannot be solvent, but shares with the World in the general ruin, both as to the guilt of its cause and the unending mischief of its effects.

In order to illustrate the disastrous consequences of dissociating, even in theory, the Church from the World, let us

now recur to the second form of the distinction indicated at the beginning—that between theology and science. Assuming, for the sake of the argument, a real separation between the sacred and the secular elements of life, let us view the contrast which arises when we compare them in respect of their several intellectual occupations. The characteristic work of the secular intellect is science; that of the Church is engaged in the determination of religious belief. Let us, then, compare the spirit in which the intellect of the World conducts the investigation of nature with the way in which the intellect of the Church applies itself to the solution of the doubts and questions constituting the religious problems of the age. Anticipating the result of this comparison, I may say at once that it will be of such a nature as to compel the withdrawal of the assumption from which the argument begins.

But, before proceeding, a difficulty will have to be removed. Any comparison of Church and World on these lines, it will be said, is precluded by the fact that theology herself is becoming *scientific*. This statement, as applied to the history of institutions, the criticism of documents, the growth of religious ideas, is true. And in order that it may not further embarrass the argument, I will say, first, that if there is any organised Church in Christendom which, in the treatment of its official formularies, has shown an undisguised determination to abide by the results of accurate scholarship and scientific theology, that Church stands entirely outside the scope of the following remarks. Personally, I know of none which has done this; but I know of several which have not, and it is of them only that I am writing. Indeed, the part which the churches as such can claim in the scientific character of theology appears to be somewhat limited. If we may judge from the treatment accorded at different periods to such scientific theologians as Bishop Colenso, Professor Robertson Smith, or the Abbé Loisy, it would appear that the point at which theology becomes scientific is the precise point at which the churches refuse to give it countenance. The churches must

show a warmer welcome to such confessors before claiming them as children of their own spirit. And, secondly, I have to remark that much of what now passes as scientific theology is not theology in the proper sense of the term. It ought to be classified as anthropology. Great subjects once rightly called theological, because they were studied as revealing the mind of God, have now become chapters, not always religiously edifying, in the historical psychology of the mind of man. We must not too hastily allow the voice of the "historical argument" to charm us into believing that we have become scientific in theology because our methods are exact in regard to the ways of the Hittites and Jebusites, and the date of St Mark. It may be noted, also, that studies which have to assume belief in God before they can be made to serve the purpose of religion[1] bulk largely in every programme of theological education; while the studies which justify the assumption are less in evidence. In short, it seems to be time for theologians of all schools to look over their field of operations with a view to a fresh grading of relative values. In non-professional circles the need for this is widely felt, and has not been one whit diminished by the advent of scientific theology. For the question which the anxious world puts to the theologian is, What do YOU believe? and all accounts, no matter how scientific, of what other men believed in near or remote periods of history are treated as irrelevant.

Society abounds with earnest and educated persons who have lost faith in a living and personal God, and see their fellows and foresee themselves passing out of life entirely without hope. Such persons are in the right when they cite theology as the science which should help them in their need, for the powers which have undermined their faith are intellectual, and the intellect must restore what the intellect has destroyed. What is theology doing to help these persons, to enlighten them, to recover them? It is to

[1] And which in the absence of that assumption frequently have the opposite effect.

be feared that in seeking to answer this we are wont to avail ourselves of vague and feeble generalities. We produce essays on the relation of theology to religion, in which we prove, beyond all gainsaying, that the first is necessary to the second in the same sense as the skeleton framework is necessary to the human body. Religion, we conclude, requires an intellectual basis, and so must rest on theology—a commonplace which for our present purpose is useless. The question is not whether an intellectual basis is necessary to religion, but to what extent that basis is being actually supplied by the studies recognised as theological. Is there no neglect of main issues; no tendency to linger on the fringes of the subject; no vain attempt to substitute description for proof; no disposition to keep at a distance from the threatened fortress which is the key of the whole position? Those studies for which universities give theological degrees, are they all equally worthy of their name? There is a story, more ingenious perhaps than true, of a certain Transatlantic university which conferred the degree of D.D. upon an individual for writing a treatise to prove the non-existence of God. Much that now passes as theology holds its title on not dissimilar terms.

But to return to the comparison of the intellectual habits of Church and World. The first thing to be said is that, whatever may be the case with the virtues in general, there is one pre-eminent virtue which no longer finds its severest field of exercise in the determination of religious belief. I refer to the intellectual virtue of veracity. A strict regard for veracity, in its simplest and most intelligible form, has become the mark—should I not say the glory?—of physical science. On the other hand, the impression has gone abroad that religious belief is a kind of doctrine which men may hold, not because they can prove it to be true, but for other reasons —whether good or bad is not now the question. Certainly the disposition is growing to appeal to anything rather than demonstrated truth in support of doctrine. In consequence of this habit, the churches are becoming the home, almost the

refuge, of an order of minds intellectually content to hold beliefs for which the evidence, when judged by the severe standards of science, is insufficient. In the handling of theological formulas loose thinking is no longer recognised, as once it was, and let us hope will again be, as the one supremely fatal vice. Pausing to weigh my words, and keeping back the strongest terms that might be used, I cannot withhold the opinion that there is not, and never has been, any department of serious human concern in which loose thinking has attained the proportion and enjoys the privilege which now belong to it in the public exposition of religious belief.[1] By a convenient fiction we treat the public as "sick of dogma." But even if this description were true, as it certainly is not, we must not infer that the public is hungry for the products of irrational sentiment or slovenly thought. What the public is sick of is not dogma, but the feebleness of the dogmatists in the pursuit of their proper vocation. If by dogma is meant a reasoned statement of religious belief backed by the authority of demonstrable truth, I say deliberately that there is nothing for which thinking men are so eagerly in search.

In this respect theology has fallen below the level of her own former practice. The framers of the Creeds understood at least that the function of formula is to formulate. With them theology was no science of variable meanings. Their work declares what *must* be believed, and declares it for no other reason than that it seemed to them to be and to remain eternally true. Guarded at every point from the risk of misconception, and elaborated to a finish which leaves no detail incomplete, the Creeds, of which the Athanasian is here the finest example, rise before us like moated citadels built out of the chosen stone of the quarry, whose rigid outlines time itself could never soften. If there is any attitude of mind which stands condemned by the spirit of such work, it is that

[1] The present revival of the philosophy of religion, in which, significantly enough, the World seems to be taking the larger share, offers a much-needed contrast to the conditions here described.

which would admit variety of interpretation as to what the Creeds may mean. This was the very thing which the Creeds were created to prevent. But all has changed. A passion for vague engagements seems to have possessed the intellect of the churches. In the sphere of religious belief men may pledge themselves to all sorts of issues without feeling committed either to this or that. A liberty of private interpretation is claimed for solemn and public undertakings. Language, when applied to the expression of religious belief, seems to have a different set of values from those carried in other departments of thought. Elsewhere words are supposed to convey something: here they may convey almost anything. Not only has it become impossible to say what a particular dogma means, but highly difficult to say what it does not mean; for there is hardly a conceivable meaning which ingenuity may not contrive to fix on the words. What would happen, we may well ask, if a witness in a court of law were to indulge in the irresponsible use of language which is now tolerated in many of the high places of religion?

But this is only one half of the picture. While religious teaching, on the one hand, has been falling into these feeble and vacillating habits, science, on the other, has been setting an example of stern responsibility in the use of language. While theologians have been appealing to this and that conception of authority, and dangerous phrases like "the will to believe" have been allowed to bewilder the integrity of thought, science has never wavered in her determination to be entirely rational. I am well aware that science herself may have to confess in the long run that she rests on presuppositions; though these are not any presuppositions you may "will" to introduce, but such only as the rational statement of the case must involve. I am aware also that the appeal to intuition rather than to understanding has the sanction of illustrious names. But we must not forget that it is ever to the intuitions *of the Reason* that these make their appeal. To what base uses has not a great principle fallen

when for intuitions of the Reason we substitute intuitions *of the Unreasonable*; and the things "that never can be proved" "*until we close with all we loved*" are offered to Faith, on the ground that *they never can be proved at all!*[1] Who can fail to see that in these contrasts between the intellectual practice of World and Church the former enjoys an impressive *moral* advantage? The stress must be laid on the word "moral." For the difference resolves itself in the long run into that between a more and a less exacting standard of veracity. The habit of professional belief in religion is loose, vague, equivocal. The habit of science is straightforward, exacting, uncompromising, direct. Therefore the conscience of mankind is on the side of science. And what does not that mean? After all, there is no moral conception so powerful in human life as the idea of truth; there is none which carries in it an influence so vital over the characters of communities and men, and gathers round it such strong reinforcements of moral sympathy. The Church which fails to command that sympathy can have at best but a feeble influence on the destinies of mankind. If I mistake not, this is just what the churches are losing and what science is gaining at the present day. It is a perilous situation, and one without parallel in any previous age.

There is no surer road to a state of alienation from what is best in modern life, and to the forfeiture of good men's confidence, than that of a careless handling of the standard of truth. The love of truth, far from having declined among the virtues, has established its sway over the intellectual life, and in quarters remote from the centres of intellectual activity,

[1] The Mystic Vision, whatever else it may mean, surely represents the highest conceivable activity of *Thought*. Thus Dante:—

Nel ciel che più della sua luce prende
Fu' io e vidi cose che ridire
Nè sa, nè può chi di lassù discende;
Perchè appressando sè al suo disire,
Nostro intelletto si profonda tanto,
Che retro la memoria non può ire.
Paradiso, i. 3.

among men who catch but the distant echoes of culture, is recognised, if not as the chief of the virtues, yet as the condition of all virtue whatsoever. We need look no further than this for an explanation of the oft-lamented fact of the growing reluctance of the best minds to offer themselves for the professed service of religion. It ought not to surprise anyone if men of scrupulous integrity and plainness of speech, looking at the state of things now generally prevalent in regard to the profession of religious belief, should sorrowfully conclude that the career in which they can best satisfy the requirements of conscience in this matter is not to be found in the official service of any church. In the attitude of such men we may often read a perception of moral danger—a suspicion that the claims of truth are being subordinated to some less paramount category. And it is not as though there were no alternative career, beyond that of professed religion, which could satisfy the aspirations of the noblest minds. One of the splendid privileges of being alive to-day is that many avenues are opened to every man who would offer his life as a sacrifice to the highest ends. In her claim to the service of the best, the Church has rivals of whom she need not be ashamed. She is exposed to a competition of lofty interests so keen that it needs but a little weakness on her part to turn the steps of good men to other doors.

Thus, by pursuing two lines of comparison, we come in sight of the consequences which attend the dualistic theory of Church and World. By pressing the distinction, the Church forces the World into a position where effective reprisals are not only possible but certain. So far from maintaining her moral supremacy, the Church by this theory invites a contest in which her whole position is seriously imperilled. If the Church on her side treats the World as lost and ruined, the World will retort by challenging the competence of its judge. Extremists have not yet perceived how disastrously the dualistic theory thus recoils upon the cause they would defend. They do not see that in condemning the

World they condemn themselves. Nor do they recognise that the World is slowly acquiring the functions of a Church, that a World-Church is in process of formation, embracing multitudes whom they disown, and destined hereafter to do the work which they claim as theirs, only on a scale and with a vigour of which the most daring imagination has not dreamed. If they choose to stand apart, society will leave them in their sublime isolation and go on its own business in its own way. Society in the twentieth century differs from that of the thirteenth in having moral resources within itself which render it independent of any single section in the pursuit of the Highest Good, and it is just because of their failure to see this that the churches are losing their position in the race of human progress. The World is actually going on ahead of them, and, in some instances, forgetting all about them. This is more to them than a matter of academic interest; it is a question of their own life or death. The alienation from Church life of so much that is good in modern culture,[1] and so much that is earnest in every class, is the natural sequel to the traditional attitude of the Church to the World. The Church in her theory has stood aloof from the World. And now the World takes deadly revenge by maintaining the position assigned her, and standing aloof from the Church.[2]

The false dualism we have been considering will never be ended by the defeat of either member at the hand of the other. The true solution of this, as of every other great problem of history, does not arrive until the opposing elements become merged in a higher unity, and the claims of the parts are finally overridden by the claims of the whole. The solution in this case is not far to seek. Students of philosophy have long been familiar with the view that the kingdom of God is

[1] Let the reader try the experiment of naming, from among his acquaintance, twelve persons of undoubted culture, not professionally connected with religion, who are regular attendants at any place of worship.

[2] Is not this the true explanation of the recent separation of Church and State in France?

not an *imperium in imperio*, but the whole of human society regarded as organised for the spiritual ends of man. It is by the application of this thought throughout the entire range of her teaching that the Church will find the means of maintaining her position as the leader of all that is best in human life—going forth to her task with the strength of the whole universe at her back. And if it be asked how can this be done, how can a conception of this kind be brought to bear on the living problems of the time, I must be content with pointing to a single fact. Let an examination be made of all the official religious formularies of Christendom, and it will be found that, one and all, they either state or imply the false dualism of a separated Church and World. They were born in times when the ethical conditions of society lent countenance to the theory; they persist unaltered in an age when those conditions have passed away. No doubt there are many persons in many churches who are as fully persuaded as is the present writer that the dualistic idea belongs to the exhausted categories of history. But in the customs, ceremonies, and above all the official doctrines to which the churches are pledged the idea is still embodied as though it were a living truth. Hence it is that these men face the world of their day in a condition of extreme embarrassment. They are shorn of half their power, and cannot make their deeper meanings intelligible to their fellow-men. Under these conditions, is it fair to say that nothing can be done?

And lastly, coming yet nearer to the practical questions of the day, we have only to turn to the education controversy now raging to discern an immediate opportunity for applying this larger conception of the Church. Running from end to end of this discussion, do we not discern an assumption, in a certain class of minds, that there exists an institution possessed of inherent power to determine the religious beliefs of society? do we not see now this and now that institution actually claiming the right to exercise the power? To all of which the reply is that no such power exists. There is no institution, there is

no group of persons, endowed though they be with the largest facilities for teaching what they will, who can control the religious beliefs of society as a whole. These are determined by the whole spiritual movement in which the World is equally involved with the Church, a movement to which the work of churches and theologians contributes no more than single elements, and these not always the chief. Every influence which is moulding the higher society of the future will have its share in forming the creed of the future, and no belief can have continuance but such as will work with these to a single harmony of truth. If, then, authority were given to any group to teach what they would in the schools, it does not follow that the opinions so taught would form, or even greatly influence, the creed of the next generation. The reaction of the social medium, never so swift and certain as now, has to be reckoned with. Were we able, for instance, to teach every child in the kingdom to believe in the literal truth of Noah's Ark, the almost certain consequence would be that twenty years hence those same children, grown to men and women, would not only have rejected Noah's Ark, but lost not a little of their respect for the institution which guaranteed it. *Ex uno disce omnia.* It is the inexorable fate of our teaching that hereafter each engrafted idea will be vigorously blown upon by the searching winds of the great world. Ought we not to ask more earnestly how this beneficent process will be borne?

If there is any force in these arguments it must be applied without distinction to all parties in the dispute. The number of persons who may be rightly counted as the victims of "clerical" ambitions has no doubt been greatly exaggerated; but, many or few, they are by no means confined to one or two of the churches. Nonconformists and Agnostics have from time to time allowed themselves to appear in the controversy as men desiring to control the direction of religious belief according to their own ideas. But wherever these designs may have their place of origin, whether in the Established or the Free Churches, or in the ranks of unbelief, the final

criticism of them is, not that they are unjust or mischievous, but *that all alike are impossible of realisation.* They are the empty dreams of men who, in the turmoil of controversy, have forgotten to read the signs of the times. Vanity stamps them every one; and the power which is vain for the one party to covet is equally vain for the other to fear. Were society so helpless as to lie at the mercy of any system or creed which a faction in power might snatch the opportunity to impose, then indeed we should do well to gird on our armour against the aggressor, and resolve, if need be, to die in the last ditch. But a just solution is not dependent on the issue of a partial strife in which church thus rises against church. When we consider the overwhelming resistance which such claims encounter from the active intelligence of the time; how, instead of meeting with material passive to their reception, they are instantly launched into the fierce fires of public opinion and perhaps flung back upon their authors with results disastrous only to these; when we see the increasing rapidity with which the social medium reacts upon the elements that are brought to it and transmutes them in the process; when, in short, we view these limited designs in the context of their whole spiritual environment; may we not at last conclude that the World will never again become the prey of any section within itself, that society has its own means of repelling the marauder—and so dismiss for ever the image of "the ravening wolf" which has so long troubled our dreams?

One danger attending the conception of a morally bankrupt world is that the churches are led to attach too little importance to what the World thinks about their own doings. It prevents the churches paying heed to those just and wholesome criticisms of themselves which are often to be heard from secular lips. A sublime contempt for what the World says or thinks goes well with the heroic endeavours of the saints, but this attitude, so splendid in its place, is more often the mark of an obstinate self-complacency, and, in the present instance, the very opposite of what wisdom requires.

For the case offers one feature which nothing less than criminal folly can afford to overlook. I allude to the steady growth of a body of instructed public opinion which is adverse, not to this or that side of the controversy, but *to the controversy itself.* As the strife proceeds Religion is seen to be suffering humiliation, and the World—the morally bankrupt World — looks on with shame. That World, whose own deepest interests are understood to be the matter in dispute, is beginning to suspect the *bona fides* of a quarrel which, starting with pretensions so high, seems at times to be nothing else than a prolonged vendetta between Church and Dissent. Old scores, we are told, have to be paid off. Who can wonder at the result? The churches have themselves only to thank if the World, saddened by the spectacle before it, begins to despair of its High Places, and to look to its Nazareths for the coming of better things.

In the *Hibbert Journal* for October 1905 the present writer called attention to the consequences which might ensue if Christendom were ethically outclassed by some avowedly non-Christian race. The case was treated hypothetically; but the hypothesis was supported by recent events. So various, however, were the impressions which these events made on different minds that the extreme consequences indicated are still remote. But though there has been no general shipwreck of prejudice, and the rule that what is not Christian cannot be best (or even very good) still holds us in an iron grip, it is yet plain that for the moment at least the Western World was morally put out of countenance by Japan; nor can we doubt that if the Japanese or some other non-Christian race should repeat the lesson of 1905, official Christianity will have to face a stern trial in every quarter where it is professed.

In the present paper the problem offered is, in essence, identical with that formerly expressed by the question "Is the Moral Supremacy of Christendom in Danger?" Only the

terms of the problem have been so varied as to force its incidence nearer home. The distinction between Christian and non-Christian has been left aside and that between Church and World has taken its place. Examining the area covered by these new terms, we find similar facts and deduce the same lesson. Both examinations reveal that, vast as are the *intellectual* changes of the time, they are nevertheless outranked in importance by the *ethical*. From both we learn that the changed ethical conditions of the world are pressing with irresistible force upon the form of religious belief and demanding from theology a recognition they have not yet received. And both, finally, issue in a plea against division; suggesting that all the lines of man's higher life converge to a single point; that the unity of the Spirit which knows nothing of East and West, embraces also the sacred and the secular, and transcends the difference of Church and World.

THE EDITOR.

UNION AND BREADTH.

A PLEA FOR ESSENTIAL UNITY AMID FORMAL DIFFERENCE IN A NATIONAL CHURCH.

SIR OLIVER LODGE.

"The true tragedy is a conflict of right with right, not of right with wrong."
HEGEL.

I SOON became aware that my article on "First Principles of Faith" in the July issue of the *Hibbert Journal* could hardly be regarded as an eirenicon in respect of the present English Education controversy, though I began it somewhat with that hope; for it is apparent that the dispute between Church and Dissent is not only of long standing historically, but is intrinsically deep-seated. It would be worth a considerable effort if the inflammation due to that chronic sore could be reduced; but the cure should be attempted, not by blinking or denying the reality of the differences, but rather by facing them resolutely and understanding their nature and origin before seeking to prescribe a remedy.

The dispute which is most alive to-day between State Church and Free Churches is not exactly religious: it seems to be rather ethnological or anthropological. That is to say, it may be held to represent a difference inherent in the varied nature of humanity, and to correspond to the divergent views taken of religion by two different types of mind. If there is any truth in this statement, it ought surely to be possible to recognise the fact, and to adjust our arrangements to it, as to any other of the facts of nature.

It must have been frequently pointed out before—but sometimes statements bear and need repetition—that there are two chief religious types: one type valuing ceremony and artistic accessories and human organisation and intervention; while the other, thinking itself competent to dispense with what it may consider adventitious aids, seeks to worship, neither in temple nor even in mountain, but directly in spirit and in truth. This one thinks that the Holy Spirit is equally accessible to every individual,—that one conceives that a Special Power is miraculously transmitted by ceremonial means, namely, by the imposition of hands.

Those who take this, which may be called the Apostolic view, necessarily exalt the Church, which to them is God's vicegerent upon earth; for its priests possess a power denied not only to laymen but to ministers of all other denominations, who in this essential respect are and must be regarded as laymen. It is true that the branches of the Catholic and Apostolic Church do not agree among themselves entirely as to the authentic channels of this mysterious influence. To the Roman, the Anglican Catholic is a layman, even though he be a prelate.[1] To the Anglican, the President of the Wesleyan Conference, or the Moderator of the Presbyterian Synod, may be in friendship a brother, and in good works a helper, but he has no claim to recognition as a priest: nor, indeed, does he prefer such a claim, because he does not belong to the type which appreciates the idea of Divine influence ceremonially conveyed from one human being to another.

But the distinction of type is not confined to the clergy: it runs through the laity likewise. Those who believe in the special and exclusive character of ecclesiastical priesthood are bound to venerate the officers invested with those powers, and

[1] The question of the recognition or non-recognition of Anglican Orders is sometimes said to have been decided like a move in a game or in party politics—after private discussion as to which course was best calculated to benefit one side and to damage the other. The subject appears to be eminently fitted for such treatment.

to submit to their teaching and influence, irrespective of their personality; for they can not only help and strengthen you by the administration of the Sacraments: they actually have the power of forgiving your sins, or, still more remarkable, of preventing the forgiveness of your sins, if they be so minded.

Baptismal regeneration is only one of the things which can be effected through their agency, but that too is a power of great magnitude, and if your child is to be eternally lost without their aid, their aid must be sought; for in this ceremony he is made, according to the Catechism—not recognised only and admitted into the Church as such, but actually made—a child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of Heaven.[1]

True, they must be regarded only as instruments and vehicles of Divine mercy; but in so far as Divine mercy is felt to be a vital thing, the channels by which it is dispensed become of overwhelming interest; and if they, as officers of a corporate and divinely ordained Church, really have in any sense a monopoly of the Holy Spirit, their unfolding of the Bible may be the only explication religiously permissible.

It is only those who have no belief in the reality of priestly powers of this kind—people to whom such powers seem like superstition, who prefer to worry out truth for themselves and to pray directly to the Fountain of Infinite Wisdom to keep them from being deceived and to lead them into the way of truth—it is only these who can afford to dispense with, or in some cases even to resent, the good offices of the Catholic Church, whether in its Greek or Roman or Anglican branches.

If now we bethink ourselves what it is that constitutes the essential difference of type, I think we shall find that we must admit as the most distinctive feature of the Prayer-book, from the denominational and ultra-protestant point of view, not the ordinary popular services of Matins and Evensong, nor the still

[1] The preposition "in" is used in the Catechism, but "by" occurs in one form of the baptismal service:—"Seeing now . . . . that this child is by baptism regenerate."

more beautiful form for Holy Communion, but the regulation for the Ordering of Priests. The greater part of that service may be passed as undenominational, save that naturally it seems intended expressly to sever the Anglican from the Roman priesthood, but the official sentence which accompanies the laying on of hands is distinctly and purposely hierarchical. Those who accept that are Churchmen; those who rejoice at it are high-Churchmen. All other details sink into insignificance before this Episcopal pronouncement:—

"Receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a Priest in the Church of God, now committed unto thee by the Imposition of our hands. Whose sins thou dost forgive, they are forgiven; and whose sins thou dost retain, they are retained."

This has been said ceremonially to every Anglican parish priest in the British Isles, some of whom doubtless believe that a mysterious efficacy has descended upon them, and that they possess the awful power thus conferred.

That being so, it should be, and probably is, clear to any contending and opposing party that priests so consecrated, and animated by such beliefs, cannot possibly consent to open their schools to dissenters: it would be more reasonable for doctors to open the hospitals to quacks. They are bound to insist on their high prerogative, and to teach children to come to them for the sacramental and other inspired influences which they can bestow on the penitent and the faithful, or be false to their trust.[1] And conversely, those who stoutly

[1] "Experience has shown the inefficacy of the mere injunctions of Church order, however scripturally enforced, in restraining from schism the awakened and anxious sinner; who goes to a dissenting preacher 'because (as he expresses it) he gets good from him': and though he does not stand excused in God's sight for yielding to the temptation, surely the ministers of the Church are not blameless if, by keeping back the more gracious and consoling truths provided for the little ones of Christ, they indirectly lead him into it. Had he been taught as a child, that the Sacraments, not preaching, are the sources of Divine Grace; that the Apostolical ministry had a virtue in it which went out over the whole Church, when sought by the prayer of faith; that fellowship with it was a gift and privilege, as well as a duty, we could not have had so many wanderers from our fold, nor so many cold hearts within it" (Advt. to *Tracts for the Times*, 1834).

deny and conscientiously resent the idea of any such special privileges—who quote in opposition, for instance, 1 Cor. i. 17—may feel bound to express their views also, and may earnestly seek to prevent their children from coming under avowedly sacerdotal influence.

The text or texts in the Bible on which an absolution dogma is based must be held responsible for a good deal of the perennial conflict between Church and Dissent. It may be possible for Biblical critics to say that John xx. 21–23 is a later insertion, like Matt. xvi. 19 and the end of Mark; but assuming the most orthodox possible view, and taking the record as exact, it is open even to devout Bibliolators to argue against its modern use, somewhat as follows:—"By whom," they might ask, "were these words spoken to the disciples? Not by Jesus of Nazareth in the flesh, but by the risen Lord just before His Ascension and Session at the right hand of God. That which He could say then, to those whom He was leaving comfortless for the ten days between His departure and the feast of Pentecost, is now said by every bishop of the Church. But it does not follow that what could be said once, under exceptional circumstances, is suitable for indefinite repetition." Thus might opponents contend, and their contention might be admitted as true.

Hence there is a well-marked cause of difference, and justification of a militant attitude. How then can it be hoped to effect formal reconciliation of the two religious types? At first sight, only in one of two ways: either by general admission of truth in a sacerdotal claim of this kind; or, on the other hand, by the equally improbable admission of the imaginary character of any sort of basis for such a claim—a perception that, though it has survived the shocks of time, and come down the centuries to our own day, it is yet a human imagination, and essentially false.

Taken in its literal and bald signification, the ordination sentence above quoted would be intolerable to a low or to a broad Churchman; consequently he must be able to interpret

it otherwise. He would doubtless claim that it signifies the right to declare the judgment of the Christian conscience, or at any rate of the Christian Church, as to details of right and wrong: to formulate, in fact, the judgments of the Holy Spirit, under whose guidance he is henceforth to act. *Securus judicat orbis terrarum.* It is not, however, a barren formula removed from practice: it enters into the pastoral work of the priest, and is applied to sick persons in the following form :—

"By his authority committed to me, I absolve thee from all thy sins, In the Name" etc.

Even this, however, though challenged by John Henry Newman, and regarded by him as inadmissible save under the Roman ægis, is doubtless capable of refined interpretation. And so it is with all the formularies—else it were impossible for great and good men, to whom the natural sense of some of them must be repugnant, to hold office in the Church to-day. Let it be admitted, once for all, that these saving and minimising interpretations are known and utilised by many of those inside the pale; and I shall assume, without question now, that they are justified in these interpretations under the circumstances; but those outside the pale, and those who are hesitating to enter it, are liable to take these formulæ more nearly at their face-value, and to mistrust ingenuity of interpretation. Wherefore — and that is my point — such formulæ act as obstacles, as weapons of exclusion, and as causes of dissension and bitterness; even among those who in all essentials agree. And they have another function, perhaps equally harmful: they encourage extreme sacerdotal pretensions in a few exceptionally constituted persons, who, whatever may be their saintly character, are in disaccord with the religious ideals of the nation. So much so, indeed, that they might find their proper place in another and a foreign communion.

Seeing, therefore, that such formulæ may do harm, it is open to question whether they do a compensating amount of good. Words, such as those above quoted, either mean some-

thing definite, or they do not. If they confer any real power, if they give real strength to the Church, they must be retained; but if they serve no useful purpose, if they signify only what is naturally to be expected without them—namely, the power of appreciating and fostering the good, of detecting and condemning the bad, which is possessed by every decent man—if they are only a difficulty to be boggled at and explained away, they constitute a weakness, not a strength, and it may be well to have them changed.

In any case it is quite absurd for either side in the controversy — the ancient controversy between Catholic and Protestant, between Priest and Presbyter, between High Anglican and Free Churchman, between upholders of public ritual and insisters on private conscience, between the objective and the subjective types of worshippers, between those who lay stress on the Brotherhood and those who emphasise the individual life—it is futile for either side to pretend that the other side is wicked and schismatic and alienated from God. So perhaps there is a third course—what some think the fatal course of compromise—in which the permanent vitality of the two types of religious humanity is recognised, and something of absolute truth admitted to be visible from both points of view. In which case it might not be too much to hope that the two groups, no longer hostile, could ultimately agree to live together in harmony, as two wings of an enlarged National Church; without need for anyone to abandon the phase of truth, or the form of worship, which specially appeals to his disposition and theological understanding. At present there are nonconformists, obedient to private judgment and disobedient to authority, at both ends of the Church of England:—those who left it when what they considered too much superstition was enforced; and those who, without leaving it, feel conscientiously impelled to ignore both lay jurisdiction and episcopal "admonition" when too little superstition is ordered;—meaning by 'superstition' in this connexion the outcome in practice of over-belief.

I do not venture to suggest inclusion in a National Church of those who take a non-national view of their civil obligations. No question of union or of adaptation can be entertained by those who regard a foreign potentate and foreign conclave as supreme authority and fount of inspiration: nothing short of submission and conversion would be acceptable to them; nor is it possible for them to join a merely national Church, however nearly their creed may approach one section of it on the purely religious side: a certain canon—which I presume is still in force—to wit, that subjects of a temporal ruler disapproved by the Church may be relieved of their allegiance, and that the promulgation of unacceptable doctrine is to be suppressed with a high hand—constitutes a sufficient obstacle.[1] It is far from desirable that any ecclesiastical gauntlet which investigators of truth may have to run should in the smallest degree be backed up by the power of the State. But no such difficulty arises when contemplating a reincorporation of the Free Churches which have grown up and divaricated in consequence of a long spell of intolerant bigotry ending in an act of disruption in and about the year 1662. Many of them could easily rejoin one pole of a National Church if it sought to attract them; at any rate they need not be repelled by enforced uniformity in detail, nor by any kind of secular legislation. The Legislature conspicuously shrinks from interference with liberty of conscience, and must recog-

[1] This Lateran Council decree, part of the Roman Canon Law, is guarded against in the English Church by the oath of the King's sovereignty administered to deacons:—

"Let the secular powers, whatever offices they may exercise . . . . exterminate from the territories under their jurisdiction heretics of all kinds marked out by the Church. . . . . But if any temporal ruler, being required and admonished by the Church, shall neglect to purge his land from this heretical filth, let him be bound in the chain of excommunication by the metropolitan and other bishops of the province. And if he shall disdain to make satisfaction within a year, let this be signified to the Supreme Pontiff, that he may declare the vassals of that ruler henceforth released from their allegiance, and may offer the land to occupation by Catholics, who, having exterminated the heretics, may possess it in peace and preserve it steadfast in the Faith."

nise that it made mistakes in the past whenever it consented to be coaxed or coerced into narrowness and brutality in matters of faith. It would surely welcome a movement in favour of breadth and reintegration, if it were mooted by those most concerned.

There is the more hope for some such solution, inasmuch as none but a bigot could claim to grasp in his own person the whole truth concerning a subject of infinite magnitude, or could suppose that the precise form of worship most suited to himself must necessarily be dominant throughout the cosmos; wherefore it might be recognised, by reasonable persons on either side, that the manifest enthusiasm and religious fervour of those from whom they differ are roused not by falsehood and error, but by real portions, even though they be fragmentary portions, of Divine truth which have hitherto escaped their own ken, or for which their own emotional and æsthetic nature happens to be unfitted.

The possibility of such a *concordat* may at first sight seem remote, but it is worth more than momentary consideration, and it is possible to detect more reasonableness embedded in the proposal than appears on the surface.

First of all, then, let us ask, is it true that any worshipper, however spiritually minded, can dispense altogether with material facts as an aid to the expression and realisation of spiritual truth, and as an external stimulus to the attitude of worship? Can the spiritual and the material, in fact, be entirely and utterly discriminated and separated? I will not ask whether such separation is or is not desirable; I will not point out how much loss would be sustained if it were practicable—how fatal to half of nature such an achievement would immediately be; but I will simply ask, is it ever done, as a fact? I believe that a little consideration will show that it is never really accomplished, and that some material agent is active even in the most refined and spiritual perceptions. It will at least be admitted that in the case of some religiously-

minded persons the sights and sounds of nature awaken a sense of Divine presence. In others the same feelings are roused by hearing of some human action, or by meeting other human beings with whom they are in sympathy. Some men are carried Godward by beauty, others by truth, others by goodness; and some even by the commonplace actions of daily life. A remarkable face, casually encountered, or a word even from a stranger, has been known occasionally to call up thoughts akin to worship, even in the most unritualistic follower of George Fox.

> "Just when we are safest, there's a sunset-touch,
> A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,
> A chorus-ending from Euripides,—
> And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears
> As old and new at once as nature's self,
> To rap and knock and enter in our soul."

If there be any truth in the suggestion—and it is a question which must be answered by each for himself, it can hardly be put in a form that will equally apply to every individual—then an essential feature of the sacramental efficacy of material or external things, when spiritually regarded and transfigured in the light of a dominating faith, is admitted: for material means whereby the soul can be elevated, and brought into conscious relation with Deity, are essentially of the nature of sacraments.

"To attempt to grasp the infinite by reason," says Plotinus, "is futile; it can only be known in immediate presence. The faculty by which the mind divests itself of its personality is *Ecstasy*. In ecstasy the soul becomes loosed from its material prison, separated from individual consciousness, and becomes absorbed in the Infinite Intelligence from which it emanated." This condition of inspiration, direct intuition, or enthusiasm, —some approach to what is meant by "seeing God"—is but transitory, and may be rare, but it can be induced by a great variety of instrument. A few attain it during the contemplation of law and order enshrined in a mathematical expression, or in some comprehensive philosophic formula; but to many

the transfiguring and revealing experience is heralded by the song of birds, by sunshine upon grass, by the wind in tree-tops, or by the wild solitude of mountains. To one the vision comes during the music of an orchestra or the sight of a great work of art; to another, the atmosphere of an empty cathedral is full of it; while to another, again, the same cathedral must contain lights and incense in order effectively to act as a medium. To many the acts of common worship are an invaluable aid; while others find their fullest help towards realising the Divine presence in the consecrated materials of a purposely arranged and specially organised sacrament.

The means of grace last mentioned—being consciously directed to a desired end—must be considered as specially forcible and effective: at any rate for those who are constituted in such a way as to appreciate accessories and aids of this kind. But it is not to be denied that, in spite of good intention, these ecclesiastical forms and ceremonies strike another type of religious disposition as so humanly ingenious and specifically organised as to repel rather than attract divine thoughts, which with these people arise in more spontaneous fashion, amid the simplicity of almost unassisted worship in plain buildings, or among the solitudes of unconsecrated nature.

It must be admitted, however,—and I presume that Nonconformists would be the last to deny it,—that there is always a danger lest, if human effort and organisation be altogether discarded, as they sometimes are by religiously-minded secularists, the opportunities for spontaneous excitation of religious thoughts may seldom or never occur; and so gradually the power of entertaining lofty ideas may become atrophied by lack of use. Moreover, those who depend entirely on the capacities of their own unaided individual soul may find, in times of stress, a sad emptiness and dearth of comfort there. That is at once the weakness and the strength of an emphatically spiritual religion: it makes a severe demand on the worshippers' own powers and faculties. This constitutes a

weakness,—for there come times when the spirit is so harassed by the troubles and trials of existence that even the stoutest cannot stand the strain; but it constitutes also a strength,—inasmuch as it braces and exercises and develops the fibres of the character.

There will always be those who are impressed with, not so much the right, as the duty of private judgment; and on the other hand there will always be those who willingly submit to authority. In the same way we must recognise a constitutional difference, a difference of temperament, a difference of response to diverse appeals. But the difference is only dependent on "accident" or appropriateness of vehicle: it is not a difference of really fundamental character; and though it is natural to prefer one form of sacrament to another, it is not human, at least it is not religious, to despise and reject them all.

It is perhaps not known to everybody that the general nature of a sacrament is recognised by the English Church—very likely by the Roman Church too,—for it is definitely laid down in the "Homilies" that in a certain sense there may be many sacraments:—

> "Therefore neither it, nor any other sacrament else, be such sacraments as Baptism and Communion are; but in a general acception the name of a sacrament may be attributed to anything whereby an holy thing is signified" (*Homily on Common Prayer and Sacraments*).

Wherefore, opponents may ask, why not then carry out this doctrine into practice? why urge the importance of two, or of seven?

One orthodox answer is that the two are "necessary to salvation,"—a doctrine corresponding with the over-literal misreading of a text, and not really believed any more than the corresponding 'Athanasian' clauses are believed. But a better answer, and indeed the answer of Christendom generally with few exceptions, is that the two were in a special sense authorised and enjoined by Christ; so in order to estimate their crucial character it is instructive to consider how these

specially Christian sacraments arose. It is easy to add an element of mysticism to the bare facts, and those who make this addition may claim it as a sign of spiritual growth; but the addition should be voluntary, it cannot wisely be imposed by legislation. The bare facts themselves may be legitimately and inoffensively regarded somewhat thus:—

Jesus found the old baptismal act of ceremonial washing revived and used as a sign of repentance by his great precursor,—either as a symbolic cleansing, or else as a symbolic burying to sin and new birth to righteousness (for both significations can be attached to the rite of immersion); instinctively he recognised the advantage of associating divine thoughts with so common an act as bathing or washing, and, just as he utilised any common event for doctrinal purposes, so he utilised this act, by submitting himself to it: thereby canonising it among Christians for all time. But then he did the same thing virtually with the sower and the seed, with a marriage feast, with fishermen's nets, with carpenters' tools, and a multitude of common incidents of life; though in these the Church, perhaps fortunately, has been slower to follow him to the full extent. I say fortunately, because it is so apt to let its enthusiasm carry it unwisely far: in the case of baptism it has at certain periods of its history, at any rate in some of its branches, gone too far, and converted a ceremony of admission into a miraculous rite of saving efficacy.

In another case also it has not only followed, but has emphatically gone beyond and exceeded, its instructions, to what many think a lamentable extent; at times even daring to inflict torture and death on those who could not travel with it along this humanly extended road. For the common act of eating and drinking was among those conspicuously sanctified by Christ; on that pathetic occasion when, after long discourse on his approaching fate, and much figurative speech concerning the necessity for complete union with himself, he took up the bread and the wine, no doubt blessing them after the still extant Jewish fashion, and then—perhaps half thinking of

ancient pagan rites, wherein exuberant gentile worshippers had spoken of eating the flesh of a god, and certainly remembering the sacrifices of flesh and blood familiar in their own scriptures and in the forthcoming passover—added, in a moment of enthusiasm fraught with strange destiny for the future Church, "This is my flesh and this is my blood. Bless it, and take it, and remember me whenever henceforth ye feed together." As for himself, this was his last food and his last drink—a long spasm of torture and hunger and thirst was all that lay before him on earth—"I shall taste no more of the fruit of the vine till I drink it new with you in the Kingdom of my Father."

Regarded simply and naturally, it is a gracious domestic ceremony; akin to the toast of good fellowship, but with the sadness of pain and parting commingled. It was surely intended as an act of union and brotherhood, not as a testing instrument or dividing engine. The sharing of one loaf is recognised by St Paul (1 Cor. x. 17) as a symbol of the oneness of the many in the Christian body—a true *communion*.

Looked at from the point of view of subsequent history, and what human organisation has made of it, even devout worshippers must admit that superstition has been prone to enter, and that its ecclesiastical developments have been at times painful beyond description.

Yet that should not prevent those who prefer not to partake of an ecclesiastically administered sacrament from recognising that to others it constitutes the very bread of life, and that to worshippers of this character the meaning and efficacy of the symbols are enhanced beyond measure by ceremonial observance and ritual.

What has been said about sacraments can be interpreted as applying to priesthood also. A priest is a vehicle of the Holy Ghost, an interpreter of divine things, and a helper towards higher life. Priesthood is a reality; but, if my interpretation of it be correct, it cannot be a professional monopoly. Like genius, it evades definition; but it is not likely to be

coercible and transmissible by ceremonial means. Surely it must be true that the Spirit moveth where it listeth, and is not amenable to clerical control.

Every man, woman, or child who has the power of elevating the thought of another human being, everyone who is chosen to act as a channel of the Divine Spirit, is for the time a priest. It may be well to set aside and train and guard a band of persons who feel specially called to this high office; in the hope that by discipline and custom their powers of true priesthood and sainthood may increase. It is desirable that the Church should set store by and guard its priests, just as it guards its sacraments, from pollution and contamination with the things of the outer world. Precautionary and reverential arrangements are humanly intelligible and more or less necessary, but they are not essential; they are matters of ecclesiastical polity, not of divine ordinance.

The Church recognises, indeed, that every man is in some small sense a priest in his own household, and admits that in times of emergency he may act as such, up to the point of administering the minor sacrament of Baptism, provided he employs the right material and the authorised form of words; but, save for this charitable exception, it jealously guards its own rites and privileges, and denies the real apostolic authority to all save those whom it has itself ordained: thereby and to that extent appearing to claim a monopoly of the Holy Spirit, which, in the judgment of many, it cannot rigorously sustain, except in so far as it may be justified by public convenience and usage.

So long as specific and special priesthood is recognised as possessed only in a representative capacity, it can do no harm. Harm begins when an exclusive character is claimed for it. The true official priest is representative or typical of the potential priesthood of all religious humanity, a symbol of the close connexion and affectionate intercourse between God and man: somewhat as Christ was essentially the son of man and son of God, to the exclusion of none of his brethren.

In this form the office is not to be stigmatised as sacerdotal —it is only to be so stigmatised when it claims to be exclusive, when it seeks to be a monopoly of the grace of God.

So also the Eucharist may legitimately be held to represent or typify a Divine Presence, provided it is likewise taught that all nature is the living garment of God, and that space and time are expressions of His thoughts. It is not a claim for the Divine presence that should be resisted, but a claim for the Divine absence—anywhere.

There is no need for nonconformist feeling in these matters, except in details of administration which may well be made more elastic. Priesthood and sacraments are realities; forms and orderly ceremonies are necessary for collective human worship: it is their exaggeration and misunderstanding that is to be deprecated, not the things themselves. Those who think they are worshipping in spirit only, are really using forms and material aids, though the forms may be of a simple character. An attitude of body, an enforced silence, a gathering together into an accustomed building, the reading of a book, the singing of a hymn—all these are physical and material aids to spiritual growth, and are therefore essentially sacramental. It is but a question of degree; and those who cannot utilise forms of so simple a character are justified in seeking to invent and enjoy ceremonies of a more elaborate kind.

So also, everyone privileged to act as a minister of God, a true vehicle of the Holy Spirit, is for the time being a priest by right divine. It is only because under present conditions such influence is comparatively rare, that we have to betake ourselves to a professional priesthood. It is a necessity: it is not an ideal. The ideal held out by Christ himself was a high one. "Be ye perfect," he said. Be a Christ, he might have said: be thyself a messenger and revealer of divine truth, up to the measure of thy capacity. "Receive ye the Holy Spirit." He did not say these things to the priests and orthodox worshippers of his own day—to them he said quite other things:—these high injunctions he laid upon a body of

trained and chosen peasants who had loved and followed him, and thus ordained them with genuine priesthood.

And to all the animate and inanimate creatures, of earth and air and sky, he gave a message too. To all of them he gave sacramental efficacy—nothing is unholy or unclean—everything can join in the song of joy and worship that rises from all healthy nature. By his teaching the whole world of matter is transfigured and glorified before our eyes; it is suffused with immanent Deity, and has become, for those with eyes to see, a mirror of the Almighty.

Now all this, which is to most of us so clear now, was not equally clear to the generality of folk in the times gone by. Saints here and there seized the truth, no doubt, and tried to express it in language fitted to their time; but from the great mass of the people it was hidden. Persons in high office—Archbishop Cranmer and others—put together our liturgy, during a moderately exalted period of English history, utilising many beautiful petitions and formularies, and showing great genius for the work; but it is not to be supposed that they were gifted with infallibility, so that they grasped the truth completely and expressed it for all time. Nor was the Act of Parliament which crystallised and congealed the Prayer-book an inspired document.[1] Admitting that historic forms make a special appeal to the emotions, revision of the Prayer-book on the intellectual side ought to be and is necessary, especially after a century of great intellectual achievement. The question arises whether the time is not ripe for revision now.

Loth as I am to meddle with professional and ecclesiastical matters, the present juncture in the history of the English Church and nation seems to me sufficiently important to compel those who recognise the pressing need for social

[1] Even Newman, in a tract urging no concession or tittle of alteration, says: "I confess that there are few parts of the Service that I could not disturb myself about and feel fastidious at, if I allowed my mind in this abuse of reason."

reform, and the great power and influence for good which a truly efficient Church would possess, to urge a reconsideration of the implicit tests and requirements imposed on candidates for Holy Orders in the Church of England at various stages in their career.—The fact that it is a National Church removes the charge of impertinence from the utterance of a layman on such matters. The spirit of the following sentences, taken from "His Majesty's Declaration" printed in every Anglican Prayer-book, is not attractive to an age which has imbibed the idea of evolution and some conception of the faithful investigation of truth:—

. . . . "the settled Continuance of the Doctrine and Discipline of the Church of *England* now established; from which We will not endure any varying or departing in the least Degree. . . . . We will, that all further curious search be laid aside. . . . . And that no man hereafter shall either print, or preach, to draw the Article aside any way, but shall submit to it in the plain and full meaning thereof: and shall not put his own sense or comment to be the meaning of the Article, but shall take it in the literal and grammatical sense.

"That if any publick Reader in either of Our Universities, or any Head or Master of a College, or any other person respectively in either of them, shall affix any new sense to any Article, or shall publickly read, determine, or hold any publick Disputation, or suffer any such to be held either way, in either the Universities or Colleges respectively; or if any Divine in the Universities shall preach or print any thing either way, other than is already established in Convocation with Our Royal Assent; he, or they, the Offenders, shall be liable to Our displeasure, and the Church's censure in our Commission Ecclesiastical, as well as any other: And We will see there shall be due Execution upon them."

If the Church excludes, and to some extent even if it only threatens to exclude, from its ministry all young men who are unable to accept an archaic system of formulæ in the light of the present day, with whatever saving clauses and subterfuges it dilutes in practice its theoretical requirements, it may be creating for itself an "unnatural selection," so to speak, a survival or selection of the weakest. And if it does so, then, like any other organism in the same case, it must in the long run infallibly degenerate.

I believe that its leaders, its real leaders, admit that it could with advantage amend its procedure in several particu-

lars; especially that it could diminish the amount of mechanical uniformity and allow some elasticity in the use of a liturgy which, though fragrant with historical aroma, has now become to many people monotonous and barren. But the chief wish of those who love the idea of a National Church is that it would so modify its entrance barriers, and so simplify its formularies, as to draw to itself more young men of character, intellect, and breadth of view.

Only so can it once more become, what it ought to be and is not, a truly comprehensive National Church, one fold under one Shepherd, elevating and sanctifying the State by connexion with it; instead of, what many now consider it, an unholy alliance of mingled constraint and privilege,—hampered in its own actions by the rigidity of its connexion with Parliament, and yet drawing thence so much worldly dignity and social independence as to be regarded with suspicion by an able and energetic portion of a religiously minded nation, whose ministers are excluded from co-operation in the national ceremonies and from official recognition by the State, and who consequently conduct their ministrations at a perceptible disadvantage: a disadvantage which to Newman seemed so serious that he wrote, in 1833: "We know how miserable is the condition of religious bodies not supported by the State."

The difficulties surrounding reform are considerable, though it is possible to exaggerate them; but sooner or later it will be undertaken; and the exclusiveness of State connexion will be broken down, either by the method of disestablishment, or by that of greater comprehensiveness and union. Would that a movement might be made towards union! Not union in every minor doctrine, nor in every detail of practice, but effort, coupled with clear practical perception of the real needs of the time. To this end artificial boundaries must be broken down, and the domain covered by the National Church must be broadened till it includes all aspiring workers who are casting out devils in the one Name.

OLIVER LODGE.

REUNION.

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WHENEVER the problem of Christian reunion is mooted, it has a tendency either to stimulate denominationalism or to issue in the foundation of a new sect. The writer has seen both results follow from an enthusiastic and loyal adherence to ideals of Christian unity. Yet it is clear that the question cannot rest where it is. The official heads of the Christian communities of England have this year appealed for united prayer at Whitsuntide for Christian reunion; and when men are constrained to pray, they will presently be constrained to act. The wearisome continuance of the education controversy has made everyone acutely aware of the disadvantages of the present situation; and to those who value the spiritual life of the nation, it is well-nigh intolerable to have churches reduced to impotence for aggressive and united work, by the necessity of devoting their energies to checkmating one another.

The demand for some kind of readjustment of church life is also receiving new weight from another quarter. There is a great and increasing company of cultured and earnest laymen who are outside the churches—to use Professor Bruce's phrase—"not on account of godlessness, but rather of exceptional moral earnestness." For reverent feeling, moral insight, elevation of sentiment, and personal self-sacrifice many of these men are more to be relied on than the regular frequenters of churches. They sit loosely to every creed, but

they are, in the true sense of the word, not far from the kingdom of God. They have a true perception of the spiritual kingdom, and give reverent obedience to its demands. They create a problem for the churches, not exactly because they are knocking at their doors for an admission which is refused, but because the churches ought not to be content to leave them outside. Church organisations which fail to provide for so many disciples of the Master have obviously something defective in their composition.

The conditions of the problem of reunion are thus defined largely by the nature of the demand for it. (1) It must proceed on the basis of including existing churches and disarming their rivalries. It must come to fulfil, and not destroy. (2) It must be a movement towards a common centre, and must be compatible with a good deal of freedom in surrounding areas.

At present there are two clearly marked tendencies in existing churches. There are churches which rank authority above vision, and churches which rank vision above authority. Sabatier's antithesis between the religion of authority and the religion of the Spirit is misleading, because no church can live without both. It is the emphasis which makes the distinction. In some churches authority is valued because it secures the supremacy of the Spirit; in others the Spirit is exploited to establish and expand authority. The centres towards which these groups of churches gravitate when they think of union are different. Rome is the presumptive heir of all the religion which leans on external authority. Evangelical Anglicanism does its own work, but the High Church inherits the results and reaps the fruits. High Anglicanism has its *via media*, and can justify its position argumentatively; but it is Rome that seems destined to be the residuary legatee of its achievements in the next generation. If men are led to indulge the craving for an external and visible authority in matters of faith and conduct, they will satisfy that craving at the fountain-head; they are inevitably drawn to the authority which is oldest and stateliest and most widely revered. They

will not be content permanently with either patristic or State authority, when they can have an authority living, continuous, and organised.

But there is another possible centre for church union. There are churches which say: "Jesus Christ has for us abolished all authority in religion but His own. He taught us to call no man master; His appeal is to the soul's experience of God. We stand by God and the soul, and the unique personality who mediates God to the soul. These are the permanent realities of spiritual experience: the Bible explains and confirms them. The soul's experience of God is its own authority: we require no other." Those who take this position are drawn towards another centre of union—a centre as really spiritual as the other is formal. For them, union has its centre in Jesus Christ; and this is the true direction in which to look for Protestant reunion. Success in this direction depends on working the spiritual elements of the religion so far free from the formal that the spiritual may unite those whom the forms have divided. And this is the true function of the spiritual. It is as naturally unifying as the formal is divisive. We are not left in doubt as to the nature of the unity which Christ desired, and for which He prayed in the upper room on that night when, outside, His enemies were plotting His judicial murder. His prayer is thus reported: "*As Thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee, that they may be in us; I in them, and Thou in me, that they may be perfected into one.*" This union is the very opposite of a formal unity. The union of the Son with the Father was not even a visible union. "Where," said His critics, "is Thy Father?" "Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us," said Philip. Yet the union had never been broken. "*Have I been so long with you, and hast thou not known me, Philip?*" This is a union which requires discernment. It does not strike the eye; it cannot be easily described; there is nothing mechanical or formal about it. If we try to describe it, we can only call it spiritual. It is a union in love, and will, and perfect sympathy; so

deep and perfect that we argue from it,—such perfect love and union of will, a Sonship so perfected, could only rest on a union deeper still, a union of nature.

This union Jesus takes as a type of the spiritual union which is to link His disciples together. It is of the essence of a spiritual union that it transcends all barriers and makes channels for itself where none are made for it. In this sense the spiritual union of believers in Christ has not waited for the slow movement of church organisations. It is already accomplished. The man who is translated into the kingdom of the Son of the Divine Love, finds himself a member of a great company of those who in all ages and many lands have shared his experience. He has a key which opens the secrets of their mind to him, and in their words he finds his own experience re-lived. That is true, but it is not all. For it is just this spiritual union of believers which makes their actual rivalries and competitions absurd. It is natural for the spiritual to externalise itself; and a union in the deepest things carries with it a union in lesser things so completely as to make disunion, rivalry, and antagonism seem like the intrusion of fools where angels are wont to tread. The spiritual union makes some effort at realisation organically a necessity.

The spiritual origin of this ideal accounts for a difference between the Protestant ideals of reunion and the Roman. The Protestant churches hope to go *forward* to a spiritual condition in which a union will be possible, where the whole body may include the specific testimony of each member of the body. The Roman idea is that all churches may be led *back* into a formal unity of organisation. The difference is well brought out by the common misinterpretation of the words, "*They shall be one flock, one shepherd.*" That is read as though it meant, "There shall be one fold, one shepherd." In one case it is the mechanical unity of a constructed fold; in the other, the living unity of a common personal relation to the Shepherd. The hope of Protestant reunion lies in the relation of the flock to the shepherd who has sheep in many

folds; the Roman ideal of unity is the inclusion of all believers in a single fold. The Protestant ideal of unity leaves room for associations based on spiritual affinity. It believes that such communities are viewed as natural by Jesus Himself. "*Behold, my mother and my brethren! For whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother.*" "*Think ye that I am come to give peace in the earth? I tell ye nay! but rather division; for there shall be from henceforth five in one house divided two against three, three against two.*" Such an outlook clearly contemplates the fact that men will feel drawn in different directions by their spiritual kinship, and will own the obligation to act on that kinship even when this conflicts with the natural ties of blood and domestic life. But the time of ferment and division holds the promise of a peace which rests on a secure and settled foundation of recognised spiritual communion. It is not the formation of communities based on special spiritual affinity which is wrong, but the refusal to recognise that there are ties which bind them all into one great communion, and which make internecine competitions, rivalries, and hostilities fratricidal. The Protestant churches owe it to themselves to carry their history one further stage forward, and to show that conscientious division leads back to conscientious union, that spiritual affinity is the true basis of a new catholicism.

By way of counterweight to the frequent assertion that the Roman ideal of unity is gaining ground, some illustrations of the recent working of the Protestant ideal are of interest. In Canada, three leading Protestant churches, the Methodists, the Presbyterians, and the less numerous Congregationalists, are moving towards union. The history of the movement appears to be as follows. In 1899 the three representative assemblies of the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational churches agreed to appoint a committee to prevent overlapping and to substitute co-operation for competition in dealing with the settled districts of the West.

Such committees have been appointed in this country; but they have found it easy to do nothing, owing to the inadequate force of public opinion behind them. In Canada, Christian opinion is evidently riper on this point than with us. The three churches arranged that their "superintendents of missions" should meet, in a spirit of helpfulness and ready concession, and take counsel as to the opening of new fields of Christian work, or the readjustment of fields already occupied. Meanwhile the sentiment in favour of union had moved on, and the churches found that they were nearer together than they thought. The Methodist Conference communicated to the Presbyterian Assembly a declaration that, since their relations were already marked by a great degree of spiritual unity, and as the churches had already become closely assimilated in standards and ideals of church life, forms of worship and ecclesiastical polity, the time had come, in the opinion of the Conference, for a movement towards organic unity.

This note of charity evoked an answering note from the Presbyterian Assembly and Congregational Unions. In April 1904 representatives of the three fellowships of churches had got as far as a declaration that *organic union is both desirable and practicable.* Then followed prolonged negotiations by separate committees such as have not taken place since the famous Westminster Assembly of Divines in 1643. Five separate committees were appointed to deal with: (*a*) doctrine; (*b*) polity, the organisation and government of the church, conditions of membership, etc.; (*c*) the ministry—training, pastoral office, etc.; (*d*) administration; (*e*) law. As the result of the goodwill with which these conferences were conducted, a fairly workable basis of union has been devised. It is too soon yet to speak with confidence, for the Congregational churches have still to decide how far they can secure local freedom under the new constitution; but it is probable that we shall see a Free Evangelical Church in Canada which will include most of the Protestant churches which are known as "Free" in Great Britain.

A movement showing the same tendency is on foot in the United States. A united council has been appointed by the Congregational churches of the States, the Methodists, and the United Brethren "to present a realisation of the unity which is so greatly desired by Christian churches." The council has succeeded in issuing a declaration of faith and polity which has met with general agreement. This is of special interest from the fact that, in New England, Congregational churches have preserved with jealous care the traditions of the Pilgrim Fathers. They have allowed nothing to interfere with the freedom of the local church to manage its own affairs, and their church-life is saturated with the ideals and methods of representative democracy. They accordingly carry with them into their united organisation the principles and ideals for which their churches have stood in the past. The declaration sets forth that:—

"Our bond of union consists in that inward and personal faith in Jesus Christ as our Divine Saviour and Lord, on which all our churches are founded; also in our acceptance of the Holy Scriptures as the inspired source of our faith, and the supreme standard of Christian truth; and further, in our consent to the teaching of the ancient symbols of the undivided Church, and to that substance of Christian doctrine which is common to the creeds and confessions which we have inherited from the past. But we humbly depend, as did our fathers, on the continued guidance of the Holy Spirit to lead us into all the truth."

Other clauses refer to the death and resurrection of Jesus, the Holy Spirit, the ordinances of baptism, and the Lord's Supper. It closes as follows:—

"Possessed of these convictions, both as truths which we do most firmly hold, and acts of faith which spring from our hearts, we do, therefore, in the happy consummation of this union and in the name of all the churches which we represent, commit ourselves, body, soul, and spirit, to the faith, love, and service of Him who made us and saved us, the everlasting God, our Father, Redeemer, and Lord."

The report suggests also a framework of the new organisation, in which the following principles are laid down:—"(*a*) The unit of our fellowship is the local church, and the character of our fellowship is that of a representative democracy. (*b*) Our co-ordinate principles are freedom and fellowship, a freedom which leaves each local church free in its separate affairs, a

fellowship which unites all the churches for mutual care and co-operant action."

We are not without illustrations of the same tendency on this side the Atlantic. Three of the Methodist bodies—the United Methodist Free Church, the Methodist New Connection, and the Bible Christians—are far on their way to union. They have certain common differences from the polity of the parent Methodist body, and in sentiment and organisation they are near akin. As their strength lies in different parts of the country, each stands to gain by the union.

In Scotland, the union of two large Presbyterian churches led one of them into serious legal difficulties, but it is generally recognised now that the law was wrong and the church right. A living church cannot be treated simply as a charitable trust. The State, as an association of associations, must make provision for the legitimate growth and development of religious communities which exist within it, as long as these communities are not themselves hostile to the existence of the State, or dissipating its strength and crippling its efficiency. Whatever the perplexities which have lain along the path of the United Free Church, the union was the result of a Christian impulse, and, as in every act of obedience to the Lord of the Church, the constituent members of the union stand to gain in breadth and vitality by their closer fellowship.

The union of the Scottish Congregational churches and the churches of the Evangelical Union has had a less troubled course. The latter were churches of Presbyterian origin which had separated on a question of faith and had adopted Congregational methods of government. The union has shown that it is possible for churches with different origins and traditions to work together with reasonable harmony.

The late Premier once complained in the House of Commons that he had found religion the most divisive influence in the State. To take that view is to hold an incomplete philosophy of Christian history. When the motive for division is religious and not personal, men divide in order to unite on a broader

basis of truth. It seems probable that every conscientious division in Christian history will ultimately be justified by adding some element to the faith and order of the Christian churches as a whole. St Paul's forecast of Christian history is much nearer the true goal than Mr Balfour's, though it tarries long on the way to final realisation. "*There is one body, and one Spirit, even as also ye were called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in all. But unto each one of us was the grace given according to the measure of the gift of Christ. . . .*"

Though the action of the English Separatists in Elizabeth's reign resulted in division, union was always within their intention. When the Pilgrim Fathers had already started on their famous voyage and lay at Southampton, John Robinson wrote from Leyden urging them to drop all nicknames, such as "Brownist," and remember that they were simply Christian. They were to endeavour to "close with the godly party of the kingdom of England, and rather to study union than division, viz.:—how near we might possibly close with them without sin, rather than in the least measure to effect division or separation from them." John Owen and John Howe desired to be Christians "without distinguishing peculiarities." Jeremiah Burroughs maintained that diversity of opinion was quite consistent with the unity of those who held them ("Opinionum varietas, et opiniantium unitas non sunt *ἀσύστατα*"[1]); and Richard Baxter would "as lief be a martyr for love as for any article of the creed." The unity contemplated in such expressions as these is much nearer to the Pauline unity than any which has been attempted on a basis of credal affirmation or uniformity of organisation. Its motive power is the sense of the oneness of believers in Christ, and the expression of that oneness is love, showing itself in scrupulous respect for the conscience, views, and motives of those who differ from one another.

[1] *Irenicum to the Lovers of Truth and Peace*, chap. xlvi. p. 255.

The Federation of the English Free Churches has already done much towards drawing them together, and is creating a sentiment which will not stop at federation. It is an endeavour to work into some practical realisation the mystical unity of believers in Christ, which all the churches hold as their version of the faith in a Church universal. But obviously such a faith carries us a good deal further than co-operation in the service of man. If federation is possible in annual assemblies, it is also possible in village churches where the fires of faith burn low because the embers of the fire are sundered.

The recognition of the centripetal tendency of Protestant churches need not mean that anyone is deceiving himself as to the manifold hindrances which prevent that tendency from operating. Three hundred years of history have left deep fissures in sentiment and tradition. There are vested interests innumerable to be reckoned with, and there are other considerations entirely honourable and praiseworthy. The question of a declaration of faith, for instance, would have to be faced, and it would present a serious difficulty to those who have never signed any creed, and never intend to do so. But the Presbyterians, Methodists, and Congregationalists of Canada have already succeeded in drafting a declaration which has satisfied the united committee on doctrine. They do not propose to demand subscription to this declaration, but lay upon a district council the duty of inquiry into the personal character and general fitness of candidates for the ministry; and they require such candidates to answer certain questions dealing with their personal faith, the sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures, and the declaration of faith accepted by the Church. A Free Evangelical Church in England might use other terms in its declaration of faith, and require a different kind of assent; but in the presence of the Canadian achievement no one can assume that agreement would be impossible on this side the Atlantic.

The problem of church government is already far on the way to solution in the Free Churches here. Presbyterianism,

which is strong in the upper ranges of its organisation, is gradually giving more freedom to the local church. The Methodist bodies now uniting are doing so on a basis which gives considerable local autonomy, and recognises the universal priesthood of the believer almost as effectively as Congregationalism. The Congregationalists are making experiments in combining freedom and fellowship, local autonomy under Christ with fraternal organisation of churches for the common benefit. So long as the individual church retains freedom to choose its own pastor, manage its own affairs, and to respond to the indications of the will of the Lord of the Church, it would not make much difference whether it were a constituent member in, *e.g.*, a Congregational union or in a Free Evangelical Church of England.

It is probably true of the present condition of Christian public opinion in England to say that Protestant reunion seems so remote that people are hardly prepared to consider its advantages. But though our present divisions seem ultimate for the present generation, it is hardly likely that they will be so for the next. A generation brought up to look steadily at the responsibilities of division and the Christian obligation of reunion would insist that, however great the obstacles to union might be, a way must be found over them, or round them, or through them. Meanwhile, it is worth while to keep in view some reasons why the idea of an organic reunion should never be allowed entirely to die out.

(1) It would be an act of obedience to the declared desire of the Lord of the Church, and as such would bring all the churches into nearer union with His will. (2) It would supply a counterweight to the movement towards reunion with Rome, and make it clear that for the Protestant Church the only possible centre for a reunion movement is Christ. A great evangelical church could do this as no one of our divided churches can. (3) It would supply an organ for the Christian consciousness on important questions of public policy. Since the Reformation, the Christian Church, as such, has had no

distinct voice in the counsels of the nation; and on moral questions the voice of the Christian conscience has gone by a name which has emphasised the dumbness of the official organ. (4) The advantage to the component churches of the union would lie in that fusion of complementary factors and forces which has been an element making for strength in English history ever since King Alfred taught Danes and Saxons to live together in amity. Congregationalists (including both orders) would carry into the union their own traditions and principles, and help to secure for Methodists and Presbyterians congregational freedom and self-government. They would gain the link between church and church which is necessary for concerted action on a national scale. Presbyterians would bring the tradition of an ancient, defined, and catholic theology, and would secure in return what they have never had—the hold on the people of England which belongs to an indigenous church. Methodists would bring the experience of a strong central organisation, and the cumulative weight of verified Christian experience. They would gain in theological freedom and in sharing the broader outlook of the older Free Churches. Such a union would have strong attractions for many Evangelical Anglicans, but it is difficult to predict their corporate action. (5) It would put an end to mischiefs which are the accidents of denominational development—the overlapping and consequent waste of money, the rivalries, jealousies, egotisms, which spring from what the man in the street regards as the "competition of churches." It would prevent some of the broken hearts which are the consequence of sending men to carry on unnecessary forlorn hopes "for the credit of a denomination." If the uniting churches could lose some of their individualism without losing their individuality, the loss would be pure gain. It would help to secure a larger place in all the churches for that fruit of the Spirit which never faileth.

D. MACFADYEN.

LONDON.

CHRIST IN EDUCATION.

Suggested by the Articles of the Bishop of Carlisle and Canon Knox Little on the Education Bill.

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Canon Knox Little's article is stimulating. Taking it at its surface-value, one is struck by the writer's argumentative force and facile scholarliness. The Canon should certainly convince his class that he is right. Truly, it is deplorable that the children of the world should be permitted to lead the children of the Kingdom astray in educational matters with "catchwords," "catch-phrases," and "catechisms." The tendency of mortals is to go out for to see the "lo here, lo there," the "dogma," the "orthodoxy," the temporal "catchwords" of men's notions in regard to the great Master whose τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, ἀγάπη, *ce consentement de soi avec soi-même*, whose moderation and love, are the only defence against the error inherent in the mortal self-hood of St Paul, Mr Gladstone, John Stuart Mill, or the writer of a *Hibbert* article. Truth must, indeed, not be sacrificed to soft speech, as the Canon says; and, with this principle in mind, I propose to show that the difficulty in regard to the question of education lies deeper than the "rights" of Dissenters and Churchmen, as such.

First, let me say that this cry of "denominational" and "undenominational" is as irrational as the notions which "we Englishmen" have adopted in regard to the character and

individuality of our Lord. Sectarians have themselves to blame for this very plague of "catchwords" which exercises the mind of the Canon. They have materialised the Saviour; nay, they have Anglicised, have Romanised, Jesus, the Christ, the significance of whose nationality as an Eastern and a Jew is found, surely, in the Mystery and the One-ness of God. The ideal of "God manifest in the flesh" has been obscured by that tendency to break up the elements of an inseparable Unity which has been the temptation of mortals from of old. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." But the "natural man" has shown great zeal in the direction of trying to make the divinely rational conform to the humanly argumentative.

The "natural man" is a dualist. In the realm of philosophy, Idealists, while discussing the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, have felt the fetters of dualistic thought. Logic and Will have been at constant war. The doctrine or notion of separateness, of dualism, of man considered apart from God, has ever carried with it an insuperable difficulty. Even while the Idealists' scheme was based upon the Absolute, as involving the truths of God, freedom, and immortality, the "natural man's" testimony led to a conflict between faith and intellect. "Their ardour for completed system, their impatience of mysticism, and their pride of intellect" (to quote Professor Henry Jones)—in other words, their preference for dualistic logic as against monistic will—led them to hold "to either a purely subjective or a purely objective method, making man prior to God and nature, or God and nature prior to man." Both these methods are "equally dogmatic, dualistic, and impracticable." In like manner have religious Idealists permitted their own personal notions to colour their theories concerning the Christ, in such wise as to make Him, not the universal λόγος, or *Vernunft*, in whom the Infinite God reveals Himself in infinite ways, but the

particular Christ of one man, one period, one Church, or even one cult or sect in a Church. And so the "natural man" is full of ardour for a "completed system" about which he can argue effectively; rejoices in a logical machine from which all mysticism is eliminated; imposes the "tests" of a "luminous and distinct" catechism; and glories in such intellect as enables him to prove that no man can "come to the Father" without the intervention of a "properly appointed" guardian of the "mysteries." And when men follow the lead of "the properly constituted authority," and start "authoritative" Bethels of their own, the "proper guardian" of the mysteries calls them "denominations," and that settles the matter—to the satisfaction of the "natural man."

It is surely a strange sight to see men who have, say they, love for their Master, who speak of sacrifice as a religious necessity, claiming that Christ, the Truth that makes men free, has placed His universal cause in the guardianship of one particular sect in a Church—that of England, say—to the exclusion of the "denominations" which have "separated themselves from the Mother Church." And when a Bishop of that Church appeals to the "great open fields of common justice," from the sectarian cult which talks of "confiscation, robbery, tyranny, injustice," the appeal is strangely met by a charge that the Bishop confounds catholicity with latitudinarianism. The Bishop of Carlisle sees clearly that "no Christian communion is free from denominationalism." If any further proof of this were wanted, we have it in Canon Knox Little's clever article, from which he has not been able to eliminate a somewhat contemptuous tone. For who can doubt that the exclusive cult which cannot see that there are such things as a "great field of common justice," and "our common Christianity," has brought upon the Church of England the troubles which beset her to-day? "My kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered unto the Jews. But now is my kingdom not from hence." These

words of the Saviour must sound strange to the ecclesiastic, who thinks that he and his visible, audible Church have kept the Truth of the Lord of Truth alive. But, in so far as the Church of England lives, the Christ has kept her alive. She may belong to Him, but He does not belong to her.

Priests have made the same mistake under Jesus as they made under Moses. They have erected rites and ceremonies, presided over by themselves, into the indispensable means of conscious communion with God. But the Lord of Life is the Spiritual Lord. He dwelleth not in temples made with hands. He has not enveloped Himself in material symbols; though this is not to say that if you seek Him there you will not find Him. Neither has He given the Church of England any exclusive right to speak in His name; though this is not to say one may not hear Him when the Church speaks His word. The Churchman, moreover, is ever ready to think of himself as the "Defender of the Faith." But God defends and saves by being Himself Truth, Love, Life; and man is safe so long as he follows the eternal gospel of continuous conscious communion with God, thus becoming his true self, or God's child. The Spirit communes with Spirit, *freely*. This is the only religious education the spiritual man can trust.

Again, God has no exclusive property. He does not, as Spirit, regard "tithes," "school expenses," and "dogma." He has no particular delight in this or any other mountain. Man thinks He has, and hence the rage and madness which fill the land. Hence this preposterous concern for God's property, which is nothing but an outward, audible sign of inward, latent atheism.

A young clergyman, twenty years ago, could not decide what "Substance" was. Further, he could not decide whether he who said ὁμοούσιος or he who said ὁμοιούσιος was right. He felt he was untrue to Truth, if he could not say he knew "luminously and distinctly" that ὁμοούσιος was right—while he called himself a clergyman. He felt he

was "getting a living" under false pretences. The memory of the agony he endured is still keen. He gave up his position and faced the world. He began to work, with a very small voice—a drawback in our noise-loving days,—as a vocal student. He had lost his God in man's theology. For many years he was a wanderer—a prodigal, if you will. But he finally found his God in Art. A great rôle was written for him—he was privileged to sing the words of the Master, the Christ, in a modern oratorio at many festivals. The opportunity came for presenting this oratorio in a cathedral. A cultured ecclesiastic had something to say on the committee of management. He was a successor of Apostles and a very strict priest, and he promptly used his position to prevent his former brother from singing a part in which the world says he has done some good. This aroused great strife in the festival atmosphere. The case was discussed in *The Church Times* and elsewhere, with the result that bitterness ensued. The offender had given up a position he could not faithfully hold. And so after twenty years he must pay the penalty, because he had slighted the "orders" which change the "water" of religious sentiment into the "wine" of ecclesiastical dogma. The Master would have judged differently; that is clear from the Master's record. And it seems also clear from the fruits of the quondam clergyman's present work that the Master does not disdain to have him for a student of Himself, even now. But the ecclesiastic would not have him in the cathedral.

The words of Canon Knox Little's retort to the Bishop of Carlisle have a bitter flavour, strangely reminiscent of the foregoing incident. "I agree," he says, "that it is kind, right, and practical to talk of 'letting little children's first sweet view of the religion of Jesus be of the white realms of peace and love.' But this can only be done by teaching the children Faith. They above all are dogmatists." Quite true! Children must have Faith taught them, and the Canon is right

when he finds the word Faith suggested by the presence of simple children. But this faith is the "kind, right, poetical" faith of and in the universal Christ who summons them to Himself, and assures them they are good—in God; not faith of and in the "dogma and catechism" of any particular church. In other words, Canon Knox Little's position, *quâ* ecclesiastic, is negative, not positive, exclusive, not comprehensive. The true, the Christ position is that which teaches children, grown-up and non-grown-up, not that they are too bad to live, but that they are too good to die.

Men may speak of the coming triumph of "secularism" or "catechism" in this country. They know not what they say. It is, of course, true that we have not yet done with the question of "imperium in imperio." The Church and State are, humanly speaking, one; and we cannot but rejoice that they whose intellect flourishes in the way of dogma are face to face with the phenomenon of the State telling them what they shall teach to the children of the State. The State is interested in her children. She does not want a race of bigots. She has vast colonies; she loves freedom. That love must spread into every corner of her dominion. The nation would commune with God and Christ direct. Its conscience must be free, and it must approach its Creator without violating the truth of its own genius and history. It would have its colonies do the same. It fails to appreciate the necessity of the priest or his dogma, as exclusively essential guardians of the "mystery of Godliness." The State makes mistakes; so does the Church. The one corrects the other. So long as the correction tends to vindicate the right of humanity to claim divinity by reason of participation in the Good, which is the real inner essence of Creation; so long as man is taught that he is essentially divine, or that he is not at all,—so long shall we rejoice that error destroys error, even as it is doing now. What England wants is a system of education based on the fundamental truth that, as children together of the One Highest, we have one life and one knowledge, and that life and

knowledge are complete when we know we are one with each other and one with our Source, through Christ in God. Christ does good by being good—He teaches essential goodness by living it. He brings holiness to light by being "of purer eyes than to behold evil." He makes men good, by showing them in His own life that they are good, and by telling them so. He makes them wise by telling them they are wise, perfect by telling them they are perfect, *i.e.* "throughly furnished to all good works," and by illustrating all this in Himself. Let Churchmen and not-Churchmen go forth to heal the children of future generations in this faith, and they will indeed heal them of ignorance, which healing is the truest education.

I said at the beginning of this article that the false notion of separateness has beset mortals from of old. Man has thought of his life as a something which he holds apart from God. This dualistic thought has pursued him into every department. What if he were to adopt the simpler monistic idea that the life of man is the life of God? What if he used his will to assert this position in the face of all the denials of the "natural man?" He would then teach himself that his God is one Lord having dominion all through. As an artist I have been severely handled because I have insisted that Art and Life are inseparable, and because I hold that I do not know where to begin my Art except in God. "Why will you mix up Art and Religion? They are two different things." Every day, in one form or another, I am assailed with these objections. Through considerable rebellion and not a little tribulation, I have been persuaded that monistic thought is alone worthy of the sane man. I know now that God is, that He is One, and I believe that in Christ we have that revelation of Him which enables teacher and pupil, in whatsoever sphere, to reproduce the beneficent, creative thought. When I insist upon it, with an art-pupil, that he has all the power in the world wherewith to do good work, the work is invariably done, and done well. Constantly, when at my public work, I relate myself in consciousness to our

Brother Christ, and I am never left comfortless. Without Him I should fail, for conditions are lethal in public performances, often enough. I know nothing of artistic work apart from Christ, who is the revelation to me of an endless source of power on which I may endlessly draw, so that I may do good art-work. But this knowledge has meant and means individual work. The "natural man" of me, who seemingly desires to set up a dual control, has to be silenced. Good art is the expression of good character, is the result of silencing the claim to lordship made by the "natural" man. So much for art-work. The case is the same in regard to all educational work. There is no antagonism between Faith and Intellect. Carry monistic thought right through to its final conclusion, that in God, in Christ, we live, move, and have our being, and education is easy. If the opinion is allowed to keep its hold upon the people that there are two separate things, called respectively religious and secular education, Bill will succeed Bill, and no one will be satisfied. Teach that God is Lord of intellect as well as the God of love, that there is only one kind of education possible to man (even as there is only one kind of worship possible, viz., the worship of work), and that this education is the bringing out of the *good* there is in children, and there will be no need to imprison the thought of God in a separate catechism. Teach "God" for fifteen minutes, and "secular" matter, which means, if anything, "not-God," during the rest of the day! I cannot see why the thought of Truth, Life, Love, of God, should be absent from a mathematical or a geographical lesson, any more than from one of my own singing lessons. And I make bold to say that the man who teaches even such things as mathematics or geography on the lines of Truth and Love will succeed. He will persuade children that they have infinite Power, Truth, and Love to draw upon, and that they cannot fail. Art, religion, education—all manifestations of mind go hand in hand, and peace and knowledge are their fruits. "Departmental" activity and thinking may seem

a necessity to those who imagine they have some kind of life apart from God, and who deceive themselves into believing that they like that kind of life. But when men realise that they have but one life, which is spiritual, and that they have the resources of Love, infinite and infallible, to draw upon for the manifestation of the power of that life, they will not come to unseemly strife over the teaching of dogmas which keep them apart from each other and from their God.

We have had, at different times, the ideas of an infallible Bible, an infallible Church, an infallible Pope. The infallible Christ includes them all, and He inspires each individual to demonstrate in his degree this infallibility. To delegate vicarious infallibility to Bible, dogmatic society, or ecclesiastic, is to remove responsibility for the demonstration of infallibility (viz., the duty and power of man in Christ to do good) from the individual to some authority other than the man himself. Christ who showed man that he cannot fail in God; Infallible Love who giveth knowledge; Christ, in life, education, art, commerce, will draw all men unto Him. The people will always "go after" Him who saves them from the unreality of their worst selves. They are "drawn unto" Him who points to and insists upon the reality of their best selves. They follow Him who, in face of all denials whatsoever, asserts that they are kings, that they "can" learn their tasks, gain knowledge of the universe in the name of the "Word," the "Reason," who made it. Nothing is impossible to them who are in Christ. But without Him we can do nothing.

I too, like the Bishop of Carlisle and Canon Knox Little, have had my experience of men and cities. I have been fighting my own and others' bigotry all my life, in Europe and America. I began by fighting the bigotry of dissent among the rock-men of Llanaelhaiarn, whose bigotry was as hard as the paving-stones they wrought upon. Then I had some experience of lay and priestly bigotry, not forgetting the bigotry of Satan, in the provinces and in London. Later, I have "fought with wild beasts at Ephesus," have encountered

the bigotry rampant in the musical world. What is the lesson which has been taught me? This. While I sought to bend men to my thought, or while they sought to bend me to theirs, chaos ensued, all "dogma and luminous and distinct catechism notwithstanding." When, on the other hand, I related myself to the Christ, the Spirit of Truth, Grace, Love, Beauty, Harmony, and Dominion, I found I did not repel men. The High Ideal drew men towards It, and my educational work was done satisfactorily and unconsciously. Particular personality, mine and not-mine, was eliminated, and Universal Mind, that of the Christ, the Ideal, revealed. It was so during my experience of Welsh Dissent; it has been so during the whole of my career as an artist, at home and abroad.

Perhaps my experience may seem worthless to Canon Knox Little, yet it is my experience in union with that of millions of my fellow-men. *Can he not make his Church big enough to hold us?* We acknowledge the Christ with glad reverence. This is not enough for the Canon, who demands the Catechism. He has appealed to the Catechism. They who are not "of the circumcision" cannot accept it. What then? Does the Canon ask them to believe that the Infinite Christ has no being, that He exercises no saving grace, apart from what the finite man of the Catechism thinks of Him? The great mass of those who are outside what he calls "Mother Church" have a rooted dislike to a mechanical system. But not one of these men could or would carry out any scheme of violence against the Christ. Nay, the Canon is better than his own words. Let him then assert the dominion of Him who sitteth above the water-floods; let him give to the devout within and without his own Church the freedom to be students of an ever-unfolding Christ-character, let him forbear to teach that any prayer-book or catechism, however worthy, has definitely, "distinctly and luminously" set forth once for all the wisdom and glory of the only begotten Son of God.

D. FFRANGCON-DAVIES.

LONDON.

THE BISHOP OF BIRMINGHAM AND THE EDUCATION BILL.

PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD.

WHATEVER may be thought of the merits of the Education Bill, there can be no doubt at all of the extraordinary sincerity and ability of the opposition which it has encountered. This has been conspicuous in the case of one or two individuals, and among these none has been more unwearying and consistent than the Bishop of Birmingham. Whoever are the nominal leaders of the opposition, it is undoubtedly he who has had the ear of the country and has provided the weightiest and most telling arguments against the proposals of the Government. These have been felt to be all the more dangerous as coming from so staunch a Liberal and so intelligent an educationalist. From the outset Bishop Gore has declared himself opposed to the Bill in spite of his Liberalism. In his recent remarkable speech in the House of Lords he goes a step further, and comes forward to oppose it because he is a Liberal and because "the Bill is thoroughly opposed to everything he can remember as identified with Liberal principle." He supports this paradox by adding that, among the supporters of the Government with whom he is acquainted, whether Liberal, Radical, or Socialist, he has not found one who had not a bad conscience about the Bill, or could justify it on any ground but political necessity.

I have no claim to speak for any of the groups which Dr Gore mentions; but, as a Liberal who supports the general lines of the Bill, I should like to explain why I find myself

able to do so with a good conscience (or at any rate with as good a conscience as one can do anything else in this complicated world), and on quite other grounds than political expediency. I will therefore set out the different considerations which Dr Gore has concentrated in the above paradox, and comment shortly upon them individually. In doing so I shall quote mainly from his speech in the House of Lords, though only the *Times* abstract is as yet before us.

1. I begin with the head and front of Liberal offending. Liberalism stands for non-interference with religious opinions; yet the present Bill seeks to establish (no less) a particular form of religious teaching in the schools. Herein Dr Gore finds an irreconcilable contradiction. To me, on the other hand, there seems to be no contradiction at all. Liberalism, of course, stands for the largest freedom of religious opinion; but it is no part of the creed of Liberalism to maintain that religion is a matter of such insignificance that the State can with safety ignore it. There is, of course, as everybody knows, a section of the supporters of the Government who advocate secular education. There may even be, for all I know to the contrary, members of the Ministry who would welcome this solution. But repeated elections have made it abundantly evident that the great mass of Liberals in this country regard religion as an element of such fundamental importance in the formation of the citizen character that it ought not to be left to the chance efforts of individuals or of corporations less responsible and omnipresent than the State itself. It is to this view that the Bill before the country seems to me to seek, under the complicated circumstances of our existing system and amid manifold doubts even among its own supporters, to give expression. It is open to its opponents to represent this as the establishment of a religion. But it contains no real analogy to the establishment of a church. The difference is that it is in the interest, not of any sect or form of opinion as such, but of those elements of character on which, in the view of the community, the whole fabric of society rests, and therefore of the State itself.

If, with modern Liberalism, we say of the function of the State what Bacon said of the function of Reason (of which it is the highest earthly embodiment), that it is "non sectae alicuius aut placiti sed utilitatis et amplitudinis humanae fundamenta moliri," and if we further hold, as the country by a true instinct does, that religion is an essential factor in this *amplitudo*, it is surely no contradiction, but the merest common sense, to seek for the best means of establishing religion in the schools.[1]

2. But here we come to the second of Dr Gore's charges. Granted that the State is justified in such a course, the means it proposes to adopt is the worst suited to the purpose it has in view. While, upon the above assumption, it is the duty of the State to establish the best form of religion, the present proposals of the Government involve the establishment of the worst. For what is this undenominational religion but a colourless residuum obtained by the elimination of all that is strongest and most characteristic in the different religions? It is as though you were to seek to get the best in science by eliminating all that divides scientific men. "You do not in any branch of knowledge get the best in this way. You get by this process what is weakest and washiest and least likely to establish the character or enlighten the mind."

But for his well-known sincerity, it would be difficult to believe that the Bishop means us to take this analogy seriously. He must surely know that the claim of Liberals is not that it is possible to reach religious truth by any such facile process, but that it is possible to teach the elements of religion to children without raising questions of doctrine and interpretation which divide the wise. This being so, the analogy of the sciences is all on the side of the position for which they contend. It is possible to teach children physics or biology without introducing remote controversies on the ultimate

[1] Whether this is logically consistent with the maintenance of an Established Church is another question. It is just because it is perceived to be inconsistent with the Church as at present established that it rouses such bitter opposition in some quarters.

constitution of matter such as divide Lord Kelvin from Sir Oliver Lodge, or as to the inheritance of acquired habit such as divide Lamarckians from Weismannians. It may be said that it is these deeper doctrines, and not the common elements, that make people enthusiastic about religion, as it is their theories on ultimate problems that make them enthusiastic about science. This is a contention that is often heard, though it is in singular contradiction to the biographies of great religious leaders. True or false, it is not one that Liberals need feel themselves called upon to deny. What they are bound to deny, and I think rightly to deny, is that it is only these things which have any palpable effect in "establishing character and enlightening the mind."

3. But the evil, according to Dr Gore, does not end here. Weak and washy as such a residual form of religion must necessarily be, it only requires to be taken along with prevailing tendencies of thought, and more particularly with the character of the average Englishman, to be perceived to be on a down plane of increasing indefiniteness and ineffectiveness. "What I am sure of with regard to undenominational teaching is not that there are many teachers who will teach error, but that the teaching will become weaker and weaker, washier and washier." "What I am afraid of is something which I know very well to belong to the character of the ordinary Englishman. Speaking to Englishmen, I ask you whether it is not true that, if the ordinary Englishman knows his religious opinions are unfixed, he studiously avoids putting into any definite shape what they are. If you set him to teach religion, he will teach the distance between Jerusalem and Jericho, the meaning of the Sadducees and the Pharisees, and avoid teaching everything that constitutes the real essence of the Christian religion." It is impossible not to believe the Bishop in earnest in this contention. The conviction he here expresses will seem to many to contain the explanation of the attitude of the whole body of sincerely religious opponents of the Bill whom he represents. The conviction is that the

tendency of all opinion upon the character and nature of God is in the direction of indefiniteness, and that, taken in connection with the character of the English nation, this must result in a more and more pronounced secularisation of education. The only security against this calamity is to hold the teachers to "the standards of definite religious societies."

We need not delay over the *argumentum ad nationem*. It is doubtful whether it can be maintained that Englishmen are less courageous in the original formulation of religious opinion, or more prone to vagueness, than other nations. But the issue that Dr Gore raises (and none more serious could be raised) concerns our whole view of the tendency of opinion on matters of religious interest. This is no question of national characteristics. Is the *general* trend of religious thought in the direction that the Bishop supposes? Nor are we concerned with the character of political Liberalism. It may very well be that many of Dr Gore's Liberal friends agree with him. But there is a wider Liberalism having its roots in a very different view of the course of human thought.

According to this Liberalism, opinion is no exception to the general law of development. All opinion, and most of all opinion on the deepest matters that concern our human life, obeys the law of growth from the more indefinite and incoherent to the more definite and coherent. It is quite true that, if popular theology be taken as the standard, or if attention be confined to some particular period, the perspective may be reversed as in a mountain railway, and change may seem to proceed in the opposite direction. In this sense it might be maintained that the theology of Plato's *Timæus* was a watery substitute for the clear-cut ideas of Greek mythology; Jewish monotheism, for the pagan ideas about the gods which it superseded; or, again, that there are periods of transition in which older views are dissolved and the new have not yet crystallised into sufficient clearness for ordinary use. But all this is quite compatible with maintaining, as the Liberalism

I am speaking of does, that, taking a sufficiently generous estimate of time, and confining ourselves to the ideas and insights from which popular religion springs and which may be said to form its substance, as contrasted with the mythology which surrounds it as an envelope, these, when properly interpreted, represent a true evolution in the direction of richness and definiteness of content.

It is thus that Neoplatonism was an advance on ordinary Greek paganism, Christianity on Neoplatonism. It is in this sense it is claimed that Christian ideas themselves, where they are alive, so far from remaining stationary or receding into indefiniteness, are ever acquiring a deeper significance and more definite utterance as they take a deeper hold of human consciousness. To take only a single example: can it really be maintained that the idea of the love of God has suffered from the progress of modern thought upon the nature of the world and man? Is it not much more evident that it has passed from a vague perception of a diffused goodness in the universe to a reasoned conviction in the minds of multitudes of the existence of forces which make for the development of fulness of life and of the decreed predominance of the social elements in human nature? If, as the President of the British Association reminds us that Bishop Creighton held, religion means "the knowledge of our destiny and the means of fulfilling it," does it not seem to follow that, as our ideas of the meaning of life and the mode of realising its best possibilities increase in definiteness, religion will follow them?

Whether and how these ideas can be conveyed to children is indeed a matter of the utmost concern to the country. This is not the place to discuss it, but one or two things are plain which point a moral for reflection at this time:—(*a*) They can only be taught—and here, of course, the Bishop and those who agree with him are perfectly right—by men and women inspired by a deep conviction of their truth and reality. Apart from this, religious teaching must degenerate into mere formalism, or be converted into something which is not religion

even in form, but history, geography, or archæology. The former is, perhaps, more particularly the danger of Church religion; the latter, as the Bishop rightly perceives, of undenominational. But the cure for both is not to tie the expanding religious faith of Christendom down to the standards of any particular creed, but to endeavour, in all courses of training for teachers, to make these ideas the foundation of their studies.

(*b*) They can only be taught to children through the imagination. Dr Gore appeals for clearness and definiteness of religious teaching. Here also he is right, but he overlooks the distinction, which elsewhere he would be the first to recognise, between what philosophers call logical and æsthetic clearness. It is with difficulty that philosophers themselves reach anything approaching logical clearness on "the character and nature of God." On the other hand, æsthetic clearness is attainable by the most ignorant through the aid of well-chosen examples, such as are available to every teacher, from poetry, natural history, and human biography. Here again the way to meet the undoubted difficulty is not by insisting, in school teaching, on the artificial clearness of dogma, but by adapting the training of teachers to the new demands. If the outcome of the turn which the Bishop has given to the present discussion be to direct the attention of the authorities in undenominational colleges to the necessity of some systematic training for the efficient performance of this fundamental part of the teacher's function, an indirect result of the greatest importance will have been achieved.

Having been for many years engaged in teaching in such a College, I have myself felt the disadvantage under which we labour in this respect, and I am not without hope that, when the present storm of controversy has passed and we have settled down into the definite recognition of morals and religion, in the widest sense of the word, as an essential part of school instruction in public elementary schools, we may have the assistance of such men as the Bishop of Birmingham in the

effort to organise something adequate to the needs of the time in this respect.[1]

There are two further contentions which, though not emphasised in the discussion in the House of Lords, have been prominent in the criticisms which the Church party has directed against the Bill, and which have been put by no one more forcibly than by Dr Gore. The first is that the simple Bible teaching advocated by the Government ignores the great line of catholic interpretation without which the Bible must be a sealed or misleading book. The second is that, whatever the merits of undenominational religion, it must by the nature of the case fail in what, after all, is the most important object of early religious training, attachment to a religious corporation which has the power and opportunity of developing the germs of truth in the mind of the child. Personally, I have been much impressed by these contentions. They are founded, like the others I have been dealing with, on an insight into important facts of the situation. None the less, I believe the conclusion drawn from them to be founded on a false interpretation of their significance. With regard to the first, I should be sorry to think that modern Liberalism was in any way committed to a narrow bibliolatry. There is a sense in which an "open Bible" may be interpreted to mean a closed intelligence, and from this a true Liberalism is bound to separate itself. So far it will be ready to agree with Dr Gore's claim that the Bible can only be a safe guide when taken along with the interpretations of the living Church. But again, its view of the Church must be a widely different one from anything contemplated by the average member of the party for which he speaks. The interpretation that is of value is not that which comes from any sect or visible corporation, but from the onward sweep of human thought

[1] What is chiefly wanted is, in the first place, to sweep away the bad tradition that these colleges have nothing to do with religion, and, secondly, to proceed to build up in the space thus cleared a systematic course in the elements of religious and ethical philosophy.

and from the efforts after religious light of all faithful souls, wherever they may be found. It is to leave scope for this interpretation, and not to bind teachers down to antiquated Biblical literalism, that "the Bible in the unfettered hands of the teacher" is advocated.

With the second of these criticisms the Liberalism I have been speaking of need have no quarrel in the abstract. It is at best but the elements of religious training that can be imparted in school. Apart from later influences, they must be like the seed scattered by the wayside. More may doubtless be done with the lengthening of the school age. But the particular method which the Bishop has in view is expressly excluded by the system with which the Government proposals are identified—is this its condemnation? On the contrary, under existing circumstances this is its particular merit. It is just here that it leaves room for the rights and duties of the parent, of whom so much has been said and so little is known. There is ample guarantee in the provisions of the Bill against anything being taught to children under the name of religion that is counter to the religious convictions of parents or to their wishes for their children. That there is no provision to secure their adhesion to any particular religious community or to any particular shade of opinion within a community, so far from being a denial of the rights of the parent, is the most effective guarantee for the preservation of them. In spite of what is urged by the denominational party, it is impossible to believe that this is not the aspect in which the vast majority of British parents regard the matter.

The conclusion I wish to draw from these considerations is that there is no contradiction between the proposals of the Government and the principles for which Liberalism in the present day stands. If, in carrying out these principles, political Liberalism joins hands with a wider Liberalism, this is only what we might expect. It is only a part of the general education which the public discussion of a great national issue brings with it. I wish again to express my

sense of the value in this respect of the contribution of opponents of the Bill. With this I might end, but, as so much has been said of the example of other countries, and especially of Germany, I will quote in support of the general contention of this article the words of a writer who will be recognised by all acquainted with contemporary German literature as the best living representative of Liberal continental thought on matters of psychology and education. Speaking precisely of the question under discussion, Professor Wundt, in one of his latest works,[1] has written: "There are a few people even to-day who, mostly with a sincere intent to serve religious interests, hold that religious instruction without creeds is of no value, and that a religious education that is not based on a definite confession of faith is the same thing as education without any religion at all. We must suppose, for the credit of those who calmly express such opinions, that they are unconscious of the import of their words. For if what we call the Christian religion were really constituted, not by the life and teachings of Christ, but by the Confession of Augsburg or the Tridentine Decrees, probably the great body of truly religious persons, as well as the whole community of thinkers, would turn from it. What sort of ideas can a man have on the value of religious education if he thinks it is derived chiefly from dogmatic structures whose origin from the complex interaction of religious ideas and philosophic systems is well known, and which escape doing serious harm to the child's mind only because as a general rule they are appropriated by the memory and not by the mind? Surely the permanent moral worth of Christianity consists, not in these artificial intellectual structures, wherein is displayed the theological acumen of centuries, but in the plain teachings of Jesus, which are accessible at every stage of intellectual development."

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

BIRMINGHAM.

[1] *Ethics*, vol. iii. p. 277 (Eng. tr.).

THE VITAL VALUE IN THE HINDU GOD-IDEA.

WILLIAM TULLY SEEGER.

In the whole field of religious inquiry, that which is of most worth spiritually is the conception which points one to the holy place where the apt beholder comes face to face with God. And whatever is of permanent spiritual worth is certain to possess eminent practical worth, for there can be no attainment in this or any world that is more intensely practical than the overcoming of error and the realisation of one's highest possibilities in the direction of right feeling and right thinking.

It is doubtful if in any other country than India so large a proportion of the reverently high-minded have agreed—and acted accordingly—that the greatest and the eventually happiest use to which they could apply themselves was the assiduous seeking and the intrepid finding of God, all else in life being accounted as subordinate in importance. In most civilised countries there can always be found a few aspirants similarly occupied, but the results among such have proved to be largely theoretical and sentimental, seldom effective enough to reanimate the heart with the full experience of the "new birth." Some earnest inquirers have given up the quest as hopeless, either because they were not prepared to make the sacrifices called for, or could not attain a feeling of certitude as to the outcome. Behind the much-heralded promise of unalloyed bliss when their labours should be successful, there loomed up, now and then, a puzzling phantom which overbold Agnostics fain would call Barren Ideality.

The reasons why numerous Hindu aspirants have attained to a high degree of spirituality are evident. Generations of reverent thinkers preceded them, and these knew well the value of a consistent, moderate asceticism. Unlike the great majority who are responsible for the materialistic character of Occidental civilisations to-day, their ruling habit was, and still is, not merely to scorn the senses' sway, but to simplify and minimise all mundane desires—retaining life's necessaries while rigidly banishing its indulgences. In their view—and it is ever the view of the purified mind—he is richest who has fewest wants, for is it not plain that nothing so prevents men from finding God as the multiplicity of their selfish desires? Another reason why the Hindu's spirituality avails much, and in a way that eludes the Western religionist, is found in the fact that in India there has been inculcated for centuries the habit of prolonged contemplation and concentration, especially upon the Vedic teachings and the commentaries thereon by such great religious thinkers and expounders as Patanjali, Bâdarâyana, and Sankarachârya. By this method the religious consciousness is absorbed in purely subjective activities. To the educated Hindu, the most significant attribute of self-conscious beings is their subjectivity. He habitually maintains that the idea of God is always presented to the mind in the very same act with the idea of self. Plainly, the inference here is that God is to be found not by means of any objective use of the mind; not by the ontological, nor the cosmological, nor the teleological argument; but by penetrating all the mental strata with which mankind's civilising processes have overlaid man's diviner nature. This done, the individual consciousness parts with the perception of self *as* self and becomes certain that it is nothing less than a manifestation of—rather the individuation of—Self Universal, the Supreme. Thus, "Tat tvam asi"—"That art thou," expresses the identity of Particular and Universal, but it does not imply that the self-consciousness of the one is lost in that of the other. The only way whereby Brahm (Universal God) can be fully

manifested is through and by means of Atmá (the divine Monad). They are identical, that is, qualitatively. Man's essential self is the spiritual nucleus (Atmá) around which his special subjectivity gradually develops. Brahm is monistic; Atmá pluralistic.

Most Western thinkers appreciate the gain to religion that has come during the past half-century from the spread and deepening of the belief in the immanence of God. Some are inclined to suspect it as a new phase of pantheism, but, even if this be so, the gain is none the less one of substantial and permanent value. At the same time, it cannot rightly be regarded as that vital change for the better which was most needed by those who have long been yearning for a certainty that should put an end to their religious doubt and substitute the gnostic for the agnostic. It does not greatly avail if men do come to conceive of God as near, instead of far off in the upper heavens, while still devoid of the inner sensitivity required to *feel* His Presence. A cursory glance to-day at the ways of men is enough to show that this Presence is but dimly apprehended, and that much too seldom to produce a steady, sustained effect.

Not from its own heart, but from that of the Orient, did religion come to the Occident. It is still coming—and to come. What is that vital need for which uninitiated Christians everywhere are still waiting, quite unmindful of the transforming effect of its realisation? It is naught else than the God-consciousness which comes with beautiful assurance when the indwelling Self is found!

Jesus is reported as quoting approvingly this significant phrase from the Jewish scriptures: "I said, Ye are gods"; and adding to it the following: "If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, etc. . . ." (John x. 34, 35). Plainly, the "word of God" should be interpreted not as a spoken or written transmission of thought, nor as any influence objectively communicated, for such were commonly received by frequenters of the synagogues and

never had such an effect as Jesus indicated. The import that it must have is much profounder—that which is herein termed God-consciousness—and the quotation may properly be put thus: "If he called them gods, unto whom the God-consciousness came." The quotation clearly refers to a subjective activity—a quickening of the mind by the spiritual Self (Atmá).

In the light of this quotation in John's Gospel, the Hindu's familiar apothegm: "That art thou," should be regarded with sympathetic consideration by Christians generally; but is it so regarded? An Emerson intuitively sees it as a truism, and his followers are increasing, but what says the Christian Church or, rather, those who prescribe what it shall teach? They look upon it, or would have their communicants look upon it, as the acme of presumption! Naturally, they cannot tolerate the teaching that each human heart has its God somewhere within its own depths, for would not this indicate that their claim of spiritual authority for the Church might justly be called fallacious?

"The sinking of the human in the Divine, or the Divine in the human, is utter nonsense," said a Methodist clergyman once to the writer of these lines. Why he made the assertion so ineptly was never ascertained, but his ingrained Calvinism doubtless had much to do with it. Once human, always human—this appears to have been the logic of the genial minister's attitude, and he would further assert that the Divine and the human cannot be two conditions of one root-self. Just here it is that the Hindu conception reveals itself as more vitally Christian than current Christianity. It grasps the true meaning of such significant utterances as this: "I and my Father are one" (John x. 30), applying it in the way than an entity worthy to be called God would undoubtedly choose to have it applied, instead of limiting its meaning to a single personage who lived about nineteen centuries ago. It is quite reasonable to suppose that there would have been no stones thrown at the author of this startling utterance recorded

in John's Gospel, if those who heard it had been able to interpret aright and to discriminate between the mundane, phenomenal man and the invisible, spiritual subjectivity, the "I," which is ever urging man Godward whenever it has a chance to make itself felt.

The pertinent question for us now is: Why do not more men of the present day discriminate as they should be able to, after all the opportunities for dispelling ignorance that the centuries have developed? Why do they not see that the finding of God in the Self—which waits to be claimed—is far and away the most feasible and happy use that it is possible to make of their minds, instead of becoming enslaved by a horde of desires that keep them estranged from their own Best?

That is a refreshingly outspoken article on "Christian, Greek, or Goth?" (in *The Hibbert Journal*, vol. iii., No. 3). One's attention is challenged by a number of timely confessions, for example, this: "The Christian ideal of the 'spiritual' man was one in accordance with which the northern nations were as little able, ultimately, to govern their lives as the peoples of the South." Is it, after all, a fact that, with the exception of a very small minority of the more delicately organised individuals, Occidental peoples of the present era are *constitutionally* unable to live in conformity with the ideals exemplified by Christ? Is it true that self-abnegation, purity of heart and spiritual detachment are commonly regarded with mere lip-service in Christendom, while for their actual realisation one must look to the Hindus? There are keen observers who cannot, if they would, answer the latter question otherwise than in the affirmative, it being understood that they would make no sweeping assertion, but simply state what appears to be the case with much the larger proportion of so-called Christians. The former question is one of absorbing interest and, among those who are most competent to decide it, there is likely to be irreconcilable difference of opinion. Certain it is that the moderns are still so captivated with the externals of life, and the sensuous pleasures which the latter-day sciences and arts

have brought within easy reach, that spiritual concerns have largely been lost to view and become more and more like unrealities. Highly probable it is that Western peoples have not yet reached the period of the soul's maturity and, if this be so, it should not seem strange that the great majority to-day are constitutionally unable to conform their lives to Christ's ideals. Maturity of soul cannot be attained except as body and mind are nourished ascetically, that is, according to the principle that all appetence should be strictly limited to the highest physical and spiritual needs, and nowise allowed to run into indulgence. As long as the many take delight in the "natural man," the many will surely fail to find the best that the human race inherits. As long as men crave only new sensations, and regard simplicity of life as primitively instead of superlatively rational, maturity of soul must, with them, be postponed indefinitely, and the search for God be regarded as illusive.

The value of the Hindu God-idea to Occidental minds consists in this, that it will enable them to say: My Atmá (spiritual self) and the Universal Self are one—and say it understandingly. When they succeed in proving it, they will experience the true Christian initiation and see that their Atmás are no more "sons" of God than sparks are sons of the fire whence they emanate. The humanistic symbols "father" and "son" cannot suffice for such as have persisted in penetrating to the heart of religion and caught sight of what is there. No adequate symbol exists wherewith to name this, but the way to the appreciation thereof lies through mysticism of a kind that can give the best of evidence for its glad tidings of the Divine Self incarnate. To the Hindu, mysticism is the timeless, formless fane wherein one may receive direct evidence of inexpressibly sacred and convincing import—evidence such as could not be communicated by the most excellent and sympathetic of fathers to the most receptive and trustful of sons. In short, it is naught else than that internal evidence which exists only in the intimate relation between Subject and Object.

It is a perfectly fair presumption that the half-developed religious sense of Occidental peoples is responsible for their prevailing aversion to mysticism, asceticism, and orientalism. But was not their nominal Lord steeped in these ideas? Were not his sayings highly idealistic—far removed from their hard, narrow dogmatism that is incapable, to this day, of correctly explaining those mystical words of his: "The kingdom of God is within you"? The great majority of so-called Christians have habitually acted as though their nominal Lord never spoke those words, but rather the following: The kingdom of God is within *me*—me alone. And when sincere followers of Christ's ideals have insisted upon the complete scope of the text as it stands, giving it universal application, they have even been denied the Christian name! Centuries before Jesus lived, Hindu religious teachers were expressing the same thought as this text contains, and they did not fail to see and appreciate the irrefutable logic of it, which is that the King is within the "kingdom," and not an absentee.

Now, what better can one do to bring home this vital and saving truth to his understanding than to let it grip the most intimate and realistic of all intimacies, namely, that which is indicated by "the Self"? There are those who will deny that they have a spirit or a soul, but who can deny that he has —or rather *is*—a self? In the same scale with consciousness of this self—but much higher—is the consciousness of "the Self," according to Hindu thinking. So limited are the powers and ideals of this immature self, by reason of its ignorance, that it has great difficulty in conceiving such a possibility as the attaining of the consciousness of "the Self." But as soon as one ascends in the scale high enough to reach the supposed impassable gap between this human and that Divine, not the least break can be found. The scale is continuous, however lengthy and trying.

The latter-day spread of the belief in the immanence, as of more pressing importance than the belief in the transcendence

of God, has prepared the way for the current diffusion of Buddhistic, Vedantic, and Theosophical ideas among Western peoples. Many thousands of the more open-minded Christians and Agnostics are finding that these newly reflected rays of orientalism have more power to quicken their religious aspirations than anything that has demanded their attention since that youthful time when the celestial beauty of the Sermon on the Mount first won their hearts. Can there be any doubt as to the threefold reason? Is it not that ecclesiastical Christianism is outgrown and now seems puerile to them? Is it not that these mature religious conceptions for the most part supplement and reinforce the words actually spoken by Jesus? Above all, is it not that in these conceptions is boldly prefigured the God-becoming of man's higher self?

If the churchmen knew more about the silent progress of that new cosmopolitan race of religiously insulated thinkers whose first aim is to realise the Divine Self, what valid objection could they make? The nearest approach to such an objection would probably consist in a general denial that there can be aught of religious value in any form of selfism. However it may be with the Oriental mind, the habit of thought among Westerners is such as to lead them to get *away from self* when religious sustenance is sought—to leave it in the basement of their existence and ascend skyward. Furthermore, to follow any such ideal of self-sufficiency would almost inevitably lead to an individualism so extreme that society would lose its cohesion and disintegrate. Such would be the criticism of the churchmen.

The answer to this is that the Occidental mind, generally speaking, fails to understand the biune (two-in-one) self, and just because it has never quite penetrated to the heart of religion. It is one of the leading conceptions of Hinduism that Spirit can become manifested only through and by means of the contrasts and oppositions of non-spirit. In order to obtain a satisfactory knowledge of what he should be, man must first have an extensive knowledge of what he should

not be. Observation shows that he has two distinct tendencies of will, one of which improves his conduct while the other does not; and, in the last analysis, it becomes clear that he is a compound of Divine Self and undivine self. There is no better evidence of this than the transformation of the perverse sinner into the steadfast saint—not a rare occurrence. If just this contrariety in man's biune nature were not a fact, there could be no such exaltations of religious consciousness and no such grandeur of moral character as have been witnessed all through the centuries in spite of the persistent appeals of the lower self. There can be no room for doubt as to what selfism is. It shows itself very clearly when one asserts, in grunting monotone, self for self's sake, and its every activity is guided by a method of exclusion. Contrasting sharply with this too prevalent vogue is that deep-reaching habit of self-appreciation which in due season intensifies into self-reverence and eventually heralds the revelation of the Divine Self. Under the latter rule of endeavour one instinctively renounces nearly everything which formerly—under the rule of self for self's sake—was desired. Self-denial instead of self-indulgence, breadth of vision instead of narrowness, idealism instead of sensism—these are convincing differences, and due consideration of them should give the quietus to that imputation, born of ignorance, which characterises the holiest of aims as "making a god of self."

Brushing aside the claims of tradition, superstition, and ecclesiasticism, it will be seen that every opprobrious name that men have applied to personified evil really pertains to nothing but the undivine self. *It* is the only Satan, the only Ahriman, the only Beelzebub that man has ever known or can know. It is doomed by the logic of development (involutional development) to remain a worldling and an agnostic tethered to sensism. Notwithstanding all this, its mission is of the utmost importance, because, without its opposition and persistent gravitational pull, the Divine Self could not obtain the experience whereby it comes to know and to demonstrate

its divinity. An unmanifested, undemonstrated, unproven "Divine" is of no interest whatever—even to itself.

Regarding the objection to the ideal of self-sufficiency, that is easily disposed of by ascertaining what goal is sought by this or that individualist. If isolation is desired in order to come nearer to the realisation of the Divine Self—and this is often the case—it would be sacrilege to allow the claims of society to prevent the detachment. The only self-sufficiency which is open to criticism is that which elevates the lower self, with its conceits and its vanities, while nursing the fond belief that one's worth consists in what one possesses.

The limits of this article do not permit such an extended and painstaking analysis as the subject deserves, but enough has been said to suggest the probability that the Hindu convictions regarding "the Self" are just what the Occident needs and must appropriate if it is to see through life's falsities and lay hold of its spiritual realities. If the term Christian must be retained, let it be preserved in a form that will serve the purpose of doing away with its puerile ecclesiasticism—namely, Neo-Christian. And it would be well to lay special stress upon the "new birth," which is not merely regeneration in the old-time sense, but a birth into a new and plenary consciousness of one's own Seity. Seity is the power of infinite self-manifestation, man's being the same essentially as God's. The difference probably is that God has a complete consciousness of the possession, while man can only acquire it through a very gradual process of outer and inner (dualistic) development. Every religion worthy to be called eternal must in its heart acknowledge this God-making—to be precise, the making of the conditions for God-consciousness—as its fundamental reason for being.

The latter-day influx of orientalism among us is preparing the way for a fusion of its purer elements with Western individualism, and the outcome that may be looked for is the *Religion of the Divine Self*—the most hopeful and rational

of all methods for overcoming the sway of the senses with the sway of the Spirit.

The Religion of the Divine Self is sure to make its way, because it will, while upholding individualism, place it firmly upon a higher basis having nothing in common with selfish motives; declare that every normally developed soul has the latent power to win and *must* win its own freedom, especially the freedom from the control of the "natural man," also prove its own right to membership among the commonalty, if not the nobility, of the immortals; and, lastly, because it will convincingly foretoken the glorified home-coming of man's long-estranged consciousness to that heaven in the heart which is his and God's alike!

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PIERRE GASSENDI AND THE ATOMS:

AN EPISODE IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND EARLY SCIENCE.

By JOHN MASSON, M.A., LL.D.

In the record of human progress few things are more saddening than the hostility of the Church towards science in its struggling beginnings. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the theologians and the philosophers leagued themselves together to stifle it. In the year 1592, when Galileo dropped heavy bodies of unequal weight from the leaning tower of Pisa in order to disprove the doctrine of the Aristotelians that bodies fall with velocity proportional to their weight, the physicists and astronomers of the cloister stood by and saw the more and the less weighty masses both strike the ground at the same moment. But so far were they from being convinced that they ascribed the result to some unknown cause, and decided that Aristotle was still in the right and the facts of nature in the wrong. Nay, such bitter hatred did Galileo rouse by this appeal to experiment that he was compelled to leave Pisa. He had committed the crime of demonstrating the falsehood of one dogma of the Scholastic physics! These dogmas, based on passages of Aristotle or verses of Scripture, probably misinterpreted, were sanctioned by the Church, and no destructive criticism might approach them.

And yet, how very helpless was that Scholastic philosophy in explaining any of the phenomena of nature! Take, for

instance, fire. Francis of Toledo tells us that "the substantial form of fire is an active principle by which fire, with heat as its instrument, produces fire." Again, calling to mind that other things than fire at times produce fire, he goes on to prove that "fire can result from all the substantial forms capable of producing it, in air, in water, or in anything else."[1] Again, as we shall see, all changes in substances—heat, cold, hardness, softness—were assumed to be caused by the entrance or departure of "Accidental Forms." The non-professional learned men, those whose tendency was towards mysticism or magic, a very large class in those days, felt the need of something deeper, of some more genuine explanation of the phenomena of matter than these abstractions of the learned Schoolmen. So they invented for themselves the doctrine of elemental spirits, little elves who could effect the changes which take place in matter. Thus Paracelsus, followed by our countryman Robert Fludd, attributes the phenomena of liquids to the nymphs, of air to the sylphs, of earth to the pygmies, and of fire to the salamanders. The action of these little demons was at least something possible and comprehensible to the mind: so long as one did not inquire further, it satisfied better as an explanation than to say, as the Schoolmen did, that given substances had the power of attracting, repelling, expanding, or contracting simply because these substances possessed "Attractive," "Repulsive," "Expansive," or "Contractive Faculties." In the burlesque picture of an examination for admission to the degree of doctor of medicine with which Molière concludes the *Malade Imaginaire*, the candidate, when asked to state "the cause and reason why opium produces sleep," answers triumphantly that it is because it has a "dormitive faculty":

> "Quia est in eo Virtus dormitiva,
> Cujus est natura Sensus assoupire."

Leibnitz complains bitterly of the hopelessness of such explanations: it is, he says, "as if watches were to indicate the time of

[1] Quoted by Professor Latta, *Monadology of Leibnitz*, p. 157.

day by a certain *horodeictic faculty* without needing wheels, or as if mills were to crush the grain by a *fractive faculty*, without needing anything resembling mill-stones."[1] Along this road no progress could ever be made. Disgusted with the hypothesis of "Occult Qualities," justly so named, men like Van Helmont and Agrippa of Nettesheim went so far as to assume countless "Plastic Intelligences," "Archei," spirits which watched over the living creature from the embryo to its full development. No wonder that Leibnitz complains of such men as believing that "God everywhere makes use of certain vicarious little deities that He may not be compelled always Himself to act miraculously."[2]

Between the Schoolmen and the believers in magic the door of knowledge seemed closed for ever. But the former were perhaps the more hopeless of the two. Not only would they not enter in themselves, but they were determined to allow none to enter.

In the same year in which Galileo had to leave Pisa, there was born of a peasant family in Provence one who was destined to follow in Galileo's steps and to do much to encourage the direct study of nature by observation and experiment, and thus destroy the old Scholastic physics. Though the world owes so much to Gassendi; though he, along with Bacon and Descartes, played so great a part in delivering men from the tyranny of Scholasticism; though his revival of Epicurus's atomic theory had so weighty and fruitful an influence over the great physicists of the generation who followed him, and in particular over Newton and Boyle, it is strange that he should be so little known in England.

Pierre Gassend or Gassendi was born near Digne, in Provence, in the year 1592. At school in Digne he composed comedies in prose mixed with verse, which his fellow-scholars used to act in carnival time. He studied at Aix, in 1615 became Doctor of Theology, and shortly after took orders as a priest. Brilliant talents, combined with a genial tempera-

[1] *New Essays.* [2] *Antibarbarus Physicus* (Gerhardt, vol. vii.).

ment which won him influential friends, made his career from the very first a smooth one. In 1616 he received invitations to two chairs at Aix, that of divinity and that of philosophy; he accepted the latter, and, after this, devoted himself chiefly to philosophy, physics, and astronomy, the last two being his favourite studies. For six years he taught the accepted doctrines of Scholasticism with great applause, but he soon found that these offered to thought not an open but a closed door; sickened with the utter unreality of the system, he rejected it in disgust. During his last year at Aix he gave out theses for disputations both for and against Aristotle. Gassendi's gifts were soon discerned by two of the most important personages in Aix, both well-known men in their day, whose intimate friend he became. One was Nicolas de Peiresc, a counsellor of the Parliament of Aix, the Mæcenas of his time in France; the other was Joseph Gautier, Prior of La Valette, a distinguished astronomer and mathematician. Wishing to procure him leisure, they persuaded him to take orders, and procured for him in 1622 a canonry in the cathedral of Digne. He now gave up his chair. The first book he wrote was against the Schoolmen or Aristotelians, under the title *Paradoxical Dissertations against the Aristotelians, in which the principal foundations of the whole Peripatetic Doctrine are shattered.* Of this work two books were printed at Grenoble in 1624. The book was a keen and searching examination of the methods of the Scholastics, enlivened both by humour and by cutting sarcasm. This bold attack on received beliefs produced a great sensation.

In the same year Sieur Jean Bitaud announced his intention to dispute in public at Paris "against the doctrine of Aristotle concerning Elements and Substantial Forms." The Parliament of Paris was appealed to by the Faculty of Theology, and in September issued a decree forbidding the disputation, ordering the disputant and his supporters to leave Paris within twenty-four hours, and forbidding them to remain or to teach in any city of the realm. Further, it is proclaimed

"that *on pain of death* no person should either hold or teach any doctrine opposed to Aristotle."[1] This decree was renewed from time to time. By order of the King, the University of Angers in 1675 and the University of Caen in 1677 forbade any teaching opposed to Aristotle. The religious communities followed suit. In 1678 the Oratorians, in union with the Jesuits, issued a proclamation, forbidding lecturers on physics in colleges to depart from the physics or principles of physics of Aristotle. This proclamation also laid down certain doctrines which must be taught in physics. The following are the first three:—

"It is necessary to teach (*L'on doit enseigner*): 1. That actual extension does not belong to the essence of matter. 2. That in every natural body there is a substantial form really distinct from matter. 3. That there are real and absolute accidents, inherent in their subject, really distinct from every other substance, and which may by supernatural power exist apart from any subject."[2]

At the urgent advice of his friends, Gassendi burned the remaining books of his work.

In the first of the two books published he criticises Aristotelianism in general: the second deals with the Scholastic logic, and also attacks the Aristotelian theory of categories. Gassendi here adopts the extreme position that logic is neither necessary nor useful. In the remaining books, of which he gives an abstract in the preface, he discussed the Scholastic physics, metaphysics, and ethics. The modern disciples of Aristotle, Gassendi complains, are so enslaved to their master that they have come utterly to distrust their own reason, and would rather err with him than attain to truth by following other guides. Their dialectic professes to teach the art of reasoning correctly; in reality it does not aim at attaining truth, but merely at vanquishing an opponent and sustaining

[1] Charles Jourdain, *Histoire de l'Université de Paris*, vol. i. p. 195.

[2] *De Varia Aristotelis Fortuna in Academia Parisiensi*, by Jean de Launoy, 1656, p. 76.

theses on problems which are useless and insoluble. Hence their insufferable subtleties and interminable debates. They are like dogs which never run straight on, but are ever rushing off to the right hand or the left, and running to and fro over the same ground. The Schoolmen pretend that they are nothing less than slaves and are free to chose whether they shall be Nominalists or Realists, Thomists or Scotists. Yes, says Gassendi, they are indeed as free as a caged bird which can move wherever it likes—*within its cage*. Their main philosophic ideas he calls "the workhouses" (*ergastula*), or, as we should say, "the treadmills of the Peripatetic prison." Further, they neglect mathematics, and import into physics a host of theological questions. In a word, they have no thorough knowledge of Nature. The "Nature" which they study in the schools is something totally different from the actual world without. In its presence they grope and are bewildered, since they have no notion of experiment or observation, and are like persons who have been brought up in the woods and are suddenly brought into the midst of a great and beautiful city. Gassendi specially attacks the Aristotelian logic on two grounds: firstly, logic is profitless for exact knowledge, because "to know" means to know the causes of things, and the causes of things cannot be known by means of the syllogism; secondly, the syllogism, granting in its conclusion only what is already in the premises, instead of being a true demonstration, is in reality only a repetition. (In his system of philosophy, which appeared just after his death, Gassendi retracts both these charges; even Induction, he says, has its power of proof only by virtue of being essentially a syllogism.) A certain scepticism is apparent in the book; there is no such thing as knowledge, he asserts; we can only affirm what appears to us, not what is; the doctrines of all the sciences, physics, medicine, metaphysics, ethics, are but conjectural; knowledge is not meant for man, but only opinion—else why need God have revealed to us the truths of religion?

The book was a severe and scornful attack, far more upon

the Schoolmen than upon Aristotle. Gassendi apologises for its tone by saying that it is difficult to treat such a subject and not write a satire. Scholasticism, indeed, held the minds of men in abject slavery; the learned would not enter in at the gate of truth themselves, and had choked the entrance with their piled-up volumes of sophistry. The commentary on Aristotle's logic to which Gassendi refers so pathetically, a commentary which was in two great folios and needed two more to complete it, was a type of the studies of the time. So little did the men of the schools see themselves as they truly were that they could afford to jest excellently on the score that they were more in earnest about finding the truth of the things themselves than about the names for them. "Non curamus, inquiunt, de *verbibus* sed de *sensis*" (as if they said, "Philosophy is superior to Grammar—as well as to common sense"). . . . "Jactare non erubescunt Soloecismos esse laudes et gemmas philosophorum." No wonder that Gassendi waxes bitter over these sayings. He saw that the jargon without which they refused to discuss any subject was the death of true thinking. We cannot help asking, what would Aristotle have said, could he have known of the malice, the injustice, the hatred of truth, the crimes against common sense to be perpetrated by his followers in his name? Doubtless most of them knew him only through a commentary, based probably upon a translation, and, even with the Greek before them, they had a veil over their eyes as they read.

Even in this his earliest work, Gassendi, in his preface, boldly owns his allegiance to Epicurus in ethics; he promises to deal with this subject in his concluding book. If we consider that Aristotle was identified with the orthodox theology, and Epicurus with atheism, we can understand why, even without the special decree of Parliament, Gassendi's friends advised the holocaust. The book aroused great interest, partly hostile and partly friendly. Gassendi's tact and faculty for affairs helped to secure for him a still higher appointment at Digne, that of *prévôt* or dean of the chapter.

He now went up to Paris, and devoted his energies chiefly to astronomy and physics. In Paris, now and later, he formed an intimate friendship with the sceptical La Mothe le Vayer, with the learned Jesuit Mersenne, the lifelong friend of Descartes, with Hobbes, whose doctrines he strongly sympathised with, and with Pascal, and also was on friendly terms with Descartes. In 1631 he was successful in making observations of the transit of Mercury, which Kepler had predicted in 1627, this being the first observation of the passage of a planet across the sun.[1] In 1642 he distinguished himself in a philosophical controversy with Descartes. In 1645 he was appointed Professor of Mathematics in the Collège Royal at Paris: here, however, he lectured principally on astronomy. Among pupils whom he instructed in philosophy in private about this time was the young Molière.

In 1649 he published his great work on Epicureanism, an elaborate commentary on the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius, a book which Diogenes devotes entirely to Epicurus.[2] As Epicurus's system included logic, science, ethics, and theology, so Gassendi thinks right to intermingle with his commentary dissertations on the most important questions not only in physics, astronomy, and even medicine, but in the philosophy and theology of his time. Probably no other such commentary ever was written. A mere hasty glance into the work might seem to justify Gassendi's fear, expressed in the preface, that readers, on first opening his book, "might think they had found their way into Chaos." In reality nothing can be further from the truth. Thanks to the very complete index and contents, everything can be found with ease in its proper place.

It was not merely Epicurus's physics which Gassendi approved. He found himself also in agreement with his logic and his psychology. Even Epicurus's ethics seemed to him more in

[1] One of the large craters in the moon is named after Gassendi.

[2] *Animadversiones in Decimum Librum Diogenis Laertii*; reprinted in 1658, 1659, 1660, 1675—this last in two large folios of 611 and 458 pages with double column, besides contents and index.

harmony with human nature than those of Plato or Aristotle. Thus Gassendi conceived the idea of making Epicureanism the basis of a new philosophical system.[1] In doing this he found it necessary, on the one hand, to correct the errors of Epicurus in physics by recent discoveries; and, on the other, to remove from it those doctrines which jarred with Christian theology.

Men of science in Gassendi's generation were sick of Aristotle—more correctly, of the Aristotelians who imitated Aristotle's faults but not his excellencies. The constant search for final causes in physics had made men indifferent and careless as to verifying experiment and patiently interrogating the facts again and again. Bacon had already expressed in his *Novum Organum*—that is to say, the "New Mode of Inquiry," the old one being that of Aristotle—his preference for the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus over the systems of Plato and Aristotle, because the former "assign the causes of particular things to the necessity of matter without any intermixture of final causes," and therefore "their natural philosophy is more solid and went deeper into nature than the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato." Gassendi saw eye to eye with Bacon here. Both of them had realised that the phenomena of nature were to be explained solely by the inquiry into secondary causes, namely, the mechanical laws which govern the motions of the ultimate particles of matter. Gassendi was doubtless first drawn to Epicurean physics because its method was to seek for the causes of natural phenomena strictly within the limits of nature itself. Himself both a physicist and a scholar thoroughly equipped, he realised the immense value of Epicurus's atomic theory, expounded it in the most clear and lucid manner, and applied it in solving the scientific problems of his time. No mere scholar could have done the work. It was especially through his brief but admirable compendium, *Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri*,[2] that the atomic theory of Epicurus became widely

[1] *His Syntagma Philosophicum*, published after his death in 1658.

[2] Published in 1649; reprinted in 1658, 1659, 1684, 1728.

known in Gassendi's day, and influenced men of science all over Europe.

It must be clearly understood that Gassendi by no means intended his revival of atomism as a means of covert attack on Theism. Such a charge was indeed brought against him by the Jesuit, Peter Cazraeus, a mathematician of some note and rector of a Jesuit college, who published three letters criticising Gassendi's treatise on the communication of motion, and especially his remarks on the movement of the earth, in agreement with Galileo; but he also attacked Gassendi's teaching on many other points as dangerous to religion. We can only touch on the controversy. Gassendi's long reply, with its elaborate and somewhat anxious courtesies, shows that he knew the serious nature of the attack upon himself as a dignitary of the Church: the one voice raised against himself would soon arouse the howls of the pack behind. As we follow the controversy between the monk and the dexterous and subtle man of science, the curtain between us and these seventeenth-century controversies which seem so remote drops away. Change the terminology a little, and the problems of that time are, after all, not so very different from those of our own day—perhaps in their own way more profound. Then as now the mystery of the bond between matter and spirit drew on the eager explorer.

Among other things, Cazraeus attacked the proposition that the atoms have no secondary qualities, such as heat, cold, colour, etc., as a doctrine hostile to religion on one very vital point. "If all the changes producing heat, cold, colour, scent, taste, and other qualities are nothing but motions of infinitely small atoms in space, then the Accidental Forms (*Formæ Accidentales*) are done away, and it is far more difficult for them to be conceived of or to exist apart from all Substance. What then is to become of the sacred mysteries of our religion?" (It was the doctrine of Scholasticism, recognised by the Church, that the qualities of matter, heat, whiteness, fragrance, and so on, are metaphysical entities having a real existence, entitled "Accidental Forms"; and it was held that these

entities might even exist—as, for example, "whiteness"—"by supernatural power apart from the subject.") In the hands of the theologians the doctrine of Accidental Forms played an important part, as explaining the miraculous change undergone by bread and wine in the Mass. It was held that the substance of the bread and wine was removed in the Eucharist, and the "Accidentals" alone of each remained. We need not wonder if no teaching was tolerated which could in any way undermine the implicit faith in that mighty miracle which the simplest parish priest had the power to work every Sunday, at the solemn moment when the bell tinkled and he raised the Host, and God came down in visible form before human eyes! One thinks of the dream of Peiresc shortly before his death, which Gassendi relates in his friend's life: how Peiresc fancied himself to be attending Mass, when suddenly the roof of the chapel fell in, and at the first alarm the officiating priest was in the act of flying panic-stricken, when Peiresc called to him, "*You afraid when you hold God in your hands!*"

Gassendi dexterously evades this objection, as also the Jesuit father's equally serious charge that, "if Birth and Death are nothing but the local motions of the atoms, 'tis all over with the doctrine of Substantial Forms!" ("Conclamatum est de Formis Substantialibus!") The Scholastics, be it remembered, identified the Immortal Soul with the "Substantial Form of a man." It is little wonder if men felt that the question was of something more than logic, and that great realities hung upon it.

Gassendi concludes by saying:—"Finally, whatever Holy Church prescribes, that I am prepared to believe, and to hold not only Epicurus and Democritus, but even Aristotle and Plato and all other philosophers, of no account whenever they propound anything hostile to religion, and I am prepared to count even the light of reason as nothing in comparison with the light of faith, and, in particular, as to the possibility of the existence of Substance without Accidents or Accidents without Substance [as the Aristotelians asserted], to admit that God

can do even what is unthinkable by us, and that the measure of His action is nothing less than His infinite power."

Evidently Gassendi's piety was quite beyond suspicion.

Could such a man as Gassendi ever have believed in the existence of real accidents? Two opinions may be held regarding the good faith of such a passage as that just quoted. It does not follow that the more apparent opinion is the true one. In Gassendi's time, and for some centuries before him, many men believed, and some dared to say, that there was such a thing as "Twofold Truth," namely, that two doctrines which were mutually contradictory might both be true, one in philosophy and the other in theology.[1] The doctrine was expressly condemned by the Synod which met at Paris in 1277. "They pretend that there are things true according to philosophy, yet not true according to faith, as if there were two opposite truths." The Pope, by a special bull, gave orders to the Bishop of Paris to seek out and punish those holding such a belief. The doctrine was Averroistic, and was vehemently attacked by Raymond Lully, who maintained that, if Christian dogmas were absurd in the eyes of reason and impossible to be understood, it was not possible that they should be true in any sense.

Space will not allow us to tell how Gassendi demolished the alchemists, Rosicrucians, and "judicial astrologers" of his day. The miracles of his own Church he prudently let alone. The sincerity of his profession of belief has been gravely questioned—on the whole, we believe, very unjustly. We cannot doubt that Epicurus's practical atheism was genuinely repellent to his mind. He defends, at length, his belief in Immortality and in Providence in various chapters, each headed *Contra Epicurum.* When, after twenty-two of the hundred sections of his *Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri,* Gassendi adds a *Refutatur* with a reference to the section of his longer work on Epicurus where the doctrine in question is combated, doubtless he has an eye on the Inquisition, and on charges which the reviver and defender of Epicurus's

[1] *Averroès et l'Averroïsme,* by Ernest Renan, 1861, pp. 275 and 259.

system might well expect. The burning of Bruno at Rome in 1600, and of Vanini at Toulouse in 1619, were still fresh in men's minds. In 1642, only seven years before Gassendi's great book on Epicureanism was published, had not Galileo died in prison, a victim to the bitter enmity of the Jesuits? Did Gassendi resolve that, even at a certain cost of sincerity, he should not be made a victim until he had done his work? Not all men of science are gifted with the intrepidity of Copernicus—"the man whose soul was free," as Kepler calls him.

It can hardly be maintained that Gassendi was sincere in his references to Copernicus. The Church had made it plain that no one must dare, on severest penalty, to defend him. Gassendi had much to lose; he was a man in high place, a professor in the University of Paris and a dignitary of the Church. In his reply to Cazraeus he affirms that the doctrine of Copernicus has never yet been expressly condemned by the Church, and that the sentence against Galileo was passed only by a Congregation of Cardinals, and has not the authority of a general pontifical decree. Should a decree of the latter kind be passed, he is prepared, he says, "at once to embrace it absolutely and to receive it, as the saying goes, with the most blind obedience." One hopes that these words are ironical: to us they can appear nothing but effrontery.

Gassendi died in his sixty-third year. "He did not fall a victim to theology because he was destined to fall a victim to medicine," says Lange. Having fallen ill of a fever, he was bled fourteen times, and before his death he said that his over-submissiveness to his physicians had cut short his life. He had been fond, too, when with his friends, of jesting about the physicians of his day and their methods! Was Boileau thinking of the manner of Gassendi's death when, in 1674, there being a movement to procure from the French Parliament an official condemnation of the philosophy of Descartes, he composed his famous "Burlesque Decree in support of the doctrine of Aristotle, pronounced in the High Court of Parnassus in favour of the Masters of Arts, Physicians, and

Professors of the University of Stagyra in the land of Chimeras?" The Faculty of Medicine complain that "one unknown, named Reason, . . . has intermeddled in curing and has, actually and in fact, cured" many cases of fever, both intermittent and continuous, "by means of quinine and other drugs, unknown to the said Aristotle and his predecessor Hippocrates, and this without bleeding, purging and evacuation—a course which is not only irregular, but wrongful and contrary to right use, the said Reason never having been admitted a member of the said Faculty." The Court in reply "forbids Reason and his adherents for time coming to cure fever by drugs not approved by the ancients, and, in cases of irregular cures by these drugs, permits doctors of the said Faculty to restore the patients by the use of their ordinary medicines to the state of fever in which they were before, so that they may be treated according to the rules, and, if they do not recover, may at least be conducted to the other world sufficiently purged and evacuated." The jesting is bitter indeed, but what wonder?

Various traits of Gassendi's character recall Epicurus. He was a man of great natural kindness and generosity, and was greatly loved, not only by his many friends, but by all who knew him. When he visited Digne, the people would leave their shops and their work in order to welcome him: he had friends in all ranks: all were proud of his renown: throughout Provence he was called "the holy priest." He was a man of astonishing industry: he rose regularly at three or four, and spent over twelve hours a day in study. We are further reminded of Epicurus by his extraordinary temperance, bordering on asceticism: "his life," we are told, "was more austere than that of the anchorets"; he never drank wine and seldom ate meat. He was a man of singularly calm and even temper: "nothing could disturb him, never did he fall into a passion; he seemed prepared for everything, whether good or bad." As in Epicurus, so in Gassendi there seems to have been no touch of self-indulgence: his pleasures were entirely those of the intellect and of friendship. Doubtless he hardly knew

what the temptations of ordinary men were, and realised no more than Epicurus did the dangers of the doctrine of Pleasure. May we say that the inconsistency in his system, due to his attempt to adapt together Epicureanism and Christianity, is reflected in the contradictions of his own life?—the daring thinker, the tireless, self-denying worker side by side with the opportunist who retracts his profound convictions from considerations of place and safety. Compared with him, Epicurus was consistent. Gassendi's temperament, in which the intellectual easily dominated, excluding violent passions and most temptations, his career of unbroken success, and his entire absorption in research may have hindered him from grasping with any profound conviction the more inner and organic truths of Christianity, and from realising how essential is the antagonism between them and utilitarian ethics.

Epicurus's theory of atoms, assimilated and revived by Gassendi, did more than merely put to flight the "Occult Qualities" and the Elves. It was of invaluable service to European science struggling for its birth. According to it, all changes in matter take place "mechanically," solely "by contact and preceding motion," or, according to Leibnitz, "in a manner which is intelligible." On no other lines could the sciences make progress.

What, then, is the exact place of the atoms in Gassendi's system? The atoms, he holds, are self-moving, and are the cause of the movements of all bodies. God, in creating them, has implanted in them the internal energy of motion which we call gravity, and He is ever renewing it. They are never at repose, always moving at the same speed, even when combined in matter. Their motion is the source of the energy in the world.

Gassendi insists that gravity appears to be not so much a quality existing in the atoms and in all bodies as a force imparted to them from the magnetic attraction of the earth.

Epicurus held that the unceasing movement of the atoms is innate in them from all eternity. Gassendi rejects this notion; repeatedly and emphatically he asserts that this

inherent capacity of motion has been bestowed on them at the beginning of the world by God; the atoms, he says, must not be considered as the Primary Cause, although they may be held the first or most remote among Secondary Causes. It is not surprising that his enemies (as does also Lange) viewed him as having thus set the machine of the world going by a Divine hand merely as a compliment to theology, intended to disguise the fact that he leaves God out of his system.

The Scholastics regarded Matter as vile and mean in comparison with Form; to them Matter was a thing absolutely passive, which acquired a real existence only through Form. Thus a modern Scholastic like Father Harper writes: "Primordial Matter has a being so attenuated as to be absolutely incapable of existing apart from some Form; consequently, without the Form, no Matter." But Matter was destined to have its revenge. Gassendi's atomic theory seemed completely to reverse the relation. With a slight change of wording, Lucretius's lines expressed the new standpoint:

"Natura videtur
Ipsa sua per se sponte omnia dis agere expers."

"*Matter* is seen to do all things spontaneously, of herself, *without the Forms.*" Thus Gassendi says: "The Forms come and go, spring into being and pass away; . . . but meanwhile matter itself remains uncorrupted and older than all things which are made, no less in bulk than it was in the beginning, and, as it existed before all the forms, so is it joined to them and survives them." In his chapter "On the Birth and Decay of Things," Gassendi sets out to prove that the generation and decay of all things takes place, not by the addition or loss of some new "Substance" called "a Form," but by the union or separation or fresh arrangement of the atoms. Forcibly he criticises the Scholastic theory of a twofold power possessed by Matter in respect to Form, the "eductive potency" enabling Matter to "educe" Form from itself, and the "receptive potency" enabling it to take on the Form thus educed. Form, he says, can no more be educed from Matter, which, the

Scholastics hold, is distinct from Form and does not actually possess it, than can gold pieces be drawn from a purse where they are not. Or is the Form to borrow its energy from the qualities of Matter which are also educed, or from the Efficient Cause, which again owes its energies to the Form? "The difficulty will always return: How can Matter supply to the Form the energy which Matter itself does not possess?"[1]

On several counts Gassendi's objections appear unanswerable. In the conflict of atoms *versus* Forms, had then the Forms been completely routed, never to reappear on the field?

We must first ask, What really was the doctrine of Substantial Forms? We can only touch on it in the briefest way. It must be looked at, not as perverted and debased by the Scholastics, but in its essential meaning as an attempt of great minds to understand the world we live in, so full of thronging life, with its endless variety both of organisms and of inorganic bodies. For one thing, the doctrine of Forms took the place of our modern classifications according to genera and species; but it implied a great deal more than this. If we ask why the infant oak with its two or three leaves does not grow up into an ash, or a rose-tree shoot into a vine, or a young sparrow into a blackbird, these are questions before which science hangs her head and is dumb. We are confident that no such confusion can occur, but she cannot tell us why we are thus confident. To talk of the different arrangement of atoms or cells in the different seeds or embryos is but to play with the question. We have to leave science and come humbly to metaphysics, if we wish to obtain an answer. The great thinkers of the Middle Ages held that the Substantial Form of man or animal or plant is that which gives to it its essential reality, which makes it what it is—a man, a horse, a rose-bush. Moreover, the Substantial Form, by attracting to itself and retaining round it certain accidents, explains individuality, and causes a man or horse or rose-bush to be this man, this horse, this rose-bush, and no other. Thus the Sub-

[1] *Animadv.*, vol. i. p. 235.

stantial Form is something more essential than the matter forming each organism, which last is all that science can take count of. Thus, when the Substantial Form of a man, the immortal spirit, has stolen away, nothing has gone which can be weighed or measured, but the essential nature of the human being, all that we mean when we say, "Our friend who is dead," all this has departed; only the husk is left behind.

A very acute and able thinker[1] has recently revived the metaphysics of Aquinas, and has even attempted to bring it into agreement with modern science. It would have been deeply interesting to follow him in his admirable exposition of this doctrine, and also when he applies it to modern chemistry and biology. Centuries later the doctrine of Forms was further developed by Bruno and Leibnitz.

Tennyson speaks in the very spirit of Bruno when he writes that, if we could understand what the flower growing in the cranny is, "root and all and all in all," meaning by this not only to know the outward aspect and fashion of its stem, leaves, flowers, which distinguish it from every other plant, nor yet to be able unerringly to identify its genus and species, but if we could know what is the inward essence which makes its actual being and qualities, causing it to choose the colour and fashion of its own lovely garb which no other flower has, to shed into the air around it its own delicious fragrance, to prefer the crevice between the stones over the richer soil of the garden—that something which neither eye nor microscope can discern, which is permanent while successive flowers and leaves wither and the material substance which it draws from earth and air continually changes,—if, in short, it were possible for us to know the true "form of the flower," the unseen power deriving from some principle beyond Nature which constitutes its real life,—then we should know what God is and what we ourselves are.

It is the poet—a Bruno, a Tennyson—who comes nearest to grasping, not by slow reasoning but by swift intuition, the

[1] *The Metaphysics of the School,* by Thomas Harper, S.J., vol. ii., 1881 (Macmillan).

individuality of things which images to us their Forms, the essential attributes which characterise each thing apart from all others. Thus Shelley seizes the distinctive character of the skylark; Chaucer or Burns, the daisy; Shakespeare, many a type of humanity. This faculty we even venture to call the "creative," in that by copying and combining the poet can, in a sense, create new types of human character which have a generic truth as depicting not individuals but classes of men.

Diderot has said that, if we suppose a quantity of printed type to be shuffled together from infinity, it is "not only not impossible, but in fact very probable," that an *Iliad* or a *Henriade* might be formed; and Lange, in his *History of Materialism*, agrees with Diderot's remark. Some would question the possibility of this on the ground that the working of chance has its own necessities, while purposeful work has also its own laws; and, even granting infinite time, blind chance would never be able to produce the same results on any extended scale as mind can. But let us assume that the text of the poem might, after an infinite shuffling of letters, thus be formed. In that case the words could only be combinations of letters, not symbols of things or of thoughts: no sentence could express either a thought or an emotion. The chance-born *Iliad* could record for us no story of Troy, no anger of Achilles or parting of Hector and Andromache, but only how infinite was the jumble which flung the letters together for a moment, to scatter them the next moment.

Again, imagine, or rather "fancy"—for imagination has its own laws which cannot be done violence to—that by some much more than miraculous chance a world such as our own could have come into being from the mere clashing of atoms during infinite time. We cannot conceive of such a world lasting for more than a fleeting moment, for the creatures and things on it would be empty of their true essences, of the underlying reality and inner self of each by which alone it could persist in being. It could only be a phantasmagoria, bearing as much resemblance to the real world as dolls stuffed

with sawdust and moved by clockwork would bear to living men and women. Only in a bad dream could we mistake such a phantom for the actual world.

After all, is it surprising that the theologians in Gassendi's day should have charged him with holding doctrines irreconcilable with the belief in God and the immortality of the soul? They saw him merely postulate a God and Creator of the atoms at the beginning; explain life, death, and all the changes of things by the addition or loss of atoms; do away with the Substantial Forms, and substitute for them *practically* nothing but atomic movements. What wonder that they saw little difference between his standpoint and that of the confessed enemy of religion, Lucretius:

"Natura videtur
Ipsa sua per se sponte omnia dis agere expers."

"Nature is seen to do all things herself and entirely of her own accord, without help from the gods." In those days, when science was struggling for life and the Scholastics were perverting the great doctrine of Forms to their own vicious uses as a mere implement for crushing all direct study of nature, Gassendi may be excused for saying that little would be lost by giving up the belief in Substantial Forms, and he may sneer at the barbarous term (*haecceitas*) invented by Duns Scotus to denote the "individuality" of a creature or thing; but these distinctions represent something which mankind feels to be even more essential than the matter of which the things themselves are composed. Does not the very jealousy with which those old theologians and philosophers resented any slightest attack on the doctrine of Forms testify to the instinctive belief of humanity that Spirit is more real than Matter? The doctrine of Forms had in it something vital; its roots go deep down to the centre of things, and no mechanical explanation of the world, no mere theory of atoms could avail to sweep it away. It is a rock against which all the navies of materialism will ever be shattered.

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DO WE NEED A SUBSTITUTE FOR CHRISTIANITY?

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If we apply to religion those evolutionary principles which in other spheres stand unquestioned, it would seem to follow that no religious institutions can claim to be eternal, and that here as elsewhere one good custom will corrupt the world if it continue too long. Why Christianity has not long ago been discarded by civilised Europe can only be understood by considering how such changes actually come in national life. History shows that they result from a great emotional upheaval or revolt. Certain vitally important instincts are starved and repressed by the existing religion; discontent gathers for generations, harshly repressed by those whose interests are bound up with the existing order; at last the load is flung off, and new institutions replace the old. In these revolts sometimes the humanitarian sentiments preponderate, as in the victory of Christianity over paganism; sometimes the protest of the religious consciousness against mechanical formalism, as in Methodism. Now, while the shortcomings of Christianity are real and serious, they are not of a character to cause an upheaval of this kind. Vast numbers of thinking people who have been bred Christians feel an ill-defined discomfort and aversion, which commonly ends in discontinuance of all religious observance; but they

are not moved to set up a church for themselves. I believe, however, that the time is ripe for a non-Christian theistic church to be established. Such a church would not be merely rationalistic or "intellectualist." Its existence would not be based merely on the insufficiency of Christian evidences. There would be practical needs and emotional forces behind it, though not forces of that violently explosive character which have caused the reformations of the past.

Though the dissatisfaction with Christianity is not often very clearly formulated, I do not think that the more obvious causes of it are difficult to discover. One of the difficulties is certainly the vagueness of Christianity itself. What *is* Christianity? The various Christian churches differ considerably in formal doctrine, and still more widely in the spirit that animates them. I must venture on some sort of answer, however inadequate, before closing with my main theme. It seems to me, then, that in Christianity, as understood in our own country, we may distinguish three main elements, which may be called the sacramental, the piacular, and the ethical. Under the first view the main stress is laid upon the sacraments, which are ceremonial acts whereby divine graces and favours are bestowed upon the devout; under the second view the important thing is what an Evangelical would call the "scheme of salvation," the atonement made by Christ for the sins of the world; under the third view religion is pre-eminently a mode of teaching and furthering good morality. Now, though the notions of sacrament and expiation have still enormous influence in the world, I do not think that we should gain much by discussing their claims to a place in modern religion. To speak frankly, they are ethically obsolete: the moral consciousness of our time has repudiated the ideas that man can get divine grace by the performance of sacramental acts and that sin can be done away by vicarious suffering. In any case, those who hold such views are not likely to be influenced by this article. There remains, then, the ethical view of religion.

In the ethical religion of the ordinary Broad Churchman we may distinguish two elements, one humanitarianism, the other what we may call for brevity the sacredness of sorrow. With the former we may deal somewhat briefly. Humanitarianism must be an element of any adequate religion, and the humanitarian element in Christianity has been growing in importance continuously. But it is obvious that a humanitarianism not fortified with those manlier virtues about which Christianity says so little is quite inadequate as a rule of life. We see this plainly from consideration of Buddhism, which is even more humanitarian than Christianity. In the opinion of competent judges, the tone of Buddhism, as we find it in Burma, is too soft and feminine for a nation that would hold its own in war and peace among other nations. The element of ethical Christianity that I have called the sacredness of sorrow deserves a slightly longer notice. What it comes to is the assertion that the best human life, the life that religion should hold up to us for an example, is that of one who, though devoted to good works, is rewarded in this mundane existence with sorrow and defeat. Viewed from this point, Christianity is essentially the commemoration of such a life, full of sacred sorrow. On all this once more my criticism must be, that an element which is subordinate has been put into the foremost place. Every religious scheme should take account of sorrow, without letting its view of life be coloured by sorrow. In war we recognise that defeat is not without a salutary chastening influence, and yet we do not hold up the defeated warrior as the type of the military hero. Why should it be otherwise in the Church militant? Indeed, a little thought will show that there are still deeper faults in a religion of sorrow. It implies that the constitution of the world is such that the best life can never be a happy or successful one. Is this consistent with theism? Is it not an imputation upon the rationality of the universe? Moreover, is it possible with this belief to be at peace with human society? *Toute idée est mortelle à ses premiers auteurs*

was truly said, no doubt, of the thinkers and reformers of earlier days; but is this to be true for ever? And can we throw ourselves heartily into the work of a society which is certain to torture and kill us if we serve it too faithfully?

Finally, in considering what meaning we are to give to Christianity, we must not leave out the possibility of returning to the religion as taught by its founder. Will the Christianity of Christ prove more satisfactory than the Christianity of the churches? The question will sound reasonable only to those who have never studied the life and times of Christ in the light of modern historical knowledge. To such a student it is fully apparent that the immense changes that have been made in the religion since its foundation have been in the direction of rendering it more workable. In origin it was a movement of dissent within Judaism, a protest against the formalism and externality of contemporary Jewish religion and a plea for a more humane conception of God and of human relationships. But there is no proof that Christ had any outlook beyond Judaism. But for St Paul's reformulation of Christian doctrine and his mission to the Gentiles the movement would probably have died out soon, or existed only as an obscure Jewish sect. In any case the national, social, and personal circumstances of Jesus are so alien to ours that we can get no religious philosophy or workable scheme of practical morality from the records of his life.

Much of all this would be admitted by many Broad Churchmen, and yet they would urge that we may conduct our lives in the general spirit in which Christ conducted his. But this raises the question how much is needed for practical guidance. Christ, Socrates, and Buddha were teachers convinced of the greatness of their mission, and carrying it through with singleness of purpose. Any man who finds it enough to be exhorted to live like them needs to look no further. My own conviction is that for most men the precept is altogether too vague. To my mind, such works as Harnack's *What is Christianity?* and Sabatier's *Religions of Authority and the*

Religion of the Spirit are interesting failures. They eliminate as unessential all the mere local element of Christ's teaching, and all that has gathered upon it since his time. In the result practically nothing is left: we must be good and spiritual as Christ was, and not degenerate into formalism.

Let us turn now from the ungrateful business of criticising the religion that holds the field to considering how it may be replaced. I can only summarise in the briefest way the two main points of a theism which would, I believe, satisfy the needs of our time.

The first point is one the importance of which may not be immediately apparent, though I believe that it is fundamental to a sound view of religion: it is that, instead of regarding God and the world as essentially static and completed, we should regard them both as in process of evolution. In regard to the world this is generally conceded; but it is not noticed that evolution in the world logically implies evolution in God. If the movement of the world comes from God, then it must have importance for God—God must be the better for it; if God were none the better, then the creation and continued existence of the world would have no meaning from God's point of view. I freely admit that to regard God as in movement or in evolution is not altogether without difficulties on a first consideration; but I think that they disappear when we consider them attentively. The chief one is, that God must be regarded as always perfect; whereas, if He changes, He must be at one time regarded as imperfect when compared with His state at a future time. But this objection I should treat as merely dependent on the ambiguous use of the term "perfect." There is no such thing in human experience as infinite or indefinite perfection; we only know perfection in relation to some definite purpose, as a perfect railway-engine. Now, from our human point of view (and we have no other) God is perfect when He is perfectly able to perform the divine functions, so far as we understand them. And there is nothing in such perfection to exclude movement or evolution. A million

years hence the world will be different from what it is now, and, by consequence, God also will be different. But, regarded functionally, He will be perfect then, as now.

Whatever may be the difficulties incident to what I have been advocating, the difficulties incident to the contrary view are immensely greater. If God does not truly change, then the world does not truly change. All our hopes and fears, all our strivings, are ultimately futile. We live and work in an element of illusion. In truth, I think that a dynamic religion is essentially connected with that thirst for new experience, that romantic instinct which is one of the deepest and best things in human nature. Let God and the world be truly changing, truly improving, and a splendid vista opens before us: we become like young men looking into the track of a sunset. The things that are seem merely promises of the wonderful things that will be.

Co-ordinate with the new conception of God we need a new conception of man. If the world is a process leading to a noble issue, then man must play a worthy part in it. It would be inconsistent with our notions of the divine wisdom to suppose that man's nature is such as to compel him to be an impediment to progress or a source of difficulty and suffering to his Creator. In one of his sociological essays Professor Bosanquet refers to the perverse conception of the "poor" held by some charitable persons—that they are a class whose function is to be anti-functional: they exist in order that they may be a drag upon the more prosperous and call out their qualities of self-denial. Such is the conception of man that we must eschew: we must not think of him as the pauper of the universe, as a miserable castaway, whose only function is to be redeemed and to receive grace. We must think of the progress of the universe as connected with the improvement of mankind, and of the improvement of mankind as dependent primarily upon increase of personal dignity, vigour, and intelligence. When this conception of man is adopted, a new religious significance is given to our

pursuits and interests, and the self-assertive virtues are justified no less than the humanitarian.

It is hardly necessary to make the admission that we cannot explain how human improvement can contribute to the divine welfare: there is an impenetrable veil over all the detail of the relationship of man to God, a veil which no religion makes any serious attempt to draw aside. But we have sufficient reason for believing in the wisdom and goodness of God, and this justifies us in feeling sure that man has an adequate function in relation to God and the universe. It is our ignorance of the precise mode in which the function operates that makes the opening for faith.

I think it is not claiming too much to say that a theism of this sort would make a great difference to practice. It is a common complaint against men of the world that, if they are religious at all, they are so on Sundays only, and for the rest of the week keep religion stowed away in a separate compartment of their minds. The fault of this seems to lie more with the religion than with the men of the world. An impracticable and obsolete religion must be kept stowed apart, if it is to be kept at all. With the religion that I have been advocating there would be no divorce of precept from practice; there would be none of the friction and loss of power due to the fact that two powerful forces pull in different directions.

These hopes for the new theism do not imply that religion will become, as some have fondly hoped, the chief motive force of life. In secular conduct the chief motives are, and always ought to be, secular: religion should never be expected to do more than reinforce the non-religious motives to goodness. But even with these allowances, the moralising influence of religion is important now, and might be made more important in the future. And its influence will be greatest on a class of men which has a great though not definitely recognised function in society: I mean, those who form schemes for social improvement. For such persons there is not even a recognised name; partly because we derive our moral philosophy from the

Greeks, whose ideal was, not progress, but permanence: nor do they get recognition from practical religion. Fortunately for the future of our race, the schemers (so we may call them) are fairly plentiful in Western Europe, ranging from men with vast plans of national reconstruction down to the minor official who presses upon reluctant superiors improvements in such a matter as letter-sorting. To such men, amid their discouragements and vexations, when the question, "What is the use of trying?" rises in the mind, a hopeful and dynamic religion may be no small incitement and consolation.

The common fault of theistic religion is that it is far too critical, far too much taken up with finding faults in the dominant system. We hear far too much in it about the barbarity of Joshua and the improbability of Jonah, about the moral difficulties of the Atonement and the historical difficulties of the Fourth Gospel. The comparative failure of such churches is no reason for distrusting the future of a theistic church which will develop its own interpretation of religious and moral experience, and will not attempt to live as a parasite of Christianity.

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PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AS BEARING ON VERACITY IN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

J. ARTHUR HILL.

One of the most striking features of the modern mind is its insistent demand for good evidence before according belief. This is the natural result of the great development of science. We have found—or we think we have found—that what we call scientific method is the only way of acquiring reliable knowledge; and this method is essentially the accumulation and balancing of evidence. We have learnt that the intellectual virtues are necessary to salvation; that "curiosity, candour, and care"—the intellectual virtues as specified by Myers—come within the sphere of moral duty. From this it follows that it is morally wrong to accept statements as true without examining their credentials, or to accept them as true when those credentials turn out to be seriously questionable. We seek further truth, and are not contented with present knowledge; we seek harder than men ever sought before, and we *test* harder that which we find. The standard of Truth is thus continually being raised to a higher plane.

One result of this development of the intellectual virtues is that belief in historical religions is diminishing. By a historical religion I mean a religion the essence of which is belief that a certain phenomenon or series of phenomena did really happen at some date more or less historically remote; as, for instance, the finding by Joseph Smith of the Book of Mormon, engraved upon metal plates by miraculous means.

With the development of science has arisen a gradual belief in the continuity of nature; catastrophic theories in geology, and theories of special creation of species in biology, have given place to the conception of a gradual advance from very simple beginnings—of a slow and steady evolution instead of a series of sudden jumps. This conception, supported as it is by evidence in all branches of science, has of itself made us suspicious of phenomena which do not seem to have arisen naturally out of pre-existing conditions; it has made us incredulous of that which cannot be harmonised with existing knowledge. And when we find, by applying our intellectual virtues of curiosity, candour, and care to records of such phenomena, that their incredibility is made manifest by the insufficiency of the evidence in their support, we are strengthened in our conviction that the uniqueness of a phenomenon is its own refutation. Now, among important unique phenomena of which we have records, probably most of us agree that the most important are the alleged facts in connection with the life of Jesus Christ. A system of philosophy, worship, and morals has been built upon this foundation; and the fabric of modern civilisation is almost inextricably blended with Christian elements. But in consequence of the modern conception of continuity in nature, and of the application of the intellectual virtues of curiosity, candour, and care to such problems, there has arisen a wide-spread doubt as to whether the phenomena on which Christianity is based ever did really happen as they are stated to have happened. The people among whom they were alleged to occur were of a poetic, visionary, sometimes neurotic type; the eye-witnesses of the miracles were—so far as we are told—mostly ignorant fishermen and others of untrained mind; no written records of the miracles of Jesus are known to have existed until many years after his death; and not one of the manuscripts now in existence dates back further than 300 A.D. In view of these facts, can it be maintained that the records as we have them are absolutely

accurate? Can it even be maintained that the amount of inaccuracy may be estimated? The action of a scholarly section of the Church in turning away from the historical evidence and dwelling more on mystical considerations, such as "realisation of oneness with Christ," is a significant answer.

But the modern temper of mind will not tolerate mysticism in questions of matters of objective fact. Either a thing happened, or it did not; and if we cannot find out which is true, evidence being insufficient to decide the question either *pro* or *con*, it is our duty to treat it as an open question. A policy of ignoring the literal truth of the tradition, and of attuning the mind to an "intense devotion to the Person of Christ"—in the words of a High Church clergyman of my acquaintance—may lead to a sort of surface piety, and even to increase of the deeper spiritual life for the time being; but in my view it is immoral, in spite of its surface or immediate tendency, because it sins against the intellectual virtues of curiosity, candour, and care. Its concern is not with universal objective truth which the whole brotherhood of sane men may come to share, but with subjective states which admittedly cannot be communicated. The modern mind requires a religious point of view which does not do violence to modern methods of discovering Truth. "The scientific man," says Emerson, "requires a faith which is Science"—or which is at least based upon science, and harmonious therewith; and mysticism, though permissible when it does not violate the principles of objective curiosity, candour, and care, must nevertheless be condemned when it results in any obscuration of those primary intellectual virtues. Mystical considerations, then, are but a temporary prop to Christianity, and may become an *immoral* prop. The question as to whether or not certain important events did really happen in Palestine nineteen hundred years ago as alleged is a question for the scientific historian to decide; and he is more and more deciding, as he becomes more and more acquainted with the fallibility of human testimony—however honest its bearers,—that Chris-

tianity, as a religion relying on the accuracy of records of these remote events, has become an impossible religion for the scientific man of the twentieth century. The wonderful events may have occurred—let us not be negatively dogmatic—but the conditions under which the records were made and handed down to us do not satisfy the requirements of modern standards of evidence. The decision is painful, for it means the dissolution of cherished faith, hallowed by many memories; but honesty demands it, and the sacrifice is made.

The question now arises as to whether, if Christianity as an historical religion is no longer acceptable, any other religion can be found to take its place. All the great religions are based upon alleged phenomena happening in remote times—in the lives of Christ, Mahomet, and Buddha—and if the evidence fails to come up to the required standard in one, it may well do the same in another. And I believe it fails in all. Of all the great religions, Christianity has by far the best evidence for its alleged facts; and if that evidence is insufficient to enable us to believe in those facts, *a fortiori* must the alleged facts of other religions be discredited. But though I think that the alleged facts of all the great religions are insufficiently evidenced, and therefore not to be believed by a careful mind, I am nevertheless of opinion that religion is a most important thing—*the* most important thing—and that it will by no means be extinguished either by Haeckel or by his energetic disciples of the Rationalist Press Association. I believe that the basis of a new religion—not a religion, which is impossible, but the *basis* of one—has been discovered during the last twenty-five years by a group of inquirers working on strictly scientific methods, and that consequently religion may again become possible to a critical and scientific mind.

The essential need of a satisfactory philosophy of life is some understanding of what we call death. Until we know what death is, we cannot know the meaning of life. Until we know whether it is a terminus, or only a portal "leading from light to light, through a brief darkness," we

cannot have anything more than tentative and hypothetical schemes of philosophy and conduct. Until we know our destination—whether near or far—we cannot tell what goods to pack, or what course to steer. It is in relation to this problem that the latest step of science has achieved a measure of success; has laid—as I believe—the scientific foundations of a new religion. The result of the work of the Society for Psychical Research during the twenty-five years of its existence is, that a vast amount of good evidence has been accumulated, tending to show that human consciousness—though not necessarily eternal or everlasting—does really survive bodily death, and that a disembodied consciousness may under certain conditions communicate with those left in the flesh. I say that the evidence tends to show this; I do not think that a cautious inquirer will say that it amounts to proof; but it is enough if the evidence seems to render the survival hypothesis probable. In my opinion, the Spiritualists err as far in one direction as the Materialists do in the other; truth, as usual, may be found somewhere between the two extremes.

If, then, survival of death is indicated by genuine evidence, if communication from departed souls is possible, we may at least reasonably hope to receive from friends who have reached that next stage some help towards the solution of life's problems—to see on that farther shore some friendly beacon-light shedding new rays on our path across life's uncharted sea. There would be nothing new, in principle, about a religion thus founded. It would base itself on facts, on observed phenomena. It would stand on a foundation of science. And this is exactly what the great historical religions have done in their time. The science may have been crude, the observers and describers of the phenomena may have erred in many ways through lack of training—as many Spiritualists do now,—but they did found their religion on what they saw and heard, or at least on what they thought they saw and heard. Christ's miracles and resurrection were objective phenomena, and Christianity was based upon them.

Christ "brought life and immortality to light" in the same sense that Professor and Mme. Curie have brought to light the hitherto concealed properties of radium. But belief in Christianity has gradually crumbled away because there has been no continuance of well-attested cognate facts. The Catholic miracles and ecstasies make belief easier for one section of Christianity; but Protestantism—which cuts off miracles at the end of Apostolic times—has committed suicide; by making unique events of its basic phenomena it has made continued belief in them impossible.

The immediately obvious conclusion, therefore, is that the accumulation of evidence must not be allowed to stop. If the Society for Psychical Research were to dissolve at the present time, its records—in default of some similar body to keep up continuity—would in a short time be as wholeheartedly discredited as the tradition about Mahomet's coffin. It is only by "pegging away" that the new facts will get themselves established; there will long be various interpretations of those facts, and many will refuse to see in them sufficient grounds for the far-reaching hypothesis of survival: but if we know that the facts are true, our business is to get them accepted, and to leave people to form their own theories. One of the possible theories, as we have said, is survival of human personality past bodily death. On this theory a new religion may arise, such as F. W. H. Myers has foreshadowed in the Epilogue to his great work.[1] The teacher of this religion—the motive personality who shall sway the hearts of men and shall fuse knowledge and emotion into one glowing whole—is not yet arisen. We must look forward to his advent with hope; trying, meanwhile, "to labour and to wait."

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[1] *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*, vol. ii. p. 284.

A DIALOGUE ON ETERNAL PUNISHMENT.

THE REV. JOHN GERARD, S.J.

Oliver. Whatever you may say, however plausibly you may represent other articles of your belief, I am quite sure that there is one—the doctrine of eternal punishment—which as a reasonable being I can never accept, and which is sufficient to condemn any creed that teaches it. The idea of such punishment being in store for any creatures, no matter what the nature of their transgressions, revolts my whole moral nature, and with John Stuart Mill I would rather go to Hell than pay any homage to a deity who could call into existence those whose lot he foreknew to be unending misery.

Roland. This, I take it, you use as an argument *ex absurdo.* You are not, I think, going to deny that our ideas of morality can be rationally traced only to the First Cause from which everything must come, and that they are but reflections in our souls of the attributes which that Cause has eternally possessed. It is, therefore, impossible to suppose the Creator to be out of harmony with the law which He has written in our hearts, and to have furnished us with the means of judging His conduct, and of feeling sure that we are right in condemning it. What you really mean is that this law of right and wrong, of which we are more absolutely certain than of anything else, makes it impossible to suppose that the Creator could do such a thing as call into being those whose

fate was destined to be so terrible, and that, accordingly, there can be no such fate for any.

Oliver. Well, yes, it comes to that.

Roland. And, at the same time, you hold that this law of right and wrong is a law in the strictest sense of the word, not in that to which we are accustomed in science. You do not mean that we learn it, as we learn the so-called "laws of nature," by observing what actually happens—that is to say, what men actually do. Were the whole of our race uniformly to transgress the laws of morality, would our confidence in the truth of these laws be in the least impaired?

Oliver. Certainly not.

Roland. And we are thus in possession of a standard which enables us to pass judgment on all conduct, even that of the Creator Himself should He—*per impossibile*—violate these laws?

Oliver. Yes, I hold that.

Roland. But, if this be so, if the perception of this law could conceivably justify you in condemning the Creator for its infraction, must it not condemn others as well, who, while recognising its paramount authority, elect to set it at naught, and to run their course regardless of its enactments?

Oliver. Yes, of course, it must condemn such transgressors.

Roland. And can there be a law without a sanction? Is not our recognition of the moral law bound up with an assurance that it will be worse for us if we break it? "There's another man within me," says Sir Thomas Browne, "that's angry with me, rebukes, commands, and dastards me"; and however you may try to explain away this element of fear, it will remain true in spite of all philosophising that conscience does make cowards of us all, for with the consciousness of having done wrong there is ever joined the assurance that there will be a reckoning.

Oliver. But what are you going to argue from a vague feeling like that, which, for all there is to show for it, may be pure fancy?

Roland. You want something that your reason finds satisfactory? Does it satisfy your mind to suppose that they who spend their life in violating the precepts of the moral laws which are recognised as such, and who nevertheless flourish like a green bay tree throughout their course—living on the fat of the land and gratifying every desire of their hearts, "clothed in purple and fine linen and feasting sumptuously every day"—does it satisfy your mind to think that at the end of it all they are in just as good a case as those who have done what they felt they ought to do, because they ought? The man who grinds the faces of the poor,—who sweats his underlings, to fill his own pockets,—who makes his pile by fraud and dishonesty,—the libertine who wrecks and ruins lives to gratify his lusts,—the company-promoter who plays ducks and drakes with the little all of widows and orphans, that he may clamber into the hallowed precincts of the Smart Set,—is there to be no reckoning for such as these? Does it square with your notion of the fitness of things that the worst they have to fear is to know that, thanks to their conduct, there will be others like them when they are dead and gone,—for all your philosophy, I fancy you find it hard not to say—when they are dead and damned?

Oliver. From which you argue?

Roland. From which I argue, in the first place, that along with the moral law there is graven in our hearts the consciousness that, if we do what we know to be wrong, we do so at our peril. Surely nothing is more significant than the readiness with which this doctrine of punishment for offences against conscience comes home to all sorts and conditions of men. Look at Felix, the Roman governor: when St Paul discoursed to him of justice, and temperance, and the judgment to come, "he was terrified," and this certainly was not the result of early training, or of anything he was unaccustomed to hear.

I argue, moreover, that the plain facts of life—and not on the side of evil only, but of good as well—inevitably force

upon us the belief that things will, somehow, be set right in the end, as obviously they usually are not, except in old-fashioned fiction, here on earth; for, as Lytton somewhere remarks, "Without another world who can solve the disparities of this?" And similarly Socrates, in the *Phædo*, expresses his assured hope "that there is something in store after death, and that it will be much better for the good than for the bad."

Oliver. But here again you are shooting wide of the mark, at least of mine. I never said there should be no punishment for sin: what I can't accept is eternal punishment—and we are still far enough away from that.

Roland. "Sin"—I thank you for the word. It is to this that I wanted to come, and you have saved the necessity of making approaches. Does not this term "sin" stamp offences against the moral law as essentially different from any others? Could it be applied to transgression of mere human ordinances? Of course, we often hold it sinful to transgress a human ordinance, but this is because such positive enactment coincides with the unwritten law of conscience. But, supposing there to be no such coincidence, would anybody think of describing as "sin" the infraction of a law, however peremptory, and by whatever sanction it might be enforced? In the time of the Terror in France, for instance, children were bound, under pain of death, to denounce their parents if they believed them to be lukewarm republicans. Would anyone describe their failure in this respect as a "sin"?

Oliver. Certainly not, I——

Roland. Or, to take a less extreme example, should we call Mr Ruskin a sinner because a judge and jury found that he had broken the law and libelled Mr Whistler?

Oliver. I think not.

Roland. Yet the law of libel is a just and necessary law, and Ruskin had doubtless transgressed against it.

Oliver. From no bad motive.

Roland. Just so. From no motive which conflicted with

eternal principles. Had he acted from personal spite or malice it would have been different?

Oliver. Of course.

Roland. So that "sin" differs in its essence from any other kind of offence on this account, that it violates what the sinner himself recognises as the final and absolute rule from obedience to which nothing can exempt him.

Oliver. But what numbers every day commit acts which are obviously gross violations of morality, yet have no suspicion that they are so! Surely you will not deny that such instances are legion?

Roland. No, assuredly I will not deny it; but what then? It only follows that these are not the sinners of whom we are speaking. Since the essence of sin is disobedience to a *known* law, there can be none without knowledge of one's obligation. The question of punishment touches such alone as offend against the light, and in proportion as they have it. But of this there will be more to say afterwards, and it will be better to keep to the main point, with which we have by no means done. Have we not to admit that the nature of sin is altogether different from that of any other transgression, and incomparably more serious?

Oliver. I am not prepared to deny it.

Roland. But the objection you brought just now seems to be that if punishment were eternal it would necessarily be out of proportion with the offence. If, however, the offence be radically and intrinsically different from all others, how can you be so positive as to what it entails or does not entail, in the way of retribution?

Oliver. But "eternal"?

Roland. How if reason points to the conclusion that the consequences will be everlasting?

Oliver. But reason will never do anything of the kind.

Roland. Remember, I don't pretend that we can *prove* the Christian doctrine by reason alone, but that is not the point. We are inquiring whether you can *disprove* it by reason.

Unless you can do so, what becomes of the protestation with which you started, that the irrationality of the doctrine is sufficient to damn any creed which admits it? And the question now to be asked is this: When we look, as far as reason enables us, into the nature of deliberate transgressions of the moral law, on the one hand, and of the penalty they may be supposed to incur, on the other, do we find it absurd to suppose that this will be everlasting? Or, on the contrary, do we find such a conclusion in some sort inevitable?

Oliver. Anyhow, you are taking the wolf by the ears, and coming to closer grips with the difficulty than I thought you would dare. But that is a very different thing from getting rid of it.

Roland. No doubt. But have we not agreed that the moral law is what it is, as being the reflection in our nature of those qualities which existed from eternity in the Cause of all things—that is to say, in God? And does not reason bear out the statement that by deliberately and knowingly violating that law we revolt, and set ourselves in antagonism to its Author?

Oliver. Well—and then?

Roland. Why, then, is it so very preposterous to suppose that, as close and intimate union with the Source of all good, and therefore of all beatitude, is the supreme felicity of which our nature is capable, to be earned by free and intelligent assimilation to its pattern as shown to us—so, on the other hand, wilful rejection of that model for another directly contrary not only forfeits all right to such fruition, but even renders it impossible for us? A man who should, in a fit of passion, put out his eyes, would be thenceforth incapable of ever seeing again; a sot who drinks himself into a condition of maudlin imbecility forfeits for ever the use of faculties which distinguish him from the brutes; a libertine who, by his excesses, contracts a loathsome disease or foul disfigurement, thereby shuts himself out of decent society as long as he lives. According to our social moral code, a woman who

loses her honour, a man who is caught cheating at cards, or who for violating the laws of the turf has been warned off the course at Newmarket, becomes a social leper whom every self-respecting person must shun, and against whom the doors of every decent house are for ever closed. In like manner, he who knowingly and finally chooses sin for his portion instead of God, excludes his soul so long as it shall live from God's presence, which is its only happiness.

Oliver. Well, at any rate, this is at least something quite different from "Hell."

Roland. Pardon me: on the contrary—this *is* Hell. This is the essential and supreme pain, the Pain of Loss, or *Pœna damni*, from which damnation derives its name.

Oliver. But the fire and the undying worm, and the other horrors of which we hear so much: you don't mean to tell me that you can have Hell without them? Are you going to throw them overboard or explain them away?

Roland. By no means, though I suppose that nobody ever imagined the worm to be an actual animal. But, in the first place, you are arguing against the Catholic doctrine, the Catholic Faith, and accordingly we must stick rigidly to what the Church teaches as *de fide* on the subject, which does not include any of these particulars. And secondly, all theologians agree that, whatever other torments there may be, the loss of God is immeasurably, transcendentally worse than any other. Should it appear that this is not repugnant to right reason, what will become of your position, which rests entirely on the assumption that our doctrine is unreasonable? You could hardly attempt to sustain it by arguing from minor elements in the sinner's punishment—elements which in truth are included in that which is fundamental.

Oliver. But do you really mean to tell me that what you call these secondary elements of eternal punishment are not essential to its very notion? Why, it is just these that make any impression, and stand for the idea of "Hell" in the minds of all men, whether believers or unbelievers.

Roland. No doubt, speaking broadly, this is so; but none the less it is certain that, as I said, the Catholic doctrine contains no such articles *as of faith.* Such a statement is doubtless very surprising to you, and you will naturally require some authority for it better than my own. Here, then, is what Perrone says, a theologian of the most orthodox type, whom his bitterest enemy would never accuse of temerity or minimising:[1] "This one point, therefore, is *de fide*, namely that there is a Hell, or that punishments are in store for the wicked; and that these will be eternal. Other points . . . are not *de fide.*"

Oliver. Well, that beats all! Your Catholic doctrines have an uncanny habit of springing such surprises upon us, just when they are needed, like so many doctrinal chameleons.

Roland. Only because outsiders won't go to the proper sources for obtaining information. Instead of applying to the authorities who have a right to declare what the teaching of the Church is, they either consult her enemies, who, even supposing them perfectly honest, can hardly be either unbiassed or well-informed, or else they satisfy themselves with popular notions and impressions—and we all know what kind of evidence these furnish. But, at any rate, this is the Catholic doctrine, as it is, and has always been.

Oliver. Always been! Now, don't try to persuade me that this is anything more than a concession inspired by the exigencies of modern thought, which would be sternly repudiated by your doctors of the old, confident, uncompromising days.

Roland. Do you know anything about St Jerome? He is old enough and uncompromising enough, I should think, to satisfy your requirements: and this is what he says:[2] "But the undying worm and inextinguishable fire is by many understood to signify the remorse of conscience which torments the lost, because, through their own fault, they are bereft of the felicity which the elect enjoy." And this felicity of the elect is nothing else than the posses-

[1] *Prælectiones theologicæ*, iii. 359.

[2] *In Isaiam*, lxviii. 829.

sion of God. So there were those in St Jerome's days—and he does not condemn their opinion—who attributed all in the way of punishment to the pain of loss.

Oliver. Prodigious! But, at least, does it not strike you that by such a line of defence, whoever may sanction it, if you save the ship you jettison the cargo? The doctrine of eternal punishment thus explained, or rather, explained away, loses all its significance and must renounce all its power. Your action is like that of the man who, when his stable was ablaze, cut his horse's throat in order to save its life. How many men will be kept in order by the prospect of punishment so purely negative in character, which consists in the deprivation of what they do not know by experience, and have no means even of imagining?

Roland. Does it not strike *you* that in urging all this you have offered the best possible justification for what you wish to attack—I mean of the doctrine of eternal punishment as popularly exhibited and understood?

Oliver. In the name of wonder, how can you say that?

Roland. It seems pretty clear. The doctrine, like all doctrines of our faith, is taught for an eminently practical purpose. The object is not to furnish philosophers with matter upon which to exercise their wits and elaborate their systems, but to assist in directing men how to live, that they may fulfil the end of their being, and attain the only goal which is worth attaining. This our doctrine does by enabling them to realise what failure in this respect means, that there is no more awful fate conceivable than that in store for him who deliberately chooses moral evil for his portion, knowing it to be evil, refusing to obey the law whose obligation he cannot but recognise. The more vividly the true state of the case can be brought home to men the better. But, as you truly say, that which is really most terrible in damnation, being a matter in which experience cannot assist us or stimulate our imagination, comes before us as a mere abstract notion, making little impression, or none

at all. And, therefore, of necessity that which, though in reality of minor importance, can in some degree be realised with the aid of sensible experiences, and so be made practically effective, is rightly employed in order to awaken men's souls to the awful truth which they are so prone to forget. That was the plan adopted by the Scotch minister who, seeing his congregation on a bitter winter day blue and numb with cold, described Hell as a place where there was not enough fire to warm one's hands—nothing but black frost, and ice and snow.

Oliver. Come now! How can you call such a mode of acting "right"? Is it not simple fraud to speak of one thing when you mean another?—to scare simple folk who know no better, by talking of being plunged in a lake of fire and brimstone, when you really mean that they will miss a state of felicity which has no attraction for them, and which they would be perfectly content to be without? For where are the terrors of this deprivation for those who have no belief in God, and no desire for that beatitude which consists in possessing Him?

Roland. The fact of their disbelief does not make Him cease to be, and that they do not desire His possession is only because they do not know what He is, and what it is to be without Him. It is the realisation of that deprivation, incurred by their own free act, which overwhelms the reprobate.

Oliver. But you said a while ago that no one will be punished for what he does not deliberately elect to do, with full knowledge of its nature. How, then, can a man merit this pain of loss, as you call it, if he does not understand what he is renouncing?

Roland. There, no doubt, you start a very serious difficulty, one that appears at first sight to be very formidable. But, in the first place, if a man did realise what God is, as he will realise when he passes behind the veil, he could no more do anything but obey His will than a river can help flowing to the sea, or a plant growing towards the light. There would be an end of free choice, which is the essence of merit. Moreover, although in this life we do not know all in this regard,

we know quite enough to make us responsible for our actions, and to invest the commission of what we recognise as sin with a significance altogether unlike anything else. And if he does not see God Himself, yet the sinner has to face his own conscience, that "aboriginal Vicar of Christ," as Newman styles it, "a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas." He who deliberately, and in a grave matter, acts against his conscience, by doing what he knows to be wrong, deliberately elects evil for his portion instead of good, and, as I have said before, it is only for those who so elect that the direful consequences of their act are in store. I should add that, according to our doctrine, the reprobate are those whose act of revolt is final and absolute, who have once for all hardened themselves against good, that is, against God, and divorced their souls from Him.

Oliver. But, however that may be, it remains true that your preachers deceive the people when they insist on the material horrors of which they are so fond, and say nothing of the spiritual pains which, you tell me, are to be understood as the real torment.

Roland. Well—what would you say to such a case as this? A father has a son who is bent on marrying a worthless and disreputable woman, who will certainly—when it is too late to escape—wreck his life and break his heart. To avoid such a catastrophe the father solemnly vows that, should he persist in his infatuation, he will be disinherited, and left to struggle with penury and want. Is there anything wrong in impressing this view of the case upon the youth's mind as forcibly as possible; and if he can thus be turned from his purpose, is there anything dishonourable in the advantage so obtained?

Oliver. No, certainly not.

Roland. The misery which the son would entail upon himself were he to persist in his intention would be immeasurably greater and more bitter than any which mere lack of wealth could bring?

Oliver. No doubt.

Roland. But this misery he is quite ready to face, just because he has no idea what it is; and therefore he must be reached by means of other considerations, which, though they are in truth of far less moment, he is capable of appreciating.

Oliver. I see what you are driving at—but can you pretend that this is a parallel case?

Roland. Parallel? No. Comparisons never are; they are never on all fours with their object. But here the discrepancy is all the other way from what you seem to suppose. In the first place, the wilful sinner commits a folly immeasurably more grievous than that of the man who takes to himself an unworthy wife—he makes him an unworthy self. By setting his soul in opposition to the moral law—and this is sin—he maims and mutilates his spiritual part far more grievously than he would injure the corporeal were he to put out his eyes, and cut off hands and feet. He is as useless in creation as is for human purposes an engine that will not work, or a ship that will not float, for which there is nothing but the scrap-heap. And as a man who should drain the life-blood out of all his veins would reduce his material frame to a mere inert, helpless, and useless mass—so, much more, the soul that empties itself of God, as free-will gives the power of doing, collapses like a burst bubble, and finds in that awful void every sort of woe and anguish which we can experience or conceive, concentrated and transcended.

Oliver. But, supposing all that to be granted, it only shows what the man does to himself, and the whole question is, not what follies he may commit, but how it can be just on the part of God to impose such a terrible penalty, whether this be what you call the *pœna damni*, or whatever else.

Roland. I quite expected that some such objection would crop up. It is the old idea, responsible for at least half the difficulties men make for themselves—which supposes the punishment of a guilty soul to be analogous to that inflicted by one of our judges or magistrates, who sentences a male-

factor to hard labour, penal servitude, the cat, or the gallows, according to the offence of which he is convicted,—and this extraneous penalty so imposed is *the* punishment. But it is not so in our case. The sinner utters his own condemnation, passes his own sentence, when he gives deliberate consent to a sin that makes him the enemy of God. And his punishment is that, being what he has made himself, he *cannot* endure the light of the Divine Countenance, frantically though he desires to do so when he realises what the deprivation means. As a bat or a mole plunges away from the light of day, so must the guilty soul hide itself even in Hell from the awful Sanctity of its Judge, who but for its own folly might have been its friend. You remember, no doubt, that wonderful passage in the *Dream of Gerontius*, the climax of the whole poem, where the soul—a soul in grace, and adjudged to everlasting bliss, but not yet wholly purged of stain and blemish—

> Flies to the dear feet of Emmanuel;
> But, ere it reach them, the keen sanctity
> Which with its effluence, like a glory, clothes
> And circles round the Crucified, has singed
> And scorch'd and shrivell'd it.

And if such be the case of the just, what will be that of the reprobate? He will no more be able to endure that presence than the gnat can endure the flame that fascinates it.

Oliver. Well—though I won't venture, after my last attempt, to call you a special pleader, you certainly have a wonderful way of presenting a case so as to make it look quite different from what one could ever have imagined.

Roland. But the question is, not whether it differs from your imagination of it, but whether my account does or does not represent the doctrine as it actually is. It is quite certain —as I have already said—that the eternal loss of God is *the* essential and supreme penalty attaching to wilful sin, and to leave this out of sight—as is commonly done by those who criticise Catholic doctrine from the outside—is to ignore the only element which can make the doctrine intelligible. Given

this—given the truth which underlies all other truths, that of the absolute dependence of creatures on the uncreated Source of all good and all beatitude—we are able to perceive, however inadequately, what must be the ruin of an existence which by its own act cuts itself off for ever from that Source, and so forfeits whatever it drew therefrom, and drew only for the purpose of attaining to a closer and more vital union with it. As I said before, this is Hell:

"The soul has missed the final end of its creation through its own fault; it has chosen self instead of God, and it remains for ever miserable. The worm of remorse that dieth not, the flame of burning thirst that is not quenched, the great gulf or chasm firmly fixed, express different aspects of the same hopeless, irremediable woe—the conscious loss of God, and all which that loss involves. It is the idea shadowed out in the words of the Roman satirist, who most nearly of heathen writers touched on the Christian aspect of sin:

Virtutem videant, intabescantque relicta."[1]

This, I repeat, is Hell, and without it no mere corporal torment could be Hell at all; for, unless it can reach the soul, there is no physical pain, however intense and exquisite, to which a man will not rise superior. There is many a martyr on record who at the stake "hymnum lætus cecinit," or jested on the rack. But then, they knew that God was not lost to them. Even the poor Redskin, amid the fiendish cruelties of his victorious enemy, "will not stain with grief the death-song of an Indian chief," for he retains his self-respect and is still master of his own soul. But it is just his own soul which the sinner abhors and loathes, and in which he finds not comfort but torment.

Oliver. Well—but, taking you on your own ground, you surely upset your case by proving vastly too much. In your anxiety to shift the onus of his damnation on to the sinner himself, you lay on his shoulders a burden they are manifestly incapable of bearing. How can any human act, any perversity

[1] H. N. Oxenham, *Catholic Eschatology*, p. 71 (Persius, *Sat.* iii. 38).

of a man's will, be of such a character as to entail everlasting consequences, and to wreck his whole being for eternity?

Roland. I said, a while ago, that we should come again to the point which lies at the bottom of your objection, and is of quite fundamental importance. Remember, I must again repeat, in the first place, that what we are discussing is the Catholic doctrine; and, according to that doctrine, eternal reprobation is for those alone who, by deliberate misuse of their free-will, have necessitated it, who have so fully and justly merited their fate that they cannot but recognise its justice—which recognition is, indeed, its supreme bitterness. They cannot even deny that in no jot or tittle does it exceed, but rather falls short of, their deserts. If there are no such offenders, there could be no damnation. Only for those who sin against light is reserved the outer darkness with weeping and gnashing of teeth, when, as old Father Parsons says, they learn to "admire their own folly."

Oliver. And do you really believe that anybody on earth ever performs an act which actually reaches such a standard of wickedness and vitiates his entire nature? What sort of acts do you mean?

Roland. No: there you would start on a totally wrong track. It is not the act performed, as I have already said, that constitutes the sin, but the perversity of mind with which it is done. And as we know nothing of one another's intentions or motives, so—most happily for all parties—it is not our part to judge the servants of another, who to their own master must stand or fall. The Church herself, although she does not hesitate to assign to her saints the honours of the Blessed, never presumes to pronounce on the eternal lot of what seems the most hardened malefactor. There is but one case in which it is practicable and profitable to make an individual application of these general principles, namely, our own. However it may be with others, I can well realise how it would be with me, were I wilfully to commit a mortal sin. I should perfectly well understand that in so doing I was performing an act of more tremendous import than any other

could possibly be—turning my back upon God, renouncing my part in Him for something else; it would be like the sun being blotted out from my soul.

Oliver. So, then, this you would offer as a full and satisfactory account of your position in regard of what your Church obliges you to believe on this head.

Roland. "Full and satisfactory"?—not quite so fast. Undoubtedly this question is full of mystery, and, the more we ponder over it, the more mysterious does it appear. Why, as Newman asks,[1] should God, existing alone from eternity, have disturbed that divine solitude by the Creative Act? Why, especially, should He have called into being such a creation as we actually see, and have willed, "after an eternity of peace, to allow of everlasting anarchy, of pride, and blasphemy and guilt and hatred of Himself, and the worm that dieth not"? This to us is, doubtless, incomprehensible. But no less incomprehensible is it that He should have no beginning; yet our reason tells us that *something* must have had no beginning, or nothing could ever have been. There is nothing for it but to accept as a necessary truth that from which reason starts back, but which it is forced to embrace.

And, as I urged before, it is no less clear that God, having been from eternity and of Himself, is the Author of everything besides, especially of the moral law, and is the supreme exemplar of goodness, beauty, and truth. Whosoever contradicts these must contradict God's purpose in creating man. That such contradiction should entail no consequences, that he who sets conscience at defiance should in the end be as scatheless as one who fulfils its precepts, though this demands self-renunciation and fortitude, is to me "unthinkable." There *must* be some sanction for the moral law, more potent than that they who conform their lives to it should be able to say to those who set it at naught, "In our opinion you are brutes," only to hear in reply, "In our opinion you are fools." Accordingly, it has been the instinctive belief of all peoples,

[1] *Discourses to Mixed Congregations,* "The Mystery of Divine Condescension."

until under the training of philosophic naturalism they learnt to disregard natural instinct, that there must be a reckoning in store for men. Thus far does reason take us, but no further. What the lot of the wicked actually is can be known only from something beyond reason—from revelation. This starts where reason stops; it makes of the doctrine a practical instrument of religious stimulus, for, without question, it has that effect. As it goes beyond the scope of reason, we can only say that it goes in the same direction as that in which reason points, and that there is nothing in it which contradicts reason; and this I have tried to show you. To require that it should dissipate all mystery would be obviously irrational, for in mystery all the teachings of reason invariably terminate, and not only in regard of purely intellectual speculations, but in the field of physical science itself.

Oliver. And, that being so, how, may I ask, can you call your acceptance of a doctrine which is confessedly non-rational a reasonable act?

Roland. Come now; I can hardly suppose that you don't know what will be my answer—for it is that to which in such discussions we must at last inevitably come. What I don't myself know, I can learn from a teacher who does; and I can assure myself of the competence of a teacher without being able to test his knowledge by comparing it with my own. Otherwise there would be no teachers at all, for we should cease to require them before we could go to them for instruction. But the whole Catholic position in regard of Faith rests entirely on the principle that in the Church we have found the teacher through whom God Himself becomes our instructor, and that, having by the exercise of our reason convinced ourselves that such is the case, we must in the name of reason believe what we are taught. That is a reasonable foundation for belief, is it not?

Oliver. Yes, of course—*if*—but that is another question.

Roland. Should you not rather say, *the* question?

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JESUS THE PROPHET.

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In studying the words of any great teacher of men, it is of the first importance to discover to what class or order he is to be assigned. In a study, therefore, of the words of Jesus Christ, our first question must be: In what category are we to place Him? Are His sayings the sayings of a lawyer or a poet, a man of business or a philosopher? Does He speak as a priest or as a layman, as a mystic or as a practical man, as an ascetic or as a man of the world?

And in order to find an answer to this question we naturally ask another: How did Christ impress the men of His own generation? Since it will be generally admitted that, however greatly they respected Him and marvelled at Him, they did not regard Him as an altogether unique Personality till after the Resurrection, it is obvious that they must mentally have classed Him with some order of men. That He was a religious teacher was evident to all. In what class of such teachers did they place Him?

That Jesus Christ during His life on earth was commonly regarded as widely different from the generality of religious teachers of His time is plain from the Gospel record. "The multitudes were astonished at his teaching; for he taught them as one having authority, and not as their scribes" (St Matt. vii. 28, 29).

But the popular contemporary estimate of Jesus was not

merely of a negative character. It not only decided what He was not; it was felt that there was one class to which He could be definitely assigned. Some people said that He was John the Baptist, whom "all men held to be a prophet"; some said that He was Elijah, some Jeremiah or one of the other great prophets of Israel; but there was a general consensus of opinion that a great prophet had arisen, and that, whether one of the old prophets had come to life again in the person of Jesus or not, Galilee of the Gentiles had seen a great light, in that from Nazareth a prophet had been given to Israel.

Now this opinion of the multitudes was confirmed by Jesus Himself. He Himself testified that the experience of His own life was the universal experience of prophets, viz., that they are not without honour, save in their own country and among their own relatives. When He was urged to flee on the ground that Herod sought to kill Him, He deprecated fears for His safety with the sad reflection that it could not be that a *prophet* should perish out of Jerusalem.

Since, then, Jesus of Nazareth was acclaimed as a prophet, and spoke of Himself as a prophet, we are enabled to assign Him a place in a definite class or order of men. He is not, as far as His work and teaching is concerned, an isolated phenomenon in the history of the world. Though His Personality is unique, His earthly life is, from one point of view, normal. Leaving out of account His mighty works, every detail of His life is comparable with similar details in the lives of other men. An Israelite by birth, an Israelite by sentiment, an Israelite by religion, He was attached to Israel, the nation of prophets, by this tie also that He was a prophet.

Now the prophets of Israel, notwithstanding great differences in temperament, and in their view of the externals of religion, have in common certain strongly marked characteristics. It may indeed be said that anyone who has learnt to understand and sympathise with one is in a fair way to understand and sympathise with all. If, therefore, we find our Lord to be essentially a prophet, we shall find the key

to the interpretation of His words in the sayings of those predecessors of His whose words He declared He had come to fulfil.

We know, it is true, almost nothing of the prophets beyond what can be learnt from the books which bear their names; but though we are shown only glimpses of their lives, the glimpses are enough to set them before us as real actors on life's stage, enough to convince us that Isaiah, Jeremiah, and all the rest of the goodly fellowship are not mere books, but men.

If, then, we compare the life and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth with what we know of the prophets in the Old Testament, we cannot but be struck by the extraordinary similarity between them. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that whatsoever we learn from the Old Testament to be characteristic of the prophets is proved by a study of the Gospels to be characteristic of Jesus, and *vice versa*. The similarity is not confined merely to one or two points; it is observable in the mode of life, in the method of teaching, in the essential character of the teaching, in the response which that teaching evoked, and in the manner of its preservation.

Thus, to take the above points in order, we may first consider briefly the purely external aspect of the lives of the prophets. With the exception of some apparently well-to-do men, such as Isaiah, and, not improbably, Amos and Ezekiel, the prophets were supported by the voluntary offerings of those to whom they preached. Micah, indeed, tells us that in the case of the unworthy prophets of his time the whole tone of their prophecy depended on the amount of the contribution which might be extorted; and the whole point of Amaziah's sneer to Amos lies in the implication that the last-named prophet has come to Bethel as to a happy hunting-ground.

But though unworthy men might gain an easy livelihood by prophesying smooth things, no one in Old Testament times questioned the right of a prophet to live by his ministry, provided only that he put truth first, and did not make his

appetite his spiritual barometer. When St Paul affirmed the right of those that preached the Gospel to live by the Gospel, he could have supported his claim by an appeal to countless precedents going back to time immemorial.

It must not be supposed that the order of men who called themselves prophets had ceased very long, if at all, before the ministry of John the Baptist. At all events, the reference in Zechariah xiii. 2–6 may be taken as evidence that, however low their character may have been, an order of prophets existed in Judah early in the second century B.C.

In like manner Jesus and His disciples, at any rate in the main, lived on the alms of those to whom they ministered. It is evident that the directions which our Lord gave His disciples in sending them forth to preach were in accordance with the custom of His time and His own practice. The nation which had ministered to prophets in the ninth century B.C. was still ready to entertain prophets in the first century of the Christian era. The widow of Zarephath and the rich couple of Shunem find their counterparts in the family at Bethany and in Zacchæus and many others, who offered shelter and food to Jesus of Nazareth until His unswerving fidelity to His gospel came into conflict with their nationalist hopes.

Again, it may be noted that, *mutatis mutandis*, the method of Christ's preaching bears a striking similarity to the method of the prophets' preaching. Thus the prophets appear to have been in the habit of preaching wherever they were likely to obtain an audience, either in the gate of the Temple (Jer. vii. 2), or in the court of the Temple (Jer. xix. 14), in a city gate (Jer. xvii. 19), in a private house (Ezek. viii. 1), in an open place outside the city (Jer. xix. 14). In like manner our Lord preached in the temple courts, in synagogues, in private houses, and in the open country.

But a much more important point of resemblance than the mere place of teaching is found in the form of teaching. For there is a remarkable similarity between the actual form of our

Lord's teaching and that of the prophets. Read, for example, Isaiah's parable of the vineyard. How essentially similar it is to one of the parables of Jesus, *e.g.* that of the husbandmen in St Luke xx. 9–16. Indeed, the teaching by illustration, whether it be the παραβολή of the synoptists or the παροιμία of St John, is a marked characteristic of the prophets. Unfortunately a certain peculiarity of prophetic speech tends to obscure the similarity which exists between many Old Testament sayings and their New Testament parallels. It must be remembered that in Old Testament thought there are no secondary causes. The prophets might have said of Jehovah:

> "And every virtue we possess,
> And every victory won,
> And every thought of holiness
> Are His alone";

and consequently they are wont to regard all their illustrations as having been given to them by Jehovah Himself, thus producing on our prosaic Western minds the impression that they are describing what we should call *visions*. Thus the so-called *visions* of Amos are in reality *parables*, the suggestion of which the prophet believes to be due to Jehovah. Amos vii. 1–3 in the mouth of our Lord would probably have run somewhat as follows: "Now from the locusts learn their parable. If the locusts swarm at the beginning of the shooting up of the latter growth, when they have made an end of eating up the grass of the land, then cometh famine. So shall it be with this generation. Except ye repent, ye shall all perish." And conversely the parable of St Matthew xiii. 33 in the mouth of Amos would have appeared in some such form as this: "Thus hath the Lord showed me, and behold leaven; and a woman took and hid it in three measures of meal till the whole was leavened. And the Lord said, So shall it be with the kingdom of heaven." And similarly St Matthew xxiv. 27 in Old Testament language would be, "Thus hath the Lord showed me, and behold lightning cometh forth from the east and shineth unto the west. And He said, What

seest thou? And I said, I see lightning. And He said, So shall be the coming of the Son of Man."

At the same time it must be remembered that Hebrew is essentially a language of poetry rather than of dogma. It could not be otherwise with a language in which the metaphorical has not yet crystallised into the abstract. And since a Hebrew could scarcely speak without using a metaphor, and sometimes, as in Isaiah xxviii. 18, blended two or more irreconcilable metaphors in one sentence, it is obvious that he did not expect to be understood *au pied de la lettre*. He accordingly could speak, and did speak, with a freedom which, to our dogmatically trained minds, is apt to be incomprehensible. It was not only from the physical world that he took his illustrations. He did not shrink from laying his scenes in the invisible world, and making even the Almighty Himself an actor on his stage. He could picture the state after death of the king of Babylon; he could set forth in dramatic form the fact of Ahab's infatuation and its cause: he could picture Joshua the high priest as on his trial before a heavenly tribunal; and, by a mingling of metaphors which it almost requires a Hebrew mind to follow, he could represent Joshua and Zerubbabel as the olive trees which supplied the oil for the lamps that typify the eyes of the Lord, or, in other words, Joshua and Zerubbabel as the means through which Jehovah's care for Israel should be manifested.

And when we turn to the teaching of Jesus, we see exactly the same characteristics. The words of our Lord given in St Matthew xxii. 30 represent the life hereafter as something beyond the power of man's imagination. Yet, when He was not discussing the state after death, but was inculcating a great practical lesson, Jesus did not hesitate to place the second act of His drama in the unseen world. It is as unreasonable to argue from the parable of Dives and Lazarus as to the nature of the hereafter as it would be to deduce from the parable of Micaiah the son of Imlah that Jehovah practises and delights in deceit.

And similarly in the great parable of the judgment given in St Matt. xxv. 31–46, the essential truth so dramatically stated is the fact that what is done to the least of Christ's brethren is done to Him. There is no more reason to interpret His words in this connexion literally than to imagine a literal assembling of all nations to worship at Jerusalem.

It is most important to keep in mind the parallelism between the words of the Old Testament prophets and the words of Jesus, especially in a study of those passages of the Gospels which are commonly called "eschatological." Whether there is any "eschatology" (in the strict sense of the word) in the Gospels is doubtful. St Matthew xxiv. 29, it is true, speaks of the darkening of the sun, and of the failure of the moon to give light, of the falling of the stars from heaven, and the shaking of the powers of the heaven; but these things, however they may have been understood by those who first heard them, are not "eschatological," at least not if one can assume that Jesus spoke and thought as an Old Testament prophet. For, to refer to but one passage of the Old Testament prophets, in Isaiah xiii. 9–13 we read: "Behold, the day of the Lord cometh, cruel, with wrath and fierce anger; to make the land a desolation, and to destroy the sinners thereof out of it. For the stars of heaven and the constellations thereof shall not give their light: the sun shall be darkened in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine. And I will punish the world for their evil, and the wicked for their iniquity; and I will cause the arrogancy of the proud to cease, and will lay low the haughtiness of the terrible. I will make a man more rare than fine gold, even a man than the pure gold of Ophir. Therefore I will make the heavens to tremble, and the earth shall be shaken out of her place, in the wrath of the Lord of hosts, and in the day of his fierce anger"; but all this description is not "eschatological." The phenomena here described are those that most terrify primitive man; and the piling up of terrors is only to emphasise the fact that the passing away of the existing state of things in the political

world will be accompanied with wars that bring retribution upon the ungodly.

And that Jesus did think and speak, not as the men of His generation thought and spoke, but as the prophets, is clear from more than one recorded saying of His. Indeed, considering what our Lord's disciples (in common with their contemporaries) believed, it is nothing less than a miracle that they recorded what they did.

When St John the Baptist was asked whether he was Elijah, he replied, "I am not." Having regard to the literal way in which his questioners understood the saying of Malachi, the Baptist could scarcely have given any other answer. Jesus, however, says, "If ye will receive it, this is the Elijah which was to come"; thereby showing that He understood Malachi as the prophet meant to be understood, viz., as looking, not for the return of the actual Elijah, but for the coming of *an* Elijah.[1] And this difference in interpretation of the Old Testament is not an isolated case. Jesus, indeed, perceived the true meaning of the prophets as did no one else in His generation. He saw the *allegorical* teaching of the great apocalypse of Daniel; He apprehended the true meaning of the vision of the "son of man," *i.e.* "the people of the saints of the Most High"; He saw that the suffering "servant" of the book of Isaiah was only another aspect of the "son of man" of Daniel, and of Jonah in the allegory which bears that name; He saw that the "day of the Lord" is not the day of the destruction of the physical universe, but the day of crisis, the day on which the Lord separates those who love the truth from those who love and make a lie. So imbued with prophetic thought is He, that since He identifies Himself with the truth, He can call the "day of the Lord" in the lifetime of a saint of old *His day*, saying, "Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day."

In arguing with captious opponents, it is true, Jesus

[1] Another example of this idiom occurs in Jeremiah xxii. 6, "Thou art a Gilead unto me," *i.e.* fertile like Gilead.

adopts the attitude of His time towards the Old Testament, only insisting that those who find fault with Him are inconsistent with their own method of interpretation. But in His own spiritual life, or when enforcing or illustrating a lesson to those willing to be taught, He always quotes the prophets in the true prophetic sense. He realises that the language of the prophets is the language of allegory. Indeed, His own language is, in many respects, so strikingly similar, that, if His words were found in Hebrew, they would be at once regarded as belonging to the volume of the prophets.

What would have happened, we may ask, to make use of an anachronism, if Amos or Jeremiah or one of the old prophets could have gone into a rabbinic lecture-room in the days of Jesus? What would have happened if prophetic faith and conviction had been confronted with rabbinic traditionalism? if prophetic poetry had encountered rabbinic legalism? if prophetic allegory had met with rabbinic literalism? Exactly what did happen in the days of Jesus. In Him we see prophecy struggling against rabbinism, poetry against prose. When He would have lifted men up to God, they preferred to grovel among legal subtleties. While He took His stand in the pure air and light of the mountain top, they bent over the backwaters and sewers of the past.

And as in the method and form, so also in the essential character of His teaching Jesus showed Himself one of the prophets. We are told that "the multitudes were astonished at His teaching: for He taught them as one having authority, and not as their scribes"; and to us who have been accustomed to look to Him as Lord and Master throughout our lives, it seems quite natural that He should have so taught. But when we compare His sayings with those of the religious teachers of His age, we cannot fail to be particularly impressed with this characteristic. Let us compare, for example, the sayings of Jesus with the epistles of St Paul. In the latter we have the teaching of a *rabbi*, albeit one fully imbued with the doctrine of Christ. It is true that St Paul claims to have

received his Gospel from God Himself (and those who have drunk in his teaching will not wish to gainsay him); nevertheless St Paul is presented to us as "a man under authority." The Gospel which he has received is not a new message which he is the first to deliver, but a definite unchanging doctrine committed to him in common with many other Christian teachers. St Paul is an exponent of an existing law rather than the giver of a new law. He is a scribe well instructed in the law, bringing out of his treasure things new as well as old.

But if, after reading the Epistle to the Galatians or that to the Romans, we turn to the Gospel record of our Saviour's words, in how different an atmosphere we find ourselves! It is not that there is any fundamental disagreement between them. Jesus taught His disciples to pray, "Our Father, which art in heaven," and into St Paul's heart God had sent the spirit of His Son, crying, Abba, Father. But whereas in St Paul's writings we see the highest teaching of God set forth by rabbinic methods, in the Gospel we see, as it were, the creation of that teaching. Read, for example, Jesus' pronouncement that whatsoever from without goeth into a man cannot defile him (the pronouncement which, it is said, made all meats clean); and then read St Paul's justification to the Galatians of the liberty of the Gospel. St Paul is, indeed, in essential agreement with the teaching of his Master; but the road by which he has arrived at that teaching, and his method of setting it forth to others, is very different.

The teaching of the prophets, like that of our Lord, is essentially *creative* teaching. They have no creed, no dogmas, only an all-pervading, all-mastering sense of the reality of Jehovah, and of His righteousness, His goodness and His power. They know in every crisis what is Jehovah's will, since they know that He is eternally the same, and that in Him exist whatsoever things are good, whatsoever is righteous, whatsoever is true, whatsoever is merciful, whatsoever is holy.

And as the authoritative nature of Jesus' teaching comes out in His bold affirmation of truth without regard to its

effect on existing thought or custom, as, for example, when He showed that all meats are clean, so also is it with the prophets. They also draw lessons directly from what they see in the visible universe. Read these words of Jeremiah (v. 23): "Fear ye not me? saith the Lord: will ye not tremble at my presence, which have placed the sand for the bound of the sea by a perpetual decree that it cannot pass it? and though the waves thereof toss themselves, yet can they not prevail: though they roar, yet can they not pass over it." Is it not the same voice of prophecy which draws a lesson as to the goodness of God from the fact that "He makes his sun to shine on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust"?

Or again, consider this utterance of prophecy so startling in its audacity: "Thus saith the Lord, the heaven is my throne and the earth is my footstool: what manner of house will ye build unto me? and what place shall be my rest? For all these things hath my hand made, and so all these things came to be, saith the Lord: but to this man will I look, even to him that is poor and of a contrite spirit, and that trembleth at my word": and compare this later utterance, equally startling, as addressed by an orthodox Jew to a Samaritan dissenter, "The hour cometh, when neither in this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, shall ye worship the Father. . . . The hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in Spirit and truth: for such doth the Father seek to be his worshippers."

It is unnecessary to speak of the similarity in the response evoked by the teaching of the prophets and that of Christ. Jerusalem, that had killed the prophets of old, and had stoned them that were sent unto her, true to her character, cried out against her greatest Prophet, "Let Him be crucified."

But it is not in its method and nature only that the prophets' teaching presents a parallel to that of our Lord: another and even more striking point of resemblance is found in the fact that the former has been transmitted to us in the same way as the latter.

It might perhaps be thought that on this point we have little information, at least in the case of the prophets. The only evidence of any sort available on the subject is internal evidence; and this would tell us little, were it not for one illuminating sentence in the book of Isaiah. It would seem that at the beginning of his ministry Isaiah had appealed to his nation as a whole, at all events to those who were in any sense its leaders; but he was soon compelled sorrowfully to admit that the nation as a whole was altogether unprepared to receive his teaching. If his words were to be preserved as a little leaven to leaven the whole lump of superstition and ignorance, they must be committed to the keeping of an inner circle of hearers. "Bind thou up the testimony, seal the law among my disciples," the prophet cried (Isaiah viii. 16); or rather, as with a slight correction in the original Hebrew, we may render his words, "the admonition must be bound up; the teaching must be sealed up in my disciples." And the prophet goes on, "I will wait for the Lord that hideth his face from the house of Jacob, and I will look for him. Behold I and the children whom the Lord hath given me are for signs and for wonders in Israel from the Lord of hosts which dwelleth in Mount Zion."

It is clear from these words that it is to Isaiah's disciples that we owe the preservation of his sayings; and the supposition of an original oral tradition will account for many of the problems, not only of the book which bears the name of Isaiah, but of other prophetic books also. For what is true of Isaiah is probably true of other prophets as well; although of all the disciples of all the prophets the name of one only has come down to us. But because Baruch is the only disciple of Jeremiah actually mentioned, we need not conclude that there were no others. At least half the whole number of our Lord's Apostles whose names we know are little more than mere names to us. Yet there were many more, almost equally closely associated with Him, whose very existence we should scarcely have suspected, were it not that two of them,

Joseph called Barsabbas and Matthias, were selected candidates for the apostleship forfeited by Judas Iscariot, and it is said of those from whom the selection was made (Acts i. 21, 22), that they "companied with" the Apostles "all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among" them, "beginning from the baptism of John, unto the day that he was received up."

And as it will generally be conceded that, if we are to allow to the Gospels any historical value whatsoever (whether we adopt an oral or documentary hypothesis to account for their present form), we must ultimately go back to the memories of individual disciples or of groups of disciples, we may inquire whether any of the prophetical scriptures that have come down to us show signs of a similar origin.

In the case of some prophets, notably Ezekiel, it is probable that we owe the existing records to the authors themselves. Thus we may reasonably suppose that Ezekiel originally composed some of his prophecies in writing, and that in the case of others he himself wrote down the gist of what he had said. In some other books, however, internal evidence is strongly against any such supposition. Even when all reasonable allowance has been made for textual corruption and the mutilation of documents, it is scarcely possible that Hosea or Isaiah or Micah could have written down their respective sayings in the form in which they have reached us. Just as it is inconceivable that our Lord originally uttered the four sayings contained in St Luke xvi. 15–18, for example, in the close connexion in which we now find them, so it is inconceivable that either of the three prophets just named could himself have written down his λόγια in their present arrangement. Even when a section seems to possess a certain literary unity, a minute examination will often reveal the fact that this unity is only apparent, and is, indeed, due to an editor.

A full discussion of this subject would involve a critical analysis of all the prophetical books; but a few illustrations may be given.

A casual reader of the Immanuel prophecy in Isaiah vii. and viii. would naturally imagine that he had before him a homogeneous section composed at no great distance of time from the occurrence of the events and the utterance of the prophecies recorded. But when we carefully examine the passage in the light of the history of the period, we find that we have in juxtaposition sayings which were originally separated by an interval of at least some months, and which refer to different historical events.

Briefly, the early history of the reign of Ahaz appears to have been as follows. Owing to the culmination of that restless desire for independence, which had so long characterised the house of David, and which Isaiah so earnestly deprecated, the allied forces of Damascus and North Israel invaded Judah with the object of putting an end to the Davidic dynasty. Ahaz and his advisers were panic-stricken; Isaiah alone maintained that the power of the allied forces was rotten, and that Judah had nothing to fear from them. The king, however, notwithstanding Isaiah's vehement denunciation of his policy, appealed to Assyria. These events took place in the space of something over a year. Early in 735 or even in 736 B.C., Ahaz followed the policy to which Isaiah refers (vii. 13) as "wearying men." Then, during the consequent invasion of Judah by the allied forces of North Israel and Damascus, which must be placed in 735 B.C., occurred Isaiah's conversation with Ahaz, and his declaration that the allied kingdoms were but burnt-out firebrands, obviously implying that they had been burnt by the Assyrian fire. On the same occasion the sign of Immanuel was given, by which the prophet asserted that, by the time when a child to be born within a year should be of age to refuse evil and choose good, the land of the two allied kings would be desolate.

Isaiah vii. 16, therefore, is a promise to encourage Ahaz. But v. 15, as is shown by vv. 21–25, is a *threat*, warning Ahaz of the certain consequence of an appeal to Assyria; v. 15, therefore, has been placed before v. 16, because it, like v. 16,

contained the phrase "to refuse the evil and choose the good." But a diet of curds and honey in consequence of the cessation of agriculture is a sorry fulfilment of the *promise* implied in the name *Immanuel*; and, indeed, in all probability v. 15 does not properly refer to Immanuel at all, but to *Maher-shalal-hash-baz*. Again, v. 17 is a description of the certain consequences of the appeal to Assyria, to which a still later saying, uttered when an Egyptian as well as an Assyrian party was urging its policy, is added, viz., vv. 18, 19. To the same period as v. 17 belong vv. 20–25. Apparently as soon as the idea of an appeal to Assyria had been mooted, probably before it had actually been carried out, Isaiah, in the presence of credible witnesses, Uriah and Zechariah, wrote on a great tablet the name *Maher-shalal-hash-baz, i.e. Plundering speeds, looting hastens.* Nine months after a son was born to Isaiah, and received as a name the words which his father had written on the tablet. Isaiah viii. 4, it is true, as it stands, refers the plundering and the looting to North Israel and Damascus; but the natural inference from the name itself is that the prophet meant the plundering and looting of Judah. If this inference is correct, viii. 4 is either the editor's comment on the name, or, if it is genuine, it should change places with vii. 15, and should refer to Immanuel. To the period of the birth of Maher-shalal-hash-baz belongs the section viii. 5–8, except that the last words, "thy land, O Immanuel," can hardly be correct, and should probably be read, "the land of Israel; for God is with us," the last clause being incorrectly copied from v. 10. The following words in vv. 9, 10, if they belong to the reign of Ahaz at all, and are not to be assigned to the time of Sennacherib, must be referred to the *Immanuel* prophecy, and understood as having reference to North Israel and Damascus.

If the above analysis be accepted, the natural conclusion is that Isaiah's utterances during the years 735, 734 B.C. were at first preserved orally among his disciples, and that the editor who arranged them in their present form, having but slight

knowledge of the history of the period, depended for his arrangement rather on similarities of phraseology than on the actual meaning of each fragmentary λόγιον.

In like manner, to turn to the Gospels, the parable of the Nobleman who went into a far country to receive a kingdom, as given in St Luke xix. 11–27, has been plausibly regarded as a combination of two distinct parables, viz., that of the Pounds (Talents, St Matt. xxv. 14–30) and one of certain Rebellious Citizens; and likewise the parable of the Marriage Supper, as given in St Matt. xxii. 1–14, is not improbably a conflation of two parables, each relating a supper given by a king, but differing in the description of the guests.

These illustrations of editorial combination in the prophets and Gospels will perhaps not commend themselves to all, and fortunately other parallels in the composition of the prophetical books and the Gospels are not wanting. It will be readily admitted that in the Gospels, especially St Matthew's, there are groups of sayings which cannot have been spoken on one occasion, and are arranged according to subject matter. The Sermon on the Mount is a familiar instance of this. So, likewise, is the denunciation of the scribes and Pharisees in St Matthew xxiii. 13–36. The latter passage is almost the counterpart of Isaiah v. 8–24, which consists of a string of "woes";[1] though the "woe" in Isaiah x. 1–4, which one would expect to be associated with them, occurs in a different connexion, followed by a "woe" addressed to the Assyrian.

Similarly in Isaiah v. 25, ix. 8–x. 4 we have a series of short utterances all closing with the magnificent refrain, "For all this his anger is not turned away, but his hand is stretched out still." Yet an examination of these utterances will show that they cannot originally have formed one discourse, since the phrase "For all this" (בְּכָל־זֹאת) is not always used in precisely the same sense; in some places (*e.g.* v. 25) being equivalent to "In spite of all this trouble"; in others (*e.g.*

[1] It may be pointed out that "woe" is too strong a translation. "Ah" would be better.

ix. 12, 17, 21, and perhaps x. 4) to "Because of all this wickedness."

Nor is this characteristic of Isaiah only. The book which bears the name of Amos, with the exception of certain passages which are pretty obviously exilic additions, is generally considered to be genuine; and, more than most of the prophetical books, might claim unity of authorship. Yet even here there are not wanting signs that sayings of Amos spoken on different occasions have been skilfully arranged by an editor, some Old Testament St Matthew, who aimed at combining λόγια of similar import. Few people nowadays will assert that the parables of the Kingdom of Heaven in St Matthew xiii. were all uttered on one occasion; and in like manner the so-called "visions" in Amos vii.–ix. cannot be all of the same date. For in the first two visions (vii. 1–6) Amos holds out the possibility of repentance and salvation; in the later visions Jehovah's sentence is irrevocable: He will not again pass by His people any more.

We need not necessarily assume, because a phrase is used in one verse in a somewhat different sense from that which it bears in another, that in one of the two it must be by a different author. Words which suggest one meaning to a man in the impetuosity of his youth may well have a different meaning to him in later years, when he is disciplined by suffering. Thus in one of his earliest sermons, that on the text "Jezreel," the prophet Hosea, thinking only of the historical associations of the word, preached Jehovah's vengeance on the house of Jehu; but at a later time, when the sorrow of his own home had wrought its discipline upon his character, and when the threatened blow had fallen, the prophet preached another sermon on the same text, the echo of which we find in Hosea ii. 23, representing the true Israel as *Jezreel*,[1] "God's sowing," a sowing to be followed by a harvest of blessing.

[1] *N.B.*—In their original Hebrew forms there was much more similarity between the names "Israel" and "Jezreel" than is suggested by the forms with which we are familiar in English.

Similarly, when Isaiah named his eldest son Shear-jashub, the phrase in his mind must have conveyed a *threat*, "Only a remnant will come back" (*i.e.* probably not from exile, but from the suicidal war that the policy of the house of David was provoking); and a fragment of the prophet's sermon on the occasion of the naming of a child is perhaps found in Isaiah x. 22, 23. The two previous verses, however, are a promise; hence in v. 21, which we need not necessarily reject as non-Isaianic, the phrase "A remnant shall return" (שאר ישוב) must mean "A remnant will repent."

It would seem that the purpose of the earliest Gospel writers was to give an account of the things which Jesus *did*: somewhat later attempts were made to collect the various reminiscences of the things which He had *said*. In the prophetical books these processes are reversed. First we have collections of the prophets' sayings; then, probably considerably later, we have some slight attempts to connect the prophets' sayings with their lives. In some cases, perhaps, this was not done till the recollections of the prophets' lives had almost faded away; and in such cases the editor would doubtless seize any opportunity of reconstructing history from the sayings which he was editing. In this way we may account for the historical details in Isaiah vii. The poetical expression in v. 2 shows that the editor drew his facts from some prophetic discourse.

The portion of the prophetical books where this process seems to have been carried furthest is Hosea i.–iii. Here we have ostensibly a brief outline of incidents in the prophet's life and of teaching which he gave in consequence of those incidents. That this whole section rests upon actual utterances of Hosea is not improbable. Chapter iii. 1–3, indeed, in which Hosea speaks in the first person, may fairly represent the account which he gave his disciples of his recovery of Gomer; and verse 4 may with equal probability represent the application of his own history to Israel as delivered to his disciples at the same time. In chapters i. and ii., however, the editor

has allowed himself more license, not only telling in the third person the story which Hosea told in the first, but blending together into a continuous discourse sayings which must have been spread over the prophet's whole ministry. It is evident, however, that this section has been mutilated. Thus, just as Hosea's words on Israel in iii. 4 are immediately preceded by the words to Gomer which suggested them, so his words in ii. 2 were probably originally preceded by an account of an exhortation by the prophet to his children to plead with their mother to give up her sinful life.

He would be a sanguine man who would hope to clear up all the difficulties in Hosea, for in many cases the text is corrupt past restoration; still there are not a few verses which give a perfectly intelligible sense, but which seem to have no possible connexion with their context. But if it be remembered that Hosea's ministry lasted a considerable time, perhaps into the latter days of the Northern Kingdom, and that during his ministry political, and possibly religious, changes were coming thick and fast, it is evident that utterances which had direct reference to contemporary events would in after times be difficult to explain without precise knowledge of those events.

And when, further, we take into account the Semitic disregard of exact order, as instanced by the book of Jeremiah and the Koran, and consider that the sayings of the prophets would frequently be strung together without regard to the circumstances under which they were spoken, it is little wonder if we find much that baffles our exegesis. It must, however, be remembered that this lack of chronological arrangement belongs to the Gospels as well as to the prophetical books: only, since our Lord's sayings concern universal ethics rather than contemporary local politics, we are not conscious of the incongruity of their arrangement as we are in the case of the prophets.

It would be possible to multiply almost indefinitely instances of Old Testament parallels to Christ and the Gospels.

Those above given, however, will perhaps be sufficient to show that students of the prophets and students of the Gospels have not severally unique problems to solve, but one and the same. As the preaching of Jesus did not differ in kind from that of the prophets who preceded Him, but is only the perfect consummation of it, so the Gospels (*i.e.* primarily the synoptic Gospels) do not differ in kind from the prophetical books.

As we describe the first book of the New Testament as the Gospel of Jesus Christ according to St Matthew, so we may describe the nucleus of the book of Jeremiah as the Gospel of Jeremiah according to Baruch.

And as those who have worked at the synoptic problem may give the greatest help to those who are working at the prophetical books, so, conversely, students of the prophets may help students of the Gospels to interpret the words of the Lord.

It needs a prophet to interpret a prophet. If we are to understand our Lord, we must not go where His contemporaries went for their ideas, either to Pharisaic legalists or to visionary writers of apocalypses, but to the scriptures in which the mind of Jesus Himself was steeped, the scriptures which He alone of His generation interpreted in their natural meaning.

The article of the Christian faith which teaches us to "believe in the Holy Ghost. . . . Who spake by the prophets" should be in itself sufficient to quicken our interest in Old Testament prophecy: much more meaning, then, must it have for us, when we remember that prophecy is not confined to the Old Testament; and that God, who of old time spoke to the fathers in the prophets, did not change His method when He spoke to the world in His Son.

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THE ZOROASTRIAN MESSIAH.

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IT is a significant circumstance that each of the two great modern Dictionaries of the Bible, edited by Dr Hastings and Professor Cheyne respectively, has introduced an article on Zoroastrianism as essential for the student of the Hebrew Scriptures. There is a difference of opinion among scholars as to which way the current of influence flowed, whether from Judaism to Parsiism, or, more probably, as Dr Mills and others think, in the other direction. Certainly, in the simplicity of its worship and abhorrence of idolatry, as well as in the purity of its ethical system, with its earnest insistence on "pure thoughts, pure words, pure deeds" as the essentials of religion, no other faith comes so close to that of the Old and New Testaments as that of Zoroaster. Of all the sacred books of the heathen, the most sublime and spiritual is the earlier Avesta. The late Canon Cook, an accomplished student of religions, declared that in its sixth chant (*Yaçna*, xxxiii.) the highest act of pure worship, absolute devotion of self to the Supreme Being, is presented in a form and with a fulness for which he knew no parallel save in Holy Scripture.[1] Another more recent writer, Dr A. V. W. Jackson, holds that, outside our own Bible, hardly any religion contains so clear a grasp of the ideas of right and wrong, or presents so exalted a view of the coming of a Saviour, a resurrection and

[1] *Origins of Religion and Language*, p. 245. See also the Catechism of the modern Parsis in Max Müller, *Chips*, i. 173 f.

judgment, the future rewards and punishments awaiting the immortal soul, and the life everlasting, as is presented in the Avesta.[1]

In the present paper I propose to examine one of the most interesting of the eschatological ideas of this remarkable religion—the belief as to what will come to pass in the latter days, when the Redeemer of the Iranian world, whom the faithful expect and long for, shall come to judgment.

To Zarathustra shall one day be born at the end of time a son supernaturally begotten. A virgin-mother, named Vispa-tarvi, "The All-conquering," with reference to the achievements of her great son, shall give him birth. He shall be called Astvat-erta, "embodied piety," or "incarnate goodness"; and this victorious Saviour shall come from Kansu,[2] far distant in the east, the fountain and abode of light (*Yasht*, xiii. 129, xix. 92). This latter point is to be noted as of importance. "He will come forth from the region of the dawn," and his name shall be Sôshyôs or Saoshyant. When he comes to earth he will free the world from decay and death. Then men shall be raised from the dead, the Spirit of Evil, Angra Mainyu, shall be finally overcome and destroyed, and everlasting happiness shall reign over a renovated world.[3] The light of sovereignty or kingly glory (*hvarenô*) will rest upon Saoshyant, that he may bring in "life everlasting, undecaying, imperishable, incorruptible, full of vigour, at the time when the dead shall be raised. Then all the world will remain for eternity in a state of righteousness, the devil and all his brood will be doomed to destruction, and he shall disappear from all those places where once he used to attack the righteous man in order to kill him. The imperishableness (eternising, *frashô-kerati*) of life then shall commence"

[1] *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran.*

[2] Otherwise Kāsava (Darmesteter, *The Zend-Avesta, Vendîdâd*, xix. 5).

[3] J. Darmesteter, *op. cit.*, vol. i. pp. lvi., lxxix. (*Sacred Books of the East*, vol. iv.); *Bundahis*, xxx. 4 (*S.B.E.*, v. 121).

(the *Zamyâd Yasht*).[1] It is further promised that the companions of Saoshyant will share in his divine splendour; men will be as the archangels. There is much here, it will be seen, that corresponds to Christian ideas (compare St Matt. xiii. 43, xxii. 30).

The name which this glorious being bears, if we could interpret it, would no doubt be an index to his nature; but, as far as I can find, none of the great Avestan scholars, Darmesteter, Haug, De Harlez, Mills, and West, have succeeded in explaining it. Dr W. Geiger indeed suggests that the name was in its original form Saoshyās or Sôshyans, as in the Pahlavi texts, and meant "Saviour," being derived from the root *su*, to help or rescue.[2] This hardly accounts for the form of the word. It is worth considering whether its provenance is not rather to be sought in the Babylonian religion, with which Zoroastrianism had many points of contact. No one can doubt that the final victory of Sôshyôs is the triumph of the power of Light over that of Darkness, in strict accordance with the dualism of Mazdeism, and it is highly significant that he is always represented as coming from "the region of the dawn," "far distant in the east" (*Vendîdâd*, xix. 5). This plainly reveals the solar character of the deliverer. I therefore propose to recognise in Sôshyôs the name of the Babylonian Sun-god Shamash, which we know was pronounced Shawash. Indeed, Hesychius says that the Babylonians called the sun Saôs (Σαὼς, better Σαϝὼς, Sawôs); and in the Ptolemaic Canon Saos-dûchinos stands for the Babylonian King Shamash-shum-ukîn, just as Shesh-bazzar stands for Shamash-bel-utsur. I have submitted this suggestion to an eminent Oriental scholar, Rev. C. J. Ball, who considers it to be a probable and attractive identification, although he himself prefers to compare Sôshyôs with Shuriyash, a Kassite name of the Sun-god. Assuming that Sôshyôs borrows his name from the

[1] Haug, *Essays on the Parsis*, 217, 312; Pfleiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 84.

[2] W. Geiger, *Civilisation of Eastern Iranians*, i. 110; so also Spiegel.

Babylonian Shawash (Shamash = Heb. *shemesh*, the sun), we notice that he preserves many of the characteristics of his prototype. Shamash, for instance, is invoked as an essentially beneficent being and righteous judge, one who dispels the darkness of misfortune, disseminates truth, and destroys the wicked; but at the same time delights in giving health to the sick man, deliverance to the captive, and prosperity to the righteous.[1]

"O Shamash! Judge of the world, director of its laws art thou."

"Strong chief whose wide heart embraces in mercy all that exists."[2]

Another hymn even ascribes to him the power of raising the dead to life:

"O Shamash, King of heaven and earth, director of things above and below;
O Shamash, thou that clothest the dead with life, delivered by thy hands."[3]

Saoshyant is an extended form, probably of a participial character, like Vivasvant in the Vedas, "the Wide-gleaming," the sun, and seems to be a *nomen agentis*. It would thus mean playing the rôle of the sun, exercising genial, sunlike influence (as if in Greek ἡλιόων or ἡλιάζων, being sunny, or in Latin *sōlans*, if *sōlari* be from *sol*). It marks the kindly and comforting attributes of the Deliverer; as the *Yasht* (xiii. 129) says, "He will be Saoshyant (the Beneficent One) because he will benefit the whole bodily world."[4] Accordingly the faithful also, who by their good deeds help on the work of final restoration to be performed by Sôshyôs, are called Saoshyants or Solarising Ones.

If this account of the origin of the Zoroastrian Mediator be correct, we can further trace many interesting points of coincidence with Marduk (or Merodach), the "great lord" of the Babylonian pantheon. Marduk, the god of growing light, whether of the morning or of the springtime, is near

[1] See Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, 71; Maspero, *Dawn of Civilisation*, 657.

[2] Jastrow, 302, 303.

[3] Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, 100.

[4] *Sacred Books of the East*, xxiii. 220.

akin to Shamash, and as essentially similar shared in a joint worship. As a solar power he was honoured above all as the life-giving deity, "the merciful," "the benefactor of mankind." The healer of the sick, the deliverer of the captive, the bestower of blessings, he shares with Shamash the glorious attribute of being able to restore the dead to life.[1] The potent sun of spring, which revivifies the dormant vegetation after its wintry death, is naturally conceived as the god of resurrection for man also. Maru-duk is interpreted as meaning "the son of the brilliant chamber," that is, the glorious east out of which he issues, at the beginning of each day and each year, to give light and dispense judgment to mankind.[2] He acts as mediator between his father, the supreme God, Ea, and his creatures, whom he compassionates in their miseries and heals of their diseases. But his highest title remains "the restorer of the dead to life." He is thus addressed in a hymn to his honour:

> "O merciful one who loveth to give life to the dead,
> Marduk, King of heaven and earth! . . .
> The spell affording life is thine,
> The breath of life is thine . . .
> Thou restorest the dead to life, thou bringest things to completeness,
> O merciful one among the gods!"[3]

The Babylonians, as we see, at an early date believed in a resurrection, and they attributed it to the mercy and power of the life-giving Sun-god, who was naturally regarded as the source of all earthly existence. The eloquent passage will be remembered in which Tertullian speaks of the daily resurrection and rending of the tomb produced by the rising of the sun.[4] It is he that each morning brings back new life and activity to a world that lay buried in the silence of the night. It is he that every spring calls up the dead vegetation out of its cold grave in the joyful Easter of nature. It is he that bestows on the sons of men the genial warmth and health and

[1] Jastrow, 120.
[2] Jastrow, 116, 630. Du-azagga, "the brilliant chamber."
[3] *Id.*, 307.
[4] *De Resurr. Carnis*, cap. xii.

food which save them from perishing. It was an obvious thing, therefore, to associate the return of the sun, whether in the morning or the springtime, with the ideas of a renewal of life and a resurrection from the dead. And this is the rôle played by the solar deliverer Sôshyôs. We are expressly told that he will come from the region of the dawn when he returns to earth to raise mankind from the grave; exactly as Marduk, the light-bringer, when he rises over the eastern waters, is said to be victorious over the power of evil, Tiâmât,[1] and is "the Prince who does good to men."

It would be an interesting inquiry to investigate how far these Iranian and Babylonian conceptions may have helped to colour the symbolic language of the Hebrews. They also certainly conceived the coming of the Messiah under the same figure of the sun rising in splendour over a darkened world. The great sun-disk with wide-extended wings (signifying probably the long, level beams of daybreak), which was with the Assyrians a favourite symbol of the divinity, and from them was derived far and wide into all lands, seems to have been present to the mind of the prophet Malachi when he wrote: "The Sun of righteousness shall arise with healing in his wings" (iv. 2). To the devout Israelite his expectation of the promised Deliverer often seemed like a patient waiting for the sunrise:

> "My soul looketh for the Lord
> More than watchmen look for the morning" (Ps. cxxx. 6).

Accordingly, when the Greek translators came to the Messianic announcement of Zechariah (vi. 12), "Behold the man whose name is the Branch" (Heb. *tzemach*, from a Semitic root which might mean "to shine forth" as well as "to sprout forth"), they rendered it by the ordinary word for sunrise (ἀνατολή); and some of the Christian Fathers, as well as Philo,[2] understood it as meaning, "Behold the Man whose name is the East." So it is in the Vulgate, "Ecce Vir oriens nomen

[1] Jensen, *Kosmologie der Babylonier*, 307.

[2] *On the Confusion of Languages*, ch. xiv.

ejus." Dr Donne's effigy in St Paul's bears the inscription, "Hic licet in occiduo cinere aspicit Eum Cujus nomen est Oriens":

> "Mindful of Him who in the Orient born
> There lived, and on the Cross His life resigned,
> And who, from out the regions of the morn
> Issuing in pomp, shall come to judge mankind." [1]

This interpretation of the passage was the more natural as the same Greek word (*anatŏlê*, sunrise) is explicitly used of the revealed Christ in Zacharias's hymn, as if it were a recognised name for the Messiah:

> "The Dayspring from on high hath visited us,
> To shine upon them that sit in darkness" (St Luke i. 78).

Hymn-writers quite naturally adopt the same metaphor, as Caswall when he sings:

> "Christ, her Sun, all ill dispelling,
> Shines upon the morning skies."

The divergence of meaning in the Hebrew and Greek words is closely paralleled in the use of the Assyrian word *ṣît*, which, meaning originally a going forth or issuing, is commonly used for sunrise as well as for a sprout or offspring; as, indeed, our own "spring," whether used of the day or of the year, is only a nasalised form of "sprig," akin to "spray" and "sprout."

The same conception of the Messianic deliverer is already found in the Sybilline Oracles (iii. 652 *seq.*) about 150 B.C.: "Then from the sun God shall send a King who shall cause all the earth to cease from wicked war, killing indeed some, and making faithful treaties with others." [2] Indeed, the idea that when God shall visit His people it will be as the morning sun rising over Mount Zion occurs still earlier, in Isaiah lx. 2–3: "Upon thee shall Jahveh dawn" and "Kings shall come to the brilliance of thy dawning" (Cheyne). This second Isaiah, himself probably of Babylonian origin, may well have remembered that Marduk bore the title of "Son of the holy mount," Du-azagga, the eastern horizon from which the sun

[1] Wordsworth. [2] W. J. Deane, *Pseudepigrapha*, p. 14.

arose, the dwelling-place of his father Ea, and that he was called Il Shaddê, "God of the two mountains," the divine Orient.[1] Amos, too, in a fine passage represents Jahveh as "treading on the high places (*bâmôth*) of the earth" (iv. 13), using the very word which in Babylonian (*bâmâtu*) is used as a synonym for *Shaddê*.[2]

"The morn
Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastward hill." [3]

The above usages, I am inclined to think, may help us to a better understanding of the ancient and difficult name Shaddai given to the God of the Patriarchs (*e.g.* Gen. xvii. 1; Ex. vi. 3), which probably bears the same meaning. The generally received opinion is that it is a figurative use of the Assyrian *shadû*, a mountain, *shaddê*, mountains, as if the mountain God, or a Being overwhelmingly high and great, and so the Almighty (Schrader, Friedr. Delitzsch, Hommel, Sayce). But as this word *shadû*, *shaddê*, was frequently used in Babylonian as a name for the Orient, with reference to the mountains to the east of Babylonia over which the sun was seen to rise, El Shaddai may well have meant originally "the God of the East," the Lord and Giver of Light. On a Babylonian tablet giving a primitive map of the world the east side is marked *Shadû*, and we find such divine names as Marduk-shadûa and Samsu-sata(na), "Marduk the Orient," "the Sun our Orient. (We may compare the contrasted phrase for the west in Icelandic, *solen bjerges*, the mountained sun; Ital. *tramontato*; Sansk. *asta*, the western mountain, sunset.)

But Radau shows that Shaddai must be read in Assyrian as a dual, and thus the correct meaning is "the god of the two mountains";[4] and this is the exact representation given on an intaglio, in the Louvre, of Shamash rising between two peaks (called in Sumerian Mas, "the Twins"). See the figure given

[1] Radau, 59; Sayce, *Religions of Egypt and Assyria*, 374, 457.
[2] Ball, *Light from the East*, 151.
[3] *Hamlet*, i. 1. 167.
[4] *The Creation Story of Genesis*, 58.

in Maspero, *Dawn of Civilisation*, p. 656. Shamash with lifted foot beginning to climb over the eastern hills is a favourite subject on Babylonian seals, and "the double mountains which each day guard the sun" are mentioned in the Gilgamesh Tablet (ix. col. 2).[1] In precisely the same way the rising sun is called in Egyptian Hor-em-Khuti (Harmachis), *i.e.* "Horus of the two mountains," those namely from which he issues at dawn.[2] Indeed, the solar disk emerging from between two hills is the common hieroglyph for sunrise. To Abraham the Chaldean this presentment of the god of light must have been familiar as the worthiest symbol of Divinity, and we notice how natural the statement is that the Almighty appeared unto him at first not as Jahveh, but simply as El Shaddai (Ex. vi. 2, 3), God of the glorious East, the Marduk of his days of ignorance.

If space permitted, it might be shown that the conception of the Sun as a deliverer and raiser of the dead which underlay the Zoroastrian Redeemer Sôshyôs (= Shamash), and finds parallels among the Hebrews as well as the Babylonians and Egyptians, was common to other religions also. We might refer to Mithra as the solar mediator between God and mankind; Vishnu, the sun-deity of the Hindūs, whose final *avatâr* will not take place till the close of the present age, when he shall be born on earth and shall destroy all that work wickedness; Baldr, the white solar champion of the Teutons, whose victory when he returns from the under-world will mark the end of time; Quetzalcoatl, the sun-hero of the Mexicans, their mild benefactor, who has left earth, but at some future day shall appear from the east and bring back

[1] Boscawen, *Monuments and the Bible*, 63. So Mithra, who in the Avesta appears before sunrise on the rocky summits of the mountains, is represented in the Mithraic mysteries as born from the rock (Cumont, *Mysteries of Mithra*, 131).

[2] We may compare *ḫiq set*, "prince of the mountain," as a Hittite synonym for a Semitic "prince of the East" (*Proc. Soc. Bibl. Arch.*, xxiii. 97); Egyptian Annu, the eastern solar mountain over which the sun rises (*P.B.S.A.*, xviii. 8), and Assyrian Anu, the heaven god, "the King who comes forth from the holy mound."

peace and happiness and plenty to his down-trodden people; Michabo, "The Great White One," the hero-god of the Chipeway Indians, "a man that wrought miracles among them," says an old discoverer, "with some kind of broken resemblance to the Sonne of God." We cannot err in recognising in his majestic figure with the blond hair "the personified idea of Light transferred from the plane of physical phenomena into that of psychical anticipation."[1] We thus see that in many religions of primitive peoples there is found a cycle of legends about a returning Saviour, who will come from afar out of the morning light, born of a virgin, and the son of a deity. In all these heathen gropings after truth we observe the same idea coming into prominence, of a great life-giving deliverer returning to earth and inaugurating a new and golden era as the dawn of a better day—and this based on the familiar phenomenon of the power of light triumphing over the vanquished hosts of darkness and death.

A. SMYTHE PALMER.

VICARAGE, S. WOODFORD.

[1] D. G. Brinton, *Essays of an Americanist*, 131. So Byel Bog, "the White God" of the Slavs, triumphs over Czerno Bog, "the Black God" of darkness.

PHASES OF RELIGIOUS RECONSTRUCTION IN FRANCE AND GERMANY.

JAMES COLLIER,
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No more interesting personality has for a long time revealed itself to the critical observer than that of M. Ferdinand Brunetière, Professor at the École Normale, the training-school of French professors, and editor of the great French review. Twenty years ago he was indeed conservative in letters as in politics, but in religion he appeared to be frankly Voltairean. Interested in all manifestations of French thought, he seemed then concerned to prove that the irreligion of Voltaire was no importation from across the Channel and a loan from the English deists, but the outcome of a French tradition and the natural evolution of a vein of speculation at least a century old. Ten years ago he was still reserved on the religious question. Sympathetically reviewing the recent works of Balfour and Kidd, he declined to follow them on to the domain of religion; "we do not touch such topics here." It was a change of attitude. The old *Revue* was always looked upon by the Catholics as their implacable foe. Georges Sand was permitted to attack Catholicism in front and others in flank. When Vitet was allowed in 1867 to make a long and eloquent defence of Christianity in its pages, it was by way of privilege and exception. Havet's and Renan's most destructive essays in Biblical criticism appeared there. The last and finest of Renan's constructive essays (his *Examen*), published

there, rises no higher than to conceive that the existence of a Deity is a probability, and the immortality of the soul a faint hope. Brunetière's shorter notices were still hostile. Reviewing a book describing the alleged revival of faith, he contended that the facts stated by the author were susceptible of a different interpretation, and that facts had been omitted which told in a different sense.

With the new century came new thoughts and a new spirit. Eloquent Catholics like M. de Vogué, Étienne Lamy, and Mme. Bentzon have been permitted to contribute articles written in a Catholic vein. The correspondence of the eloquent Dominican, Father Didon, author of a biography of Jesus that rivalled Renan's in popularity—a correspondence redolent of Jesus and Palestine, and full of Christian sentiment—has also been lately there published. Other contributors were there allowed to perform their evolutions. An accomplished Russian dilettante (in the better sense), M. Teodor de Wyzewa, who at the end of the century was sceptical of James Tissot's re-creation of the scenes of Christ's life, in the beginning of the new is a convert, and sympathetically tells over again *Contes chrétiens* of the first century, which M. Brunetière as sympathetically reviewed. But the most significant sign of the times is a series of articles by M. Brunetière, aiming at the rehabilitation of Positivism as a metaphysic, the denigration of Protestantism, and the restoration of Catholicism.

He was not the first to perceive that revival of the Idealist philosophy which is the prerequisite of a religious revival. In an eloquent essay, composed on the model of a still more famous essay by Jouffroy, the late M. Caro described the death and the new-birth of philosophical dogmas. M. Brunetière gave it a leading place, and five years ago he himself published a companion sketch of "the renaissance of Idealism." In the autumn of 1901 he entered on an oratorical campaign in aid of the new doctrines, when he addressed the Lyonnese on "our grounds for hoping." In the following

January he spoke to the students of the Catholic university of Freiburg in Switzerland on the critical work of one of the two great masters of the last generation of French youth. He described the change that had come over the mind of Taine as he passed from philosophy to psychology, and from the psychology of individuals to that of peoples. Like Buckle, Taine sought in history a solution of the problems that philosophers had endeavoured to solve by meditation or dialectic. In the course of his vast inquest he saw all that a metaphysic or a verbalism of the schools had destroyed, and all that he himself, on the authority of Kant, had begun by doubting or disbelieving, rise from its ruins. The criticism of that very critical philosophy restored to the human mind the self-assurance it needs in order fully to possess its powers. Ethics was reinstated in its primacy, and history thus rescued from being an illusion or a phantasmagoria. Religion, finally, was discovered to be at once the foundation, the mainspring, and the surety of society. Taine thus passed from the Positivism of his youth to the Idealism of his riper years, and the transition symbolised the evolution of a whole period or phase of contemporary speculation.

Too evidently, the desire begat the vision in this half-imaginary reconstruction of the French thinker's toilsome progress towards a goal invisible to himself. But if the exposition is only prophetic of the orbit Taine *might* have traversed, it is historical of the one through which M. Brunetière has himself revolved. His first task, as it was Taine's, Renan's, and that of so many others, was to destroy in his own mind the prestige of the eighteenth century, mother of all French grandeurs, mother also of French fallacies, ferocities, and meannesses. What was its chief error? It made a god of society, and subordinated morals to politics. To it all questions were social questions. Science and art, ethics and religion, were to be governed and their truth determined by their social utility. Taken in a narrow sense, as the writers of the century were apt to take it, the doctrine was without doubt false and

injurious; taken in the wider significance given to utility by Darwin and Wallace, and still more in the far wider meaning assigned to it by Mr Benjamin Kidd, it is harmless and the greater part of the truth. Brunetière rebounded abruptly from it, believing that all social questions are at bottom moral questions. It was the first step of a whole new development.

A few months later he took another step, or rather a stride, in the same direction. What motived it? He had proved that irreligion in France was self-evolved, and that English influence was only a dynamic. He was now to show in his own person that English cross-fertilisation was again fruitful, if it was not creative. Some years before, he had read and meditated Kidd's *Social Evolution*; the new ideas it had generated, after a long gestation, now came to the birth. What is ethics? If metaphysic is the counterpart of theology, ethics is the mask of religion. There is no ethics known to history which is not the application of a religious conception; and (here borrowing from Mr Kidd) there is no obligation or sanction that is not ultra-rational. There can be no scientific ethics. Solidarity, which some French thinkers claim as a new ethical base, has its origin in religion, and has no meaning but in that. There can be no solidarity without submission to an external power, and, with Pascal, supported by Mr Kidd, M. Brunetière names this power supernatural. But whatever appellation we give to this, the belief in it is already a beginning of religion.

We are now in quest of a religion. Which among the many candidates for our favour shall we choose? We must elect between a religion founded on a philosophy of emanation, or Gnosticism, and one founded on the philosophy of evolution, or Agnosticism. All belong to one or other group,—unless, indeed, we can hold the two together and reconcile them. We will try, at all events. Comte received little honour in his own country in his lifetime, but he reaped no small fame abroad, especially in England, where he established first a school and then a church, and the prophet went back to France rehabilitated. When his centenary came round, a few

years ago, his countrymen were at last prepared to pay homage to his memory. They are now accepting his thought, if not exactly his system. What aid may we look for from him? He lends us three stepping-stones to a faith. He allies us with modern philosophy in being evolutionist; in giving prominence to the relative he virtually posits an absolute; and he has a profound faith in the Unknowable. The Unknowable, again, lays a scientific base for religion. All propositions are more or less disputable, we may interpolate; but it matters little to our present purpose. The French writer has found the starting-point for his new religion.

We cannot follow Comte when he condenses his Unknowable into a Grand Être—into mankind, which is not unknowable. It is not the living God whom we seek. Where shall we find Him? Not in the heart and mind of the individual man. There it is placed by some of the most enlightened thinkers of our day—by such men as Edmond Scherer and Renan in his prime, as well as by more commonplace writers like Anthony Trollope. Were that its source, it would be as shifting as quicksand, but it is founded as the rock. The truths of religion, like those of science, are impersonal truths. There is not, and there never has been, a religion that is other than the assemblage and the grouping of individuals around a common belief. We might add that religion has its origin in the common emotions felt beside the grave of a dead chief or the dead member of a family, and theology has a joint origin in the ideas that simultaneously arise. It was collective at the outset, and will remain collective to the end.

As little can we follow the young Renan (the Renan of the *Avenir de la science*) when he enthrones science in the place of religion. Renan speaks lightly of science in general, and of English science in particular (he did not speak lightly of it in later years), as furnishing the means of clothing man with fresh powers and adding beauty to life. He was, later, to change his opinion when he conceived the savans of the future manipulating men and things like gods. But the still optimist

Renan of 1848 attached value to science only in so far as it seeks for that which religion professes to teach, only in so far as it resolves the enigma of the universe, and only in so far as it then becomes a substitute for religion. On the contrary, science has to do with the relative, while the concern of religion is with the unchanging absolute, and the transformation of science into religion is therefore impossible. No progress of science in general or of any particular science will illuminate the mystery that lies behind phenomena. *Ignorabimus*, cried Du Bois Reymond; and though Haeckel believes that he has solved the seven, the three, or the two enigmas of the universe, M. Brunetière still cries *Ignorabimus*. At the extremest bounds of the domain where science rules as queen, the unknowable raises a barrier which we may displace, but shall never overthrow. We shall ever beat our wings against it in vain.

Not only can there be no religion of science; there can be no natural religion, no rational religion, no religion of philosophy. The human reason, reduced to its own resources, cannot attain to a knowledge of God. Religion begins where natural knowledge ends. It therefore posits, as its point of departure, the necessity, the truth, and the reality of the supernatural. There is, in fact, a religion only of the supernatural. The very definition of religion can be framed only in terms of the supernatural. It is, as we know, the point of view of Mr Kidd, but it was also that of Mansel. The entire polemic of the famous Bampton lectures is directed against "rational religion."

But if there is no personal, no scientific, and no natural or philosophical religion, there can be no religion that is not founded on authority—an authority that has the right and the power to reduce dissidents to unity. M. Brunetière will not away with the "Christian *expérience*" (the word in French is amphibological, meaning both "experience" and "experiment") "in all minds awakened to the same higher life . . . and in the collective soul of all Christendom,"—at least, as a

source of authority. "They talk of the harmony of the Gospels," said the late Master of Balliol to a New Testament class. Then, after a long pause: "there is no such thing." M. Brunetière says flatly that there is no such thing as the collective Christian consciousness. There is no hope for us in that direction. If religion is the affirmation of the supernatural, there must be a book, a church, or a man to which or to whom it belongs to state, to explain, to develop that affirmation. Religion therefore involves theology; it is a collection of dogmas. So far have we travelled and in so brief a space.

There are, however, rival churches, creeds, and men. M. Brunetière goes in search of them, and proceeds to examine the title-deeds of the one that was closest at hand. French Protestantism has a glorious record; within M. Brunetière's memory it was adorned by the great names of Guizot (accused of coquetting with Catholicism in his later years) and Edmond de Pressensé, of Athanase Coquerel and the eloquent Adolphe Monod. It was founded on a book and a man—the *Christian Institution*, and its author, Calvin. Brunetière draws an uninviting sketch of the man—his youthful reserve, concealing the process of his conversion, his stern manhood, his pitiless public action, and his premature old age, unrelenting even in death. He lays stress on the character of the reformer, because he believes that French Protestantism (and he might have added, Scottish Presbyterianism) rests on the Bible indeed, but on the Bible as interpreted by Calvin. His theology is individualist and subjective. His ethics is not so much severe as arbitrary, inquisitorial, and tyrannical. The principle of that tyranny lies in the confusion he makes between morals and politics, and his effort to buttress morals against the contradictions of his doctrine; in his conscious urgency to bring back the social sense his individualism had abolished; and in the obligation to mask, by an excess of severity, all that is vacillating and ruinous in his theology. No; whatever prejudiced historians may allege, M. Brunetière fails to

perceive what France can have lost by refusing to accept Protestantism.

Whither, then, shall we flee? Where, but to the bosom of the old Mother, to whom our wives, our children, and our sisters have not ceased to adhere? Never since the great revolution has she been persecuted as she is now; and as (Taine being witness) her persecutions in those dark days brought back France to religion and Catholicism, so is the uncompromising action of the French radicals re-converting the Conservative and literary classes. M. Brunetière had crossed the Atlantic to lecture at Harvard and in Boston, and there he witnessed one of the most marvellous developments of modern times. The Catholic Church at the Declaration of Independence had been small and poor to insignificance; he found it the largest and wealthiest of all the denominations. Not only had it grown by immigration; it was growing daily by conversions. He sought to disentangle the causes of these conversions. Rightly does he say that they have in them something so personal and so belonging to the depths of the soul that they escape generalisation. But they do not elude analysis, and he essays to analyse them. Shall we be in error if we discern in the ingredients or factors the keys to his own conversion, then still in the distance? First, there is the force of attraction in the Roman Church, residing in the mass, the cohesion, and the density of its doctrine, its rites, and its organisation. More than all other Churches it embodies the collective character of the religious emotion. Secondly, it is steadfastly opposing the breaking up of the family by the agency of the divorce laws, and is thus winning the adhesion of the women, who, again, are gaining over the men, and bringing up their children as Catholics. Lastly, the independence of American Catholic apologetics is disarming lay criticism. Laymen and priests alike are joining the Church *because* they are Darwinians, and find in it a welcome, not in spite, but in consequence, of their scientific views. At all events, liberalism is the note of American Catholicism, as it

is of Australian Catholicism. It would permit that "Christian Positivism" which in 1903 he seemed inclined to adopt as a badge. In the same year he still refused to declare himself "a believer." At a later date, on perhaps the solitary occasion when he took the place of his disabled political oracle, M. Francis Charmes, he avowed with pride that he was acquainted with the bishop of this, the archbishop of that, and with Cardinal Perraud, the ornament of the Academy, and he welcomed Cardinal Mathieu's work on the Concordat, as he did the works of other members of the Catholic aristocracy. In reviewing a book by the Viscountess d'Adhémar, he recognised that "it is only under the auspices of the Church that the modern woman will fill a noble part in contemporary democracy, by working for the fusion of the vital forces of a renewed society." He is of too strenuous a temperament to play, with Huysmans and the decadents, at matins and vespers and retreats. He is more likely, with Mr Mallock and the younger Pressensé, and many English agnostics, who follow the services of the Churches without being members of them or communicants in them, to remain fluttering on the outskirts of Catholicism. Should he, after all, make the plunge, he will be, like Father Gratry, the keenest of disputants, and perhaps, like him, the least tolerant of converts.

The elect youth of France is following in his footsteps. After the publication of his enthusiastic articles on Manning, as he named him, *tout court*, the conversion of M. Francis de Pressensé to Catholicism was eagerly looked for. A rising scholar, the late Léon Ollé-Laprune, left behind him a *Vitalité chrétienne* that may be profitably compared with Bushnell's *New Life*. M. de Wyzewa anxiously seeks, and does not wholly fail to find, in the last work of Mr Frederick Myers some encouragement to believe in the independence and survival of the soul. A brilliant savant, Jean Marie Guyau, sought a new solution of the world-old problem in the vistas opened up by psychological science. M. Brunetière himself discovers in the work of a young American novelist the sug-

gestion of something in us that is immortal and divine. The higher French literature is evidently on the point of undergoing a radical transformation.

A similar movement has arisen in Germany, if with less energy, yet with more originality, and perhaps greater attractiveness. The worship of nature, founded by Rousseau and consecrated by Wordsworth, has at last struck root across the Rhine, where it has assumed a peculiar form. By vocation the poet of flowers, and by culture a devotee of science, Christian Wagner has blended the old doctrine of the transmigration of souls with the new doctrine of the conservation of energy, and shaped out of the compound a new religion, which has been denominated scientific metempsychosis, with a distinctively Christian inspiration for its base. At a somewhat later date Dr Bruno Wille has created a closely resembling religion of nature, which has its dogmas and rites, which can be taught and lived. A belief in the indestructibility of the individual, and his survival amid scenes like those where his nature was moulded, is common to the peasant poet of Suabia and the Berlin socialist.

The same characters of mysticism or inwardness and individuality that have sharply distinguished the German from the Frenchman for centuries differentiate both of these types of a new German religion from the French revival already described. They no less strongly mark another still to be described. Born in England, reared in France, nurtured in Germany, and resident in Vienna, Mr Houston Stewart Chamberlain seems to possess many hereditary and acquired titles for posing as the apostle of a new faith in a book that has scored a signal success. A strange mixture of questionable ethnology and amateur metaphysics, of expert art (at least in music) and evangelical religion heightened to mysticism, the *Bases of the Nineteenth Century* professes to be nothing less than a new gospel. It is the gospel of the Germanic religion *par excellence*, but as its saints include Abelard, Francis of Assisi, and Dante, Pascal, Racine, and even Voltaire, it

cannot be called exclusive; and, as embracing such Russians as Tolstoi, it might be called Celto-Slavo-Germanic. Did it comprehend the Semites, instead of branding philo-Semitism with a Teutonic ferocity, it might be called Caucasian. It is absolutely scientific, and explicitly accepts the principle that nature can be mechanically explained to its inmost heart. On the other hand, it asserts a sphere of transcendent liberty, woven of ideas and revealed solely in the consciousness, yet more real than the world of the senses. Being transcendent, this inner world cannot be freely expressed or communicated, and therefore remains non-existent to most hearts and eyes. Between the two an intermediate sphere, that of art, with its free and plastic creative activity, reconciles the two, and exhibits inward liberty as dominating the outward world of cause and effect. But its real service is less speculative. It gives, what Goethe claimed of all art, "an instant and living revelation of the Unknowable." This is, as we know, the characteristic doctrine of Schopenhauer, who yet also held (a point not often noted) that goodness is no less a revelation of the absolute. It is pre-eminently the theory and practice of Wagner, and we find in *Parsifal* the plastic representation of the redemption of a soul. Do not we feel, even in listening to his less mature works, such as the overture to *Lohengrin*, that such music tears away all veils and opens up all depths, so that we perceive with the woman of Samaria that here is a man who tells us all things that ever we did? Alas! music has other than religious effects, and Wagner's in particular acts differently on different natures. If in Mr Chamberlain it arouses the slumbering god, in Vernon Lee it wakes up the sleeping animal; and on Herbert Spencer, who yet was keenly susceptible to the grandeur of cathedral music, it had no effect at all except to excite impatience and weariness. Mr Chamberlain himself seems to realise its inadequacy, and he falls back on the music of Bach to evoke the vision and the presence of the Founder of Christianity. Thus the wanderer returns to the evangelical religion of his childhood and youth.

He returns only in appearance, or returns spirally, as is the law of true progress, on a higher plane. Trace the iconography of Jesus from the first Christian centuries to the end of the Middle Ages, from Piero della Francesca to Lerolle, and from Perugino to Burne-Jones. It will be perceived to run a close parallel to the history of the doctrine of the person of Christ as described by one of the profoundest German theologians, J. A. Dorner. Later periods sometimes pass through the same phases of thought as earlier periods, and Occidental theology often re-discusses the problems of Oriental theology, but always with a difference, and on the whole there is an advance. The beliefs to which our English, French, and German thinkers are returning are not the beliefs they abandoned, nor are they the beliefs of a prior age. We can no more go back to the theology of the nineteenth century than we can permanently go back to Queen Anne furniture, pre-Raphaelite painting, or extinct literary forms. "Back to Kant!" cry disillusioned German thinkers, but it is neo-Kantism they go back to. "Back to Catholicism!" cry the French, but it is a neo-Catholicism, which makes room for Darwinism, and which, as in the reformed Catholicism of Professor Ehrhardt, the worship of the Virgin is being displaced by the worship of Christ, formerly supplanted by itself. "Back to Jesus!" cry the German and English Protestants, but this Jesus has become openly, what he has all along been implicitly, the Christian Deity. He is aggrandised by the deepening and expansion and exaltation of human nature that has taken place through all the Christian centuries. The corresponding doctrines have undergone a parallel development. The words of the credos are the same, but the words that expound them are renewed day by day. Christian worship assumes a changed complexion. Compare the bulky new Methodist hymn-book with the thin volume issued by the Wesleys, and realise the greater range and depth of devotion. Who that has heard the ecstatic prayers of James Robertson of Edinburgh or of his brother William, known as "Robertson

of Irvine," can fail to perceive that religious rapture has attained heights unknown to former generations? As an inalienable portion of the same complex social movement, religion will always retain an identical relation to the science, the literature, the art, and the life of the age.

The novelist has a privilege that is denied to the publicist. He can dramatically exhibit the reconversion of a soul without being supposed to identify himself with the being thus represented. Yet the choice of characters and situations, the drift of the action, and the general complexion of a work betray the preoccupations of a writer, and it is by no means difficult to distinguish the places where he is speaking by deputy and those where he is speaking in his own person. Even where he is insincere to the thought of the moment, we feel that he is expressing the thought of earlier years. M. Bourget's *L'Étape* is a striking example of these remarks. It is plain from his republished essays that he was at one time an emancipate. He worshipped Renan, like the youth of his time, and if he now disowns his former adorations as mere studies, we perceive the hollowness of the pretext. The chief personage in the romance named is of too feeble a character to represent the author, but he manifestly shows the process by which an unbeliever may rationally pass from Agnosticism through Deism to Catholicism. Mr Spencer has much to answer for in furnishing French unbelievers with a war-cry that has served them so well as the Unknowable. In no country was the badge more lovingly accepted. In none has the concept been more thoroughly examined. It was long the anchorage of French thinkers. But they can no longer ride there securely under a blackening sky. What is the leverage that has lifted the anchor? In men like Brunetière, the movement of contemporary thought, the pressure of conservative and official influences, and the aggressions of Radicalism. In writers like Bourget, at handgrips (at least in imagination) with human nature in conflict with circumstances, it is experience of the world, the tragedies of life, and above all the illumination of

love. Antoine and Julie Monneron *might* not have fallen so low had they been brought up under a Christian roof, and Jean Monneron finds a way to the heart and hand of believing Brigitte Ferrand through the altar. The high-road of affection, sometimes moistened with tears and blood, is doubtless, as it was with Chateaubriand, the path of most returns to the old faith.

Is it because Pierre Loti is a Protestant that he discovers the return less easy? Desolate at heart (he seems to have neither wife nor child, and the refrain of dear ones lost resounds through his writings), and solitary in mind no less (he told the French academicians that he never reads), he wanders through the world in search of a religion. First, he repaired to the birthplace of Christianity—a land dangerous and tempting to souls in distress, says M. de Vogué—which for eighteen centuries has never ceased to be the resort of pious pilgrimages, and is in our days become, for perhaps the first time, the scene of desperate attempts to recover their faith on the part of men who have for ever lost it. If Tissot almost literally found Christ on the desolate shores of the Lake of Gennesareth, Loti was less fortunate. "Twice or thrice the ineffable phantom of Christ appeared to him as he neared Nazareth," but he "let it escape." He listened in vain for "the words of hope and the word of love once spoken" by Lake Tiberias, but they are dead to-day. He had dreamed for years of the Garden of Gethsemane, and fondly imagined that there Christ might appear to him. In an agony of mind he passed the night on the sacred spot, but found no peace. Indeed, he confessed eight years afterwards that "in that night of horror and despair all his early beliefs irremediably foundered." He climbed up the steps leading to Golgotha, and there, in company with an old woman, a young Cossack soldier, and an aged pilgrim, the contagion of belief seemed to pass into his soul, and he believed that he at last had "found Christ." So at least he permitted himself to say ten years ago, but it proved to be a hallucination. Like the Wandering Jew, he had again to

take up his pilgrim's staff, and he bent his steps to the sites of still older faiths. He traversed Persia, and there it was the religious manifestations that most attracted his curiosity. He passed into "famine-stricken India," and travelled through "India without the English," describing all that he saw with the eye of a poet; but it was still in quest of a faith that he wandered. He interrogated the Brahmins at Odeypore, but they were immersed in rites they had ceased to understand. In search of a little hope, he repaired to the theosophists of Madras, of whom he had heard such wonderful things, and what did they tell him? Of a heaven without a personal God, immortality without an individual soul, and purification without prayer. It was the glacial dogmatism of a Buddhism that he was already well acquainted with, the mere gleam of his own reason. One of the most dismal silences of his life followed the communication, and the last leaves fell from his most cheering beliefs. That same night were repeated the experiences of the night in Gethsemane, with its boundless sadness and its unspeakable horror. The chief of the theosophists told him that what he wanted was esoteric Brahminism, and bade him go to Benares. There he entered the House of the Sages. It was a low and humble, whitewashed Indian dwelling, at the foot of a garden, with green blinds, such as he remembered in his native countryside at Saintonges, and an all-round verandah, such as is common in Australia. The Sages resembled bronze Christs with black hair—men with grave and fine countenances and winning smiles. Their chests and feet bare, wearing only a cloth around the loins, and sitting on their haunches in a circle to discuss sacred things, they yet looked as if they dwelt on high in another state of existence. They made the loftiest pretensions. "Our philosophy begins," they said, "where yours" (the philosophy of Europe) "ends." They have almost conceived the inconceivable, these thinkers of the Orient, in whom a hereditary refinement of bodily frame and a back-stretching atavism of meditation and prayer have created subtleties of perception and delicacies of sensibility unknown

to our flesh-eating and commercial races. Yet even they confessed that they knew nothing for certain, but were only seekers; and Loti felt that long years of initiation would be necessary before he could pierce the depths of their thought and wing his way across the ineffable abysses their ancient books revealed. Mrs Besant, a sage among sages, and dwelling with them apart from the world, was hardly more definite. She feared to destroy the hopes that he still unconsciously entertained; but no—"in the matter of hope" he "had nothing to lose." We need not condemn these old-world philosophers for their indefiniteness. The never-doubting Victor Cousin once asked Hegel to give him a summary of his philosophy, and others have solicited philosophical students for a concise account of the philosophy of Plato. "Monsieur," replied the German, and his answer might be generalised: "these things do not sum themselves up in sentences." Such philosophies have to be lived before they can be understood. Had he possessed fortitude enough to be initiated in these mysteries of the astral spirit, Loti would probably not have gained the least satisfaction. He could only have received answers in terms of the pure reason to questions asked from the plane of the emotions.

Let us not exaggerate the extent any more than misconceive the nature of the reaction. It is not universal. There will always be people outside of the Churches. "The wits will be inconvertible," says Renan. "You will never induce Ninon de l'Enclos, Saint-Evremond, Voltaire, or Mérimée to accept the same religion as Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, or the good Hermas." Mérimée himself was well aware of his irremediable loss or incurable lack. "I have the misfortune to be sceptical," he wrote to one of his *inconnues*, "but it is not my fault. I have tried to believe, but I want faith." There are others, like Herbert Spencer, in whom an inborn spirit of rebellion against all authority combines with a self-sufficingness that nullifies the feeling of dependence without which the religious sentiment cannot thrive. There are still others in whom

the religious brain has died for lack of nutriment (as in Mark Pattison) or atrophied (as in Darwin) from overgrowth of the scientific faculty. All such may have their place in that Heaven where there are mansions for all benefactors of mankind, and it is a high one, but not the highest. These great spirits are not among the elect, but among those noble reprobates just within the gates of Purgatory who excite the envy of the redeemed. And there will ever be those—a still selecter, indeed, a sacred band—who are above all Churches. Emerson in his beautiful old age, slightly touched with a pathetic decay, like a tall poplar that has begun to wither at the top, found it comfortable in the decline of his cerebral strength to join in public worship; but in the prime of his pure reason he refused "to deck himself with the red rag of a false religion or false church." In his far sadder last years Carlyle was cut to the heart by the singing of Faber's tumultuous hymn, and he was once induced to accompany Froude to Westminster Abbey, where the too-eloquent Dean Farrar could not supply the balm that would have healed the ever-bleeding wound; but in his Titanic manhood the "storm-god of the northern foam" breasted the billows of his transcendental agnosticism and worshipped only in "the cathedral of Immensity." "Will you hold by consecrated formulas," he cried, "and expect salvation from traditions of the elders; or are you for Divine Realities, as the one sacred and indispensable thing?" And he condemned Loyola because he inquired, poor man, "not of eternal nature and her oracles," but "of temporary art and hers."

Such Spartan examples and such heroic counsel are for the few, and for them only on certain conditions. Most of those who have cast away conventional religious beliefs have remained in a state of "brutal nakedness," clothed "in a costume of putrid tripes," or the generalisations of physical science. They have forgotten the grandest generalisation of them all. A recent French romance has for its object to show that a social stage cannot be omitted with impunity. No more can a phase of thought. The latest scientific theory

of the universe is the lineal descendant of the oldest Babylonian, Indian, and Greek cosmogonies, which passed from mythology to philosophy, and from philosophy to science, by a long series of insensible transitions. So would a true theology consist, not in making a *tabula rasa* of all received theological ideas, but in developing them. They all answer to realities. Every one of them has had a natural genesis and a necessary evolution. Wrench them out of the collective mind, and you leave it bleeding and mutilated. Popular theology will remain as imperfect an expression of social relations as popular science is of physical relations, or the law administered in the courts of justice is of juridical relations; but there is a theology that has as indubitable a place as psycho-physics in the circle or the tree of the sciences. It will answer to popular theology as a literary language answers to a provincial dialect. It will not be created entirely by theologians. The metaphysicians will lay its foundations. The unsystematic philosophers will furnish its larger intuitions. The prophets will breathe into it the breath of life and fill its eyes and limbs with fire. The unfrocked priests, in lay sermon, fiction, and verse, will suffuse it with emotion and widen its horizon. But the more select of its ministers will supply its substance and keep the flame burning on the altar. More than all others these are the hierophants of truths that will ever be mysteries, because they can be known only to those in whom they are born of an intimate converse with the realities of the inward life. Nor should we write of them in the future tense. That science of the higher nature has ever been in course of construction. Its records are in many tongues, and they are no less rich in our own noontide of science than in the twilight of the so-called ages of faith.

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DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books will, in future, not be open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

PROFESSOR CARPENTER ON JAPANESE BUDDHISM.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1906, p. 503.)

Professor Carpenter's paper on Japanese Buddhism has in a most lucid way supplemented what I had left out of consideration in my paper on Christianity as viewed from the standpoint of a Japanese Buddhist. Since my essay was mainly intended to point out the essential basis of Christian faith, which seemed to me to be identical with that of Buddhism, many other points of importance were left untouched. These have been now commented upon by an able student of religions, and I think they are as follows:—

1. Whether Japan was ever converted to the Buddhist faith, and how?
2. What does the *Dharma-kāya* of Buddha mean, and what has it to do with faith in Buddha?
3. How can the theory of *karma* be reconciled with a belief in salvation?
4. Can Buddhism contribute anything to the social life of the future?

1. As regards this first question, the estimates of the Japanese themselves deviate one from another, as noticed by Professor Carpenter. This is true, but I also find that his statements about Buddhist influence on Japanese life are quite to the point. Japanese civilisation is a product of Buddhism, though, of course, of Buddhism in co-operation with the national characteristics. Buddhism is a still living force in Japan. This is negatively proved by the self-contradictory statements of Mr Okakura, as quoted by Professor Carpenter. Mr Okakura thinks that no real conversion of the Japanese has been achieved by the doctrine of Buddhism during the past eleven centuries. The same author believes, on the other hand, that all those qualities which make a Japanese truly and typically Japanese are in a most marked degree due to the influence of the Buddhist doctrine of *dhyāna*. He must be asked whether *dhyāna* be an exception

to the doctrine of Buddha. There are some who, judging by the survival and revival of the old Germanic mythology, think that the Germans have never really been converted to Christianity. A Tolstoi, again, condemns as anti-Christian European states which stand against one another with rifles and cannon. Certainly there is truth in these statements; still, we have right and reason on our side in calling Europeans Christian. The civilisation which has produced Fra Angelico, Dante, Thomas Aquinas, Luther, and many other bright stars of the Christian religion, and the people among whom the *Imitatio Christi* or *The Pilgrim's Progress* is read with reverence, cannot but be called Christian. Japan has among her children a Buddhist Fra Angelico in the painters of the Tak'ma school, a Dante in Genshin (942–1017), a Thomas Aquinas in Dengyō (767–822), a Luther in Nichiren; and the praises of Buddha and the Saints, written by Shinran, are recited every morning and evening in millions of families throughout Japan. The future is another question, but up to the present our civilisation has been, and is, Buddhistic.

2. The transition of the idea of Buddha's personality from the actual and tangible person of Gotama to the *Dharma-kāya* has by no means been made by one step, nor yet by a single bound. The basis and the significance of this development lies in the very idea of *dharma* (or *dhamma* in Pāli). The term is certainly a very flexible one, as pointed out by Professor Carpenter. But its manysidedness is not by chance. Leaving aside the pre-Buddhistic history of the idea, it means in Buddhism, firstly, phenomena, evanescent and impermanent, *dhammā viparināmā*, but not chaotic. These are subject to law or laws. The law or laws pervading the phenomenal world and the way to transcend it have been revealed by Gotama, the Buddha. Here is the second aspect of the *dharma*. Its revelation has not been made by mere words, but it has been revealed by and realised in the personality of the Lord. Buddha, as a human being (*manussa-bhūta*), is subject to the law of causation; but as the Lord, the Tathāgata, He is the *Dharma* incarnate. The Tathāgata represents in His person the *Dharma*, He is the being of the Law (*dhamma-bhūta*), of the eternal Wisdom. In Him is realised the *Bodhi*. Here lies the third aspect of the *Dharma* and the foundation of the belief in the *Dharma-kāya*, or the *Dhammatā*, as is expressed in an immature stage of the idea.

Buddhism has cherished the Johannine conception of the Logos applied to itself. This conception has grown up out of the deepest sources of faith and wisdom among those who have believed in the Tathāgata's *Bodhi* and *Dharma*. There has been no necessity of borrowing it from outside.

3. The above remark has touched to a certain degree my third point. The Buddhas are subject to the laws of moral and physical causation in their bodily aspects. But, as we are told in the *Diamond-Cutter*,[1] those who see Buddha solely in his *rūpa* do not see the real Buddha. In order

[1] This and other Prajñā-pāramitā tests emphasise the negative side of the Buddhist idealism. They, by the by, do not belong to the *Shingon*, but they are the chief Scriptures of the *Zen*.

to see him we must look for his *Dharma-kāya*. There is here certainly a trace of the dualism (I mean the complete dissociation of reality from phenomenality) which Professor Carpenter calls a barren idealism, and which has been fully developed in India into the extreme idealism of the later Vedānta. But the Buddhist philosophers knew how to put a check upon extravagance of thought, though it is occasionally manifested, especially when a Buddhist sophist tries to argue against his opponent, as illustrated by the words of a priest, cited by Professor Carpenter on p. 515.[1] For the present I shall justify myself by a quotation from Nichiren's writings. He said: "When we review this phenomenal world (*i.e. dharma-dhātu*) just after having returned to the home of the supreme enlightenment (*samyak-sambodhi*), (the world changes its aspects thoroughly, and we see that) it is the Land of Bliss where the serene light (of *bodhi*) pervades; and thus our bodies, which we looked upon with contempt, are seen to be the Tathāgata Himself, whose enlightenment has no beginning and in whom the three bodies (*Trikāya*) are an unity.

4. At the bottom of the idea of Saṅgha there lies the idea of the communion of the saints.[2] The Saṅgha is always compared to the ocean, which embraces and purifies everything pouring into it and which the one taste pervades. The path which the members of the Saṅgha tread is the one path (*ekayāna*) which was trodden by the saints of the past and will be trodden by every future saint. Buddhists have the ideal of the universal communion of the saints, but they have not succeeded in building up that ideal into a visible church. This defect will be felt more in the future than in the past, as Buddhism tries to exercise its influence upon the social life of the modern age. We want, indeed, a Buddhist epistle to the Ephesians and its full realisation.

I know these short remarks add very little to Professor Carpenter's view on Japanese Buddhism, but I must wait for another opportunity to expound my points more fully.

M. Anesaki.

Tōkyō.

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1906, p. 721.)

Sir Oliver Lodge has given us, in his Catechism, an interesting illustration of what may be done in the way of undenominational teaching. I imagine that he would like us, who are Churchmen, to say why we cannot accept

[1] I suspect that Professor Knox's priest was rather a Zen priest than "a worshipper of Amida Buddha." It is usual for a Zen priest to change his own standpoint and to try to sophisticate in any way convenient to him. That is, indeed, a bad fruit of an idealism akin to acosmism. I hope Professor Carpenter and his readers will not think that there are many Buddhists like that priest, or that even he is now teaching his followers in the manner with which he confronted Professor Knox.

[2] *E.g.* Aṅguttara-nikāya, x. 20.

such a scheme of instruction as adequate for our children. May one Churchman, speaking only for himself, try to answer this question?

It would be an impertinence to praise Sir Oliver Lodge's Catechism. Its earnest reverence and high ethical standard are a lesson to us all. But when I ask myself what are the things I most want my children to know, I do not find that it meets my need. For first of all, I want them to know, not only that there is "one Infinite and Eternal Being," but that this Eternal Being is, and has been from the first beginning of their lives, reaching down to them in gracious love, calling and claiming them as His. I want them to know that they are not left to climb the steep hills of life as best they can, but that they are children of God whom He has already claimed as His in the sacrament of Baptism.

And secondly, I want them to know that they are members of a Society whose face is turned, not towards the past but towards the future. I do not want to say to them first, "this is the past from which you have come," but "this is the goal towards which we are being led on—we are 'inheritors of the Kingdom of Heaven.'"

And, thirdly, I want to awaken in them the sense of gratitude, to urge them to respond to what He has already done, not to disappoint their Divine Father. I want them to be able to say, with genuine feeling, "I heartily thank my Heavenly Father that He has called me into this state of salvation, and I pray unto Him to give me His grace that I may continue in the same unto my life's end." I want them to learn, at the very beginning of their intelligent life, that it does really matter to God whether they make shipwreck of their lives or keep a straight course through the storm to the end.

So when I come to Sir Oliver Lodge's creed, I miss there just the one thing I want most—I miss the idea of the grace of God. I find myself in a world where it is not easy to do good, where some Power has,

> "with pitfall and with gin,
> Beset the path I was to wander in."

Has God been indifferent to it all? Has He done anything, taken any step, made any sacrifice? If not, why should I trouble? "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

There is a familiar hymn that is, for some of us, among the earliest and sweetest memories of our childhood:—

> "I love to hear the story
> That angel voices tell,
> How once the King of Glory
> Came down on earth to dwell.
> I am both weak and sinful,
> But this I surely know,
> The Lord came down to save me
> Because he loved me so."

There is enough dogmatic theology there to make a large volume, yet there is nothing that cannot be understood by little children. Of course,

if it is not true—if "the King of Glory" did not "come down on earth to dwell"—then we shall be doing grievous wrong in nourishing the spiritual life of our children with fairy tales that pretend to be realities; but if it is true, it is the greatest truth in the world, the truth in the light of which all other truths must be interpreted, a great presupposition that colours all our thinking. But ought we to begin by teaching our children dogmatically what some people deny altogether? Ought we not to bring them to it gradually, when they can understand the evidence on which we found our creed? Is not the answer this, that in every department of knowledge we teach our children results long before they learn, or are capable of learning, the process by which these results have been reached? Sir Oliver Lodge proposes to begin by teaching, as a dogma, that "my ancestors have ascended from lower forms of animal life." The fact that many people altogether deny this is no reason for leaving it out of his scheme of teaching. But my point is that it is as much a dogma as the statement that "for us men and for our salvation" He "came down from heaven," and that both dogmas will have to be verified by the children long after they have been taught to them in our schools. But the one dogma is a statement of human progress, the other a statement of Divine provision and love. A child's moral character will not suffer from his not knowing that his ancestors ascended from lower forms of life, but we believe a child's moral character will suffer from his not knowing that the life and death of Jesus Christ were a message of love from his Father in Heaven.

But if it be urged that, as a matter of fact, children brought up on this definite dogmatic teaching do not differ in conduct and character from children trained under some such ethical system as Sir Oliver Lodge outlines, I should reply first by denying that this is so. And I should also reply by pointing out that, to a degree that we very inadequately realise, our ideas are shaped in a Christian mould. In a vague way our teaching presupposes Christianity, even where its tenets are specifically denied. But this will not continue to be so for long if the specifically and definitely Christian education, that has been given in our schools side by side with vaguer ethical teaching, falls into the background. I do not believe that a system of teaching like Sir Oliver Lodge's would long survive in a world that had repudiated the dogmas of Christianity. Children are so constituted that their interest is not in things but in people. Duty divorced from the idea of a Personal God has little meaning for many of them; the claim of social service does not appeal apart from the idea that "inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these My brethren, ye have done it unto Me."

Sir Oliver Lodge's scheme of teaching would, it seems to me, admirably meet the needs of a world where evolution was not hindered or held back, where the incentives to good were manifestly stronger than those to evil. But it is not into such a world as this that the children from our schools are going out, and therefore they need the incentive that comes from

the truth that "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son."

It is good to end on a note of agreement. The recognition of religion as "not a thing for special hours or special days, but as a reality permeating the whole of life" is vital to any adequate scheme of religious education; here at least Churchmen may find themselves heartily in agreement with Sir Oliver Lodge's paper.

J. Howard B. Masterman.

Queen's College, Birmingham.

MR BIRRELL'S CHOICE.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1906, p. 540.)

The Bishop of Carlisle on "Mr Birrell's Choice" greatly interested me. It was written in an excellent spirit. It was this that appealed to me, as well as the earnest and able way in which the Bishop stated his case.

In this distant State we have been through the strife and turmoil that is now being experienced in the Mother Country. We have fought the educational fight. Probably a permanent settlement has been effected; if not, there is a time of truce. For a season peace has been proclaimed. Ephraim does not vex Judah nor does Judah vex Ephraim. I read the Bishop's article in the light of our experience, and thought that some criticisms might be of service.

The Bishop pleads for religious teaching in the public schools of a non-sectarian character. He speaks of the great fundamental truths concerning which all sections of the Christian Church are agreed, and desires to see these taught in the national schools. He says: "The national teaching must be catholic teaching—the universal Christian teaching which is common to all the orthodox Christian communities" (p. 546). There are thousands in South Australia to-day who would gladly have accepted this position if it had been possible for them to do so; but such was not possible. Unconsciously the Bishop of Carlisle has emphasised the difficulty in which we were placed. Speaking of Mr Birrell's choice, he asks: "Will he build national education by the waves of secularism . . . or will he build it on the rocks of faith in God, and the majestic immortality of man?" . . . "In the path of his choice stands the lion of denominationalism." I would like to put the last sentence in small capitals. It was "the lion of denominationalism"—more especially of Roman Catholicism—that prevented even the reading of the Bible in school hours in South Australian State schools. Bishop Diggle truly says: "One of the principal notes of Romanism is its exclusive sectarianism" (p. 544). The position taken by the Roman

authorities in our State is this: "You may introduce Bible reading or religious teaching into the Government schools if you please, but if so we must withdraw our children. We must establish our own schools, in which to teach our own dogmas, and look to the State for some financial assistance." What the Roman Church in South Australia would be willing to accept (as well as some of the Anglicans and Lutherans) would be a capitation grant — so much per head from the State coffers for all children who passed a certain educational standard. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of South Australia (Dr O'Reilly) says: "Let those schools who claim religion as the basis of their teaching have that countenance and support which the tax-payers favouring them are entitled to out of the public money voted for educational needs." Suppose the State were to grant this, what then? Our splendid system of national education would be broken up. By countenancing the establishment of denominational schools—by granting financial aid to them—the State would pull down a universal system of education which it has been building up for many years. Not only so, but those "evil forces" of which the Bishop of Carlisle speaks, that "rage and swell most tumultuously" (p. 542) — denominational strife and bitterness—would be intensified and perpetuated. The "lion of denominationalism" would more fiercely rage. Let me show how. I desire to do so, because what is true of South Australia will be true of the Old Land from which our fathers came, and in which we are profoundly interested. In this State, directly the capitation grant is granted for religious purposes, denominational schools will spring up over our land. Such would be a national calamity. Under our present system of education (free, compulsory, and secular) Romanists, Protestants, Lutherans, Anglicans, Methodists, Baptists, etc., are all being taught in the same schools. The boys and girls know no religious differences. They sit side by side in the school, and frolic together on the playground. What is the consequence? We are building up a united nation—a young nation that is not divided against itself. The rising generation are being preserved from that disintegrating denominational bitterness of which the Bishop of Carlisle speaks. Bigotry in the State is dying out. The young nation now growing up will be more tolerant, and consequently more united than their fathers; for experience demonstrates that there is nothing more divisive in its effects than denominational bigotry. It stirs up bad blood; it leads Romanist to persecute Protestant, and Protestant to persecute Romanist; it sets Anglican and Nonconformist at variance with each other. In its education of the young the State must not support a denominational system that has led, and will lead, to disintegration, bitterness, and strife: it must give the secular knowledge that the child needs, and leave the spiritual instruction to the Church.

If the State schools are to give religious instruction, even on the broad and catholic lines suggested by the Bishop of Carlisle, there are two difficulties in relation to the teachers. First: they must be competent to

give that instruction, they must hold—intellectually and spiritually—all the cardinal doctrines of the Christian Faith. This means the imposition of a religious test. Again: assuming that all the teachers were Christians by conviction, in their teaching would they confine themselves strictly to the great truths on which all sections of the Church are agreed? Would there not be a temptation to colour their teaching by their own peculiar denominational views? I think so. It is really the non-essentials in the Christian Faith that lie at the basis of denominational strife, bitterness, and exclusiveness. It is "the mint, the anise, and the cummin." The Bishop of Carlisle holds strongly what he calls "the beautiful" doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration. "Large bodies of earnest, orthodox Christians," as he affirms, do not. What then? The Bishop will teach this doctrine on "all rightful occasions—through books, in sermons, at Bible-classes, in lessons in Sunday-school"; but, he says: "I will not ask permission to teach it in the day-schools of the nation" (p. 545). But with religious instruction in day-schools there is ample opportunity for teaching, *in an indirect way*, peculiar dogmas, and there are men and women who feel that they could not conscientiously restrain and restrict themselves in the way suggested by the Bishop of Carlisle. The more intense a teacher's devotion to denominational principles the greater the temptation to colour his teaching with them. But Bishop Diggle has no fear. He says: Trust the teachers. "The more confidence you place in men's honour, the more worthy they grow of that confidence." Yes, in some relationships; but there are no questions on which some men feel so deeply as religious ones, and, strange though it may appear, it is the non-essentials of the faith to which they are specially devoted.

The question of religious instruction in State schools in South Australia (though we have no State church) bristles with such difficulties that we have had to make our educational system "free, compulsory, and secular"—*not godless*. State school reading-books which speak of God, heaven, and of prayer (as ours do) cannot be spoken of as godless or irreligious. The Bishop of Carlisle evidently looks with fear and suspicion upon a national system of education in which religious instruction is not directly given. He says: Will Mr Birrell "build national education by the waves of secularism, which, when the storm arises, will engulph the nation?" (p. 544). *Assuming* that a secular system of education, such as we have in South Australia, is an evil, then it is the lesser of two evils. The introduction of direct religious instruction would mean the breaking up of our national system; it would mean the establishment of denominational schools with Government grants, with all the consequent disadvantages that I have pointed out. Instead of the children being trained as a national unit they would be trained as cliques—brought up in denominational pens, isolated from each other, with their natures soured, and their sympathies stunted and straitened; more than this, with prejudices and antipathies evolved that really make for national disunion and disintegration.

With the Bishop of Carlisle I agree that "to the life and progress of a nation pureness and stability of character are even more important than technical skill," but I do not share his fears in relation to a national system of education that is "secular," but not godless nor irreligious. My conviction is that the Church should give religious instruction, and the State should impart secular knowledge.

JOHN BLACKET
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THE SEPARATION OF THE CREEDS FROM THE SERVICE OF WORSHIP.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1906, p. 741.)

I WISH to express most hearty appreciation of Mr Garnett's paper. I am disposed to think that the separation of the creeds from the general service of worship, for which he pleads, offers the most effective remedy for the difficulties which more and more press upon thoughtful members of the Established Church. It has been suggested that a declaration to the effect that the creeds are to be read as historical documents, expressive of received tradition, would afford relief to the scrupulous, and not deprive the orthodox of a "privilege" they value. And, as a step towards freedom, this might suffice. But it leaves untouched that particular objection to the recital of creeds which Mr Garnett urges, and which is being felt with increasing keenness by many, viz., that our habit of making constantly renewed profession of the soundness of our beliefs, and of our loyalty to the true God, does not mark the right attitude either of the enthusiastic worshipper or of the devoted servant. Moreover, while creeds are recited at all services, we are repeatedly reminded of the discussions which are associated with them. From all such distractions of criticism Mr Garnett calls us away, to those wider thoughts and profounder emotions which, inexpressible in set forms of words, yet lie at the roots of the spiritual life. By this appeal we are all brought together, priests and laymen, and called upon so to humble ourselves before God when we gather for worship, so to humble ourselves in the recognition of the divine holiness and our imperfection, as to have no heart for the exposition of our own sound opinions, still less for the condemnation of those others who lack the same illumination.

We are shown in this paper with how little loss, nay, with what real advantage, the creeds may be omitted from our public services, since, in fact, they are not a proper part of worship, being expressive neither of repentance nor prayer, nor praise, nor aspiration (*Hibbert*, July 1906, p. 742). We are reminded of the far-reaching practical significance (p. 746)

of the "belief" demanded by Christ, of which, not a scheme of words, but "a man's whole life is the only true expression." We are warned against the growing danger of "a breach between profession and practice," and of the superfluousness of repeated declarations of loyalty on the part of the servant who in thought and deed is utterly devoted to his master.

Mr Garnett, I venture to think, has given utterance to the thought which has been gradually forming itself in the minds of many; but it is well that a layman should have spoken. The laity hardly realise how little help the clergy get in the attempt to gauge the real thoughts of their parishioners.

With a renewed expression of my hope that this paper will receive the careful consideration which it deserves, I might conclude. Let me add just two or three words from my own point of view.

Scepticism apart, the recital of the creeds is losing its effectiveness. The repetition by the priest from day to day, or Sunday after Sunday, is so obviously an inevitable part of his prescribed official duty, as representing the people, that it is very apt to lose its personal significance for him, and permits of a careless, or, it may be, a dissatisfied, acquiescence on the part of the congregation.

Again, the growing custom of having creeds chanted by the choirs, formed largely of boys at the most irresponsible age, is in itself a kind of confession that we are in fact putting aside the solemn declaration of personal beliefs, and substituting a musical recitative, allied to "Oratorio." Whatever be the effect of this upon the congregation, it is liable to have an injurious influence upon the boys, encouraging the idea that they may sing with gusto what seriously they dare not say.

And this brings up the matter of hymns, which offer a very difficult problem to those who contemplate any reform of our liturgy—a most crying need. There are many hymns which are neither more nor less, in parts at least, than rhymed creeds, and creeds far more effusively dogmatic than the "Apostles'." It would tend to the greater dignity and significance of our worship of praise if some of these were put aside. We want more reticence and self-restraint in the expression of religious thought and feeling.

WILLIAM C. STEWART.

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CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1906, p. 661.)

THOUGH late, it may be worth while briefly to reply to Mr de Sélincourt's remarks concerning my January article on the Material element in Christianity. It is always my wish to be grateful for and to utilise philosophical criticism, but this particular criticism I find myself unable to utilise: it seems to be wholly based upon misapprehension.

The chief objection taken relates to my incidental use of the phrase "quasi-material" as an adjective covering such half-known entities as that immaterial substratum of matter—as it appears to be—which we find filling all space and denominate Ether. The author speaks of the term as a subterfuge, and says that "if Sir Oliver Lodge considers the old dichotomy of spirit and matter unscientific, he will not clear our thoughts by inventing a new name."

Why on earth not, if there is a thing requiring a name! I trust that no class of philosophers are averse from new facts or anything to which they are not historically accustomed; though I confess to a suspicion in that direction, for it cannot be that they object only to the use of a tentative nomenclature for them.

Mr de Sélincourt goes on to say that I ought to describe the nature of the ether, and show in what respect it differs from either matter or spirit. Most certainly this should be done, at any rate as regards the former of these two categories, and to the best of my power I have at different times done so, and so have other physicists; but one can hardly introduce a treatise on physics into the midst of a *Hibbert* article.

A few words will suffice for the remainder of this note. My critic says that if I had contended that the human body "was bulkier and clumsier than it need be" for self-expression, and that death left it with only the less highly organised parts which were essential to the embodiment of spirit, "we could have understood him." To which I can only reply that I am sorry to hear it, for I should assuredly have been talking arrant nonsense. But since it appears from the concluding paragraph that Mr de Sélincourt thinks I am trying to instruct philosophers what monism is, I can readily excuse some slight irritation.

OLIVER LODGE.

REVIEWS

Some Dogmas of Religion.—By John M'Taggart Ellis M'Taggart, Doctor in Letters, Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College in Cambridge, author of *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic* and *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology.*—London: Edward Arnold, 1906.

Mr M'Taggart's last volume is written in the clear, crisp style to which he has accustomed his readers, and in substance it may be described as the negative complement of his own constructive theory, expounded in *Hegelian Cosmology.* The real drift of the argument can hardly be understood without reference to the earlier volume, and in what I have to say I will endeavour to connect the two books. Mr M'Taggart begins by defining what he means by "dogma" and "religion." By "dogma" he means any proposition which has metaphysical significance, and a religious dogma is one whose acceptance or rejection by any person would alter his religious position. He considers various definitions of religion, including the suggestion that religion is identical with morality; but he rightly contends that the two names denote separate things, and should therefore be kept distinct. Arnold's definition of religion as "morality touched by emotion" is commented upon. The defect of that definition is, that it does not indicate the source of the emotion. Religion, says Mr M'Taggart, may best be described as "an emotion resting on the conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe at large," and some belief in such a fundamental harmony between our ideals and the nature of things has always been implied, he contends, in religion. Religion is conceived in common usage as "something which brings with it rest and peace and happiness." This view of the relation of religion to morality seems to me fundamentally sound, and is substantially identical with the position formulated by Höffding in his *Philosophy of Religion*, that "the characteristic axiom of religion is the conservation of value—the conviction that no value perishes out of the world." Religion does seem bound up with such a belief. Ethics, or morality as such, only tells us what the "good" is. It does not tell us how far the good is realised, or is capable of realisation. That depends on our view of the nature of the universe as a whole. But, as Mr M'Taggart says, a view of the universe as a whole is a metaphysical belief or a dogma. In this large and ultimate sense, there-

fore, dogma is essential to religion. Our beliefs on metaphysical subjects are, accordingly, far from being as unpractical as many people suppose. They may be of supreme importance for the determination of our attitude towards reality in general and towards our own lives in particular.

"It will depend on those beliefs," says Mr M'Taggart in a fine passage, "whether we shall consider the universe as determined by forces completely out of relation with the good, or whether, on the contrary, we may trust that the dearest ideals and aspirations of our own nature are realised, and far more than realised, in the ultimate reality. It will depend on them whether we can regard the troubles of the present and the uncertainties of the future with the feelings of a mouse towards a cat, or of a child towards its father. It will depend on them whether we look on our pleasures as episodes which will soon pass, or on our sorrows as delusions which will soon be dispelled. It will depend on them whether our lives seem to us worth living only as desperate efforts to make the best of an incurably bad business, or as the passage to a happiness that it has not entered into our hearts to conceive. It will depend on them whether we regard ourselves as temporary aggregations of atoms or as God incarnate. . . . These questions are not devoid of practical importance. It is common to speak of metaphysical problems as abstract and unpractical. In reality all other questions are abstract as compared with these, and most, as compared with these, are unpractical."

But how is dogma to be established? In other words, how are such metaphysical convictions to be justified? In his second chapter Mr M'Taggart considers various attempts at justification. Dogmas are sometimes supported by the assertion that they do not rest on arguments at all, and cannot therefore be shaken by them. They rest on the immediate conviction of the believer. "If the person who holds a belief in this manner," says Mr M'Taggart caustically, "mentions the fact to me as a reason why I should not waste his time in trying to upset it, he is acting in a perfectly reasonable manner. And it is also strictly relevant to mention it if he is writing an autobiography, for it may be an important fact in his life. Also it is relevant as a contribution to statistics. It shows that one more person has this particular conviction in this particular way. But it is not relevant if it is put forward for any other motive. Above all, it is absolutely irrelevant if it is put forward as a reason to induce other people to believe the same dogma." Dismissing this view, therefore, he proceeds to consider the argument that a dogma must be true because it is held by all, or by most people. If it were really held by all, it would be superfluous to spend time in proving it. This argument must therefore mean no more than that the belief is, or has been, very general. But the opinion of the majority has very often been proved wrong in the past; and besides, the appearance of a decisive majority for a particular dogma is often gained by first excluding certain nations on the ground of their asserted inferiority. This test of truth, therefore, cannot be applied with consistency or safety. Nor can the

truth of a religious dogma be proved by miracles. Finally, there is the argument from consequences. If a particular dogma is not true, this argument runs, the universe would be intolerably bad, and therefore the doctrine must be true. Put in this way, however, the argument evidently begs the very point in question, for what reason have we at this point to assert that the universe is not very evil? Moreover, in arguing from our desires and aspirations to their fulfilment, men too often ignore the races to which they do not belong, and also leave out of account those of their own race whose desires are different from their own. Such arguments are generally put forward in favour of the orthodox ideas of a particular time and place. This is notably the case, for example, with the doctrine of immortality. And if it is argued that any dogma which would paralyse our activity cannot be true, we may ask whether there is really any dogma the belief in whose truth would paralyse action. "It would be absurd to act, no doubt, if action made no difference in any result which was of value. But neither materialism nor any other dogma which has ever been maintained could lead to this conclusion. We may not survive the death of our bodies, and the race may be destined to endure for only a few brief millions of years, but meanwhile the race has not yet ceased to exist, and here we are, particular individuals, and while we are here, whatever the future may be, it is better that we should be full than hungry, better that we should work than steal, better that we should read Robert Browning than that we should read Robert Montgomery." As a last resort, an appeal is often made to faith in matters of dogma on account of the limitation of our knowledge. Of the limitation of our knowledge Mr M'Taggart is as profoundly convinced as Hume, but, as he neatly puts it, "it is somewhat remarkable that our want of knowledge on any subject should be put forward as a reason for coming to a particular conclusion on that subject."

So far as these arguments are concerned, therefore, Mr M'Taggart's result is entirely negative. He next proceeds to discuss in detail the three dogmas of God, freedom, and immortality, which are usually considered to form the substance of religious belief. He begins with the question of human immortality, arguing, in the first place, that the presumption against immortality, produced in many people by supposed results of physical science, should be discarded. Science is concerned solely with uniformities in the routine of our perceptions. Physical science can have nothing to say, for example, on the question of the independent existence of matter, which is only one theory about the causes of our sensations, and a theory which, on examination, is found to be involved in inconsistency. The "self," therefore, cannot be treated as an activity of the body. Its conscious existence is, on the contrary, a primary reality. On lines which recall Berkeley and Lotze, Mr M'Taggart thus leads up to the theory of monadistic idealism, which he had already advocated in his *Hegelian Cosmology*, and, as in that book, he again proceeds to connect the belief in immortality with the belief in pre-existence. "The present attitude of most Western thinkers to the

doctrine of pre-existence," he says, "is curious. Of the many who regard our life, after the death of our bodies, as certain or probable, scarcely one regards our life before the birth of those bodies as a possibility which deserves discussion; and yet it was taught by Buddha and by Plato, and it is usually associated with the belief in immortality in the far east. Why should men who are so anxious to-day to prove that we shall live after this life is ended, regard the hypothesis that we have already survived the end of a life as one which is beneath consideration?" Mr M'Taggart himself believes that any evidence which will prove immortality will also prove pre-existence.

The ethical argument that immortality is demanded by the claims of the moral personality, and that such a belief is required if we are to vindicate the goodness of God or the moral order of the universe, Mr M'Taggart dismisses on the general ground that the nature of reality is obviously not incompatible with the existence of *some* evil, and therefore we cannot hope for an *a priori* proof that any particular evil is too bad to be consistent with the nature of the universe. We are forced back, therefore, he says, "on the purely metaphysical arguments." These, as partially disclosed here and more fully developed in *Hegelian Cosmology*, turn out to be based on abstract considerations as to the nature of substance. They are indeed curiously pre-Kantian in character, and it is strange to find so profound a student of Hegel using substance throughout as the ultimate category in speaking both of the self and of God. The perdurability of substance naturally refers just as much to the past as to the future. Substance, indeed, is conceived as that which can neither be created nor destroyed. Mr M'Taggart believes, accordingly, that our present existence has been preceded by a plurality of lives, and will be followed in like manner by a plurality of future lives. The obvious objection to this theory is the fact that we retain no memory of those previous lives, and Mr M'Taggart, it is to be noted, does not imply that in the lives to come we shall have any memory of our present existence. "An existence that is cut up into separate lives, in none of which memory extends to a previous life, may be thought to have no practical value." He labours hard to prove that this is not so, his most important argument being that though the actual experiences are forgotten, their results in the training of mind and character may be carried forward into the next life, so that the man will be wiser and better in the second life because of what has happened in the first. He will, as it were, have a better start; he will build in the new life upon the foundations laid in the old. This sounds, however, more plausible than it really is, and depends upon the ambiguity of the word "person." "In spite of the loss of memory," says Mr M'Taggart, "it is the same person who lives in the successive lives." Now, as Mr Bradley has forcibly recalled to us, it is exceedingly difficult to determine precisely what we mean by personal identity, and what its limits are. Obviously, within the present life, countless items of our experience lapse

from conscious memory and survive only as aptitudes, dispositions, and tendencies. Yet they play their part in training the mind and tempering the character. Our personality is not exhausted, therefore, by the individual experiences we can consciously recall. Still, although much may persist only in this subconscious fashion, it seems clear that a continuity of conscious memory within certain limits is involved in the ordinary notion of personality, so that a complete break of such continuity (and this is supposed to occur between one life and another) would make the assertion of personal identity in the two lives unmeaning. Locke is arguing, therefore, on right lines, it seems to me, when he emphasises in his well-known chapter "that personal identity consists not in the identity of substance, but in the identity of consciousness."

I cannot help feeling that throughout the discussion Mr M'Taggart substitutes for the living and concrete unity of self-consciousness, as manifested in experience, the numerical unity of a soul-substance or indestructible soul-atom on which the personal unity of experience is supposed to depend, or in which it is somehow housed. This soul-substance forms, as it were, the vehicle by which the mental and moral qualities acquired by an individual in the course of a single life are transmitted to the next incarnation to be his working capital and the starting-point, possibly, of further advance. The two lives are thus continuous in the sense that both have the same metaphysical substrate, and the identity of substance manifests itself, on Mr M'Taggart's theory, in identity or continuity of attributes. But even so, it is surely paradoxical, or rather simply misleading, to speak of this continuity as "personal identity," and to say that in spite of the loss of memory it is "the same person who lives in the successive lives." The identity that exists is the identity of an object for an onlooker; it does not exist for any one of the successive incarnations. Each self is the realised unity of its own separate life, and if the new life is not consciously knit to the old, it is unmeaning to speak of the new individual as the same self. Mr M'Taggart argues that the loss of memory need not render immortality valueless, because the present life has value, although, admittedly, it carries no memories beyond itself. Why, then, he says, should not future lives have value, although in the same way without memory beyond themselves? "In that case a man will be better off for his immortality, since it will give him an unlimited amount of valuable existence, instead of a limited amount. And a man who believed that he had this immortality would have a more desirable expectation of the future than if he did not believe it." Certainly the future lives, when they come, have the same chance as this life of being valuable to the persons who have to live them, and as the lives go on for ever, there will thus be "an unlimited amount of valuable existence"; but there is to me a savour of mockery in the saying that the "man" is better off because the prospect gives "him" an unlimited, instead of a limited, amount of valuable existence. Mr M'Taggart himself is candid enough to add that "if a man should say that he takes no more interest in his own fate, after memory of his present life had gone, than

he would take in the fate of some unknown person," he does not see how he could be shown to be in the wrong. "*His own* fate" is so far a question-begging description of the facts, since it implies the truth of Mr M'Taggart's theory of what constitutes identity. He puts the case more fairly in *Hegelian Cosmology* when he says: "Suppose a man could be assured that in a short time he would lose for ever all of memory the past, would he consider this to be annihilation, and take no more interest in *the person of a similar character* who would occupy his old body than he would in any stranger?" In both connections Mr M'Taggart expresses his own conviction that most men would regard the fortunes of this hypothetical individual with an interest at least analogous to that which they take in their own conscious survival. That is a question which could only be determined by statistics, and I will at least record my adhesion to the opposite view. I am not here arguing in defence of an immortality accompanied by memory. I can vividly appreciate the stimulus of the Positivist view that all the good of every life becomes the enduring possession of the race; or, on more homely ground, I can understand a man working for his family or his country without giving a thought to his personal continuance. But I fail to understand what special interest a man can take in the unknown series of those who are to inherit his soul-substance, any more than in the equally unknown series of those who had the usufruct of it before him. Nor can I see how, what I should describe as the non-personal immortality of such individual substances, should "make any difference to our attitude towards reality in general and towards our own lives in particular."

I think, however, that I see in what consists for Mr M'Taggart the attraction of the belief, considered not with reference to the particular person who is misleadingly described as immortal, but as a general theory of the nature of existence. It is because it seems to guarantee an idealistic theory of the universe. Mr M'Taggart holds, and in this I agree with him, that value resides only in the experience of conscious beings. Such values are realised (it may be, progressively realised), in the present life of the human race upon the earth; but if these values are realised only in perishing individuals, in perishing civilisations or races—if our solar system, for example, is after a given time to pass away leaving behind it no result beyond a certain increase in the temperature of surrounding space,—there is an aimlessness in this ceaseless process of building up and pulling down, which is at variance with our moral ideas, and seems to contradict the belief that spiritual values constitute the ultimate facts of existence. In order to save the situation, therefore, Mr M'Taggart argues that reality consists, in ultimate terms, of a definite number of eternal "selves" or monads, which appear over and over again in the time series, and serve as the media in which the cumulative results of experience in the time-process are preserved. These spiritual entities flower, as it were, in successive lives. They constitute the "fundamental differentiations of the Absolute," which is, in fact, only a name for the "assembly of spirits" formed by these "finite individuals, each of which finds his character and

individuality in his relations to the rest, and in his perception that they are of the same nature with himself." Such a "city of God" has been recognised by various thinkers as the highest form of the spiritual ideal, but the attempt to give precision to the idea by converting it into the doctrine of a definitely determined number of eternal self-existent substances seems to me to obscure the true meaning of personality and to exemplify the kind of metaphysical speculation from which Kant, and still more Hegel, was supposed to have set us free.

The other dogmas above referred to, the existence of God and the freedom of the will, are treated by Mr M'Taggart in a more exclusively negative sense. Not only does he set himself to demolish the ordinary arguments by which they are supported, but he holds that on metaphysical grounds they can be shown to be untrue. The discussion of free-will seems to me below Mr M'Taggart's usual level of freshness and incisiveness. He attacks a "freedom of indetermination" for which I do not think any champion would enter the lists. What upholder of freedom, for example, would accept the statement that "according to the indeterminist theory our choice between motives is not determined by anything at all"? And when Mr M'Taggart says that "on the determinist hypothesis an omnipotent God could have prevented all sin by creating us with better natures and in more favourable surroundings," and that "he cannot see what extraordinary value lies in the incompleteness of the determination of the will, which should counterbalance all the sin, and the consequent unhappiness caused by the misuse of that will," the answer is that creatures so turned out would not be moral beings at all; they would be things and not persons. Mr M'Taggart's own arguments treat the question entirely on the plane of efficient causality, on which motives are regarded as external forces impinging upon a given "nature," that is to say, an inherited or implanted disposition. But such schematic representation remains entirely outside the realities of the moral consciousness. In the fundamentals of ethical theory, however unfortunately he may sometimes have expressed himself, Kant's insight is unerring, and the basis of all ethical discussion is just the difference between a person and a thing. A being who can only act under the idea of freedom is really free in the sense required by ethics. It is the judgment of the moral agent upon his own action which can alone tell us the real nature of the act, however justifiably the psychologist, the historian, or the social reformer may deal with it from another point of view. I believe that a more sympathetic study of the great master in ethics would have made Mr M'Taggart's chapter on "Free Will" more adequate to its theme.

Belief in immortality and belief in God usually go together. Indeed, the tendency of modern thought is rather to make the conviction of immortality dependent on the doctrine of God. But for Mr M'Taggart the one doctrine excludes the other. The eternity of finite selves in the sense explained above negates for him the supposition that the Absolute is a self or person. "It would be difficult," he has told us in his *Hegelian Cosmology*,

"to find a proof of our own immortality which did not place God in the position of a community rather than a person." In the present volume Mr M'Taggart begins by distinguishing God from the Absolute. The two terms are generally used, he allows, as synonymous; but the God of Spinoza, for example, is not personal, whereas personality seems inseparable from the ordinary idea of God. "By God," says Mr M'Taggart, "I mean a being who is personal, supreme, and good"; and the definition may be taken as coinciding, so far as it goes, with ordinary usage. By most men the attribute "supreme" is probably taken to imply that God is the Creator or Author of the universe; but in Mr M'Taggart's view it is not necessary for a belief in God that God should be conceived either as omnipotent or as creative, provided the belief is retained in a being who is personal, supreme, and good. He himself, indeed, denies the existence of God, if undersood as a being omnipotent and creative, but he is willing to admit the possibility of a non-omnipotent God, whom he styles "the director of the universe," "a person of appreciable importance when measured against the whole universe," "one who fights for the good and who may be victorious." The only reason why we should not believe in the existence of such a God, he says, with a dash of cynicism, is that there is no reason why we should believe in it. He first attacks the doctrine of an omnipotent and creative God. The cosmological argument from the necessity for a first cause, he points out, is powerless. If we suppose that God exists in time "then we have a substance which has persisted through an infinite past time." But if one substance can so exist without being caused, why not others? If God did not need a creator, why should "a man" or "a pebble" require one? On the other hand, if God's nature is timeless, then it is incapable of change, and the creation of the universe at a particular moment cannot, therefore, be explained from the nature of God. If we pass to the argument from design, Kant has already told us that it can prove, at most, the existence of an architect or designer, not that of an omnipotent creator. If it proved the existence of a God at all, says Mr M'Taggart, it would also offer a positive disproof of his omnipotence. He next proceeds to argue that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with the belief in an omnipotent being who is also good. He repudiates with not unnatural warmth the theory of Pascal and Mansel that goodness in God may mean something quite different from what is called goodness in men. He refers to Mill's famous saying in this connection as "words which form one of the turning-points in the religious development of the world." This is, surely, somewhat exaggerated language, and in view of this high estimate of the sentiment, it strikes one as quaint when Mr McTaggart goes on to criticise the prudence of Mill's resolve. It might be wiser after all, he suggests, to compound with such a God-monster than to risk the extremes of his malignity. It must be said that the discussion in this chapter is, on the whole, rather profitless, because Mr M'Taggart insists on taking omnipotence as implying the power

to make contradictions true. It may be undesirable to use the word at all, but as those whom he is attacking never assert omnipotence in the sense of ability to override intellectual and moral necessities, the polemic is rather in the air. It is no very pertinent answer, therefore, to the argument that the evil in the universe is the result of free will, to say that "a God who cannot create a universe in which all men have free will and which is at the same time free from all evil is not an omnipotent God, since there is one thing which he cannot do." Mr M'Taggart passes next to consider the alternative of a creative God who is not omnipotent, referring in this connection to Dr Rashdall's essay in the volume *Personal Idealism*. If God is creative, he argues, nothing exists unless He decides to create it—unless, that is, He prefers its existence to its non-existence. We cannot, therefore, in strictness, speak of God's will as *thwarted* by the existence of evil, for He willed the universe as a whole with the evil in it. Such a being could not be a God in the sense in which we have agreed to understand the word, because he would not be good. Here again, however, there seems to be implied in Mr M'Taggart's argument the same interpretation of creative power as we found in the case of omnipotence. He understands by it power to compass moral, if not intellectual, impossibilities. The contention of those against whom Mr M'Taggart is arguing would be that moral goodness, or indeed the existence of a moral agent or a personality at all, is impossible without the risk (without the practical certainty, we may say) of the occurrence of evil volitions; but it does not follow from this that evil is not repugnant in itself to the author of the universe. The discussion of the third possibility, that of a non-omnipotent God who is not regarded as creator but as one person among others, though indefinitely more powerful, leads to the less negative, but somewhat equivocal, result already indicated. To be frank, one sees no reason why this mythical "person of appreciable importance" should be dignified with the august name of God; and as a description of Mr M'Taggart's own conclusions the blunt expression in *Hegelian Cosmology* seems preferable, "the Absolute is not God, and in consequence there is no God."

The concluding chapter considers the negative result of the whole discussion in its bearing on human happiness. The existence of an omnipotent creator, it is argued, would give us no reason to expect any goodness in the universe which we should not have expected otherwise. The existence of a non-omnipotent God would give us "no appreciable help towards a cheerful view of the universe," seeing that it leaves us uncertain how much God may be able to do. On the other hand, "it is quite possible without a belief in God to maintain that the nature of reality is such as to *ensure* the predominance of good. There might be a God and yet the universe might be, on the whole, bad. There might be no God and yet the universe might be, on the whole, good." The only way, therefore, of arriving at any certainty on this point "would be by the establishment of a complete system of metaphysics." Mr M'Taggart evidently refers here to his own theory as sketched in *Hegelian Cosmology*.

In spite of its acuteness, and in spite of the flashes of deep feeling which redeem much that is merely clever, the book leaves me with a distinct impression of unreality. I may be to some extent disqualified as a critic. When one does not believe in a creator *ab extra*, whether omnipotent or non-omnipotent, and when the conception of a finite director of the universe strikes one as frankly fantastic, it is perhaps difficult to appreciate a laborious discussion of these alternatives. But if Mr M'Taggart was going to discuss religious dogmas to any purpose, he should have spent his time upon the view which is only mentioned in passing, that "God is the sole reality." Neither religion nor philosophy can seriously entertain any other alternative. In many cases this view has led to a denial of the personality of the divine, but even Martineau, personalist of the personalists, speaks of God as "the soul of all souls." The preliminary difficulty, therefore, which Mr M'Taggart alleges of conceiving "how one person could be part of another," is of a nature which suggests a reconsideration of the conception of personality rather than the omission of a thorough discussion of the only vital theory of God and man. If I may say so without offence, Mr M'Taggart's treatment of the dogmas he discusses seems to deprive them of their primary reference to the needs and utterances of the religious consciousness. The doctrines seem, if I may so express myself, to become finitised and mechanised. I have already indicated my view of the doctrine of eternal soul-substances. Similarly, in the case of God, it is surely not the existence of "a substance which has persisted through an infinite past time" that we are concerned about, or even the existence of another person to love. When Mr M'Taggart speaks of the love of God as "something entirely distinct from reverence and admiration and gratitude—a feeling of one person for another, which is not unworthy to bear the same name as the feeling of friend for friend," I feel somehow that Spinoza's description of the *amor intellectualis Dei* and Kant's austere warning against importing the notion of "pathologische Neigung" into the practical love of God are at bottom more religious, and become the situation better. What does the existence of God, or the personality of God, mean for the religious thinker save the intense conviction of the rationality and the righteousness of the universe? And is it not strange to say, as Mr M'Taggart does, of faith in God (p. 69) that "it will only give us light on *one particular dogma*, that the world is wisely and righteously governed"? Surely this is the sum and substance of all religious faith and of all philosophical construction. Does it not carry with it the ultimate answer in regard to immortality as in regard to every other question? As Carlyle puts it in one of the pathetic outbursts of the *Autobiography*: "Perhaps we *shall* all meet Yonder, and the tears be wiped from all eyes. One thing is no Perhaps; surely we *shall* all meet, *if* it be the will of the Maker of us. If it be not His will, then is it not better so?"

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Descartes, his Life and Times.—By Elizabeth S. Haldane.—London: John Murray.—Pp. xxviii + 398.

It has only recently been possible to construct a satisfactory Life of Descartes. The main sources of information are Descartes's own Correspondence, and the biography by Baillet published in 1691. Much of the Correspondence had to be rescued from the Seine in 1653, and it was sadly mixed in the drying. Other portions were recovered at various dates and from various sources, and in course of the last ten years we have at length obtained, in the fine edition of MM. Adam and Tannery, a complete and rightly arranged collection. This, with Baillet's *Life*, has been the basis of Miss Haldane's work, and she has so skilfully extended the material thus afforded by study of the events and the men of Descartes's time, as well as by accounts of his writings, that we have now as admirable a picture of the great philosopher as it is possible to obtain.

As Miss Haldane points out, the life of Descartes conformed to the ideal prescription of a period of study, a period of action, and a period of reflection. And accordingly she divides her book into three parts: the first dealing with his education in France (1596–1612); the second with his *Wanderjahre* (1612–1628), spent in seeing the world, in travel, and in warfare; and the third with his constructive period (1628–1650). Yet action was the least of Descartes's characteristics, and the dullest part of the book, except for the account of his thinking and inquiry, is the second period. He was involved in the miserable tangle of the Thirty Years' War, and one does not wonder that in the end he gave up warfare in disgust. War for war's sake had little attraction for him, except on its scientific side, and few wars seem more futile and uninteresting than that of the Thirty Years. Soldiering, indeed, seems to have attracted him—not as a profession, but as a means of seeing the world and knowing men. The preparation for his life-work was made at the Jesuit College of La Flèche, where he had apparently learned with ease all that his instructors could teach him, only to arrive at a premature disillusioning. "Not only did he despise his own knowledge, but . . . . he extended his disdain to the work of others, even of the so-called *Savants*, and, indeed, he could not hide his contempt for what were denominated the sciences themselves. Was it, he asked himself . . . . that the knowledge which he sought for was an illusion, a mirage which enticed men on, just to disappoint them?" A brief trial of "seeing the world" in Paris was followed by a return to study; and this again being interrupted by the incursions of friends, he seems to have thought that as a volunteer in camps, with slow sieges, winter quarters, and other spaces of leisure, he might have that contact with the real world of men and that solitude for meditation which he instinctively craved. Accordingly, even in his military life, he was not a man of action. Indeed, the broad impression which Miss Haldane's biography leaves in the reader's mind is that

Descartes was essentially a spectator of time and existence, that he lived the θεωρητικὸς βίος with almost unshaken steadfastness. This detachment of the keenly interested onlooker is the key to his whole life. He learns at La Flèche; but he learns critically, though keenly, and he has his own thoughts. He is content for a time to live in camps, he likes to see something of Courts; but he will not allow himself to be involved in the business of these places, and he continues to think for himself. He loves his friends; but he would rather correspond with them than have them near enough to draw him into society and distract him from his own meditations. And thus he exiles himself: gives an address for letters, but conceals for a time his actual abode lest people should be tempted to follow him: and chooses not an absolute solitude, but one that remains just in touch with life. And this detachment is not a mere idiosyncrasy: he is living his own philosophy, his own "Method." For what is his method but the endeavour to stand away from the great mass of traditional learning, the knowledge and opinion acquired uncritically from books and life, and to view it dispassionately, to lay bare its foundations and to reconstruct it without destroying its material? His doubt is not an absolute doubt, a virtual rejection, even of the Scholastic doctrines. "The fault of the old philosophy lay in its manner rather than its matter," and in his discussions with his Jesuit teachers he "continually emphasises the assertion that he is in no wise breaking with Aristotelian tradition, or bringing Scholasticism into disrepute." But he will not place himself with unquestioning obedience under the hand of the past: he must look at it all from the outside, he must get back to first principles and rebuild for himself from the beginning.

The attitude of the onlooker, detached from practical affairs, is appropriate also to the founder of modern scientific method. For Descartes, as Miss Haldane puts it, "to know the beginning of things and the laws that govern their action, is emphatically to know the whole, since the rest is merely a question of the operation of physical law." And again, "in concluding [the *Principia*], Descartes explains that he has dealt with every sort of phenomenon without breaking with the old Aristotelian traditions. He has considered *how* we can know and *what* we can know, and he declares himself to have found that the principles of geometry and mechanics supply a satisfactory key to all the phenomena of Nature, and that no other principles supply their place: the rules of mechanics are present in Nature, and the building up of a tree can be regarded just in the same way as we regard the building up of a watch. And thus he founded through his *Method* that great school of thought which has largely dominated the thinking science of later times. To show that the universe is governed by mechanical laws—laws of which we can be absolutely certain—and that Galileo's discoveries simply indicated this, was Descartes's great endeavour." The mechanical view is just the view of the dispassionate spectator. It banishes metaphysics and teleology from the study of Nature; it severs matter from mind, making mind a mere

perceiver; it looks at things from the beginning and not from the end. Descartes's life is thus in harmony with his doctrine, his practical with his theoretical detachment.

No man, however, can maintain perfectly the attitude of the onlooker; and least of all can one who is attempting it as a new beginning. "It was impossible even for him [Descartes] to apply the Cartesian method relentlessly, and clear himself of all prepossessions before building up his faith." He "is reported to have said that 'his religion was that of his nurse; that he lived in it without scruple, and hoped to die in it with the same tranquillity.'" And he was ever anxious to stand well with his early Jesuit teachers. This may not be consistent, but it is human; and it was easy for Descartes to overlook the inconsistency, inasmuch as he applied his method, not to the special dogmas of the Christian religion, but to the philosophical conception of God, and the interpretation of the material world. Miss Haldane deals admirably with the vexed question of Descartes's "trimming." She admits moral weakness in his attitude, especially in his relation to Galileo. "Descartes was not of the stuff martyrs are made of; he even seems to have had, by nature, a physical dread of death. His interests were intellectual, and he was a scholar much more than a reformer." Yet this is not the whole explanation. It was not merely the fear of death that moved him: he was sincerely attached to his religion. "There appeared to be two points of view always present in Descartes's outlook on the world, each kept entirely separate from the other—the point of view of reason, with which the facts of life could be rationally explained and the point of view of faith, which had to be accepted. . . . The fact seemed to be that Descartes lived a double life, with views developed from his reason clearly and definitely established on the one hand, and certain inherited beliefs which somehow had to be accommodated to these beliefs, on the other. Their reconcilement was no easy task." It may indeed be said that Descartes was setting a problem which we are still trying to solve. With Kant behind us, it is easy in our day to see wavering and inconsistency in Descartes. But we have waverings of our own; and it is an additional witness to the greatness of Descartes that so thorough an investigation of his life as Miss Haldane has accomplished should leave us with increased admiration of his genius and character.

Miss Haldane has given us the standard life of Descartes. Its interest is not merely biographical; for it throws light on many points of difficulty in Descartes's philosophy, and on his relations to the philosophers and scientists of his time. The value of the book is enhanced by a well-selected bibliography; and there are four illustrations—portraits of Descartes, the Princess Elizabeth, and Queen Christine, and a picture of Descartes's house at Endegeest, near Leiden.

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Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir.—By A. S. and E. M. S.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1906.

Before this book was written, I heard the opinion expressed, by one who knew Professor Sidgwick well, that his would be a most difficult life to write, because he had "such a subtle mind and such a simple character." Whether this is so or not—whether or not, that is, it is specially difficult to write an adequate life of the man of whom this is true,—it is certain that the Memoir of Professor Sidgwick by his wife and brother is of deep interest and value both to those who had the great privilege of knowing him, and to others. It is perhaps not too much to say that the book does not contain a page, or even a paragraph, which is not interesting, and the gratitude of all readers is due to its authors for this Memoir of a life full and effective, successful and happy, in no ordinary degree, made beautiful by the rarest refinement of nature, and simple in the sustained enthusiasm of its devotion to truth and right, the life of a man who had (to quote words of his own) "an ardent love of goodness"—the love of a philosopher, bound up with an intense desire for intellectual enlightenment —by whom the "high and severe delight" of serving his ideal—the satisfaction which attends "the resolute choice of virtue . . .

> The stubborn thistles bursting
> Into glossy purples, which outredden
> All voluptuous garden roses"—

was consistently valued above all lesser goods.

The idea of the authors has been to make the work consist as far as possible of Mr Sidgwick's own writing. Besides a far too brief autobiographical fragment (1858–1869), dictated in his last illness, it is composed chiefly of letters (and extracts from letters) written by him to various relatives and friends—in particular to his mother, Mr H. G. Dakyns, and Mr F. W. H. Myers, and letters and journal (1884–1892) to Mr J. A. Symonds, with connecting links for the periods which were considered to be not covered, or not adequately covered, by these.

The plan, which has its own merits and advantages, has been carried out with admirable fidelity and skill. The merits and advantages are certainly in this case both profound and obvious. The letters are frank, fresh, spontaneous, but never crude or hasty; playful and humorous, yet full of consideration for others, and keen and delicate sympathy with this correspondent or that; and they show an extraordinary generosity of temper, and—on occasion—a height and depth of emotion of which at any rate the adequate expression is to the last degree uncommon. We feel them to be the outcome of a very rare combination of endowments—gentleness joined with strength, enthusiasm and originality with keen and balanced judgment, warmth of feeling and an exquisite gaiety with steadfastness and flawless self-control.

The authors of the Memoir, leaving all this to be for the most part

gathered from the journal and letters, and a few contributions from friends, have refrained from many words of their own. In this, indeed, we divine their depth and reverence of appreciation. "That is the best part of beauty which a picture cannot present—no, nor the first sight of the life." And the better we know a face, the more we feel this; and the same is true—even more true—of the spiritual beauty of heart and life.

Thus Mr Sidgwick's letters, on the whole, tell their own tale. He has remarked somewhere that "at least the letters in a biography are true." That is, they are in a sense the very man himself—a reflection rather than a portrait. It is such a reflection that the authors wish to give us.

Yet the modesty of mood about himself which Mr Sidgwick shows in the letters ("An Englishman," he tells us in one place, "chooses his worst [motive] to publish") has perhaps some drawbacks from a biographical point of view; one might easily fail to gather from them perfections of life and mind that were known in some measure to all who knew him; for example, his faculty for seeing things in right perspective, and for recognising and drawing out what was real and what was best in everything and in everybody. When, to give a small instance, he chose as title-page motto to his *Political Economy* the stanza:

> 'Tis the day of the chattel,
> Web to weave and corn to grind;
> Things are in the saddle,
> And ride mankind,

he saw in it the whole sweep and inwardness of Emerson's thought in a way in which most of us certainly had never seen it before. We must allow similarly for some other characteristics, *e.g.* a dignity of temper which would never stoop to complaint or condescend to self-praise, and the high development of intellectual sympathy, which contributed so much to make him not only an ideal correspondent from the point of view of those to whom his letters were addressed, but also an unsurpassed philosophic and literary critic, a most enlightening teacher, and an enchanting talker. His letters are so adapted to the circumstances of the case that for full appreciation the reader needs to know (or infer) the context. Only on this condition is the self-revelation which is there adequately apprehended.

Here, I think, is a letter-writer who, though he frequently writes in obedience to the impulse and the mood of the moment, and even now and then simply in accordance with well-recognised conventions of expression, yet habitually takes account of his correspondent's personality and circumstances, and will use infinite pains to meet his point of view and answer his demand, but never bring forward or discuss matters of interest to himself inopportunely or unasked—never, however great the stress, speak from his own standpoint, regardless of the other's.

All this being so, it comes about that the subject of philosophy (or moral science, as it is called at Cambridge), to which Mr Sidgwick rendered lifelong and devoted service, does not on the whole loom large in the

Memoir, and that one does not gather from it much concerning, *e.g.*, his teaching, his talk and discussion on moral science topics, and his acquaintance with Greek as well as English ethical thought, or about his published writings and the estimation in which they are held. Nowhere, I think, in the letters do we even hear much of the ethical system which he worked out with such splendid insight and constructive power, a system which was both the finest intellectual production of the author, and likewise to him the guide of a life adorned with the "white flower" of blamelessness, with the unstinted benevolence which is the very soul of goodness, and a charm which can give ethical value to even trifling actions.

It may be allowable to draw attention here to Professor Sidgwick's style as a philosophic writer—especially since the style of the letters, delightful as they are, would perhaps hardly have led us to expect such a high level of scholarly thoroughness and finish, though they abound in indications of the depth and freshness and comprehensiveness by which all the writer's thought is marked. In his books and published papers, as in his lectures, Professor Sidgwick was unsparing of pains, not only in the thinking out of the matter, but also in its expression. This is specially noticeable in his best-known book, *The Methods of Ethics*, now in a sixth edition. How carefully and effectively every successive edition of this work was revised and improved (though without fundamental alteration) may be realised by anyone who will take the trouble to compare the editions, and how admirably articulated the thought of the whole is may be tested by analysis and comparison. There are no gaps and no contradictions, and there is, moreover, an organic unity of thought which comes out the more clearly the more the book is studied.

I think that not only did its author retain to the end an unshaken faith in the ethical doctrine here set forth, but also that in his own mind and in his writings he was ever testing it afresh in every way, meeting the objections that came to his notice, working it out to greater completeness. His book has been permanently successful and influential, yet he missed, no doubt, in connection with it, the fulness of intellectual sympathy which he so much valued; but he was among those who are able "to give more than they receive of pity and aid," and was strong enough, courageous enough, self-reliant enough to go steadily on without it, attaining to an ever clearer vision of the ground of his convictions. And there can be no question that he tasted to the full the keen delight of the excellent workman in his work, though he never simply rested content with what had been accomplished, but was always pressing on towards further light.

In a deeply interesting fragment of intellectual autobiography included in the preface to the last edition of the *Methods* (cp. also *Mind*, N.S., No. 38) Professor Sidgwick describes the development of his ethical view, and explains how he came to hold that "the opposition between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism was due to a misunderstanding. There was indeed [he says] a fundamental opposition between the individual's interest and either morality which I could not solve by any method I had yet found trust-

worthy, without the assumption of the moral government of the world; so far I agreed with both Butler and Kant.

"But I could find no real opposition between Intuitionism and Utilitarianism. . . . The Utilitarianism of Mill and Bentham seemed to me to want a basis; that basis could only be supplied by a fundamental intuition; on the other hand, the best examination I could make of the Morality of Common Sense showed me no clear and self-evident principles except such as were perfectly consistent with Utilitarianism" (p. xxi.).[1]

Here we have a brief indication of the extremely important ethical construction which we owe to Professor Sidgwick, a construction as important, I believe, in one region as Kant's in another. To Professor Sidgwick it is due that no instructed moralist can now regard Utilitarianism and Common Sense Intuitionism (ancient doctrines in modern guise) as irreconcilable or even antagonistic; the ever-renewed struggle of theoretical ethics has now entered on an apparently new phase, and we have ideal (or intuitional) Utilitarianism opposed (very inadequately opposed, I venture to think) on the one hand by "evolutional," and on the other hand by "transcendental" or "idealist" ethics. There are, however, not wanting signs that the rational or ideal Utilitarianism of the *Methods* is gradually gaining ground.

The difficulty that, on this view, does remain is the "Dualism" of the Practical (or Moral) Reason, so fully recognised by Bishop Butler—the intuition of self-evident dictates, on the one hand, of reasonable self-love, on the other of conscience, together with the want of an equally clear and certain intuition "that the performance of duty will be adequately rewarded and its violation punished." It was, I suppose, chiefly this unsatisfied demand of practical reason which was at the bottom of Professor Sidgwick's continued interest in psychical research as a possible source of light, and, to a certain extent, of the mental struggle about acceptance of the current views of orthodox Christianity in which he had been brought up, which has prominence in the Memoir.[2] "If," he says, "we may assume the existence of such a Being as God, by the *consensus* of theologians, is conceived to be, it seems that Utilitarians may legitimately infer the existence of Divine sanctions to the code of social duty as constructed on a Utilitarian basis." As long as we have neither intuition nor demonstration that duty will be rewarded—that is, as long as we cannot certainly show that reasonable self-love and conscience do not conflict—this, or some philosophically similar, assumption is the best we can get; but even so, ethical science is no worse off than physical science, and we have no more reason to reject it: "Those who hold that the edifice

[1] By Utilitarianism is meant "the ethical theory that the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole."—*Methods of Ethics*, p. 411.

[2] As far as current orthodox Christianity was concerned, it would seem that its connection with pressing problems of practice came to be an important factor in the struggle.

of physical science is really constructed of conclusions logically inferred from self-evident premises, may reasonably demand that any practical judgments claiming philosophic certainty should be based on an equally firm foundation. If, on the other hand, we find that in our supposed knowledge of the world of nature propositions are commonly taken to be universally true, which yet seem to rest on no other grounds than that we have a strong disposition to accept them, and that they are indispensable to the systematic coherence of our beliefs—it will be more difficult to reject a similarly supported assumption in ethics, without opening the door to universal scepticism" (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 507). And again he says (*Lectures on Spencer's Ethics*, p. 188): "Unless we assume or prove the moral order of the world, there is a conflict between rational convictions. —Do I assume it? Yes, practically, as a man; provisionally, and with due recognition of the need of proof, as a philosopher. The assumption is normal to reflective man, and a postulate of common sense." Compare also *Memoir*, p. 607, etc. (date 1898).

One further word with reference to the published works I must add here, namely, that among them is a book on politics (*The Elements of Politics*), which, together with *The Methods of Ethics*, provides a complete and harmonious theory of conduct on utilitarian principles.

I have exhausted the space at my disposal, and have not room to say what I would have wished on some other points—for instance, the distinguished and active part which Mr Sidgwick took in all educational matters, in University business and reform, in the improvement of women's education (particularly in regard to Newnham College), and in social life; the wholly delightful way in which he used to preside at meetings and manage discussions, the wide range of his knowledge and interests, and his rare capacities of sociability, friendship, and affection, which met with as rare a response. He was indeed one who, long before old age, reaped its best fruit in "honour, love, obedience, troops of friends."

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Idola Theatri, a Criticism of Oxford Thought and Thinkers, from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism.—By Henry Sturt.—Macmillan & Co., 1906.

This work arose, the author tells us, out of a dissatisfaction with the vindication of personality and the spiritual world, offered by such thinkers as Green and Nettleship in the Oxford of twenty years ago. Their philosophy infected modern Idealism in England with unsatisfactory tendencies which he calls "Intellectualism," "Absolutism," and "Subjectivism." These three constitute the "Idola Theatri" of contemporary thought, the ultimate source of which is the "Passive Fallacy" considered by the author to be "the besetting temptation of Philosophy in every age."

This Passive Fallacy and the idola which arise out of it are described in the first three chapters. The next three give a critical account of the idola and their systematic development. The second part of the book is devoted to the exposition of the mischievous working of these idola in the writings of certain Oxford thinkers.

"Intellectualism" is a vice which taints Philosophy in all its departments. In Psychology it attempts to panlogise: it will deduce sensation, make volition a kind of thought, and treat all knowledge as if it belonged to the one type of abstract science (38–57). In Ethics it accentuates the social side of morality at the expense of its personal side (57–65). In Political Philosophy its defect is similar: it leaves no room for the criticism of the State by individuals (65–69). Intellectualist Æsthetics, if there were such a thing, would ignore the "dynamic side" of æsthetic experience (69–75). Finally, an intellectualist Philosophy of Religion "depends too exclusively on the facts of knowledge"; its God is only a relating consciousness (75–79).

The author's criticism of the second *idolon*, "Absolutism," is directed not against the general theory, but rather against a definite example of it, —the "Feeling-Absolutism" of Mr F. H. Bradley. He regards Mr Bradley's metaphysic as a reaction against Hegel's, the aim of which is to include volition and feeling in the absolute as well as thought. "But it is plain . . . . that he takes much more account of feeling than volition" (82). In fact, he ends by reducing volition to thought, while on the other hand he practically identifies feeling with the absolute itself (85). As a result of dividing reality thus between feeling and thought, Mr Bradley renders his "degrees of truth and reality" unintelligible. The "Feeling-Absolute" is not a thing that a dialectic process can really lead up to. It is but "a Mettus Curtius abyss, into which appearances successively jump and disappear" (87). Another review of the philosophical disciplines shows that the "Feeling-Absolute" avails nothing for the solution of their problems (90–137).

"Subjectivism," the third idol, is said to have two forms, of which the more important is "impersonal Subjectivism," a doctrine "which regards the world as constituted . . . . by an absolute world-spirit." Though this theory makes a commendable stand against materialism, it raises more difficulties than it solves. Of the nature of the "Universal Subject" which it postulates, experience gives us no hint; nor can we render intelligible the relation of such a subject to our finite selves. We are said to be included in it; but, outside of mental pathology (which the theory in question takes no account of), we have no example of such inclusion of one subject in another.

This exposition of the idola articulates into definite doctrines those general tendencies which the author had found unsatisfactory. Few readers, we think, will be disposed to quarrel with him for rejecting most of what he has thus formulated. An "Absolutism" which makes Truth and Goodness disappear hardly answers to our aspirations. A "Subjectivism" which attempts to explain the universe on the analogy

of a "solipsistic human subject" (144) will never get any further with its task. And an "Intellectualism" whose Psychology leaves out sensation, whose Ethics leaves out will, and whose Religion knows no God or only a contemplative one, is hardly more satisfactory. But, in regard to some of these doctrines at least, a question will remain as to where the author got them.

The view that any responsible idealist is committed to such a position as "Subjectivism" is, to say the least of it, sufficiently startling. Whatever be the shortcomings of idealism, it surely has not failed to teach the essential relativity of subject and object. Indeed, the fact which Mr Sturt adduces against idealism in this connection—that "the mode of existence of the human subject is conditioned throughout by its commerce with objects"—is one of the very points which idealism lives by emphasising; and if that philosophy should go on to postulate a "Universal Subject of the World," it does so in the light of this fact, not in virtue of having forgotten it. Its teaching is that the subject becomes more of a subject by his dependence on objects. The measure of his personality is the degree to which he surrenders his particular being, to become the channel and instrument of that Reason which is objective in the world. A perfect or universal subject, whatever more it may be for idealism, must be at least one which has completed this process and identified itself fully with objective Reality.

Mr Sturt's discussion of Intellectualism suffers from a similar disability. It does not compel anyone to own the theory it refutes so easily. As an ethical or political doctrine "Intellectualism" is alleged to be so infected with passivity that it cannot account even for the individual's devotion to the State, much less for his criticism of it. "Social loyalty . . . . is a virtue that we recognise at once. . . . But the pure intellectualist, if he is consistent . . . . must think of society merely as a system of very intricate relations, something like an enormous game of chess when human beings are the chessmen" (61). Loyalty, according to this "chessman morality," would consist in "understanding" the moves one is compelled to make. Such a theory as this, which would rob man of everything but an abstract syllogising intellect, certainly leaves the half of the spiritual world without recognition or explanation; at the same time, it seems a creation of Mr Sturt's own mind rather than any really vital doctrine of contemporary philosophy.

In the discussion of "Absolutism," the author is engaged with a definite metaphysic—Mr Bradley's—and partly for that reason his contentions here are more pertinent. True, the main criticism he adduces is in essence the same as one which Mr Bradley has already replied to, viz., that the subordinate forms of Truth and Reality being all equally self-contradictory, do not bring us any nearer to the absolute which is their consummation (see *App. and Real.*, 2nd ed., p. 557). None the less the difficulty seems essential to Mr Bradley's whole attitude towards the thought form. Yet Mr Sturt never joins issue over the real point.

Having shown accurately where the root of the matter lies, viz., in the final contradiction supposed by Mr Bradley to be involved in the concept of relation and term, Mr Sturt falls back on an assertion to the effect that "personal experience" is the "norm of reality." So far as it has a bearing on the problem at all, such a statement seems merely to cut the knot:—Relation, being a thing which "personal experience" finds quite intelligible, need have no questions raised about it. He supplements this view by an explanation which practically dispenses with the need of solving the problem, by adducing the psychical cause of its existence (92 ff.).

The application of these results to representative thinkers occupies the latter part of the book. A historical chapter, beginning with Kant, brings us down through Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel to the idealism of modern England, as it appears in the three writers to be examined, viz., T. H. Green, Mr Bradley, and Professor Bosanquet.

Green is charged with two of the fallacies exposed—Intellectualism and Subjectivism. Under the former charge there are two counts: Green's "Eternal Consciousness" is not a Moral God, and his "Freedom" is but a disguised necessity (232–244). Under "Subjectivism" various criticisms are advanced. Their main purport is that Green fails to prove either the "abiding reality" of the objective world or the peculiarly intimate relation which he supposed to exist between the "Eternal" consciousness and the human (244–252). Regarding the latter, Green's argument is alleged to be no better than the argument from design:—knowing the world, we see that it must be constituted by a mind like our own. Regarding the former, it is alleged that Green's anxiety to oppose materialism betrayed him into solipsism, and that he had to postulate the "Spiritual Principle in Nature" in order to restore the objective world "of abiding realities." The Spiritual Principle, however, is inadequate for its purpose. An abiding objective world cannot be guaranteed for man by its mere "presence" to the mind of God; unless, indeed, "God can enter into the human 'universe of conversation,'" and communicate with men as they do with each other (248–250).

All these latter criticisms, and also to some degree the criticism of Freedom, imply a latent antithesis from which the critic seems never to get free. Either, he assumes, God is one spirit amongst others, inhabiting the same Universe with them,—greater than they perhaps, but yet differing from them in no other way than as they differ from one another; or else he is himself the Universe, and then there isn't "room" for finite spirits at all. Now, it would seem that Green's attempt to maintain *both* the spirituality of the Universe and the Freedom of Man implies from the very beginning the transcendence of this antithesis. As to the "morality" of the Eternal Consciousness, it might be well, amid the constant allegations of "passivity," and "static intellectualism," to draw attention to one very simple fact—that a "relating" consciousness, by its very conception, cannot be "static." To relate is to *do* something; and if the world be actually a system of relations constituting the mind of God, then

it is not static, but implies in every element and fibre the ceaseless strain of God's activity. Any view which begins from a static passiveness as the inner nature of things, begins not with Idealism, but with a travesty both of its history and its essential spirit.

The remaining discussion on Bradley and Bosanquet is mainly logical. Here, however, in the field where his battle must ultimately be fought out, Mr Sturt never seems to succeed in raising a clear issue. He speaks as before of the Passive Fallacy; 'it hangs over Bradley's conception of thought' (p. 267) and 'penetrates Professor Bosanquet's whole view of things' (p. 324). He mentions particular instances of the Passive Fallacy in Bradley's case, *e.g.* his views of Disjunction, Quantity, Modality. But by way of reply, the critic never seems to do more than reiterate a general point of view in hopelessly general terms. For instance: "There is in the judgment, an intimate connection of thought and action which ordinary theories overlook" (53). "Inference depends upon plan" (281). "The whole inferential construction . . . . is nothing but a contrivance to further human purposes" (290). "I believe that a sound theory of Logic would be based on the principle that thought is purposive through and through" (329). But Mr Sturt does not make any attempt to deal at close quarters with the root problem which all these statements raise—that of the relation of psychology to logic. Once only he comes near to it—in his last chapter, when discussing Professor Bosanquet's treatment of thought as a "living function," and his use of such conceptions as "evolution," "genetic analysis," "systematic development," and so forth. Just here, too, Mr Sturt makes the somewhat significant confession, that Professor Bosanquet's speculations "are in the right direction."

The criticism contained in the latter half of Mr Sturt's book illustrates what we venture to think the chief weakness of his whole treatment of the philosophical problems. The course of the argument here is governed ostensibly by certain leading ideas. The various writers are examined in the light of the dominant fallacies, "Intellectualism," "Absolutism," and "Subjectivism," and are charged with having committed these under this, that, or the other guise. Really, however, the argument is controlled by another idea—that which underlay the discussion of the idola themselves, the many-faceted conception of Personality. But this central conception or view-point—this "Norm of Reality"—is itself loose in the writer's mind; so loose as to be hardly distinguishable at times from the uncritical consciousness. It is therefore incapable of subjecting other views to a systematic examination. The result is that the work lacks systematic thoroughness; the criticisms are often haphazard, and the positive views adopted are so various that the reconciliation and substantiation of them all prescribes a somewhat difficult task to that yet unwritten new system of philosophy to which the author looks (104) for a complete proof of his "master principle."

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A propos de la Séparation des Églises et de l'État, par Paul Sabatier.—Paris: Fischbacher, 1905.

À propos de la Séparation des Églises et de l'État, par Paul Sabatier.—Seconde édition, complètement revue et très augmentée.—Paris: Fischbacher, 1906.

Towards the end of last year, when the French Separation Law was still awaiting the approval of the Senate, M. Paul Sabatier essayed in a little book of some hundred pages to write the spiritual history of that decisive political event. The guiding spirit of M. Sabatier's enterprise is perhaps best revealed in some words which he has recently written:—"The history of religions will become, in a future which is perhaps not very remote, not one of the departments of history merely, but the very substance of the labour of the historian." So it is that he refused to see in the Separation Law of last year the momentary triumph of a political party actuated by anti-clerical malice, or to conceive as possible the redress of that policy by some sudden stroke of clerical dexterity or by the steady hardening of clerical intransigence. It was, of course, true that the extreme anti-clericals, or at least some of the less intelligent among them, were ready to claim the Separation Law as an instance of clever political engineering on their part, just as the reception of the Encyclical of Pius X. by the clerical press has recently shown it to be equally true that that party has not utterly abandoned its faith in political management and intrigue. But nothing that has happened, or that is at all likely to happen, can contravene the essentially sane judgment which M. Sabatier has passed upon recent events in France and their causes. The Church has lost her official position in France, because for thirty-five years she has deliberately chosen to be the inveterate and implacable enemy of the Republic. And in wedding herself in indissoluble union to that enmity, she has pledged her fortunes to all the consequences of hostility to everything that constituted the living soul of France. The history of these thirty-five years in France is the history of a protracted ecclesiastical suicide and of all the injury to religion which that suicide was bound to involve in the case of a people whose genius is peculiarly positive and logical. For seven years after 1870 the Church ruled in France as she had never ruled since 1789, not even in the days of the devout Charles X.; yet her only use of her opportunities was to turn the sword against her own breast by the *coup d'état* of the Seize Mai, and to provoke the lightning word of Gambetta, "Le cléricalisme, c'est l'ennemi." And since that fatal day she has been identified in the popular mind with every abortive reaction against the living soul of France, and has suffered condemnation accordingly. It is this oft-told story that M. Sabatier rehearses once again. But his distinction is that he tells it not as the story of a mere political conflict which on the surface it appears, but as the great human drama of contending ideals which it has been in fact. Liberty, reason, moral initiative and moral

force, these were the things for which in the mind of France the Republic stood, and in delivering formal challenge and waging implacable war against the Republic the Church became for France the one conspicuous enemy of these things.

So far, indeed, any *mangeur de prêtres* might suppose that he had found in M. Sabatier a valuable ally. But he would soon be undeceived. For M. Sabatier recognises a saving leaven in the Church which, insignificant in quantity as it may yet appear, has all the promise of power to redeem it from the stagnation to which it seems self-condemned. The future of the Church in France depends upon its capacity and its willingness to assimilate the working of this leaven. No one knows better than M. Sabatier all the various movements in the Church of France which contain the promise of better things, as no one, too, knows better than he the difficulties with which these movements have to contend. But his hopeful spirit naturally chooses to emphasise their promise, and to find that promise especially in the very fact of their variety. There are patient and sincere seekers of the truth in the domain of history and criticism, men like Loisy, Duchesne, Ulysse Chevalier, Houtin, and Père Delehaye. There are men whose orientation in the realm of abstract ideas is entirely modern, like Blondel and Laberthonnière and Le Roy, and the great master of them all, who is no longer with us, Ollé-Laprune. There are brave and bold soldiers of democracy in the ranks of the priesthood, like the Abbés Lemire and Dabry and Naudet. And there is that little group of earnest and courageous young laymen, the men of the "Sillon," led by Marc Sangnier, whose apostolate, undaunted by the terrors of episcopal censure, penetrates into every large centre of working-class population. And perhaps of greater import than any of these movements is that tendency to a mutual understanding, till quite recently so unhoped-for in a country like France, and yet already pronounced and continually increasing, between the more earnest leaders of free thought like M. Desjardins and M. Séailles and M. Seignobos and those representatives of Catholicism who are not afraid of having flung at them the contemptuous epithet of "intellectuals."

It is natural, perhaps, that M. Sabatier's little book should have excited the wrath of the orthodox clerical press of all Catholic countries. It certainly has had that effect. From Louvain to Milan, from Brussels to Rome, he has been denounced as a friend of the "traitors." Perhaps the most worthy and least abusive attack which he has had to endure was that of Mgr. Turinaz, the Bishop of Nancy, which has formed the text of the preface to M. Sabatier's second edition. That fact alone has completely justified the good bishop's denunciation of the Freethinker who ought to be a Protestant. If Mgr. Turinaz had kept silence, we should have missed some of the finest pages that even M. Sabatier has ever written. And no honest reader can doubt the sincerity of M. Sabatier's admiration of Catholicism as it is expressed in the beliefs and the aspirations of the young Catholics whom he admires. Almost, it would seem, have they persuaded him to be a Catholic, if it is possible to be a Catholic

after their fashion. Quite recently, in a very remarkable letter, he has said of the Church :—"The friends who credit me with a lively sympathy for her are not in the wrong, but the arguments put forward by orthodox theologians to demonstrate her metaphysical qualities appear to me powerless to convince any but the already converted. I love her because in her I see a mighty family, an eternal family which has its errors and its failings, a family of which I myself have been in the first instance an unconscious cell, but of which I may become little by little a conscious and voluntary member." They are words which serve to explain the obstinate courage with which M. Sabatier fights the battle of the Catholic "intellectuals." Never did that cause need such stubborn defence as at the present moment, when what a Catholic writer has described as the "policy of the Jesuits" has achieved a triumph disastrous for the cause of French religion in the Encyclical of the 10th of August.

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Jesus Christ and the Christian Character.—By Francis Greenwood Peabody, Plummer Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard University (Lyman Beecher Lectures, 1904).

Jesus Christ and the Social Question.—By the Same Author, 1905.

These two books, while not sequential, are closely related, and are supplementary one to the other. The thinking in them is strong and clear, but somewhat conservative; in style they are beautifully lucid, being frequently lighted up with sparkling epigram and metaphor. The subject matter is personal and social ethics. The present is a time of social unrest, and social problems cry clamorously for solution. It is fitting at such a crisis to turn afresh to Jesus, and to inquire if He has any light to throw upon the question. Primarily speaking, Jesus was a great *religious* teacher; His mission was not in the first instance the reorganisation of society, but to disclose the relations of the human soul to God, hence social reconstruction is rather an indirect than direct product of His life and teaching. His first interest was in the individual, in the creation of such personal ethical character as would be fit and able to save society. Jesus manifests in His own life a specific kind of character in which the most prominent feature is *power*, authority, mastery, which enables Him to move calmly amidst different types (*e.g.* the ascetic and æsthetic) of life, and to pass equably through the whole orbit of His duties without moral halt or intellectual hesitation. Indeed His intellectual mastery was as marked as His moral, enabling Him by direct intuition, rather than by ratiocinative reasoning, to go to the heart of a question, and to touch the very spot. Power also manifests itself in the breadth of His sympathies, in

the prodigality of His great deeds, and in the ease with which His mighty works were done and His whole round of duty accomplished.

The teaching, as well as the life, of Jesus had for its chief object the development of character. He did not seek to accomplish this object by drawing up an elaborate code of laws, nor by issuing a set of maxims for the settlement of specific ethical questions, but by fostering a certain temper of mind which in itself would be the root of moral character—a simple, guileless, teachable spirit. It was the absence of this spirit that led to His severe condemnation of the Scribes and Pharisees and to His beautiful commendation of the little child. The possession of this spirit gives right direction to character, and it is tendency rather than perfection that weighs most with Jesus. The second great principle in Christ's teaching was His faith in the persons taught. Also His appeal to men was ethical; *i.e.* He made His appeal to the will rather than to the reason or the emotions; it was a challenge to moral decision. "First obedience, then insight." Of course He knew, and none better, that moral progress was hindered by sin, but this great impediment was removed by His doctrine of Divine forgiveness which meets the surprised soul as it struggles upward, making it to feel as "the first blades of spring might feel as they venture forth into the cold and find the sunshine waiting for them."

The lines of development of character are indicated in three great words frequently on the lips of Christ: Righteousness, Love, Life; and these are regarded by our author as taking this order in Christ's teaching: Righteousness the stem, and Love and Life the blossom and fruit. The question, however, arises as to whether or not this is the order of these principles in human experience. In nature the order is reversed. Here life is the first requisite, for there can be neither stem, nor flower, nor fruit without it. And in human experience life is our possession before there can be either love or goodness. The natural order then seems to be: Life, Love, Righteousness; God, Love, Duty; Christ, Affection, Obedience. It might be said in reply that it is not the *natural* order that is under discussion, but the order in Christ's teaching. But is it quite clear that this is Christ's order? He no doubt commences early to ethically train His disciples, but He first seeks to attach them to Him; to make them one with Him by confidence or faith, and through this new life to impart the new qualities of love and obedience.

The personal effects of Christ's teaching are great, extending to the body, mind, and affections; the body must be made to serve the spirit, the intellect clarified and balanced through obedience, and the emotions purified by right motives. The social results are as wide as the personal. Jesus inculcates self-surrender—self-realisation by sacrifice; service—self-development by helping others; and idealism—gaining the best present good by looking towards the future; *i.e.* grasping the real by directing the life towards the ideal. Such principles as these, while intended in the first instance to be personally effective, cannot fail to have widespread *social*

consequences. And here Mr Peabody's first book merges into his second, for the making of a new ethical man is the direct road to a new social order.

Jesus did not teach social economics—there are no economics in the New Testament, as there are no mathematics. But the social problem was present with Jesus, and the principles He enunciated are His contribution to its solution. He looked on human life from above, and approached it from within. He planted Himself outside the incidental struggles of society and viewed life as a whole; He saw the stream as it issued from under the throne of the Divine purpose and as it emptied itself into the sea of the Divine perfection. He also approached the problem from within; *i.e.* taught that a regenerated society must proceed from the regenerated man—through personality. "Instead of regeneration by organisation Jesus offers regeneration by inspiration." From these two there springs a third principle, namely, that personality fulfils itself in the social order. As Professor Henry Jones says: "The true individuality is to be found in the fully organised society, and the worthy society in the fully developed individual." Mr Peabody applies these principles to the family, the care of the poor, the use of wealth, and to the problems of industry, and has some pertinent words upon each section well worth reading. He also shows the correlation of each social problem, and truly points out that all are so linked together that to understand one is to understand the other, and that the solution of one will help to solve all the rest. He also makes clear the fact that ethical problems realise their consummation in religion, and that all social service must find the source of its persistence and inspiration in the altitudes of the Christian Faith.

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The Prophet of Nazareth. By Nathaniel Schmidt.—Macmillan, 1905.

To the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, vol. iv., Professor Schmidt contributed a noteworthy article on the "Son of Man," in which he presented an exhaustive study of the use of that phrase in the light thrown upon it by the Aramaic and Syriac languages. He reached the conclusion that "Son of Man" was not used as a Messianic title by Jesus to indicate himself as the Messiah—in fact, that Jesus did not apply it to himself as a title at all. On his lips it meant simply "man," and when he used it he was not speaking of himself. This was a bold theory, though not wholly a new one; but its defenders are still not numerous, though several distinguished scholars support it. If it be well founded, it implies a conception of Jesus different in some important respects from that usual amongst even advanced critical scholars. For, on this theory, the Messiahship of Jesus is entirely eliminated, so that he was not, and did not in any sense

of the term claim to be, the Messiah. What then was he, on the lines which this theory allows?

This question, which naturally presents itself to the reader of the article referred to, is answered in the present volume; and the answer is given with clearness and decision. That it will carry conviction to all readers is not to be expected; still less that it will prove to be the last word in the great controversy which for so long has been held over the life of Jesus. But that it is an extremely good answer, and that it really does carry the debate nearer to a final settlement, most readers would probably admit. And not only so, but Professor Schmidt has drawn out, in a most valuable concluding chapter, the lines of the relation between the Jesus whom he has presented in the earlier part of the book, and the religious thought of the present-day Christian. Scholars, and especially those engaged upon the problems of the New Testament, do not always bear in mind that sooner or later the truth which they establish will have to be brought into relation with the religious consciousness, and that it cannot for ever be kept apart as a subject of pure scholarship. A recent writer in the *Spectator* (July 21, 1906), in a review of this book, says: "Whether Professor Schmidt's conclusions will be categorically accepted by scholars we have no means of foretelling; but what may be considered certain is that they will not be adopted by the general public, who will not be at the pains to understand learned decisions, and who will always regard the Bible for all practical purposes as having been written in Elizabethan English." That some time may elapse before the results of scholarship in regard to the New Testament will come within the range of the general public, and modify the religious thought and belief of the ordinary Christian, is probable enough. But that such will eventually be the case is hardly open to doubt. And perhaps the process has gone on a good deal further than the writer in the *Spectator* is aware. Be that as it may, Professor Schmidt has done well to draw out the conclusions which follow from his conception of Jesus, in their bearing upon the religious, moral, and social problems of the present day. I will return to this point after having considered Schmidt's conception of Jesus, and the manner in which he presents it.

He begins with the Christ of the creeds, and is careful to show that he recognises to the full the grandeur and spiritual beauty of that great figure. "It is impossible to contemplate this wonderful conception, that has exercised an influence so vast and uplifting in human history, without the deepest reverence and gratitude" (p. 9). "Perhaps no man ever felt the intrinsic worth of the prophecy, the psalmody, the legislation of the Old Testament as deeply as he who, having looked upon the heavenly Christ, saw the glory vanish from the covenant of the letter. So it may be that the beauty of the Christ is best seen, the grandeur and power of the celestial Son of God are most fully appreciated, by him whose eyes have been entranced by the surpassing glory of the new conception that is destined to take its place, the ideal suggested by the life of Jesus of

Nazareth, as a critical study of the records is able to restore it" (p. 10). That last sentence should be carefully pondered by those who think that to replace the divine Christ by the human Jesus is to descend from the higher to the lower, from the greater to the less. It is in reality the exchange of one ideal for another and more glorious one; and those who are aware of this will be glad that Professor Schmidt has so clearly stated it.

In sketching the process of the decline of dogma, in the next chapter, the author opens the way for the critical treatment of the life of Jesus. And incidentally he remarks that the forces which have broken up the traditional conception of Christ do not suffice, as some think, to sweep away a historical nucleus embedded in that conception. "The scientific instrument itself, by which this change has been effected, prevents the dissolution of the personality of Jesus into a symbol and a name, and points the creed-making tendency into new paths. Nothing can more convincingly prove that Christianity ultimately owes its origin to a living Galilean prophet than the preservation in the written records of a tradition radically at variance with the estimate held by the authors of these biographies. This tradition cannot have been invented. Every motive for such a creation is wanting. It can only be the reflection of historic fact. . . . The very facts that most unmistakably show the historical character of Jesus, are at the same time precious indications of his distinctive spirit and peculiar genius. They furnish the basis for constructive work. By a careful sifting of the material on the vantage-ground thus gained, and a careful testing of each *logion* in the closest possible restoration of its original Aramaic form, the general trend at least of the teaching of Jesus may be ascertained" (pp. 30, 32). The reference, in the last sentence, to the Aramaic text, as the criterion of the genuine words of Jesus, gives the key to the whole of Schmidt's treatment of the problem. It is the same that he used in his article, above mentioned, on the "Son of Man"; and it indicates what is at present the most promising field for research in the study of the life of Jesus. Schmidt starts from the assumption that Jesus spoke Aramaic and not Greek; and that assumption is justified by the inherent probability of the case. Nothing short of positive evidence that he spoke Greek could invalidate it, and such evidence has not up till now been produced. Schmidt refers (p. 130) to Sanday and Driver, who have given countenance to the theory "that Jesus, who ordinarily spoke Aramaic, may have introduced the mystic title [Son of Man] upon some occasion when he addressed his Galilean disciples in—Greek." And in a note, the author invites the eminent Oxford divines to produce any fresh evidence upon the point, if they have such. That the transference of the centre of the controversy from Greek to Aramaic is inconvenient to those who do not know Aramaic is true enough; but until the new field has been thoroughly explored, and found to be worthless, it is safe to say that no return will be possible to the old one. The attempt to solve the problem by Greek without Aramaic is at present out of court;

and the sooner that students of the Gospels make a serious study of Aramaic the better.

Schmidt shows some part of what can be done by this method, in his chapter upon the "Son of Man," which is not a mere reprint of the article before mentioned, but a fresh study of the material. He shows that "*bar-'nasha*" is the only Aramaic term in general use which can be accepted as the original of "Son of Man," and that "*bar-'nasha*" in ordinary Aramaic simply means "man," "member of the human race." It never occurs as a Messianic title, except in Christian literature; which implies that if Jesus had called himself "*bar-'nasha*" his hearers would not have taken him to mean that he was claiming to be the Messiah. That the disciples believed him to have been the Messiah, and in course of time read that meaning into the term "*bar-'nasha*," is true enough; but there is nothing whatever to show that Jesus himself put that meaning on it. The weak point of the theory is that the term "*bar-'nasha*," in its generic use, is not found in extant Galilean literature till three generations after the time of Jesus. But this does not amount to much. For, in that literature, there is no sign to show that "*bar-'nasha*" was a new term, still less that it was invented to designate the Messiah, or any other specific person. Schmidt concludes that the whole Messianic idea is foreign to the thought of Jesus. And he meets the objection that, if this be so, the opposition of his countrymen and his crucifixion cannot be accounted for, by saying: "Unless it can be proved that Jesus could have used '*bar-'nasha*' as a Messianic title referring to himself, there is no evidence that he claimed to be the Messiah. He certainly was a teacher of righteousness and love. He classed himself with the prophets, and consequently must have been conscious of a special religious position. Jerusalem had killed her prophets before his time. His opposition to the leading parties, his peculiar ethical teaching, and his life explain the opposition of his enemies. His crucifixion is accounted for by the false testimony borne against him, and the political interests of Pontius Pilate" (p. 131).

What is here stated in a few lines, and, as some will think, less convincingly than it might have been, is set forth in fuller detail in the chapter entitled "The Life of Jesus." There Schmidt puts down all that he regards as being reliable in the gospel traditions concerning Jesus; and after the somewhat drastic treatment of his material contained in the earlier chapters, it is refreshing to find so much allowed to stand as historically true in regard to Jesus. It is, of course, impossible to summarise, in a few lines, a long chapter in which every statement needs attention. And the same is true of the following chapter, which deals with the Teaching of Jesus. One may say that the book was mainly written for the sake of these two chapters. It need hardly be said that the author draws his picture on broadly humanitarian lines. But the reader who may be little inclined to be impressed by a purely human Jesus will perceive how strongly the author is moved to reverence and devout enthusiasm for the Jesus whom his researches have set before him. Schmidt shows, uncon-

sciously as well as consciously, how great was the personal influence of the human Jesus, and thereby meets more fully the objection of those who say that a merely human Jesus could not have been the origin whence have flowed the results actually observed in history. The chapter on the Historic Influence of Jesus is excellent, so far as it goes, but is rather curiously incomplete. For although a good deal of attention is given to the Crusades and the Reformation, nothing at all is said of the influence of Jesus upon Paul and John, without whom there would scarcely have been any Christian theology. The reason of this omission is not clear, and so far as I have observed is not explained.

In the two chapters which end the book, Schmidt boldly faces the question of the relation of the human Jesus, as restored by critical research, to modern thought and life. The question is, "In what way, if any, can Jesus still be the leader in the true progress of human life?" The chief need is shown to be an increase of moral strength to realise a high ideal; and in Jesus, as a man, is seen the inspiration of such moral strength. Scholars may say that Schmidt leaves his proper subject in order to deliver a sermon on modern life. But many a one, on whom lies heavy the weight of the problems of the present age, will be grateful to him for his burning words, and will feel that not for nothing has the author sat so long at the feet of the Prophet of Nazareth, and heard his word.

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Verzeichnis der von Adolf Hilgenfeld verfassten Schriften zusammengestellt von den Mitgliedern der neutestamentlichen Abteilung des theologischen Seminars der Universität Jena v. S.S. 1902 *durchgesehen*, ergänzt und herausgegeben von Dr Heinrich Hilgenfeld, ao. Prof. a. d. Universität.—Leipzig, 1906.

The pamphlet of sixty pages bearing the above title owes its appearance to the filial piety of Dr Heinrich Hilgenfeld, who dedicated it to his distinguished father in celebration of the diamond jubilee of his Doctor's degree. It contains a full bibliography of Professor Adolf Hilgenfeld's writings, arranged in the order of publication. The titles of these works occupy nearly fifty pages; and though Dr Hilgenfeld's literary activity has extended over a period of about sixty years, we have in this immense enumeration a very remarkable record of untiring industry and fruitful scholarship. But the list does something more than bring before us the stimulating example of a great theologian: the titles of a multitude of reviews recall to memory a large portion of the theological literature of the last half-century, and a student who would trace the advance of learning and criticism during that period might find in these pages many suggestions to help him in his researches.

A similar but less perfect list was presented to Dr Hilgenfeld on his eightieth birthday, June 2, 1903, by the New Testament section of the theological Seminar of the University of Jena. This has been completed and brought down to the present year by the son. An interesting portrait of the Professor is placed at the beginning; and at the end there is a chronological list of the chief public events of his life, which would have been more attractive, at least to foreign readers, if it had been rather fuller and more descriptive. The name of Hilgenfeld is known wherever theology is studied; and though one may not always agree with his judgments, and he may seem in some points to represent a school of criticism that is passing away, we must honour his ardent love of truth and his candour in following the evidence as it presented itself to his mind, while we admire the mental vigour which old age seems unable to impair. May he still have many years before him in which to extend still further his contributions to theological scholarship!

JAMES DRUMMOND.

OXFORD.

The Genuineness and Authorship of the Pastoral Epistles.—By Rev. J. D. James, B.D.—Longmans, Green & Co., 1906.

THE question discussed in this volume is one of real importance in Church history. For, as Harnack says, "anyone who admits the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles will reach quite different conclusions from one who regards them as non-Pauline, and relegates them to the second century." In spite of the great authority of the names now ranged against the authenticity of these epistles, I venture to predict that the time will come when the rejection of the Pastorals as spurious will be pointed to as a strange aberration on the part of the critics. If ever works were stamped with the personality of a particular author, these works are stamped with the personality of St Paul. They are as genuinely Pauline as the Epistles of Cicero to his brother Quintus are Ciceronian.

The external evidence for them is as strong as it could well be. It is set forth at full length in the first chapter of Mr James's work. The first sentence that we have of Irenæus contains a quotation of 1 Tim. i. 4, as "what the Apostle says." They were obviously known to the author of the Letter from Vienna and Lugdunum. This evidence from Gaul towards the close of the second century is corroborated by that of Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria in Africa. But at the beginning of the same century we find Ignatius saturated with Pauline phraseology, and the passages which recall the Pastorals are more frequent relatively than any other. Out of thirty-one instances of affinity with St Paul's writings, no less than nine are from the Pastorals. Polycarp, again, in his one epistle to the Philippians has twenty reminiscences of St Paul's

language, of which seven are from the Pastorals. These letters, being, as it were, the dying instructions of the great Apostle with regard to the government of the Church, naturally sank into the minds of those who cherished his memory. With Clement of Rome we actually get within the first century. The traces in him of imitation of the Pastorals can hardly be explained away as arising merely from a common Christian phraseology. But as this might be maintained without absurdity, we need not press the point.

But Marcion, it is urged, rejected the Pastorals. Of course he did. It was a necessity of the situation. His opponents were able to ply him so effectively with weapons from this armoury that it must have seemed to him, as it did afterwards to Baur, that they had been forged expressly for the purpose. No one holds this view of Baur's now, that the Pastorals are directed against Marcion, and yet people still assert his conclusion as to their spuriousness after the premises have been withdrawn. The phrase *ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως* (1 Tim. vi. 20) seemed to have been coined with special reference to Marcion's book, and yet this is, as Dr Hort called it, only "a seductive verbal coincidence." Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* ii. 11, p. 457 P) naturally remarks: "Convicted by this utterance, the heretics reject the epistles to Timothy."

The remaining six chapters deal with the internal evidence under the respective headings of "Historical and Geographical Circumstances," "Theological Polemics," "Ecclesiastical Conditions," "The Personality of the Writer," "Literary Obligations," "The Style and Vocabulary." The least satisfactory among them is that on "Ecclesiastical Conditions," in which the Churchman seems to be more prominent than the historian. This chapter as a whole is far from clear, and produces the impression of hankering after a conclusion which is not explicitly asserted. Discontented with Lightfoot's well-founded conclusion "that the terms *ἐπίσκοπος* and *πρεσβύτερος* are synonymous in the New Testament and in the Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians," Mr James follows Dean Bernard in a desperate attempt to extract authority for the three orders out of a passage relating to the Temple-services (1 Clem. xl. 4, 5). "The layman" here mentioned, he tells us, "is clearly the Christian layman." But why is this clear? Since the high-priests, priests, and Levites are unquestionably Jewish, it follows rather that the "layman" who is mentioned along with them must be Jewish also. Like so many other technical terms of Christianity, this one also seems to have come to us from the Jews. The word is used by Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, of whom Symmachus was an Ebionite Christian, while the other two were Jewish proselytes.

To combat Lightfoot on a point of scholarship is a dangerous task, which Mr James has essayed without success. In 1 Clem. i. 3 and xxi. 6, Lightfoot takes *πρεσβύτεροι* in its untechnical meaning of "elder persons," for which he is in each instance formally corrected by Mr James (p. 76), who seems not to have noticed that in both these passages *πρεσβύτεροι* is contrasted with *νέοι*.

In the last chapter, what Mr James has to say as to the possible influence of St Luke on the phraseology of St Paul in the Pastorals is well worth attending to. Another point, perhaps, does not equally commend itself. He says that the difficulty as to the use of particles tells "in favour of the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles rather than otherwise. A clever *falsarius* would not have omitted such obvious marks of his master's style." To attend to the particles may indeed seem obvious now, after the microscopic criticism to which the language of the New Testament has been subjected in our own time; but would it have occurred to anyone in the early decades of the second century A.D.? No: there were no such diabolically ingenious forgers about then. If the charge against the Pastorals of an exceptional use of particles were really established, it would be a weighty one. The right line of answer to it is to show, as Dr Headlam has done, that the same sort of charge might be laid against some of the admittedly genuine epistles.

The difficulties of language with regard to the Pastorals have been greatly overrated. These letters do not contain a single word that can be shown to be of later date than St Paul. All that the facts establish is that the Apostle's vocabulary became more copious, the older he grew—a phenomenon by no means confined to himself. Yet on the strength of these facts the conservative critics of England seem to cower before the confident neology of Germany. Mr James appears grateful to Riggenbach and Zöckler for thinking that, though it may be necessary to suppose that genuine letters have been put together by a disciple of St Paul, Luke, or Timothy, "the apostolic authority of our letters, guaranteed by the demonstration of the Spirit and of Power, is not the least affected. They are and remain an authentic part of the Canon." This "latest expression of opinion" Mr James regards as "on the whole favourable to these Epistles." Whether they are or are not part of the Canon is not a question which interests the present writer, but whether they are the work of one Paul of Tarsus. If they are not, their authority will be on a par with that of Second Peter.

St George Stock.

Oxford.

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F *Dijkema* (*F.*) Psalm 2. Th. Tijd., May 1906.

[Argues that the speaker is the community of Israel: ingenious explanation of "Kiss the son."]

4B *Minocchi* (*S.*) Versione di Isaia. Cap. xxxviii. 10–xliii. 21. Studi Relig., May–June 1906.

[With textual and exegetical commentary.]

F *Laur* (*E.*) Thr. 1–5. Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 3, 1906.

[Text, translation, textual and critical notes of chaps. 3 and 4 of Lamentations.]

G *Venetianer* (*L.*) Ezechiels Vision und die salomonischen Wasserbecken. 40p. Kilian, 1906.

H *Wright* (*Charles H. H.*) Daniel and its Critics: A Critical and Grammatical Commentary. 284p. Williams & Norgate, 1906.

[The object of the work is to a large extent defensive. Although firmly believing in the historical facts recorded in Daniel, the writer calls attention to the fact that he considers the place assigned to it in the Canon can best be upheld by a study of the prophecies which it contains.]

Daubney (*W. H.*) The Three Additions to Daniel; The Song of the Three Holy Children; The History of Susanna; Bel and the Dragon. 274p. Deighton Bell, 1906.

M *Oesterley* (*W. O. E.*) Codex Taurinensis (ϒ). J. Th. St., July 1906.

[V. Greek text of Obadiah, Jonah and Micah.]

P *Driver* (*S. R.*) The Minor Prophets: Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi. Intro. Revised Version, with Notes, Index, and Map. 353p. Jack, 1906.

5 *Anon.* The New Testament in Coptic. Church Q. R., July 1906.

k *Moulton* (*J. H.*) Egyptian Rubbish-Heaps and the Study of the New Testament. Interpreter, July 1906.

[As throwing light on the social and religious conditions of the time, and the current speech.]

6 *Barton* (*J. E.*) The Philosophy of the Gospels. Optimist, July 1906.

[Supposed letter of a philosophic young Roman on first reading the Synoptic Gospels, 150 A.D.]

Gebhardt (*H.*) Untersuchungen zu der Evangelienhandschrift 238. Ztsch. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1906.

MacGuinness (*J.*) M. Loisy and the Gospels. Irish Th. Quar., July 1906.

[A discriminating but wholly unsympathetic criticism.]

Maier (*F.*) Zur Apostolizität des Jakobus und Judas (nach den Evangelien). *Conclusion.* Bibl. Ztschr., July 1906.

[Holds that the "Lord's brothers" are identical with the Apostles of those names sons of Mary, wife of Clopas, and seeks to refute the arguments that would deny the identity.]

Hart (*J. H. A.*) The Scribes of the Nazarenes. Expos., July 1906.

[Dealing, under the sub-title "Records of the Master's Teaching," chiefly with the inter-relationship of the Gospels and the origin of their variations.]

b *Neumann* (*Arno*) Jesus. Trans. by M. A. Canney. With Pref. by P. W. Schmiedel. 180p. Black, 1906.

[Review will follow.]

q *Knight* (*W.*) The Site of Capernaum. Expos., July 1906.

[Identified here with Khan Minyeh. The fountain which Josephus speaks of as watering the Gennesareth plain is the spring at Et-Tabigah, where there are found the remains of an aqueduct descending to Khan Minyeh.]

r *Henslow* (*G.*) The Spiritual Teaching of Christ's Life. 254p. Williams & Norgate, 1906.

B *Andersen* (*A.*) Mt. xxvi. 26 ff. und Parallelstellen im Lichte der Abendmahlslehre Justins. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1906.

[Justin's teaching is the first stage of development, and that of the Synoptics marks a stage only reached after Justin's time.]

Hilgenfeld (*A.*) J. Wellhausen und die synoptischen Evangelien. Ztschr. f. wiss. Th., Heft 2, 1906.

Schott (*E.*) Die Aussendungsrede Mt. x., Mc. vi., Lc. ix., x. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1906.

D *Du Brisson* (*J. C.*) The Gospel according to St Mark. (The Churchman's Bible.) 220p. Methuen, 1906.

Wellhausen (*J.*) "Αρτον ἔκλασεν. Mc. xiv. 22. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1906.

[The last meal with the twelve did not take place on the eve of the Passover (Paschaabend), for then not ἄρτος but ἄζυμα was broken.]

Bennett (*W. H.*) The Life of Christ according to St Mark. Expos., July 1906.

E *Harnack* (*Adolf*) Lukas der Arzt der Verfasser des Dritten Evangeliums und der Apostelgeschichte. (Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Neue Testament, i. Heft.) 160p. Hinrichs, 1906.

[Review will follow.]

L *Barnes* (*A. Stapylton*) The Evolution of the Lord's Prayer, i. ii. Cont. R., Aug., Sept., 1906.

[St Luke's form of L. P. older than St Matt. Number and order of the clauses changed by the constant action and reaction, one upon the other, of liturgy and text.]

N *Bugge* (*C. A.*) Über das Messiasgeheimnis. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1906.

[Jesus gave his disciples esoteric teaching, of which the substance is: He is a second divine appearance, the Torah, which he supersedes, being the first. His unique sonship corresponds to the unique "daughter-ship" of the hypostatised Torah of Jewish theology. The writer seeks to establish this "Identitäts-grundsatz" by adducing parallels in the circumstances of the two "Promulgations."]

W *Moulton* (*J. H.*) Synoptic Studies. I. The Beatitudes. Expos., Aug. 1906.
[A comparison of the Matthew and Luke forms, the latter being held to be the more original.]

7k *Jordan* (*H.*) Gibt es Rythmik in den neutestamentlichen Briefen? Th. St. u. Krit., July 1906.
[What Blass regards as proving a rhythmic composition is only a chance appearance. Neither Paul nor the writer of Hebrews followed any rhythmic theory.]

A *Oort* (*H.*) Het besluit der apostelsynode van Hand. 15. Th. Tijd., March 1906.
[Shows that the four prohibitions are directed against idolatry.]

Ramsay (*W. M.*) Tarsus. Expos., July and Aug. 1906.
[The papers deal with the settlement and population of Tarsus: xi. The Greeks in Tarsus. xii. The Jews in Tarsus (with special reference to S. Paul). xiii. The Jews settled in Tarsus in 171 B.C. xiv. Tarsus the Hellenistic City. xv. T. as Capital of the Roman Province Cilicia. xvi. The Oriental Spirit in T.]

B *Carr* (*A.*) St Paul's Rule of Life. Expos., Aug. 1906.
[Exegesis and Exposition of 2 Cor. v. 14.]

Chadwick (*W. E.*) The Social Teaching of St Paul. 170p. Clay, 1906.

Drysdale (*A. H.*) The Epistle of St Paul to Philemon. (Devot. Comms.) 186p. R.T.S., 1906.

Brückner (*M.*) Zum Thema Jesus und Paulus. Ztsch. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft. 2, 1906.

b *Fairbairn* (*A. M.*) The Making of Paul the Apostle. Homiletic R., July 1906.

M *Buckland* (*A. R.*) St Paul's First Epistle to the Thessalonians. (Devot. Comm.) 170p. R.T.S., 1906.

S *Büchel* (*C.*) Der Hebräerbrief und das Alte Testament. Th. St. u. Krit., July 1906.
[Treating of the quotations from the O.T. in their verbal peculiarities and theological application, and of the points of contact of Hebrews with Philo. The article amounts to a complete "introduction" to the Epistle.]

9 *Bartlet* (*V.*) The Origin and Date of 2 Clement. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1906.
[Against Harnack's theory of Roman origin and date 166–174, the Alexandrian origin is maintained, and the date fixed at 120–140.]

Franko (*J.*) Beiträge aus dem Kirchenslavischen zu den neutest. Apokryphen. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1906.
[III. Revelatio Sancti Stephani.]

Hilgenfeld (*A.*) Noch einmal die neuesten Logia-Funde. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1906.
[Giving his own, and Swete's and Deismann's reconstructions.]

James (*M. R.*) Notes on Apocrypha. J. Th. St., July 1906.

Taylor (*C.*) The Oxyrhynchus and other Agrapha. J. Th. St., July 1906.

C CHURCH 14 ·· *Social Problems*, 20 ·· *Polity*, 42 ·· *Liturgical*, 50 ·· *Sacraments*, 60 *Missions*.

1 *Mathew* (*A. H.*), *ed.* Ecclesia, the Church of Christ. 182p. Burns & Oates, 1906.

14 *Johnson* (*Henry*) Stories of Great Revivals. 407p. R.T.S., 1906.

26 *Routh* (*W.*) Lay Influence in Church Concerns. Liberal Churchman, July 1906.

28 *Henson* (*Hensley*) The Ecclesiastical Discipline. Report i., ii. Cont. R., Aug.–Sept. 1906.
["The recommendations of the Commissioners would not secure immediate relief from ecclesiastical disorder, and they would fatally compromise the character of the National Church."]

MacColl (*Malcolm*) The Royal Commission and the Ornaments Rubric. 398p. Longmans, 1906.

Anon. The Government of the English Church. Quar. R., July 1906.
[Discusses Report of Royal Commission in Ecclesiastical Discipline.]

Russell (*H. P.*) Ritualists and the Royal Commission. Fort. R., Aug. 1906.

36 *Frazer* (*J. G.*) Feasts of All Souls. Fort. R., Sept. 1906.
[A comparison of European customs with the similar heathen rites can leave no room for doubt that the nominally Christian feast of All Souls is nothing but an old pagan festival of the dead, which the Church, unable or unwilling to suppress, resolved from motives of policy to connive at.]

55 *Richard* (*J. W.*) The Church and Divorce. Amer. J. of Th., July 1906.
[Outlines the views put forth by the various bodies, finds that Protestant churches are "harking back to Rome," thus making impossible any rapprochement of State and Church. Let churches leave making canons, and devote themselves to teaching on the subject of marriage.]

60 *Allen* (*E. B.*) Outlook in the Orient. Biblio. Sacra, July 1906.

70 *Dennis* (*James S.*) Christian Missions and Social Progress. Vol. III., with Ills. 675p. Oliphant, 1906.
[In this, the last vol. of his work, author deals with results of missions tending to develop the higher life of society, touching national life and character, affecting the commercial and industrial status of social value traceable to reformed standards of religious faith and practice.]

80 *Peake* (*A. S.*) Reform in Sunday School Teaching. 128p. Clarke, 1906.

D DOCTRINE 10 ·· *God*, 22 ·· *Christ*, 60 ·· *Eschatology*, 70 ·· *Faith*, 90 *Apologetics*.

Essays for the times, Nos. 16, 17, 18. Reform in the Teaching of the Old Testament, T. K. Cheyne. Christianity and Wealth, H. H. Bemrose, W. F. D. Smith, F. W. Orde-Ward. The Fourth Gospel, Emil Schürer. Griffiths, 1906.

Anon. Liberal Theology, III. Church Q. R., July 1906.
[Discusses the bearing of criticism and biological science on Christian belief, and the basis of theological authority.]

M'Intyre (*D. M.*) The Mystical Doctrine of Christ. Expos., Aug. 1906.
[An outline sketch of various forms of platonizing doctrine of the person of Christ.]

Franceschi (*L.*) Teologia morale e scienza medica. Studi Relig., May–June 1906.
[Review of some works on pastoral medicine, with a lament that some of them depend on out-of-date physiology.]

Greene (*W. B.*) Broad Churchism and the Christian Life. Princeton Th. Rev., July 1906.
[Broad Churchism is a destructive agency in the Christian life. "Orthodoxy does not of itself ensure piety . . . . but without orthodoxy true piety is impossible."]

h *Frere* (*E. F. H.*) The Dominion of Christ: A Criticism of Christian Science and a Plea for the Church's Healing. With Pref. by J. R. Illingworth. 102p. Mowbray, 1906.

Drawbridge (*C. L.*) Is Religion Undermined? 238p. Longmans, 1906.

[A defence of Christian doctrine. Author has investigated "the fundamental factors which unite saints into one vast brotherhood, be their theological systems what they may."]

2 *Bainvel* (*J. V.*) La Dévotion au Sacré Cœur de Jésus. Doctrine–Histoire. 373p. Beauchesne, 1906.

Thompson (*H. A.*) The Catholic Cultus of the Virgin Mary. Amer. J. of Th., July 1906.

[A sketch of the growth of doctrine and practice.]

4 *Keirstead* (*W.*) Theological Presuppositions of Ritschl. Amer. J. of Th., July 1906.

5 *Lindsay* (*J.*) The Development of Scottish Theology. Princeton Th. Rev., 1906.

12 *Streatfeild* (*G. S.*) The Self-Interpretation of Jesus Christ. 211p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

Author of "The Faith of a Christian." Christ's Consciousness of His relation to God. Interpreter, July 1906.

White (*N. J. D.*) The Unchangeableness of Jesus Christ in Relation to Christian Doctrine. Expos., Aug. 1906.

[Christians regard Jesus Christ under three aspects—the historic Jesus of the Gospels; God the Son Redeemer and the Life of the Church; God the Son as Creator. The Person of Christ in these aspects, and unchangeable, is the test of the truth or falsity of doctrine, and must in future be, as it has been in the past, the guide of doctrinal development.]

13 *Thomson* (*A. E.*) Authority of the Holy Spirit. Biblio. Sacra, July 1906.

17 *Greene* (*W. B.*) The Relation of Miracle to Nature. Biblio. Sacra, July 1906.

[The essence of the miracle, as of mediate creation, is creation *ex nihilo*.]

26 *Jones* (*Rufus M.*) The Double Search. Studies in Atonement and Prayer. 106p. Headley, 1906.

[No psychological discovery has ever thrown so much light upon the meaning of atonement and prayer as the fact of the conjunct or social character of personality.]

65 *Montagu* (*Henry*) Death and Immortality. With intro. by Eliz. Waterhouse. (The Lib. of Devot.) 230p. Methuen, 1906.

Moule (*Handley*) Concerning them which are asleep. Words to Mourners from a Mourner. 31p. S.P.C.K., 1906.

Tucker (*Comyns*) On the Doctrine of Personal Identity: Considered with reference to a Future Life. 31p. Longmans, 1906.

81u *Boehmer* (*J.*) Zum 2. Artikel des Apostolikums. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1906.

["Auch eine Komma-Frage," arguing we should punctuate "he suffered, under Pontius Pilate was crucified."]

Barns (*T.*) Some Creed Problems. J. Th. St., July 1906.

[Discussing the origin of the *Textus Receptus* of the Apostles' Creed. The old Creed of Rome was simply the old Creed of Asia, remaining unchanged. The enrichments of the *Textus Receptus* had their origin in Asia, and were transmitted into North Italy *viâ* the Danube.]

90 *Anon.* Rationalism and Apologetics. Edin. R., July 1906.

Sewall (*F.*) The Freedom of Authority. New Church Rev., July 1906.

[Review of Professor Sterrett's book under this title.]

E ETHICS. 1–9 *Practical Theology, Christian Ethics, Transition to General Ethics*, 10 *Theories*, 20 *Applied Ethics, Sociology*, 23 *Economics*, 27 *Education*.

10 *Jones* (*E. E. Constance*) Mr Moore on Hedonism. Inter. J. Eth., July 1906.

[An examination of Mr Moore's treatment of Sidgwick's Hedonism. That a given concrete state may be pleasant, and yet not good on the whole, is no proof that pleasant consciousness is in itself not good. Similarly a given concrete state may be painful and yet not bad on the whole, though *quâ* painful, it is intrinsically bad.]

Dole (*Charles F.*) About Conscience. Inter. J. Eth., July 1906.

[There are two valid elements in what men call a decision of conscience. One element is intellectual; the other is emotional.]

Lévy-Bruhl (*L.*) La morale et la science des mœurs; réponse a quelques critiques. Rev. Phil., July 1906.

[Replies to Fouillée, Cantecor, and Belot. The basis of morality is inseparable from the very structure of every society. The morality of a social group, like its language and its institutions, is born with it and with it develops.]

Gomer (*A. de*) Le problème moral et la science. Rev. de Phil., Aug. 1906.

Chatterton-Hill (*G.*) La physiologie morale. Rev. de Phil., July 1906.

20 *Deploige* (*Simon*) Le conflit de la Morale et de la Sociologie 3e Art. Rev. Néo-Scol., May 1906.

[Refers especially to the sociological conceptions of Durkheim.]

Draghicesco (*D.*) De l'impossibilité de la sociologie objective. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 3, 1906.

Hand (*J. E.*), *ed.* Science in Public Affairs. With Pref. by R. B. Haldane. 316p. Allen, 1906.

Salt (*Henry S.*) The Sportsman at Bay. Inter. J. Eth., July 1906.

[One cannot but smile at the sportsman's "love" for the animals he persecutes and worries. Tom Tulliver was described as "fond of animals—fond, that is, of throwing stones at them"; and so it is with this affection of the sportsman's.]

Bullock (*Shan F.*) The Burden of the Middle Classes. Fort. R., Sept. 1906.

Cadbury (*Ed.*), *Matheson* (*Cécile*), *Shann* (*George*) Women's Work and Wages. 368p. Unwin, 1906.

21 *Anon.* Back to the Land. Church Q. R., July 1906.

23 *Slater* (*T.*) Monopoly Price. Irish Th. Quar., July 1906.

[A moral theologian's discussion of the ethics of economic monopolies.]

27 *Watson* (*Foster*) The Freedom of the Teacher to teach Religion. Mind, July 1906.

[An able article in defence of undenominational religious teaching. Protests against the idea that the day school must be reserved for secular teaching and the Sunday school for the religious teaching. That would make the latter another of the long list of technical schools of our times, and sever it from any broad humanism.]

M'Cabe (*J.*) The Truth about Secular Education: Its History and Results. 96p. Watts, 1906.

Anon. Denominationalism and the Education Bill. Dub. R., July 1906.

Barry (*W.*) The Crisis in English Education. Catholic World, Aug. 1906.
[An English R.C. explanation, for the information of American Catholics, of the present educational position in England and of the Education Bill.]

Rashdall (*H.*) A Plea for Undenominationalism. Liberal Churchman, July 1906.
[It is recommended, not as really satisfactory, but as the best and justest system possible at the moment.]

Anon. Education and Politics. Church Q. R., July 1906.
[Stating the objections to the present Education Bill, and defining the principles on which a just settlement might be reached.]

Oliphant (*James*) Moral Instruction. Inter. J. Eth., July 1906.
[The problem for the teacher of morals is how best to help the child to give altruism its proper place in his scheme of life. It is of the highest importance to recognise the place filled by the imagination in moral development. In its nature the power of imagination is antagonistic to egoism.]

Tufts (*James H.*) Some Contributions of Psychology to the Conception of Justice. Phil. R., July 1906.
[Following doctrines are applied to problems of justice:—Individual mind complex in origin and structure; Individual mind is both habit and adjusting activity; Forms without contents are empty; Individual is social in origin and nature. Problems discussed are the just distribution of wealth, of education and other mental goods, and the administration of justice by the courts.]

28 *Eastman* (*Max Forrester*) Patriotism: A Primitive Ideal. Inter. J. Eth., July 1906.
[If a man counts himself first a citizen of his country, and zealous for her more than in so far as she represents the true and the good, his ethics will be like the geography of one who never saw a map, but takes his judgments from the little valley where fortune dropped him.]

F PASTORALIA. 2 *Sermons.*

Randolph (*B. W.*), *ed.* Letters and Reflections of Fénelon. (Mowbray's Devot. Lib.) 158p. Mowbray.

2 *Ingram* (*Winnington*) A Mission of the Spirit. 230p. Wells Gardner, 1906.

Hicks (*E. L.*) The Christian and Reform. Optimist, July 1906.
[Sermon in Manchester Cathedral: Text, St Luke vi. 22.]

Stapfer (*E.*) Le Dieu caché. Rev. chrétienne, July 1906.
[Text: Is. xlv. 15.]

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 *English.*

St Cyres (*Viscount*) François de Fénelon. (Oxford Biographies.) 208p. Methuen, 1906.

Harrison (*J. A.*) George Washington: Patriot, Soldier, Statesman. (Heroes of the Nat. Series.) 481p. Putnam, 1906.

1 *Lecigne* (*C.*) Le capitaine Wyart. Rev. du clergé français, June 15, 1906.
[Account of the early life of the lately deceased general of the Trappist order, and ex-captain of the Papal Zouaves.]

Meyboom (*H. U.*) W. C. van Manen. Th. Tijd., April 1906.
[Special number, with portrait. Can be had separately.]

2 *Anon.* Archbishop Temple. Church Q. R., July 1906.

Anon. James Redfern, Sculptor. Church Q. R., July 1906.

Gout (*R.*) Newman, était-il un mélancolique? Rev. du clergé français, July 1, 1906.
[It is affirmed that he was.]

Wilberforce (*W.*) Newman and Littlemore. Catholic World, Aug. 1906.

Chesterton (*G. K.*) Charles Dickens. 303p. Methuen, 1906.

Kitton (*F. G.*) Charles Dickens. 504p. Jack, 1906.

H HISTORY. x *Persecutions* C *Christian* M *Mediæval* R *Modern* 2 *English.*

Weiss (*Berthold*) Lamprechts Geschichtsphilosophie. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 2, 1906.
[A sympathetic study and appreciation of Lamprecht's *Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft.*]

Arnold (*W. T.*) Studies of Roman Imperialism. Ed. by Edward Fiddes. With Memoir of the Author by Mrs H. Ward and C. E. Montague. 281p. Univ. Press, Manchester, 1906.
[Aims to preserve the fragment of Roman history which W. T. Arnold left behind him. Mrs Ward has written an interesting and sympathetic account of her brother's early years and last years, and the Memoir of his Middle Life is written by Mr Montague.]

Breasted (*J. H.*) Ancient Records of Egypt: Historical Documents. Vol. III. The Nineteenth Dynasty. 307p. Luzac, 1906.

x *Wright* (*Charles H. H.*) The Persecution of Heretics enjoined by the Present Public Ecclesiastical Law of the Church of Rome. 32p. Thynne, 1906.

Workman (*Herbert B.*) Persecution in the Early Church. A Chapter in the History of Renunciation. 382p. Kelly, 1906.
[Treats the subject as a whole in its legal, historical, ecclesiastical, and experiential aspects. The author is Principal of Westminster Training College.]

Cumont (*F.*) Sarin dans le Testament des martyrs de Sébaste. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxv. fasc. iii.
[Sarin is here identified with the modern Turkish town of Ziléh, the ancient city of Pontus made famous by Cæsar's victory.]

C *Taylor* (*John W.*) The Coming of the Saints: Imaginations and Studies in Early Church History and Tradition. With Ills. 326p. Methuen, 1906.
[An interesting piece of work. As one who has been familiar with the legends of the Saints for many years, who has always loved them and occasionally lived in the environment of their acceptance, author has written these pages.]

Jones (*H. S.*) The Catacomb of Commodilla. J. Th. St., July 1906.

Peeters (*P.*) Miraculum SS. Cyri et Johannis in urbe Monembasia. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxv. fasc. iii.
[Introduction, Arabic and Latin texts.]

M *Oman* (*Charles*) The Great Revolt of 1381. 2 Maps. 219p. Frowde, 1906.

Staley (*Edgcumbe*) The Guilds of Florence. 645p. Methuen, 1906.

Ficker (*G.*) Der Häretiker Eleutherius. Th. St. u. Krit., July 1906.

[Discusses the charges and synodal proceedings against Eleutherius of Paphlagonia, on the basis of a document (text here printed) from a Greek MS. of the Escurial.]

Görres (*F.*) Die Religionspolitik das spanischen Westgotenkönigs Swinthila, des ersten Katholischen "Leovigild" (621–631). Ztsch. f. wiss. Th., Heft 2, 1906.

[Described by the author as "Weitere Bausteine zur Kirchen- und Culturgeschichte der Pyrenäen-Halbinsel im Vormittelalter."]

Hocedez (*E.*) La Légende Latine du B. Venturino de Bergame. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxv. fasc. iii.

Moretus (*H.*) Un opuscule du diacre Adelbert sur S. Martin de Montemassico. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxv. fasc. iii.

R *Knappert* (*L.*) Geschiedenis van de hervorming binnen Leiden van den aavang tot op het beleg., ii. and iii. Th. Tijd., March and May 1906.

Anon. Illuminism and the French Revolution. Edin. R., July 1906.

Beaton (*D.*) "The Marrow of Modern Divinity" and the Marrow Controversy. Princeton Th. Rev., July 1906.

[An account of the contents and history of the work.]

Kawerau (*Prof.*) Über eine unveröffentlicht gebliebene Schrift Bugenhagens. Th. St. u. Krit., July 1906.

Knodt (*Prof.*) Briefe von Caspar Olevianus. Th. St. u. Krit., July 1906.

Loetscher (*F. W.*) Schwenkfeld's Participation in the Eucharistic Controversy of the 16th century. Princeton Th. Rev., July 1906.

1 *Coulton* (*G. G.*) The Truth about the Monasteries: A Rejoinder. Cont. R., July 1906.

[Replies to Father Benson.]

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C *Fathers* 2 *R.C. Church* 3 *Anglican.*

Labourt (*J.*) Un Traité inédit de Babaï le Grand. Le Muséon, vol. vii., Nos. 1–2.

[The treatise of the Persian Nestorian of the seventh century here referred to is "On Union," and is "a complete study on the Incarnation." The headings of the twenty-one chapters are given.]

Mayhew (*W. H.*) The Restful Teachings of the New Church. The New Church Rev., July 1906.

Montet (*E.*) Un Rituel d'abjuration des Musulmans dans l'Église grecque. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., Mar.–Apr. 1906.

[Text, translation and notes.]

Reed (*J.*) Varieties of New Church Thought. New-Church Rev., July 1906.

A *Ropes* (*James Hardy*) The Apostolic Age in the Light of Modern Criticism. 327p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

[Lowell Institute Lectures, 1904.]

C *Bonjoannes* (*Berardus*) Compendium of the Summa Theologica of St Thomas Aquinas, Pars Prima, A.D. 1560. Trans. Revised by W. Lescher. 334p. Baker, 1906.

D'Alès (*Adhémar*) La Théologie de Saint Hippolyte. (Biblio. de Théologie Historique.) 242p. Beauchesne, 1906.

[A careful study from the Roman Catholic point of view.]

Dräseke (*J.*) Zur Frage der Eschatologie bei Hippolytos Refut. ix. 10. Ztschr. f. wiss. Th., Heft 2, 1906.

[Discussing the relationship of the passage with Heraclitus.]

Krüger (*G.*) Zu Justin. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1906.

[1. Zur οἶνοι–ὄνοι–Frage in Apologie u. Dialog (supports the reading οἶνος). 2. Justin der Verfasser des Dialogs mit Trypho? (There is ground for doubting Justin's authorship.)]

MacRory (*J.*) The Didascalia and Constitutions of the Apostles. Irish Th. Quar., July 1906.

[Review of Funk's edition.]

Nairn (*J. A.*) On the text of the *De Sacerdotio* of S. Chrysostom. J. Th. St., July 1906.

Souter (*A.*) Prolegomena to the Commentary of Pelagius on the Epistles of S. Paul. J. Th. St., July 1906.

Sperbeck (*H. C.*) Chrysostom the Preacher. Biblio. Sacra, July 1906.

Turner (*C. H.*) Adversaria Patristica. J. Th. St., July 1906.

[Discussion of some patristic exegesis.]

Vogels (*H. J.*) Der vom hl. Augustinus in der Schrift de consensu evangelistarum verwandte Evangelientext. Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 3, 1906.

[Augustine did not use in this work the text of the Vulgate, but an old Latin one.]

Winstedt (*E. O.*) A Further Note on Cosmas. J. Th. St., July 1906.

[Exemplifying Montfaucon's inexactness in biblical and patristic quotations.]

2 *Chapman* (*Dom John*) The Condemnation of Pope Honorius. Dub. R., July 1906.

Anon. Catholic Social Effort in France. Dub. R., July 1906.

Sabatier (*Paul*) Religious Events in France. Cont. R., July 1906.

["It is not a question of the constrained and forced acceptance of certain scientific results of which it is impossible not to take account, or of a chance Liberalism, a day-by-day opportunism, but, on the contrary, of a broadening and deepening of the faith which brings many Catholics to claim as orthodox in advance, every scientific truth, every idea of love and justice."]

Turmann (*M.*) The Religious Situation in France. (1st Article.) Catholic World, Aug. 1906.

[Reviewing the cause of the crisis, the provisions of the Separation Law, and the attitude of the French bishops.]

Coulton (*G. G.*) From St Francis to Dante. A translation of all that is of primary interest in the Chronicle of the Franciscan Salimbene. (1221–1288.) 364p. Nutt, 1906.

Robinson (*P.*) The Franciscan Centenary. Catholic World, June 1906.

[Recounting the circumstances attending the conversion of St Francis, as gathered from the writings of his companions.]

Howell (*A. G. Ferrers*) Franciscan Days; Selections for every day in the year, from Ancient Franciscan Writings. 366p. Methuen, 1906.

[Intended to set forth the most characteristic features of the life and teaching of St Francis, and the effect of that life and teaching upon his first disciples.]

Carmichael (*M.*) The Catholicism of St Francis. Catholic World, June 1906.

[Seeking to prove St Francis an orthodox Catholic, against Sabatier's description, *Hérétique sans s'en douter.*]

Cuthbert (*Father*) St Francis and Modern Society. Catholic World, June 1906.

[To show the practical nature of the saint's ideals.]

de la Warr (*Countess*) The Love and Humility of St Francis. Catholic World, June 1906.

Thureau-Dangin (*Paul*) Saint Bernardine of Siena. Trans. by Baroness G. von Hugel. 288p. Dent, 1906.

Ortroy (*F. van*) Vie inédite de S. Bernardin de Sienne, par un Frère Mineur, son contemporain. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxv. fasc. iii.

[Introduction and Latin text.]

Jackson (*S. M.*) The Scorn of the World: A Poem in three Books. Amer. J. of Th., July 1906.

[The third book in Prebble's translation of Bernard of Cluny's poem.]

Maes (*L.*) Lettres inédites d'André Schott. Le Muséon, vol. vii., Nos. 1–2.

Moran (*Cardinal*) The Félire of St Oengus. Irish Th. Quar., July 1906.

[Review of Stokes' "Martyrology of Oengus," praising the text but criticising the translation.]

Fox (*J. J.*) Some Notes on the Dreyfus Case. Catholic World, Aug. 1906.

[As illustrating what the writer regards as the unhappy anti-democratic and anti-republican spirit of the French clergy.]

Palmieri (*P. A.*) La Mente e l'Opera di Ermanno Schell. Studi Relig., May–June 1906.

["The eschatological theories of Schell are a bold attempt to reconcile the Christian dogmas concerning the future life with the theological pretensions of anti-Christian philosophers of to-day.]

Poncelet (*A.*) Vie et miracles du pape S. Leon IX. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxv. fasc. iii.

[Introduction and Latin text of an eleventh-century MS.]

Simon (*J. M.*) Les Ordres religieux au Sénat de Bavière. Rev. du clergé français, June 15, 1906.

[Text of a warm eulogy pronounced by a Protestant member of the Upper House.]

Turmel (*J.*), *and others.* Consultations and Renseignements. Rev. du clergé français, June 15, 1906.

[Dealing with "Denzinger's Enchiridion," "The Separation," "Preaching, direction, and religious instruction."]

Winstedt (*E. O.*) The Original Text of one of St Antony's Letters. J. Th. St., July 1906.

Bremond (*E.*) La Filosofia religiosa de Newman. Studi Relig., May–June 1906.

3 *Overton* (*J. H.*) and *Relton* (*F.*) The English Church from the Accession of George I. to the End of the Eighteenth Century (1714–1800). 392p. Macmillan, 1906.

Summers (*W. H.*) The Lollards of the Chiltern Hills. 186p. Griffiths, 1906.

Anon. The Origin and Historical Basis of the Oxford Movement. Quar. R., July 1906.

Newton (*R. H.*) The Church in the United States. Liberal Churchman, July 1906.

4 *Ménégoz* (*E.*) L'antifidéisme. Rev. chrétienne, July 1906.

[Reply to Professor Doumergue, who considers the "fidéisme" of the Paris school (a form apparently of solifidianism) as the next step from rationalistic liberalism to agnosticism.]

Monnier (*G.*) L'union possible. Rev. chrétienne, July 1906.

[Deprecating fusion (as equivalent to surrendering principles), but commending federation among the sections of French Protestantism.]

Hallard (*Alys*) Renan's Early Note-Books. Indep. R., Aug. 1906.

5 *Rait* (*R. S.*) John Knox and the Scottish Reformation Quar. R., July 1906.

Rowntree (*John Wilhelm*) Palestine Notes and Other Papers. Ed. by J. Rowntree. 276p. Headley, 1906.

[First part contains a considerable portion of the journal of a visit to Syria and the East. The second gives adult school lessons and addresses; and the third some of the many lectures he was in the habit of giving.]

Baker (*G.*) Unhistoric Acts: Some Records of Early Friends in North-East Yorks. 264p. Headley, 1906.

Brown (*W. A.*) Changes in the Theology of American Presbyterianism. Amer. J. of Th., July 1906.

[Notes, and analyses the causes of, the growing liberalism, using as text the revised Standard of 1902, and the Book of Common Worship of 1903.]

L LITERATURE. 2 *English* 3 *German* 5 *Italian* 9 *Classical.*

Hunt (*Theodore W.*) Literature: Its Principles and Problems. Vol. I. 427p. Funk & Wagnals, 1906.

Schinz (*A.*) Literature and the Moral Code. Inter. J. Eth., July 1906.

[A discussion of the respective attitudes of Anglo-Saxon and of Latin races in regard to the freedom of authors in discussing moral problems.]

2 *Brégy* (*Katherine*) Lionel Johnson: Poet and Critic. Catholic World, July 1906.

Guiney (*Louise J.*) Childhood in English 17th Century Poetry. Catholic World, July 1906.

V *Sizeranne* (*R. De la*) Ruskin at Venice. Trans. by Mrs Frederic Harrison. 70p. Allen, 1906.

Symons (*Arthur*) Walter Pater. Mont. R., Sept. 1906.

Browning (*E. B.*) The Religious Opinions of Elizabeth Barrett Browning. Three Letters to William Merry. 56p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

W *Rhoades* (*W. C.*) Is Bernard Shaw among the Prophets? Biblio. Sacra, July 1906.

[A fierce moral earnestness is at the bottom of Shaw's work, but he is wholly ineffective because nothing else but denunciatory.]

3 *Yusuf-Ali* (*A.*) Goethe's Orientalism. Cont. R., Aug. 1906.

Rea (*T.*) Schiller's Dramas and Poems in England. 166p. Unwin, 1906.

8 *Archer* (*William*) Ibsen's Craftsmanship. Fort. R., July 1906.

Viénot (*J.*) Henrik Ibsen. Rev. chrétienne, Aug. 1906.

9 *Phillimore* (*J. S.*) Crinagoras of Mitylene. Dub. R., July 1906.

Mahaffy (*J. Pentland*) The Silver Age of the Greek World. 482p. Unwin, 1906.
[Intended to replace author's "Greek World under Roman Sway."]

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4 *Hinduism.* 7 *Judaism.* 9 *Demonology.* 12 *Occultism.*

Haddon (*A. C.*) Magic and Fetishism. (Religions, Ancient and Modern.) 99p. Constable, 1906.

Pfleiderer (*O.*) Religion und Religionen. 255p. Lehmann, 1906.

Söderblom (*N.*) Die Religionen der Erde. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, iii^e série, 3^e fasc.) Vol. I. 65p. Gebauer-Schwetschke, 1905.

Mead (*G. R. S.*) Thrice - Greatest Hermes: Studies in Hellenistic Theosophy and Gnosis. A Translation of the Extant Sermons and Fragments of the Trismegistic Literature, with Prolegomena, Commentaries and Notes. 3 vols. 481–403–371p. Theoso. Pub. Soc., 1906.
[These volumes may be described as the preparation of materials to serve for the historic, mythic and mystic consideration of the Origins of Christianity.]

Foucart (*G.*) Une tombe d'Amarna. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., Mar.–Apr. 1906.
[Based on N. de G. Davies' *Tombs of Huya and Ahmès*, in the fifteenth Memoir of the Archæological Survey of Egypt.]

Hoernle (*F. R.*) Origine et premiers développements du Jainisme. Le Muséon, vol. vii., Nos. 1–2.
[Translated from the author's English "Annual Address to the Asiatic Society of Bengal."]

Monseur (*E.*) La proscription religieuse de l'usage récent. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., May–June 1906.
[A number of rites can only be explained as originally proscriptions of newly - introduced usages, either as being dangerous or out of place under certain circumstances. This theory is applied to explain such customs as removing the hat, wearing sackcloth, removing the dying from their beds, laying the newly-born on the ground, the eating of unleavened bread, etc.]

Capart (*J.*) Bulletin critique des Religions de l'Égypte: 1905 (1^re partie). Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., May–June 1906.

3 *Squire* (*Charles*) The Mythology of Ancient Britain and Ireland. (Religions, Ancient and Modern.) 80p. Constable, 1906.

Craigie (*W. A.*) The Religion of Ancient Scandinavia. (Religions, Ancient and Modern.) 70p. Constable, 1906.

4 "*Barhaspatyah.*" The Jyotisha Vedanga explained. Hindustan Rev., May–June 1906.

Boyer (*A. M.*) Note sur le Manuscrit Sanskrit-Ouïgour en brâhmî de la Mission Grünwedel. Le Muséon, vol. vii., Nos. 1–2.

Roussel (*A.*) Les idées religieuses et sociales du Mahâbhârata. Le Muséon, vol. vii., Nos. 1–2.

5 *Cranmer-Byng* (*L.*), *Kapadia* (*S. A.*), *eds.* Musings of a Chinese Mystic. Selections from the Philosophy of Chuang Tzŭ. With Intro. by Lionel Giles. (Wisdom of the East Series.) 112p. Murray, 1906.

Cesaresco (*Martinengo*) A Religion of Ruth. Cont. R., Sept. 1906.
[A description of the Jainas, a set distinct from the Buddhists. The law of *Ahimsa*, "non-killing," more rigidly observed by them.]

Anesaki (*M.*) Traces of Pali texts in a Mahâyâna Treatise. Le Muséon, vol. vii., Nos. 1–2.

Kern (*H.*) Sur l'invocation d'une Inscription bouddhique de Battambang. Le Muséon, vol vii., Nos. 1–2.

Mitra (*B. K.*) Buddhism in Modern India. Hindustan Rev., May–June 1906.

7 *Abrahams* (*Israel*) A Short History of Jewish Literature: From the Fall of the Temple (70 C.E.) to the Era of Emancipation (1786 C.E.). 176p. Unwin, 1906.

Harris (*Isidore*) History of Jews' College, 1855–1905. The first part of the Jews' College Jubilee Volume. 202p. Luzac, 1906.

Brody (*H.*) and *Albrecht* (*K.*) The New-Hebrew School of Poets of the Spanish-Arabian Epoch: Selected Texts, with Intro., Notes and Dictionary. 217p. Williams & Norgate, 1906.

Bischoff (*E.*) Im Reiche der Gnosis, Ch. i.: Jüdischer Gnostizismus. 153p. Grieben, 1906.

Montague (*E. R.*) Tales from the Talmud. 290p. Blackwood, 1906.

Adler (*M. N.*) The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela (*concluded*). Jewish Q. R., July 1906.
[Facsimiles, text and translation.]

Elbogen (*I.*) Studies in the Jewish Liturgy. Jewish Q. R., July 1906.

Ginsberg (*L.*) Geonic Responsa. Jewish Q. R., July 1906.
[Introduction and text.]

Hirschfeld (*H.*) The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge. 13th Article: Sa'adyâh's Commentary on Exodus. Jewish Q. R., July 1906.
[Description of fragments, text and translation.]

Margoliouth (*G.*) Gunsburg and Stassoff's "Hebrew Illuminated MSS." Jewish Q. R., July 1906.
[Critical notice.]

Massebieau (*L.*) *and Bréhier* (*E.*) Essai sur la chronologie de la vie et des œuvres de Philon (2^e article). Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., Mar.–Apr., May–June 1906.

Philipson (*D.*) The Breslau Rabbinical Conference. Jewish Q. R., July 1906.
[Seventh of the series of articles on the Reform Movement in Judaism.]

Jacob, son of Aaron. The History and Religion of the Samaritans. Biblio. Sacra, July 1906.
[First article by the High Priest of the Samaritans at Nâblus (the ancient Shechem). The object of this and the succeeding articles is to make known to Christians the doctrine of his community.]

8 *Anon.* Mohammed and the Rise of Islam. Church Q. R., July 1906.
[With special reference to Margoliouth's work under the above title.]

Cranmer-Byng (*L.*), *Kapadia* (*S. A.*), *eds.* Sadi's Scroll of Wisdom. With Intro. by A. N. Wollaston. (Wisdom of the East Series.) 63p. Murray, 1906.
[A work, popular throughout the Persian-speaking East, written by Sadi, the celebrated Persian poet, born between 1175 and 1193.]

52 *Ligneul* (*F. A.*) Les religions japonaises et leur état actuel.
Rev. du clergé français, July 15, 1906.

Lloyd (*A.*) Japanese Sketches.
Catholic World, July 1906.
[Bearing on the moral and religious conditions and on the outlook for Catholicism.]

P PHILOSOPHY. 10 ·· *Metaphysics*, 21 *Epistemology*, 33 ·· *Psychical Research*, 40 ·· *Psychology*, 60 ·· *Logic*, 70 ·· *Systems*, 90 ·· *Philosophers.*

Ueberweg-Heinze. Grundriss der geschichte der Philosophie. IV^ter^ Theil. 19^tes^ Jahrhundert. 10^te^ Aufl. 712p.
Mittler & Sohn, 1906.
[In this edition a good deal of new material is added. There is an account of Meinong and his *Gegenstandstheorie*, and in Prof. Hicks' section on English Philosophy new paragraphs dealing with the teaching of Ward and Adamson appear.]

10 *Koigen* (*David*) Jahresbericht ueber die Literatur zur Metaphysik, ii.
Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 2, 1906.
[Discusses Dressler's *Die Welt als Wille zum Selbst*, and Froehlich's *Der Wille zur höheren Einheit.*]

Laurie (*S. S.*) Synthetica: Meditations, Epistemological and Ontological. 2 vols. 321–416p. Longmans, 1906.
[Review will follow.]

Gordon (*Kate*) Metaphysics as a Branch of Art. J. of Phil., July 5, 1906.

12 *Frischeisen-Köhler* (*Max*) Über die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 2, 1906.
[A discussion of Rickert's book on this subject.]

Koch (*Emil*) Über naturwissenschaftliche Hypothesen.
Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxx. 2, 1906.

13 *Jones* (*Harry C.*) The Electrical Nature of Matter and Radio-activity. 212p.
Constable, 1906.

19 *Hocking* (*W. E.*) The Group Concept in the Service of Philosophy.
J. of Phil., Aug. 2, 1906.

21 *Sageret* (*J.*) La commodité scientifique et ses conséquences. Rev. Phil., July 1906.
[Discusses Poincaré's two books on *Science and Hypothesis* and *The Worth of Science*. He upholds the use of the word *convenience* in the place of *necessity*. It emphasises the fact that there is no metaphysical necessity, no absolute necessity.]

Baldwin (*J. Mark*) Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought or Genetic Logic. Vol. I. Functional Logic, or Genetic Theory of Knowledge. (Lib. of Phil.) 287p.
Sonnenschein, 1906.
[In this vol. author deals with the nature of what he calls Genetic Logic, and with the Prelogical and Quasi-logical modes of apprehension.]

Dewey (*John*) The Experimental Theory of Knowledge. Mind, July 1906.
[An experience is a knowledge, if in its quale there is an experienced distinction and connexion of two elements of the following sort: one means or intends the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through an operation it sets up.]

Thoene (*J. F.*) Die Welt und die Kategorien des Denkens.
Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 3, 1906.

Bullaty (*Emil*) Erkenntnistheorie und Psychologie, i., ii.
Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 2, 3, 1906.
[A long and able article setting out the author's epistemological standpoint which he has developed in detail in two works about to be published.]

Wernick (*Georg*) Der Wirklichkeitsgedanke, i.
Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxx. 2, 1906.
[Objective and subjective estimates of reality are two different psychical processes that relate to the same content. Reality is originally not a concept, but a thought, which, like every other thought, may be reduced to processes of perception.]

Tawney (*G. A.*) Two Types of Consistency. J. of Phil., Aug. 16, 1906.
[Consistency can not be identified with either the law of habit or the law of accommodation and selection. Yet these laws do enter into the experience of consistency in important ways. Hence consistency will have a somewhat different character in the two cases.]

Davies (*A. E.*) The Genesis of Ideals.
J. of Phil., Aug. 30, 1906.
[The ideal is at once the product of experience and the organising centre of all knowledge and conduct. The essential quality of ideals is found in the functional relation to the individuality of experience. By means of the ideal, experience is transmuted into knowledge.]

23 *Spaulding* (*E. G.*) The Ground of the Validity of Knowledge, iii., iv.
J. of Phil., June 7, July 5, 1906.
[Existing "things," *whatever* their further "nature" may be shown by subsequent philosophical criticism to be, are known "in" the self-transcending perceptive act as things, qualities, events, relations, as the "elements" and "constituents" of a permanent, unalterable, causal transcendent.]

27 *Bosanquet* (*B.*) The Meaning of Teleology.
Proc. of Brit. Acad., vol. ii., 1906.
[That the finite intelligent being has the duty and position rather of coming to himself and awakening to his own nature and his unity with a greater mind and will than in controlling the course of the universe or moulding it as an independent cause, is a point of view that needs reaffirmation at present.]

33 *Baron* (*E.*) Le Psychisme inférieur.
Rev. de Phil., July 1906.

Moisant (*X.*) Le merveilleux en psychologie. Rev. de Phil., Aug. 1906.
[Concerning Poulain's work *Des Grâces d'oraison traité de Théologie mystique.*]

Gates (*Elmer*) The Transparency of Animal Bodies.
Annals of Psy. Sc., June 1906.

Lombroso (*Cæsar*) "Haunted Houses" which I have studied.
Annals of Psy. Sc., June 1906.

Bozzano (*E.*) Cæsar Lombroso and Supernormal Psychology.
Annals of Psy. Sc., July 1906.

Fotherby (*H.*) Ether the Medium of the Subliminal Self.
Annals of Psy. Sc., July 1906.

Hyslop (*J. H.*) The Smead Case (illustrated). Annals of Psy. Sc., Aug. 1906.

Constable (*F. C.*) Science *versus* Psychical Research. Annals of Psy. Sc., Aug. 1906.

40 *Taylor* (*A. E.*) The Place of Psychology in the Classification of the Sciences. Phil. R., July 1906.

[The dependence of psychology upon empirical existence-theorems of itself deprives it of truth as a knowledge of human nature, when contrasted with the revelations of biography or history. It is not in the reactions of the laboratory, but in appreciation by an ideal standard of the ends to which human life can be devoted, that we most truly learn what the mind of man *is*.]

Duprat (*G. L.*) Contre l'intellectualisme en psychologie. Rev. Phil., July 1906.

[Whilst metaphysical psychology makes Reason or Understanding and Will intervene everywhere, scientific psychology must make tendencies and habits intervene.]

Spiller (*Gustav*) Wundt and "Pure Self-Observation." Mind, July 1906.

Sterling (*Stefan*) Biogenetisches Gesetz in der Psychologie. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 3, 1906.

43 *Jastrow* (*Joseph*) The Subconscious. 549p. Constable, 1906.

[Author has attempted a statement of the natural import of the Subconscious, its comprehensive scope in the familiar fields of normal life and in the perplexing mazes of the abnormal. He cannot accept Myers' point of view.]

Schiller (*F. C. S.*) Idealism and the Dissociation of Personality. J. of Phil., Aug. 30, 1906.

[Discusses the light thrown on the nature of personality by the tribulations of the "Beauchamp" family dealt with in Dr Morton Prince's book on the "Dissociation of a Personality."]

45 *Mourre* (*Charles*) La Dualité du Moi dans les sentiments. 2e Art. Rev. de Phil., June 1906.

48 *Compayré* (*G.*) La pédagogie de l'adolescence. 2e Art. Rev. Phil., June 1906.

Wities (*Bernhard*) Das Wirkungsprinzip der Reklame. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxviii. 2, 1906.

[Discusses the problem how it is that advertisements always exercise anew a determining influence upon the public, such as they were intended to, whilst this same public is theoretically well acquainted with the self-interested motives of those who advertise, and ought therefore, and in consequence of repeated experience, to be distrustful and sceptical of all such promises and inducements.]

Major (*D. R.*) First Steps in Mental Growth. 360p. Macmillan Co., 1906.

49 *Heymans* (*G.*), *Wiersma* (*E.*) Beiträge zur speziellen Psychologie auf Grund einer Massenuntersuchung, i. Z. f. Psychol., xlii. 2–3, 1906.

Levy-Suhl (*Max*) Studien über die experimentelle Beeinflussung des Vorstellungsverlaufs, i. Z. f. Psychol., xlii. 2–3, 1906.

Veraguth (*Otto*) Die Verlegung diaskleral in das menschliche Auge einfallender Lichtreize in den Raum. Z. f. Psychol., xlii. 2–3, 1906.

Prandtl (*A.*) Eine Nachbilderscheinung. Z. f. Psychol., xlii. 2–3, 1906.

51 *Norris* (*E. A.*) Feeling. J. of Phil., Aug. 16, 1906.

[The whole psychical process may be considered as a feeling process consisting mainly of peculiar activities between emotional states and imagery phenomena, specialised feelings, seemingly for the purpose of establishing a maximum of agreeable states.]

Boggs (*Lucinda P.*) The Relation of Feeling and Interest. J. of Phil., Aug. 16, 1906.

[Interest is a train of thought having a central idea which seeks to organise relevant ideas into a logical relation to itself. It is never to be identified with feeling.]

53 *Cevolani* (*J.*) À propos d'une règle sur la conversion des jugements. Rev. Néo-Scol., May 1906.

Pudor (*Heinrich*) Von den ästhetischen Formen der Raumanschauung. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxviii. 2, 1906.

M'Dougall (*W.*) Physiological Factors of the Attention-Process, iv. Mind, July 1906.

Roerich. L'attention spontanée dans la vie ordinaire et ses applications pratiques. Rev. Phil., Aug. 1906.

[Discusses spontaneous or involuntary attention under two aspects, primitive and apperceptive.]

Henmon (*V. A. C.*) The Detection of Color-Blindness. J. of Phil., June 21, 1906.

57 *Tassy* (*E.*) Le sympathique et l'idéation. Rev. Phil., Aug. 1906.

58 *Ribot* (*Th.*) Comment les passions finissent. Rev. Phil., June 1906.

[A passion or desire is extinguished by habit or exhaustion, by change into another, by substitution, by madness, by death.]

60 *Chide* (*A.*) La logique avant les logiciens. Rev. Phil., Aug. 1906.

Joseph (*H. W. B.*) An Introduction to Logic. 564p. Frowde, 1906.

[An attempt to furnish what might be called the body of traditional doctrine in Logic, which is not only itself an instrument of intellectual discipline, but ought to be mastered by those who would proceed to the higher problems.]

Geissler (*Kurt*) Über Begriffe, Definitionen und mathematische Phantasie, ii. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 2, 1906.

61 *Mansion* (*A.*) L'Induction chez Albert le Grand. 1e Art. Rev. Néo-Scol., May 1906.

71 *Fichte* (*Johann Gottlieb*) The Vocation of Man. Trans. by W. Smith. With Biographical Introd. by E. Ritchie. (Religion of Science Lib.) 176p. Kegan Paul, 1906.

Binet (*A.*) Les premiers mots de la thèse idéaliste. Rev. Phil., June 1906.

[Not true to affirm that we are only capable of knowing mental states, that the knowledge of matter is less immediate than that of mental states, or that the existence of matter needs to be demonstrated, since it does not result directly from the witness of consciousness.]

Mason (*M. Phillips*) Reality as Possible Experience. J. of Phil., Aug. 16, 1906.

[The real is the true or valid. This conception, when taken in its fullest and most accurate form, is a sufficient answer to the problem as to the nature of reality.]

Reimann (*R.*) Einige Gedanken über die Organisation des Ideenreichs, mit kurzem Hinblick auf die platonisch-aristotelische Idee. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxviii. 2, 1906.

[Our age identifies reality with what is empirical, and regards Notions, Spirit, God, in so far as they do not enter the phenomenal world, as unreal. But the possibility of abstracting an Idea from its concrete setting is a proof of its real existence.]

Mackenzie (*J. S.*) The New Realism and the Old Idealism. Mind, July 1906.

[Idealism must learn from the new realism to find a real place for nature. The lesson for the idealist at the present time is—"Close thy Browning—open thy Goethe: Close thy Berkeley—open thy Plato: Close thy Bradley—open thy Hegel."]

72 *Lilly* (*W. S.*) Kant and the Buddha. Fort. R., Aug. 1906.

[Striking parallelisms between Kant's doctrine and the Buddha's, such as (*a*) the essential difference between real and empirical being, (*b*) the antinomies of reason, (*c*) object conditioned by the subject, (*d*) moral law supreme guide of life, (*e*) moral law transcendental, (*f*) primacy of the will, (*g*) attitude towards prevailing religions.

Delacroix (*H.*) La philosophie pratique de Kant, d'après M. Delbos. Rev. Phil., June 1906.

74 *Russell* (*John E.*) Some Difficulties with the Epistemology of Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism. Phil. R., July 1906.

[Difficulties are (1) confounding the situation in which thinking and knowing arise, with truth and knowledge themselves, (2) confounding the consequences to which truth leads with truth itself, (3) no logical escape from solipsism.]

Schiller (*F. C. S.*) Pragmatism and Pseudo-Pragmatism. Mind, July 1906.

James (*W.*) G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy. J. of Phil., June 21, 1906.

76 *Stern* (*Viktor*) Ein neues Argument gegen den Materialismus. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 2, 1906.

[For materialism everything is object, for idealism everything subject. Modern dualism differentiates reality into object and subject, and recognises both. The standpoint of the author resembles the last, but draws the line at a different place, inasmuch as it does not include psychical material phenomena in the subject. It finds in the object itself a differentiation into direct and indirect experience.]

77 *Le Dantec* (*F.*) Les objections au monisme. Rev. Phil., Aug. 1906.

[The question of individual liberty divides monists and dualists. If, as monists believe, the reasons which make the animal act are connected with the modifications of measurable elements, some day the direct study of the human brain or mind may become possible by means of a phrenograph or phrenoscope.]

80 *Dauriac* (*L.*) Un historien de la philosophie grecque: Th. Gomperz. Rev. Phil., July 1906.

84 *Piat* (*Clodius*) La vie future d'après Platon. Rev. Néo-Scol., May 1906.

[Plato's three principal proofs of a future life are: (*a*) the nature of the soul, (*b*) its relation to the moral world, (*c*) its relation to the physical world.]

85 *Ross* (*G. R. T.*) Aristotle De Sensu and De Memoria. Text and Trans. With Intro. and Comm. 303p. Clay, 1906.

[A translation of the first two tractates belonging to the Parva Naturalia, with an introduction dealing with Aristotle's theory of Sense-perception.]

90 *Dolson* (*Grace Neal*) The Idealism of Malebranche. Phil. R., July 1906.

[Malebranche presents us with an idealism which is in some respects unique, an idealism which, while it resembles that of Berkeley, is yet more akin to later systems.]

Powell (*Elmer E.*) Spinoza and Religion. 344p. Open Court Pub. Co., Chicago, 1906.

[The right name for Spinoza's philosophy is Atheistic Monism. It represents a world-view which, in its essential features, is the very antithesis of that required by the religious consciousness.]

Bastian (*Albert*) Quellen und Wirkungen von Jakob Böhmes Gottesbegriff. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxviii. 2, 1906.

[The sources discussed are: (*a*) the Bible and Sermons; (*b*) the Teachings of Paracelsus; (*c*) Eckehart's Idea of God; (*d*) the Idea of God formulated by Nicolaus von Cues.]

92 *Umfrid* (*O. L.*) Karl Christian Planck und der Zeitgeist. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 3, 1906.

V *Barth* (*Paul*) Zu J. St. Mills 100. Geburtstage. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxx. 2, 1906.

[Deep in insight, clear in his ideas, full of faith in human ideals, J. S. Mill's was a mind of little glamour, but from which already much light and warmth have radiated, and from which more will radiate in the future of educated humanity.]

Gribble (*Francis*) John Stuart Mill. Fort. R., Aug. 1906.

[Herbert Spencer was at once a deeper and more interesting thinker than Mill. The crowning advantage, notwithstanding, rests with the latter. For, when the end came, Mill, looking back upon his work, could feel, not only that it was very good, but also that it had been worth while to do it.]

Anon. A Representative Philosopher. Edin. R., July 1906.

Ward (*Wilfrid*) Some Characteristics of Henry Sidgwick. Dub. R., July 1906.

[Sidgwick was morally as well as mentally one of the great academic figures of our day, strenuous in effort, rich in sympathy, with high and simple aims, combining in his intellectual life a noble ideal with unrivalled powers of analysis and criticism, and above all with an intense passion for truth.]

Petre (*M. D.*) Studies on Friedrich Nietzsche. VI. Nietzsche, the Anti-Christian. Catholic World, June 1906.

Nietzsche (*F.*) Thus Spake Zarathustra. First authorized Trans., 2nd Ed. Common, 1906.

V ART. 83 *Sacred Music.*

March-Phillips (*L.*) Form and Colour. Cont. R., Aug. 1906.

Anon. Modern British Art and the Nation. Quar. R., July 1906.

Martin (*F.*) Chronique artistique. Rev. du clergé français, June 1, 1906.

Griffis (*W. E.*) Rembrandt as an Interpreter of Holy Scripture. Homiletic R., July 1906.

Baughan (*B. E.*) The Apostasy of a Wagnerian. Fort. R., July 1906.

83 *Anon.* The English Hymnal: A new hymn-book for use in the Church of England. 651p. Frowde, 1906.

[Claims to be no party book, but to collect the best hymns from the Fathers to the present day, making a special point of giving the hymns, wherever possible, as the authors wrote them.]

Roerich (*E.*) Les origines du choral luthérien. Rev. chrétienne, June 1906.

[Traces very interestingly the derivation of the great chorales from the pre-Reformation graduals, sequences, proses, etc.]

Roerich (*E.*) Les origines du choral luthérien. Rev. chrétienne, Aug. 1906.

[With specimens of the original melodies and of their Lutheran modifications.]

G. D. H. and J. H. W.

THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

OUR FINAL VENTURE.

PROFESSOR CAMPBELL FRASER.

"A LITTLE philosophy," according to Bacon, "inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion;—for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no farther; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity."

This maxim of the English philosopher in the end of the sixteenth century has been in a manner reversed by some thinkers who have considerable influence on popular as well as scientific thought, in Europe and America. They tell us that rude and shallow thinking disposes men to religion and metaphysics, but that depth of insight leads, not to atheism, but to an agnosticism that is neither atheistic, pantheistic, nor theistic; because the riddle of the universe, which these three ultimate conceptions have been supposed in their several ways to dispose of, must remain for ever a riddle; so that we must at the most confine our regard to a wholly physical interpretation of the phenomena among which we live, and by which our lives are supposed to be shaped.

This virtual inversion of Bacon's maxim has been countenanced under various forms by David Hume in Scotland,

Auguste Comte in France, J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer in England, and now by Ernst Haeckel in Germany. Comte's law of the three stages of humanity makes religion a characteristic of the earliest and rudest periods in the history of mankind, and yet accepts positive science of "second causes scattered," but with inevitable ignorance of an efficient and intending cause of "the chain of them confederate," as the necessary limit of man's knowledge of his environment. Imagination, active in the infancy of the race, is taken as the parent of theistic faith; this, sublimated by abstract reasonings which contradict one another, is supposed gradually to induce vain metaphysical or idealistic constructions of the universe; after which theology and metaphysics are both dismissed in favour of an Agnosticism which declines to believe as soon as empirical methods are no longer available,—the human race in its onward march gradually shedding the religious illusions of its infancy, and the metaphysical abstractions of its early manhood, and finding final satisfaction in "scientific" interpretation, with consequent practical applications of physical laws. Again, the modified agnosticism of Spencer, dismissing alike atheism, pantheism, and theism, on the ground that they all transgress the necessary limitations of human knowledge, permits us, notwithstanding, to contemplate with blind emotion Unknowable Power behind phenomena; on which the universe of visible things and conscious persons, in their scientifically concatenated evolution, was believed by Spencer to depend. Worship of empty abstract Power, of which nothing either good or evil could be asserted, appears to be his substitute for Comte's worship of Humanity as the divinest object offered in experience. But Spencer does not explain how, under his philosophy, he can reasonably postulate even this "Unknowable Power" behind phenomena, or why he suggests as he does that this Power may be "the same as that which in ourselves wells up in the form of consciousness." Nor does Comte show why, at his point of view, he assumes the creed about nature that tacitly underlies positive science, in the form of faith in

continued uniformity of nature; without which science would be impossible, induction of laws illusion of imagination, and the universe inconceivable *as universe* or concatenated unity.

Is reason on the side of those who accept Bacon's maxim, or is reason with those who thus reverse it? Is our deepest and truest interpretation of events in the end determined by inevitable ethical and religious presuppositions, or does it finally rest on the otherwise unsupported presuppositions of physical science? Is science itself able to subsist reasonably in combination with total negation of all that is metaphysical or theological? Can we have really trustworthy positive science unless we are living in a physical universe that is spiritually and morally trustworthy at the root? Do not those modern advocates of agnostically constituted science of nature either go too far, or not far enough, in the way of agnosticism? Is not *uncertainty about everything* the alternative to this disclaimer of faith in the moral or spiritual worth of the universal immanent Power? Where is the ground in reason for trust in a physical cosmos, if we can in reason believe nothing about what underlies it?

Questions like these seem to imply that we can know nothing unless we *know* everything; that each part is so connected with the whole that ignorance of the whole must leave us in ignorance of the part; and that, without perfect knowledge of the infinite reality, even "finite knowledge" must be illusory.

Finite understanding in man *is*, without doubt, paralysed by the infinite universe of concrete reality, when presented under the forms of space, time, and causation, with which we are all confronted; and, unsustained by omniscience, *must* we not at last accept, in a faith due to the entire constitution of man, what we cannot fully know? Sooner or later, in its philosophical regress, must not *human* understanding be fundamentally sustained by reasonable trust, when intellectual vision

gradually becomes dim, and man can find in a *via media* between omniscience and total nescience the only escape from paralysis of intelligence and will? David Hume introduces his sceptical solution of sceptical doubts by asking what explanation can be given of the universal claim to transcend the sensations of the moment, and even the records of individual memory; in the way we all do when we *take for granted* that the past and present may be trusted in some degree to reveal the future. Have we ground in reason for assuming that we are living in a universe in which the future *will* resemble the past, and where all that is to happen *will* exemplify uniform natural law, and be accordingly scientifically interpretable? It is true that uniformity has been exemplified millions of times in past experiences of the universe, and this without a single exception. But do we know enough about the immeasurable Whole to be assured in reason that this past custom of experience must continue in future, or that the physical cosmos may not suddenly become physical chaos? We are told by the philosopher that past customary uniformity is apt (also under natural law) to produce blindly in us a *previsive habit*, which we find that we cannot resist. But blind habit is not reason; and unless man is omniscient, how can he affirm with assurance that he is living and moving and having his being in a universe in which nature will *continue* steady in its supposed uniformities? Do I *see* that the universe is thus trustworthy at its root, so that its movements in space and time are interpretable? An intense view of the insufficiency of human understanding, measured only by sense, to determine ultimate questions of this sort, which seem to demand omniscience in the response, so wrought upon the sceptical philosopher that he was ready, he says, to surrender all general assertions about phenomena and to look upon no one human judgment as more probable than another. Where am I and what? he asked in vain. What sort of Power now maintains the universe, and me in it; and into what condition shall it and I finally return?

But this *intellectual* prostration, in presence of the riddle of infinite reality, is not the only obstacle which is alleged to stand in the way of a theistic interpretation of human life. "God" is a word that properly connotes *Absolute Goodness* at the root of all. Now the universe, at least on this planet, presents a perplexing mixture of good and evil in the history of the persons and sentient beings who inhabit it. Even if I may take for granted that I am living and moving and having my being in a *physical* cosmos, experience shows that I am also living in what is more or less a *moral* chaos, in which vice is common, and seems often more favoured under natural law than virtue is; happiness and suffering are apparently capriciously distributed. Evil found in persons, and in their relations to their environment, is a bar to theistic faith, even more obstructive than our want of omniscience. It seems to deny to finite intelligence trustworthy dealing with a consequently uninterpretable universe. This moral difficulty in the way of a theistic final synthesis of experience is thus put by David Hume into the mouth of *Philo*, in the "Dialogues on Natural Religion":—

"It must, I think, be allowed," Philo argues, "that if a very limited intelligence, which we shall suppose to be utterly unacquainted with the universe, were somehow assured that it was the production of a very good, wise, and powerful Being, he would beforehand have a different notion of it from what we find it actually to be; nor would he ever imagine beforehand that the effect would be so full of vice, misery, and disorder as it actually appears. Notwithstanding, he would never retract his assurance that, in spite of its misery and disorder, it was the work of a very good, wise, and powerful Being; since such a limited intelligence as his own must allow that there may be many solutions of those phenomena which must for ever escape his narrow comprehension."

"But supposing, as is the case, that this being is *not* thus assured of a Supreme Intelligence, benevolent, very good, and powerful, but is left to gather a conclusion as to

this from the appearances of things. This entirely alters the case; nor will he ever find any reason in the facts presented to observation for inferring a very wise and powerful Supreme Being. He may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of his own understanding; but this will not help him in concluding the *goodness* of the Supreme Power, since he must form his conclusions from the little he knows, not from what he is ignorant of. The more you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you render him, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the reach of his faculties." And so Hume, in his *Natural History of Religion*, agnostically concludes that "the whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery; doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment appearing to be the only result of our most accurate scrutiny concerning this subject." We may busy ourselves in our little lives among passing appearances: the Whole is a hollow show, in which nothing deeper is revealed.

Hume elsewhere takes for granted that, although finite intelligence is confronted by a world in which happiness and misery, good and evil, in persons and sentient beings, are mixed in moral confusion, yet the universe, which we enter as total strangers, is nevertheless *known* to be a *physical* cosmos, and therefore interpretable in physical science. Notwithstanding the distrust in it that is awakened by its moral anarchy, we may rely, it seems, upon its being physically cosmic,—because we have been accustomed to find it so. Its past physical behaviour may be taken as a warrant for its future physical behaviour. The final venture of the metaphysical agnostic is thus blind dogmatic faith in unintended natural order, in the inevitable lack of omniscient insight.

But is our final faith-venture only this blind cosmological faith in physical order, and not essentially teleological faith in universally immanent Divine Order? Without divine trust at the root, is this trust in a physical cosmos reasonable? Is the faith that we are living and moving and having our being

in a scientifically interpretable world that strangely includes persons living in a moral chaos, and is therefore a morally chaotic world, a reasonable faith? Can man as a spiritual or moral being rest in the creed on which a wholly physical science rests, without at least tacit, underlying, moral faith in the Power universally at work; without implied "assurance" that he is in touch with a fundamentally trustworthy universe; so that reason when applied to it cannot in the end be lost in contradictions? Is not either an atheistic or an agnostic universe even *physically* uninterpretable; and, on the other hand, is not a logical pantheism virtually *acosmic*?

Answers to these questions turn upon our conception of Active Causation and Power, and upon the relation of morally responsible agents and the phenomena of sense to the supreme, immanent Power.

The inductive generalisations of science reach only to laws or rules that are exemplified in the changes to which the universe is subject in its physical evolution. They give no final or satisfying explanation of things, nor show why natural laws exist at all. The so-called "causes," which inductive science is said to reveal, are only the methods according to which the Power that pervades the universe actually operates. It is a useful and beautiful system of interpretable signs with which the positive sciences are concerned. The changing events amidst which we live are for us a sort of language in which the universe may be said to be continually addressing us, and through which we believe that we may have valuable intercourse with it—our lives being embodied, and dependent for their comfort upon prevision of physical changes. But without ground for absolute trust in the Power immanent in nature, which constitutes and maintains those laws of change, scientific interpretations are ultimately baseless, and may all be contradicted in a coming universal anarchy. At the best, the "explanations" of natural science are necessarily unsatisfying; for each demands an explanation of itself, in the infinite regress of

caused causes, without any uncaused or finally satisfying cause.[1]

Is not Spirit or Active Intelligence, as Socrates long ago hinted, the one satisfying cause? "I was no longer satisfied," he tells us in the *Phædo*, "that I could through natural science alone understand why anything is either generated or destroyed; and I had in my thoughts a confused notion of a more deeply penetrating method. In this state of mind some one told me of a book of Anaxagoras, where that philosopher argued that Mind or Spirit must at last be the disposer and active cause of all change. I was delighted with the idea, and rejoiced to think that I had found a guide to the causes of things such as I desired; for here was a cause in which I could find rest, intending mind not admitting any cause of its own actions external to itself. Active Spirit needs no ulterior explanation of what it causes, being, unlike a natural cause, the sufficient explanation of its own effects. It cannot be a dependent consequence of a preceding cause. The responsible activity of Spirit is the only known uncaused cause."

So it has come to pass that the word "cause" has a double meaning. In one meaning it is applied to those antecedents in the sequence of phenomena which are believed to be constant, and *as such* signs of what is to follow. In its other meaning it is confined to responsible agents in the moral world of spirits, embodied or unembodied. The "causes" in the former case are neither active nor satisfying: they are practically only warnings of coming events, supposed to be connected with them by imposed rules; with which rules we want to become acquainted in order that we may be ready for what is coming. As changes in their organised bodies reveal to each of us the invisible world of human spirits, so all the changes in the universe reveal the Universal Spirit. Like spoken words to thoughts, they are an expression of the invisible in forms of sense. And if things of sense are called

[1] The reader may refer to Professor Ward's profound and luminous article on "Mechanism and Morals," *passim*, in this Journal, October 1905.

"causes," we must distinguish this causation in the physical cosmos—steadily ordered in space and time, and full of practical significance for us in our embodied state—from the causation of morally responsible persons, who originate their own good or bad acts, of which accordingly *they* are the satisfying causes.

It is therefore a perverse conception of the universe which, overlooking this verbal ambiguity, sees in the victories of inductive science proof of gradually lessening need for Active Intelligence or Spirit at the root of all; and expects in a fully interpreted physical cosmos the final disappearance of theistic faith. Natural causes and Supreme Active Intelligence are supposed to divide the universe between them, and law in nature is thus opposed to God in nature; so that God is wholly excluded when nature is interpreted scientifically;—instead of the laws themselves being regarded as a revelation of God, the principle of universal order, not a far-off, capriciously interfering Despot.[1]

Crude ideas of God, combined with inadequate conceptions of causation, have to answer for this supposed antithesis between the agency of God and the discoveries of natural science. Words attributed to Epicurus are here to the point: "Non deos vulgi negare profanum; sed vulgi opiniones diis applicare profanum." "God" far off, located beyond the stars, whose agency appears only in events not yet explained by "natural causes," but not in the universe of things and persons spiritually ordered, is not the God in whom we live and move and have our being, who is imposing rules of natural order which determine the interpretations of inductive science. As for the polytheistic conception of many finite and mutually discordant gods, instead of Omnipotent Universal Spirit in whom reason in the form of faith finds final rest, *its* gods are not God, for, like other finite persons, such "gods" need God to explain them. Polytheism, although a rude expression of religion in its early development, is unconscious

[1] This is more fully considered in my *Philosophy of Theism* and *Biographia Philosophica.*

veiled atheism misconceiving the infinite object of religion. "Omnipotence" is needed in the perfectly trustworthy God. Yet this omnipotence cannot mean that God *can* sin; for sin against the eternal necessities of either Speculative or Moral Reason would be *contradiction* involved in the very constitution of Active Reason or Divine Spirit. To suppose this is to express in words a proposition that is unthinkable and out of all relation to Divine Omnipotence.[1]

But scientifically interpretable Intelligence at the root of all does not mean the same as God at the root of all.[2] It omits the most important part of the connotation of the word God, so far as men and other self-conscious persons are practically concerned with God. For this Universal Spirit may be cruel and deceitful to the all-important moral universe of *finite persons* — all-important, for the universe would be negation and darkness if all finite personality and sentient life were for ever absent, leaving the material world, as it were, alone with God. Further, it is an observed fact that the Universal Intelligence is revealed in and through a universe which, as *Philo* complains, is "full of vice, misery, and disorder." If the word "God" means for us perfect Moral Reason personified, how can this moral chaos exist? How can there be even one wicked person? How can suffering be; or why so capriciously distributed as it seems among sentient beings? At anyrate, where is the "assurance," independent of all events, for which *Philo* asks, as our final guarantee that, notwithstanding the suspicious facts, we are having our individual being, not in the universe

[1] This is well put by Professor Pringle-Pattison in his criticism of Mr M'Taggart in our last number, when he protests against his author "for insisting on taking Divine Omnipotence as implying power to make *contradictions* true. Those whom he is attacking never assert omnipotence in the sense of ability to override intellectual and moral necessities" (pp. 202–3). Faith in God cannot be absolute if God is not thus omnipotent and omniscient.

[2] This point is powerfully handled by Mr Mallock in *The Reconstruction of Belief*.

of a cruel and deceitful Spirit, whose "revelations" may be intended to mislead, but that instead we are all constantly sustained and environed by Omnipotent Goodness? Have we sufficient assurance that, in spite of the malign appearances, theistic faith is open to all, in consideration of the limiting conditions of human intelligence; or, in lack of this independent assurance, are we left with *Philo* to draw our conclusions about the *character* of the Universal Spirit, only by induction from the mingled good and evil apparent in ourselves and in persons and other sentient beings around us?

These questions raise the two alternatives of a *final* faith-venture in a merely physical cosmos, with metaphysical and moral unreason in the background, and, on the other hand, final faith-venture in a divinely constituted cosmos, the guarantee and explanation of the physical. They lead us to ask whether physical faith in natural order, on which common experience as well as inductive science immediately rests, can be fully reasonable without at least unconscious faith in Omnipotent Goodness at the heart of the Whole;—whether, in short, faith in God relies upon physical experience, or physical experience itself presupposes faith in God. Is there any guarantee for the maintenance of the physical cosmos unless the Universal Agent is *presupposed* to be absolutely veracious, absolutely equitable, and infinitely loving—in a word, perfectly Good? Not otherwise do we have a universe that is fundamentally trustworthy enough to yield a scientific interpretation of its events, or even for working intercourse with it in any of its aspects.

But if theistic or teleological faith underlies common cosmic faith in the constancy of natural order, so that the former is in reason presupposed in the latter, then our *inevitable* faith in natural order *gives* the assurance that we are having intercourse with a divinely constituted universe which *Philo* missed. We must either absolutely trust the Universal Spirit who speaks to us in and through the universe, or subside into total scepticism speculative and practi-

cal, the victims of a discredited, because undivine, experience. The implicates of our *inevitable* physical faith give *practical* assurance that the universe of persons or moral agents, as well as the universe of ordered things, is somehow all divinely ordered; and that it is possible to reason about persons and things without at last necessarily falling into confusion and contradiction. Theistic faith in the constitution of the universe is involved in the possibility of applying reason to it: unless the Universal Spirit is absolutely good, I have no right to scientific faith in its changes being in constant order.

This takes for granted that "goodness," when attributed to God, does not mean something different in kind from all that we mean by goodness or moral rectitude. Indeed, a spiritually perfect Man seems to be man's inadequate, yet highest attainable, conception of the *character* of God. In order to inspire absolute trust in the natural evolution and final meaning of the universe, the animating Universal Spirit must be absolutely Veracious, for obviously, without veracity, no "revelation," spiritual or physical, general or special, would be possible; perfectly Equitable, for partial or unjust Spirit is not God, because not morally good; and perfect Love, the end or purpose of divine love being that all persons in the universe, if they will permit this, should be, or become, perfectly good, or, according to finite individuality, "like God." And faith in Active Moral Reason at the heart of the Whole seems to imply that God must have a universe on which to work, with persons to make good, and distribute pain and happiness among them reasonably. Is not all this finally presupposed in a divinely ordered physical universe, the medium of intercourse among embodied persons, and an organ for their intellectual and moral education and discipline? Its continuous evolution must be throughout divinely providential.

To endow persons with the power to choose freely or independently between what is morally good and what is morally bad, is surely not necessarily inconsistent with the

divine constitution of the universe. A universe empty of all morally responsible agents, and consisting only of naturally determined things, seems, on the contrary, undivine. Now this power independent of God, for which the individual person is responsible, implies risk or possibility of evil actions as well as good coming into existence, and thus, *within the sphere of each person*, contradicting the Divine moral order. The moral personality of the agents signifies their inherent power to make their own actions good or bad, and to become individually divine or diabolic. Risk of evil action is necessarily involved in individual moral agency; the finite agent has from the first to struggle against the "temptations" due to his *original* finitude. But would not a universe altogether *physically* cosmical be less worthy of perfect goodness than the existing universe, even with its present mixture of moral good and evil? At anyrate, even *Philo* allows that if we have practically an assurance sufficient in reason, that the universe is the revelation of morally perfect Spirit, then, in spite of its abounding misery and moral disorder on this planet, we are not obliged to distrust that assurance of final faith. There *may* be solutions of the "assured" moral mystery "which the limited mind of man is unable to comprehend." Our assurance is, that otherwise all would be so untrustworthy that we could not have any experience fit for scientific interpretation, or as a basis for action.

What has been said goes to show how faith in natural law justifies ethico-religious faith in the divine at the root of things and persons, as man's final venture. This philosophy accepts, what some seem to regard as a humiliating fact—that in all intercourse with the infinite universe of reality, the finite mind *must* at last rest in reasonable faith-venture; because of its inevitable lack of omniscience. "A little philosophy" is satisfied with the past behaviour of nature, as a sufficient index of its future behaviour. Deeper reflection finds that this blind faith in customary uniformity presupposes faith

in immanent constructive intelligence, and then explains events according to forms of intelligence, each of which is scientifically valuable. Yet these forms, neither separately nor collectively, hinder the concrete universe of experience from being fundamentally unveracious, inequitable, and cruel, in a word, undivine, with the total sceptical paralysis to which this finally leads. Now just *because* total scepticism is not consistent with any human experience of anything, it would follow that this purely intellectual construction presupposes and therefore justifies the still deeper moral faith which interprets the universe as manifestation of final moral order,—present moral disorder somehow reconciled with the perfect ideal, through the Universal Spirit in whom all works for good to all persons in all worlds, and in Whom all may be said somehow to live and move and have their being. Theistic faith thus becomes the inspiring parent of the "peace of God which passeth understanding"; although many questions inspired by speculative curiosity still remain unanswerable.

But what sort of questions as to the origin and destiny of the universe of things and persons does this final faith suggest? Take examples. Was there ever a beginning of the continuous physical evolution within which we find ourselves involved? Does final extinction wait for the universe at some time in the endless future? No "revelation" presented to a finite mind can make either an unbeginning or an unending natural evolution, or their consistency with one another, conceivable in human philosophy. Whatever we positively contemplate from "our bourne of time and place" must, however prolonged, be under finite relations of time. On the other hand, the sudden appearance of the universe of things and persons, according to the popular idea of "creation," at a definite time in the unbeginning past, before which there was no universe at all for a solitary God to regulate and love—no room for omnipotent divine philanthropy—seems too bold, if not too repulsive, for acceptance. God is now, and

has at anyrate for long been, sustaining in a perpetual creation the universe in which we find ourselves;—why must there be any beginning of all creative or providential activity? May not Divine Providence shown in an eternally evolving universe be a more worthy conception, although at last (for us) a mysterious one, than providential activity confined within a limited period of time?

But our practical concern as human beings is with the future, not with the past, or with the past only as it colours the future; and we are concerned immediately with the destiny of persons rather than with the destiny of material things. We may consign the unbeginning Past to the unknowable; the supreme interest for self-conscious and morally responsible persons is, whether persons, in their self-consciousness with memory, are destined to final extinction when they lose their earthly embodiment; if not, what is the alternative to this? Is an endless succession of dissolving self-conscious individuals part of the Divine Order? Or are persons who have been in self-conscious existence destined to continue in it, after they disappear from this world of sense?

These questions, which we cannot now discuss, carry us back to the implicates of theistic faith. Is either the final extinction, or the endless wickedness and suffering of finite self-acting agents, who have lived (as those on this planet do) under conditions of moral disorder or chaos, consistent with the Absolute Goodness which any intercourse with the universe presupposes in its providential Universal Spirit? One office of the material world seems to be, to afford a medium of communication between embodied persons; in another way it serves as a school for their intellectual and moral discipline, so that they may learn to conform their actions to its laws, and submit to be morally educated by the suffering to which the things of sense often give rise. Anyway, the future of *embodied persons* is infinitely more significant for us than the future of individual things, even of stars and their attendant planets. Plato refers to philosophy as a

meditation upon death. The final extinction of persons, immediately after a short and dangerous life in this world of intermingled good and evil, and of apparently only preparatory discipline, in a moral struggle with temptations due to their finitude, is difficult to reconcile with faith in the divinity of the universal evolution. This faith is ready to hope—

> That there is yet another world to mend
> All error and mischance,

as morally involved in faith in Divine philanthropy, and as thus somehow involved in the Divine Order to which the physical order is subordinate—the "Whole" by us intelligible only in part, in our final faith-venture. It may be more fully interpreted in the gradual advance of human intelligence, when the implicates and applications of our faith in the physical cosmos are more seen in their relations to the implicates of our metaphysical and theistic faith in the moral cosmos. And the Supreme Divine Order may even be called "nature" in a larger and less common meaning of that word. As Bishop Butler says, "The only distinct meaning of *nature* is what is *settled.* Nor is there any absurdity in supposing that there may be beings in the universe, whose capacities and knowledge and views may be so extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation may to them *appear natural,* as natural as the visible course of things appears to us in science." This would be so if a complete rational development of the implicates of theistic faith in their application to the whole temporal history of the universe were within our reach.

Spinozistic and even Hegelian Idealism is at the opposite extreme to the Cosmic Agnosticism to which our remarks have been confined. Absolute Idealism essays an exhaustive philosophical construction, as from the Divine point of view, being dissatisfied with the *via media* imposed by the intellectual finitude of man. It thus leads to the Acosmism which overlooks "contingent" facts conditioned by time and change, above all morally free self-conscious persons endowed

with individually responsible activity, and it appears to aim at a point of view that is superhuman—at an ideal open only to Omniscience. Cosmic or Scientific Agnosticism, on the other hand, assumes a point of view that is less than human, and therefore inadequate—that of scientific understanding measured by sense alone. Can we, in either of those ways, forsake the middle path, where finite man, who is spiritual as well as sensuous, may progressively interpret the infinite universe in which he finds himself, under the conditions imposed by his final faith-venture?

The *entire* spiritual and physical constitution of man, not merely his sensuous embodiment and consequent relations to other bodies, is presupposed in final faith in Omnipotent Goodness, immanent in the heart of the real universe in its whole organic evolution. The spirit latent in man, that inspiration of God which constitutes his knowledge, appears in different degrees of intensity and intelligence, of ethical insight and æsthetical embodiment, in the various religions of the world, speaking through their inspired prophets as organs of what is divine. This inspiration welled forth in its highest and most articulate spiritual form in Palestine, which has thus been the chief factor in the evolution of theistic faith, and the main source of its progressive influence in the lives of men.

To invite attention to the divine implicates of the creed in natural uniformity and order that is accepted as the foundation of modern science, is the purpose of this essay. Its moral and spiritual implicates are represented as our final venture. The initial venture is our common faith in a physical cosmos. Science, when confined to this shallower creed, looked at philosophically, is seen to perish in total doubt. Greater depth in philosophy awakens men's minds in trust and hope, as regards the divine constitution and destiny of the universe, and of each person contained in it.

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THE ENTANGLING ALLIANCE OF RELIGION AND HISTORY.

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A VISITOR from another planet—if we may take down once more one of the most lifelike and serviceable of the automata that philosophers keep upon their shelves—who was familiar with the general nature and meaning of religion, but not with its terrestrial manifestations, might well find matter for some astonishment in the current religious system of civilised Europe and America. Since religion—he would be likely to argue—constitutes a man's ultimate and definitive intellectual and moral reaction upon his experience, and since it presupposes the possession of truths valid and significant for all men, religious belief will naturally affirm only truths of a universal and cosmic bearing. It will deal exclusively with the "eternal" verities, and ignore contingent and temporal matters-of-fact. It will concern itself with the nature of the universe or its source, with the meaning of the life of rational beings and with their generic destiny. Its content will consist of propositions equally pertinent to the interests, and equally accessible to the knowledge, of all such beings, at any time, in any place. It will, doubtless, come into relation with the particular facts of each man's experience, by giving to them a universal interpretation and by correlating them with a larger meaning; but it will not make the belief in the occurrence or non-occurrence of specific local and temporal

events any part of its essence. For what, indeed,—our Martian might ask—can religion have to do with history? But upon comparing his presuppositions with the actual phenomena of Christian belief, he would discover that history appears to have almost everything to do with the Christian religion, as that is commonly understood; that even the simplest and least debated of the orthodox creeds of Christendom contains no less than six statements concerning the happening of particular incidents at a particular time in a particular manner; and that a large part of the energy of theologians and apologists is given up to highly technical inquiries of an historical character—inquiries concerning the genealogy of manuscripts, the dates of certain ancient writings, the congruency of testimonies, the credibility of witnesses. It would pretty certainly impress our visitor as singular, perhaps even as a little humorous, that the interests of a body of truth professedly cosmic in its import, and needful for every man to know, should be supposed to be inextricably involved in these minute inquiries. And he would doubtless be sufficiently surprised to be called upon to find his own salvation in the belief in the real occurrence of remote terrestrial transactions of which he had never previously heard, and of the reality of which he could properly convince himself only by entering upon inquiries equally technical and minute.

In the large place which it has given to historical elements in its traditional creeds, Christianity stands unique among religions. Buddhism, in some of its developments, has attached much importance to the legend of its founder; but certainly in the Southern Buddhism—and, so far as I know, in the divergent Northern forms of the doctrine—beliefs about incidents in the life of the Buddha have never been regarded as of the essence of the faith. The Buddha of the Pitakas appears as the preacher of a method of salvation from the evils of existence, the value of which every man is supposed to be able to verify for himself. So little—as would appear—did

the Buddha preach about himself, or regard his activity as anything more than a means to the promulgation of the saving Dharma, that even the pious enthusiasm of his followers was unable to establish more than a loose and external bond between the essentials of the doctrine and the personal history or legend of its first enunciator. But in historic Christianity, the bond between what may be called the historical and the philosophical elements in dogma very early came to be far more intimate; and historical matters-of-fact presented themselves as having a metaphysical significance. Particular temporal incidents were conceived to have (in the proper logical sense) an eternal aspect; beliefs about past physical events came to be profoundly implicated in the Christian's beliefs about God's nature and man's destiny.

This, of course, was a natural consequence of the Jewish ancestry and origin of Christianity. The religion of Jewish prophetism centred about a religio-ethical and patriotic interpretation of history—of the movement of events in the history of Israel and of the nations with which Israel was brought into relations. Political occurrences and social tendencies were apprehended all as episodes in a great process, in which the controller was the God of Israel, and the end and aim the moral purification and then the visible glorification of Israel among the nations. The messianic hope formed, as it were, an anticipatory chapter in this particularistic but profoundly ethical philosophy of history; just as the transactions by which the Supreme and Creative God was conceived to have established special covenant relations with the ancestors of the race and with Moses constituted the essential opening chapters. Christianity, growing up in a *milieu* where religion thus largely consisted in an attitude of historical expectancy based upon beliefs about the course and meaning of past historic events, inevitably came to have a similar character. Whatever be the truth about Jesus' own messianic consciousness, and whatever the original meaning of his gospel of the coming Kingdom of God, it is manifest that to the early Jewish Christians the primary

article of their faith was their belief in his Messiahship, coupled with a confident expectation of his reappearing and of the final triumph of the faithful. Now the assertion of Jesus' messianic character meant essentially the ascription to him of a certain historic rôle; and further, the belief could be held by a Jewish Christian only upon condition of his acceptance of prior beliefs as to the existence of the prophets, as to the meaning of their utterances, and as to the occurrence in Jesus' life of the kind of incidents necessary to prove him to be the object of the messianic prophecies. So it is that, in one of the earliest pictures which we have of the Christian apologist at work, we see Philip the deacon converting the Ethiopian eunuch by means of essentially historical arguments to an essentially historical faith. And meanwhile the Church, just because of this preoccupation about the incidents of the life of its Founder and about his future return, was losing the tradition of Jesus' utterances as a teacher of perennially fruitful conceptions of God and man. For the Sermon on the Mount (in Matthew's version) and certain of the parables are good evidence that, even if Jesus' own preaching contained a large messianic and chiliastic element, it contained also many teachings whose worth depends, not upon their source or the time and place of their first publication, but upon their intrinsic spiritual profundity and their universal pertinency to the life of man. And of these utterances we have only a few fragmentary sentences.

Yet, though we owe to the Jewish messianic element in early Christianity the irreparable loss of probably a large part of the more universally significant and, in a broad sense, "philosophic" teaching of Jesus, we owe to it also the carrying over into the European consciousness of the general idea of a possible philosophy of history, and of a pedagogic significance in the course of human events—a distinctively Jewish idea destined to great and fruitful development in the Occidental mind. Moreover, this general idea was capable of being fairly easily disengaged from those particular historical beliefs and

millennial expectations in which it was at first enclosed as in a shell; and though it of itself — though any religious or philosophical interpretation of history—necessarily implies the possibility and the importance of knowing what actually has happened in the history of the planet, it does not necessarily demand more than a general knowledge of this kind; it is not concerned with the reality of specific single incidents at specific localities and dates. It was not, therefore, after all, Jewish messianism that did most to bind up the fortunes of Christianity with beliefs about historical matters-of-fact. It was rather that development of thought which begins in the Pauline writings and is continued, with a difference, in the Fourth Gospel: a development which may be defined as a curious fusion of theosophy with history.

For in the Pauline notion of justification we get for the first time that extraordinary translation of historic incidents into the terms of mystical metaphysics which has had so singular and, in the long run, so harmful a vogue in subsequent Christian thought. The fulfilment of the purposes of the Creation, the relations between God and man, and therefore men's hopes of salvation, depend for Paul entirely upon the real occurrence of two events—Jesus' death by crucifixion, in such a manner as to make him, in a Jewish legal sense, an outlaw, and his subsequent resurrection. "If Christ be not risen from the dead, then is your faith vain;" and the Crucifixion has, if not a more essential, a still more fundamental place in the Pauline system. The Crucifixion was for Paul the central fact in the universe; it was, indeed, more than a mere fact — a sort of cosmic force, and a logical *prius* to many things both before and after it in the order of time. Thus Paul frankly rests the whole fabric of the Christian faith, like an inverted pyramid, upon the testimony of witnesses to the happening of two very specific past events—witnesses of whom, even at the time of the publication of his argument, "the greater part" had "fallen asleep." In reality, all that was most valuable in Paul's

teaching concerning the mystical relations of the Christian to the "second Adam," Christ—his conception of the death unto sin and the new birth unto righteousness through a definite "putting off" of the old personality and the identification of the whole self with a newer and higher one—would have been no less edifying if taken as a symbolic and poetic reading of certain very real inward moral experiences. But Paul was too much of a Jewish legalist to be content merely with the realities of the inner life, which he yet understood so well; the possibility of the new birth was for him still conditioned entirely upon the historic reality of an external and past *opus operatum*. The effect, therefore, of his teaching was too often to divert the interests of Christianity from the inwardly verifiable facts of the soul's experience to jangling controversies over the legal and metaphysical *modus operandi* of Jesus' death as a means of atonement, and to the discussion of elusive questions of historical evidence.

In the Fourth Gospel we have an extremely interesting and singular combination of the essentially historical habit of the Jewish mind, interested in the movement of temporal events and ready to find a dramatic unity and meaning in them, with the essentially unhistorical fashion of thought of the Greek—especially of the Platonising Greek—mind. A metaphysical entity found in the system of the later Platonic theosophy—an entity primarily belonging purely to the supra-temporal world—is identified with a particular terrestrial person who lived and died at a certain time. Christianity, in its dogmatic content, now comes to involve the belief that *this* historical figure identically was *that* metaphysical entity—and, incidentally, the belief that the pretensions which he put forward and the powers which he exercised were such as to establish this identity. On the whole, it must be said, the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Logos is less specific in its implication of particular historical incidents than is the Pauline doctrine of Justification. Though it implies a great deal in a general way in regard to the circumstances of Jesus' life, there

is no single and definite occurrence—scarcely even the Resurrection—which is logically indispensable to it. The author of the Fourth Gospel feels, indeed, the need of some historical evidence for the reality of the Incarnation, and devotes himself to supplying it; but the incidents he narrates are put forward as evidences to something else, not as themselves of the innermost substance of the faith which he desires to inculcate. Another imaginable set of incidents might have done as well. His doctrine, in short, while it is essentially historical in its content, is so in a somewhat elusive fashion, since it is not intrinsically tied down to detailed happenings; so that the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity which was eventually developed out of it has proven capable of statement in purely non-temporal and non-historical terms. Yet the total influence of the Fourth Gospel clearly has been to strengthen the nexus between the historical and the "philosophical" elements in Christianity. For that Gospel's conception of the Incarnation has, as it were, ostensibly entangled the ultimate reality of metaphysics and theology itself—has involved the God of universal religion—in terrestrial history; and not in the total historic process, but uniquely in a limited and local history of a life lived in Syria in the first century.

Chiefly through these episodes in the early development of Christianity did historical propositions come to be introduced into the fabric of the orthodox theology of the Church. But of course a still greater number of such propositions was more indirectly but not less fixedly connected with the substance of the faith through the disposition of ecclesiastical theology to make certain beliefs about the *sources* of religious knowledge a part of the *content* of its system of religious knowledge; in other words, through the formulation of the doctrines of the inerrancy of Scripture or of the Church. Through these doctrines there was incorporated among the Church's *credenda*, to be defended no less strenuously than the deepest philosophical affirmations of religion, a whole host of miscellaneous and unlikely incidents, to many of

which small cosmic import or first-hand religious value could have otherwise seemed to attach:—stories of wonder-working bones or floating axe-heads, of a backward-turning sun or an arrested moon, of demon-possessed pigs or divinely inspired asses. From this point forward the Church conceived itself to be inevitably committed to all this huge burden of historical beliefs—a burden which, it should be added, it bore lightly and even enthusiastically enough for many centuries.

The definite impeachment of the historical in Christianity, *qua* historical, was the characteristic work of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—especially of the eighteenth-century Deists. Characteristic of modern thought, indeed, from almost its beginning was a reaction against all historically mediated beliefs—all beliefs which came to a man because he chanced to belong to a particular age and country and line of tradition. This was the essence of the Cartesian spirit. An optimistic confidence in the possibility of finding an adequate system of truth mediated inwardly, and with complete certitude, to the individual through his own reason, was what prompted Descartes' sceptical procedure; and it followed that, since all propositions about historical facts can be imparted only *through* outward and very devious channels of historical tradition, no such propositions can be regarded as either important or certain. Descartes himself, of course, rather ignored than opposed the historical affirmations of current religion; but Cartesianism spread through the general European consciousness the demand for a knowledge that should be certified to each individual independently by precisely the fact that it came to him, not through any sources peculiar to himself because contingent upon the historical accidents of his birth and experience, but through the necessities of reason, which must be supposed to be the same for all rational beings everywhere. And the eighteenth century applied this contempt for the historically mediated, and this demand for the universal and purely rational, where Descartes did not apply it—to the institutions of society and the dogmas

of historical religion. In its application to political and social affairs, this spirit proved, as everybody knows, upon the whole highly unfortunate and inappropriate. But in its application to religious beliefs it had a much greater force and pertinency than the nineteenth century has always recognised.

The Deists' objections to historical religion as such were, in general, merely a natural consequence of that immense widening of men's intellectual horizon which had been taking place ever since the fifteenth century. It has often enough been remarked, and it ought by this time to be a truism, that the possibilities implied by the Copernican revolution in astronomy are alone sufficient to render paradoxical the maintenance of particular historical propositions as absolute essentials of religious truth. Nineteenth-century theology has, indeed, shown a singular facility for forgetting that it lived in a Copernican universe. But to those who, like the reformers of the eighteenth century, realised vividly all this extension of the bounds of the universe in time and space and in the multitude of its diversities and possibilities, a religion that centred its interest chiefly upon a small number of historical transactions in Palestine seemed singularly meagre, parochial, out of scale. Now, as we have by this time discovered, there is not necessarily any great harm in a certain parochialism in politics; since politics is essentially a practical, relative, and temporal business, it is not—as the eighteenth century supposed—self-evident that the same order of government and society ought to prevail in France and England, in China and Peru. But a conscious and avowed parochialism in religion seems impossible without self-stultification, without a surrender of the distinctive nature and function and dignity of religion. And it was the general influence of such considerations as these—considerations the precise scope and limits of which were, doubtless, not too carefully noted — which explains broadly the anti-historical religious attitude of Deism. But more specifically, the Deistic objection to the historical in religion resolved itself into two points, already foreshadowed

in what has been said about the spirit of Cartesianism: (1) Historical propositions, even if true, could be known and verified only by the comparatively small number of persons to whom the tradition containing them chanced to come; they could not be known to possible inhabitants of other worlds, or to persons living before the incidents referred to by these propositions, or to those to whom no record of such incidents had been transmitted. And therefore they were not appropriate to the kind of thing that religion is. The Deists, as Sir Leslie Stephen has said, simply applied more honestly and literally the Church's criterion of essential truth, *Quod semper, ubique et ab omnibus*; and no beliefs about events, assuredly, could be justified by that criterion. It was a peculiarly eighteenth-century way of putting this objection, to say that historical knowledge could be taught only by society and its traditions, and not by "Nature" or the "unaided light of Nature." For the typical mid-eighteenth-century thinkers almost took it for granted that no truth about religion, morals, or society could be of any consequence which Nature could not be supposed to have made self-evident even to the simplest and most primitive man, or to one brought up from infancy, like Autonous, upon a desert island. If Christianity must be shown to be "as old as the creation," it was obvious that no happenings subsequent to the creation could be of interest to Christianity.

(2) But it was also a serious objection to the historical elements in dogma, that, as Locke's survey of human knowledge had shown, historical propositions do not strictly constitute knowledge at all; that at best they can attain only to probability, and, if the events they refer to be at once remote and particularised, to a low degree of probability; and that if those events be at the same time contrary to the usual order of experience, the presumption of probability is so strongly against them that it becomes at least debatable whether any amount of purely traditional or documentary testimony can offset that presumption. And therefore an historical religion

seemed fated to endless uncertainty, and to endless controversy about issues intricate, involved, and of no direct bearing upon the moral or religious life of men. But what eighteenth-century thought craved was a religion, simple, luminous, convincing, verifiable at first hand by the experience and reflection of all honest and reasonable men, and not compelled to wait for its attestation upon the settlement of the obscure debates of specialists in the schools.

With all this, it is true, went the characteristic aberration of eighteenth-century—and of most early modern—thought. The ignoring or rejection of the historical elements in Christianity was coincident with, and was partly caused by, the loss of that conception of the meaning and interest and dramatic consecutiveness of the historic process which (in more or less confused forms) Christianity had brought over from Jewish prophetism. One cannot say that history was entirely destitute of interest and meaning to the representative men of the Enlightenment, since they were fond of using it to supply edifying illustrations of permanent moral or political truths. But the *sequences* and *order* of history were, to them, unmeaning and uninteresting; most of the events of the past were regarded as only so many regrettable deviations from the one order of Nature to which at last mankind was to return. The revival of what may be called the dramatic interest in history as a process, the renascence of the evolutionary imagination, began only with the work of Lessing and Herder and Condorcet. Since then, as we all know, the nineteenth century has been *par excellence* the age of historical and developmental points of view in all the provinces of human inquiry. With this, however, I am not concerned, nor with the new modes of critical attack upon, or transformation of, the historical content of traditional Christianity, which have been the product of nineteenth-century historical scholarship. I desire rather to insist upon the truth in the eighteenth century's more general and *a priori* objections to the historical in religion, as such; and at the same time to guard against exaggeration or misapplication of that truth.

Both the defenders and critics of orthodox Christianity seem often during the past century to have been unable to see the wood on account of the trees. Much admirable learning, and a subtlety worthy of a Sherlock Holmes, have been bestowed in the investigation of the evidential standing of this or that incident in biblical history; but it would have been worth while to stop more often to ask such logically prior questions as these: Are we really in a position to determine *whether or not* the incident occurred as narrated? Is not a great part of history, and notably of Jewish and early Christian history, rather a matter for honest agnosticism—for a Scotch verdict—than for positive affirmation on either side? And even where circumstances are most favourable, can we expect to establish more than a more or less weak probability on one side or the other? And must we not be constantly mindful that our conclusions in this domain can have only a precarious vitality, subject to destruction at any moment by some new discovery in archæology or philology, some new theory in criticism? Again, is anyone entitled to believe, or to ask others to believe, in specific historical matters-of-fact except upon historical evidence? And if not, does not this mean that the layman, who has no qualifications for the difficult and delicate investigations which all honest handling of historical evidences presupposes, must take the historical parts of his religious convictions at second hand from the historical critics? And does a belief held thus at second hand possess much spiritual value? And is there any very intimate relation between the activities of a Sherlock Holmes or a cross-examining lawyer and the deepening and diffusion of religious faith? And, finally, can a proposition about the happening of a particular incident at a certain time in a little corner of the earth really be one of the fundamental verities which every man ought to know and believe for his soul's health?

How little these seemingly obvious questions are even now considered is illustrated, in a way that would be amusing

if it were not pitiable, by a recent curious episode in English and American Protestantism. The plot of an ill-written and meretricious popular romance turns upon the supposition of the discovery in Palestine of an actually forged but seemingly genuine inscription, calculated to disprove the reality of the Resurrection. As soon as the knowledge of this discovery is spread abroad, the masses of mankind begin to lose their faith in the Resurrection, therewith in supernatural Christianity, therewith in the worth of Jesus' ethical teaching, therewith in the validity of the moral law—since, for the purposes of the novel, not only religion but also morals appear to rest ultimately upon historical evidences. The bonds of social order —if my memory of the plot serves—are only saved from something like dissolution by the timely discovery that the inscription is spurious. Now, this romance, instead of being taken as an elaborate joke, was received by a large part of the religious public with fervent enthusiasm; was, it appears, preached about in a multitude of pulpits, and even canonised with an episcopal commendation, as an edifying argument in favour of the Resurrection-belief. It ought rather to have been regarded as the *reductio ad absurdum* of the assumption that Christianity consists in beliefs about historic happenings; and the religious leaders of the people, being thus reminded that archæological or historical research *may* some day turn up some concrete bit of external evidence fatal to one or another of the historical propositions of the Creed, should have spared neither haste nor zeal in persuading their followers to withdraw their spiritual interests from a shelter so precarious.

What the time really calls for, in other words, is the general proclamation of the dissolution of this ancient and entangling alliance between Christianity and detailed history. For though both conservative and radical critics, alike unable to point to any piece of clinching external evidence upon the now most debated matters of biblical history, must content themselves with involved conclusions drawn from internal evidences, the fact shows all the more plainly that just those

incidents to which theology has attached the greatest dogmatic weight have been removed from the sphere of the clearly ascertainable to that of the problematical. For the fault with them is not so much that their reality has been disproved—though to many that must seem true, too—as that they are, in any case, dubious, incapable of conclusive verification in the present state of knowledge, a matter for the subtle debates of technically trained experts. It may, indeed, be objected that other religious issues are equally problematical and subject to debate. Men's views, it will be said, differ upon almost everything—upon metaphysics, upon the existence and nature of God, upon questions of right and wrong, as well as upon points of history. But there is a vital difference between the cases. A man's purely religious and moral convictions—his thoughts and feelings about the world in which he lives, about God, about himself and his right relations to other men—are, in the last analysis, the result of the total experience and reflection of his life—a vital reaction, a final expression of his personality and character. While men differ in these convictions, it is reasonable to believe that through the widening of their physical and the deepening of their moral experience, and especially through the mind's progressive clarification of its own fundamental ideas and categories, all men will gradually and naturally tend to reach, for themselves, the same general beliefs upon the more essential issues of life. But we have no good reason to anticipate any similar development with respect to our knowledge of some minute matter of past history. And the source and method of our knowledge in the two classes of cases must always remain different. Upon religious or moral or even broadly metaphysical questions, the plain man, who has neither time nor learning to go into the nice reasonings of specialists, has his own inner lights of reason, and direct outer evidences from experience, which, even if imperfect, are capable of progressive improvement; upon these great matters there is truly a light that lighteth (though unequally) every man coming into the

world. But where the doctors of history so greatly disagree, what lights of his own has the average man which should entitle him to hold, upon historical questions, any opinion whatever? In truth, the greater number of the historical propositions that have found a place even in the simpler of the traditional creeds have come to be so obscure and so involved in purely technical and nicely balanced controversies that no serious mind ought longer to regard them as matters of vital religious interest. It is the great merit of Professor G. B. Foster's recent book, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*, to have candidly and forcibly insisted on this. Professor Foster offers, indeed, an extended inquiry into the historical character and content of the Gospels; but he is at pains also repeatedly "to point out how intolerable is the present situation to the Christian who fails to understand that the Object on which his faith reposes is not one of the objects in the region which historical science has both the right and the duty to explore. One cannot too earnestly asseverate that the principle of Christianity is not to be found among historical data which science can doubt, but in the filial relationship to God, with which science can have nothing whatever to do." One may hope that such language may in time become a commonplace of theological treatises. But for the present, it still needs copious iteration.

Meanwhile, it is important to avoid exaggerating even this truth. What precisely—we must ask—is the significance of historical facts, and especially of historical beliefs concerning Christianity and its Founder, in relation to religion? Space is lacking for an adequate answer to this question; but a few primary considerations ought to be set down. In the first place, the mere question of *reality* in connection with a supposed matter of history is, in several respects, of far less religious value than has often been supposed. One cannot, indeed, agree with Professor Santayana in cheerfully identifying the whole substance of religion with poetry. There are religious issues where the existential predicate assuredly

makes a difference—a practical and emotional difference—to the mind. But religious history, undeniably, often becomes more available and more useful religiously when it is taken as poetry. If we take even the life and character of Jesus, and consider them solely with respect to their inspirational and exemplary value, it is not a question of primary *religious* importance whether that life and character existed in bodily incarnation upon the solid earth of Galilee, or chiefly in the devout imagination of earlier believers. There happen, just now, to be signs of a revival of the theory of the non-historicity of Jesus of Nazareth; Professor W. B. Smith's newly published and important volume, *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, offers evidence that Jesus was primarily a divine being worshipped by a gnostic sect in Syria some time before the Christian era. The theory seems to the present writer in the last degree improbable, though Professor Smith's patristic learning is far too solid to entitle one to dismiss his conclusions without careful examination. But suppose the theory established: it would make far less difference than the shocked imagination of multitudes of devout souls would at first fancy. Indeed, there would be some real gain. The Gospels would become more wonderful and more encouraging than before; for the profound wisdom and the lofty character found in them would prove to be the expression, not of a single and unique religious genius, but of the spiritual idealism of many humble and unknown men. That a group of men should be able to conceive the hero of the Synoptic Gospels is more inspiring than that one wholly exceptional man should have been that hero—but, for the same reason, doubtless, more improbable. In so far, then, as religious history simply affords ideals for our reverence and imitation, the ideals are no worse for their lack of past reality; they were, at least, the products of some other men's minds, and foreshadowings of possible realities to come, in the human nature of the future. Our feeling with respect to Jesus would undoubtedly be in significant ways altered, if Professor Smith's theory were

to prove true. But nothing of the deepest religious concernment can be at issue here. New Testament historians are under obligations in some measure to suspend their judgments, but religious believers are not under obligations to suspend their religion, until this and any other such new historical theory can be duly examined by experts.

In regard to such a specific occurrence as the Resurrection, it must be confessed that its reality, if it could be established with a very high degree of historical probability, would properly make some difference. It would have a significance similar in kind, but perhaps superior in degree, to that of the conclusions offered by Professor Hyslop concerning the reality of his intercourse with deceased friends, if those conclusions, too, could be established. Those who believed it real, in other words, would possess a source of encouragement, and a vivid piece of empirical evidence concerning life after death, which would be lacking to those who found themselves quite unconvinced of its reality. But, as I have intimated, even the believer ought not to regard the occurrence as the sort of central and metaphysically fundamental thing in religion which it has so often been declared to be. For since the number of those who can never have even known of the occurrence, together with those who are never likely to be convinced of it, is so great, he who *is* convinced ought to be honest and modest enough to recognise that his supposed historical fact cannot belong among the essentials of universal and verifiable religious truth. To such a distinction between the essential and spiritually discernible in religion, and the secondary and (even if possible) inevitably problematical, the churches are imperatively called by the present situation; and it will be well, also, if they realise how deeply problematical, and how much less than probable, even the most cherished historical affirmations of their creeds are likely hereafter to seem to minds of modern training. Meantime, for those unpersuaded of the historicity of the Resurrection, one tolerably certain historical truth about it remains—namely, that,

at any rate, the belief in its reality arose among the early Christians. And this is a highly interesting and encouraging fact. For it is evident that, without the belief in the Resurrection and other like marvels, no sort of Christianity could have survived and spread in the intellectual atmosphere of first-century Palestine. Without the help of these illusions, the invaluable treasure of the Christian teaching and of the figure of the Teacher must necessarily have been lost to humanity, at least until rediscovered after two millenniums by the diligence of modern historical research. I know of no more striking example of what has been called the "conservation of values" in the historic process, than the way in which Christianity took upon itself the bold illusions indispensable to its survival. If the embalmed body of the crucified Nazarene did not rise again on Easter morning, at all events the Christian Church and its message appear to have been marvellously resurrected after what must have seemed a final extinction; and the latter circumstance is not only better evidenced, but also really more notable, than the former. For it is the kind of fact that should serve to encourage us in holding to the postulate that the large process of human history, the order of the race's experience, is not, after all, wholly fortuitous or wholly meaningless or wholly sterile.

And this last and very general point of historical belief, brought over by Christianity from Judaism, must, I think, remain as a real essential of any religion justly to be called Christian. At this point, at least, is religious faith organically involved with historic fact. A purely unhistorical religion is, indeed, conceivable; and it finds exemplification in more than one of the great systems of India;—a religion that denies the worth or even the reality of the temporal process, that attaches no value to the struggling and achieving will or to the concrete historic tasks of society, but turns men's minds wholly to a mystical other world, and bids them destroy their wills and lose their personalities in an eternal abstraction that never enters into time-existence at all. But such a religion has no

kinship with the spirit of Christianity or the temper of the Occident. At this point one cannot merely syncretise religions; we are called upon for a plain choice between radically opposed types. And if the Christian type is to survive, it must carry with it the affirmation that, through all the confusion and waste and cross-purposiveness of the historic turmoil, here or in any other worlds, something that has meaning and worth is getting achieved; that history is the scene of the working of some power, greater than any one of us, that makes, through orderly and "natural" processes, for righteousness; and that man's participation in this process, just because it contains the possibility of significant and conscious activity of will and thought, is a participation in the supreme good. Christianity, in a word, ought no longer to let itself be involved in obscure and uncertain issues of historical detail; but it ought still, if it is to be true to its distinctive essence, to proclaim the worth of personal and racial experience under the form of time, and the divineness of the historic order. In this large and general but far from unmeaning postulate lies the inexpugnable residuum of the historical element in Christianity. This will necessarily always imply an interest in the great sequences of past history, in the nature and causes of the successive movements through which human thought has developed, in the outstanding personalities who have been at once the most expressive products and the most efficacious causes of that development; and it will consequently give to the work of the historical investigator a real spiritual import, a large capacity for religious and moral incitement and instruction. But it will not make the historian—what in Christianity he has hitherto been—the keeper of the Ark of the Covenant.

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LA CRISE RELIGIEUSE EN FRANCE ET EN ITALIE.

SON INTENSITÉ—SES ORIGINES—SES MANIFESTATIONS EN FRANCE—EN ITALIE—CONCLUSION.

PAUL SABATIER.

Il est fort à désirer que l'opinion publique ne se laisse pas trop accaparer par les péripéties de la lutte entre l'Eglise et l'Etat. C'est un duel, et, comme tous les duels, celui-ci a quelque chose de simple qui nous captive malgré nous ; mais, si important qu'il soit, il ne faut pas lui permettre de nous absorber complètement et de nous empêcher de voir une crise plus profonde, dont les événements politico-ecclésiastiques ne sont qu'une conséquence et un épisode, je veux dire la crise religieuse.

Le cléricalisme et l'anticléricalisme d'accord ici—cela leur arrive souvent—n'aperçoivent rien de cet immense travail qui s'accomplit obscurément, mystérieusement, comme toutes les grandes transformations ; et de là vient qu'ils attendent de la loi de Séparation des résultats diamétralement opposés, mais également erronés. Ne voyant pas la crise religieuse, ils se figurent que la lutte entre Rome et la France se résoudra comme d'autres se sont résolues ; et tandis que les uns préparent déjà les images et les caricatures où ils représenteront le gouvernement de la République à Canossa, pieds nus, la corde au cou, demandant pardon à une papauté d'apothéose, les autres voient déjà la France débarrassée des rêveries

religieuses à peu près comme l'homme qui, au matin, secoue les visions d'un long et pénible cauchemar bien vite oublié.

Ils se trompent également, parce qu'ils ne voient de la religion que le côté extérieur et matériel, ils n'en connaissent que les institutions. Pour les premiers, la religion est une révélation tombée du ciel ; pour les autres, c'est une superfétation maladive. C'est la même erreur sous deux formes antithétiques.

Si les fils aînés de l'Eglise se sentent mal à l'aise dans les institutions où s'étaient encadrés jusqu'ici leurs efforts vers plus de justice et d'amour, cela veut-il dire qu'ils renoncent à ces efforts, ou bien, au contraire, qu'ils veulent leur donner plus de vigueur, quelque chose de plus méthodique et de plus vrai ? Là est, me semble-t-il, la vérité. Nous n'allons pas plus à une déroute de l'Etat, qu'à une déroute de l'Eglise. Nous allons franchir une des étapes de l'histoire religieuse de l'humanité.

Détournant donc les yeux de cette lutte passionnante et passionnée engagée entre Rome et la République française, je voudrais tâcher d'exposer les grandes lignes de la crise religieuse qui remue l'élite du catholicisme jusque dans ses profondeurs.

Si je ne parle point du protestantisme, ce ne sera pas par manque de sympathie, mais simplement parce que je ne trouve rien à en dire dans cet ordre d'idées. L'activité théologique, scientifique, littéraire, politique, missionnaire du protestantisme en France est tout à fait remarquable ; il est le collaborateur persévérant et efficace d'une foule d'entreprises civiques, morales, qui sans lui auraient sombré ; mais si je vois chez lui une crise ecclésiastique, je n'y vois pas de crise religieuse profonde. Les protestants français travaillent avec ardeur, discutent avec une parfaite liberté, mais visiblement ce sont des gens arrivés.

Ils ont bâti sur le roc une maison dont ils changent l'ameublement avec une réjouissante fréquence. Mais les grandes préoccupations sur l'édifice lui-même, sa solidité, sa durée ne semblent pas leur venir. S'il y a quelques crises pro-

fondes, ce sont des crises individuelles, qui n'altèrent en rien l'aspect général du protestantisme. Tout fameux qu'il soit par ses variations, nos descendants le trouveront—s'ils le retrouvent — beaucoup plus semblable à lui-même que le catholicisme.

Le protestantisme français souffre des défauts de ses qualités. Essentiellement individualiste, il constitue une grande école d'énergie intellectuelle et morale; on n'y est pas sceptique, mais on y croit trop en soi-même. On n'y manque pas d'amour et de dévouement, mais d'un amour et d'un dévouement qui ne s'épanche pas au hasard, se réserve pour les membres de la famille ou du petit milieu auquel on appartient. Et de là vient sans doute l'isolement dans lequel il vit. Le contact entre lui et le reste de la France n'a pas su s'établir, parce que visiblement chez lui l'intelligence prime le cœur, et que dans notre pays, c'est le cœur qui prime l'intelligence. Notre pays a raison. Si le pullulement des sectes est une force, quand il est un indice d'activité intellectuelle, il devient symptôme des péchés par excellence, l'égoïsme et l'orgueil, lorsqu'il devient le morcellement. Les chapelles ont du bon, mais à la condition d'être, comme dans nos vieilles cathédrales, grandement ouvertes vers la nef centrale. Notre siècle n'est certes pas anti-individualiste, mais il a la sensation que l'individualisme n'est qu'une méthode; qu'une préface de la solidarité une préparation pour faire des hommes de toute la terre les membres intelligents et volontaires de cette famille humaine, saluée jadis par les prophètes et qui devient de jour en jour une réalité plus concrète.

C'est donc du catholicisme seulement que je parlerai, et encore ne parlerai-je que de la crise qui se déroule en France et en Italie. Elle existe bien dans les autres pays et s'y développe, profondément solidaire de ce qui se passe ailleurs—preuve en soit, pour l'Angleterre, par exemple, le sillon si profond creusé par le P. Tyrrell,[1]—mais il faut se restreindre.

[1] La lettre du P. Tyrrell à un Professeur d'anthropologie a été sur la fin de 1905 traduite en italien d'une façon admirable. Ces courtes pages débor-

Ce qui frappe tout d'abord quand on étudie la crise catholique actuelle, c'est son intensité. Elle est d'une toute autre nature que celle du XVI[e] siècle. La réforme ne changea pas la notion même d'autorité, elle en changea le siège ; au lieu de la voir dans l'Eglise, elle la vit dans la Bible. Le nom du maître avait changé, sa figure aussi, mais les sentiments du protestant vis à vis de la Bible étaient très analogues à ceux du catholique vis à vis de l'Eglise. Sans doute en refusant d'obéir au magistère de l'Eglise et en se plaçant sous l'autorité de la Bible, les réformateurs avaient implicitement fait acte d'indépendance absolue. Luther disant sa fameuse parole : " Me voici, je ne puis autrement " . . . . comme Calvin, dans les pages admirables où il étudie le témoignage intérieur et individuel du S. Esprit, tentèrent un effort pour transformer complètement le problème de l'autorité ; mais, soit que les temps ne fussent pas accomplis, soit que le protestantisme eût encore besoin d'un point de vue plus extérieur et plus simpliste, on peut bien dire que la réforme dans notre pays a mérité l'appellation toute négative de protestantisme.

Sans doute il y a eu çà et là et il y a encore dans le protestantisme, des penseurs qui ont senti que la notion même d'autorité—que ce soit celle de l'Eglise, de la Bible ou de l'Etat—a besoin d'être transformée, renouvelée ; qu'il ne s'agit ni de passer d'une autorité à l'autre, ni de les renverser toutes, mais de passer à une obéissance plus profonde, plus complète, plus spirituelle, devant laquelle disparaîtront les vieilles antinomies. Il ne s'agit pas de renverser tel ou tel dogme et de passer orgueilleusement à côté, en disant, c'est une erreur ; il s'agit de faire avec lui ce que fit le Christ avec la loi

dantes de pensée et de vie intérieure, répandues dans les milieux religieux y ont exercé une influence profonde, en précisant, en particulier pour beaucoup de séminaristes, les préoccupations dont ils étaient assaillis. C'est cette publication qui a amené la C[ie] de Jésus à se séparer du P. Tyrrell. Le texte original anglais, précédé d'une préface, vient d'être mis en vente (à Londres chez Longmans) sous le titre *A Much-abused Letter*. Chez le même éditeur on trouve toutes les autres œuvres du célèbre religieux : *Nova et Vetera—Hard Sayings—The Faith of the Millions—Lex Orandi—Lex Credendi—External Religion—The Soul's Orbit.*

de Moïse, il s'agit de l'accomplir. Ce dogme fut un filet d'eau auquel plusieurs générations vinrent étancher leur soif. Aujourd'hui, c'est à peine, en y regardant de près, si nous apercevons un suintement. Crierons-nous, il n'y a plus d'eau ? Oui, mais à condition de nous mettre bien vite en devoir de creuser plus profond.

Mais la voix des hommes qui dans le protestantisme ont eu non seulement le sentiment, mais la sensation de ces besoins des temps nouveaux, s'est perdue dans le désert. Ariste Viguié,[1] pour n'en citer qu'un, avait profondément saisi ce qu'il y a de vérité, de vérité à la fois profonde et provisoire, aussi bien dans la théologie de S. Paul que dans celle du Moyen âge. Avec un sens historique rare, un don de poésie et de générosité qui le faisait fraterniser avec toutes les époques, il avait saisi ce qu'il y a de fort, de bienfaisant, de doux, de vrai, dans la tradition. Il fut incompris. Cet amour qui se répandait sur tout et sur tous fut pris pour de l'éclectisme, du synchrétisme, quand il ne fut pas pris pour une incapacité native à résoudre les grands problèmes, pour de l'impuissance théologique, ou même pour de la vulgarité.

La crise catholique actuelle est tout entière orientée vers une nouvelle conception du rôle de l'autorité. Ceux que j'appellerai les jeunes catholiques ne sont à aucun degré des révoltés. Ils sont même tout le contraire. Pour des spectateurs trop éloignés ou mal préparés, peut-être même pour l'autorité ecclésiastique, qui, à l'instar de beaucoup d'autres autorités, s'est habituée à l'obéissance immédiate, passive, sans explication, ces jeunes gens qui ont le verbe haut, connaissent mal les heures d'audience et les rites de la curie romaine, peuvent paraître indociles ; en réalité, s'ils posent tout haut des questions, ce n'est pas pour marchander leur obéissance, mais au contraire pour substituer à l'esclavage de la lettre, la joyeuse et intelligente obéissance spirituelle.

Chez eux tout est force, fierté, vigueur juvénile. Ils ne

[1] Pasteur à Nimes, puis professeur à la Faculté de théologie protestante de Paris.

cessent d'interroger leur mère, et peut-être de la fatiguer par leurs questions ; mais ce n'est pas avec l'arrière-pensée de la trouver en faute : ils veulent mieux comprendre et pouvoir agir *con inteletto d'amore*, ainsi qu'on dit en Italie. En d'autres termes ce ne sont plus des enfants, ce sont des fils, des fils pour lesquels le moment est venu d'être les collaborateurs de leur mère.

Telle est la grande nouveauté de la crise catholique actuelle, elle ne concerne pas tel ou tel détail, elle va d'emblée jusqu'à la notion fondamentale celle de l'autorité ; et elle va la transformer par le dedans, car il en est dans l'Eglise comme dans la famille. Le père ne parle pas à son fils de vingt ans comme à un bambin de quatre ou à un garçon de quinze. Pour les juristes l'autorité paternelle est une notion massive, toute d'une pièce, de même que pour les théologiens l'autorité ecclésiastique.

Laissons juristes et théologiens et examinons les choses dans leur réalité concrète.

Son Origine.

Avant d'aller plus loin peut-être faudrait-il nous demander d'où vient la crise ? Elle vient de l'Eglise elle-même, et puisque c'est une crise de croissance, elle est immanente, naturelle, profonde ; elle va vers la vie et le développement, et non vers la dissolution et la mort.

Sans doute il y aura des ruines semées çà et là, mais ce seront des ruines de même nature que celles que le poussin laisse derrière lui lorsqu'il abandonne sa coquille.

Pourtant, quoique intime et immanente, cette crise a été favorisée par les circonstances, tout comme le poussin, s'agitant dans sa coquille, est discrètement aidé par quelques coups de bec de la poule.

Or la philosophie de l'évolution a tout renouvelé autour de nous. Elle a été comme ces rayons du soleil printanier qui réveillent à la fois toute la nature. Le sol religieux qui est le moins superficiel a été atteint le dernier, mais rien ne saurait

faire pressentir le résultat qu'auront les puissantes effluves qui désormais l'atteignent.

Bon gré malgré il devient impossible de parler des dogmes comme on le fit durant des siècles, à peu près avec la langue des mathématiciens étudiant les théorèmes de géométrie. Le dogme est devenu quelque chose de vivant qui a son histoire, et qu'il nous est impossible de séparer de son histoire. Et cette simple constatation suffit à montrer l'infirmité égale qu'il y a dans les jugements de ceux qui y voient une vérité définitive, et de ceux qui y voient une pure et simple absurdité.

Par la crise actuelle l'avant-garde du catholicisme s'assimile peu à peu la pensée transformiste, comme jadis elle s'était assimilée la philosophie d'Alexandrie—comme au XIII[e] siècle elle s'assimila avec Thomas d'Aquin la philosophie d'Aristote.

C'est cette pensée transformiste qui pénètre, parfois sans qu'ils s'en doutent, les travaux d'histoire, de littérature, d'exégèse, de philosophie, de politique, de sociologie des jeunes catholiques ; et M. Fogazzaro, l'un des représentants les plus autorisés des tendances nouvelles en Italie, a pu consacrer, il y a quelques années, tout un volume *Le ascensioni umane*—qui n'a pas été mis à l'index—à étudier la philosophie religieuse du point de vue de l'évolution.

Mais je me hâte de revenir à la crise catholique. Comme toutes les crises elle est difficile à décrire. C'est une mystérieuse bataille entre la vie et la mort, mais où la douleur est accompagnée d'une indéfinissable volupté. Tout ce travail nous ne pouvons que l'entrevoir, en saisir çà et là quelques indices, la gazon qui verdoie, l'amandier qui fleurit, l'enfant qui sort sur le seuil de la maison, et jette à la nature une chanson que hier elle ne se connaissait pas.

Jugements erronés sur la Crise.

Si j'ai su m'expliquer clairement, on doit comprendre dès maintenant la puissance de la crise, et comment, sans mettre le moins du monde en danger l'existence de l'Eglise, elle peut être la préface de transformations fécondes.

On voit aussi tout ce qui différencie cette crise des efforts qui l'ont précédée ; de l'effort du XVI^e siècle et de la série, ininterrompue, on peut le dire, des tentatives du libéralisme qui sous ses aspects les plus divers s'est ingénié depuis des siècles à marier la foi et la raison. Dieu me garde de dire du mal des ambassadeurs si bien intentionnés qui ont avec une étrange patience recommencé des démarches qui n'ont jamais abouti. Pourquoi la foi céderait-elle devant la raison ou la raison devant la foi ? La question ainsi posée est insoluble et on n'a pu y répondre que par des expédients au jour le jour.

Les jeunes catholiques sont l'extrême opposé du type de curé bon enfant, assez répandu en Italie, qui fait la carrière ecclésiastique parce que ses frères sont militaires, administrateurs ou propriétaires fonciers, et qu'il vaut mieux se répartir dans les diverses fonctions sociales. Si vous demandez à cet ecclésiastique des explications sur ses vues personnelles, sur sa foi, il vous répondra—s'il vous répond, et ne vous tourne pas le dos comme à un mal appris—par quelques bribes des manuels qu'on lui fit apprendre au séminaire. Les jeunes catholiques au contraire vont au devant des questions, les attirent et les provoquent, non pas qu'ils se croient capables d'avoir réponse à tout, mais parce que la question les amènera à réfléchir, à travailler. La contradiction, bien loin de les apeurer, leur apparaît comme le moyen naturel de voir plus clairement la vérité et d'exercer l'apostolat.

Du point où nous sommes parvenus on voit aussi combien est erroné le jugement de ceux qui ont regardé la crise catholique actuelle comme une infiltration protestante. Si ceux qui par cette qualification ont cherché à soulever l'opinion catholique contre les modernistes,[1] étaient un peu plus attentifs et n'étaient pas aveuglés par la peur, ils auraient vu que la jeune école catholique, bien loin d'être une infiltration protestante, a été la première qui depuis Bossuet ait complètement renouvelé l'apologétique. M. Fogazzaro et M. Loisy, le P. Semeria et le P. Laberthonnière, l'archevêque d'Albi et M. Klein sont les

[1] Mgr. Servonnet ; Mgr. Turinaz ; le P. Fontaine, l'abbé Maignen.

plus redoubtables adversaires que le protestantisme ait jamais rencontrés.

D'autres se persuadent que la crise est due à l'influence de Newman ou de l'américanisme. Certes, le prestige de Newman sur la pensée des jeunes est immense à l'heure actuelle, et pendant quelques années ils ont obstinément tourné la tête du côté de l'Amérique, comptant sur l'épiscopat des Etats Unis pour entraîner plus rapidement l'Eglise vers les temps nouveaux. Mais supposez que Newman n'ait jamais existé et que l'Amérique du Nord ait ressemblé à l'Amérique du Sud : la crise aurait éclaté tout de même et avec la même force. En réalité, les jeunes catholiques se tournent vers Newman comme vers un lutteur qui a passé par des épreuves analogues aux leurs. Ce n'est pas la fréquentation du clergé américain qui a créé en eux cet irrésistible besoin d'une obéissance moins littérale, moins extérieure, moins servile ; plus spirituelle, plus joyeuse, plus efficace et d'une activité plus humaine et plus complète. Mais, c'est quand ils ont ressenti ce besoin, qu'ils ont regardé auprès et au loin pour voir si d'autres n'ont pas éprouvé la même crise.

Ses Manifestations en France.

Jusqu'ici je me suis à peu près borné à des affirmations sans preuve, à répéter que la crise religieuse existe, qu'elle est profonde, d'une importance qu'on ne saurait exagérer : il est temps d'être plus précis, de donner des noms et des faits.

La crise religieuse se manifeste dans toutes les directions à la fois, et il n'est pas jusqu'à la liturgie qu'on ne soit en train, non de renverser, mais de vivifier par le point de vue de l'évolution. Au lieu d'y voir un bloc de formules, la critique, à force de science et d'amour, y retrouve l'œuvre graduelle des siècles, le souvenir des sentiers par lesquels la pauvre humanité s'est acheminée vers une conception de la religion toujours plus profonde, plus efficace et plus spirituelle. De là, l'étude de toutes ces formules bizarres, rébarbatives, qui au premier coup d'œil pouvaient sembler une fastidieuse collection des

erreurs de l'esprit humain, cette étude prend une méthode, une importance, c'est l'histoire de l'âme populaire, de cette âme populaire ancestrale à laquelle notre âme actuelle tient encore par tant de fibres.

Bien plus, les formules païennes dont la présence dans la liturgie catholique, a si souvent étonné, choqué les protestants, s'explique, s'illumine, prend sa signification et sa valeur. Elles font partie de notre héritage. Les détruire, les expulser, serait aussi inepte que d'aller détruire le Colysée ou l'Acropole, sous prétexte que ces monuments ne correspondent plus à l'état de nos mœurs actuelles.

J'ai parlé de la liturgie parce qu'il était peut-être plus facile de dire le travail de rénovation qui est en train de la transformer et de la reconquérir ; mais on peut dire qu'il n'est aucune province de la pensée religieuse ou même de l'activité humaine qui échappe complètement à l'effort des jeunes catholiques. L'exégèse, la dogmatique, l'histoire, la philosophie ont été les premières atteintes, mais la politique, la pédagogie, la conception même du ministère sacerdotal sont en train de se transformer, elles aussi, sous nos yeux. Qu'on lise les ouvrages de M. Klein, de M. Fonsegrive, de M. Fogazzaro, on y verra un type de prêtre que le concile de Trente ou le concile du Vatican n'avaient certes pas rêvé. Or cette notion est virtuellement victorieuse, et sa force est de descendre très légitimement et naturellement des notions anciennes, elle en est non la contradiction, mais l'épanouissement.

La crise catholique a été révélée au grand public par l'affaire Loisy ; mais on vient de voir qu'elle remonte bien au delà, et que M. Loisy, loin d'en être l'initiateur ou l'ouvrier unique, n'en est qu'une des nombreuses expressions. Mais il en est l'expression adéquate, on pourrait dire, sur les questions les plus délicates et où il y avait tout à innover.

En effet, plus sont admirables les travaux de l'exégèse protestante, plus il était difficile de ne pas les reprendre purement et simplement en sous-œuvre, de ne pas les recommencer en les perfectionnant. Or ce qu'a fait M. Loisy est toute autre chose.

Quelles que soient, à l'extérieur, les analogies entre son exégèse et l'exégèse protestante, elles sont pourtant complètement différentes parce que leur méthode est opposée. L'exégète protestant part d'une conception scientifique abstraite, toute nue, si je puis ainsi parler : il s'agit pour lui de retrouver la pensée de l'auteur ; pour M. Loisy cet effort pour retrouver la pensée de l'auteur n'est pas secondaire, mais il vient en second lieu ; notre exégète part d'une notion concrète, d'une notion de fait, à la fois passée et actuelle, la notion d'Eglise, de cette société aussi difficile à définir et pourtant plus visible et plus génératrice d'énergie que la société politique. Les livres sacrés sont bien l'expression de la pensée d'un homme, mais ils sont d'abord et avant tout l'expression de la vie de l'Eglise qui a adopté ceux-là, et en a laissé d'autres de côté.

M. Loisy est un merveilleux exégète qui ne le cède à aucun des princes de cette science, quand il s'agit d'étudier des détails ; mais ses travaux, si admirables qu'ils soient par leur érudition, n'auraient eu, s'ils n'avaient été qu'érudits, qu'une influence scientifique. Leur importance, leur retentissement dans les consciences, leur vient d'ailleurs ; elle leur vient de ce que ce savant, soupçonné d'hérésie par certains catholiques, est en train, en réalité, de bâtir une des assises du catholicisme de demain.

Il y a un moment où l'intelligence scientifique du texte ne suffit pas, où elle s'arrête, interloquée, où elle doit être complétée, couronnée, par le sentiment de la communion qui nous unit à ce passé. C'est de notre pensée qu'il s'agit, puisque c'est celle de nos ancêtres ; elle nous appartient. Ces idées tantôt fétichistes, tantôt grandioses, puériles ou grossières ont été pensées par des hommes, qui avaient commencé le long pélerinage vers la vérité que nous continuons. C'est dans cet atmosphère formée d'amour, de respect, de liberté, du besoin d'aller de l'avant, que l'exégèse cesse d'être une science morte. Or c'est cette résurrection que M. Loisy a opérée et voilà pourquoi dans presque tous les séminaires de l'Europe, il y a

de jeunes prêtres dont l'œil brille d'une joie si intense, lorsqu'ils peuvent approcher quelque heureux mortel, qui ait passé à Garnay, et qui puisse leur donner des nouvelles de ce modeste, de ce silencieux, qui a ouvert à leur intelligence et à leur cœur des horizons nouveaux.

Une partie du grand public n'a vu tout cela que par le dehors. M. Loisy a eu malheureusement de nombreux historiographes qui n'ont pas eu tous l'intelligence fine et plastique de M. Paul Desjardins.[1] Ils étaient surtout préoccupés de renseigner rapidement leurs lecteurs. Les difficultés qu'a rencontrées M. Loisy sur son chemin, la condamnation de l'index, ont contribué aussi pour leur large part à égarer l'opinion, et à le faire passer pour un prêtre rationaliste ou vaguement révolté contre l'Eglise.

Pendant qu'à l'école des Hautes Etudes M. Loisy renouvelait l'exégèse, d'autres, dont le nom est moins populaire, mais dont l'influence n'a pas été moins profonde, travaillaient aussi—très souvent sans le savoir—à donner à la pensée catholique une orientation nouvelle, MM. Maurice Blondel, Edouard Le Roy et le P. Laberthonnière, d'autres encore qu'il vaut mieux taire, pour ne pas les signaler à l'aveugle piété de leurs adversaires, ont fait école et jeté des semences qui germent de tous côtés. Rien, en effet, ne serait plus erroné que de se représenter la crise catholique comme l'œuvre d'un petit clan d'intellectuels sans contact avec la masse. Elle a pénétré tout et tous ; la cohésion du mouvement, qui n'a rien de discipliné, est pourtant complète, et la meilleure preuve, c'est que si on fait abstraction de la presse politico-cléricale, enlisée dans son rêve de réaction, et des journaux d'œuvres, pour ne pas dire des journaux d'affaires, on peut affirmer que bon gré malgré presque tous les périodiques catholiques se sont ouverts, un jour ou l'autre, à des articles pénétrés des idées nouvelles. N'est-ce pas ainsi que procède la vie ?

Il ne serait pas difficile de citer une longue série de

[1] V. *Catholicisme et Critique* par Paul Desjardins ; in 8° de 122 p., aux bureaux de l'Union pour la vérité, 152 rue Vaugirard, Paris.

Revues qui sont dans ce cas. La *Revue du Clergé français*; le *Correspondant*; les *Annales de philosophie X^me*; la *Revue d'histoire et de Littérature*; la *Quinzaine*; *Demain*.[1] Je cite pèle-mèle, au hasard, et j'en oublie certainement. Peut être les janissaires de l'orthodoxie obtiendront-ils la mort de l'une ou de l'autre; elle reparaîtront le lendemain sous des noms nouveaux, aguerries par la lutte et débarrassées d'une partie de leurs éléments rétrogrades. Si l'autorité romaine écoutait les dénonciations qui lui arrivent chaque jour, elle engloberait dans sa réprobation outre les périodiques cités, à peu près toutes les créations récentes, et de ce nombre seraient tout d'abord les *Semaines sociales* et le *Sillon*. La haine et la peur rendent étrangement perspicace. Les dénonciateurs ont raison. Il est bien sûr que les *Semaines sociales* ainsi que le *Sillon*, si loin qu'ils puissent se croire de Loisy ou de Fogazzaro, sont les manifestations sur un terrain différent d'une seule et même poussée de sève.

En Italie.

En Italie les mêmes causes produisent les mêmes effets avec je ne sais quoi de plus populaire, de plus plastique, de plus éloquent, de plus ensoleillé.

Des noms se pressent en foule sur les lèvres, noms d'évêques vénérables, hardis pourtant et optimistes comme des lutteurs de vingt ans; noms de jeunes gens qui, comme les saints de jadis, renoncent aux plaisirs faciles et au luxe pour creuser leur sillon de bon ouvrier; des noms de saints timides aux yeux pleins de rêve, de naïveté, de fraîcheur et de vigueur, les frères de ceux auxquels pensait Donatello quand il fit son S. Georges; des noms de femmes qui ont eu l'insigne honneur d'être calomniées, à cause de leur activité et de leurs convictions, par la presse cléricale et par de vertueux jésuites!

La caractéristique de la crise religieuse en Italie, c'est d'avoir placé sur le même rang les préoccupations sociales et

[1] *Demain*, hebdomadaire, plein de faits et d'idées qui s'adresse au grand public. 12·50 par an. Bureaux, 2 rue Simon Maupin, à Lyon.

les préoccupations scientifiques, d'avoir compris que la même impulsion qui portait à chercher des méthodes scientifiques nouvelles amenait aussi à chercher des modes d'action nouvelle pour les questions politiques et sociologiques. Les publications de l'abbé Murri n'abordent pas seulement les questions sociales avec une entière franchise, elles sont aussi d'admirables instruments de travail intellectuel.[1]

Chez lui, comme chez ses disciples et ses amis, répandus maintenant à travers toute l'Italie, on sent une passion de liberté et d'italianité qui leur ouvre le chemin de tous les cœurs. L'italianité est un sentiment si complexe et si profond qu'il est peut-être impossible de la définir. L'italianité n'a rien à voir avec le nationalisme si fréquent dans les autres pays. C'est d'un côté le sentiment de la beauté de la terre italienne, de l'originalité de son génie ; d'un autre, c'est la claire compréhension que, sans l'Italie, l'évolution de l'humanité manquerait d'un de ses facteurs essentiels. L'italianité bien loin d'avoir à sa base un sentiment d'égoïsme, d'orgueil ou simplement de particularisme haineux, desséchant, infécond, vient au contraire du sentiment profond de la collaboration de toutes les nations, d'un instinct énergique d'amour et de solidarité.

Quand on songe que l'abbé Murri n'a guère que trente-cinq ans, et quand on voit tout ce qu'il a déjà fait, le pullulement de journaux et de revues qui dans toute la péninsule répandent ses idées et les nouvelles méthodes de travail, on est émerveillé. Si les résultats sont si nombreux et si profonds, c'est que l'abbé Murri a eu la meilleure des collaborations, celle des circonstances ; je veux dire qu'il a eu le bonheur de semer au moment où le sol était le mieux préparé.

Son œuvre n'est pas connue au dehors autant qu'elle le mériterait. Cela vient, sans doute, de ce qu'elle est toute en profondeur et en efficacité. Les jeunes catholiques italiens étudient et agissent ; et jusqu'ici ils n'avaient guère fait de

[1] V. surtout la *Rivista di Cultura* (bimensuelle) ; 8 francs par an. Bureaux, Società Nazionale di Cultura, 83 piazza Sant' Eustachio, Rome.

littérature, mais voici que cette année leur voix s'est élevée de façon à être entendue dans toute l'Europe et au delà.

Dans son *Santo*, en effet, M. Fogazzaro est le héraut de la nouvelle école. Toutes les préoccupations, les idées, les aspirations de l'élite catholique se retrouvent sous sa plume, avec une ampleur et une harmonie qui font de ce livre une date dans l'histoire religieuse. Sa beauté gît dans sa sincérité vécue.

Par son passé, comme par tempérament, M. Fogazzaro était dans tous les domaines ce qu'on peut appeler un conservateur. Mais il a eu le courage non seulement de penser sa pensée jusqu'au bout, mais aussi d'agir en conséquence et de devenir l'apôtre de la rénovation catholique.

Son livre est donc l'histoire d'une âme, mais d'une âme éminemment représentative. En nous racontant une crise individuelle, il nous a raconté la crise qui se déroule dans l'élite de l'Eglise, a aidé à sa solution ; et avec lui, avec son héros, des milliers et des milliers de consciences ont passé du catholicisme de naissance, de hasard, ou de routine à un catholicisme personnel, conscient, fécond.

Ainsi donc, chez Murri, comme chez Fogazzaro, le fond même du catholicisme au lieu d'être obéissance passive, acceptation d'un joug, renonciation, est au contraire une obéissance active, joyeuse, raisonnée, une affirmation, une plénitude de vie, une ascension.

De là l'immense succès de la nouvelle orientation ; ses adversaires ont cru à je ne sais quel complot, à de ténébreuses machinations. En réalité ces idées ont un allié au fond de tous les cœurs, et il ne serait pas difficile de citer des prêtres, hier adversaires acharnés des jeunes, aujourd'hui leurs partisans résolus.

Je vous parlais tout à l'heure des séminaires où l'éclosion et la diffusion des nouvelles méthodes est si rapide, mais rien n'échappe à cette influence parce que les mêmes besoins de travail, de liberté sont ressentis aujourd'hui par toutes les consciences, et je pourrais vous citer tel couvent de dames domini-

caines où on a lu avec enthousiasme les lettres du P. Tyrrell, d'où l'on à envoyé des fleurs au monument de Savonarole.

Aussi l'évolution de Tommaso Scotti, bien loin d'être un fait isolé ou individuel, est-elle un cas éminemment représentatif. Scotti appartient au milieu le plus aristocratique de Milan, mais il a eu le bonheur de trouver parmi les membres du clergé chargés de son éducation un homme d'une valeur intellectuelle et morale hors de pair. L'élève a été digne de son maître, et on peut dire que depuis une dizaine d'années, Scotti, qui a aujourd'hui environ vingt-huit ans, n'a pas cessé de vivre ses idées avec une intensité et une sincérité de plus en plus grandes. La guerre que le conservatisme politique et religieux a déclarée aux jeunes n'a eu d'autre résultat que de le faire réfléchir et de l'amener à fortifier ses positions, et enfin ces derniers temps il a écrit à l'abbé Murri une lettre publique d'ardente sympathie, pour lui annoncer que désormais il lutterait à ses côtés.[1] Il faut lire cette lettre pour comprendre le mouvement qui entraîne irrésistiblement ce qu'il y a de meilleur en Italie, non pas, je ne saurai trop le répéter, vers des révoltes ou des négations doctrinales, mais vers une intensité de vie et de pensée dont les affirmations doctrinales d'hier étaient le plan, le schéma, la préfiguration.

On a depuis longtemps comparé l'autorité ecclésiastique à une mère. Rien n'est plus juste, plus fécond que cette comparaison, car l'autorité des parents, absolue en principe, absolue en fait durant la jeunesse de l'enfant, est en perpétuelle transformation ; son rôle est de travailler à se rendre inutile.

Mais il y a parfois des parents qui ne comprennent pas ce rôle transitoire qui leur est assigné par la nature ; ils agissent comme si les enfants étaient faits pour eux, et non eux pour les enfants. Leurs intentions sont excellentes, mais ils font le malheur de leurs enfants ; car, soit que ceux-ci se révoltent, soit qu'ils se soumettent, le résultat est malheureux.

Or, l'autorité ecclésiastique est en train de suivre ces mêmes

[1] *La nostra crisi.* Lettre ouverte. 0·20 centimes, aux bureaux de la Società Nazionale di Cultura, 83 piazza Sant' Eustachio, Rome.

errements. L'enfant bien sage, qui ne fait pas de bruit, est l'idéal pour elle. Elle aime ses enfants ; mais quand elle les voit grimper sur l'escabeau, pour regarder par la fenêtre, elle supprime l'escabeau, puis condamne la fenêtre. A tous ses fils avides de vie, d'espace, de lumière, elle répondrait volontiers, comme une religieuse de ma connaissance : " Tiens, mon petit, voilà des ciseaux, et du papier ; amuse-toi à faire des découpures."

Il y a un âge où on n'en veut plus faire, où on ne peut plus en faire.

Cette tendance à calfeutrer, à traiter les hommes comme d'éternels mineurs, est l'écueil naturel de toute autorité, mais jamais on ne l'avait vu aussi manifeste que dans la bulle *Pieni l'animo* du 22 juillet 1906, adressée par Pie X. à tous les évêques d'Italie. On peut dire que le pape s'y est mis tout entier. C'est là qu'il faut aller le chercher, l'étudier, bien mieux que dans les encycliques sur la séparation ou les bulles du début du pontificat, qui laissaient à sa plume bien moins de liberté et d'originalité. Ce n'est pas que la bulle *Pieni l'animo* ait une originalité ; mais elle en manque à un degré tel qu'elle en devient originale.

Il faut lire ces pages dont chaque ligne est une défense ou une menace, dont chaque paragraphe est une sorte de chaîne où l'autorité ne nous apparaît que sous son aspect coércitif, négatif, prohibitif, où elle se montre découragée et décourageante, orgueilleuse et vaincue, amère, aigrie, morbide et, pardessus tout, étrangère, indifférente ou hostile à toutes les causes vers lesquelles s'échappe irrésistiblement le cœur de ses enfants.

Quels en seront les résultats ? Quelques-uns parmi les catholiques italiens n'auront aucune peine à se soumettre ; dans l'Eglise, comme dans la famille, il y a de grands garçons de dix-huit ans qui jouent à la poupée ou font des découpures. Rachitiques intellectuels, ils feront des fleurs de papier, seront faits camériers de cape et d'épée ou chevaliers de l'ordre de l'éperon d'or.

De quelques autres Pie X. obtiendra un loyalisme tout

extérieur, cachant le scepticisme, l'indifférence, le sarcasme, et peut-être l'épicurisme de la vie pratique.

Quelques-uns enfin briseront la chaîne, et ils auront tort, à mon avis; mais, pour la masse les choses se passeront dans l'Eglise comme dans la famille: *Il tempo è galant'uomo*, dit le proverbe italien. Le temps dénouera bien des situations qui à l'heure actuelle paraissent insolubles. Ne soyons pas trop pressés.

L'acte de Pie X. n'a excité d'enthousiasme que du côté du conservatisme voltairien très zélé à soutenir l'Eglise, parce qu'il espère que celle-ci le lui rendra avec usure. Du côté des vrais catholiques il a été accueilli avec une respectueuse tristesse. Pie X. ne comprendra pas; mais le successeur que l'avenir lui réserve, se rend peut-être déjà compte de ce qu'il y a d'incoercible dans le mouvement qui entraîne les jeunes vers des horizons nouveaux, et qui sait, si le successeur du successeur ne se rendra pas compte de ce qu'il y a là de beau et de saint. On m'objectera, sans doute l'immutabilité de la papauté, mais c'est là une vue simpliste et erronée que nous n'aurions dû accepter que sous bénéfice d'inventaire.

Conclusion.

Si je me suis bien expliqué, on doit voir que le jeune catholicisme bien loin de constituer une révolte est une rénovation; bien loin d'être un acte d'incrédulité est un acte de foi; et l'on peut dire que si les novateurs, comme on les appelle, sont si à l'aise avec les protestants, s'ils ne les fuient pas maladivement, comme on faisait jusqu'ici, c'est parce qu'ils les ont dépassés, et que la doctrine protestante leur apparaît comme la sœur authentique de la scolastique, à la fois aussi respectable et aussi éphémère que son aînée.

Le cléricalisme était en train de nous faire de l'Eglise une secte; eux lui rappellent son vieux nom de catholique, et veulent qu'au mot corresponde la réalité. Ils veulent être les héritiers de tout le passé; des héritiers qui font valoir leur héritage et dont les regards sont tournés vers l'avenir pour le préparer.

De là ce titre bizarre, au premier abord, de *Demain* et de

Domani, que deux périodiques ont simultanément adopté en France et en Italie, sans s'être concertés. Combien de journaux qui, s'ils voulaient dire leur programme, devraient s'appeler *Hier*.

Il ne s'agit donc pas pour eux de ne pas penser, mais de repenser en raccourci toute la pensée des siècles, non pour en choisir un instant, comme le feraient des éclectiques, mais pour donner à cette tradition un nouvel anneau. Par ces préoccupations ils se trouvent de plain pied avec la pensée contemporaine et les aspirations du prolétariat.

Eux aussi chantent l'émancipation, ils la préparent ; en les voyant chanter la liberté, tout en se livrant au plus dur labeur, bien des prolétaires comprendront que la vraie liberté est autre chose qu'une émancipation d'écoliers, qu'elle est le besoin de prendre la responsabilité de sa propre vie, pour travailler plus et mieux.

L'unité de l'Eglise, qui jusqu'ici avait été surtout disciplinaire et doctrinale, prend un sens plus complet, plus intense, plus efficace ; c'est une union de forces vivantes, non pour un effort déterminé, mais pour préparer les cieux nouveaux et la terre nouvelle dont parle la Bible.

Les jeunes catholiques sont donc plus catholiques que leurs aînés, car ils comprennent plus de choses ; ardents et généreux, ils s'avancent au devant de ceux qu'ils ne connaissent pas et du plus loin qu'ils les voient, ils les bénissent. Il n'y a là ni capitulation devant l'incrédulité, ni opportunisme au jour le jour, ni religiosité douceâtre ; il y a non seulement le sentiment, mais la sensation vécue que nous sommes tous frères. Il y a l'amour et il y a la foi ; la foi qui en évoquant à nos yeux l'image des réalités futures nous aide à les préparer.

Nous voilà bien loin du sectaire et du clérical qui jadis régnaient alternativement sur la France. Leur puissance est bien loin d'être annulée, mais la force qui les annulera un jour agit déjà maintenant autour de nous.

PAUL SABATIER.

Chantegrillet près Crest (Drôme),
10 *décembre* 1906.

THE FAILURE OF THE FRIARS.

G. G. COULTON, M.A.

In preparing an edition for English readers of that strange autobiography which Brother Salimbene of Parma wrote for the edification of his niece (1221–1288),[1] I have often been embarrassed by the very wealth of my material. Those portions of the Friar's story which are most significant for the study of thirteenth-century society are naturally just those which need, for the general reader, most explanation and illustration from other documents of the age. In many places, such full illustrations would have taken me too far afield, and I have been obliged to deal with them in separate essays.[2] One of the most important of these subjects is the rapid decay of the Franciscan ideal—a subject often slurred over altogether, and never, so far as I am aware, thoroughly explained.[3] The

[1] See the *Nineteenth Century and After* of June 1905 for a brief account by the present writer of this too little-known chronicle.

[2] *Medieval Studies* (Simpkin, Marshall & Co.). No. 2 deals with the Guelfs and Ghibellines of Dante's day; Nos. 3 and 4 with Puritanism in the Middle Ages; No. 5 with thirteenth-century morality; Nos. 1 and 6 with the monks.

[3] Karl Müller's *Anfänge des Minoritenordens* is confessedly a fragment. Lempp's *Frère Élie* deals with only one corner of the subject; Father Ehrle's articles in the *Archiv für Litt. und Kirchengeschichte*, however learned and illuminating, are often tantalising in their avoidance of debatable questions. Professor Herkless, in his *Francis and Dominic*, has no space to do anything like full justice to the early Spirituals, whom he seems, moreover, to confound with their less defensible followers. Miss Macdonell gives some pleasant portraits from the earlier Spiritual circle in her interesting *Sons of Francis*; but her comparative unfamiliarity with other sides of thirteenth-century history often prevents her from grasping the real significance of the party.

Friars, however they may once have been misunderstood in an age of bitter strife, are now recognised on all hands as the greatest of all Church reformers during the first fifteen centuries. But, far beyond this just recognition, there is a growing tendency to make party capital by whitewashing the Friars, in contrast to correspondingly blackened pictures of the sixteenth-century reformers. The former, it is argued, were the real saviours of the Church: the latter were mere bungling marplots. This theory, however, impinges on one serious difficulty, for, in spite of Francis and Dominic, the Church was at least as corrupt in 1500 as she had been in 1200 A.D. To meet this difficulty the "Great Pestilence" theory has been devised; and we are assured that Luther found the Church still reeling helplessly under the effects of the Plague of 1349. But this again, even though supported by far more scientific evidence than has yet been adduced, would still fail to meet the facts of the case. Long before the Great Pestilence, good men despaired as deeply of the Church as their pre-Franciscan grandfathers had despaired. It would be difficult, I believe, to find a single writer between 1250 and 1350 expressing a real conviction that his own world was permanently better than the world of 1200. On the other hand, it is startling to find how many among the greatest Churchmen in this period —and especially among the Friars—were haunted by an even exaggerated sense of the world's almost hopeless decay. Yet this striking fact is entirely ignored by the most popular Church historians; and the average reader, even though he be specially interested in Franciscan history, is seldom aware how rapidly the Friars degenerated, or how directly the Roman hierarchy was responsible for their failure. The heroes of the *Fioretti*, of Eccleston, and of other noble Franciscan records are indeed admirable to all time. But how many readers of the *Fioretti* realise that, within a century after the Saint's death, the very existence of such Friars as Giles and Masseo and Conrad of Offida had become illegal? So far from condemning the sixteenth-century Reformation, the

early Friars are, in fact, among our strongest witnesses in its favour.

The story of Franciscan decay may be found written in the plainest characters within a few dozen pages of St Bonaventura's works: other documents (and they are many) do but corroborate the Saint's assertions, and illustrate his protest that only the bitterest necessity compelled him to speak. From his two *Epistles* to the Provincials of the Order, and his *Quæstiones circa Regulam*, we see how near the Friar of the second generation stood already to the sturdy religious vagrant of Chaucer and Erasmus. He speaks of the idleness and viciousness of many, and the commercial spirit of the Order as a whole. Their importunate begging and legacy-hunting, the extravagance of their buildings and private expenses, their familiarities with women, are rapidly making them "wearisome and contemptible in divers parts of the world." The charity of the laity is naturally grown cold; the wayfarer fears to meet a Friar as he would fear a robber. What is worse, these abuses are already so chronic and so wide-spread that many accept them as quite necessary and irremediable. So writes St Bonaventura; and other equally trustworthy contemporaries give us the same picture. The Friar, whom you can no more keep out of your private affairs than you can keep a fly out of your plate, is often so unpopular already that the country-folk attribute the failures of their crops to the malign influence of these sons of Francis and Dominic. "St Francis cries aloud for reform, and the blood of Christ that was shed for us," pleaded St Bonaventura in 1257. Yet nine years afterwards we find him reiterating the same complaints; and a younger contemporary records the Saint's cry of despair: "I would willingly be ground to powder, if so the brethren might come to the purity of St Francis and his companions, and to that which he prescribed for his Order."

Paradoxical as it may seem, it was the Rule itself which made the keeping of the Rule impossible. In framing this code of precepts and restrictions, St Francis had deviated

from that evangelical freedom and simplicity in which lay the real strength of his first teaching. By allowing his brethren to be formed into an Order under a formal Rule he assured the outward success and the essential failure of his movement. At a very early stage, many of the most enthusiastic Friars had either perished under their immoderate mortifications, or only dragged on a broken existence in the infirmary, where, in their own despite, they set a dangerous example to the rest.[1] Among "the multitude of those who entered in," few were proof against the temptation of beginning on that lower plane on which their worn-out predecessors were now forced to end. The small luxuries which had become a sad necessity to the seniors were claimed as of right by the juniors; and that earlier prophecy was fulfilled: "Self-indulgence will grow in the Order as insensibly as hairs grow in a man's beard" (Eccleston, *R.S.*, p. 69). St Bonaventura describes all this in detail, complaining that the new generation of officers in the Order, themselves relaxed in discipline, are fast teaching the novices to be no better than themselves, "so that the early brethren, so far from being looked up to as examples, are now treated as laughing-stocks. Nay, by so much less the men of this new generation know the virtues of perfect brethren, by so much the more do they imagine themselves to be better than their forerunners; and, seeing that they keep certain examples of outward discipline in divine service, or in processional entrances, and in suchlike matters, therefore they dare to assert that the Order was never in so good a state as now" (*Quæst. XIX. circa Regulam*). His contemporary, David of Augsburg, speaks even more strongly: the most spiritual Friars "are thought lunatics and called heretics by other Religious": "virtue is proscribed, and condemned as vice."

It was just this double movement in the Order which

[1] *Cf.* Etienne de Bourbon, p. 422, for the extent to which even St Bernard, after ruining his own health, was obliged to set a dangerous example to the rest.

made reform so impossible: this increase of pharisaical formalism and observances and self-satisfaction, in proportion as the true spirit of Franciscanism decayed. This alone can explain the headlong ruin of the strict Franciscan ideal. Roger Bacon, writing about the time of St Bonaventura's death, mourns that both Franciscans and Dominicans are "already horribly fallen from their former worth" (*R.S.*, p. 399). Less than half a century later, Ubertino da Casale complained to the Pope: "So high has the flood of idleness and gluttony and continued familiarities with women risen, that I rather wonder at those who stand than at those who fall" (*Archiv*, iv. p. 80, *cf.* 187). Chaucer, Gower, and the author of *Piers Plowman*, however much they may differ on other points, agree in representing the Friar as a real danger to the purity of family life. Chaucer's Friar, tramping the roads with a sturdy fellow to bear his bag, selling imaginary spiritual favours, and privately erasing the names of those for whom he was publicly pledged to pray, can be exactly paralleled from prosaic and irrefragable documents (*cf. Archiv*, iii. 70, 104, and *Eubel Oberd. Minoritenprovinz*, p. 239). But the very worst of these abuses is already logically implied in St Bonaventura's complaint, only a generation after the Master's death, that the few stricter Friars were already a laughing-stock to the superficially correct and self-satisfied majority. The tide set more and more strongly against these "Spirituals," who soon became not only laughing-stocks, but martyrs in grim earnest. Angelo Clareno's *History of the Seven Tribulations*—a book of passionate pleading indeed, but one which only gains by comparison with official or unfriendly records—shows what a terrible price was often paid by those brethren who clung doggedly to the plain letter of the Rule.

> "Under a pot he schal be put, in a privie chambre,
> That he schal lyven ne last but litell while after!"

writes the fourteenth-century satirist of the unlucky Friar whom his brethren find no longer useful to them as a beggar; but this was a merciful process of extinction compared with

the nameless horrors inflicted in convent dungeons upon such as refused to beg for unlawful corn and wine. It was worse still when the Pope interfered with a decree which startled even the mediæval conscience. The constitution *Quorundam*, published by John XXII. in 1317, made it heresy for a Friar to disobey his immediate superior by wearing the short garments which he believed St Francis to have commanded, or by refusing to beg fresh stores to fill those barns and cellars which the founder had most explicitly forbidden. In other words, it became flat heresy for a Friar to adhere strictly to that solemn vow from which, according to St Thomas Aquinas, not even a pope had power to absolve him! In accordance with this new move, four Spirituals were publicly burned as heretics at Marseilles (1318) for asserting that the Rule of St Francis was identical with Christ's Gospel, and that even the Pope could not dispense Franciscans from their solemn vow of poverty. These four were only the residuum from a body of sixty more who had gradually been induced to recant by a process of intimidation, and probably torture, lasting over six months; and no single episode is better calculated than this to explain the startling contrasts which we find between the ideal Friar of the *Fioretti* and the real Friar even of the first century.[1] The stricter Friars pleaded for leave to form a separate congregation of their own, in which they might live unmolested after the tenor of their early vows: but even this reasonable request was refused; and Angelo Clareno, the leader of the Italian Spirituals, though beatified by the Church after his death, breathed his last in hiding and in apparent failure eleven years after Dante. The persecution in England seems to have been even more bloody, though more silent, than in

[1] The whole story is fully told at the beginning of the third volume of Lea's *Inquisition*: yet even Dr Lea scarcely brings out with sufficient clearness the cynical frankness with which loyalty to the first traditions of the Order was proclaimed to be heresy. This can only be fully realised by studying the official declaration of the thirteen Doctors upon the case, and by noting how distinctly they proclaim *that each one of the condemned propositions is separately heretical* (Baluze-Mansi., *Misc.*, vol. ii. p. 271.)

France or Italy. The Chronicle of Meaux (*R.S.*, ii. p. 323) informs us quite casually that twenty-five men and eight women of the Spiritual Franciscans were burned "in England, in a certain forest," about the year 1330. Facts like these are often partly passed over in silence, partly falsified, by modern historians. Thomas of Eccleston records how the General Albert of Pisa praised the special zeal of the English Franciscans, whom he found "ready to go with him to prison or into exile for the sake of *the* reform *of the Order*." Father Cuthbert, the recent Romanist translator of the book, has suppressed the words italicised, thus concealing the fact that the reform of the Franciscan Order was already a pressing and dangerous duty, even in Eccleston's days.

It is extremely significant that a man like Salimbene, who was on intimate terms with so many of the leading early Spirituals, should show such an utter want of sympathy with the party as a whole, and go on recording without remark a state of things so glaringly at variance with the first Franciscan ideal. He shows us incidentally, over and over again, that many of the main precepts of the Rule were obsolete before the generation of those who had known the living Francis was extinct. The Order, as a whole, no longer even wished to be what it once had been. A certain Spiritual Friar prayed long and earnestly to see St Francis in heaven: at last his prayer was granted. The Saint, whom he had hoped to see in dazzling glory, was discovered in an obscure corner, tending a leper covered with sores from head to foot; and the disillusioned visionary fell at his feet in bitter tears. "This leper," explained St Francis, "is my Order, which I tend at Christ's bidding, and for which I plead unceasingly before God."

It was partly the tragedy of all great movements—too great, in many ways, for their age. But partly also we see here the inevitable result of the Saint's own doubts and inconsistencies. He had wavered to the very end of his career between love of solitude and love of his fellow-men. He himself lived each life so truly and so whole-heartedly that in

him we scarcely see the conflict of the two ideals; but it came out fatally in his Rule. The Friars must teach others, and yet remain too poor to study themselves: they must evangelise the whole world, and yet bind themselves by the lifelong vow which cut them off from all natural intercourse with half of the human race. St Francis himself was both hermit and apostle, and a few followed him with steps not too unequal: of the rest, the best were those who forgot only one side of the Saint's example. Some became the most ascetic of hermits; others, the most adventurous of missioners; but vast numbers, who had no deep or enduring vocation for either sacrifice, drifted quietly amid the general uncertainty, and doubtless without realising clearly how far they were drifting, into a fairly easy routine of life, safe for both worlds. Indeed, mediæval conditions were eminently favourable to such rapid degeneration. Nothing contributed more inevitably to the inward decay of the Order than the desperate resolve to preserve an outward show of discipline and unity. In the modern world, men agree with more or less good grace to differ on even the most vital questions; thus ideals apparently irreconcilable, flourishing side by side, gradually forget much of their differences, and have leisure to realise the likeness of their general aim. The honest men of either party in the Franciscan Order had much to learn from each other: a common-sense division would have made them most valuable competitors in the long run. The minority might have continued, as they wished, to keep the Rule in all its first severity: the majority might have formed a separate Order, frankly avowing the necessity, to all but one man in a thousand, of certain relaxations. The questions at issue between the two parties were not deeper or more complicated than those which have been left open for three centuries in the Anglican Church under the so-called "Elizabethan Settlement." No doubt it is in itself regrettable that two or more religious bodies should cling with equal obstinacy to mutually exclusive doctrines, and pray with equal fervour for each other's

corporate, if not personal, extinction. Yet this has also its good side; for each party thus remains a standing witness to one side of the truth, and each, in the face of its rivals, must needs practise to some real extent the doctrines which it professes; otherwise, it will surely die out in a world which has no use for stale unrealities. In the Middle Ages, this agreement to differ was impossible; and St Francis himself was too much a child of the Middle Ages even to dream of modern freedom. He, the freest of men in his own soul, inflicted on his brethren the bondage of a Rule which, as the mediæval hierarchy was certain to enforce it, must needs become intolerable to one party or the other within the Order. Since the Spirituals were only a small minority,[1] the large majority got their own way. Strong in the mediæval ideas of religious discipline and in the general sympathy of the ruling powers, the "Conventuals" buried their too stubborn opponents in filthy dungeons, or burned them publicly as heretics. If the Popes had allowed the Spirituals to form a separate "Order of Literal Observance," this would have kept the rest comparatively pure by the continued protest of its mere existence. As things were, relaxation and hypocrisy were positively officialised. The strict Rule was still retained in name, but its strict adherents were treated as heretics. The novice still vowed himself to lifelong obedience: the minister who admitted him solemnly promised eternal life as a reward for this obedience. But meanwhile the Vicar of Christ sent him to the stake in this world, and to hell in the next, for presuming to obey too literally those precepts of which the Saint himself had protested, on his deathbed, "By God's grace, they are plain and simple enough to need no explanation." Nothing but the most refined Jesuitry could reconcile this plain Rule, which all

[1] Father Cuthbert's contention (p. 67) that the relaxed Friars were always in the minority is not only contrary to all contemporary evidence, but would also fail to explain how they became strong enough to immolate recalcitrant Spirituals.

swore to keep, with the elaborate papal comments which practically forbade the keeping of it; and St Bonaventura's writings show us how deeply this Jesuitry had penetrated into the Order within thirty years of the Saint's death. Meanwhile, by a common vice of human nature, the less men wrought the works of St Francis, the more glibly they took his name in vain. Salimbene, knowing very well in his heart that he breaks the Rule every day of his life, vaunts quite complacently the Saint's promise of certain salvation to all who should truly keep that Rule. He would have made an admirable example for Butler's famous sermon on Balaam: "Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his." The fetishism of the Franciscan frock—the superstitious investiture of dying laymen with so effective a passport to Paradise—began at a time when only a few condemned heretics still clung to the strict form of life which that gray frock implied.

This was the price paid by St Francis and the Franciscans for having obediently conformed to the ruling hierarchy instead of going their own way like the Wesleyans. It is true that, in the thirteenth century, the nonconformist had to face the probabilities of helpless martyrdom or bloody rebellion. But St Francis's divine Master had long ago shown the world that obstinate nonconformity, even in an age of bitter intolerance, is quite compatible with the most lamblike innocence and the most perfect charity. Even while we praise St Francis as the most Christ-like figure in later Christian history, the very comparison does but serve to show how far he stands, in every respect, below his great Exemplar. The spiritual iniquities of his time were almost beyond modern belief;[1] but he himself lacked the sterner fibre of a thorough reformer. His charity and humility, his intense respect for all who sat in Moses' seat, kept him always far above vulgar sectarianism;

[1] I have dealt briefly with this subject in the *Independent Review* for June 1905. Even the third chapter of M. Sabatier's *Vie de St François* gives, if anything, a too favourable idea of the early thirteenth-century Church; and his readers are left to infer that the Franciscans and Dominicans worked a far more thorough and lasting reform than was actually the case.

but he pushed this deference and self-effacement to an extreme at which it became a serious weakness. In the eternal fight against evil, obedience to an evil-doer in authority may prove the worst of treasons to the cause. When, therefore, we hear the Saint extolled so unreservedly for his conformity to a system already deeply corrupted—when we are told how the Papacy succeeded where Anglicanism failed, in keeping its Methodists within the pale—then we may well ask: "What was the ultimate consequence of this conformity?" In an independent rivalry for purity of doctrine and of works, the Franciscans would have shamed the hierarchy out of its worst abuses, as the Wesleyans unquestionably did much to rouse the Anglican Church from its torpor. Instead of that, we find the hierarchy deliberately corrupting the Rule in order to bring the new movement into line with current traditions; and soon the typical Friar is no longer the reformer, but the willing tool of a worldly papacy—the Jesuit of the Middle Ages. The early Friars had spoken out manfully against the growing abuse of indulgences; their later brethren became the busiest of pardon-mongers. Brother Berthold of Ratisbon, St Bonaventura's contemporary, speaks quite as bitterly against the "penny-preachers" as Luther himself. The penny-preacher is the "devil's huntsman," who "hath murdered true penitence."[1] Yet, three centuries later, Bishop Gardiner complained that "the devil used Friars for his ministers" in the matter of false indulgences, "wherein heaven was sold for little money."

The early history of the Franciscan movement — the murderous violence with which the Papacy encouraged the suppression of all too inconvenient reforming energies within the Order—seems to give a very clear contradiction to Bishop Creighton's theory that a wiser statesmanship might have brought about the Reformation of the sixteenth century without any schism in the Church. Until long after that century was out, men's minds were far too exclusively haunted by

[1] *Predigten*, i. 208, 394; *cf.* 132, 148, 154, and ii. 12, 219.

the false conception of religious unity as an outward conformity, and of faith as an assent to a special form of words, to render possible such a yoking together of divergent views as might be attempted in the present century. All unnecessary differences are deplorable; and yet they have their uses in God's providence. Nothing has done more to make Christians seek a deeper unity and a deeper faith within their own hearts than the competition of many separate, yet undeniably Christian, bodies during the last three hundred years —bodies too strong and well organised for violent extermination by their enemies—outwardly conflicting, yet essentially (as even the least tolerant cannot fail to see more and more clearly) marching towards a common goal. "When the half-gods go, the gods arrive." The violent rending of the veil has brought mankind one step nearer to the Holy of Holies: our eyes may ache still to pierce the darkness; but every day more clearly the modern world sees God where the Middle Ages only shuddered at a black and hopeless void. Saints of all ages and of all creeds have taught us to look for deeper spiritual truths in apparent spiritual failure. "Where wast Thou, Lord?" cried St Catherine of Siena in her passionate welcome of Christ's restored presence after a long period of spiritual bereavement: "Where wast Thou hidden, Lord, these many days that I have sought Thee sorrowing?" "Daughter," replied the Voice, "I was all the while in thine own heart."

It has always been the worldly strength and the spiritual weakness of the Papacy to idolise outward unity and to sacrifice everything to that idol. For this end the hierarchy shrank from no bloodshed, and for this end they deliberately clipped the wings of the Franciscan reform. But, if it is difficult to speak too strongly of the papal policy which domesticated the Franciscan body by organising hypocrisy within the Order, on the other hand it would be very unjust to apply so odious a word off-hand to individual Friars. They stood in the position of the common soldier, who must indeed

think to some extent for himself, but whose first duty is to obey his immediate superior. If modern freedom of conscience tempts us so often to cloak our self-will under the name of God's will, it was still more difficult in the Middle Ages to avoid the opposite error of mistaking a man's command for God's. No doubt very many Friars were too earnest and simple-minded to take much harm from a system which solemnly promised them salvation for keeping strictly certain prescriptions which it forbade them strictly to keep; but the average Friar was very much like the average convert in any great religious revival, and on him the official hypocrisy was certain soon to have a disastrous effect. The *fact* of the Order's rapid decay is undeniable: it stares us in the face from official documents as plainly as from the complaints of outsiders. The *causes* may not be so easy to analyse; but assuredly one of the most fatal was that false notion of authority and unity which enabled the majority, while swearing obedience to the Rule, and boasting themselves of the strictness of the Rule, to torture or slay those few who really followed the Rule.

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THE MESSIANIC IDEA IN VERGIL.

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Few things are more characteristic of the spirit of modern criticism than the complete decay of the reverence with which Vergil's Fourth Eclogue was once regarded. That beautiful, playful, mysterious poem celebrated the expected birth of a child, by declaring it to mark the advent of a new Golden Age. For fourteen centuries this declaration was interpreted in only one way. From the first establishment of Christianity in the Roman empire, down to the days of Pope and Johnson, the title of this article would have been at once understood to refer to the Fourth Eclogue, and no one would have thought it natural to connect it with any other part of the poet's writings. Some scholars, indeed, might state more carefully than others the degree of consciousness of the meaning of the Eclogue which they attributed to its author; but that the poem was an inspired prediction of the Christian Messiah seemed both clear and good to every Christian eye. Modern commentators, however, protest with one voice that the child—if it existed at all—was some Roman infant of Vergil's own day and they lament over a belief which one of the most judicious of them describes, with quite theological warmth, "the ridiculous, and if it were not sincere, I might have said blasphemous, notion that the Eclogue contained an inspired Messianic prophecy."

We find, then, the critics of a particular epoch, though by

no means clear as to what the poem does mean, at least confident in declaring that all their predecessors were wrong; and they do not pause even to exempt from their censure the greatest student ever drawn to Vergil's poetry—so that a living and distinguished Oxford scholar accuses Dante of "ridiculous" if not "blasphemous" conduct. Under these distressing circumstances it may seem worth while to look into the poem for ourselves, to separate its central idea from the rest, and to ask what place that idea holds in other parts of Vergil's writings. For it can hardly, I think, be denied, that in both the *Georgics* and the *Aeneid* we continually meet with a conception which in many ways is parallel to the Jewish expectation of a Messiah; that is to say, the conception of a national hero and ruler, divinely inspired, and sent to deliver not his own nation only but mankind, raising them to a new and ethically higher existence. So far as I know, no attempt has been made to examine this question in the light of our present knowledge of Vergil.

The Fourth Eclogue is addressed to the Consul Pollio—at least if we are content, as honest persons[1] must be, to accept the reading of l. 12 which is given by all the manuscripts. Gaius Asinius Pollio was a distinguished member of Cæsar's party, soldier, statesman, and poet, in whose consulship, towards the end of the year 40 B.C., was expected the birth of the child which is the subject of the poem. Of the position of Roman affairs at that time we must take some note later on; here let us simply observe that Pollio was one of the friends to whom, a year sooner, Vergil owed the restoration of his father's farm, which for a time had been handed over to one of the countless "veterans" of Octavian's army "settled" on other men's lands. After invoking the muses of pastoral poetry to help him in higher strains than heretofore, Vergil

[1] The desperate "emendation" of Schaper, who (in the leading edition for schools in Germany) changes *Pollio* into *orbis* without the faintest critical warrant, has the beautiful (though unnoticed) result of making Lucina a consul; for she is the only person to whom *te consule* in l. 11 could then possibly refer, as the reader may see from the quotations below.

turns at once to his double theme, the return of the Golden Age, and the birth of a particular child. By a not uncommon accident of language the only Latin word for "child" is one that is masculine in form, namely *puer*; and hence it is natural, indeed almost inevitable, that the poet should write as if it were certain that the child would be a boy. And it is well to notice now that the lines which invoke Lucina, the Goddess of Birth, and the concluding prayer[1] that the mother's weary months of waiting may be happily ended, make it quite certain (to every reader, at least, whose sense of humour is not totally in abeyance) that it is not of some mystical moral emblem, but of an actual mother and child, that we are meant to think.

One of the sacred books of the Roman state-religion was a collection of rhymes and rubrics attributed to an ancient Wise Woman or Sibyll, though the collection in use in Vergil's day had in fact been compiled no earlier than 82 B.C., after a more ancient document had been burnt in the Sullan tumults. According to tradition, this Sibyll lived at Cumæ; and one of these rhymes seems to have improved on the familiar doctrine[2] of the four ages of the world—gold, silver, bronze, and iron—by declaring that the golden age, in which Saturn was king, and which ended when the Maiden Justitia (Δίκη or *Astræa*) left the earth, was soon to begin over again. The Roman astrologers, too, fired by the marvellous portent of the *Iulium sidus*, the comet which appeared soon after the murder of Julius Cæsar in 44 B.C., had been unusually busy; and, among other items of popular instruction, they had spread the belief that Cæsar's death had fallen in the "last month but one" of the "great year," or stellar cycle of the Etruscans, at the close of which the whole world was to begin its course anew. Such were some of the current conceptions that helped

[1] Matri longa decem tulerunt fastidia menses;
Incipe, parue puer, risu cognoscere matrem,
Incipe, parue puer.

[2] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 180.

to mould the form of the prophecy[1] to which the reader's attention is now invited.

"Lo, the last age of Cumæ's seer has come:
Again the great millennial æon dawns.
Once more appears the hallowed maid, once more
Kind Saturn reigns; and from high heaven descending
Comes a new offspring. But do thou, we pray,
Pure goddess, by whose grace on infant eyes
Daylight first breaks, smile softly on this babe.
For in his time the age of iron shall cease
And golden generations fill the world.
E'en now thy brother, lord of Light and Healing,
Apollo rules and ends the older day."

The lines thus roughly[2] rendered supplied, as we shall see, what may be called the kernel of the mediæval view of the poem.

The reference to Apollo is due to the Etruscan doctrine that the last period or "month" of the *magnus annus* was under his lordship; and the same bright deity had been chosen by Augustus for his special protector.

Vergil then turns to the patron to whom the ode is offered, and from whose consulship the year of the child's birth will be dated[3]:—

"Yea, by thy office, Pollio, men will name
The year this star began his glorious course.
Under thy banner, all that yet remain
Of our ill deeds shall be annulled and break
The long, long night of universal dread."

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[1] Lines 4–10: Ultima Cumæi uenit iam carminis ætas;
Magnus ab integro sæclorum nascitur ordo.
Iam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna;
Iam noua progenies cælo demittitur alto.
Tu modo nascenti puero, quo ferrea primum
Desinet et toto surget gens aurea mundo,
Casta faue Lucina, tuus iam regnat Apollo.

[2] And literally, except for the attempt to express the meaning which the proper names conveyed to the Latin reader.

[3] Lines 11–14: Teque adeo decus hoc æui, te consule, inibit,
Pollio, et incipient magni procedere menses;
Te duce si qua manent sceleris uestigia nostri
Inrita perpetua soluent formidine terras.
The meaning of this "night of dread" will appear clearly later on.

The rest of the poem pictures three stages in the unfolding of the new era, corresponding to the childhood, youth, and manhood of the boy himself. Upon the infant, earth lavishes unwonted gifts; flowers spring untended, and such flowers as make the fairest contrasts, crimson foxgloves on a background of wandering ivy, the soft leaves of water-lilies[1] and the glistening, pointed foliage of the acanthus. "The she-goats unbidden shall bring home their full udders, the cattle shall no longer fear great lions; . . . . the serpent shall perish, poisonous plants shall perish too; the balm of Assyria shall grow by the wayside."

The second stage comes when the child is "old enough to read of the prowess of ancient heroes and the great deeds of his father, and to learn what manly valour means." Nature will then double her bounty and add corn, wine, and honey to the flowers, without human toil. But men will not yet have understood their new blessings; "there will still remain within them a few traces of their ancient evil" (*Pauca tamen suberunt priscae uestigia fraudis*) which will bid them seek adventures over sea, build city walls, and plough the fields as of old. Again a band of heroes shall sail, like the Argonauts, to seek treasure in the unknown East, "another Achilles shall attack another Troy." There cannot be a great leader of men, thought Vergil, with nothing to conquer, at least in his youth. The picture of the new age is not all fairyland. Men will still have enough "original sin" (so Augustine understands the phrase[2]) to lead them into bold adventure. Or—if we may leave the allegory for a moment—the new ruler of the Roman world still has realms to subdue; the Parthians and Indians will give scope to his youthful ambition.

But Vergil cannot stop there. His dream would be left incomplete if it ended with the shout of triumph. "When sturdy age has made the child a man," mankind will have learnt to accept earth's bounty, and to force her gifts no

[1] Such seems to be the meaning of *colocasia*.

[2] *Civ. Dei*, 16, 27.

longer; the ground shall no longer suffer the harrow, nor the vineyard the pruning hook; the merchant shall no longer trouble the sea. Every man's needs shall be satisfied in his own land; instead of dyed stuffs from Tyre, there shall be goats with purple and saffron hair, and lambs with scarlet fleeces. And with these playful colours[1] the picture is complete. The imagery, indeed, covers a quite serious thought[2]—the contrast between the natural labour of the farmer and the frauds and cruelties of trade (at a time when every merchant ship had slaves for a part of her cargo). But its main purpose is to bring the reader back to the magical flowers beside the cradle, a cradle still waiting for its child. And so the poem closes with a greeting to the infant, rising to a higher note as the poet bids him enter upon a more than human course. Glories shall be his such as rewarded Hercules, the toiling servant of mankind,—a seat at the table of the gods, a goddess for his bride. Only let the mother's prayers be speedily answered and her weariness crowned with a baby's smile.

But who is the child? Why is the poet so strangely reticent of the name of its father? Why, indeed, said the early Christian Church, but that he was speaking greater things than he dared give a name to; that he and the Sibyll he is quoting were inspired to predict the advent of the Christ. The earliest recorded attempt (so far as I can find) to interpret the poem in this sense was that of the Emperor Constantine the Great. His biographer, Eusebius, the contemporary historian and bishop, attributes to him a "Speech to the Assembly of the Saints," which contains (cc. 19–21) an elaborate exposition of Vergil's Eclogue (Eusebius' record is, of course, in Greek). It is sincere and interesting, if not entirely edifying. The Emperor was very glad to connect his newly recognised[3]

[1] Far less strange to an Italian eye than to ours, as every traveller knows.

[2] This is worked out later on in one of the noblest passages in the *Georgics* (ii. 496–531).

[3] Here and in one or two other points of later history I owe some not unimportant corrections to the learning and kindness of my colleague, Professor T. F. Tout.

religion (313 A.D.) with the great traditions of the pagan empire. After quoting and expounding a "Sibylline" oracle (which is clearly a Christian forgery) on which he supposed Vergil's poem to be based, he proceeds from Vergil's opening prediction of a new generation and an unknown infant, and declares that the poet knew that he was writing of Christ, but wrapped the prophecy in an allegory in order to escape persecution. The chief figures of the poem are interpreted with somewhat appalling ingenuity. The *Virgo* is, of course, the Virgin Mary;[1] the "lions," who are no longer to be feared, are the persecutors of the Church; the serpent who shall perish is the serpent who betrayed Eve! The imperial commentator felt no hesitations; and he has at least given us an excellent demonstration of the way in which poetry should not be interpreted. One may be thankful that he has not laid hands on the saffron-coloured goats.

From Constantine and Eusebius we turn with relief to more thoughtful readers of Vergil. Augustine is never tired of quoting him,[2] and regards him with unbroken veneration, but ascribes[3] the actual prophecy of Christ in this Eclogue only to the Sibyll, and supposes that Vergil himself had no knowledge of the person to whom the prediction referred. He even acknowledges[4] that he would have been unwilling to

[1] The Greek rendering given for *Iam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna* is Ἥκει παρθένος αὖθις ἄγουσ' ἐρατὸν βασιλῆα, the latter half of which at first sight reads like a deliberate falsification. But a glance at the description of Saturn's descent to reign on earth given in *Aen.*, 8. 319–321, will, I think, be enough to defend the translator from the suspicion of conscious fraud. The knots of the last two lines were all cut by putting only a comma at *puer* and a full stop at *parentes*!

[2] See, for instance, the lemma *Vergilius* in any index to the *Civitas Dei*.

[3] *Civ. Dei*, 10. 27.

[4] *Epistolæ ad Romanos inchoata Expositio*, lib. i. c. 3. "Fuerunt enim et prophetæ non ipsius (dei) in quibus etiam aliqua inueniuntur quæ de Christo audita cecinerunt, sicut etiam de Sibylla dicitur: quod non facile crederem, nisi quod poetarum quidam in Romana lingua nobilissimus antequam diceret ea de innouatione sæculi quæ in Domini nostri Jesu Christi regnum satis concinere et conuenire uideantur, præposuit uersum, dicens, *Ultima Cumæi iam carminis ætas.*" Augustine's wording has the caution of a true scholar.

believe that the Sibyll had spoken of Christ (even by repeating "prophecies that had been heard") had not Vergil referred to her in this Eclogue,—for the reference of the Eclogue to Christ was to his mind too patent to admit of any reasonable doubt. So it came about that the *Dies iræ* (whatever its date) ranks the Sibyll side by side with David.

Such, too, was the belief of the poet Dante. Every one is familiar with the unique position of honour which Vergil holds in the *Divina Commedia* as the interpreter of the divine will and the poet's guide through two-thirds of the unseen world. Nor is this due merely to reverence for Vergil as a poet. Explicitly and many times Dante ascribes to him the power of converting men to a knowledge of divine truth.[1] At the outset, when Dante was lost in the *selva oscura*, the dark forest of worldly ambitions, it was Vergil who came to "lead him home" (*a ca' riduce mi*,—*Inf.* 15. 54) by a marvellous way; and it is Beatrice herself, the impersonation of divine grace, who has sent Vergil on his errand. As she commissions him[2] she declares, "When I stand before my Divine Master, I will often speak thy praise to Him." And in a passage[3] on which a flood of light has been recently thrown by Dr Verrall, Dante makes the poet Statius, whom he thought[4] to have been a Christian, attribute to Vergil, and to the Fourth Eclogue in particular, his own first interest in Christianity.

"What sun or what candles," asks Vergil,[5] "so dispelled thy darkness that thou didst direct thy sails to follow the Fisherman" (*i.e.* St. Peter)? And Statius replied: "Thou it was that first leddest me towards Parnassus . . . . and next

[1] On Dante's representation of the relation of Vergil to Christianity, I cannot do better than refer the reader to the very interesting and scholarly Excursus (to which I am not a little indebted), in Notter's *Dante's Göttliche Comödie übersetzt u. erläutert*, Stuttgart, 1871 (vol. i. p. 517).

[2] *Inferno*, 2. 73, and indeed the whole speech from l. 55.

[3] *Purg.*, 22. 61.

[4] The origin of this belief has been set beyond doubt by Dr Verrall's brilliant article, "To follow the Fisherman" (*Indep. Rev.*, i., 1903, p. 246).

[5] I quote from Mr Arthur Butler's admirable prose translation, with only occasional modifications.

didst light me on the road to God. Thou didst as one who goes by night, who bears a light behind him and helps not himself, but after him makes the people wise, when thou saidst, 'The world renews itself: justice returns and the first age of man; and a new offspring descends from Heaven.' Through thee I was a poet, through thee a Christian. . . . Already was the whole world teeming with the true belief, sown by the messages of the eternal realm: and thy word . . . . was in harmony with the new preachers, wherefore I began to visit them. And at last they came to seem to me so holy that when Domitian persecuted them, their plaints were not without tears from me. And so long as [I was] in the world I aided them, and their righteous manners made me hold all other philosophies of small price. . . . Thou then . . . . didst lift the covering that hid from me so much good."

In our own country it is scarcely two hundred years[1] since Pope published his *Messiah*, in the preface to which he accepts the view of Augustine, namely, that the prophecy of an unnamed child was taken by Vergil from the Sibyll, and in her lips had been a prediction of Christ. Pope followed the tradition of his own Church; but even that Protestant of Protestants, his critic Samuel Johnson,[2] does not seem for a moment to demur.

[1] 1709 is the date of the *Pastorals*.

[2] *Lives of the Poets* (ed. M. Arnold), p. 419.

Pope made an interesting contribution to the criticism of the Eclogue by collecting the six or seven passages in it, and the fifth Eclogue (which, as we now know, relates to the deification of Julius Cæsar) in which the poetical imagery resembles that of the similar prophecies of a regenerated world in Isaiah. Now it is true that Vergil's snake and lions do not behave quite like Isaiah's; true also that similar parallels can be found without difficulty, as the commentators show, in Greek and Latin poets; but their combination in one poem renders at least attractive, though perhaps not very probable, the ingenious theory of Mr H. W. Garrod (*Class. Rev.*, 1904, p. 37), that they were taken by Vergil from some poem of Pollio's own—since from Josephus it appears that Pollio had Jewish connexions, and it is possible that a Pharisee named Pollio (*Josephus*, 15. 1. 1) was actually related to him. But this literary problem seems to me distinct from the general question of Vergil's attitude towards Messianic doctrine.

In all this, then, we see that the outstanding reason for the Christian interpretation of the Eclogue was the fact that the child was not named. I have already expressed my conviction that Vergil had in mind a real child whose birth was expected. On the question what child it was whom Vergil meant, I can hardly do more[1] than state the conclusion to which I was led some time ago; but I do so with confidence, because I find that it has been reached by several distinguished scholars independently of one another—Henry Nettleship, Mr Warde Fowler, and one of the first of living German Latinists, Professor Skutsch[2] of Breslau.

The plain fact is, that the "father" who has given peace to the world can be no one but Octavian; the child who is to rule the world can have been in Vergil's mind no other than the heir to the empire, whose birth was expected in the latter half of 40 B.C., but who, in fact, was never born. To Octavian's bitter disappointment the child whom Scribonia bore him early in 39 B.C. was a girl, the Julia whose happiness was to be so deeply chequered by her father's dynastic designs. Scribonia was divorced upon the same day, having lost the one strong claim she might have possessed to the Emperor's gratitude.[3] But Vergil's Eclogue had been already published, and was itself, as an ante-natal ode must always be, more

[1] It is perhaps due to Mr Arthur Sidgwick, to whose lucid teaching our generation owes so much, that we should notice why his view must be rejected. He thought the child was the child of Pollio, and we know from Asconius that this particular youth did afterwards claim the honour, though we also know, as has been often pointed out, from the way in which the report is made, that Asconius did not think the claim to be justified. But, apart from all minor difficulties, who can believe that Pollio was the father of the child when Vergil only calls him the consul in whose year the child is to be born? One can only suppose it to be due to the unhappy obscurantist spirit which Professor Jowett made fashionable that so wise a critic as Mr Sidgwick could be content to believe that such a poem could be addressed to the father of such a child without a single word even alluding to his fatherhood.

[2] *Aus Vergil's Frühzeit*, pp. 148–160. Professor J. W. Mackail tells me, too, that he has now reached the same conclusion.

[3] Dio Cassius, 48. 34. There can be no doubt that this is the true interpretation of the divorce; it was given first, I believe, by Mr Warde Fowler (*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, xiv.).

concerned with the father than the child, more indeed with the hopes of the world than with either father or child. To cancel the poem later on would have been to draw men's attention to Scribonia's misfortune and the Emperor's greatest perplexity, his want of an heir; it was therefore allowed to stand, enigma though it had become.[1] Who could possibly have foretold the extraordinary influence upon the history of the world with which this wise and gentle silence was destined to endue the poet? Or that the authority derived from it would be great enough to model for many centuries, if not for all time, the whole Christian conception of the after-world upon the Vision of Æneas in the Sixth Book of the *Aeneid*?

If, then, we may at last leave behind us the controversies which have gathered round this particular fragment of Vergil's poetry, we come to a rather wider question. Do Vergil's other writings show anything like the hope of a Messiah; and if so, what kind of a Messiah do they foreshadow? We have seen that certain external coincidences with Christian tradition were merely accidental: is there beneath these any real harmony?

My contention may be briefly expressed in a few statements, some of which will be, I think, admitted at once. I believe that we may and must attribute to Vergil the conscious possession of certain ideas which may be roughly enumerated as follows:—

1. That mankind was unbearably guilty, and in urgent need of regeneration.

2. That the establishment of the Empire was an epoch strangely favourable to some such ethical movement, and intended by Providence to introduce it.

3. That it was part of the duty of Rome to attempt the task.

[1] Dr Rothstein pointed out to Skutsch a precise parallel, an unfulfilled prophecy (of an heir to Domitian) which still survives in Martial, vi. 3. It is difficult not to adopt John Henry Newman's famous apostrophe to Kingsley when one thinks of the worthy commentators who have declared that such a survival in poetry was inconceivable!

4. That one special deliverer would be sent by Providence (or, in the *Aeneid*, that a deliverer had already been sent) to begin the work.

5. That the work would involve suffering and disappointment; and that its essence lay in a new spirit, a new and more humane ideal.

Now if we can show that these were among the thoughts which moved Vergil, the admission will surely imply that, in the deepest and truest sense of the word, Vergil did "prophesy" the coming of Christianity. We should be justified in maintaining that he read the spiritual conditions of his time with profound insight, and with not less profound hope declared that some answer would be sent to the world's need. How much more than these two gifts of insight and faith men may take to be involved in the conception of a prophet we need not consider; for we shall all agree that no great religion will ever be content with less; no mere mechanical foreknowledge has ever been or will ever be enough to make a man a great teacher of his fellows. In inquiring, therefore, into Vergil's teaching upon such points as have been suggested, we are not following some curious by-way of literary study; we are at the very heart of the central movement of history, and touching the deepest forces that have made and are making mankind.

Of the points enumerated, only the last (if even that) can be called in any sense new. The others hardly need to be justified, save that we must examine the first a little more closely if we wish to realise what kind of a world it was in which Vergil lived and wrote.

No one who is even superficially acquainted with the terrible century before Augustus (say from 133–31 B.C.) will doubt that the sufferings caused to the world by the 'delirium' of its rulers[1] had reached an unbearable pitch. In that period of time Italy had seen twelve separate civil wars,[2] six of which

[1] Hor., *Epistles*, 1. 2. 14.

[2] Bellum Sociale; Bellum Octauianum; the return of Sulla; the wars of Lepidus, Sertorius, Spartacus, Catiline, Julius Cæsar, the Triumvirs; in 41 B.C.,

had involved many of the provinces; a long series of political murders, beginning with the Gracchi, and ending with Cæsar and Cicero; five deliberate, legalised massacres, from the drum-head court-martial,[1] which sentenced to death three thousand supposed followers of Gaius Gracchus, to the second proscription dictated by Mark Antony.[2] Men still spoke with a shudder[3] of the butchery of seven thousand Samnite prisoners in the hearing of the assembled Senate, and the boy Vergil would meet many men who had seen the last act of the struggle with Spartacus and his army of escaped gladiators —six thousand prisoners nailed on crosses along the whole length[4] of the busiest road in Italy, from Rome to Capua. And the long record of the oppression of the provinces year by year under every fresh governor is hardly less terrible. The chief causes of this chaos were the complete decay of civil control over the military forces of the empire; the growth of capitalism and the concentration of capital in the hands of the governing class at Rome; and the economic disorder springing from the methods of ancient warfare, especially the enormous growth of slavery and the depopulation of Italy. They are all summed up in that tremendous *Ergo* in the conclusion[5] of the First Georgic, which attributes the miseries of mankind directly to the just wrath of heaven.

> "Therefore it was that twice Philippi saw
> The clash of Roman hosts, both armed alike."

And the same evils have their place in the famous contrast between the peaceful toil of the farmer and the corrupt, reckless ambitions of political life, which closes the Second Georgic.

the year before the Fourth Eclogue, the Bellum Perusinum; and after that, before the Georgics were published, the naval war with Sextus Pompeius and the final conflict with Antony.

[1] Orosius, 5. 12.

[2] The three others were those of Marius and Sulla, and the execution of the followers of Spartacus.

[3] Cæsar, ap. Cic., *Ad Att.*, 9. 7c, 1.

[4] About one hundred and fifty miles; Appian, *Bell. Ciuil.*, 1, 120.

[5] Georg. 1. 489: Ergo inter sese paribus concurrere telis
Romanas acies iterum uidere Philippi.

Hardly even Cicero, and certainly no other man of that generation, felt the shame of that corruption as did Vergil. With burning scorn he points to the roads by which the greatest men[1] of his age had won their way to power.

> "Some fret with labouring oars the treacherous sea
> Eager to trade in slaughter, breaking through
> The pomp and sentinels of ancient kings.
> This man will storm a town and sack its homes,
> To drink from alabaster, sleep in purple.
> His rival hoards up gold and broods alone
> On buried treasure. That man's dream is set
> On power to sway a crowd by eloquence,
> Or so command the acclaim of high and low
> That vast assemblies at his coming vie
> To fill his ears with plaudits. There the victors
> March proud of brothers' blood upon their hands;
> Here steal the vanquished, torn from home and children,
> To seek new fatherlands in alien skies."

And in the *Aeneid*, who can forget the picture of the fall of Troy, with the concentrated pathos of its central scene, the butchery of Polites before his father's and his mother's eyes, and of Priam himself upon the steps of the altar? And what is the tremendous machinery of punishment after death which the Sixth Book describes in the most majestic passage[2] of all epic poetry but the measure of Vergil's sense of human guilt?

That the advent of the Empire, with the possibility which it offered of universal peace, seemed to Vergil the providential forerunner of even greater blessings, is clearly stated all through the *Aeneid*. Not less clear is the part which he deemed the temporal power of Rome was to play in the new growth of society; and almost equally clear is the function he assigns

[1] G. ii. 503–12. Every Roman reader must have felt the indictment which these lines framed against the first triumvirs, though not against them only: the oriental triumphs of Pompey with his enormous fleet: the cruelty of Cæsar's Gallic Wars (especially, perhaps, the siege and sack of Alesia); and the miser's wealth of their partner Crassus were clearly in the poet's mind.

[2] ii. 506–558. vi. 548–627. To see how far, at his greatest, Vergil towers above the Homeric level of thought, compare this passage with *Odyssey*, xi. 576–600.

to the idealised Augustus.[1] In other words, few readers of Vergil will doubt the truth of the next three steps in my argument. One comment only may be here permitted, though it is so simple that at first sight it may seem almost trivial. Free communication between different parts of the world was made possible by the new roads, the new postal system, and the complete suppression of war by land and of piracy by sea; and these things, which marked the accession of Augustus, lasted through the first three centuries of the Empire—precisely the period in which Christianity grew to be a world-religion. Has such freedom of travel ever been known again, I wonder, in any other three centuries of history? We may repeat a saying of Pope Leo the Great,[2] (440–461 A.D.), which anticipated many eloquent pages of Professor Freeman: "To the end that the fruit of God's unspeakable grace might be diffused throughout the world, the Divine Providence created beforehand the dominion of Rome."

We come now to my chief and last point, the character of the change that Vergil prophesied, and the spirit in which it was to be sought. And this will explain what may have seemed an inconsistency in the argument hitherto. How can you, it may be objected, see in Vergil's writings any anticipation of a spiritual Messiah, when Vergil declares that Augustus is the deliverer he celebrates, that Augustus' work is to bring the great reformation? If Vergil was in the end content to accept as the Deliverer a personality so full of blots, can we interpret seriously his loftier predictions? But such a criticism is based on a misconception. Vergil was not content with the past or present weaknesses of the particular human being called Octavian; he condemns roundly, as we have seen, the violent deeds linked with his earlier career; what Vergil extols is the vast service[3] which Augustus was visibly rendering to man-

[1] *E.g.*, G. i. *ad fin.* *Aen.*, i. 289–296.

[2] Quoted by Notter, *l.c.* p. 526. Ut enarrabilis gratiæ per totum mundum diffunderetur effectus, Romanum regnum divina providentia præparavit.

[3] This conception of service to humanity marks all the praise of Augustus in Vergil, as I have shown elsewhere (in the forthcoming *Proceedings of the*

kind, and the still higher service which seemed to lie in the new ideal of the Empire. In the passage devoted to Augustus in *Aeneid* vi., there is no mention of his triumphs in war; his first glory is the recall of the Golden Age of Justice;[1] the last, his journeying in peace through the Empire, like the traveller Hercules who tamed the wild beasts of the forests, like Liber who yoked his tigers to the chariot of harvest-rejoicing.

What, then, was the new ideal? It was the conception of peace by forgiveness, of conciliation instead of punishment, —in a word, the ideal of mercy. It was indeed for a part of this, that is, for just and humane government, that Cicero had lived and died; and from him Julius Cæsar had learnt, ere the end of his stormy career, the great political secret of forgetting offences; but the deeper ethical note, the human sympathy and tenderness of Vergil's appeal to the world, is all his own. In his great picture-gallery of Roman heroes,[2] nothing surely is more striking than the faint praise or open censure which he bestows on those who were merely great warriors, like King Tullus, the Tarquins, or Torquatus "of the cruel axe." Of Brutus, the first consul, who sentenced his own son to death for conspiring against the republic, Vergil's kindest word is *infelix*. Of Julius Cæsar we have nothing but a lament for his share in the Civil War,[3] and a prophetic entreaty to him (in the lips of Anchises) to be the first to throw away the sword; and in this delicate, poetic homage to the great dictator, who shall say if there is more praise than regret?

Among the characters with whom he peoples Elysium,

Classical Association, 1907), and separates it somewhat widely from the tributes of Propertius, Tibullus, and even of Horace; and by a great gulf from the abominable flatteries of Domitian in Martial.

[1] vi. 792. Aurea condet Sæcula qui rursus Latio regnata per arua Saturno quondam. [2] *Aen.*, vi. 756–846.

[3] *Aen.*, vi. 832–5. After prophesying the war between Cæsar and Pompey, Anchises continues:—

> Ne pueri, ne tanta animis adsuescite bella,
> Neu patriæ ualidas in uiscera uertite uires.
> Tuque prior, tu parce, genus qui ducis Olympo,
> Proice tela manu, sanguis meus.

Vergil sets the faithful warriors only at the beginning;[1] in the climax come the virtues of peace and human affection:

"Whoso through life kept priestly honour pure,
Or found new arts and made the world more fair,
They whose good service made their memory loved,
These all are crowned with wreaths of snowy wool."

And in the same vision of Anchises we have the famous description of the duty to which Rome is called:[2]—

"Others I well believe with finer touch
Shall kindle breath in forms of bronze, and carve
Faces of marble all aglow with life;
Others shall plead with greater eloquence,
Make chart of Heaven and tell the rising stars;
But choose thou, son of Rome, the imperial task
Of ruling peoples; this shall be thy art,
Show mercy to the humble, crush the proud,
And make the nations own the law of peace."

But the fullest embodiment of this conception is in the second half of the *Aeneid*. The story gives us a dramatic picture of the ideal ruler in conflict with the concrete forces of selfishness, passion, and ignorance; a picture more profound than any that the art of Homer ever essayed to draw, and for

[1] *Ibid.*, 662–5. And the warriors are only admitted because they "have suffered wounds in defending their country" (*ob patriam*, not merely *pro patria*).

Hic manus ob patriam pugnando uolnera passi,
Quique sacerdotes casti dum uita manebat,
Inuentas aut qui uitam excoluere per artes,
Quique sui memores alios fecere merendo,
Omnibus his niuea cinguntur tempora uitta.

It is impossible to translate words like *excoluere*, which suggests turning a wilderness into a garden; *artes*, which includes philosophic, artistic, and poetic creation as well as mechanical inventions: and *merendo*, which includes every form of service rendered to one's fellows; nor can the golden simplicity of the whole passage be conveyed by any translation.

[2] *Ibid.*, 847–53.

Excudent alii spirantia mollius æra,—
Credo equidem,—uiuos ducent de marmore uoltus:
Orabunt causas melius, cælique meatus
Describent radio et surgentia sidera dicent:
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento;
Hæ tibi erunt artes, pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.

that reason losing something of the fresh, boyish delight in stirring action that rings all through the battles on the Trojan plain. The whole fabric of Vergil's narrative, we can hardly doubt, is woven out of the impressions made upon him by the history[1] of his time; but we can trace here only its central thread, a thread of gold. The thought that shines through the story is that no such warfare ought to be; that it is not the natural but the unnatural, or as Vergil calls it, the "impious" way of settling human questions; that reasonableness and pity are the greatest prerogatives of power.

For observe that Æneas enters Italy not as an invader, but as a friend, no freebooter, but a pilgrim, seeking only to execute divine commands. The war is created by the powers of evil.

"Mischief, thou art afoot; take thou what course thou wilt," cries Shakspere's Antony, as the mob he has excited rush off to murder the innocent Cinna. It is the same cruel, unscrupulous passion which Vergil portrays when Juno[2] sends the Fury to incite the Latins to break faith with Æneas. This is her commission.

> "Thine is the power to embroil kind brothers' hands,
> Sink homes in hatred, light the father's pyre,
> And make his freeborn children dread the lash.
> A thousand names, a thousand mischiefs thou!
> Wake all thy cunning: tear their solemn treaty,
> Sow slanderous seed that blood may be the harvest,
> And fill at once hearts, voices, hands with war."

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[1] We can only note in passing how closely the enemies of Aeneas resemble the leaders of strife in Rome. The likeness of Turnus to Antony, of Mezentius to Catiline (both, by the way, Etruscans), of Latinus to Pompey, cannot be accidental. Still less is it by chance that the half-plebeian Drances represents with such eloquence the humane and law-abiding patriotism of Cicero, but, like Cicero, cannot resist the temptation to spoil a noble plea by one bitter shaft of invective (the word *pulsus*, in *Aen.*, 11. 366).

[2] *Aen.*, 7. 335–40.

> Tu potes unanimos armare in proelia fratres,
> Atque odiis uersare domos, tu uerbera tectis
> Funereasque inferre faces. Tibi nomina mille,
> Mille nocendi artes: fecundum concute pectus,
> Disiice compositam pacem, sere crimina belli;
> Arma uelit poscatque simul rapiatque iuventus.

To this spirit the brave, patient humanity of Æneas is in perpetual contrast. In words it is expressed clearly in his speech to the Latin envoys:[1] but the most striking, and, as one is attempted to say, the most un-Roman example, is his conflict with Lausus. Æneas is pressing Mezentius hard: his young son Lausus rushes in to save his father, and proudly insists on continuing the combat himself when Mezentius has retreated. In vain Æneas warns and tries to spare him; the Etruscans gather in support of Lausus, who will not be stayed until the spear of Æneas has pierced his heart. How does Æneas regard him then?[2]

> "But when he saw the dying look and face,
> The face so wondrous pale, Anchises' son
> Uttered a deep groan, pitying him, and stretched
> His right hand forth, as in his soul there rose
> The likeness of the love he bore his sire.
> 'Poor boy! What guerdon for thy glorious deeds,
> Say what, to match that mighty heart of thine
> Shall good Æneas yield thee? Those thine arms
> Wherein thou gloried'st, keep them; and thyself,
> If such desire can touch thee, to the shades
> And ashes of thy fathers I restore.'
>
> Then calls he the lad's followers, chiding them
> For laggards, and uplifts their fallen lord,
> His comely boyish hair all stained with blood."

There is no such scene in Homer, nor, unless I mistake, in any other poetry before that of Christian chivalry. And it is thrown into high relief by the contrast with the savagery of Turnus,[3] who allows no one but himself to slay the young prince Pallas, and cries, "Would that his father were here to see him fall."

In the crowning scene of the *Aeneid* this cruelty recoils on Turnus himself. As he lies defeated and begs for mercy, Æneas stays his hand and is about to spare even Turnus.

[1] *Aen.*, 11. 108–119.

[2] *Aen.*, 10. 821–832. The version is that of Mr James Rhoades, save that, greatly daring, I have made one or two slight changes at the end, where Mr Rhoades' beautiful lines seemed perhaps to have sacrificed some fraction of the strength of the Latin. I should perhaps add that this is the only one of the renderings of Vergil in this lecture which I have ventured to borrow.

[3] *Aen.*, 11. 443.

But his eye falls on the baldric of Pallas which Turnus had taken for himself, and his grief for Pallas rouses again the temper of the warrior and the judge. Turnus must die. "Pallas," he cries, "Pallas slays thee," and plunged his sword full in Turnus' breast. "The chill of death relaxed his frame, and moaning his spirit fled indignant through the darkness."[1] Moaning and indignant the defeated rebel ends his course: pitiful and indignant Vergil ends the story. The ruthless Turnus could not be trusted to live in the new era, but oh, the pity of his fall, the pity of his punishment. Nowhere more exquisitely does Vergil "stretch out his hands in longing for the further shore," nowhere more touchingly express his sense of the incompleteness of the greatest human triumph, than by this last line of the *Aeneid*, his last word to mankind. His hero has fought, has suffered long, has conquered; yet his conquest itself is cause for sorrow, because it shows that the deeper enemy, the wilfulness of human passion, has yet to be destroyed. Surely, if more than human breath ever moved in human utterance, some whisper at least of divine inspiration must be heard in such an ending to such a poem as this. In Dante's words we think of Vergil as of "one who goes by night and bears a light behind him, and after him makes the people wise." It was what we call an accident that gave to the author of the Fourth Eclogue such authority among Christians that his teaching was studied as almost an integral part of the Christian revelation; but it was not an accident that his teaching was so profound, so pure, so merciful. Understood in the only way possible to the mind of the early centuries, that Eclogue made him a direct prophet, and therefore an interpreter of Christ; and it is not the deepest students of Vergil who have thought him unworthy of that divine ministry.

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MANCHESTER, 1906.

[1] *Aen.*, 12. 952. Vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata per umbras. The Homeric warrior dies "moaning over his own fate," but not "indignant." Only Vergil has room for this touch. Observe that the ethical colour of the word is even stronger in Latin than in English because of its close association with *dignus* and *dignari*.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT AS INFLUENCED BY SEMITIC RELIGIOUS IDEAS.

THE REV. R. J. CAMPBELL, M.A.

THE word Atonement, which for so long a period has occupied a specially important place in Christian thought and experience, stands for certain ideas and moral values which have come to us through Hebrew religion, although it is not a literal translation of any single Old Testament term. It connotes a group of related religious conceptions rather than one simple homogeneous idea or doctrine. To attempt to convey the full force of the meaning of a complex term, employed in one language, by making use of a single term as its equivalent in another is to incur the danger of confusion of thought, as the history of Christian theology abundantly proves. To carry a term over from one language to another without some change of content or association is practically impossible. It is so even in the modern Western world, with its international civilisation and continuous interchange of ideas, as every European traveller knows. How much more impossible, therefore, does the task become when it is sought to trace the history of a highly complex idea or set of ideas, not only from one language to another, but from one civilisation to another, from East to West, and from the ancient to the modern world! But, as unquestionably our acquaintance with the idea of Atonement, and even with the word itself, is

derived mainly from Hebrew sources, a scientific investigation of those sources is necessary in order to understand its constituents; in other words, we must go to the Jewish sacred scriptures.

It might plausibly be maintained that this is just what we have been doing all along. Every treatise on the Atonement that has ever been written makes some reference to Old Testament sources. But it is not too much to say that, broadly speaking, the treatment of the Old Testament from this point of view has been uncritical and therefore unsound. It has been too commonly assumed that New Testament religion is the climax or fulfilment of a clear-cut, definite system known as the Mosaic dispensation. Now that, under the influence of the historical method, this kind of theologising has ceased to be legitimate, we are perhaps in danger of undervaluing, not only the Old Testament origins of the doctrine of Atonement, but the central importance of the doctrine itself. Where this is not so, the mode of presenting the doctrine is liable to be unconvincing, as witness Professor Denney's attempts to commend the doctrine to the modern mind. With all his clearness of thought and brilliance of style, Professor Denney's efforts are unsuccessful simply because he takes too much for granted in regard to his sources. It is of little use to analyse New Testament statements about the relation of the death of Christ to the forgiveness of sins, and such-like, unless we possess an accurate acquaintance with the historical and psychological background of those ideas. Some part of that background lies outside the Old Testament, as, for example, the influence of Greek thought mediated through Alexandria and the Syro-Greek dominion generally. Still, the main stream of historic development is best represented in Old Testament literature. It is not from Hebrew tradition chiefly, but from the Hebrew written word, that we have drawn so many of our theological conceptions. Israel in her turn drew from, and during her whole history was constantly influenced by,

the religious beliefs and practices of surrounding nations, especially those of kindred race. The roots of the Christian doctrine of Atonement are, as of old, to be sought in the Old Testament, but in the Old Testament read in the light thrown upon it by reference to the religious life of Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, Phœnicia, the Hittites, Scythians, Persians, and others. This vast field is only really beginning to be worked, and will certainly yield valuable results. Hebrew religion grew by differentiation out of the common Semitic stock, and its uniqueness arises from the fact that it had exceptional opportunities of receiving enrichment from the best that Israel's more powerful neighbours had produced. Israel, and Israel alone, had this particular kind of training, and it is from this that the uniqueness of her religion, such as it is, has sprung. She sojourned both in Egypt and Babylon, and she owed something to the comparatively elevated ethical teaching of her Persian deliverers and overlords. These successive experiences had the effect of developing rather than repressing the national consciousness, while at the same time deepening the content of inherited religious ideas. Had Israel ever possessed vast political power, the result would have been quite different: her religious influence in the world is largely due to the fact that she did not. She learned from her neighbours less by ruling than by being ruled. This close connection of Israel with the Semitic race in general has not received sufficient attention from those who have thought and written on the Atonement. It explains much that would be otherwise obscure in the Old Testament itself. Nor is her religious influence in the least dependent upon the traditional view of her descent from the patriarchs and her freedom from admixture with other nationalities. If there is a fact which historical research has placed beyond dispute, it is that Israel was as much a mixed race as any other people. It was only after the Captivity that national exclusiveness became pronounced and reflected itself in the sacred scriptures; and even after the Captivity Edom, the ancient foe against whom so many prophetic curses had

been directed, was somehow absorbed into the chosen people —as far as there was anything left to absorb.

Thus the best, and indeed the necessary, method of investigating the origins of the Old Testament doctrine of Atonement, and its bearing on the Christian development of the same idea, is to examine the psychology of Semitic religious beliefs, especially those pertaining to sacrifice. The Old Testament term which, in various forms, is rendered Atonement in our English version of the Scriptures has had a somewhat intricate history. There was one great annual religious feast called the Day of Atonement, on which the nation as a whole confessed its sin and readjusted its relationship to God. The ritual in connection with this Day of Atonement is described with some fulness in Leviticus xvi. It was the Good Friday of the Levitical system, as Delitzsch calls it. It was a day prepared for by fasting and humiliation. The people were enjoined to rest from every kind of work and to abstain from all fleshly indulgence for some time beforehand. On the great day itself a specially elaborate ceremonial had to be gone through. The high priest first selected a young bullock for what was called a sin-offering, and a ram for a burnt-offering, for himself and the priestly order. After having carefully washed himself, he put on penitential garments of white linen instead of the ordinary gorgeous golden vestments pertaining to his high office. He then took from the people a ram for a burnt-offering, and two goats for a sin-offering; one of the latter was chosen by lot to be offered to Jehovah, and the other to "Azazel"—an idea due remotely, perhaps, to Persian influences. When these preparations had been completed, the high priest offered the selected bullock "to make atonement for himself and for his house" (Lev. xvi. 6). He then filled a censer with coals from the altar of the burnt-offering, and, taking with him a handful of incense, entered the inner sanctuary or Most Holy Place, where he threw the incense upon the burning coals, thus causing a cloud of smoke to cover the ark of the covenant which was

kept there. At the same time, having dipped his hand in the blood of the sacrificed bullock, he proceeded to sprinkle it on the covering of the ark, known as the mercy seat. It is probable that "mercy seat" is not a very satisfactory rendering of this word. He also sprinkled the blood seven times on the space in front of this mercy seat. All this part of the ceremonial is stated in Leviticus to be necessary as making atonement for the high priest himself and his order. Afterwards he proceeded to kill the goat presented by the people, and which had fallen by lot to Jehovah. Once more he entered the Most Holy Place and sprinkled the blood of this second victim in the same manner as the first. In this way the inner sanctuary was supposed to be purified. A similar ceremony followed in the outer sanctuary or "tent of meeting." This latter portion of the ritual for the day is not described in detail in Leviticus, but in Exodus xxx. 10 we read that the blood of the sin-offering of atonement was placed on the golden altar of incense. No one but the high priest was allowed in the tabernacle while these ceremonies were in progress. When they were completed, the second of the two goats was brought near; the high priest placed both his hands upon its head, and confessed over it all the sins of the people. According to Leviticus, the animal was then led away into the wilderness by an attendant who was in readiness to perform this duty. The goat was let go in the wilderness "for Azazel," bearing upon it the guilt of the people. We learn from later Jewish sources that this particular victim was driven away with curses and pushed over a precipice. The high priest then returned to the Holy Place, discarded his linen garments, washed himself once more, put on his sacerdotal robes, and offered two more burnt-offerings for himself and for the people.

What was the meaning of all these strange ceremonies, so foreign to present-day ideas of worship? What was their intention? What were they supposed to effect? What moral significance, if any, can be attributed to them? Out of what

sense of need did they arise? What is their historical origin, so far as it can be ascertained? How do they stand related to what we now mean by Atonement? These questions are not all simple or easy to answer, but we are fortunately not without light upon them.

First, as to the word itself. The verb (*Kipper*), the root of which appears in the forms "atone," "atonement," and "mercy seat," apparently means *to cover*. In its Syriac parallels, according to such scholars as W. R. Smith, it means to "wipe out." Dr Driver, in his work on Deuteronomy in the International Critical Commentary (p. 425), gives preference to the Arabic form of the word = *to cover*, as best expressing the meaning of the Hebrew term. He thinks, however, that it is not thus employed in a purely literal sense, but always with a moral meaning, that is, with the idea of *conciliating* an offended person or *screening* an offence or an offender. In support of this view he adduces three applications. (1) Its primary sense is illustrated in such passages as Genesis xxxii. 31, where Jacob, in dread of Esau's anger, says, "I will *cover* his face with the present." Evidently here the idea is to conciliate a person, to blind him by a gift in such a way that he will overlook something. (2) In the distinctively priestly phraseology the subject of *Kipper* is usually the priest, and designates a sacrifice of some kind. In this usage it means to perform a propitiatory rite on behalf of someone; something has to be covered up or screened by this rite. (3) Sometimes God is the one who covers, or treats as covered, overlooks, pardons, condones, either the offender or the offence. In actual usage the primary sense of *covering* must have been greatly modified. On the other hand, Professor Deissmann, in his important article on the Mercy Seat, in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, tells us that the *Kappōreth* (rendered "mercy seat" in our version) was, in the priestly writings, identified with the gold plate which covered or formed the lid of the ark of God which was kept in the inner sanctuary. It was this lid which the high priest sprinkled with the sacrificial blood on the Day of Atonement.

But Deissman does not agree that the word originally meant a "covering"; its primary meaning was "an instrument of cleansing or propitiation." In the judgment of the present writer there are other and deeper psychological values suggested by the use of these terms. The mere etymological sense does not exhaust or wholly indicate their religious use and significance. The word Atonement is closely associated in the Old Testament with the idea of sacrifice, and hence does not invariably suggest the thought of propitiation or even of sin. It means something due from the soul to God, an offering which we ought to make and He ought to accept. Beneath this use of the word is the idea of community of life, and the solidarity of man with God, the source of all life. See the illuminating passage in Lev. xvii. 11: "For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given (*i.e.* ordained) it for you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls. For it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of its life." Here the thought of blameworthiness is not necessarily present. To make atonement is to recognise, assert, and act upon the knowledge of a common life of which God is the source.

To follow this part of the subject further would lead us into dim regions of philological speculation. Sufficient has been said, however, to indicate the principal elements in the Old Testament use of the root-word which in various forms appears as "atone," "atonement," and "mercy seat." The descriptive account given in Leviticus in the form of directions for the observance of the Day of Atonement professes to be of Mosaic origin. But it is of comparatively late date, and the introduction has been lost. A Mosaic origin for these elaborate prescriptions is of course impossible; they do not belong to a primitive age, but to a highly organised sacerdotal system. The institution itself does not belong to the pre-exilic period, for there is no reference to it in earlier Old Testament literature. The vivid consciousness of sin, so clearly evident from the nature of the ceremonial, has no place in early Israelitish religion any

more than in that of Semitic peoples generally. The institution can be traced to the time of Ezekiel, but no further. We learn from Zechariah that public fasts and days of national humiliation were enjoined during the Exile on account of the national misfortunes. Probably this is their first appearance in the religious life of the nation as a whole, although they are frequent enough in later Jewish history. Ezra and Nehemiah do not mention the Levitical Day of Atonement, although both speak of a yearly fast with confession of sin. It is clear, therefore, that the Day of Atonement must have been a comparatively late development, although it came in the end to be the most important in the Jewish ecclesiastical year. But the meaning and purpose of the institution are obvious enough. It is intended to be the occasion of a thorough purification of the whole nation and of every individual member thereof in their relation to Jehovah. There were many other sacrificial services throughout the year, but it was feared that there might be an accumulation of transgressions of which these took no cognisance. A covering sacrifice was required lest the ordinary sacrifices should fail of their effect and Jehovah abandon both sanctuary and worshippers. The Day of Atonement was therefore designed to deepen the national and individual sense of sin and dread of the judgments of God, while at the same time assuring the whole people of a fresh start, so to speak, in His favour and regard. National and individual holiness was renewed at this penitential season. It is not difficult to discover the essential meaning of the various ritual acts. The high priest himself approaches the altar as a penitent before he can do so as the representative of Israel. His ceremonial bathing, the wearing of a white linen garment instead of the ordinary sacerdotal robes, and the offering of a special sacrifice for the whole priestly order, are evidence of the nature of the ideas that underlay the entire system. The elaborate symbolism was designed to express contrition for sin and to secure by an offering the favour of a deity who might otherwise abandon

his people to the consequences of their misdeeds. That this was the chief element in the ideas underlying the institution is beyond question.

But no doubt the institution owes something to Babylonian influences. The great Jewish fast was kept in the autumn in the seventh month, and from the evening of the ninth day to the evening of the tenth. The first day of this particular month was reckoned as the beginning of a new year, and it was therefore in the fitness of things that these first ten days should be regarded as a kind of penitential season. But, according to Babylonian mythology, human destiny was decreed on New Year's Day and sealed on the tenth day after. It was therefore necessary to placate the deity, or at least to make sure of one's relation to him, before this particular day. The Babylonian pantheon was extensive. Every individual devoted himself to the service of some particular god or goddess, who in return was supposed to afford him protection and guidance. When any misfortune overtook the worshipper, he regarded it as a sign that his deity was angry about something and had therefore abandoned him to his own resources or had become his enemy. To be thus deserted was held to be a calamity, because of the innumerable dangers to which the soul was exposed from the action of powers seen and unseen. It was even possible to offend the tutelary deity without knowing it, so that even as a matter of precaution it was as well to maintain a propitiatory attitude. From the Babylonian religious literature, which is in process of being re-discovered at the present time, we obtain some startling parallels to Old Testament examples. The penitential psalms contain humble confessions of sin and prayers for divine assistance. The sacrificial system was most intricate; practically everything of value was considered a suitable offering to the deity, whichever it might be. Two things stand out clearly from our growing acquaintance with Babylonian religious ideas. One is that the conception of sin had very little ethical content, and the other is that temporal

misfortune was a sign of the displeasure of the gods or of a cessation of their interest. Hence the great object of worship was to secure and retain the somewhat capricious favour of these various deities. The new-year period was held to be of special importance because of its bearing on individual welfare by the good or evil decision of the gods. Our present-day custom of wishing our friends a happy new year has probably a closer connection with Babylonian ideas than is commonly supposed.

It can hardly have been otherwise than that Israel should have absorbed some Babylonian religious influences, especially during the long captivity which ended about the middle of the sixth century B.C. All the national pride and resentment against the conqueror would fail to be proof against daily association and the lapse of time. Amongst the ideas which germinated into institutions after the return, or even during the Exile itself, was that of the new-year purification or renewal of the covenant with the particular deity chosen by the worshipper. To Israel, of course, this deity was Jehovah. There are ethical elements in the Jewish form of the institution which are wanting in the Babylonian, but the object to be secured is fundamentally the same: the people seek to be put right with God; possible causes of offence are to be removed; Jehovah must be rendered favourable by offerings of a sacrificial character. The root-idea of the institution of the Day of Atonement is therefore plainly and simply that of propitiating God, or making sure of the harmonious character of the national relations with Him.

Nor was this idea wholly unworthy even under its most repellent aspects. It was based upon considerations which are implied in the most elevated monotheism. The chief of these is the belief in a community of life between the deity and his worshippers. It was held that the deity, whoever he might be was at once the source and the guardian of the life of the clan or tribe, the blood-relation of his worshippers. This does not apply to the minor divinities, the demons of wood and stream

but to the ethnic gods, such as the Chemosh of Moab, the Dagon of the Philistines, the Yahweh of Israel. As the giver and protector of life, the deity was entitled to the best of its fruits, whatever they might be. Hence the Semite offered to his god the firstlings of his crops, his flocks and herds, and even—in seasons of special stress and calamity—the children of his own body. A further idea underlying the practice of sacrifice was that of the solidarity of the individual with the community. Personality, as we know it, had not emerged. The individual had no life of his own, and no value, apart from that of the clan or tribe. Hence, when communal offering was made to the deity, this relationship of the unit to the whole was emphasised. It will be seen at once that underneath such considerations as these there is a great truth which is the life both of religion and morality in all time, namely, the solidarity of the individual with the race and with God, the source of all. Thus sacrifice was mainly of a joyous character. There was a Babylonian saying that sacrifice enlarges life. When the worshipper dedicated his possessions to God he but rendered to Him His own. In the shedding of blood he symbolically offered himself, for the blood was supposed to be the seat of the life or soul. It was only in time of war, pestilence, famine, or other exceptional calamity that the more terrible kinds of sacrifice were offered. Hence, when a Semitic mother gave her babe as a blood-offering she was really doing something which was not wholly superstitious and horrible, sad and awful as it must have been. She was giving something dearer than her own life for the life of the whole. She had been taught that this was an offering acceptable to the deity from whom the life came, acceptable because the greatest demand that could be made upon the worshipper. Was there not a sublime truth struggling for expression here? Christianity has deepened and clarified this idea, but has not superseded it; it never can; for the highest morality and highest religion alike affirm it, stripped of all its horrific associations. It is the truth that

the noblest individual life is the life which is lived in terms of the whole, the life which is the most perfect gift to the life of the whole. This truth was present in Semitic religion from the first, although it was only after ages of travail that it became freed from ritual entanglements. Israel was fortunate in possessing, what no other nation did in the same degree—although all Semites had them—her teachers of ethical and religious truth, called prophets. No doubt the majority of these simply spoke the language of their time, but no generation was without its outstanding man who tried to rescue the spiritual idea from its materialistic associations. And yet it was through these associations that that idea first found expression.

It should be noted that never at any time was the Day of Atonement held to mean a complete amnesty for all kinds of sin. The thief or murderer had to expiate his offence all the same; no ceremonial purification availed for him. His crime being an injury inflicted upon the communal life, the community had to take measures to protect itself against him. Protestant theology in its adaptations of the Old Testament conception of Atonement has not paid much attention to this, or, at any rate, it has separated between man's duty to God and his duty towards his neighbour. From this dualism certain artificialities have risen in connection with the doctrine of sin, a doctrine which urgently requires to be restated in terms of ethics and common sense. If the conception of sin has been of slow growth, and has deepened with the increase of individual self-consciousness, it is equally true that it has acquired some morbid accretions in the course of its Christian history. Why not say that, as the true life is the life lived in terms of the whole, so the false life is the self-life? Every possible activity of human nature is either whole-wards or self-wards. If the latter, it is away from God as well as from man. The vague language employed about sin is often misleading; sin is selfishness. This the primitive Semites dimly saw. To them separation from their deity was the one great calamity

which laid the way open for the inroad of all other mischiefs. To be right with the deity was communal health; for any individual to offend against the latter was to offend against Him. Thus forgiveness, in the sense of escaping punishment for an individual offence, was not thought of. The sacrificial system was, in fact, the antithesis of this; it was the symbolic offering of the individual and the community as a whole to the deity as the truest self-fulfilment. This thought preceded any thought about sin; sin was turning the back upon this ideal, and had, therefore, to bear its consequences.

It is not difficult to see the bearing of these ideas on the symbolism of New Testament language concerning the sacrifice of Christ. That symbolism never deceived the New Testament writers themselves, but it has deceived many since. The Pauline theory of Atonement is not self-consistent if regarded as exact statement, instead of what it really is, a symbolical or analogical presentation of the ethical and religious values presumed in the Old Testament sacrificial system and applied to the work of Christ. Neither are the theories of the Johannine writers, and that of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, consistent with Paul, save in the fact that they are an elaboration of the same Old Testament ideas applied to the ethical and religious content of the self-offering of Jesus. Naturally the language for the conveyance of these ideas is borrowed from the Old Testament, just because the truths to be expressed are fundamentally the same, although deepened and purified. It is a pity that they should ever again have become materialised as they have been in Christian soteriology. Deep down beneath Semitic modes of worship there is, as we have seen, the truth that the most acceptable offering to the deity is that which demands the most from the individual for the life of the race. This is the true Atonement, and there is not, and never has been, any other. It is the fundamental principle both of morality and religion. In the life and death of Jesus, according to primitive Christian

experience, this principle was consistently expressed for the first time in human history. Jesus not only taught but lived the truth that the true life for mankind was the life of perfect harmony with God, the life of love. In a limited world like ours this implies sacrifice, for love is not a mere sentiment, but the perception of the essential oneness of all mankind in God and the impulse to realise that oneness. The life of Jesus did this, but if it had not been crowned by a Calvary it would not have had the power it has ever since possessed over the hearts and consciences of men. He had been living his life for the world all along; the world then tore it away from him altogether, and he submitted without making any effort to avoid the inevitable outcome of the life he had been living amid the conditions of his time. Here at its highest and best are the fundamental principles of Old Testament sacrifice. No offering has ever been made to God for man otherwise than through man. That a life was once lived in terms of the whole, and took the consequences of so doing, was the true Atonement, whose full effect will be realised only when the whole race has become conformed to its spirit and likeness.

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LONDON.

A GRAVE PERIL TO THE LIBERTY OF CHURCHMEN.

THE ECCLESIASTICAL DISCIPLINE REPORT.

THE REV. HASTINGS RASHDALL, D. LITT.

THE unanimity of the Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline gives weight to its report, and increases the probability that legislation on the lines recommended therein may shortly be attempted in Parliament. I propose in this article to discuss the matter chiefly from the point of view of its bearing upon the prospects of Liberal Theology in the Church of England.

With many of the recommendations few sensible people will be disposed to quarrel. That the bishops should have some power of enforcing obedience to the law of which they are the appointed guardians without incurring a heavy and indefinite liability for legal expenses; that parishioners should have some power to secure themselves against having unaccustomed ritual vagaries thrust upon them by the caprice of an individual clergyman; that, instead of haggling over the interpretation of ancient or obscure rubrics, some living authority should have the opportunity of definitely saying what English clergymen of the twentieth century are to wear, and how they are to behave in church—these are matters in which there is not room for much difference of opinion on the part of those who, on the one hand, wish well to the Church of England, and, on the other, have no desire to turn it into a paler imitation of the Church of Rome. When

the question is raised what this living authority should be, more difference of opinion is no doubt likely to emerge. Much might be said as to the unsuitability of any existing authority really to represent "the mind of the Church" or of the Nation on such matters. Parliament is obviously unwilling to enter upon discussions as to "Reservation" and the use of incense; and, whatever may be thought about its intrinsic right to legislate upon such matters, it is certain that, in the present state of ecclesiastical opinion, any attempt on the part of Parliament to settle them by its sole authority would only be followed by a fresh outburst of "lawlessness" and a great increase in the number of Reservationists, Incense-burners, and the like. The Convocations are distrusted by some because they represent an exclusively clerical opinion, by others because they do not sufficiently represent clerical opinion; by some because the large proportion of official as compared with elected members in the lower houses secures but a doubtful representation of the beneficed clergy, by others because it does not represent the unbeneficed clergy at all. Whether the dignitaries, who are appointed either directly by the Crown or by Crown-appointed bishops, may or may not be said to represent the "sanior," if they do not represent the "major," part of the clergy; whether the decisions of the unbeneficed would or would not be more enlightened than that of the beneficed clergy—these are questions on which, no doubt, different opinions might be held. Whether, again, a body of rather clerically-minded laymen, put forward very often by clerical, or at least by upper-class, suggestion, would at present be likely to represent either the most numerous or the most intelligent section of lay opinion, is also open to doubt. But with all their defects the Convocations have one great advantage over any more ideal ecclesiastical legislature that might be suggested. They exist: and for some time to come no other legally-constituted representation of the Church of England is at all likely to exist. No doubt, from many points of view, the practical paralysis of "spiritual

authority" in the Church of England is to many of the Church's best friends a most welcome fact. If attempts to adapt the liturgy, the usages, and the organisation of the Church to modern requirements are thereby rendered difficult, we are at least preserved from reaction—from new doctrines or new and narrower interpretations of old ones, from fresh "pronouncements," new-fangled services, medieval revivals, or innovations of any kind. While the old formulæ remain, opinion as to their interpretation gradually matures, develops, expands. But in such matters as those with which the Commission has been chiefly occupied, there is no reason to anticipate that any action of Convocation would be other than that which is desired by the great mass of non-romanising members of the Church of England. There is not the slightest fear of the four houses of Convocation agreeing upon a canon or a new rubric authorising Reservation, at least in any of its more objectionable forms, or incense, or the adoration of the Cross, or Communions without communicants, or the "Stations of the Cross," or "portable lights," or new devotions and services of a non-Anglican or anti-Protestant character, or any of the practices which must obviously tend to alienate the mass of sensible and intelligent laymen. If they did attempt anything of the kind, it is inconceivable that the present or any other Government would advise the King to sanction the promulgation of such a canon. If it wanted to do so, Parliament would not fail to interfere; and if it were proposed to alter or repeal a rubric, an Act of Parliament would be necessary, and no such Act would have a chance of passing. It is, of course, possible to urge—and with reason—that the state of the law on such matters, from any conceivable point of view, is already clear enough, and that the Ritualists have nothing to say for themselves except upon the principle that no possible law—of Parliament or of Convocation; no possible living authority, episcopal, clerical, lay; no requirement, however explicit, of Prayer-book or Canon or Article—is of any avail against a supposed

consensus of "Catholic usage" interpreted at the will and pleasure of each individual rector or vicar. But at all events there are plausible arguments which, as a matter of fact, procure for the extremists the sympathies of many who are not extremists. If a new canon could reconcile the conscience of a Ritualist to obeying his bishop, it is a pity that the experiment should not be tried. If a clergyman persisted in burning incense in face of a canon of Convocation enacting that incense was not to be burned, and were deprived for doing so, he would meet with few sympathisers among any section of clergy or laity which it is desirable or possible to conciliate. For these reasons I do not regard the prospect of legislation on such matters by Convocation with the horror and alarm expressed by Liberal Churchmen such as Canon Henson and Mr Paul. It seems to me that it is impossible to "put down" Ritualism except by means which will commend themselves to the principles, and even the prejudices, of the mass of moderate High Churchmen.

There is only one matter about which it is doubtful whether canonical legislation of any kind might not be less desirable than the *status quo*. The position of vestments in the Church of England is rather different from that of most other disputed matters of ritual. It is unquestionably illegal by Privy Council law: yet there is more to be said against the Privy Council interpretation of the Ornaments rubric than there has been in respect of any of the disputed usages since the Lincoln Judgment conceded the eastward position and other points contended for by moderate High Churchmen. No serious attempt has for a long time been made by legal prosecution or by episcopal pressure to compel the disuse of vestments, at least in churches where it has been once established; on the other hand, there has been strong episcopal dissuasion from the further extension of the practice, and with such success that the churches in which vestments are worn are still in a minority of about one in ten throughout the country. There is none of the ritualistic innovations which in itself is

more harmless; there is nothing particularly shocking or un-Protestant in a clergyman of the Church of England dressing like a Norwegian pastor. And yet the re-introduction of these vestments after three centuries of disuse cannot help presenting itself to the ordinary layman as a harking back to pre-Reformation ideas about the Eucharist. There is probably no ritualistic innovation (except incessant bowings and prostrations) which is more offensive to the average lay mind, or which has done more to produce a feeling of alienation and disgust in the minds of average churchmen against the system with which it is associated. But still it is a practice which has been adopted by a tenth of the clergy, and is theoretically valued by many more who are sensible enough not to offend their parishioners by adopting it. Under these circumstances it is doubtful whether a law against the use of vestments could really be carried through Convocation and enforced by the bishops. Yet even a permissive sanction to the use of vestments would probably do much to extend that use. But so many things might happen to prevent any such action—failure of the four houses of Convocation to come to an exact agreement, the veto of the Government, the refusal of Parliament to pass an act repealing the Ornaments rubric, which would in this case be necessary—that it is not worth while to resist any reasonable and practicable improvement of the present situation for fear of this rather problematical lion in the path.

So far, then, as the Commissioners recommend that Convocation should be allowed to legislate upon the matter at issue, there is, as it seems to me, nothing to be said against this recommendation from the point of view of comprehension or of liberality. The enactment of canons on such matters is not likely to end in turning out of the Church any section except those clerical followers of Lord Halifax who deliberately and openly say that they will not obey any living authority in the Church or realm of England, when its decisions happen to militate against their private interpretation (in the teeth of all

learning and all history) of the requirements of "Catholic usage." These might, no doubt, be called upon to submit or to go. It is extremely unlikely that many of them would adopt the latter alternative: if they did so, I cannot imagine anything which would strengthen the Church of England more than a moderate exodus of such extremists. I believe that every Ritualist turned out would secure a sensible candidate for orders who is now repelled by the recent orgy of reaction.

For my own part, therefore, I rejoice that the Government have taken the first step towards carrying out the recommendation of the Commissioners by granting letters of business to the Convocations. But there is another side to the Commissioners' report which will be received in a very different spirit by those who value the comprehensive character of the Church of England—by those who agree with Archbishop Temple that the existence within moderate limits of uniformity in practice is not only not opposed to, but is the condition of, large varieties of theological opinion among the clergy and laity of the Church, and who do not want the Church of England to be made narrower by the suppression of any of the recognised types of theological opinion within it, least of all of the most liberal and progressive section of opinion.

The recommendation to which I refer relates to the ultimate court of appeal in ecclesiastical matters. The Commissioners do not, indeed, recommend any change in the constitution of the Court of Final Appeal. But the most dangerous of their recommendations is that "where, in an appeal before the Final Court, which involves charges of heresy or breach of ritual, any question touching the doctrine or use of the Church of England shall be in controversy, which question is not, in the opinion of the court, governed by the plain language of documents having the force of Acts of Parliament, and involves the doctrine or use of the Church of England proper to be applied to the facts found by the court, such question shall be referred to an assembly of the

Archbishops and Bishops of both Provinces, who shall be entitled to call in such advice as they may think fit; and the opinion of the majority of such assembly of the Archbishops and Bishops with regard to any question so submitted to them shall be binding on the court for the purposes of such appeal."

The one feature of the Church of England's constitution which has secured that measure of toleration, of liberty, and of liberality which it enjoys, has been the existence of a final Court of Appeal constituted for the most part by laymen and lawyers.[1] It is not only the Broad Church party or the more liberal section of the High and the Low Church that owes its existence at the present moment to the drily legal and statesmanlike tone which has characterised the decisions of the much-abused Judicial Committee. Not only would those moderately liberal opinions—those views about biblical inspiration and canonicity which are no longer regarded as notes of heresy—most infallibly have been condemned and rendered impossible in the Church of England, had the decision of such matters rested with any exclusively clerical assembly, with an archbishop, with the Upper Houses of Convocation, with both houses—probably even with individual ecclesiastical lawyers appointed by any ecclesiastical authority; but the characteristic opinions of both High and Low, most unquestionably of all the opinions of Lord Halifax and his friends, would certainly have been disallowed by any such Court of Final Appeal as they profess nowadays to desire. Every party of the Church of England has been brought before ecclesiastical tribunals, and has been condemned: every party in the Church of England has appealed to a secular court, and been acquitted. In 1847 there was the famous Gorham case. Philpotts, Bishop of Exeter, a learned but bigoted and intolerant High Churchman of the

[1] At one time, as is well known, the two Archbishops and the Bishop of London sat as Privy Councillors. At the present time an Archbishop and four Bishops sit only as Assessors. I do not know that the Court has been strengthened by the change. Archbishops are usually cautious and moderate.

pre-Oxford-movement days, refused to institute George Cornelius Gorham, a distinguished and typical Low Churchman, a Third Wrangler and former Fellow of St John's, to a benefice in his diocese on account of his denial of the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration. He appealed to the Dean of the Arches, and was upheld: the Judicial Committee reversed the decision, and Gorham was instituted by archiepiscopal authority, the bishop declaring that he would rather go to prison than perform that act. In 1856 Archdeacon Denison was deprived of all his preferments by the Archbishop of Canterbury in person for holding that doctrine of the real presence which is now professed by perhaps five-eighths of the clergy. As the Archbishop had acted as Guardian of the Spiritualities during the vacancy of Bath and Wells, there was, it appears to have been held (a most extraordinary interpretation of the law), an appeal to the archbishop's own judge, the Dean of the Arches. No scruples about the sacredness of episcopal authority or the profaneness of lay intrusion into spiritual judicature prevented the accused champion of spiritual independence from appealing to the lawyer, and keeping his archdeaconry. On account of their articles in *Essays and Reviews*, Rowland Williams and Henry Bristow Wilson were, in 1860, brought before the Arches Court for holding opinions about Inspiration, Canonicity, the Doctrine of Atonement, and the non-eternity of future punishment, which are no longer confined to the Broad Church party. Many of the incriminated passages could be easily paralleled from the works of the Bishop of Birmingham, and some which could not would find support in the writings of Bishop Westcott. Many of the Articles of Charge were indeed disallowed by the lawyerlike and scholarly judgment of Dr Lushington; but the two clergymen were condemned for others, and won their liberty only by appealing to the Judicial Committee. But what would have been the fate of these men, had the matter been referred to the episcopal bench of the fifties? The bishops of those days were not for the most part bigots, but they were ignorant of critical

theology, and extremely timid. In Convocation they did extra-judicially condemn, not merely the strong articles of Williams and Wilson, but also the very moderate one of Temple. There can be little doubt that, had they been acting in a judicial capacity, their judgment would have been the same. There can be equally little doubt that it would have gone hard with Denison or any other High Churchman had they been brought before any such tribunal. In only one case is it in the least likely that there would have been an acquittal. In condemning Gorham, Bishop Philpotts had condemned what was probably the opinion of many of his episcopal brethren, though it was not till a few years afterwards that Lord Shaftesbury began to crowd the bench with men of Gorham's party.

But it is not merely a distrust of episcopal judges in the matter of heresy which will excite in many minds intense alarm at this feature of the Commissioners' report. Some bishops would make much better and more impartial judges than some lawyers. Individual lawyers, when they happen to have strong theological opinions, are apt to have their decision swayed by theological prejudice hardly less than ecclesiastics. When, for instance, the present Mr Justice Phillimore, as Chancellor of Lincoln, and the late Sir Robert Phillimore, as Dean of Arches, supported the action of a clergyman in refusing to allow a Nonconformist minister to describe himself on a tombstone as "reverend," they were as much influenced by theological prejudice as Bishop Wordsworth of Lincoln, who also supported the clergyman's action.

There are no doubt now, and perhaps always have been, individual bishops whom an avowed Broad Churchman would have less reason to distrust than many really eminent lawyers whom one could mention. But a court consisting of many lawyers of the highest rank is more likely to represent the enlightened public opinion of the day—to be less pre-occupied with the desire to suppress heresy and more mindful of the dangers of hastily suppressing new opinions, even new opinions

which, as individuals, they do not share—than the general average of bishops. But it is not so much the constitution of the Upper Houses of Convocation which will cause the proposal of the Commissioners to be received with suspicion and distrust. The great security for liberty in the Church of England has lain, not merely in the constitution of the court, and particularly of the final Court of Appeal, but in the purely judicial manner in which prosecutions for heresy have been dealt with. It has always been strongly insisted upon by the judges that they have nothing to do with determining the question whether the opinions of the Rev. A. B. were sound or unsound, heretical or orthodox—still less with determining in general terms what precisely was "the teaching of the Church of England" on such and such a point. They had simply to decide whether the actual words spoken or printed by him (no matter what they might suggest as to the probable state of his heart or his head) were so plainly and so seriously inconsistent with any possible interpretation of the letter of the formularies, and especially (as has been laid down) of the articles, the only part of the formularies which was drawn up expressly as a standard of doctrine, as to call for judicial censure and punishment. As lawyers, the judges have always remembered that they were trying not merely a case, but a criminal case in which every possible advantage and loophole of escape was to be given to the accused. As statesmen and men of the world, they have remembered that it was extremely undesirable that even rash and ill-considered expressions of theological opinion should be so dealt with as to put a stop to as much freedom of thought and discussion among the clergy of the Church as was consistent with the nature of a definitely Christian society. They have remembered that they were dealing with a great national institution, not with a sect: that they were the guardians of liberty, not only for the immediate present but for a long future. Even when, as individuals, they might have little enough sympathy with the incriminated opinion, they have remembered that

their decision, when it was favourable to the accused, could affect only an individual case; while, if it were hostile, it might exclude from the Church of England a type of opinion which might represent the theology of the future. They have remembered that, if Baptismal Regeneration was a doctrine of the Church of England, it would be none the less so because Mr Gorham were allowed to minister to the parishioners of Brampford Speke: while, if Mr Gorham were practically expelled from the ministry, it might have led to the expulsion or secession of many hundreds of devoted clergymen. It is not merely in the actual decision that the legal character of the proceedings offers so many advantages to the accused. The whole atmosphere of the inquiry is that of a court, and (in a sense) of a secular court, not that of a synod. The accused can appear by counsel: his counsel are at liberty to interpret his words in the most favourable sense, to emphasise his reservations, his qualifications, his hesitations, his silences: the accused need not open his lips, or offer himself for examination: he may sit by, while his counsel argues that he has not said what he has certainly thought, that he may conceivably have meant what he certainly did not mean, that the formularies of the Church of England may mean what every theologian and every historian knows very well that they were deliberately intended to exclude. I will not stay to argue whether this is or is not a desirable state of things. I will only add that it is only because these matters would be treated in this way by the Judicial Committee that the majority of the present Archbishops and Bishops could hope for an acquittal, if their least orthodox opinions were to be brought under the notice of a court of law. My argument is addressed to those who are anxious that this liberty and comprehension should be extended rather than diminished.

I contend that, if the recommendations of the Commissioners are to be carried out, all this will be altered. The point of my objection is not merely that the two Upper

Houses of Convocation will be substituted for the Judicial Committee. At the present day, and so long as the bishops are appointed by the Crown, I do not doubt that the attitude of an episcopal assembly upon a prosecution for heresy would be, within limits, tolerant, open-minded, judicial, though hardly so favourable to decidedly liberal opinions as a judicial committee presided over and selected by the present Lord Chancellor, and including (say) Lord Davey, Lord Lindley, and Lord M'Naghten. But the bishops are not to sit as judges. They are not to be consulted as judges: they are not to be asked whether they think A. B. has so flatly contradicted the formularies of the Church that he ought to be deprived. They are to be consulted apparently (the suggestion has a humorous side) as theologians; they are to be asked, not whether A. B. ought to be deprived, but in an abstract way whether such and such a tenet is in accordance with the teaching of the Church of England, or perhaps the still more abstract question, What is the doctrine of the Church of England on such and such a matter? The interpretation of the formularies which might have been permissible before the bishops spoke would appear to be closed after a decision of the episcopal bench. Bishop Colenso was deprived, deposed, and excommunicated by Bishop Gray of Cape Town for saying (*inter alia*) that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses: and that prelate expressly claimed that, in interpreting the doctrines of the Church of England, he was not limited to the letter of the formularies, but was at liberty to take into account the authority of the Fathers and the general stream of Catholic tradition, Now suppose Bishop Colenso had continued an English clergyman, and had been led in time by his own reflections to the conclusions which were, in fact, precipitated by the penetrating questions of a Zulu theologian. It is barely possible that, had the bench of bishops heard the case against him in a judicial way, they might, after listening to the arguments of counsel and being assisted in their deliberations by the Vicar-General of

the Province or some other trained lawyer, have acquitted the accused on this particular charge, though his ideas on the Atonement might have met with less indulgence. But supposing the question had been put in a general way to the Court, "Is a denial of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, or an assertion of the uninspired and fallible character of its arithmetic and chronology, consistent with the doctrine of the Church of England?" it may be doubted whether the decision would have been more favourable to the higher criticism than the recent pronouncement upon these points of the Vatican and its advisers. Or if it be contended that this is ancient history, let us put a more recent case. It is generally understood (though I pretend to no private information on the subject) that the present Bishop of Birmingham was nearly refused ordination by the then Bishop of Oxford (Mackarness) on account of his views about the Old Testament. I do not doubt that had he, thirteen years afterwards, been accused of heresy on account of the views expressed in *Lux Mundi*, there would have been enough good sense and moderation on the episcopal bench to procure his acquittal; but, supposing the question had been put to the bishops, "Is it consistent with the doctrine of the Church of England to assert that the account of the Fall is a myth?" I very much doubt whether the majority would have ventured to assert that it was. Clerical opinion might even then have favoured an acquittal, though those who remember the newspaper correspondence and pamphlets of the time will not be too sure of that. It may be doubted whether the bishops would have consented actually to write themselves down heretics by pronouncing the mythical view of Gen. iii. to be orthodox, or even allowable. No doubt, since those days things have changed. The heretic against whom orthodox pamphlets and newspapers thundered in 1889 is now (next to Lord Halifax) the nearest approach to a theological Pope that the Anglican system can tolerate; but even Dr Gore can hardly persuade his right reverend brethren to agree upon any

definite dealing with the Athanasian Creed. What would happen if a clergyman had suggested that a Unitarian might be saved, and the Court were to direct the bishops to try the issue, "Is it consistent with the doctrine of the Church of England to maintain that there is considerable doubt whether anyone who denies the truth of the Athanasian Creed will perish everlastingly?" And yet these are moderate pieces of Liberalism. What would happen to more thoroughgoing "higher critics," and less compromising thinkers, if their opinions came to be adjudicated upon by a body of men among whom the Bishop of Birmingham represents at least the left centre, I forbear even to speculate.

Of course this argument may be met by the suggestion that, if the bishops did enunciate that such and such an opinion was contrary to the doctrine of the Church of England, it would still be open to the court to say whether the accused had so plainly controverted it as to make his condemnation necessary. But the real question in all cases of heresy is precisely this. The formularies have already determined in a general way what is the doctrine of the Church of England in so far as the Church of England (legally speaking) has any doctrine at all. If it is the court who are, in the last resort, to say whether or not the accused has transgressed it in such a way as to call for legal punishment, what is the use of the episcopal reference? In these matters everything depends upon shades of opinion, turns of expression, delicate qualifications. It would be useless to say in general terms whether the Church of England teaches, or does not teach, the doctrine of the Real Presence; the real question is whether the teaching of "Father" This or Mr That constitutes or does not constitute an infringement of that doctrine in the sense in which the Church of England asserts or denies it. This is the essential question. If the bishops are going to decide this, the intervention of the lay tribunal becomes a useless piece of machinery, introduced to hoodwink the general public as to the real character of the change which the Commissioners have proposed.

If this point is to be decided by the court, what is the use of the bishops being called in to assert that the doctrine of the Church of England is to be found in the Articles of Religion? If the bishops are to be allowed to repeal articles of religion or to add to their number, this should be done openly and deliberately, and not under the plausible and popular cover of an act for the suppression of Ritualism. If the bishops are to interpret, and then the court is to be free to disregard their interpretation,—to say that the interpretation of the bishops is inconsistent with the plain language of the articles, or not so plainly consistent with it that a clergyman who adopts another interpretation should be turned out,—what becomes of the spiritual authority, to save which is the avowed object of the proposed revolution? The condemnation of a Ritualist for interpreting a rubric in the way which the bishops allowed and the judges did not would still seem to the ritualistic conscience a monstrous usurpation of spiritual authority by an essentially secular tribunal. The acquittal of a Broad Churchman for opinions which the bishops held inconsistent with the formularies of the Church would seem to them, as it does now, a grievance and a scandal. The proposals of the Commission are an attempt — ingenious, no doubt — to bridge over the gulf between two essentially different conceptions of the relation between Church and State—the one now held by the mass of the laity, and the new held by precisely that clerical clique whose doings have led to the appointment of the Commission.

I have no doubt that an attempt on the part of an individual clergyman to discredit the unanimous findings of so distinguished a body will be treated in many quarters as presumptuous and absurd. Is it not extravagant to suggest, it will be asked, that the Lord Chief Justice of England and the Dean of Arches could have approved of a division of jurisdiction between court and bishops which is open to such objections as I have mentioned? Is it not extravagant to suggest that Evangelical leaders like Mr Drury and Sir John

Kennaway should have consented (as I suggest they have done) to play into the hands of the Sacerdotalists? Is it probable that so staunch a supporter of existing relations between Church and State as Sir Edward Clarke should have consented to a scheme which will revolutionise them in the sense desired by the extreme Sacerdotalists, and dreaded by Protestant-minded persons? To these suggestions I would venture to make two replies. I have nothing to say against the moderation, the ability, or the statesmanlike qualities of the Commissioners; but, in the first place, I submit that they have been pre-occupied with the question of "putting down Ritualism," and have not bestowed a moment's thought on the question how their scheme will affect a matter of far greater and more far-reaching importance than the suppression of ritualistic vagaries, *i.e.* the liberty of theological thought and expression in the National Church. They have not asked themselves what effect it will have upon attempts to bring the teaching of the Church of England into harmony with the growth of knowledge and the development of ideas in the community at large. In the second place, there is no indication that this is an object which would have commended itself as particularly important to most of the Commissioners. High Churchmanship both of the more advanced and the more moderate types is amply represented on the Commission. Reasonable Low Churchism had at least one lay and one clerical representative. Legal learning, conservative statesmanship, and moderate churchmanship had a conspicuous share in framing its recommendations. I do not pretend to know the exact theological opinions of one or two of the laymen, but it may fairly be said that there is not among the Commissioners one single clergyman or layman who, so far as his opinions are known, can be said to represent in any distinctive way the interests of Broad Churchmanship, of advanced criticism, of free and progressive theological thinking. The most liberal of the clerical members is probably the Primate himself. When the liberal party is represented by an Archbishop of Canterbury, it must surely

be considered, to say the least of it, to be represented by its extreme right! The suggestion of this paper is that the weapons which the Commission have devised for "putting down Ritualism" are not in the least likely, in the present state of ecclesiastical opinion, to be used in a way which will bear at all hardly upon the great body of High Churchmen, but that they are very likely indeed to be used to enable the narrower High Churchmen and others to turn out of the Church the more outspoken representatives of broad-church opinion. Whatever weapons Parliament may put into the hands of the bishops, it is not likely that they will do more than check the growth of one or two of the extremest excrescences of ritualistic ceremonial. The proposed remedies will not touch the real "crisis in the Church." Sacerdotal opinions, the sacerdotal tone, the sacerdotal temper will not be extinguished by courts and convocations, however reconstituted. They can flourish rampantly enough even without incense or "portable lights." Even the tyranny of practically compulsory confession will not be mitigated by the removal of confession boxes. To effect any real improvement in the tone and temper of the High Church majority among the clergy, we must trust to other agencies — to the advance of knowledge, to better clerical education, to the general progress of educated opinion which sooner or later does affect the clerical mind, if only the door of holy orders is not entirely closed to decently educated and intelligent young men by an obscurantist policy. I do not underrate the importance of preventing the further alienation of average lay opinion by those medieval or Italian usages which are so much more conspicuous and unmistakable than the state of the parson's private opinion about the nature of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist or the precise kind of efficacy which he attributes to baptism or orders. But it would be far better that the incense-burning and the reservation and the other Romanising practices should go on a little longer in a few dozen or a few hundred churches than that a weapon should be placed in the

hands of persecuting and obscurantist prelates for driving out of the ministry of the Church the clergy who take the trouble to study, who have the clearness of mind to accept, and the courage to proclaim to-day results of science, of criticism, and of thought, which may be universally accepted to-morrow. Even in the ranks of the Roman priesthood persecution has failed to stop the progress of thought; it has pretty effectually stopped its expression; and the results for that Church are much the same as if all the learning and scholarship of her learned priests did not exist. There are bishops on the bench who would like to treat the representatives of criticism as the Roman Church has treated Loisy, or to treat them worse than that Church has treated Loisy; for Loisy still says Mass. The Commissioners have suggested a way of helping them to do so. I trust that public opinion, the Government, and Parliament will see the tendency of their recommendations in time to prevent their adoption, and to save the Church of England an even worse fate than that with which it is threatened by the growth of Ritualism. It would be of little use to drive out the spirit of Ritualism, at the cost of enabling the spirit of Irrationalism to take up its abode in the discretely swept and legally garnished Churches.

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THE NEW THEISM.

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IT is often said that the greatest gain of theological thought in recent times lies in the substitution of the idea of God as immanent for the idea of God as transcendent. The statement is correct; only one cannot help asking whether all the men who use these terms see clearly the implications of them; or whether, great as is the advance from transcendence to immanence, a further advance upon the ordinary idea of immanence is not necessary to make the conception of God satisfactory to the mind of the present day.

It is the contention of this paper that some such further advance is necessary, and that men who do not stop with the mere word "immanence," but who earnestly try to make the word God mean what it ought to mean, will find themselves, consciously or unconsciously, taking it. What this step is, as I have myself been driven to it, and how the God with whom it leaves me seems to me to be not merely grasped by religious faith, but required by our intellectual processes, is what I hope to show.

The heart of the idea of God, to which, as I conceive, we must come, is not merely that God is in his world, but that in his world there is nothing outside of God.

For one may say, indeed, that God is in his world, just as he may say that the man is in his house; in it, yet separate and distinct from everything else in it—as individual, particular

and separable as if he were still outside. But God is not separable, not particular, not an individual, not a third something added to two already here without him, not one more person or individual added to the rest of us as one more brick (only larger and better than the rest) may be thrown upon a pile of bricks, or as one more person may be added to a group. We can say, "Here is the house, and here inside of it are the carpet, and the piano, and the table; and here also, inside like the rest of the things, but perfectly distinct from them, is the man." But we cannot say of God, "Here is the world, and here in the world are nature and man; and here, inside like nature and man, but perfectly distinct from them, and in addition to them, is God." God is not an individual like the rest of us; not a particular thing like nature; it is not enough even to say that he is inside of humanity and inside of nature. The heart of the matter is that neither nature nor man, nor anything else actual or conceivable, is outside of God.

Why is it necessary that we should hold some such idea of God as this? Simply because no other idea is large enough. Nothing is or can be outside of God, for the simple reason that if anything is thus external to him, then God is not infinite, but is limited by that which stands off against him. He is not infinite, but only another finite, though it may be a larger and better finite than the other finites to which he stands externally related. If we have nature plus God, then even though God may be in nature, yet nature being distinct from God and God distinct from nature, each is equally limited by the other and both are equally finite. So we may say that God is in humanity, but if we do not also say that humanity is in God, and exists only as a part of God, we have God and humanity standing off against each other, and both God and humanity limited by each other's externalism, and both, therefore, finite. In other words, an infinite which is merely the negation of the finite, or the mere opposite of it, or merely what is left over and beyond after

you get to the end of the finite, is not an infinite at all. It is only another finite. Therefore it is not God.

By the infinite we do not mean what the word has sometimes been made to mean—something without bounds, limits, or relations. By the infinite we mean that which contains and includes all things that are. The infinite is only a name for the sum-total—for the existences and the processes. The finite does not stand off against this infinite. It is merely a convenient sub-division within it. So long as we can think of an infinite which shall thus contain and include all things, we can not think of God as anything less than infinite in this way. Any God who is less than infinite in this way is local, temporary, partial, restricted—at the most only a fraction, even though a large fraction, of what God ought to be. Therefore I said, and therefore we must so think of him—God is not an individual, because he is not divided from anything in his universe. He is not a thing or a person added, numerically, to the other things and persons in his world. He is in all, but all is equally in him. He is that before which, beyond which, outside of which, nothing is or can be.

No sooner do we come to this idea of God, however, than we seem to be losing one of the elements that has made that idea a religious force in human thought. We seem to be losing the element of personality. If God is not a person, he is of no particular consequence to religion, whatever he may be worth to abstract thought. If he is merely an infinite essence in which the world is held in solution, or an infinite ether in which the universe is bathed, or an infinite energy persisting amid all changes, he is nothing for religion.

What many people do, therefore, at this point, is to drop the idea of the personality of God, or else to keep this idea, but to keep it merely at the command of religious feeling. They keep it—those who do keep it—not because they see their way to it, but because they feel they must have it. They do not see that with this modern conception the personality of

God becomes all the more inevitable; they merely feel that, in spite of the greater difficulties which the modern conception throws in its way, personality in God is still a practical necessity.

I can not but regard this as the attitude (and the same may be said of the man who drops the idea of personality) of one who has only thought his way half through. Followed to the end, this larger idea of God is precisely the idea that makes the personality of God clear.

What do we mean by personality, in any one of us? As nearly as we can describe it, we mean a certain unifying power. Now this unifying power appears in us under the guise of will, again under the aspect of feeling; we think of it now as self-consciousness, and now as the power of self-direction. But the most we can say of it is that it is something in us that binds things together for us, and gives our life an inner aspect or meaning in distinction from the merely outward aspect which our life wears to others.

Thus, to anyone looking at that series of events and processes, physical and mental, that makes up the life of an individual, and viewing this series entirely from outside, it would appear like a mere string of unrelated items, like so many numbers, 1, 31, 82, taken at random, or like so many sounds following one another. But why they should occur in this order rather than in any other, or what as a series they mean, or whether they have any inner meaning at all, he would have no sort of idea. They would be to him not a unity, but only a juxtaposition. If the same things that have happened to any man might be conceived as happening to a tree or a stone, this is all they would be—not a unity, much less a unity with an inner meaning in it, but only a string or a pile.

The personality of every man is that in him which takes all these things—all events that happen to him or come within the range of his knowledge, all ideas he entertains or has entertained, all experiences he has or shall have—and binds all these,

past and present, near and remote, similar and diverse, into one continuous whole which he calls his life.

Now this is exactly what we mean by the personality of God. God is a person because this is precisely what he does. Only he is the person who does this for all things, and not merely for a small section of them as you and I do. Whatever is part of your life is such because it is related and unified by this power of personality in you. But there is a great deal in the universe that is not thus unified by your personality, and that, therefore, is outside of your personal life. God is simply that person in whose life all things are thus unified, and outside of whose personal experience nothing is. You and I are individuals, because each one of us unifies only a small section of things, leaving out the rest. God is not an individual, because he thus unifies all things. He is not an individual, and not an individual person; but this is only because he is the universal, or the infinite, person. It is only because he is too large a person to be an individual. He is the infinite mind in whose consciousness all things find their place. He is the infinite spirit of whose personal life all things are part. The fact that nothing exists outside of him, so far from annulling his personality, merely discloses the extent and the meaning of it.

I may say all this, perhaps, in a different way. The most ultimate and unbridgable distinction which every man draws for himself is the distinction between himself and other things and persons—between subject and object. But inside himself, and for every man himself, this distinction disappears; every man is for himself both subject and object. This is because he is a self, and his life has an inner aspect in distinction from the outer aspect which it wears to others. And this is what we mean by saying that he is a person. Now what we mean when we say that God is a person, is not that there is one more individual in the world beside us human beings, and that the name of this other individual is God, but that the world, or the universe, has also an inner aspect to it—that it is, in

short, a self, a personal life, within which (as within each one of us for himself) the last of all distinctions, namely this distinction between subject and object, disappears or is transcended. God not merely unifies it all in his personal experience; he is the unity of it all. The universe is an infinite self; and this self we call God.

This is what I mean by "the new theism." This is the idea of God to which, as I conceive, present-day thought is leading.

I have already given, as a general reason for holding this idea of God, the fact that any other idea is too small, too particular, too partial, to satisfy us. There is however, in my own case, a further reason; not so patent, nor so easily presented, yet in itself quite simple, and going, as it seems to me, much further and deeper. And that reason is this: whenever I try to analyse certain of my mental processes, I seem to find this idea of God at the bottom of them. When I look beneath the surface of certain ideas that I hold, and that I have to hold, I run invariably upon this same idea of God. So far from being able to repeat the famous utterance, "I have no need of that hypothesis," I have to say, "This is the master-light of all my seeing."

I start, for instance, with the idea of truth. There must be such a thing as truth; otherwise there is no such thing as error, and all distinctions between things that are and things that are not fall away. If nothing is true, the very statement that nothing is true is itself false, and therefore something must be true. In other words, the idea of truth, and the conviction that something is true, are involved in the very attempt to deny them, and therefore lie at the basis of all our mental processes. Let us start, then, with this idea of truth. How is this modern idea of God involved in it?

In a manner perfectly simple. What do we mean by truth, or by the statement that a certain thing is true? We say, ordinarily, that we mean that the statement agrees with the object. If the words are like the thing to which they

refer, the statement is true; if not, not true. "Truth is the resemblance of thought to its object."

All this is a pure fiction. When you try to find the resemblance, and what kind of resemblance it is, between a red house and the idea of a red house, between a long time and the idea of a long time, or between the battle of Gettysburg and the idea of that battle, it is impossible to say what the resemblance is, or, indeed, how there can be any resemblance between things so utterly diverse. As Berkeley said, "How can an idea be like anything except another idea?" Quite aside from this fact, even, it is plain that if we had any means of getting outside of our own, or others', ideas of things, to the things themselves, so as to know whether the ideas answer to the things and really agree with them or not, we should have no need of the ideas at all.

What we really mean when we say that something is true, is that the statement we make can be verified in our own experience, at other times and in other manners, or in the experience of other persons. When we say, for instance, that fire is hot, that does not mean that there is any "resemblance" between heat and our idea of heat. It means that whoever gets near to the fire will experience the same sensation, or come away with the same idea, of heat which we have. I say that two and two are four; I mean simply that whoever puts two and two together will find, as matter of fact, that he has four, and that this is and will be a universal experience. I say a ghost is not real, because though one may see it, he cannot corroborate this sight by touching it, nor can he make other people see it. The truth about anything, in other words, is simply what can be verified in the experience of someone; it is what someone would think about the thing who knew it perfectly. Whatever we say that is true, is true because it would or does thus agree with this experience or insight of some mind or spirit.

If, then, there is anything that is true, not merely for you and me, but in itself and for all competent intelligences, if

there is any absolute or permanent truth, this can only be because there is an absolute or universal or infinite spirit or mind, by agreement or disagreement with whose experience or insight every particular statement that can be made is either true or false. Without the existence of such a mind or spirit, truth and error are alike impossible.

Beneath other ideas that we all hold will be found, in the same way, this idea of the infinite spirit, as their necessary presupposition.

Take, for instance, the idea of which we are so fond these days, the idea of a "universe." By this word I suppose we mean to indicate our conviction that what we have here, and all of it, is not a mere hodge-podge or conglomeration, nor a pile of separate and mutually distinct and exclusive things, but is in some sense one thing, held together in some way by something that makes it one. But what is it that does or can thus hold it together and make it one? It is and can be nothing but this infinite mind or spirit which the modern man means by the word "God." We might say, to be sure, that the material universe is bound together, and so becomes a universe, by one system of physical laws, and because it exists in one continuous space. But this would leave the psychical universe standing off against it, not held together by physical laws and not existing in space. This would give us not a universe, but two universes, each independent and unrelated, and so no universe at all. I can not see that the so-called "materialistic monist" has any universe. What makes the universe a universe is the personality, the personal life and experience, of the infinite spirit. So here we come again to God, in our modern understanding of him. It is either God, or no universe.

We might take, as another starting-point, the idea of cause and effect. It is an idea of which we can not rid ourselves in ordinary experience, and without which science can not proceed. Yet it is in itself a mere temporary makeshift. Physical science assumes it as a category behind which it need

not go; but whoever stops to look behind it, will find that it is only a name for a particular phase of the life of the infinite personal spirit. So we might take righteousness from the moral realm, or motion from the material, or even the idea of existence itself, and every one of these will be found to rest upon the presupposition of this absolute mind.

And this infinite spirit without whom it is impossible to be either good or bad, this absolute mind without whom it is absurd to talk of being either correct or mistaken, this personal life which makes the universe a universe, this person beyond and outside of whose personal consciousness and experience nothing is or can be—without whom not a sparrow falls, nor a planet swings out into the sky, nor a man is born or dies, in whom we live and move and have our being and who equally lives and moves and has his being in us and in all things—is God.

To this idea of God there must be added those moral attributes which have always been assigned to him. We must also keep for ourselves those attributes, like freedom and responsibility, which upon any theory of the universe are immediately guaranteed to us by consciousness and experience. But the background against which these conceptions will stand out is, under this new theism, a radically different one. For myself I do not see what basis there can be for an absolute religious confidence, such as that offered by this new theism. It is for these distinctly religious implications that I chiefly value it. For this, which I have ventured to call the new theism, the least I can claim is that, sooner or later, it will prove to be the most revolutionary idea for religious thought that has arisen since the days when polytheism gave way to monotheism. The change that came over men's views of life and religion when the one God succeeded to the many will be paralleled by the change that will come when it is generally recognised that the God who is one has been again succeeded by the God who is all.

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THE "ETERNAL NOW" IN ANGLICAN THEOLOGY:

A POINT OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE NEW THEISM AND THE OLD.

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THE object of this paper is not to prove a proposition, but, first, to explain that attitude of mind which finds the expression "the Timelessness of the Eternal" one that is natural and full of meaning; and secondly, to show that this conception is not modern, but one that has left traces not only in the history of philosophy and theology, but also in the language of the Book of Common Prayer. Indeed, it is not too much to say that apart from this conception much of the Book of Common Prayer can hardly be understood.

What is the conception? It is the assertion that eternity is not merely the sum of an infinite series of successive periods of time, but that these successive periods are the mere fleeting shadow or expression of something which endures. It affirms that this permanent something should be thought of as a whole, and that in its totality, which is superior to its subordinate divisions, "past, present, and future," it is a mode or manifestation of "that which is," the existence which lies behind appearance and renders it possible.

> "The days and hours are ever glancing by,
> And seem to flicker past through sun and shade
> Or short, or long, as Pleasure leads or Pain;

But with the Nameless is nor day nor hour;
Tho' we, thin minds, who creep from thought to thought,
Break into 'thens' and 'whens' the Eternal-now;
This double seeming of the single world;
My words are like the babblings in a dream
Of nightmare, when the babblings break the dream.
But be thou wise in this dream-world of ours,
Nor take thy dial for thy deity,
But make the passing shadow serve thy will."[1]

It must be carefully noted that all this is pure assertion, for, properly speaking, proof there is none. It rises above and beyond proof. He who asserts it says, "I say it is so, and you have but to open your eyes and see and you will say the same." To any demand for proof or even for explanation he will reply that all knowledge, even our boasted scientific knowledge, rests upon proofs which rest in their turn upon fundamental ideas which cannot be proved. He points out that space and time are really needful forms of thought which are presupposed in every human conception and which are involved in every scientific proof. It is "by faith we understand that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear."

Intuition, therefore, is for man the source of the fundamental elements of knowledge, and it is from within himself that man contributes these elements to everything that he knows, and it is by intuition that man claims to know the "Unknowable." This is no modern claim. Clement of Alexandria, writing about A.D. 200, called God τὸ ἀγνώστον; and Tennyson, in speaking of "the Nameless" in the passage I have quoted above, was using language drawn from this same Clement and from Justin Martyr, who, in his *Apology*, A.D. 160, repeatedly uses the phrase "Him who is a God unnameable."

On the other hand, men of so-called common sense have always raised their protests against conceptions of this nature. They protest still. As a typical protest we will give a quotation from the *Leviathan* of Thomas Hobbes, A.D. 1651. He says:—

[1] Tennyson, *The Ancient Sage*.

"The privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject but man only, and of men, those are of all most subject to it that profess philosophy."

And he gives as the last of seven reasons for absurd conclusions:

"The seventh, to names that signify nothing, but are taken up and learned by rote from the schools, as hypostatical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, eternal-now, and the like canting of the Schoolmen."

And on the other hand we will remember that the common sense of Thomas Hobbes had to bear the rebuke of no less a thinker than Bishop Butler, who, in 1726, wrote in a footnote to the first of his published sermons on Human Nature, the following comment on Hobbes' remarks on the subject of "benevolence":—

"These are the absurdities which even men of capacity run into when they have occasion to belie their nature, and will perversely disclaim that image of God which was originally stamped upon it, the traces of which, however faint, are plainly discernible upon the mind of man."

Let us then turn from Hobbes, and his attack in the name of common sense on the "canting of the Schoolmen," and let us see what the Schoolmen themselves have said on the Eternal-now which is the subject of this paper; and because we must subsequently note how these speculations have influenced the Book of Common Prayer chiefly drawn up by Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury, in A.D. 1548, we will give quotations from the writings of another Archbishop of Canterbury, A.D. 1093–1109—Anselm, who has been called the first and greatest of the Schoolmen.

The *Monologion* and *Proslogion* were written when Anselm was Prior of Bec, and Dean Church speaks of these treatises as having gained for him a place amongst the great thinkers of Christian Europe, and as containing essentially that argument for the existence of God which was revived in later days by Descartes, Leibnitz, and Hegel. It should, however, first be noted that in the preface to his *Monologion* Anselm distinctly states that he has based his work on earlier

writers, affirming that he has said nothing which "does not agree with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, and especially of the blessed Augustine"; and in this connection it should not be overlooked that Augustine, in books vii. and viii. of his *Confessions*, has told us how he passed through Platonism to Christ.

In these two books, then, the *Monologion* and the *Proslogion*, Anselm has discussed at great length the relationship of the "supreme being" or "ultimate essence" to space and time, and it should be most carefully noted that he has dealt with space and time in terms of absolute equality or parallelism, exactly as Kant did at a later date. The following extracts will give a fairly complete view of his position.

Chapter xxii. of the *Monologion* shows in what manner the "supreme nature" is in "every" and in "no" place and time. Anselm says:

"Wherefore since inevitable necessity compels that supreme being in its totality should be absent from no place or time, and no reason of place or time forbids that it should be at the same time in its totality present in every place or time, it is necessary that it should be in its totality at the same time present in each and every place and time.

"For because it is present to this place or time it is not therefore hindered from being in like time or manner present at another or some other place or time. Nor since it was, or is, or will be, hath therefore aught of its eternity vanished from the present time with the past so as now not to be, or passes with the present which scarce is, or is about to come with the future so as to be not yet."

In chapter xxiii. he shows how we must speak of this Supreme Nature rather as "everywhere" than as "in every place." He goes on:

"For we are wont often without blame to assign words of place to things which are neither places nor contained by boundaries of place, as if I should say that a conception is there in the mind where there is reason."

In chapter xxiv. he shows how he must speak of this Supreme Nature rather as "always" than as "in every time," and speaks of it as having neither past nor future nor being subject to time, but being a "present endowed with movement," "a gliding present," "labile presens," and he adds:

"Does it not then seem far more true, so to speak, to use 'always,' which seems to designate time as a whole, to signify that eternity which is never dissimilar from itself, rather than that variety of time which as time becomes other is always not like itself?"

The *Proslogion* is an address to this Supreme Nature as God, and from this treatise an extract taken from chapters xviii. and xix. must suffice:

"Thus then thou hast no parts, neither at any place or time is thy eternity, which is thyself a part of thee or of thy eternity, but everywhere thou art complete and for ever is thy eternity complete. But if by reason of thy eternity thou hast been, and art, and shalt be, and if to have been is not to be about to be, and to be is not to have been or to be about to be, how then is thy eternity complete always? Doth aught of thy eternity pass so that one may say, 'It is no longer'? or is aught to come so that one may say, 'It is not yet'? Therefore thou wast not yesterday, nor shalt be to-morrow, but yesterday and to-morrow thou Art; nay, thou art not either yesterday, or to-day, or to-morrow, but simply THOU ART, beyond all time, for yesterday and to-day and to-morrow are things in time and nothing more; but thou, though nothing is without thee, yet art not in space or time, but all things are in thee, for nothing containeth thee but thou containest all things."

Speculations such as these were not lost sight of in the succeeding centuries, and were familiar to the Schoolmen. Abelard, for example, says with regard to God: "Every place is present to Him, and so too every time," and we find similar sayings even down to the seventeenth century.

Leibnitz also, in chapter xi. of the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, says:

"The many investigations which I carried on compelled me to recognise that our moderns do not sufficient justice to St Thomas and to the other great men of the period, and that there is in the theories of the scholastic philosophers and theologians far more solidity than is imagined, provided that these theories are employed *à propos* and in their place."

Newton, too, Leibnitz' great contemporary, in the final scholium with which he concluded his *Principia*, made use of the following words, which seem to exactly agree with the teachings of Anselm. God is

"eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient, that is, he endures from eternity to eternity and is present from infinity to infinity; he rules all things and knows all things which happen or can happen. He is not eternity or infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration and space, but endures

and is present. He endures always and is present everywhere, and by existing always and everywhere hath established duration and space."

These and like utterances of Sir Isaac Newton did not escape the criticisms of the sceptics of the age in which he lived. We find Bishop Berkeley putting in his work called *The Analyst* the following satirical question:

"Whether it be really an effect of thinking that the same men admire the Great Author for his fluxions and deride him for his religion?"

And of the age itself Bishop Butler wrote in 1736:

"It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious."

We must now pass on to consider the mark that this conception of the Eternal-now has left on the structure of Anglican theology as set forth in the pages of the Book of Common Prayer. It would indeed be strange if it had not done so, when its chief compiler, Cranmer, who was Archbishop of Canterbury some five hundred years after Anselm, had been a Cambridge examiner in theology versed in the writings of the Schoolmen. Our central conception is that we are ourselves, to use the language of 2 Pet. 1–4, "partakers of the Divine Nature," a thought which in early days moved Athanasius to write in ch. liv. of his *De Incarnatione Verbi Dei*: "He became man that we might be made God," and which Browning in his *Christmas Eve* has expressed as follows:

"Take all in a word: the truth in God's breast
Lies trace for trace upon ours impressed.
Though He is so bright and we so dim,
We are made in His image to witness Him."

In other words, we must assume that, if we indeed have such a nature as to deserve the name of children of God, and as such to enter into relations with the Supreme Being, then we are in a certain sense in those relations freed, as He is free, from dependence on time and space. Put concisely, time and space do not count. God is a spirit, and we must worship Him

in spirit. God is beyond time and space; in our worship, then, we lift up our hearts into that spaceless and timeless region and therein meet God as He is. Two quotations taken from Bishop Westcott's book, *The Revelation of the Father*, will illustrate the same point of view:

"By speaking of the Lord as the Word, the Logos, he (John) opens to us such a view as we are able to bear of the diversity of persons in the timeless, absolute existence of the Godhead."

And again:

"Therefore it is that the Christian goes forth as his Lord opens the way, to claim fresh victories for the faith, to quicken in others the sense of the Unseen behind the Seen, to set forth the Eternal which underlies things temporal."

We must next show how this thought of the timeless eternal underlying the temporal is expressed in our Book of Common Prayer in specific instances. We will commence with a very simple example. In the Order for Morning Prayer we are taught that we come to church as "miserable sinners" so that we may confess our sins at "the throne of the heavenly grace" and hear the words of divine pardon declared unto us in the Absolution, and may then in the Venite "rejoice in the strength of our salvation," sin and sorrow having been removed.

But if we look closely into the words of the service we shall see that all this, regarded as a series of events in time, is unreal.

In the Absolution we are bidden to pray for repentance after we have had pardon declared unto us on the condition of repentance. And moreover, since it is declared to us as an eternal truth that pardon is always accorded to those who truly repent and unfeignedly believe, if we have come in the right spirit our absolution must have preceded our confession, and hence we were no longer miserable sinners at the moment when we described ourselves as such.

A precisely similar inversion of the order of events in time is found in the Order for the Visitation of the Sick,

in which a prayer for forgiveness follows directly after an absolution in which forgiveness is regarded as given. From this analysis we see that the words can only be understood when regarded as setting forth eternal timeless truth in logical sequence and relationship. This is a usage found in the pages of the Bible; for example, the "wretched man" of Romans vii. 24 utters in the next verse the words "I thank God," and this is a sequence not necessarily or primarily in time, but one in truth and fact.

Another example is found in the Order of Confirmation, in which, at a definite moment of time, the bishop lays his hand upon the head of the person to be confirmed as an outward and visible sign of a daily, that is, a continuous increase in the Holy Spirit, or as it is expressed in the collect that follows, as a sign to certify that the fatherly hand of God is ever over us. In other words, there is no connection in time between the temporal sign and the eternal thing signified of which it is the appointed sign.

Exactly the same conceptions underlie the sacramental teaching of the Church of England, and the most convenient way to show this will be to start with the definition of a sacrament as set forth for us in the Catechism:

> "An outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace given unto us ordained by Christ himself as a means whereby we receive the same and a pledge to assure us thereof."

In this answer it is not at first obvious whether the words "given unto us" refer to the "grace" or to the "sign." In the manuscript attached to the Act of Uniformity, A.D. 1662, which is the one strictly legal standard, and in almost all the editions of the Prayer Book previous to the year A.D. 1800, there is a comma between the words "grace" and "given," which would refer the word "given" to the "outward and visible sign." On the other hand, the Warrant and the Patent Roll of King James, A.D. 1603–4, are the original sources in which this part of the Catechism occurs; in the letters patent bearing the great seal there is no stop in the

whole sentence; in the warrant the comma, which is after "given unto us," would seem to unite "given unto us" with the word "grace."

This ambiguity assumes a very interesting significance when we turn to the Greek and Latin versions of the Prayer Book, which were made shortly after the last revision, and it must be remembered that until comparatively recent years these versions remained unchallenged.

The Greek version appeared first; it appeared in A.D. 1665, and was based by Duport upon an older version made in A.D. 1638 by Elias Petley. In both these Greek versions the passage is rendered χάριτος ἡμῖν δοθείσης σημεῖον.

Five years later, in A.D. 1670, the Latin version appeared; it had reached its final form in the hands of Dean Durel, who had undoubtedly submitted it to Sancroft, who had been intimately connected with the whole revision of A.D. 1661. In this Latin version the passage is rendered "signum quod nobis datur."

This difference is most significant: a sacrament is, we should all admit, a sign given of a grace given, but with regard to the outward sign Durel's Latin version employs the present tense "quod nobis datur." Water, or bread and wine, visible things which are given to us, belong to the temporal. Space and time have dominion over them and condition them. On the other hand, the older Greek versions which connect the "given" with "grace," and hence with God, employ the aorist participle, and so indicate the spaceless and timeless, that is, the absolute, nature of the gift.

Quite naturally connected with this is the Anglican doctrine of baptismal regeneration as connected with repentance and faith. We have in the Catechism the question: "Why then are infants baptised when by reason of their tender age they cannot perform them?"

Before the last revision in A.D. 1661 the answer to this question was: "Yes, they do perform them by their sureties, who promise and vow them both, in their names, which when

they come to age themselves are bound to perform." In A.D. 1661 the simpler words we now use were adopted: "Because they promise them both by their sureties, which promise, when they come to age, themselves are bound to perform."

This endeavours to express in a few words the teaching of the whole Office for the Ministration of Baptism of Infants. In that office we find a helpless and unconscious infant represented as receiving "remission of sins by spiritual regeneration," although he is too young to have committed any; and the phrase cannot refer to original sin, because the word used is "sins" and not "sin." He is supposed to have received this blessing on condition of renouncing, believing, and desiring baptism, which conditions, since A.D. 1662, we are told he cannot perform, and before A.D. 1662 we were told he did perform by somebody else. And yet, when he is older, and comes to confirmation, that service will inform him that he actually did receive this blessing in baptism.

The unreality of all this only vanishes when we realise that it is an attempt to set forth how eternal and timeless truths and relationships enter into and must of necessity be expressed in time. It is a statement as to how the spiritual which is eternal or archetypal enters into the visible which is temporal or ectypal.

This is the historic position which we find, not only in a reformer like Luther: "Ita semel es baptisatus sacramentaliter, sed semper baptizandus fide, semper moriendum semperque vivendum," as quoted in Hardwick's *History of the Christian Church during the Reformation*, from Luther's prelude on the Babylonish Captivity of the Church (opp. ii., fol. 273*b*, Jenæ, 1600); but also in the writings of the Schoolmen—for example, Peter Lombard, as quoted by Professor Mozley in his *Review of the Baptismal Controversy*, 1862, speaking of regeneration and writing A.D. 1100–1164, says (l. iv. dist. iv.): "Nec mireris rem aliquando præcedere sacramentum, cum aliquando etiam longe post sequatur." And it is this historic position which is continued to this day in the Book of Common

Prayer. Baptism is regarded therein as an eternal means, an everlasting pledge, offered and received in time, whereby we receive that which is not of time, but which is timeless and for ever true.

An analysis of the Anglican doctrine of the Lord's Supper will lead to precisely the same result. For the purpose of this paper it will be best to concentrate our investigation on the meaning of the term "Real Presence." The Roman position was most carefully stated in A.D. 1898 by Cardinal Vaughan and the Bishops of the Province of Westminster, in their *Vindication of the Bull. Apostolicæ Curæ.* They wrote:

"We say that His true Body is present, meaning that what is present on the altar is not some symbol of the Body of Christ, but His Body itself, the very Body which hung on the Cross. This also is what we mean by the word 'really': namely that His Body is not present merely figuratively, as if only a figure of itself were present really; nor merely virtually, as though some effect of its virtue and power, such as grace, were what is present really; but that the Body itself is present . . . . present on the altar, so as to be there quite independently of any action of the believing mind upon it."

As a statement of the Anglican position we may perhaps take the words of Dr Aldrich, A.D. 1687, which Waterland quotes with approval. He tells us that the phrase "real presence" is a term "which may be safely used among scholars," although "it is not so easy to conceive of" "a natural substance really present when at the same time it is locally absent."

This is one form of the difficulty which Bishop Gore, writing in his *Body of Christ*, finds so great. In his preface to the second edition he quotes the Rev. N. Dimock as saying the "res sacramenti" is "not absent only, but distant, and distant not in place only, but in time." This quotation gives a decidedly inadequate representation of Mr Dimock's views. Mr Dimock, on page 15 of his *Notes on the Round Table Conference*, writes as follows:—

"If we reject the idea of an event which belonged to a date nearly two thousand years ago being made to belong in its past reality to the reality of the present hour, it follows from this view that the true 'res sacramenti' is to be regarded as that which is locally and corporally absent, and not only absent but distant, and not distant in place only but in time."

And he also quotes Thorndike as saying that this idea which he here rejects would make "the present time to become the present time another time."

But in truth this rejected idea, according to which reality, being archetypal and not ectypal, is neither local nor corporal, and which would enable us to say that the "res sacramenti" is really present, although distant both in place and time, is entirely in accord with the language of the older school of Anglican divines. Bishop Gore himself gives one instance, quoting Bishop Andrews (A.D. 1555–1626), who wrote in his *Sermons of the Resurrection*, vii. (vol. ii. p. 301):

"Christ's Body that now is. True; but not Christ's Body as it now is, but as it then was, when it was offered, rent and slain. . . . By the incomprehensible power of His eternal Spirit, not He alone, but He, as at the very act of His offering, is made present to us. . . ."

Bishop Burnet too, in his commentary on the Thirty-nine Articles, wrote in A.D. 1669 on Article XXVIII. words to exactly the same effect:

"We assert a real presence of the Body and Blood of Christ; but not of His body as it now is, glorified in heaven, but of His body as it was broken on the Cross."

That is, we assert a real presence of that that is neither here nor now, but there and then, because both here and there and now and then have been caught up into the spaceless and timeless presence of the spiritual. It is this view which Tennyson set forth in his poems of *Sir Galahad* and *The Quest of the Holy Grail*, and which Anglicans believe to be the meaning of St Paul in 1 Corinthians x. 1, 2, 3, 4.

The views of Cardinal Newman on this matter are most interesting. We find them quoted by Bishop Gore in his *Roman Catholic Claims* from *Viâ Media*, vol. ii. p. 220, written in 1877:

"Our Lord is 'in loco' in heaven, not (in the same sense) in the sacrament. He is present in the sacrament only in substance, *substantive*, and substance does not require or imply the occupation of place.

"But if place is excluded from the idea of sacramental presence, therefore division or distance from heaven is excluded also, for distance implies a

measurable interval, and such there cannot be except between places. Moreover, if the idea of distance be excluded, therefore is the idea of motion . . . . etc. etc."

In this passage Cardinal Newman, as far as his language is intelligible, seems to approximate to one half of the Anglican doctrine of the Real Presence, and to utterly fail to grasp the other half. He has failed to see what Anselm would have taught him, that whatsoever is spiritually true of space or place is in like manner true of time. Had Cardinal Newman been consistent with himself and pursued these thoughts further, he might perhaps have emerged from the mazes of mediæval materialism and reached the position Cranmer reached when he penned the Order of the Ministration of Holy Communion as it was left in our Prayer Books in A.D. 1551. He would have understood the reason why in the revision of that year Cranmer changed the following passage of the thanksgiving prayer as it stood in A.D. 1549:

"Almighty and ever-living God, we most heartily thank Thee for that Thou *hast* vouchsafed to feed us in these Holy Mysteries with the spiritual food of the most precious body and blood of Thy Son our Saviour Jesus Christ,"

into

"Almighty and ever-living God, we most heartily thank Thee for that Thou *dost* vouchsafe to feed us who *have* duly received these Holy Mysteries with the spiritual food," etc.—

that is, dost vouchsafe to feed, for ever, in the spiritual and the timeless, us, who in the external and visible place and at the definite moment of time have received the outward mystery.

It is the same contrast that we find in the early translations of the Catechism, between Petley and Duport's χάριτος ἡμῖν δοθείσης, A.D. 1634 and A.D. 1665, and Durel's "signum quod nobis datur," A.D. 1670.

It is as Cranmer wrote in book iii. of his *Lord's Supper*:

"Now the papists say that Christ is corporally present in the sacrament, and is so eaten only when men receive the sacrament. But we say that the presence of Christ in his holy supper is a spiritual presence: and as he is spiritually present, so is he spiritually eaten of all faithful Christian men, not only when they receive the sacrament, but continually, so long as they be

members spiritual of Christ's mystical body. And yet this is 'really' also, that is in deed and effectually. And as the Holy Ghost doth not only come to us in baptism and Christ doth there clothe us, but they do the same to us continually so long as we dwell in Christ; so likewise doth Christ feed us so long as we dwell in him and he in us, and not only when we receive the sacrament. So that as touching Christ himself, the presence is all one, the clothing all one, and the feeding all one, although the one for the more comfort and consolation have the sacrament added to it and the other be without the sacrament."

Our investigation has now reached its conclusion, and has, I trust, shown the effect which the deeper study of metaphysics and theology has in bringing men back to hold in terms of reasoned language that which they have already intuitively grasped. Metaphysics and theology in the long run justify the conclusions of common sense and religion.

The author of *John Inglesant* was right when in a letter to Bishop Talbot he spoke of "the mysticism of the Prayer Book and the Caroline divines, on the one side *safe* and on the other *infinite*." And Bishop Berkeley was expressing the same truth when he concluded the last of his three famous *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* with the words:

"You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks and falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent as well as its descent proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation. Just so, the same principles which at first view lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to *common sense*."

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CHANCE OR PURPOSE?

HUGH MAC COLL.

THE central fallacy in all atheistical explanations of the phenomena of our universe is the tacit assumption that *chance* and *design* are antagonistic terms; that the presence of either factor in the evolutionary development of mind or matter necessarily implies the absence of the other. Without this assumption the reasoning of the modern atheist falls to pieces. Yet the assumption is absolutely false, as the following simple experiment in mathematical probability will show.

Take two fixed points, A and B, five or six inches apart, on a sheet of foolscap paper. Then take at a random distance from A, not greater than eight inches, and in a random direction, a very great number of minute pencil points, but all subject (though otherwise taken at random) to one inexorable "law" or restriction, namely, that for every point P *the sum of the distances* AP *and* BP *shall never exceed* eight inches. Points not satisfying this condition are to be rejected; points satisfying it are to be retained. It requires but little knowledge of the mathematical theories of probability and averages to forecast the final result with extreme accuracy, *if the random process be continued long enough.* It will be a shaded ellipse of predetermined known form and calculable distribution of shading. The darkness of the shading in the vicinity of any point P (measured by the number of minute points that fall there) will be inversely as the distance of P from A. At first the figure in its embryonic stage will appear

as a confused assemblage of irregularly scattered small points. By degrees, as the process goes on, the points will be found to thicken round the point A, and be wider apart as their distance from A increases; while none will be found to fall beyond a certain elliptical though previously untraced boundary. Finally, the exact form and shading predetermined and foreseen will be obtained. Similarly, other geometrical figures, of far more complicated forms and shading, may thus be evolved *randomly*—that is to say, randomly (as in natural evolution) within certain prescribed limits of variation—although the exact forms and shading have been accurately foreseen by the mathematician to whom the laws, limits, and results owe their real origin and existence. *Blind chance* (as in natural evolution) is the apparent automatic cause; but the real though invisible cause (also as in natural evolution) is *intelligent and foreseeing design.*

This illustration shows plainly, though in the form of a parable, that the theory of evolution, instead of undermining the old argument of design, as atheists suppose, enormously strengthens it. The analogy is a close one. Chance and design are both at work. The more complicated the geometrical figure to be evolved, the higher the intelligence needed for laying down the necessary laws and conditions for its seemingly chance evolution. The process of evolution in the case of the figure is very slow; in nature it is infinitely slower. The random points that conform with the imposed conditions, and therefore help in the evolution, are retained; those that do not are rejected. The advance of the figure towards perfection is not continuous. Sometimes there is temporary retrogression. Points *will* occasionally persist in falling just where they seem least needed, and obstinately avoid the spots where they seem indispensable; but, in the long run, the law of averages always asserts itself, and the figure advances slowly and surely, if not always steadily, towards its foreseen and predestined form and shading. Making allowance for the wide difference of circumstances, does not this typify closely what we observe in the gradual

evolution, physically and morally, of the individual and of the race? In one respect, indeed, the analogy may be found even *too* close—too painfully suggestive of the sad actualities of nature. The Creator here typified does not at first sight resemble the loving Father of Christian theology. To all appearance he is a Creator who leaves his laws to work automatically, and gives no heed to the pain, discomfort, or destruction which their chance combinations bring upon many of the individual units required for the accomplishment of his purpose. If his purpose requires the evolution of the lamb and the dove on the one hand, it also seems to require the evolution of the wolf and the eagle on the other. "Nature red with tooth and claw" seems an ever-present factor in the cosmic process. Is it a *necessary* factor? And can this factor be reconciled with the attributes of justice and benevolence which we would not willingly withhold from the Creator of the human brains and human souls in which those ideas originated? And what about the wolves, tigers, and demons of humanity, and the unspeakable horrors which they sometimes inflict upon the weak, the innocent, and the defenceless? Are these necessary for the divine purpose? And can they be reconciled with the three great attributes of the Christian Deity—omniscience, omnipotence, and infinite benevolence? Can that purpose be infinitely benevolent that employs such terrible means for its accomplishment? These are hard questions, but they must be faced and answered before we can have a religion that will satisfy both the logical demands of the intellect and the yearning aspirations of the human heart. Is such a religion possible? I think it is; but it must be built upon assumptions, some of which cannot easily be harmonised with the tenets of any existing theistic religion. These assumptions are the following.

1. Just as life descends below the human in numberless gradations of intelligence and consciousness, down to the senseless plant, and then still lower to its final limit in inorganic matter; so also life ascends above the human

through higher forms of consciousness and intelligence in infinite gradations, till we reach that one Supreme Power, or combination of Powers, from whom all others proceed, and on whom all others depend.

2. Just as in the numberless living conscious forms below the human many perceive not, and never, in the present stage of their development, can perceive, because they possess not the requisite faculties for perceiving, that higher conscious beings, such as birds, quadrupeds, and man, exist above them; so man perceives not, and, through want of adequate faculties, never, in the present stage of his development, can perceive, that he is but a link in the ascending and descending series. But that which man cannot perceive *directly* through his outward senses he is capable of learning *indirectly* by the exercise of his slowly developing reason—a faculty which was given him expressly that he might so apply it.

3. It is man's duty, as the experience of ages has proved it to be his interest, to study the divine language, that is to say, the phenomena past and present of the world around him, in conjunction with his own inner thoughts and feelings, and therefrom, so far as his faculties permit him, to learn the purpose of the Supreme Will, and, having learnt it, to carry out his own small share in its development to the best of his lights and to the best of his abilities.[1]

4. All forms of life, or at least of *conscious* life, life capable of feeling pain and pleasure, are in a state of transition, and are destined at death to pass into a higher life, with higher pleasures, higher pains. That higher life, too, will end and will be succeeded by a still higher, and so on for ever. In each successive life pain and pleasure, evil and good, must for ever coexist until its end, and so must the struggle for existence. For the struggle is necessary for the development, and the struggle would be impossible without the incentives of pain and pleasure—pain at the failure, pleasure at the success. The idea

[1] See the author's seventh article on Symbolic Logic in the *Athenæum*, No. 4007, p. 213, and his *Symbolic Sign and its Applications* (Longmans).

of a perpetual, never-ending happiness in a future life, without struggle and without pain, is an unwholesome dream, beautiful but paralysing, like that of the opium-eater.

5. Though each transition is from a lower to a higher life, with other pleasures, other pains, it does not necessarily follow that each successive life is happier than its predecessor. That may well depend upon the training received in the life gone by. But though there may be occasional retrogressions, temporary triumphs of evil over good, the general progress will be upwards, ever upwards, towards an eternally receding limit. For each and in each individual the evil and the good must for ever coexist, because they will be for ever necessary; but for each and in each the evil *in proportion* to the good will eventually diminish, and the good in proportion to the evil will increase. And for each, sooner or later, the good will take the lead in the eternal race upwards, and, having gained it, will keep it and increase it.

6. Omniscience may logically be attributed to the Supreme Power, but omnipotence only within limits. The laws of logical consistency cannot be altered even by omnipotence, and, for aught we know to the contrary, the highest happiness may be logically impossible without the preliminary pain and struggle. Must we then affirm that the Supreme Power is the author of evil? Could not his omniscience and omnipotence combined have foreseen and prevented it? Could he not have devised a world teeming with life and happiness, and eternally free from that terrible alloy called *evil*? The answer is *No*, if that world, as is probable, would be an inconsistency to an omniscient mind, though apparently possible to ours. And sin and crime? Were these also foreseen and predetermined? Assuming an omniscient and all-powerful will, there is no escape from the answer, *They were*. Are these consistent with infinite benevolence? Assuming them to be necessary for the development of each sentient unit upwards towards eventual and increasing goodness, the seeming inconsistency disappears. For we cannot draw a hard and fast line

between crime and other evils. The criminal, like the virtuous, is more or less the outcome of heredity, education, and surroundings. Should criminals on that account be held irresponsible and exempted from all punishment? If we knew of any means, such as a surgical operation on the brain, whereby they could be rendered useful members of society, yes; but, as we know of no such means at present, society has a right to protect itself by the only effective methods with which it is at present acquainted, and that is their punishment, even to the extreme penalty, when necessary, of death. On the assumption of future successive lives, the laws of nature—the laws of that higher nature which we instinctively divine but cannot perceive—will automatically effect hereafter the moral cure which we find an impossibility now.

The preceding speculations are admittedly but instinctive gropings in the dark—mere hypotheses which, in the actual state of our knowledge, can neither be proved nor disproved. This is a time of transition, and the data for either proof or disproof are at present wanting. The phenomena of the world around us, and not least, as already shown, the facts upon which the theory of evolution is based, point unmistakably to some superhuman intelligent Power or Powers imperceptible to our senses; but beyond this we cannot, on purely logical ground, advance. Nevertheless, instinct counts for something even in the pursuit after truth. There is such a thing as *scientific* instinct. Our brains are not always entirely at our own disposal. Some conscious Power different from our personal ego, yet still more different from the unconscious vibrating hypothetical ether (which the German professor Haeckel, without the smallest warrant from facts, science, or logic, affirms to be the ultimate cause of all mental no less than of all physical phenomena), often directs the general tendency of our thoughts towards some great discovery long before the discovery takes a distinct and definable form, and still longer before its reality can be established on a firm scientific basis. And it is not alone

the individual brain that feels the influence of this directing power; it often acts upon many brains at once, so that they make the same discovery independently and almost simultaneously. Those who can detect no evidence of superhuman design in nature will, of course, scout the idea of a scientific instinct preceding, beckoning, and partly guiding the conscious workings of the reason; but those who do perceive this evidence and can appreciate its significance will find the idea perfectly natural. Even atheists must admit, in spite of Professor Haeckel's coarse and shallow mockery about a "gaseous" being, that an invisible superhuman intelligence is at least conceivable, that it involves no self-contradiction, no conflict of incompatible concepts. Can we say as much for the Professor's rival hypothesis of the "vibrating ether," which he confidently affirms to be "the ultimate cause of all phenomena"? Let the reader judge. Here are the Professor's words:[1]

> The consistency of ether is also peculiar on our hypothesis, and different from that of ponderable matter. It is neither gaseous, as some conceive, nor solid, as others suppose; *the best idea of it can be formed by comparison with an extremely attenuated, elastic, and light jelly.*

Further on, the Professor says that this jelly-like ether

> is in eternal motion; and this specific movement of ether (*it is immaterial whether we conceive it as vibration, strain, condensation*, etc.), in reciprocal action with mass-movement (or gravitation), is the *ultimate cause of all phenomena.*

One quotation more, and I have done:

> The two fundamental forms of substance, ponderable matter and ether, are not dead, and only moved by extrinsic force, but *they are endowed with sensation and will* (though, naturally, of the lowest grade); they experience an *inclination* for condensation, a *dislike* of strain; they strive after the one and struggle against the other.

The words which I have put into italics dispense with all serious comments. So this is the creed of the great apostle of "Monism," as modern atheists have chosen to call their new religion! The Ultimate Cause, the real creator and sustainer of all phenomena, mental and physical, the pheno-

[1] See Mr M'Cabe's English translation of Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe.*

menon of human intelligence included, is no intelligent Deity or Deities. It is nothing at all analogous to, much less surpassing, the intelligence of man. It is simply an immense attenuated, yet all-powerful, eternally vibrating jelly! And this strange jelly-god is endowed with sensation and will, "though necessarily of the lowest grade"! Alas! alas! what wild nonsense some eminent specialists can write when they venture beyond the narrow limits of their own familiar domain! If Professor Haeckel had possessed even an elementary knowledge of the first principles of modern logic and mathematical probability, he would have been able to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant data; he would have known that an explanation of a mystery x in terms of still greater mysteries y, z, etc. is no explanation at all; he would have been more modest and less dogmatic as well as less offensively aggressive in his language; and, lastly, he would have restricted his researches to matters really within his competence, and left the for ever insoluble "riddle of the universe" alone.

There is a dangerous illusion abroad, which, in the interests of all honest truth-seekers, it is high time to signalise. Many people appear to be under the impression that mankind can nowadays be divided into two mutually exclusive classes, respectively represented by the all-knowing "scientist" on the one hand, and the poor, ignorant "man-in-the-street" on the other. Now, there is absolutely no line of demarcation. *Science* is simply *knowledge*; neither more nor less. Hence it follows that, if astronomy, geology, and biology are real sciences, no less real are the sciences of teaching, tailoring, and bootmaking. Let the man-in-the-street take courage. He, too, is a scientist, and has been more or less so since his childhood upwards. If his more highly esteemed colleagues are better equipped by special training and education for certain lines of research, he is better equipped by special training and education for others. For certain transcendental lines of research we are all equally unfitted. As regards the

ultimate solution of any of the many riddles proposed by the inscrutable sphinx called *Nature*, such as the real origin of life, of consciousness, of intelligence, or, in brief, of anything, the man-in-the-street and Professor Haeckel are pretty much on the same level—the level of absolute dataless ignorance. Nevertheless, there is a slight difference. The former is under no illusion; he knows that the "riddle of the universe" is utterly beyond his capacity. The latter is a victim of a certain mental malady which elsewhere[1] I have ventured to call *symbolatry*. He mistakes the symbol, the name, the mere catchword, for a reality. Hence it is that he imagines himself well-nigh omniscient—the real brain, so to speak, of his own jelly-god. He is quite confident that he has found the real key to the great "riddle of the universe," whereas, in reality, his ignorance of this transcendental problem is as profound as that of his humbler colleague.

Once admit the existence of an invisible intelligent creative Power, or combination of Powers, and the customary arguments against the possibility of a future life fall to the ground. These arguments turn almost wholly on the connection between the brain and the conscious ego of our personality, and especially upon the observed connection between certain portions of our brain and special mental processes. A certain portion of the brain is injured; thereupon a corresponding injury is inflicted on the mind—not on the mind as a whole, but on some special faculty, leaving the other faculties untouched. Therefore, says the atheist, the mind, the conscious soul or ego, is not one and indivisible. Its separate faculties are separately connected with separate portions of the material brain. Slice off these portions one by one, and one by one you slice off the separate faculties of the ego also, till finally there is nothing left.

Now, let us examine closely this assertion that our conscious soul or ego is inseparably connected with the brain, and that therefore with our death this ego passes wholly

[1] *Mind*, New Series, No. 55, p. 397.

out of existence. The first question that presents itself is this: with *what* brain is our ego so intimately connected? the brain that is ours now, or the brain that was ours a year ago? For, from the *material* standpoint, the two are wholly different. The material brain with which our ego did its thinking a year ago has already passed clean away, and has been replaced by fresh material particles, forming a new brain, with which it does its thinking now. Yet does not the ego itself endure, and remember much of the thinking which it performed with the aid of the brain that is no more? If the atheist admits this, he surrenders his whole position. An ego that uses up one brain after another, or that passes from brain to brain as they succeed each other, from the birth of the first to the death of the last, cannot be said to be inseparably connected with any one of the series. Either the ego of our personality and consciousness changes continually with the changing brain, so that every fresh brain has a fresh ego; or else this ego remains constant while the brain changes. Consider the consequences of the first alternative. Let us suppose that a murderer has been apprehended, found guilty, and condemned to death for a crime committed more than a year ago. Is not this a clear injustice? The really responsible ego has passed away with the brain that planned the crime; the present ego and the present brain should not be held responsible for a crime committed before they came into existence. But where is the barrister who would venture to take this line of argument in addressing the jury? And there is another difficulty. How is it that the ego of to-day knows so much — it is hardly logical to say *remembers* so much—of the thoughts, sayings, and doings of the ego that is no more? Is it by some kind of brain tradition? May we suppose that each expiring cell transmits its experience by some kind of protoplasmic language to its successor, and that the so-called *memory* of the present ego is but the sum-total of these transmissions from cell to cell through successive generations? Even if this unprovable

supposition were true, it would be in no way inconsistent with the assumption of an ego separate from, yet working through, the instrumentality of the changing brain. Dataless hypotheses of this kind which can neither be proved nor disproved may be imagined without limit. Let us take an example at least as plausible on the other side. Is there anything inconceivable in the hypothesis that, when the body perishes and dissolves into its constituent elements, there remains intact a small particle, a molecule or even a single atom, of brain-matter upon which is imprinted, as in a microscopic cinematograph, the whole record of the dead man's past? Or in the further supposition that this invisible particle may afterwards develop into essentially the same ego, though changed in externals, with a remembrance more or less vague, or more or less accurate, of his previous existence? Have we not analogous though not identical phenomena in that infinitesimal portion of nature which comes within the ken of our observation even in this fleeting life? Among animals, not excepting man, does not the germ-developed offspring inherit to a great extent the propensities and capacities of its parents, if not their actual recollection of past events? How little the most advanced biologist or physiologist really knows of the mysteries of life and consciousness! For aught we can prove to the contrary, the real primary moving, thinking agent may be millions of miles away from the human machinery which it sets in motion. Where data are wholly wanting, science should modestly avow ignorance. Without data science has no problem before it, not even a problem in probability. For without data not only are we unable to decide whether a proposed hypothesis is true or false; we are unable even to assign any approximate limits to its probability, to the chances for or against it. Conclusions drawn from direct sensation are often deceptive. A man suffering from gout feels a pain in his toes. "He is mistaken," says the physiologist; "the seat of all sensation is the brain. For does not a man whose leg has been amputated also imagine that he feels pain in his toes and

that he can move them, though these same toes no longer form part of his body? whereas these sensations cease when pressure is applied to a certain portion of the brain."

But why not carry the principle further? Is it quite certain that all sensation *is* in the brain—or in the material body at all? If, in spite of the *direct* evidence of our sensations, we draw a wrong inference when we locate a certain feeling in our toes, may we not also be wrong when, trusting to the *indirect* evidence of our sensations and to our fallible reason, we locate that feeling or any other in the brain, or, for the matter of that, in any *fixed* position anywhere, whether in the body or out of it? Granted that complete destruction of the body, or a mortal injury to some vital part of it, apparently destroys for the time all visible evidence of the existence of the conscious ego with which it had been associated: what, after all, does this prove? In wireless telegraphy also, does not the destruction of the receiving apparatus, or any injury to it, destroy all evidence of the existence of the living, conscious, human, but invisible agent who had acted on it from afar? Yet this living, conscious, human, but invisible agent still exists, although, for the time, he can no longer transmit his message. May not the real human ego also be, in a similar manner, far away from the material body on which it operates? Speculation, even the wildest, is free when data are wanting. And it is a remarkable and suggestive fact that some of these wild, dataless, but not logically inconsistent speculations, as if they owed their origin to some inexplicable prophetic instinct, are subsequently verified.

We hear it sometimes asserted that not an inch of the ground wrested from religion by science is ever afterwards abandoned. This is a rhetorical and far from accurate way of stating the real facts. It is quite true that the *truth-seekers* of the past, *whatever may have been the subject of inquiry*, made grievous mistakes; but may not the same be said of the living truth-seekers (scientists as well as theologians) of to-day? And is it not morally certain that sooner or later it

will be said with more or less accuracy of the truth-seekers of the future? If the theists of the past, be they monotheists, polytheists, or pantheists, have made mistakes, have not the other scientists of the past, be they astronomers, biologists, or geologists, made mistakes also? And is confident dogmatism, based on no data, quite extinct in any branch of science among the scientists now living? Between honest, truth-seeking religion and honest, truth-seeking science there need never be any conflict. On the contrary, if, profiting by their past errors, they unite as truth-seekers under one banner, each may powerfully support the other. But there must be no finality or baseless dogmatism on either side. True religion, founded on pure Theism, must, like science, be progressive, and adapt its tenets to changing conditions and new discoveries. Science, accepting the same pure Theism, must, like true religion, tread softly and reverently, and regard nature as a divine book which it is man's privilege and bounden duty to study. Religion, as the pioneer, must ever supply the instinctive faith and sure though vague and indefinable aspiration. Science, with its more exact methods and instruments of research, must move slowly and warily in the direction indicated, verifying here, correcting there, and leaving untouched the ground for which its methods and instruments are as yet, and it may be for ever, unsuited.

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THE PARALLELISM OF RELIGION AND ART.

A COMMENT ON WILLIAM BLAKE.

BASIL DE SÉLINCOURT.

It is, I think, very widely felt that the word Religion, understood, as we usually understand it, in reference to its accepted derivative sense, fails to call attention to the essential quality in the great department of life and thought which it names: that a man's Religion is not the recognition of something external to himself, in the sense of something of alien nature by which he is bound down; and that those who listen to its voice as to the voice of Law, and hear in it only the "Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not" of authoritative warning and command—to which, if they listen, they listen, as it were, under protest—are strangers to the spirit of all true Religion.

At a period of disintegration like the present, there is danger that such a point of view may be pressed too far. The rising generation certainly lays all its emphasis both in thought and action on the side of life and liberty. Not only in the religious but also in the political sphere there is a general dissatisfaction with received creeds, and in the sphere of morals "conventionality" is severely dealt with. Wherever the individual finds his desire for independent action hampered, he assumes the restricting medium to be a dead weight of accumulated prejudices. And though, on the whole, our intellectual leaders seem to believe that this movement will justify itself in the end, to watch its progress is to be aware

that many symptoms are revealing themselves which give grave cause for apprehension. For the value of the individual's claim to life and liberty depends upon the nature of the individual who makes it; and even if, by submitting to an external code, he becomes, in spiritual phraseology, a slave, one is bound to accept the conclusion that the good of society requires the multitude of its less enlightened members to accept a term of slavery, and to forego their claim to that perfectly unfettered self-development which is the essence of humanity according to the democratic ideal. As the burden of the present article will be in a contrary sense, it seemed well to pay in passing this salute to law and order: and before we proceed to our principal contention, one last remark in parenthesis and reservation may be permitted us. The word Religion, though it seems to emphasise the lifeless element of law, and by naming it to give a misleading prominence to the negative and restrictive side of a life which, in its full development, has been described as "perfect freedom," may yet be differently regarded. One of the main difficulties involved in the attempt to communicate thought by means of language is that the significance of words undergoes perpetual modification as the mental and moral outlook of the individuals who use them is enlarged. The highest, the most inclusive outlook, could we but attain to it, would revolutionise our understanding, if not our use, of language. But no terminology can raise us to a height which is still beyond our reach; and to what is as yet unattained we can only be referred by negatives. Words are not experiences, and except as a record or index of experience they are valueless. If the true life is in a man, he will easily recognise a sense in which it is rightly to be called Law; if it is not in him, if what he takes for light is darkness, the light, of which he knows nothing, can only be described to him by pointing to its contrary which he knows. And thus it may be just because it contains the secret of an inclusive freedom, that Religion appears before mankind generally as the thing that binds.

But there can be little doubt that if we look to Religion, as far as we are able, on its positive side, we find little or no affinity in it to the domain of Law. If we wish to find a parallel for the typically religious temper, we shall be forced to turn not to the political but to the artistic life. Nothing more nearly approaches the spirit of true Religion than the spirit of true Art. It is of interest to quote in this connection words written by one of the greatest and most original of English artists. "And now let me finish by assuring you that, though I have been very unhappy, I am so no longer. I am again emerged into the light of day. I still and shall to eternity embrace Christianity, and adore him who is the express image of God; but I have travelled through perils and darkness not unlike a champion." The value of this and many other similar passages that occur in the writings or in the recorded conversation of William Blake, is that being a man, the fervour of whose religious life is indisputable, they testify that in one mind at least religious and artistic activity coalesced. Blake has often been called mad, and one must admit that, according to the old sense of the word, he was in some respects an "idiot": he allowed, he even constrained his mind to develop in total disregard of the intellectual atmosphere of his time; he lived in a world of his own making, and described what he saw there in terms which were only the more confusing because they were in familiar use. But although, in a kind of impetuous contempt for the lifeless conventionalities and narrow complacencies he saw around him, he had deprived himself of the moderating, reconciling influences which come of intercourse between man and man, and was thus driven, much like Ruskin in his latter days, into a reckless stubbornness of antagonism which delighted in riddles and paradoxes for their own sake, yet nothing is clearer to those who have studied his work sympathetically than that his apprehension of the larger realities of the spiritual life is sustained, serious and profound. And his utterances have a peculiar value because they possess in a very

high degree the directness only to be found in the speech of men whose thought is their own.

To the mind of Blake, then, Art and Religion were identical. In the passage above quoted, he is describing to a friend what would ordinarily be called not a religious but an artistic experience. The Christianity he refers to includes, and is here intended primarily to convey, the practice of a particular kind of painting. "I know of no other Christianity," he says elsewhere, "and of no other Gospel than the liberty both of body and mind to exercise the Divine Arts of Imagination." And the page on which the latter words are written is illustrated by a rendering of the Crucifixion unmatched for grandeur and dignity and depth of spiritual insight since the days of Angelico or even of Giotto himself.[1] In his own peculiar language, Christ and the Imagination are often convertible terms, and he regards the Crucifixion as an eternal symbol of the destruction by each individual of his inborn faculty for immediate communion with the Divine. Those who turn to Blake's rendering of the Crucifixion just referred to will need no further witness to the intensity of his religious life: in his poetical work if it has escaped notice, the reason is that the most exalted expressions of it are obscured by a profitless mystical terminology, like mountain summits by the clouds about their base. The following lines, which explain the design of the Crucifixion, have the same intensity of inspiration:—

> "And O thou Lamb of God, whom I
> Slew in my dark self-righteous pride:
> Art thou returned to Albion's land?
> And is Jerusalem thy bride?
>
> Come to my arms and never more
> Depart: but dwell for ever here.
> Create my Spirit to thy Love:
> Subdue my Spectre to thy Fear."

If we remember that Albion is Man, Jerusalem the city

[1] A remarkably beautiful reproduction of this design is given in Gilchrist's *Life of Blake*, vol. i. p. 240 (2nd edition).

where Albion dwells when his Spectre, the eighteenth century god of Reason, is subdued and the Spirit of Liberty and Imagination made perfect in him, we shall enter readily into the deep religious passion here expressed; and whoever reads these lines or considers the form and features of the Christ in the design already referred to, must know that Blake's views upon the subject of Religion, however fantastically worded, were something quite different from what we ordinarily mean by views. They were not intellectual conjecture, but the expression of spiritual fact, of the events of his inward life. It was not that, being an artist and religiously brought up, it was a matter of interest to him to "effect a synthesis" of Art and Religion—a questionable sort of operation at the best: for everything is at one with everything else, as everybody knows; and the chief temptation of the intellectual life is to say we see unity when as yet we have not even seen diversity—but that he had himself so lived and worked that the two had for him actually become one. He affirms the identity in his most exalted and in his most prosaic moods. Nor is it merely that all Art is Religion: he believes the converse to be equally true. "A poet, a painter, a musician, an architect, the man or woman who is not one of these is not a Christian." "Jesus and his Apostles and Disciples were all Artists." These latter statements are peculiar but not ludicrous, and they deserve the same reverent attention as the rest.

Relieved of its paradox, Blake's position is perhaps describable as follows. Both Art and Religion have two aspects: you may look at them from within and from without. Looking at them from without, you see perishable matter, you see law, ceremonial, dogma, tradition, phraseology, technique, and with these before you you realise only the diversity, the separation between them. But the true view is from within: look from within and what you see is a spirit clothing itself, finding expression for itself, in certain kinds of thought and action: it matters little which; for the action and thought are nothing in themselves, they only exist for those to whom the sole

reality is the spirit manifested in them. And however diverse the manifestations, the essential is the same. Art and Religion are a motion of the soul, a self-forgetfulness of the individual before the universal life, a movement from within outwards: the life of both, their secret, is e-motion. Thus it was that Blake devoted all his strength to passionate preaching of a single doctrine—that this spontaneous "emanation," by which man rises into communion with the Divine, this power, which, according to the sphere in which it operates, he calls sometimes Imagination, sometimes Love, is the one thing needful, and that whatever in government or in society tends to check it and throw man back upon himself defeats the true end of living and robs man of his one possession of priceless worth. In short, Art and Religion are the same to him, because both give, what there is nothing else that can give, a complete expression to the spirit of life itself.

But Art and Religion, though they were the same to Blake, are not the same to everybody: Blake's experience is, in fact, so unique that it must remain spiritually unfruitful, unless it can somehow be set in relation to more familiar attitudes of mind. The point which, with Blake to guide us, we have now reached is that the essential both in Religion and in Art is a certain kind of activity of the soul. Clearly, the next point to consider is the mode in which that activity expresses itself. Needless to say, the complete product of the activity is, in the one case, a work of art. What is it in the other? Some might point in answer to the acts of public and private devotion which are naturally associated with the religious life. But these are parallel rather to the communion with nature or the imaginative aspiration, which prompt the artist to his work; they are not the work itself. The activity of the soul, which we are now calling Religion, issues in no clearly definable product; for there is no action of man which may not be a religious action: all that can be said is that the only "work of religion" comparable to what in the sister sphere is called a "work of art" is a life in which the promptings of religious

aspiration and communion are realised. And just as a work of art, though produced by a spiritual activity, exists only by taking a material form, so also the spiritual activity of Religion cannot exist without a material on which to work and in which to express itself—the difference being that this material is not sound or colour, but the man himself. The parallel we are now suggesting is not the same as that which induced the Greeks to conceive the moral life as a work of art; viewing Art, at least for this dialectic purpose, more externally, they called attention to the subservience of all the parts to a single end in order to emphasise the value of a similar unity in the conduct of life itself. The appeal was an appeal to reason. But, as a matter of fact, the unity of a work of art, where art is perfect, is not a thing produced to meet the demands of logic,[1] it arises because the work reflects a single, that is a continuous, spiritual appeal. The artist sees or half sees a vision, which, though it is yet formless, though as yet he has not realised it or made it his own, draws him from himself; he is in touch with a "beyond": his condition is a condition of desire: he is in the presence he knows not of what, but this unknown has a moving influence upon him; and his emotion, as he answers to its call, guides him by a higher than the law of reason to the characters that are at harmony with itself. Thus it is not the essential of the work that it should be thought out or constructed according to a plan; its unity is the unity of the passion to which it owes its life. And it was passion as the unifying element which we had in view in referring to the material expression demanded as well by the religious as by the artistic impulse. "Christ and his Apostles were all Artists," not in so far as their lives were "unities," but in so far as their speech and action were penetrated and transformed by the rapture of an inward vision. Perfect religious action, according to this view, is that in which the whole man, with whatever individual strength he has of mind

[1] Or in Blake's forcible metaphor, "If morality is Christianity, Socrates was the Saviour."

and body, becomes an instrument, a vehicle, to express the emotion which includes all others, giving form to the breath of God in man, making the divine Inspiration visible and comprehensible in acts of love.

"Prayer is the study of Art. Praise is the practice of Art.[1] Fasting, etc., all relate to Art. The outward ceremony is anti-Christ." Blake delights to work out his paradox into the minutest details. The objection which would naturally be offered here, that Art cannot exist without an outward ceremony, but that Religion can, has perhaps been forestalled by the exposition that precedes: but a new difficulty presents itself. We habitually regard the artist as the possessor, and in general as the unexplained possessor, of a special gift: if a man has no artistic faculty, no one dreams of considering his personality incomplete; but the religious life is viewed quite differently. It is supposed the natural inheritance of every man, into which, if he does not enter, his own perversity and hard-heartedness are to blame. In what sense therefore, it may be objected, can it be profitable to compare or identify a specialised function with the one faculty without which man's life cannot be truly lived at all? We should answer, in the first place, that however we may admit in theory the universality of the religious appeal, the actual secret of the religious life as outlined earlier is possessed by very few; and those who possess the secret would be first to acknowledge how intermittently their lives express it, how seldom they are, according to Blake's sense of the word, true "artists": and, on the other hand, that the normal attitude of the majority of men to Art is much nearer than might be supposed to their normal attitude to Religion; they have neither in the one case nor in the other any power of creation or originative action; but in various degrees they can enter into and reflect the spirit which has prompted

[1] Not only in his artistic but also in his political theorising, Blake often anticipates Ruskin. It was one of Ruskin's favourite dicta that "All great art is Praise."

thought or action in the creative mind. To understand a poem or a picture you must, however dimly, enter into the spiritual atmosphere in which it was conceived; to read poetry, you must be a poet; to see a picture, you must be an artist; and poets and artists, more or less intermittently, with more or less of intensity, we all are. In the second place, we would allege that the identification, even as conceived by Blake, need not be taken to amount to more than this—that no human action can be complete or representative, unless it engages the entire man, unless, that is, it expresses, however remotely, the elemental emotion which is the witness and assurance to man of his kinship with the divine heart of things: all human activity to be perfect must be religious. And this same test of entirety, that the whole man should be engaged and all his faculties contribute harmoniously and in due subordination, that is, under the guidance of the highest, to an end in which all are involved—here precisely is the test, by which for ever we may distinguish true Art from false; only, in a work of art, because the materials and the end are at the outset determined within comparatively narrow limits, both process and product can be more readily appreciated and judged. In fact, as man is to the universe, so is a work of art to the life of man, a second microcosm within the first; and it is for this reason that the work of the artist may be taken as a type of all perfect human activity.

Finally, it may be objected that this limitation in the scope of Art, the necessity to make each several expression of the inspiring passion complete, individual and self-sufficient, is a distinctive feature too important to be overlooked, that all the problems of artistic workmanship are involved in it, and that nothing of a similar nature can be suggested to complete the parallel in the religious life: that the identity is destroyed. The objection is valid: but to advance it would be to attack the line of our argument too mercilessly. Art and Religion are not the same: but it was interesting for the moment to identify them, because in the mind of one great artist they

had been permanently identified. This was possible to Blake, in part, because the groundwork of his artistic training was so thorough that the specific problems of artistic expression hardly occupied his mind: in part, because that training was no more than a groundwork and left him—if the expression is allowable—at the mercy of his inspiration, when the time came that it should be transmuted into the grander artistic forms. It was thus at once the intensity and the defectiveness of his genius as an artist that made the identity conceivable by him. That it was not only conceivable but conceived, that the identity was actual in the life and thought of a serious and great-minded man, is a fact, which, at a time when philosophy turns more and more to experience for her guidance, readers of a philosophical journal will not wish to overlook.

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A PEACE POLICY FOR IDEALISTS.

W. R. BOYCE GIBSON.

I. The Movement towards Solidarity.

There exists to-day a movement of infinite importance and promise, the development of which, in my opinion, is likely to dominate the philosophic interest of the coming generation. I allude to the leavening of life through philosophy, and to the solidarity of philosophic thought and endeavour which such a leavening should inevitably bring with it. The self-consciousness of philosophy has recently been assuming a new form. It is coming to appreciate the affinity of its interests with those of the larger social life within which its speculations arise and develop. It is realising itself as a philosophy of life, and in so doing is giving both to life and to philosophy deeper meaning and deeper worth. Nor is it only through its direct participation in the problems of education, economics, and sociology that philosophy is demonstrating the practical value of its speculative activities. It is revealing itself more and more clearly as an imperative need of the religious consciousness, and, in endeavouring to meet that need, is coming to recognise the importance and philosophical power of categories, such as those of love, communion, redemption, which until quite recently were left to the sole interpretations of theology. The wall between philosophy and theology is already transparent, and tends to break down entirely whenever a radical earnestness is shown in the reasoned reconstruction of the religious life.

The same influence of sympathetic interpenetration is at work within philosophy itself. Counteracting forces are, indeed, unmistakably operative. Evil speaking and worse insinuation still do their small quota of harm to the causes they profess to defend; and, what is far more harmful even than the futility of mere abuse, the spirit of misconception is abroad, blinding and paralysing powers which, in reality, are both able and ready to co-operate in a common cause. But these influences have no right of home within the freedom of philosophy, and they run counter, moreover, to the most rudimentary dictates of common sense. We may therefore hope to be eventually rid of them.

What is much more significant than these transitory symptoms is the steady attempt which is at present being made to emphasise the convergence of philosophic opinions. That Naturalism and Idealism are not yet in a position to fraternise over the interpretation of life and its philosophy must be regretfully admitted. But Humanism, whether idealistic or radically empiristic, and all Idealism, whether Berkeleyan, Neo-Hegelian or Personal, are at present showing a distinct inclination to understand each other. Professor James, in a recent article in *Mind* (Oct. 1904), has set the cue, and Mr Hoernlé and Dr Mellone (*id.*, July and Oct. 1905) have carried the spirit of reasonableness an important step further. It remains for other writers to follow up a tendency fraught with such manifest good to the essential interests of philosophy. In the present article I propose to carry the peace-policy one stage further still. And should it prove that I have been crying peace where there is no peace, then, no doubt, further adjustments will be called for, into the nature of which we need not enter at present.

The philosophy of Martineau has recently attracted, and most deservedly, a great deal of attention. Among the various books and articles dealing with the subject, I wish to single out a pamphlet by Professor Henry Jones, published under the title *The Philosophy of Martineau in relation to the*

Idealism of the Present Day, and to consider it, not as directly affecting Martineau's position, but as touching the relation between the two branches of concrete Idealism currently qualified as Absolute and Personal. As the latter type of Idealism is the less familiar, I propose in the first instance to point out as succinctly as possible the main essentials for which I conceive it to stand. I shall then consider the bearing of Professor Jones's discussion on the relation between the two Idealisms.

II. The Essentials of Personal Idealism.

1. Personal Idealism, as I understand it, is the attempt to support what is central in the claim of Absolute Idealism from the point of view of the personal experient. The central requirement I refer to is best expressed in the Hegelian dictum that the Real is the Rational, understood not in any pan-logical sense, but as expressing a full faith in the reason's power to answer any question it is capable of asking and of stating in a reasonable form. The contention, I take it, is that there is no kind of experience that does not admit of being perfectly understood and lived out in the light of its own categories or principles of unity. So conceived, Idealism *qua* absolute is diametrically opposed to any line of thought which leads to a sceptical distrust of the reason. It is opposed to the Intellectual Pessimism which holds that the most reasonable course is just to work on without thinking, to the Agnosticism which limits the intelligibility of things to their phenomenal appearance, and to the higher Irrationalism which still holds to the truth of the spiritual life, but at the desperate cost of a faith that defies the reason.

The rationalistic aspect of Personal Idealism is well brought out in the theory of knowledge appropriate to its own point of view. The broad lines of such a theory have been clearly laid down by Professor Eucken in one of his earlier works.[1] On Eucken's view, our conception of know-

[1] *Die Einheit des Geisteslebens*, pp. 302–306.

ledge, of its function and limits, depends on the meaning we attach to life. Hence a spiritual conception of life necessitates a spiritual conception of knowledge. But to see life spiritually, we must see it from the personal point of view, from the point of view of the personal experient.

The conception of personal experience includes three main essentials :—

(1) The initial and yet inalienable fact of personal life is a self-immediacy or a being-for-self. The essence of a person, as Dr Rashdall puts it, is not what he is for another, but what he is for himself. Such self-reference in no way spells individualism, nor does it imply any intrinsic finitude or isolation. On the contrary, our self-immediacy is sensitively active in proportion as the limits of individualism are broken down and immediacy of communion is established between man and what is spiritually akin to man—his fellow-men, Nature, and God. Still, even in his most personal relationships the law of spiritual discreteness holds good. To be one in spiritual aim and feeling, we must at least be two in spiritual endeavour.

(2) Personal experience is essentially oppositional in character. The oppositions of self and not-self, subject and object, freedom and order, and all other antagonisms are oppositions *within* personal experience. A true view of the progress of our personal life shows us that these oppositions are *indigenous to the process.* They arise within it because they are necessary to its self-development, and the reconciliation is achieved within the very action that brings the opposition into being.

(3) Personal experience (to adopt Eucken's own expressions) is essentially "action" or "deed." It is in and through active spiritual endeavour that we come to realise our spiritual unity. It is in and through action or deed, inwardly conceived as the expression of personal aspiration, that we actually and perpetually transcend the oppositions inseparable from the spiritual development of a personality.

It is as an integral factor of such personal experience that

knowledge has its true and indispensable function. Knowledge is not a mere reflection upon life, but a very part of life itself. It does not develop alongside the spiritual reality it helps to interpret, but within it, opening new possibilities, deepening and developing the reality itself. So philosophy, the highest type of knowledge, is not a mere after-reflection upon life, nor is it an *a priori* predetermination of its significance. Philosophy is a part of life, a reflection within life from the point of view of the active experient: it develops out of the very endeavour to live truly, and is the self-expression of this vital endeavour. Hence, as we have already insisted, there can be no spiritual reality uninterpretable in the light of its own categories, and all explanation must in last resort be self-explanation. And where personal experience is deepest and most spiritual, the theory of that experience must be most profound and most truly interpretive of the meaning of life. Far, therefore, from there being a point beyond which a reasoned grasp of principle is impossible and unnecessary, it is in our religious emotions and activities, *personally* interpreted, that the reason is most indispensable and illuminating.

2. Personal Idealism is essentially a teleological Idealism. What we take to be distinctive of the teleological point of view cannot be indicated in a word. For the statement would necessarily vary in form according as we professed to speak from the psychological, ethical, or religious standpoints. We content ourselves with pointing out what we take to be the essential significance of final causation from the concretest standpoint of all, the standpoint of the religious consciousness. We interpret it, in a word, as the power of God in man. If the Incarnation is spiritually understood as implying the saving intimacy of God with the human soul, then the teleology of personal experience has its roots in the Incarnation. The End towards which our feeble beginnings strive is thus present at the start, and immanent within this germinal effort to grow towards it. If the fact of God's omnipresence is conceded, this immanence of the Perfect within the imperfect as

"the Soul of its soul" (Martineau) is *eo ipso* implied; and if the religious consciousness accepts love as its supreme category, and is alive to the conviction that God is Love, and inspired with love's redeeming strength, the intercommunion of perfect and imperfect, of divine and human, provides at once the ideal, and the motive to reach after and rest in that ideal, which are the essentials of all teleological development.

The concrete explanation of the teleology of the spiritual life thus seems to require a reference to the most central convictions of the religious consciousness. For if the movement from human to divine has its roots in the Incarnation, so that, in Pascal's phrase, we could not seek after God unless we had already found Him, the intercommunion which God's presence in the soul implies must itself be the source of all spiritual revelation and redemption. The intercommunion is indeed itself a germinal revelation and redemption. Through communion as through action, through faith as through works, we come to see what the Incarnation means—and in so far as we do this, we have our revelation; we experience how it can save us from our finitude and error—and this again is our redemption.

Personal Idealism is essentially a Religious Idealism, a philosophy, *i.e.*, which endeavours to give a reasoned support to the fundamental claims of the religious consciousness. In particular, it holds that the spiritual significance of works lies in the faith that expresses itself through them, that morality is rooted in religious inspiration, and that the freedom which is our spiritual birthright can grow to its full stature only in profoundest dependence upon God.

3. Adopting as it does the standpoint of the personal experient, Personal Idealism demands the reconstruction of psychological science from the experient's point of view. It demands a psychology of personal experience. The first requirement of such a psychology is that experience should not be treated metaphorically. It repudiates as inadequate the mechanical associationistic metaphor of the upbuilding

of experience from states of consciousness originally discontinuous. Again, the further metaphor of the stream of consciousness, though it does some justice to the continuity of experience, is seen to be entirely inadequate so soon as the experient's point of view is taken. For experience does not consist in any mere series of subjective states, however continuously these are linked together. Thus, if it is a question of attention, the relation of the subjective interest to the topic attended to is the central feature of the experience. We cannot, in fact, dissociate object from subject in any act of cognition. Moreover, the continuity of the subjective interest in any object, though it works itself out under time-conditions, is not itself a time-continuity. An interest may be broken off a hundred times, but invariably resumes itself, though the interruptions have broken the time-continuity into a hundred pieces.

A psychology from the point of view of the experient is therefore not to be confused with a psychology of the experient reduced to a thin series of subjective states, to a mere time-flux of feelings devoid of all epistemological significance. No reason save that of methodological convenience can justify an abstraction of this kind. A psychology from the point of view of the experient is a psychology of personal experience, and what personal experience involves we have already attempted to show. We need only add here that the analysis of man's mental development from this point of view, whether traced out as an acquisition of skill or as an acquisition of meaning, or as a concrete synthesis of these, is throughout an analysis of the processes through which the human consciousness acquires its freedom and makes it effective for the discipline of life.

4. Personal Idealism develops itself from the standpoint not only of personal experience, but of experience as experienced by a person. It is in this sense anthropocentric; but, in insisting on human life as central, it insists at the same time that such life is essentially spiritual and infinite, integrally one

in nature with whatever has a spiritual and infinite significance. If the term "anthropotheocentric" were taken to imply an experience in which human and divine interpenetrated, then that term would still more aptly represent the true standpoint of Personal Idealism. But by whatever name the standpoint is labelled, it is essential that it should be that of the personal experient, for Personal Idealism is just a reasoned presentation of personal experience, a philosophy of man's spiritual life.

The adoption of the anthropotheocentric position, characteristic of Personal Idealism in its religious form, may appear incompatible with the doctrine of an impervious ego which has figured so prominently in the confession of the Personal Idealist. The point is crucial, for an inviolate or uninvadable self-hood, a being-for-self, may be so understood as to render inexplicable the transition from Personal to Religious Idealism, and to make of the transcendence of the anthropocentric starting-point through the anthropotheocentric standpoint a logical *tour de force*. That a certain spiritual imperviousness is an inalienable characteristic of personal existence and a fundamental precondition of all personal intercommunion would not, I think, be denied, except in the pantheistic interest. The more intimate the fellowship of love, the more sensitive is the reverence with which love greets the love of another. Nor can I believe that love is no longer self-limited by this differentiating reverence when we pass into the communion of the soul with God. And yet I admit most frankly that, for the misconception which has arisen on this point, the Personal Idealist may be largely to blame. Speaking of my own part in this matter, I remember, with gratitude, a recent conversation with Professor Stout, in which he pressed upon me his conviction that in the case of divine communion, at least, the imperviousness of the self could not amount to an impenetrability; that the presence of God must be spiritually interpenetrative of our own self-consciousness. The revision of some of my previous utterances on this point, implying as they do a right of self-protection

against God Himself, is, I believe, demanded in the interests of a thorough-going inwardness of starting-point. It is needed to explain how the point of view of the experient is at the same time anthropotheocentric. It is needed to explain how our freedom as moral agents is compatible with that panentheism or doctrine of God's omnipresence which is perhaps the dearest conviction of the mystical consciousness.

5. The essentials of Personal Idealism as above outlined are presented in their completest and most vital form in Professor Eucken's philosophy of life. I do not think it is possible to realise the ingrainedness of our intellectualistic prejudices till we have submitted to the rejuvenating influences of this philosophy. The philosophy in its present form, especially in its earlier presentation, does insufficient justice both to the Rationalistic contention of Personal Idealism and to its call for a psychological analysis (*inter alia*) of personal experience. But these defects are not intrinsic to the system, and Professor Eucken has fully admitted the deficiencies here indicated and the need for their removal. I look to Eucken's philosophy as destined in the near future to be the most potent factor in that consolidation of Idealistic endeavour which is the paramount desideratum of the present philosophical era.

III. Professor Henry Jones's Centenary Address.

In his Centenary Address[1] Professor Jones contrasts the philosophy for which he stands with that held by Dr Martineau, and by others who, in his opinion, share in common the cardinal error of starting from the inner life of the individual, from individual experience; and he sets himself to show that the individualistic starting-point stands logically guilty of all the disabilities which flow from that cardinal error as from a fountain-head, dualism, subjective Idealism, and in last resort an utter scepticism. I do not say that the discomfiture of individualistic philosophy is the main object of this address.

[1] The pamphlet in question reproduces an address delivered in Manchester College, Oxford, at the celebration of the centenary of Dr Martineau.

Its dominant strain is of that higher mood which makes for solidarity, and sees unity in difference. In the religious genius of Dr Martineau, in the purity and fervour of his spiritual insight, Professor Jones detects and welcomes the greater harmony in which the contrast of the two philosophies dies imperceptibly away. The address is thus a lofty and becoming tribute to "one of the noble knights of the spirit of holiness which is called in the sacred book the Spirit of Truth."

It is well that, where the end in view is one, the sense of this unity should penetrate into the strife of means and methods, raising it to the level of the end subserved. This is a principle of controversy I learnt from Professor Jones himself in the Moral Philosophy class-room at Glasgow. But methods are important, and, if sufficiently fundamental, may even rank among those causes "in which a man," as we read, "is justified in striking with all his might."

That Martineau's Intuitionism lacks the systematic strength of the Hegelian philosophy may be unconditionally granted. It is inward, profoundly inward, and yet it is not central. The breach of a dualism which cannot be philosophically defended keeps man and Nature, God and man, in logical isolation. And this truth Professor Jones drives relentlessly home. Even Martineau himself, in an almost wistful passage at the close of the *Ethics*, hints in his own luminous way that his philosophy would have gained through a closer appreciation of Hegel's message. So much must then be granted. Martineau had not risen to the conception of a spiritual Monism that subsists and develops undisintegrated by the freedom of man and the apparent aloofness of Nature.

But to suppose that Martineau exhausted the logical possibilities of the inward position he so definitely and fruitfully adopts is, in my opinion, an assumption it would be hard indeed to justify. The assumption would be paralleled by supposing that Hegel could see no deeper or more universal meaning in the *Cogito ergo sum* than could Descartes before him. And this very comparison goes to the root of the

matter. For it is precisely Hegel himself who has given to the inwardness of personal experience its true philosophic dignity by teaching it to adjust its categories of self-interpretation to the height of its spiritual experience. Hegel does not refute Jakobi, but teaches him to understand himself. All intuitionism and all mysticism, if it desires to be at once philosophically and appropriately articulate, must first learn the secret of Hegel.

I would liken the inwardness of the self's experience to a limit which at its base is a dungeon. Here the egoism that sees no further than its inclinations lies bound in its own selfishness. But the dungeon which at its lower level isolates the soul within its windowless walls, is domed by the open sky, and when the level of the dome is reached by the soul as it moves upwards towards the light, it finds dungeon and limit gone, and in its place the limitless reaches of the infinite. This is but a similitude, and yet it appears to me to be eloquent of the truth. The movement from the individuality that is hedged within its own feelings to the personality that is open to the omnipresence of God takes place within one continuous self-experience. How it should be otherwise it is difficult to see.

The individualist, as Professor Jones has it, starts from individual experience; and this, it is supposed, is the permanent limitation debarring it from all participation in Idealism, a limitation which no logic can possibly transcend. The Idealist, on the other hand, "sets forth from experience, that is, from a self related to a not-self" (p. 31). It sets forth from a unity in difference, whereas the individualist sets forth from two contrasted differences, the soul and the world, and is left with the insoluble puzzle of extracting from these desiccated differences an inward and a vital unity. But as the Idealist *does* set forth from experience, we are forced to inquire from *whose* experience the start is made. To start from experience in general, *i.e.* from experience in the abstract, is, in virtue of the same principle

which forbids the extraction of unity from mere differences —"ex nihilo nihil fit,"—to condemn oneself to the purely logical development of any man's or of no man's experience. We must surely start from someone's experience. But to start from the divine experience is an aspiration open only to God Himself. From whose experience, then, shall we start? Each, we say, must start from his own experience or from the sympathetically imagined experience of another. But another's experience, *qua* imagined, is still one's own experience. Each must therefore start from his own experience.

There is no need to suppose that this conclusion casts us back once again into the individualistic dungeon, for why should not *my* experience be the experience of a person? My experience, at its richest, is the experience of my religious consciousness, an experience in which I personally realise what love and love's power can do to explain the universe. Can anyone ever hope for a deeper experience than this?

Why, we venture to ask, is the standpoint of the experient incompatible with the Idealist position as held by Professor Jones himself? That it restricts us to a psychological method is too much to allow, if the standpoint is identified with that of the abstract individualist who sees in the experient an entity dissevered from what it experiences. Such an experient could not, of course, be an experient at all, and some physical method, politely called psycho-physical, would be required to cope with such a lifeless phenomenon. On the other hand, if the standpoint is identified with that of the *personal* experient, a psychological method is appropriate only so far as a psychological analysis of personal experience is the type of analysis desired.

I cannot resist the conclusion that Professor Jones is identifying the experienced inner life with a mere feeling-life or "activity" devoid of all objective reference. He cannot be conceiving it as a spiritual life, for a spiritual life essentially progresses through the very oppositions he denies to the inner

life. But it is not to be supposed that Dr Ward, for instance, identifies individual experience with a blind and abstract ghostliness of this kind. But if this identification is withdrawn—and it surely is gratuitous—Personal and Ontological Idealism join hands at once. "While repudiating the psychological method," writes Professor Jones (p. 19), "which begins from the inner life of the individual, Idealism does not endeavour to do *without* that inner life—nor, indeed, without any part of it, whether that part be emotional, or purposive, or a mere 'activity.' It recognises the inner life in all its variety of fulness; but it finds it to be a life at all only in relation to the realm of reality, within which alone it has any content or character or being." The inner life has then to be recognised in all its fulness. But how can this desirable end be compassed unless one adopts the experient's point of view? For what is the alternative, we ask? It cannot be the external spectator's standpoint, for that would reduce Idealistic philosophy to the impersonal level of natural science. But what other alternative is there? The logical point of view of the Universal Thinker or Pure Reason is the personal point of view in one of its most earnest and strenuous forms. We ally ourselves in thought with the logical divinity within us: there may even be some who find themselves nearest God when steeped in the ecstasy of thought. And should it be contended that it is not we who think, but the Universe or God who thinks through us—a solution which Professor Jones emphatically repudiates—then no doubt the experient's point of view turns to a mere phrase without a meaning; but it is then equally meaningless to suppose that it is through *us* that the thinking is done. If it is not our experience, how can we be aware that anything has transpired?

Our discussion has so far taken the form of an attempt to indicate the experient's point of view as the essential starting-point of an Idealistic philosophy. For we believe that in this main essential all Idealism is either implicitly or explicitly a Personal Idealism.

To test the soundness of this conclusion, we propose to consider Professor Jones's own statement as to the essential requirements of Idealism, and show in what sense these demands may be interpreted by Personal Idealism.

Professor Jones adopts the motto, "Unity in difference," as the distinctive badge of Idealism. What Idealism professes to be, he says (p. 22), "is a theory that starts neither from the self nor from the not-self, but from the self as real through the not-self, and the not-self as ideal through the self. It maintains that the experience of man—whether that be the rudimentary experience of ordinary consciousness, or the more comprehensive and concrete experience of the philosophic consciousness—attests to no other fact than this intrinsic and constitutive inter-relation of subject and object in knowledge, and of the self and the not-self in the realm of the real. It avers not only that the object is essentially implicated with the subject — which every form of recent Idealism, however incomplete, admits — but also that the subject is essentially implicated with the object, a truth which is only seen by incomplete Idealists in a glass and darkly, and is therefore an object of terror to them." This same contention is urged even more forcibly in the following passage (p. 27):—"The subject apart from the object, and the object apart from the subject, are nothing. It cannot even be said that the one is empty and the other blind—for neither the one nor the other can be at all for *any* thought." Again, when speaking of the relation of Idealism to morality, he adds (p. 26):—"I should like to make this clear, at least, that the Idealist is committed beyond recall, and without reservation, to the unity of man with the system in which he lives."

We have now to consider the attitude of Personal Idealism towards these strong and unambiguous statements. They have the ring of an ultimatum, proclaiming the irreducible minimum of a basis of agreement on which the solidarity of Idealism can be permanently secured.

It would be quite impossible, after what has been said as to

the essentials of Personal Idealism, to disagree in principle with the monistic claims which are here put forward. Even when Personal Idealism, as in the important instance of Professor Howison,[1] is confessedly pluralistic in character, we find that the universe promises to issue in a harmony of wills, and such a solution, as I understand it, is pluralistic only in the name. High-level pluralism is much more truly monistic than low-level monism. There seems, therefore, no reason why the ultimatum should not be accepted as a bond of fellowship, and Idealists meet as friends to discuss differences and difficulties of interpretation.

Any allusion to the subject-object relation at once raises some of the most fundamental difficulties in philosophy. I can only diffidently indicate the line of thought which the relation suggests to me. I ask myself, in the first place, what I precisely mean by the object of my *thought*. Can I, for instance, include sense-presentations as such, say the black characters on the white page of a book, under the term "object of *thought*"? I cannot persuade myself that I should be justified in doing this. Sense-quality, *as such*, I feel, is emphatically impervious to my thinking: I can only think the meaning which it symbolises. Thought does not think *of* what is sensed; it thinks through it. And the meaning which it thinks is, as I take it, a product of the spiritual interaction of our thinking with the thought of another, be that other a fellow-thinker or the Mind in Nature which science reveals to us. Suppose that my purpose is to think out an essay on character. The suggested topic at once defines my purpose, gives it its orientation and its preperceptive and selective tendencies. The object of my purpose, as thus defined, is character itself as evidenced in the lives of men and women; the articulation of my purpose as defined by the topic is won through what we might fitly call a spiritual communion with these expressions of personal character, and the organised essay is the product of this intercommunion. I

[1] *Limits of Evolution*, 2nd ed., and *Personal Idealism*.

should therefore prefer to characterise the subject-object relation as primarily a subject-subject relation, a relation between thought and thought, of which the object thought about is the intelligible issue. Thinking, on this view, is just the intellectual and defining factor in spiritual communion. Hence to deny the implication of subject and object would be to deny the fruitfulness of spiritual intercourse. As regards that "terror" of the incomplete Idealist, the constitutive indwelling of the object within the subject itself, nothing could be more welcome or more indispensable than the effective presence of science or organised meaning—for this is the object-product about which we think—within that communing of spirits in which thinking ultimately consists. Without it, indeed, the cumulative effects of continuous thinking would be impossible, for the products of previous intercourse form the basis and fresh starting-ground for all further communion.

Thus conceived, this central epistemological problem is seen to be intimately bound up with that of our spiritual freedom; and, as a Personal Idealist, to whom personal freedom —or religious freedom, as Eucken would have it—is the breath of philosophical life, I would deprecate any interpretation of that relation which would render the free intercourse of minds fruitless and ineffective. Indeed, since an interpretation in that sense would not even be the beginning of an interpretation, it would be tantamount to denying all significance to spiritual life. A fruitless spirituality is a contradiction in terms. In this sense we may truly say that the subject apart from the "object" is nothing, just as the "object" apart from the subject is nothing.

With this new interpretation of the relation, the problem which is bound up in the use of the word "apart" is shifted from the relation between subject and object to that between subject and subject. Are we to say that one personality—to put the same problem more concretely—is nothing apart from its connection with another personality? And if we admit this, in what sense do we propose to admit it?

Professor Jones has insisted that *distinction* may be imperative where a *separation* is logically impossible. Provided that the meaning of the term "distinction" is not confined here to that of "logical distinction," I would emphatically endorse Professor Jones's contention. But from the point of view of a freedom-philosophy, the central interest in this connection lies in showing that free personalities can be distinct, not only in the sense of non-separate but also in the sense of *free*. It lies in showing that personal freedom is compatible with a monistic philosophy.

The secret of a real distinction, a distinction that unites through the very differences which it emphasises, reveals itself most clearly when we come to analyze the religious emotions —best summed up under the name of love—through which man enters into vital communion with God, and thereby into living spiritual relations with Nature and his fellow-men. Let us note the characteristics of the love-intimacy between man and God, as we read the record in the lives of great religious thinkers. From man to God, reverence, worship, devotion, and the service which is perfect freedom, freedom to do the right in the face of all tyrannies organised to crush it. From God to man, the ideals which sanctify man's freedom; the saving inspiration which transfigures human finitude, imparting to it a present sense of immortality; and that insight of Himself which concentrates within the meannesses of life, infinite perspectives leading Godward in all directions. These relationships presuppose the distinction of man from the Spirit which he worships. Reverence, for instance, or in other words, love itself, as conscious of the spiritual distance still dividing presences that inwardly interpenetrate, fixes the invisible barrier which is at once love's own self-limitation and the religious expression of its freedom. Gratitude and humility are similar self-limitations of love. The tendency to oneness which is instinctive in love realises itself through these distinctions; but as these same distinctions are of the very substance of the emotional harmony, they

can introduce no alien element calculated to prejudice the organic oneness of the relationship. It is through the spiritual ties that express his freedom that man asserts his unity with the system in which he lives.

The above indications are all too brief and summary, and the tribute which they pay to the claims of the older Idealism may be accepted for its goodwill whilst its logic is rejected. But I would still venture to hope that, in the light of this acknowledgment, the shelter of the simple term "Idealism" may be extended so as to cover the Personal Idealist. Pledged to the same cause through a common respect for personality, freedom, and all other principles of the ethico-religious consciousness, Idealists of both schools might unreservedly co-operate in the great task of bringing philosophy to bear more directly and more fruitfully upon the thought and life of their generation. Sworn anti-individualists as they unitedly are, whether in logic, ethics, or metaphysic, the tendency towards solidarity is rooted in convictions which they hold in common. If two systems so akin in name and structure show mutual suspicion and distrust, there can be but little chance of that union of reflective forces which should secure to philosophy its legitimate influence over the social and religious life of the present day.

W. R. BOYCE GIBSON.

LONDON.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books will, in future, not be open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

CHURCH AND WORLD.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1906, p. 1.)

I.

I GLADLY comply with the request made to me by the Editor of the *Hibbert Journal* that I would put into clearer form a few lines written to him in adherence to the views put forward in the October number on Church and World. If we are disciples of the apostolic writings, especially those of St John and St Paul, we must think of Christ as the Lord, not of a certain part of mankind and of the world, but of the whole. By the Word of God all things were made. He is the Light which lighteth every man. He is before all things, and by Him all things consist or stand fast. We confess, though we often act as if there were no such confession, that He is the redeemer of all the world. "I came," Christ says, "not to condemn the world but to save the world."

Putting aside for the moment the bearing of these expressions of the divine Immanence in the creation generally, and confining ourselves to humanity, we must realise that the spirit of which the life of Jesus Christ is the full expression is the true spirit of all genuine human society. No society can stand without justice, and justice sublimated into love is the very nature of God.

I have been sometimes told, when I have put forward these obviously Scriptural teachings, that it destroys the Church. No! it drives us back to the teaching of Christ about the Church. The space of this *Journal* is precious, and I must put things abruptly. I say, then, that the Church is simply human society inwrought by the spirit of Christ; and its function is not that of a society bound together by doctrinal profession or by ordinances of worship, but of a society striving to carry Christ's righteousness into all the relations of life—to establish, by actually living it out in all its departments, the kingdom of God and of Christ.

Christ is recorded to have used the word church in only two places. In the one ("tell it to the church") He means by it the synagogue, or local committee, which was not a body specially organised for public worship, but for enforcing the whole Mosaic law so far as circumstances permitted, for exercising discipline, and, as in this passage, for reconciling those who had quarrelled. In the other place, Christ says that His Ecclesia will be founded on the rock of faith in Him. The Ecclesia or Synagogue (in the LXX, which the New Testament writers used, the words are synonymous) was "the whole congregation of Israel," not as gathered alone or chiefly for worship, but (like the Ecclesia of a Greek city) for all national purposes: for war, for the ratifying of legislation, for the choice of rulers—always under the supreme sense of the presence and influence of God Himself. And such local body was the Ecclesia for the enforcement of the law so far as was practicable. Christ, we must assume, had no idea of limiting the sphere of the Ecclesia. Each body of Jews—Libertines, Cyrenians, etc.—had its own Ecclesia in which it tried to live out the Mosaic law; and Christ did with this institution what He did in the Sermon on the Mount with the old commandments. As He gave them a spiritual and universal significance, so He did with the Ecclesia. It was to be no longer the organ of an exclusive and legal system, but of the universal justice and love of which His life was the perfect type and inspiration.

Christ never said a word to exhort His disciples to attend public worship; He formed no system. His twelve apostles were simply "to be with Him and to preach." All the rest was left to work itself out under the guidance of the Holy Spirit and according to the circumstances which Divine Providence might order.

It is one of the strangest perversions that the followers of Him who said nothing about any worship but that in spirit and in truth, but lent all the force of His personality to the inculcation of truth, justice and love, should after nineteen hundred years be distinguished mainly by the manner in which they observe the ordinances of public worship, and should be occupied in systems of ceremonial devotions which separate them from their fellow-men. We are working for sect, not for righteousness. It is time that we should reverse the order of our thoughts. It is righteousness which is essential and eternal; the modes of worship and the systems founded on them are secondary and mutable. We must welcome righteousness in whatever guise it may appear: in the family, in business, in literature, in social intercourse, in worship, or in government; and account all these to be functions of the universal Church of God. It is thus that we may end the fatal dualism, the source of perpetual misunderstanding, which makes religion a partial and sectarian power, and may restore it to its true place as the inspirer of truth and goodness through the whole great family of man.

W. H. Fremantle.

The Deanery, Ripon.

II.

No one will deny that there is a wide difference between what we, on the one hand, mean by "Church" and "World," and what, on the other hand, they claim for themselves; and unless this difference is made perfectly clear, to use the words of the writer of the above article, "loose thinking revels in its wildest debauch." Now apparently, according to the writer, the Church claims to be an "oasis in a moral desert; as a solitary witness for righteousness in the midst of universal corruption; as an ark of refuge mercifully launched upon the wasting flood of the world's folly and sin"; and in addition, it includes in its condemnation of the world "the huge complex of secular activity which keeps the world up from hour to hour and maintains society as a going concern"; therefore the writer concludes that "the churches which stand apart and describe all this as morally bankrupt are simply advertising themselves as occupiers of a position as mischievous as it is false."

Now no one at least will condemn a man or any body of men for holding a high ideal of his or their duty. Is it not right, then, that at least in intention the Church should aspire to be "an oasis"?

Her sole purpose is to lead men higher, and consequently all that tends to promote the moral and physical elevation of society is of the same essence as herself, and ought not only to be welcomed but recognised as working—whether or not even more strenuously and successfully than herself—at least in the same direction, and having the same end in view.

In the above article, however, the Church is represented as disparaging all efforts, good and bad alike, that do not emanate from herself: they are labelled "world," and consigned with the "flesh" to the devil.

I do not propose discussing how far the Church may have been guilty of earning for herself this reputation, but at any rate there can be no doubt as to its complete absence from her intention and authorised calling.

How can the Church be in antagonism to a world which represents "municipal governments, the great industries of the nation, the professions of medicine, law, and arms, the fine arts, the courts of justice, the hospitals, the enterprises of education," etc., when the very existence of these goes to prove and confirm her own object and desire, *i.e.* the need of protecting humanity against existing evils, and misusing life through ignorance and carelessness? In other words, all these things only corroborate what the Church herself really does mean by "World"—namely, its abuse.

Can we possibly say that the Church's teaching is founded on the "hypothesis of a lost and ruined race," of a world that is "morally bankrupt," and at the same time believe in the Incarnation? The two ideas are in complete contradiction. The foundation of the Church's teaching, on the contrary, is based upon the hypothesis of God's having "so loved the world" as to commit to it His Divine Logos.

And now, turning to the second point which the writer raises: Is it so certain a fact that religion and scientific theology are inter-dependent?

To say that "the powers that have undermined their (men's) faith are intellectual, and the intellect must restore what the intellect has destroyed," not only savours of homœopathy, but is, moreover, entirely opposed to New Testament teaching and our common experience. "Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen" (*cf.* Heb. xi.). In other words, our religious convictions are of the heart, and not of the brain, as Newman says—because faith is the realisation of things hoped, it is not of things proved by evidence, for it makes its own evidence—"it is the evidence of things not seen." Moreover, the whole spirit of the Gospel message is that faith is something quite new, a power of man hitherto unrecognised, and by no means dependent upon scientific theology or any intellectual argument.

In other words, Religion and Theology represent two widely separate human faculties; and whatever be the attitude of scientific theology, it will never affect true religion, or the Church's fundamental message from her Lord to men.

C. Cowland-Cooper.

Ross-on-Wye.

III.

Is it quite fair to contrast the "strict regard for veracity" of physical science with the "loose thinking" which prevails in the "public exposition of religious belief?" The sphere of physical science is to a considerable extent distinguished from other spheres of thought by the susceptibility of its subject-matter to exact—or relatively exact—measurement. When instruments and methods for obtaining a high degree of exactitude are available, it is a simple duty to insist that they shall be employed.

Even in physical science, reinvestigation often subtracts much from results formerly regarded as exact. The classical and laborious efforts of Stas to determine the atomic weights of the chemical elements were not entirely free from error. In his recent *Life and Experiences* Sir Henry Roscoe alludes to defects in his methods and errors in his results that have been established by modern chemists. It is, of course, true that these errors were made in good faith, and that the continuous critical process to which scientific results are subjected is in itself an example of the "intellectual virtue of veracity." But it is not unimportant to notice that apparent exactitude is often only apparent.

"Science herself may have to confess in the long-run that she rests on presuppositions." Men of science are divided amongst themselves upon such questions as the real nature of "vital force" or life. Now, it is with the great and fundamental presuppositions of life that religion and theology deal. When science confesses that her own methods are insufficient to establish the absolute validity of principles deduced from her own results, it is hardly fair to expect a scientific demonstration of

ultimate religious truths. Mere conflict of opinion is not sufficient to prove that any particular religious intuition is not an "intuition of the reason."

There is a certain sense, and a very real one, in which it might be said that the great and ultimate veracity of religious truths or beliefs is the cause of their apparent irrationality. Men who believe in the great truths of immortality and the providence of God may find difficulty in linking them with the main body of knowledge on the mere purely physical plane. His conviction that the great truths of his religion are primary and essential may lead the preacher into trouble when he attempts to combine them with the main body of thought. The "loose thinking" "in the public exposition of religious belief" may be, it often is, deplorable; but, in fairness to the preacher, be it remembered that his conviction—surely the product and cause of a spirit of veracity—of the importance of the truths he proclaims leads him to persistent and continuous utterance. Science can wait for the final ripening of the harvest, but the religious teacher deals with great primary and pressing verities that demand instant attention and heed.

Science begins at the bottom to work upwards, religion proceeds from the top downwards. If science has certainty at the bottom and religion at the top, until the work is complete it may well happen that there is confusion in the region where they have not yet met. Scientific thought is fluid; there is constant criticism, qualification, alteration here and there, and constant progress everywhere. If religion deals with the permanent truths, it may well prove a difficult task to discern the essential truth underlying all the creeds in the flowing mass of thought. Religious truth must be expressed in terms of current thought; and when thought is "current" (and research is the watchword of science), it is not surprising that its pronouncements should often be confused. In short, the message of religion is urgent, and its urgency often produces a difficulty in adapting its expression to the swiftly-moving tide of thought.

JOSHUA C. GREGORY.

BIRMINGHAM.

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1906, p. 186.)

I HAVE been told for some time by militant atheists that the orthodox churches would not consider my faith as Christian, in spite of its otherwise despicable character; but I have not regarded their judgment as competent. I knew, of course, that my formal statement did not go far enough for any specific denomination; it must stop somewhere, and it was intended to stop where denominations begin to differ. It is not easy

—I doubt if it is possible—to satisfy both scientific and distinctively denominational requirements.

Taking my statement of creed as a careful statement, drawn up in a scientific as well as a religious spirit, I would ask Canon Masterman whether he still has much fault to find with it, when he realises that he must not expect to find picturesque phrases like "coming down" or "only begotten." I believe that my catechism as drafted, with some improvements, would constitute a sound foundation for religious teaching, if it could be accepted: acceptance may be a difficulty—there are some who would go farther, but there are many exact thinkers who would not go as far. An orthodox critic should remember that.

I agree that the "ascent of man" is a dogma, but I am unaware of anyone entitled to a biological opinion who denies it. Truly it is an unusual item in a child's creed, but it is, I think, a helpful item: it explains much that would otherwise be dark, and it instils hope for the future. For in the light of an evolution doctrine we can readily admit:

1. That low and savage tendencies are naturally to be expected at certain stages, for an evanescent moment; and

2. That having progressed thus far, we may anticipate further—perhaps unlimited—advance for mankind.

My critic says that children want more explanation of the term "God" than "one Infinite and Eternal Being." I agree, but the very next sentence in my creed is "a guiding and loving Father in whom all things consist." That word "guiding" is not introduced cheaply; I have thought and written much on the subject of guidance and directive control. All the words indeed are carefully weighed. Doubtless I stop short at places where he would go on. I too would teach people that they are children of God, but I could not scientifically teach them that they were made so in baptism — these additional comments and supplementary decorations must be left to the various branches of the Church; and perhaps even priests of the Church would like to re-word some of them.

Children are also to be taught—at any rate by some teachers and some hymns—to say that they are "weak and sinful." Weak they are, but why sinful? It is their business not to be sinful. I do not believe that they ought thus to accuse themselves as a mere matter of form. I have found the goodness of some of them almost awe-inspiring. They should not plume themselves on that either: self-consciousness is troublesome enough without any encouragement.

Finally, Canon Masterman says that he misses from my creed just what he "wants most"—he misses "the idea of the Grace of God": my statements seem to represent to him an Omar Khayyam sort of world, spread "with pitfall and with gin." I am astonished at that, and am obliged to him for pointing out any apparent omission in that direction; for if there is one thing I realise more closely and more continuously than another, it is what I understand by the Grace of God, and its correlative the love of Christ. So far from denying that the life of Jesus was an

explicit and clear-voiced message of love to this planet from the Father of All, I can admit it with hands and head and heart; but I do not remember that a statement about a message of this kind usually appears in a catechism. I should like to insert a clause with this kind of meaning, but I do not find it easy of formulation in exact terms. I attempt it, however, below; with due restraint, since it is a question whether it may not be better to leave something to intuitive apprehension, and to let the life and death of Christ gradually teach their own eloquent lesson without premature dogmatic assistance. Far be it from me to say that the scope of my "creed" could not be enlarged in several particulars, even under the restrictions self-imposed upon it; nor do I contend that it is already perfectly worded as far as it goes, though the wording is carefully chosen; but surely it is plain that if it merely repeated orthodox forms of expression, with glib ease, it would be certainly useless, to some extent impertinent, and perhaps noxious.

If I am unable to express sacred things in language that will stand the strain of scientific scrutiny and exactitude I shall fail in my task. That is a small thing: I am quite willing to fail if I am not worthy. But I trust that orthodox theologians will grant—as I am sure my present critic will—that there is an advantage, for some purposes, in throwing old and over-familiar formulæ into new modes of expression; and that a variety in mode of formulation does not necessarily indicate a lack of appreciation of the loftiest truths yet vouchsafed to humanity.

Proposed additional clause to replace or to follow the clause at foot of page 730, *July number of "Hibbert Journal":—*

Q. Is man helped in his struggle upward?

A. Man did not bring himself into existence, nor can he, unaided, maintain existence or achieve anything whatever. There is certainly a Power in the Universe vastly beyond our comprehension; and we trust and believe that it is a Good and Loving Power, able and willing to help us and all creatures, and to guide us wisely, without detriment to our incipient freedom. This Loving-kindness surrounds us at every moment; in it we live and have our real being; it is the mainspring of joy and love and beauty, and we call it the Grace of God. It sustains and enriches all worlds, and may take a multiplicity of forms, but its essence and higher meaning were specially revealed to dwellers on this planet in the form of a Divinely-human perfect life, the life of Jesus Christ, through whose spirit and living influence the race of man may hope to rise to heights at present inaccessible.

OLIVER LODGE.

A DIALOGUE ON ETERNAL PUNISHMENT.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1906, p. 119.)

I.

I HAVE space here only to deal briefly with some of the assumptions underlying Father Gerard's attempt to save the face of his Church's doctrine on eternal punishment. They are the following:—that in meeting objections to a doctrine of the Church of Rome an apologist may claim to take his stand exclusively on what is strictly matter of faith, that the only points which are matter of faith in the Roman Church on eternal punishment are that there is a hell, that punishments are in store for the wicked, and that these will be eternal: that because theologians agree that the pain felt by the damned in having lost God is immeasurably worse than those sufferings usually associated with the idea of hell, an apologist may ignore the latter as realities, and treat them as though they were figments of the imagination used to make persons realise what awful suffering is involved in losing God, and then, taking advantage of the little that is of faith on the matter of eternal punishment, may argue as though the Church taught that the one essential and only real punishment in hell is the pain of loss, which ought to be considered not as the result of God's sentence, but as self-imposed when the act was done by which the sinner knowingly chose sin for his portion instead of God.

Not one of these assumptions will stand examination. A doctrine of the Church of Rome is any doctrine for which this Church is responsible; and the Church of Rome is responsible not only for what is strictly matter of faith, but for whatever by her ordinary magisterium she teaches is certainly true, and for which she claims interior assent. Although theologians, without any warrant from reason, Scripture, or the Church, have chosen to imagine that the pains suffered from the loss of God are far worse than the torments inflicted on them by the positive punishments of hell, they do not the less emphatically insist on the reality and frightful character of the latter. If they say that the pains of loss are much worse than the pains of sense, they say that these latter are far worse than any earthly pain. Turning to what is strictly of faith on the subject in question, we shall find that it is very far from permitting the liberty of interpretation Father Gerard's argument requires; for the dogmas of the Faith must be believed, not in any sense the words will bear, but precisely in the Church's sense, which is ascertainable from her ordinary and universal magisterium. The chief dogmatic utterance of the Church of Rome on eternal punishment is the assertion in the Athanasian Creed "that they who have done evil shall go into eternal fire." Certainly this does not give the slightest countenance to the notion that exclusive or predominant stress should be laid on the pain of losing God, still less that the pains of hell are self-imposed and not the direct consequence of a final sentence from the judgment-seat of Christ. The eternal fire prepared for

the devil and his angels, into which they who have done evil are told to go, cannot mean the pain arising from an unsatisfied longing after God. It must mean a something which either destroys utterly as fire consumes vegetable matter (and this certainly is its meaning in St Matthew iii. 10 and 12, St Luke iii. 9 and 17, St Matthew xiii. 30, St John xv. 6, Hebrews vi. 8), or something which will inflict that sort of excruciating pain which fire causes in living bodies on earth. The Church of Rome by her ordinary and universal magisterium has declared that this last is the true meaning. And to this effect are the words of the highest authority in this Church, in the person of Innocent IV., in his XXXV Constitution. After speaking of purgatory, this Pope goes on to say: "Si quis autem absque penitentia in peccato mortali decedit hic procul dubio aeternae gehennae ardoribus perpetuo cruciatur." It is obvious that the Pope is giving utterance to what he has not the shadow of a doubt is the belief of the whole Church. And Father Gerard must admit that according to his Church's teaching, as evidenced by her pastors, her doctors, by all her approved theologians, by her theological schools, by her catechisms, by her pulpits, by every organ through which she makes known her mind, hell is a place where the condemned will remain for ever with their wills fixed in evil, hating God and suffering excruciating agonies positively inflicted on them as by fire, which theologians almost to a man hold is real material fire,[1] made by God expressly to be an instrument of torture.

If this doctrine is contradicted by the clear dictates of the moral consciousness and is therefore false, if it is derogatory to the divine attributes and therefore blasphemous, what is to be said for the claim of the Church which teaches it to be under the perpetual guidance of the Spirit of Truth? Nor can it be proved by revelation. For if a Being with the resources of omnipotence at his command may without prejudice to his goodness consign any of his creatures to everlasting sin and torment, he may also deceive and yet be good.

WILLIAM W. ROBERTS.

LONDON.

II.

FATHER GERARD'S contention in the above article seems to be that the doctrine of Eternal Punishment is contrary neither to Reason nor to Revelation; hence, that it cannot be disproved (p. 123), but should, on the contrary, be accepted as an article of faith by the individual Christian, since it is taught by the Church.

Without touching upon the question of the authority or competence of the Roman or any other Church as a teacher, I desire simply to point out what seems to me the mistake of requiring belief in a doctrine which (whether it can actually be disproved or not) does not seem capable of proof positive by an appeal either to Reason or to Revelation.

Much that the writer of the article says will find emphatic endorsement

[1] The great theologian Suarez says this is the "certa et catholica sententia."

in the reason and conscience of all thoughtful men, *e.g.*, when he insists on the character of hell as a spiritual state of loss rather than a place of physical torment (p. 125), and on the "incomparably more serious nature of sin" as such than of "transgression of mere human ordinances" (pp. 122, 123). But there are points where his logic fails to be convincing.

1. His argument depends largely on the assumption that the belief in a day of reckoning stands or falls with the belief in the *eternity* of the punishment which that day will bring. His position is this:—You must *either* believe in eternal punishment, *or* say (in defiance of the moral consciousness and of reason itself) that "he who sets conscience at defiance" will "in the end be as scatheless as one who fulfils its precepts" (p. 134), and thus deny that "it will be much better for the good than for the bad" (p. 122).

But these are not the only possible alternatives, and the dilemma is not really forced upon us. The punishment for, or consequences of, sin, recognised by conscience as inevitable and just, are not necessarily *eternal.*

2. The familiar analogy from destruction or atrophy of natural function (p. 124) may be pressed too far. After all, it *is* an analogy, and analogy is not proof. May not the grace and glory of Redemption lie just in this —that it may make possible what is naturally, "with men," impossible? I do not venture to say how far this is actually so or not, but it is worth considering.

3. The assumption that perfect realisation and knowledge would of itself ensure obedience to the Divine Will, and would thus be "an end of free choice, which is the essence of merit" (p. 128), may be in accord with the old Greek view that virtue is knowledge, but it scarcely seems in accord with all the facts of the moral life: the essence of morality, as we now conceive it, lies in the *will*, rather than in the knowledge of the individual.

No man who has reflected at all will feel inclined to deny the moral necessity of "another world" to "solve the disparities of this" (p. 122), whether he believes that punishment will play a more or a less prominent part in the solution. The *crux* lies in the word "eternal." To make such a belief obligatory is a needless burden if it can be shown that at any rate the *hope* (I do not say the proof) of ultimate restoration is not contradicted either by Reason or Revelation.

i. *Reason* makes it clear that there must be a reckoning for sin. But Reason also justifies the belief that the end of punishment is not only to vindicate the moral law which has been outraged, but also to reform the offender. Reason prompts the questions, Will God's purpose in making man in His own image to attain the Divine likeness, be finally and endlessly frustrated? Are we prepared to admit the possibility of such a defeat of good by evil?—for nothing less than this is involved in the eternity of punishment. If a soul is capable of feeling "the *pain* of loss," of realising what it means to be deprived of God, can we not say that there is involved an incipient turning to Him, a movement of search for Him?

And the infinite difference between the Divine and merely human love lies in the enduring and unwearied response of the everlasting love of God.

ii. The appeal to *Revelation* may be used as much on one side as on the other. Isolated passages of Scripture may indeed seem decisive, but a study of the general tenor gives the impression that no dogmatic solution is possible. But the door is not shut on hope. In attempting to form a right judgment (or suspension of judgment) on the question, all that we can gather as to the purpose of our Lord's life and death (for this is the one Revelation) must be taken into account.

Finally, the *argumentum ad individuum* (p. 133) may be applied both ways. It is true that the "exceeding sinfulness of sin" is my own burden, and no other created being knows the extent of my guilt. But I know also, from the same individual experience of moral and spiritual realities, how "inconceivable" it is that the God who can forgive sin should not also "save to the uttermost." Such an argument, since God loves the world as well as the individual, surely admits of generalisation.

The momentousness of the subject demands quite other treatment than the present writer is in any way qualified to give. But I have written for the sake of those who judge, and perhaps reject, the religion of Jesus Christ, because they believe (as I have tried to show, unnecessarily), that it teaches the doctrine of eternal punishment.

F. R. Shields.

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III.

There is plainly one point lacking to Father Gerard's ingenious argument in defence of eternal punishment. He ought to have postulated the natural immortality of the human soul. Otherwise God is made out a monster, if He keeps a damned soul alive for ever, when by His fiat he could put it out of pain. But will Father Gerard assert that the indestructibility of man's soul is an article of the Christian faith?

St George Stock.

THE ZOROASTRIAN MESSIAH.

(*Hibbert Journal,* Oct. 1906, p. 156.)

I must beg to demur from the statement of Dr A. Smythe Palmer in his article "The Zoroastrian Messiah" (p. 158 of your October issue), that no scholar has succeeded in explaining the title Saoshyañt (nom. Saoshyañs) of the future great prophet who (according to Mazdean teaching) is to come at the end of the world, born of the seed of Zoroaster. The word is a perfectly normal future participle of the common verbal root *su* or *sav*,

"to benefit, cause to prosper," formed in a manner analogous to the Greek future participle, *e.g.* λυ-σ-οντ-, the Zend future affix being, as in Sanskrit, *-sy-* (*-hy*, *-šy-*), instead of merely *-σ-*. It signifies, therefore, simply "he who shall save, or benefit." I have called the form a "title," because it is not strictly a name, but an epithet with the above signification. And the important fact to notice is that it is used in the Avesta for various persons whose office or quality it expresses. Thus it is applied to Zoroaster himself (thrice), to his fellow-workers and assistants (twice), to the Mazdean priests (at least a dozen times). Again, it is applied generically to the various "future Saviours"—for there are three of them, each with his own millennium—and lastly, κατ' ἐξοχήν, to the last and greatest, whose *name* is Astvat-ərəta—just as Gautama is the *name* of the Indian reformer whose *title* is the Buddha. This simple fact, together with the undoubtedly clear etymology of the epithet Saoshyañt, at once disposes of Dr Palmer's elaborate attempt to connect the latter with the Babylonian name Shamash or Shawash.

The later Pahlavi, etc., forms, Sōshyãs, Sōshyōs, are quite normal derivatives of the original Avestic form.

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DO WE NEED A SUBSTITUTE FOR CHRISTIANITY?

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1906, p. 105.)

I

I have read Mr Sturt's article with something like amazement. That he, or anyone else, wishes to form a new Theistic Church, should surprise no one. Such attempts are by no means new. They range from a lofty Theism or Unitarianism to an unbalanced fanaticism. They start with splendid ideals and under the ægis of names of conspicuous power, but as yet they have failed to attract. Their destructive criticism has been powerful, their constructive ability inadequate. Perhaps Mr Sturt will have better success. But I doubt it. The verdict usually has been, in spite of many obvious weaknesses, due to mistaken and one-sided developments, rather than inherent deficiency, that "the old is better."

But the amazing part of the article is on the critical side. Mr Sturt deprecates too much criticism. He rightly thinks that the stories of Joshua and Jonah are not vital. But he appears to me, when dealing with points that are vital, to fall short in the appreciation of the Christian case. We are accustomed to have the Christian doctrines misunderstood and wrongly stated by minor controversialists; we have found the same failure to enter into the meaning of them even in great men. Doubtless, only Christians can really value Christianity aright; but that a critic of

Mr Sturt's ability should take the position he does, is truly remarkable. I do not allude to his rejection of Christianity. As Dr Hort said long ago, when men plunge into these deep waters, "There is not, indeed, and cannot be, any security that they will emerge on the Christian side,"[1] but what we do and ought to expect is that the Christian faith should be interpreted at its best. To do this is surely the least a man can do. Let me briefly refer to one or two of Mr Sturt's remarks. He says (p. 106) that in Christianity we may distinguish three elements, "the sacramental, the piacular, and the ethical." I venture to urge that his description of all three is—I will not say unfair—but certainly lacking in depth.

The sacramental point of view is briefly described as laying stress on "ceremonial acts, whereby divine graces and favours are bestowed upon the devout." Can anyone imagine that this is an adequate representation of the sacramental point of view? Has Mr Sturt ever read Illingworth's *Divine Immanence*? or *Lux Mundi*? Let me quote one short passage from the former. The writer says (p. 132, ed. 1898): "A Being who is omnipresent is, *vi termini*, present at all times and in all places. When, therefore, He is recognised at a particular time or place, the recognition is not imaginary but real. He is there, and causes His own recognition, or reveals Himself. So far, indeed, from God's universal immanence being incompatible with such particular presence, as is sometimes mistakenly supposed, it is the natural and necessary presupposition of it. Because God is everywhere, He can appear anywhere; while because man is not everywhere, but limited to a particular time and place, his relation to God must be realised under the like particular conditions."

Now this, no doubt, while leading up to a sacramental (but not necessarily a sacerdotal) view of religion, conveys more than a suspicion of a philosophy which Mr Sturt is believed to repudiate, and even to detest. But I may venture to say that it is at any rate worth consideration, and certainly impels a clear-minded and candid controversialist to put forward a somewhat more complete statement of the view he is opposing than is the case with Mr Sturt.

Again, with regard to the "piacular" form of Christianity and its "scheme of salvation," to read Mr Sturt's words, one would think that the only possible view of the atonement, viewed as "vicarious," is to be found in the superficial and even shocking "Revivalist" hymns. But even Mr Sturt would admit that there is a deeper view than this. Multitudes of quotations might be given, but I will only refer to Lightfoot on "Colossians." The view he takes (not an unreasonable one, I think) is that of the solidarity of humanity in Christ the Son of Man. The quotation I will give is from Dr Lightfoot's paraphrase of chap. i. vv. 21–23.

"In times past ye have estranged yourselves from God. Your hearts were hostile to Him, while ye lived in your evil deeds. But now, in Christ's body, in Christ's flesh which died on the Cross for your atonement, ye are reconciled to Him again. He will present you a living sacrifice, an

[1] *Hulsean Lectures*, p. 36, 1894.

acceptable offering unto Himself, free from blemish and free even from censure, that ye may stand the piercing glance of Him whose scrutiny no defect can escape. But this can only be, if ye remain true to your old allegiance," etc.

Now I urge that on a merely superficial glance at these two quotations (and many more could be cited) it is worse than misleading to speak of these views as "ethically obsolete." With regard to the "ethical" side, Mr Sturt refers to two points.

1. Humanitarianism; and on this he urges that Christianity says not enough on the "manlier virtues." I fear this is too large a subject to enter on now—and one may only say that the natural virtues are a good deal taken for granted. The Christian life has not shown itself unmindful of them.

2. Where does Mr Sturt get his conception of the Christian life as a religion of sorrow? What does he mean when he says that (according to Christianity) the best life can never be a happy or successful one?

(*a*) As regards sorrow, Christianity did not make it; it found it in the world and hallowed it. On the other hand, joy is a mark of true Christianity. Let Mr Sturt read the Bishop of Oxford's words on *accidia*.

(*b*) That Christianity cannot be successful, or lead to success, is only true in the same way that would be the case with any *ethical* religion.

There are many roads to worldly success which are barred to every conscientious man. But surely success may be achieved by other roads than these. The man who bribes at an election is not always successful.

On the whole, I maintain that Mr Sturt's presentation of Christianity is insufficient. It is not stated in such a way as to make an impartial and uninstructed judge acquainted with the facts of the case. And a constructive religion, to take the place of Christianity, must rate its opponent at its best.

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REVIEWS

Greek Thinkers. By Theodor Gomperz, Professor Emeritus of the University of Vienna. Translated by Laurie Magnus and G. G. Berry. Three vols.—London: Murray, 1901–1905.

Griechische Denker. Von Theodor Gomperz. Band iii. Erste Lieferung. —Leipzig, 1906.

Forty years and more have come and gone since the name of Theodor Gomperz became honourably known for his labours on the fragments of Philodemus, an Epicurean philosopher of the first century A.D., written on papyrus rolls, which had been buried in the ruins of Herculaneum, and, charred and blackened as they were, had been unearthed and partially deciphered in the eighteenth century; but had only been made accessible to the learned world in 1861. About ten years previously the same keen observer had perceived in a portion of the Hippocratean writings, a Protagorean treatise of the fifth century B.C. From that time forth — practically for half a century—he has pursued with unremitting, but by no means exclusive persistency, a single aim, viz., the reproduction, in a full and clear, and also compendious form, of the whole body of Greek thought from Homer to the first Christian century. The chief part of the result of this long-continued effort has lately been published in Germany, and is here reproduced in a very readable English translation. The title of Professor Gomperz's book is suggestive of one main feature of his remarkable industry—namely, the concrete mode of presentation. His subject is not Greek thought merely, but Greek *thinkers.* The mental outcome is nowhere separated from the personality, and each person has his due setting in the environment of race, of nationality, and time. The author's view of Greek culture starts from the Asiatic seaboard with Miletus for its central point. But he is aware that the worship of ancestors, of which the aristocratic audience of the Iliad knew little and cared less, had its roots in a more remote antiquity, aud that the Hesiodic cosmogony represented a crude attempt to reduce to order incoherent elements of earlier creeds.

With the daring attempts of the first Ionian thinkers there comes a change as sudden as it appears extraordinary. The impulse towards generalisation, so wild in seeming, so sagacious in speculative foresight,

seems to have been prompted by the contact of Greek intellect with Babylonian astronomy and the practical geometry of Egypt. Thales predicted an eclipse, and solved a geometrical problem. He also said that water was the universal substance. We are apt to think of these great Ionians as living in their theories apart from the social and political influences of their time. Professor Gomperz's method effectually obviates any such erroneous impression. We see Thales trading in oil, and giving sound advice towards the federation of Ionia, and Anaximander, with his map of the world, only publishing his philosophy at the end of a busy life.

But what was the ultimate aim of these successive thinkers? As Professor Ferrier once said to the present writer, they were "trying to get at something that would outlive us." They were convinced that at the root of things there lay the Unchangeable, the Indestructible, the Imperishable. That they should fall into childish errors was unavoidable; the wonder is that they attained so often to far-reaching anticipations of truth. Anaximander's vague conception of infinitude did not prevent him from rightly imagining geological changes, nor from conceiving the operation of centrifugal force. Anaximenes "was the first to proclaim as the ultimate reason of all material transformation a *vera causa*. . . . . He ascribed the separation of material substances to condensation and rarefaction, or differences of proximity and distance in the particles. When most evenly diffused—in its normal state, so to speak—air is invisible; when most finely diffused it becomes fire, and in its progress towards condensation it becomes liquid and finally solid."

The pages devoted to Heraclitus are peculiarly interesting. His personal isolation and embitterment are naturally accounted for. It is observed that his friend Hermodorus, whose exile he recorded in scathing words, was consulted by "the authors of the Roman laws of the twelve tables, and a monument was erected to his memory which was seen as recently as by Pliny." "Heraclitus' great claim to originality does not rest on his theory of matter, nor yet on his theory of nature. It is rather to be discovered in the fact that he was the first to build bridges, which have never been destroyed, between the natural and the spiritual life, and that he constructed comprehensive generalisations, comprising both realms of human knowledge. . . . . He pursued his observations of nature and human life through the series of single rules which he noted to one all-embracing rule. His eye perceived a universal law in strict unexceptional operation, and his recognition and proclamation of the universal rule of Law, of the dominion of unexceptional causality, marks a distinct turning point in the intellectual development of mankind." That the grand thought of a supreme Logos or reason, in which contraries were continually resolved, was in any way suggested or confirmed, as Professer Gomperz imagines, by the discoveries of Heraclitus' elder contemporary Pythagoras, whom he despised, is extremely doubtful. Our author compares him with Lord Bacon as the herald of the new philosophy who was unjust towards

the actual promoters of science. But Bacon's notions were not derived from the experiments of Gilbert.

The early Ionians had sought for one primal *substance* by whose inherent energy the manifold forms of nature were evolved. The disciples of Pythagoras, from a different starting-point, arrived at a universe of vacant *forms* which they imagined as substantial. Water, air and fire were deposed, and the vacant throne was taken by number as the expression of universal law. Professor Gomperz compares the aphorism of Oken, "everything that is real, posited, finite, has become this out of numbers, or, more strictly speaking, every real is absolutely nothing else than a number," and, in a suggestive passage on the limitations of the mathematical intellect, he states good reasons why this powerful school, while making signal progress in mathematics and astronomy, were strangely liable to superstition. In their religious aspect they were in alliance with the Orphics, and inculcated ethical precepts which strikingly recall the Egyptian *Book of the Dead.*

It appears that Parmenides owed at least as much to the Pythagoreans as to his predecessor Xenophanes. In reaction from the flux of Heraclitus, he rose from Number to the yet higher abstraction of Unity—to the One Being exempt from growth and decay. In comparing this principle to a full and perfect sphere he would seem to regard it as corporeal. But the friend of Xenophanes and the admired of Plato could never be a consistent materialist. Gomperz well compares Spinoza's combination of thought with extension. The Being of Parmenides "is universal matter and universal spirit at once. But the matter is sterile, because capable of no expansion, and the spirit powerless because capable of no action."

Passing by, for the moment, Anaxagoras, who crowned Ionian speculation by introducing Nous as an efficient cause, and the weird but noble figure of Empedocles, we come to the momentous achievement of Leucippus and Democritus. The natural realism of Anaxagoras (implied in his homœomeries) left qualitative change a mystery still unsolved. Parmenides in separating Reality from Appearance brought speculation to a stand by denying the possibility of change and motion, growth and decay. The fulness of his perfect sphere precluded a vacuum. Leucippus argued—"Without a vacuum there is no motion; but there is motion: therefore there is a vacuum." Gomperz argues with some force that the elements of Atomism were older than Parmenides, and possibly due to the Pythagoreans, to whom, however, Parmenides was bitterly opposed. Our author heartily agrees with Lord Bacon in lamenting that the solid worth of Democritus should have been swept under by the relentless flood of time. But the triumphs of the Atomic theory could not be yet. Speculation was called off from the investigation of Nature to a new beginning in the study of Man. The Atomists themselves, in discovering that sensible qualities were relative to perception, had given an impulse to the feeling of subjectivity. This was accentuated in the teaching of another native of Abdera.

With Protagoras we enter on more familiar ground. His doctrine of "man the measure" has been much discussed, and Professor Gomperz decides in favour of the generic, as against the particular, interpretation of "man." However logically defensible, this view is hardly consistent with the phrase which, as Plato gives it twice *verbatim*, may be supposed to be likewise a quotation from the Protagorean "Essay on Truth," that "things are to me as they appear to me and to you, as they appear to you." In the first edition of my *Theætetus* (1861) I suggested that the distinction between the race and the individual, between the general term "man" and the singular term "this man" was probably not distinctly present to the Sophist's mind. In the absence of any abiding consciousness of the universal as such, and of the distinction between abstract and concrete, the term *man*, thus barely used by a popular teacher, would call up the idea, not of human nature, nor of the human mind, nor of the race collectively, but of "a man," "this or that man," not, however, consciously distinguished from any abstract or generic notion of man, but simply present to the imagination. The theory of Gorgias, so far as known to us through quotations, seems to have come in aid of this assertion of the relative by disproving the absolute. For the rest, our author's account of the age of enlightenment, of which Athens was the central seat, is, on the whole, very satisfactory, and gives a background which throws what follows into due perspective. The influence of Anaxagoras, Gorgias, and Protagoras is apparent in Thucydides and Euripides.

We are thus brought face to face with Socrates. The chapters on the great martyr of free inquiry are full of keen appreciation and impartial judgment. The circumstances which made possible the epoch-making judicial murder are described with much originality of historic insight. "All centuries have produced their quota of strong, clear, cool heads; and there has rarely been any lack of warm hearts. But the two are rarely combined, and the rarest phenomenon of all is a heart of mighty power working with all its force to keep the head above it cool, as a steam engine may give motion to a refrigerating machine. Such a combination occurs but once in a millennium on any large scale. But when it does occur it exerts, as if to compensate for its rarity, an influence which persists unexhausted for a long train of centuries. . . . . Benjamin Franklin has been called 'an enthusiast of sobriety.' The term is applicable in far higher measure to Socrates. The passion which dominated his powerful personality, the cause for which he was eager to suffer martyrdom, was the attainment of intellectual clearness. He thirsted for pure concepts as ardently as any mystic ever panted for union with the Godhead." Perhaps the mystical side of Socrates might have been somewhat more fully developed. "That which Socrates observed with pain to be lacking in the character of even the foremost of his contemporaries was inward consistency and self-containedness—government of the whole man by a will at one with itself and free from all taint of division. We have termed him the great champion of enlightenment; he was at the same time the

man who saw most clearly, and felt most intensely, the inevitable defects of an age of criticism and enlightenment. Ancient faith was undermined; traditional standards of conduct seemed outwardly intact, but their authority was gone; men's souls were full of unrest and desolating discord. This distracted condition, whose voice speaks to us to-day in the dramas of Euripides, must have awakened in deeper natures a yearning for a new theory of life, which should exercise the same undivided dominion over man as religion had done before. Socrates was the originator of such a theory."

The minor Socratic schools are treated at once succinctly and with much originality. Especial emphasis is laid on the importance of Cynicism. Much has lately been written about Antisthenes, and I venture to think that the allusions to him in Plato which critics have discovered are not always clear or certain. The heart of his philosophy appears to Gomperz to be a return to Nature,—the "feeling of contempt for all that is conventional, artificial, the work of man,"—and he compares him in this respect to Tolstoy and to Rousseau, who, in common with Antisthenes, interpreted the Promethean myth to mean, not that the Titan was punished because Zeus hated the human race, but because that gift of fire had sown the seeds of civilisation, and therewith those of luxury and corruption. "The cynics took the savage for their teacher, just as Diderot and Rousseau in a later age. They contrasted the elaborate, stimulated wants, the weakness and enervation of civilised man, with the independence, the unimpaired force, and the superior health of the animals." The account of Cyrenaicism will have a special interest for the readers of the late Mr Walter Pater's novel, *Marius the Epicurean*. It is prefaced with a graphic description of Cyrene—the cradle of Hedonism.

Dr Gomperz's determination to descend into the concrete is conspicuously manifest in his treatment of Plato, which occupies more than one-third of his work, so far as it has gone. The "wholesome scepticism" which in the nineteenth century was carried perhaps to an extreme, has recently relaxed something of its severity, and the body of tradition, lightened of all that is impossible and contradictory, becomes a more or less secure foundation for the work of synthetic imagination. The chapters on the life of Plato, whatever else may be said of them, have an undeniable charm. Dr Gomperz, with some reservation, agrees with those who accept the evidence of the Epistles, if not as genuine, yet as founded on authentic tradition. Such "Dichtung und Wahrheit" has undoubted use, but it is not without its dangers. It promotes a tendency towards the over-accentuation of possible conditions, which, even when actual, have little to do with the substance of great works of thought or imagination: *e.g.*, the attribution of the *Gorgias* to the provocation of an abusive pamphlet by Polycrates, or the conjecture that the *Meno* was intended as a palinode, may have ground in truth, but it is easy to exaggerate the light thus thrown on the contents of either dialogue. The detection of literary feuds by Spengel, Teichmüller, and others has not contributed much to the

elucidation of Plato's thought. A singular fortune has attended the endeavour to apply an objective test to the order of the Platonic Dialogues. First attempts in that direction were ignored in England, and long remained unknown in Germany. And yet it was strange that students of Platonism should neglect the stepping stones that were laid at the deepest part of the ford, and not less so that scholars should fail to recognise phenomena which helped to characterise a transitional moment in the history of Greek prose. With a union of boldness and moderation, Professor Gomperz has endorsed the general drift of these inquiries, and has made good use of the result. That in his fifty years of authorship Plato's works were various, and not always consistent with each other, had long been an acknowledged fact, and many had been the attempts to arrange them in an order of supposed development. From Schleiermacher, who believed him to be imparting step by step an already full-blown system, and K. F. Hermann, who looked for an evolution of thought conditioned by events, to what has been called the Atomism of Mr Grote, every such attempt was inevitably infected with metaphysical preconceptions, while acute critics of the language, who perceived great differences of style, rejected on this account as spurious some of the most important dialogues. The detailed examination of these differences, in the light of the *Laws*, Plato's latest writing, whose genuineness is attested by Aristotle, has provided a body of evidence philologically convincing and independent of philosophical points of view. That the dialectical dialogues are thus brought near to the *Laws* which is not dialectical is an observation which, so far from weakening such evidence, really confirms it.

What, then, it will be asked, is there no unity in Plato's thought? There is a unity, but it is a unity of natural growth. If, instead of endless talk about the Platonic ideas, it were acknowledged that from first to last Plato's teaching made towards the position, that the ultimate reality is of the nature of mind, there would be no call for such a polemic as that contained in Professor Paul Shorey's otherwise instructive essay on *The Unity of Thought in Plato*. Those who, like Professor Gomperz, adopt the arrangement of the dialogues in three successive groups, have sometimes spoken of a sceptical moment in Plato's course of thought. But that does not mean that Plato ever doubted the existence of metaphysical truth. Two passages in the so-called sceptical dialogues should make this abundantly clear. When the youthful Socrates has been puzzled by the aged Parmenides, who has raised objection after objection to the doctrine of ideas, he is asked, "What, then, is to become of philosophy?" and answers, "I do not see my way," but it is evidently assumed by both speakers that philosophy is, at all risks, to be pursued (*Parm.* 135). And when the young Theætetus has been reduced to similar perplexity by Socrates and asks him, "Can you argue without an ideal of knowledge?" "Never, while I am Socrates," is the reply (*Theæt.* 196 E).

From the first Plato's teaching had a metaphysical background, which had not been consciously present in the mind of Socrates. As the disciple

reflected on his master's work, the thesis, "Virtue is Knowledge," became the expression of an aspiring intellectualism, which in the Protagoras is set over against the relative ethical standards that are current in the world. The conception of degrees of truth had not yet emerged. By and by, mathematical notions come in aid of ethical. Then new questions arise as to the nature of the ideas. From the assertion of the reality of the universal, thought passes on to the contemplation of the universal as such, first in and for itself, and then in relation to the actual world, to knowledge and being. The object of inquiry is now to ascertain the highest forms of thought, in which subject and object are combined, Being, Identity and Diversity, Number, Unity, the Good, and their relations to one another and to things. The aim is not merely "to obtain a working logic"; but to lay a firmer hold upon the highest realities which have hitherto been felt and seen afar off by the way of intuition, but are not yet completely understood. In turning from the *Phædrus*, or from the sixth book of the *Republic*, to the laboured dialectic of the *Politicus* and *Philebus*, we feel the truth of Matthew Arnold's words:—

> "We cannot kindle when we will
> The fire which in the heart resides;
> The spirit bloweth and is still,
> In mystery our soul abides;
> But tasks in hours of insight willed
> Can be through hours of gloom fulfilled."

But, on the other hand, Plato is no mere metaphysician. As Professor Gomperz tells us, he was several men in one, a thinker and a poet, sceptic and mystic by turns, at once a constructive and an analytical genius. From each excursion into the region of the suprasensible, he returns to the contemplation of the actual world with the aid of the larger light obtained in that high vision, and his views each time are more and more distinct and comprehensive.

Metaphysical inquiry goes hand in hand with progress in logic and psychology, while ethical reflection and mystical contemplation are always present and sometimes occupy the whole field; and gradually, in proportion as his hold upon ideal truth is more assured, he returns with increasing interest to practical affairs, and even to the physical inquiry which Socrates abjured. Subject and method, the ideas and dialectic, are inextricably blended in Plato. This is manifest to anyone who studies the sixth book of the *Republic*, and who compares the earlier portion of the *Phædrus* with the conclusion. How closely the latter part is "mortised and adjoined" to the former appears in one sentence of the transcendental myth: "*Man* is bound to understand what is said generally, passing out of many sensations into one concept that is comprehended by reasoning." The *Phædrus* contains a vivid and concentrated anticipation of the dialectical movement that is laboriously, though partially, worked out in the

dialectical dialogues. In the *Gorgias*, however, his grasp of logical principles was less mature. Our author—here also following Mill—dilates (perhaps at undue length) on the paralogisms in that dialogue, which, as they both acknowledge, detract little from its splendid eloquence and ethical fervour. It was only by degrees and with much effort, that the nature of predication was cleared from doubt.

Psychological inquiry runs side by side with logical, and here, also, the comparison of earlier dialogues with those which have been shown to be later, gives evidence of a distinct advance. To the general question, "Is the soul one or many?" Plato answers differently according to the context. The soul is essentially one, but has different aspects, such as thought, volition, feeling, desire, etc. And within the category of thought there emerge further distinctions, perception, judgment, inference, imagination, memory. It is not a mere accident that these faculties are more exactly distinguished in the *Philebus* than in the *Phædo*.

Morality cannot wait for the completion of metaphysical theory. But at each return from abstract discussion the conception of the moral ideal becomes more distinct and practicable. The lessons of the *Gorgias* are reaffirmed with equal conviction but with more comprehensive grounds of experience and reflection in the *Laws*. The ethical interest is the central thing in Plato, and it was because moral purpose could not be divorced from clearness of mental vision that he discussed those metaphysical questions from which Socrates had turned aside. He thus converses, not as Socrates had done with individuals, but with prevalent theories of life, and with contemporary and previous philosophies, and hence arises much of the diversity in Plato's writing. Professor Gomperz rightly adverts to the philosopher's habit of "outbidding his adversary." In discarding rhetoric he outdoes the rhetorician. In dealing with the Eleatics he runs to an extreme of subtlety. Or, to state the same thing otherwise, his view for the time, without being confused, is coloured by the region of thought with which he is in contact. The *Phædo* has a Pythagorean atmosphere, the *Theætetus* a Megarian aspect, and so forth. That in this contemplation of other systems there is a progress observable, is a fact which cannot any longer be denied. Even if the priority of the *Theætetus* to the *Sophistes* were not clearly indicated by Plato himself, it would be manifest that the statement of the controversy between idealism and phenomenalism in *Soph.* 246 was subsequent to the discussion of the theory that knowledge is sensation. It is useless to attempt a harmony by massing together various statements on the Soul, the State, Nature, the Good, etc. That only produces a sort of "Turkey carpet criticism." And yet in refraining from systematisation one is accused of "Atomism"; but it is one thing to treat the Dialogues as wholly independent of each other, or to separate absolutely between Plato's constructive efforts and "the negative arm," and quite another thing to follow him as Professor Gomperz has done through the fitful evolution, not of a system, but of a body of thought, having the degree of consistency which, as Bishop Butler said,

"will always be found in the writings of the same person, when he writes with simplicity and in earnest." Shall I be accused of irreverent jesting if I say that the Mount of Vision is succeeded by the Tables of the Law, that this is followed by Numbers, and again, after a further interval, by Deuteronomy?

It was impossible that Plato should make any considerable contribution to what is recognised in the modern world as physical science, that region which, as Mr Bradley says, "appears to fall outside of all mind." The *Timæus* contains some striking anticipations of truth; but for the most part its physical constructions are phantastic and unreal. Plato never made much way in the deduction of the concrete. But it is important to remember that he did make the attempt, and two things are evident—that he was increasingly bent on realising the ideal in the actual—on reaching an identity of idea and reality; and that in this endeavour he constantly had recourse to experience. (1) In *Rep.*, Book VI., there is a downward as well as an upward way, and in the ideal method of the *Phædrus* generalisation is to be combined with minute and accurate classification. Analysis and synthesis go together. It is here that he refers to Hippocrates' principle of taking infinite trouble about Nature. But the patient investigation of natural processes in which Hippocrates led the way, stood quite beyond the reach of Plato's industry. And he had turned aside from the speculations of Democritus, which in the far future were destined so bear rich fruit in discoveries concerning Matter in Motion. (2) Yet in two places of the *Politicus* he betrays a consciousness of the necessity of such a task, and of the complexity of the actual world. In the strange fable founded on the tradition of the Golden Age he thus speaks of a conceivable interrogation of Nature: "Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men, but with the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view to philosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with one another, and *learning from every nature which was gifted with any special power, whether it were able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom*, there would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand times happier than the men of our own day" (p. 272). And again, where he enforces the necessity of teaching through example, he argues as follows: "The higher ideas can hardly be set forth except through the medium of examples:—. . . for when the elements are translated *into the long and difficult language of facts* the man who in a dreamy sort of way seemed to know them is again ignorant of them." The same consciousness appears in the *Philebus* in distinguishing the exact from the inexact, and yet indispensable, sciences.

It has often been observed that in Plato's *Laws* there is a felt absence of the dialectical exercises which are so prominent in the *Sophist*, *Politicus* and *Philebus*, and it is apt to be inferred that Plato has departed from his ideal. It is true that there is nothing in this long dialogue corresponding to Books VI. and VII. of the *Republic*. But, first,

the higher education, which is to be the work of the Nocturnal Council, is expressly reserved. Plato did not live to execute it. Perhaps it was not possible, even for him, in his extreme old age. And, secondly, there are many applications of the method of generalisation and division to be traced amidst the prolixity of popular exposition. Thirdly, the assertion in Book X. of the essential priority of mind, is a sufficient indication that Plato held firmly to his metaphysical point of view. It cannot be supposed that he would have been contented with such bare Pythagoreanism as that which we find in the *Epinomis*. That his metaphysical theory remained incomplete is only too like what has happened to other philosophers before and since. The Paralipomena promised as the end of the *Philebus* are nowhere supplied.

Dr Gomperz has now published a first instalment of his third German volume, which has already reached a second edition. This *brochure* deserves the earnest attention of all students of philosophy; above all, of every Aristotelian student. In less than one hundred pages, and in a style eminently luminous and readable, the author has condensed a wealth of interpretation and criticism which can only be described as masterly. The great Stagyrite comes before us vividly in the light of his personal history, the romantic fate of his writings, and his relation at once to antecedent thought and to the subsequent evolution of philosophy and science. His excellence and his defects are portrayed with equal certainty of insight. The Platonist and the Asclepiad, the admirer but not the follower of Democritus, the inspirer both of Oriental and European wisdom, he is shown to have arrested the progress of scientific inquiry for centuries. This portion of a comprehensive work covers the logical books, the metaphysics, and the physical theories. In what remains we are promised a similar account of the biological, psychological, theological, ethical, political, rhetorical, and æsthetic treatises. A brief description of the later Peripatetics and the notes to the new volume will complete this splendid *résumé* of a long life devoted to fruitful research.

LEWIS CAMPBELL.

ALASSIO, ITALY.

An Agnostic's Progress.—By William Scott Palmer. Longmans, Green, & Co., 1906.

A Modern Pilgrim's Progress. By an anonymous authoress, with an introduction by Henry Sebastian Bowden of the Oratory.—Burns & Oates, 28 Orchard Street, London, W., 1906.

THESE two books record two pilgrimages. The one is the religious pilgrimage of a man, the other of a woman, and, though they sometimes seem to be travelling in the same direction, and even traverse the same ground, they are markedly different stories.

An Agnostic's Progress is a book based, as Mr Palmer tells us in his preface, upon two articles of his which appeared under the same title in the *Contemporary Review*. But the story of his progress as it was told in the articles is interrupted in the book by comments made in the light of present-day knowledge. Mr Palmer's aim is not merely literary, but friendly, and his transparent sincerity throughout, and his heart-searching analysis of his own motives, render his story and his comments upon it a most valuable, intellectual, and spiritual guide-book. For him the summing-up of the intellectual puzzle of life is that a reasonable and persevering man may open many locks with two keys, "Evolution and Organic Unity" and "The City which hath Foundations."

Mr Palmer describes his birthplace as being in the social borderland which lies between the Philistines and the Barbarians. At the age of nineteen he knew nothing of the real meaning of Christianity as a personal religion. He was familiar with church-going and prayer-saying, and accepted the border men's belief in an unquestionable world, *totus teres atque rotundus*, rounded off and simply *there*.

The vitality of this borderland religion, in the early sixties, showed itself in a certain almost savage code of honour, which forbade open-mindedness to all ideas outside the conventional theology and prescribed acquiescence in an externally deposited and irrational revelation. Here lay the City of Destruction from which our author fled. He had found a book, *The Origin of Species*. A dynamical instead of a statical conception of the world's life was revealed to him. The conventional religion was shattered. For him the earth shook, the world was in flux, all things were being made new. Then, from far across the ages, there came to him Paul's sermon preached on Mars Hill. It revealed a dynamical conception of religion; it rose like a star, it glowed with personality, it revealed a divinely-developing humanity, and shed a far-off ghostly light on the dimly-developing life-world. Our pilgrim's shadowy companion stepped forth to look at it. Next he plunges into the library of his great-uncle, who had silently embraced the religion which is said to be that of every sensible man, and emerges from it a fairly reasonable agnostic, in the popular sense of the term. Now, therefore, he becomes a whole-hearted student of science, working in her laboratories, and patiently pursuing her method and her spirit; he seeks the one God he could then be sure of, the concealed elusive God of the truth of natural appearance and of reasoning in the scientific way. We might call him a mere truth-seeking machine, were it not that fires, which he does not recognise as yet, are burning within. He is following a light that ever dances before him as leading to the ultimate truth of things. It leads him from barren steep to quagmire, and, like a will o' th' wisp, shows him searching for the philosopher's stone in the rubbish-heap and for the elixir of life in the grave. Calling a halt after this wild adventure, he finds that it has not been the mere waste it seemed. The very act of seeking brought him gain, and the method of it effectiveness; he is like the man who dug in his vineyard for gold and

found good wine. He has discovered that science can indeed explain the world by casting it into a more rational shape in our minds. This is his reward. But though science might describe accurately every movement in a fairy dance, it could never find the fairy. It cannot "solve the enigma." This was his disappointment. And once this was seen, all the splendid conquests of science failed to keep him at her feet. He turns and takes the riddles, which his own reason has put to him, to the philosophers.

Beginning the stony philosophic track with Spencer, he arrives at the place where "the universe appears to wear rather a spiritualistic than a materialistic aspect." Here he quits his guide to follow the road he has pointed out. He falls in with T. H. Green, and is shown that as knower he cannot be merely a product of the nature which he knows and constitutes as known; and gradually he ascends high enough to find himself primarily ghost and only secondarily flesh and bones, and more akin to the angels than to the apes.

Lotze meets our pilgrim puzzling over the meaning of himself as a person; and telling him that perfect personality is in God only, assists him over a very difficult bit of road, and indicates a pathway of thought that may lead him eventually towards God, freedom, and immortality. For by this time our pilgrim finds insufficient lodging in the idea of "the Absolute." He has discovered a desirous heart, even that which at first burned as an intellectual desire, and that now impels him to reach a hostelry furnished with life's still richer values, and with some clear regard for his personal needs.

Our pilgrim goes on towards God, and reaches Pantheism in safety, but feels it an unsafe place, both morally and in other ways, to remain in. Something there was in Pantheism that bade him back out and retrace his steps. To quote his own words, "When I lifted up my eyes to God I found God not only looking through my eyes, but looking into them." But though he has long left Agnosticism, in the popular sense, our pilgrim has not essayed as yet to join himself to any company of religious believers. But now a scientific party, bent on exploring spiritual regions, "The Society for Psychical Research," attracts his attention and wins his fellowship. This marks an important stage in his pilgrimage. His resistance to definite religion begins to break down, and a careful reconsideration of his attitude to religious questions awakens the growing recognition of their great claims. Professor James' phrase, "Each of us dichotomises the Kosmos in a different place," comes upon our pilgrim much as the first streak of dawn might have come upon the night, so far as we can judge by its scattering the darkness of materialism and revealing so quickly the rising power of personality, that great miracle worker, which reveals

> "This main miracle, that thou art thou,
> With power on thine own act and on the world."

With much effort, as he tells us, our pilgrim throws off the once fashionable conception of life as a product of mechanism, and rejects as a colour-

less neutrality the hypothesis of the mere precise parallelism of psychical with physical processes. Though still haunted in weaker moments by the old bogeys of mind and matter, he has now definitely accepted Dr Ward's conception of the universe as a life rather than as either a mechanism or two mechanisms; and he regards the world-life as a duality in unity similar to that in which higher and lower influences interact in the oneness of each man's own experience. Heartily acknowledging his indebtedness to many philosophic writers, whose works he frequently quotes, our pilgrim reaches at length a reasonable assurance of God, freedom, and immortality. After twenty years of travel he finds himself skirting the borders of the Christian, Buddhist, and other formulated faiths in quest of the distilled essence of all religions. But when he is in a somewhat tight corner between Individualism and Monism, he is led by Dr E. Caird and Aubrey Moore to discover in Christianity itself the very harmony of opposites that he is looking for. And now at last he stands in open view of the endless progress of a divine humanity. Faith in the God-man brings deepening faith in man as well as in God, and shows the wisdom of putting himself to school within a larger religious experience than his own. But even as he sits learning in the school of Christian experience, our author does not cease to be critical. He carries with him his dynamical conception, and looks forward to a fuller and richer development of Christian doctrines in the future. He desires especially more definite teaching about the self-limitation of God, that the Incarnation of God may be realised as a living truth, and that men may become free men in the kingdom of love, in the city that hath the foundations. Though no longer agnostic in the popular sense, yet in another sense he is agnostic still: for he holds that God overpasses all things, and that even in the open Vision of the Blessed every step will reveal new fulness of joy.

We do but venture one criticism. It is concerned with our author's rejection of "Natural Religion" on account of "Nature red in tooth and claw." Has not the old materialistic bogey caught hold of him here? If Nature be allowed spirit enough to account for the existence of pain, why deprive her of those higher ranges of the soul whose purposes may explain her sufferings? Is not Christianity itself but one of the trees, and the best exponent of the fruits of suffering, that grows in the garden of Natural Religion? Nature flows in pity and sorrow over every broken claw, and on her cross reveals the spirit of her self-sacrifice. If we read a new meaning into Nature, must we not attach a correspondingly new meaning to "Natural Religion"?

In *A Modern Pilgrim's Progress* we have, not a logical analysis, but a mere psychological history of the beliefs of an anonymous writer who, in the first instance, wrote at the wish of an intimate friend for whom alone this history was originally intended. We are not told who this friend was, but the book has an Introduction by Henry Sebastian Bowden of the Oratory, who vouches of his own knowledge for the actuality of the writer and the genuineness of her experiences. We gather from the

Preface that the narrative has been published in order to point out to thinking and suffering womankind the stepping-stones that may help them; and the writer not only tells us that some of the phases of thought through which she passed are described in the light of later days, but also wishes to say emphatically "that the matter and even the form of many of my arguments are due to the authors I studied, and that I have not scrupled to use the words of others when those words seemed best to express my meaning." Nevertheless, instead of a *Pilgrim's Progress* we seem rather to be watching the desperate endeavours of a hunted soul to escape from the beaters who, in successive chapters, drive the game nearer and nearer to the waiting guns.

A long row of Protestant beaters come first in view, and standing at different points of Biblical interpretation, drive her out of her trust in the Bible and towards the Anglican Church. But there she is brought face to face with hundreds of volumes of the early Fathers, and finds that scholarship is necessary to salvation. Moreover, the cry that Christ has failed to establish an undivided Church, strikes terror into her, and the very divinity of Christ becomes doubtful in view of this failure. Unitarians and Catholics now drive her logically to choose between them, but she will not allow the unitarian idea to mature in her mind, and for the moment she escapes Catholicism and seeks the open fields of freedom, by clinging to conscience as her guide. But here stand the beaters of Science and Philosophy, Materialism, Pantheism, and the like, and ere long we have the spectacle of a woman, who at no time in her life could be permanently agnostic, who believed in her own personal existence, and in God's, and in personal immortality, and in a future life of rewards and punishments, running hither and thither after every religion and philosophy under the sun, seeking an immediate and infallible revelation of what precisely God meant her to do. Finally she finds rest in the Catholic Church, whose claim to infallibility and whose rich religious teachings bring peace at last.

The book has helped us to see that the desire for an infallible revelation produces intense religious restlessness. Had our pilgrim possessed a deeper faith and been able to trust God without waiting till the Divine Mind had been officially audited and found correct, we think that she would have found a deeper peace. A deeper belief in the Personality of God and in the immortality of the soul would surely have helped her here. For as our life on earth is but as a moment by the ticking of the clock on God's mantelpiece, is it likely that the soul will infallibly catch God's whole meaning in that one moment? Is an infallible revelation to be expected under such circumstances? And as in conversation one sentence half conceals as well as half reveals its meaning, and the sentence following throws light on the sentence that preceded, so the brief moment of our earthly life is not likely to contain within it the whole explanation of itself. It is but a single sentence in God's conversation with our immortal soul. We think our pilgrim lacked faith in the Life Eternal.

Again, despite many words about it, we think she lacked faith in the Personality of God. Persons like to be trusted; and they like also to have their wishes anticipated. If God is a Person we may well believe that He will not infallibly reveal to us all that He wishes us to do. A Personal God is more likely to give hints and suggestions, and in various ways to indicate to a loving heart the general character of His wishes. God may well wish us to do many things for His sake, which nevertheless He would not like to have to tell us to do. And just as a human father may educate his children in their social duties by suggesting that they look round the table and see if there is anything which they ought to do for other people, and only when hints and suggestions fail, exclaims, "Pass your sister the salt," so a Personal God may deal with immortal souls; and earth may well be, not the moment in which God is giving one of His infallible answers, but the moment rather wherein He watches our response to one of His infallible questions. And though we may go to some sort of Heaven by obeying God's commands, yet surely we have already lost the highest Heaven by having compelled Him to command us. We have obeyed Him. We might have loved Him.

WILFRED HARRIS.

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International Critical Commentary: The Book of Psalms. By Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., D.Litt., Professor of Theological Encyclopædia and Symbolics, Union Theological Seminary, New York, and Emilie Grace Briggs, B.D. Vol. I.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1906.

IF this book in a high degree satisfies the requirements of to-day, its appearance is an event in biblical study. We shall have to consider it from two points of view—the educational and the scientific, *i.e.* both as a contribution to the reform of the teaching of the Old Testament, and as an attempt to extend the bounds of knowledge as to the religion of the Israelites. From the former point of view it is worth remarking that not so long ago it was orthodox to believe that at any rate the psalms headed "of David" were the work of the king of that name, and that fundamental beliefs of the Christian Church could be found in the Psalms, which, of course, were assumed to have come down to us in their original form. Neither of these views is held by Dr Briggs, who has indeed bravely and persistently fought against them. He admits, indeed, seven psalms either of the Davidic age (especially Ps. xviii.) or at least of the early monarchy (vii., xiii., xxiii., xxiv*b*., lx*a*., cx., besides xviii.), also seventeen of the middle and late monarchy, but the remainder of the psalms he distributes between the Exile (xlii.–xliii., lxiii., lxxiv., lxxxviii., lxxxix*b*., xc., cxxxvii., cxlii.), the Persian, the Greek, and the Maccabean periods. And though he assigns Ps. xviii. to David or to some poet who spoke for David, he does not deny that it contains many late conceptions; only he supposes that the passages referred to do not belong to the original writer. Simi-

larly in the other psalms a number of glosses are supposed, adapting the poems to later ages. Thus in Ps. xvii. 15 Dr Briggs is of opinion that a later editor inserted "when I awake (*i.e.* from death)," perhaps because the vision of the "form" of God was only possible on the morning of the Resurrection. And in Ps. xlix. 14, another editor inserted "the upright," having before him the faulty reading "in the morning" (instead of "every morning"), which seemed to him to imply a reference to the Messianic day when the dominion would pass to the righteous.

Educationally, Dr Briggs is fortunate. For it is a piece of real good fortune to be able conscientiously to say that the non-existence of any Davidic or even pre-exilic psalms is an "extreme position" which certain higher critics "rightly refuse." Our critic does not, indeed, tell us explicitly what to think of David, whether he was really a devout believer in a moral God, such as the "psalms of the early monarchy" set before us. But he at any rate implies that David was a religious poet, and this again is fortunate, though 2 Sam. xxii. 1, xxiii. 1 will hardly prove the fact. Then as to exegesis. The style is clear, the matter instructive. But there is one conspicuous defect—very little is said thus far about Biblical ideas. It is true, it may be justly replied that this arises not from the author's poverty but from his fulness. He had not space enough, and proposed to repair the omission in a separate work. But I confess that I am not satisfied. There is much that could have been omitted with less injury than Biblical religion. I see in the small-print notes a great deal on linguistic and phraseological usage which is by no means indispensable. In the introduction, too, though the facts are accurate, I cannot think the selection of subjects always judicious. I will venture to make another objection. The names of commentators are given fairly enough. But Dr Briggs has quite passed over a large number of valuable exegetical contributions in periodical literature (such as Wildeboer's on Ps. xvi. 1–4, and numerous articles of Professor Haupt), and of not unimportant works on subjects (such as the "I" of the psalms), which the author has not treated with anything like sufficient fulness. Let us add that Dr Briggs's attitude towards textual emendations is strictly moderate. This is educationally prudent, though scientifically it is, I think, incapable of complete justification. Interesting remarks are made in the introduction respecting textual glosses (see below) and errors, and as to how they arose, which may be commended to teachers as a good starting-point for fuller and more detailed instruction.

Scientifically (the word is here used in the well-known German sense), the most important parts of the book are those which relate to the headings and the note "Selah," and to the metre. Fully to justify the theories was impossible, nor can space be found for a discussion of them here. It should, however, be cordially recognised what scrupulous nicety has been used in tabulating the facts relative to the occurrence of "Selah," and students may be invited to refer, not only to Dr Briggs's "Inductive Study of Selah" in the *Journal of Biblical Literature* (xviii.

132 ff.), but also to his daughter's learned paper on the same subject in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages* (xvi. 1–29). He arrives at the conclusion that the word "Selah" indicates the abbreviation of a psalm in liturgical use, and marks the place where the closing benediction might be sung. I am sorry that he has not noted that Grimme and (to a much greater extent) the present writer have suspected that *s–l–h* might sometimes (or even always?) be due to textual corruption.

"Textual corruption"—the phrase is short, but contains much. The possibility of accidental or deliberate changes of reading must constantly be remembered in dealing with such a book as the Psalter. It is in this respect that Dr Briggs is perhaps deficient, and this deficiency, for me, throws much doubt on his metrical arrangements of the psalms. At the same time, his place in the development of these inquiries is secured, and it is a higher one than many German scholars appear to be aware. Instead, therefore, of recording and (where necessary) criticising our author's metrical theories, it devolves upon me to consider at such length as circumstances allow his treatment of the text. If he is a brilliant textual critic, all those theories to which I have referred will assume a vastly greater importance. It is a pity that we have only the first fifty psalms upon which to form an opinion.

One of the chief testing passages occurs early in the Psalter. The common text of Ps. ii. 11, 12, literally rendered, runs thus: "Serve Yahweh with fear, and exult to him with trembling. Kiss * lest he be angry." Now, if the redactors have been as conscientious as has been stated above, they must have left us relics of the true text of this passage under neath the false. For who is so blind as not to see that the traditional text *is* false? The first who had the good fortune to see the true text (for such it may be called) was the writer of this article. He was followed independently by Marti and J. D. Prince, and the restoration has been accepted by Duhm, Beer, and Salvatore Minocchi.[1] All depends on method. When Dr Briggs (who only mentions Marti and Prince) commented on Ps. ii. 11, 12, he was not in possession of the only method which is applicable to such a passage. Otherwise he would not have made the poor corrections, "rejoice in him" and "kiss sincerely." There are, of course, many passages in which the original text presupposed a less advanced religious conception than the redacted text which has come down to us. We may be sure, for instance, that the oppressed Jewish people did not originally pray against mankind in the abstract, but against particular peoples whose names it gave. This gives us a clue to the (probably) original reading of x. 18, xi. 4, xii. 1, xiv. 2. Underneath the words for "man" and the word in ix. 20 rendered "terror for them" there lie, safely and unobserved, the names of peoples. Dr Briggs has not noticed them. Now, I do not blame him for this, but

[1] See Cheyne, *Jewish Religious Life after the Exile*, 1898, p. 112, note; *Book of Psalms*, 1904, i. 8; and *Review of Theology and Philosophy*, December 1905, p. 379. Even Marti (as reported from a private communication by Duhm) does not see what underlies the improbable word rendered "kiss."

I do regret that he has not seen what are the two tasks waiting for the commentator, one of which is the exposition of the sense put upon the redacted text by the redactor or his early readers, and the other the discovery, wherever this is possible, of some earlier phase of the text, or, best of all, of the original text. I think, for instance, that to render in Ps. xliv. 11, written, according to Dr Briggs, after a disastrous defeat in the early Maccabean period, "Thou makest us meat like sheep, and among the nations dost scatter us," implies a wrong method. The text has, "Thou givest us up like sheep of food." This is certainly poor, but by tabulating the recurrent types of corruption we ought to be able to penetrate the impossible word rendered "meat," "food." Just here the secret is particularly easy to read. Often it is not quite so much so. In Ps. xvi. 4, for instance, our tables ought to give us a clue to the words which underlie the improbable phrases "that hasten (?) after another (God)," and "(their drink-offerings) consisting of blood," but a connected view of the original text cannot be obtained with certainty. Here, again, Dr Briggs's renderings, "who hurry backwards," and "because of bloodshed," are methodically wrong. Similarly, in Ps. xxii. 2 Dr Briggs gives "far from my salvation is my roaring." But what right has he to omit "the words of" (before "my roaring"). Again a fault of method. Our author gives us neither the redacted text nor the underlying one. A "prosaic copyist" inserted "the words of," he says. But the "hurt" of the text cannot be "healed (so) lightly." In *v.* 8, Dr Briggs, following the points, gives the improbable rendering, "Roll on Yahweh." The underlying reading cries out to be recognised, and it is not even mentioned. The omission is an injury to the student. In *v.* 16, "they dig into my hands and my feet," at any rate excludes the notion of a prediction of the Crucifixion. But knowing the extreme faultiness of the textual tradition in all its forms, how can we accept it? Can we get no help from the parallel psalm (lxix.)? Surely, here if anywhere tradition ought to have been deserted. Nowhere, however, perhaps is Dr Briggs's narrowness more conspicuous than in *v.* 19, where he actually puts, "Oh Thou, put not afar off my hind; | Yahweh, O haste to my help." No parallel for "my hind" is offered; Ps. xlii. 1 can hardly be accepted as such, for this passage is a fully drawn-out metaphor.

The 35th Psalm contains some singular complaints against false-hearted neighbours, and assertions of Israel's unrewarded sympathy with them in their troubles. One of the strangest passages is *v.* 13, "I afflicted my soul with fasting, my prayer returned to my bosom." Surely a keen criticism ought to suggest some remedy, but all that is offered (on metrical grounds) is the omission of the verb "returned," thus producing the still more difficult statement, "my prayer was upon my bosom," *i.e.* "my prayer (for them) was heartfelt" (?). On *v.* 16 Bäthgen's well-known article ought to have been listened to by such a friend of the versions, but it is not even mentioned. Let us now pass on to Ps. xl. (*vv.* 1–11), a most important

document for the study of biblical ideas, and therefore specially interesting to Dr Briggs. How does the new critical commentary deal with the central portion of this psalm (*vv.* 6–8)? The most difficult passages in it are those rendered "ears didst thou bore for me" and "in the book-roll it is prescribed for me." There is also an obscurity about the word in *v.* 6 (7) rendered "sin-offering." Dr Briggs has long held that this word should rather be rendered "sin"; if so, the psalmist means that "whole burnt-offerings associated with sin are displeasing to God" (cp. Isa. lxi. 8). A reference to B. Jacob in Stade's *Zeitschrift*, xvii. 279, ought to have been added. The sense, however, is unsatisfactory. On the other passages Dr Briggs is boldly original; in fact, originality is here called for. "Ears didst thou bore for me": how can this be correct? Dr Briggs's remedy is to emend it into "then had I the covenant," parallel to which in the next pentameter is (according to him) "then didst thou command me." I much doubt, however, (1) whether a Hebrew writer would have expressed himself thus, and (2) whether any scribe would have hit upon the idea that *'az* ("then") was an abbreviation of *'oznayim* ("ears"). The only suitable correction (for the whole line) is, "In sacrifices and offerings if thou didst delight, from my flock (*miṣṣo'ni*) would I choose me"; I mention it because it is so obvious. The words rendered "then said I" (Briggs, by emending, "then didst thou command me") are clearly an early conjectural (and incorrect) substitute for the words rendered "ears hast thou bored." The third passage remains uncorrected by Dr Briggs. Yet if our critic ventures to correct the "boring" of the "ears," why does he leave the "book-roll"?

How does our critic fare with Ps. xlii.–xliii.? I will not linger on a mere matter of English, such as "the God of my crag" (in a previous psalm one even meets with "attend to my yell"). In *v.* 4 (5) he, of course, uses the LXX., but, as often, gives the history of the correction inadequately (cp. *Book of Psalms*, 1904, i. 188). "Mount Mizar" still holds its ground in *v.* 6 (7); we are told that it is "not yet identified," but will it ever be more so? What poet would express himself with a geographical particularity so elaborate and yet so obscure as the critics (except Bäthgen) still suppose? Ps. xlv. taxes every commentator severely, and though our author is bolder than usual, he has hardly solved, or even always grasped, the problems. Verse 1 is a prologue, *v.* 17 an epilogue—both due to a late editor. Verses 6 and 7*a* are also a late insertion, implying that the psalm is Messianic, which enables the critic to keep "thy throne, O Elohim, is for ever and ever," etc. I conclude that he would not accept the defence of the text which Gunkel bases on the ground that it was the style of court-poets to address the king as divine, like "O king, live for ever." In *v.* 7*b* Dr Briggs rather strangely makes a pause at "hath anointed thee," and continues as the beginning of a fresh strophe:

> "O oil of joy above thy fellows,
> Myrrh and aloes, cassia thou."

He still makes the king's garments come from "ivory palaces," but in

v. 9 he stumbles at "gold of Ophir," for which LXX. gives "in golden attire." In *v.* 10 he cuts a Gordian knot by omitting "O daughter, and." The king referred to is that furious driver Jehu. But I must not try the reader's patience further.

There is a well-known passage in Ps. xlviii. which has long troubled commentators. Bäthgen renders it thus:—"Mount Zion, the farthest north, | is the city of a great king." Why "the farthest north"? Is it merely a phrase transferred (as Gressmann thinks) to Zion from the great northern mountain on which the Most High was anciently believed to have been seated (cp. Isa. xiv. 13)? Or is there some other better view? Dr Briggs does not answer either question, and himself gives the trivial explanation that the Temple was on the north-east "corner or back" of Mount Zion. Those who look for light from old myths will be sorry for this, and the more so because Dr Briggs elsewhere (see on Ps. xix.) is by no means prejudiced against the wise use of mythology.

One psalm more must here be referred to—the 49th. It is described as "a lament of the pious over the riddle of death"—a poor description which prepares us to find a poor commentary. In his proposed supplementary work Dr Briggs will perhaps correct this meagreness. We may at least hope this, for it is an important psalm for the history of religion. Here, too, it is specially needful to distinguish between the different phases of the psalm. We may well expect that in its original form it did not fully satisfy later readers. Dr Briggs himself ascribes, not only "the upright" in *v.* 14, but the whole of *v.* 15, to a later editor. I hesitate greatly to follow him, nor am I at all struck by his treatment of the text. No progress is made in the solution of problems. In the very first couplet (*v.* 5) of the first "strophe" it seems to me that he goes wrong, though the right path was not far to seek.

I have left myself small space to speak of Dr Briggs's view of glosses. By the indication of glosses he thinks it possible to regard certain psalms as pre-exilic. I too admit the existence of glosses, but I can find no pre-exilic psalms. The point of cardinal importance is to ascertain, as far as possible, the underlying text of the Psalms. This Dr Briggs appears to me to have done only to a very slight extent. Still, I consider his work of great educational use, and that even for very advanced students it will save much trouble to have the book near at hand. And when anyone has given such proof of willingness to suffer for truth's sake as Dr Briggs, the most austere reviewer may well be disposed to deal respectfully with his writings. Nor must that learned lady, his daughter, miss her due reward of admiration and gratitude.

T. K. Cheyne.

Oxford.

A Grammar of New Testament Greek based on W. F. Moulton's Edition of G. B. Winer's Grammar.—By James Hope Moulton, M.A. (Cantab.), D.Litt. (Lond.). Vol. I. *Prolegomena.*—Edinburgh, 1906.

Johannine Grammar. By Edwin A. Abbott. — London, Adam and Charles Black, 1906.

The work which more than any other has promoted careful philological study in the interpretation of the New Testament is Winer's *Grammar of the New Testament Idiom as a Secure Foundation of New Testament Exegesis.* The first edition of this important volume was published as long ago as 1822. Its merits were soon recognised, and the author lived to bring out a sixth edition, the preface of which is dated October 1855. Though half a century has passed, the work has maintained its place. A seventh revised and enlarged edition, under the editorial care of Dr Lünemann, appeared in 1867; and Professor Schmiedel has deemed it worthy of an eighth, which is still unfinished, because, as Dr Moulton pleasantly observes, he "has unfortunately been called away from grammar by the *b'nē Jerahmeel*, to perform a post-mortem examination upon the Gospel history." In England Winer's *Grammar* is best known through the translation made "with large additions and full indices," by Dr W. F. Moulton. This was first published in 1870, and appeared in two subsequent editions. The history of the Greek language, however, was being investigated with all the resources of scholarship; and a new and welcome light was shed, especially on the Greek of the New Testament period, by the discovery of quantities of papyrus, containing writings of the most varied kinds, belonging to the Ptolemaic and early Roman times in Egypt, while at the same time attention was bestowed on inscriptions which were found in widely scattered regions. The attention of biblical scholars was directed to these new sources of knowledge, pre-eminently by Deissmann's *Bibelstudien* and *Neue Bibelstudien*, since combined and translated into English under the title of *Bible Studies.* The time seemed to have come for a reconsideration of many linguistic questions, and Dr Moulton was desirous of re-writing his *Grammar* as an independent work; but his death in 1898 put an end to his plans before a page of the new book was written. The task has passed into the very competent hands of his son, Dr J. H. Moulton. This first volume, containing "Prolegomena," is an original work, indicating with considerable detail the changed point of view from which the grammar of the New Testament must be regarded. The second volume is intended to be strictly a grammar, which, while introducing the needful modifications, will be really "based on W. F. Moulton's edition of G. B. Winer's *Grammar.*" The first two chapters of the present volume, on "General Characteristics" and "History of the 'Common' Greek," are especially interesting, and may introduce to a new and fascinating field of inquiry even mature scholars, who, owing to other pursuits, have not had time to make themselves fully acquainted with recent researches. The

chief gain is in the extended knowledge of the κοινὴ διάλεκτος. So far as can be learned at present, this had become the universal language of those who spoke Greek, and exhibited no serious dialectic differences. The newly-acquired knowledge shows that the number of "Hebraisms" must be greatly reduced, though Semitic influence cannot be entirely removed, and so great an authority as Wellhausen seems to give it a wider range than Dr Moulton is willing to allow. Where translation is not involved, the latter believes that there is hardly any Greek expression in the New Testament "which would sound strangely to speakers of the Κοινή in Gentile lands." Even a construction which looks so little like Greek as ἧς τὸ θυγάτριον αὐτῆς is found "in Greek that is beyond suspicion of Semitic influences." It is only just, however, to remember that Winer himself pointed in this direction. He showed that the Greek of the New Testament represented, not the language of literature, but the vernacular speech of the people; and he was anxious to compare it with the popular speech of Alexandria, so far as that could then be ascertained. It is here that the papyrus has brought us stores of knowledge which were inaccessible to him. There are other points where his clear insight and cautious judgment were displayed; and we may confidently expect the fine qualities of his work to be retained, amid the wealth of more recent knowledge, in Dr Moulton's second volume. The chapters of the Prolegomena which I have mentioned are followed by several on the Accidence and Syntax. It would be an excellent discipline for the young student to work through these chapters under a competent teacher, and so to acquire, as Winer desired, "a secure basis for New Testament exegesis."

Dr Abbott's *Johannine Grammar* completes the task of which the first part was executed in his *Johannine Vocabulary*. It is impossible to convey in a few lines any adequate notion of the copious learning, illuminated by interesting suggestions and careful judgments, which adorns this ample volume. Though unable to accept the direct Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel, Dr Abbott recognises its greatness in the domain of religious literature, and appreciates the lofty spiritual genius which is reflected from its pages; and accordingly he thinks no labour too arduous which can lead to a more exact understanding of the text, and bring into view the faintest shades of meaning. He endeavours to reach his aim by this systematic *Grammar*, in which, as he says, "the Johannine language in general has been carefully classified with a view to the elucidation of particular passages; and the LXX., the Synoptists, the New Testament as a whole, Epictetus, and the Papyri of 50–150 A.D., have been recognised as safer guides than writers of the third century and far safer than those of the fourth." He has tried to extend the utility of the work by making "several interesting peculiarities of Johannine style intelligible to readers unacquainted with Greek literature except through translations." For purposes of consultation the work is provided with ample indices for both the present and the previous volume.

It may stimulate the curiosity of our readers if we refer to two or

three points by way of illustration. It is remarked in the Preface that there is a "grammatical argument" which favours the conclusion that in John iv. 9 the clause "for Jews have no dealings with Samaritans" is "an evangelistic explanation." "There are two words, ὅτι and γάρ, used by John to express the conjunction 'for.' For the most part, in Christ's words, he uses the former; in his own comments, the latter." I think this distinction has not been used by Wendt in support of his interesting thesis respecting the origin of the Gospel. A careful examination of the facts, however, would hardly have justified him in appealing to it. According to Dr Abbott "John uses γάρ about twenty-seven times in Christ's words, . . . and about twenty-seven times in strict narrative," including in the latter "what would commonly be called evangelistic comment." As regards ὅτι I find that it is used about fifty-five times in Christ's words (of which twenty-five are in chapters xiv.–xvii.), eight times in the words of others, seven times in strict narrative, and seventeen times (of which three are doubtful) in remarks by the Evangelist. Where the occurrence of the two words is so frequent in both the kinds of material into which the Gospel may be divided, it would not be safe to resort to difference of authorship in explanation of the proportionate use, which may be due to quite other causes.

A very obscure saying, as generally understood, is that of John the Baptist (John i. 15 and 30), rendered in the revised version, "He that cometh after me is become before me: for he was before me": words which can hardly convey any meaning to the English reader. It has always seemed to me that the true meaning might be thus expressed, "He that follows me (as a disciple) has got before me (has become my leader and teacher), for he was (by intrinsic nature) my chief." This meaning is supported by Dr Abbott's remarks. He recalls the fact that the Synoptists have, instead of πρῶτός μου, ἰσχυρότερός μου, and suggests that both may come from the Hebrew *Rab.* "The Baptist may have said, in effect, 'Jesus of Nazareth numbers Himself among my disciples, but He was from the first my Teacher or *Rab.*'" He thinks, however, that the Baptist unconsciously *implied* more than he *meant*, and that the words might be interpreted as meaning "the Firstborn of God, the Beginning." It seems to me that the presence of μου renders this explanation very difficult. The same remark applies to another passage to which Dr Abbott appeals, John xv. 18, where he takes πρῶτον as an adjective, and translates, "It hath hated me, your First, *i.e.* your Chief," afterwards explained as "the First (born) of you (all)." I would not, however, deny that, being the stronger expression, it may, as Dr Abbott contends, mean more than μείζων μου. It may seem at once to institute a comparison, and to imply that there can be no comparison. We may compare Herodotus ix. 27, where the Athenians claim πρώτοισι εἶναι ἢ Ἀρκάσι, "to be first rather than Arcadians," which gives a stronger meaning than Rawlinson's "to be preferred above Arcadians." Similarly Philo says οὐδενὶ πρῶτον οἰκειοῦσθαι πέφυκεν ἢ ταύτῃ, "stands in the first relationship to nothing

rather than to this" (*De Mundi Op.*, § 57). So, if we understand the Baptist to say in effect, "It is He that is first, not I," leaving the meaning of "first" indefinite, the saying exactly suits the situation.

Another very interesting passage is John vi. 19, where the disciples see Jesus walking ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης. The genitive seems to imply, not "on," but "near, or beside the sea." So the boat is ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, close by the land: and in xxi. 1 it is said that Jesus manifested himself ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς Τιβεριάδος. A few lines further on this is explained by ἔστη εἰς τὸν αἰγιαλόν. Dr Abbott quotes from Polybius ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἔστησαν, the Romans stood on the edge of the sea. The whole examination of this passage, which is too long to quote, ought to be read.

I may refer also to the vexed passage, John xix. 35, where Dr Abbott defends his interpretation of ἐκεῖνος, as referring, not to the writer, but to Christ. But these few examples must suffice. We cordially commend this valuable work to the attention of our readers, and would advise every student who wishes really to understand the Fourth Gospel to keep it beside him for consultation in his difficulties.

JAMES DRUMMOND.

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Newman, Pascal, Loisy and the Catholic Church.—By W. J. Williams.—Francis Griffiths, 1906.

NEWMAN is fortunate in finding such an acute and able champion in Mr W. J. Williams, whose book offers from the Roman point of view a most valuable addition to the literature on the subject. No serious writer afterwards, from whatever side he comes, will find it possible to neglect a consideration of it and the new and weighty arguments adduced from a larger criticism. It will be interesting to see how Dr Fairbairn will meet the defence offered and parry the strokes of the counter attack, for he cannot afford to remain silent before such a masterly presentment of Newman's position. Mr W. J. Williams, though this appears to be his first published volume, has long been well known as an occasional writer for the Liberal Roman Catholic Press at home and abroad, and stands recognised as one of its very foremost representatives. But many readers will disagree at once with the opening sentences of his Introduction, when he asserts with a light heart, "How seldom the right of private judgment is defended or even mentioned" now. This observation does not certainly define the attitude of the *Hibbert Journal*. It is not "the right of private judgment" that has been condemned, but "the right of private stupidity." And this surely is a very different matter. "The right of private judgment" remains as it was, only it has grown temperate and assumed a scientific form, and knows a little history and accepts limits.

Nor does Protestantism alone make this claim. All forms of culture at the present day implicitly or explicitly allow it—namely, the right to think for oneself, at least in the first resort and certainly in the last.

And we may fairly appeal from Mr Williams to Mr Williams. For, with a courage that we must all admire, he does not attempt to deny the infirmities and imperfections of his own great Church, a Church whose principal glory has ever been the protest of individuals and their exercise of private judgment. He writes (p. 146), and endorses, Newman "is ready to admit that this treasure is in earthen vessels. It may be true, then, that for the loss of a great part of Christendom and for the failure to gain so large a part of the world the Church is chiefly responsible. The Church may have made too absolute a claim for the truth she held, may have asserted her authority too much as from above, too little as connatural to and in consonance with the human reason. It may have been—indeed, few Catholics will deny that it was—the obscurantism of ecclesiastics which lost to the Church the vigorous French intellect of the eighteenth century. No modern Catholic historian worth mentioning will deny that it was, to a great extent, the laxity of churchmen which lost to the Church the rugged intellect of the reformers. Nay, even in the early Church, Newman does not deny that many a heretic was condemned for the premature utterance of what turned out afterwards to be true. . . . Heretics sometimes argued with better logic, with more patience, courtesy, and enlightenment than their orthodox opponents." What further concessions could we ask? But the quarrel of Protestantism and Science—and the principle of both seems the same—has always been that the Roman Catholic Church has so often played the part of Epimetheus, and only been wise after the event. When troubled souls, "whose only language was a cry," looked to Rome for a leader, they found none. Prometheus arose outside of the Church far more often than within it. When the conclusions of Science and the teachings of history stood at last on an unshaken basis and could not be contradicted, then and not till then the lost leader spoke out as if she had never withstood the truth, or silently accepted it and made no sign. Mr Williams claims for the Roman Church—"the general movement of thought in Europe is favourable to some such ultimate tribunal as the Catholic Church would be"—what belongs to no one communion, but to the whole of Christendom and the spirit of Christianity. Every branch of Nonconformity, as well as Romanism, has contributed something to the stream of religious progress and spiritual life. We must read now, *extra Christum nulla salus*, but we have no objection to *ecclesiam* if it mean *ecclesiam Christi*. Mr Williams deplores the divisions of Protestantism, and yet differentiation frequently implies growth and also strength. *Salus autem, ubi multa consilia.* Progress by antagonism, truth by conflict, is surely the cosmic process, physical, moral, religious. But, in his defence of Newman and Pascal, to say nothing of Loisy, Mr Williams proves himself a brilliant, original, and powerful advocate. Few who read his book—and it is a liberal education on these particular lines, and every lover of Newman should read it—will refuse the author the merit of having thrown new light on his theology, and cleared his reputation from the

misunderstanding of friends and the misrepresentations of enemies. Still, the fact cannot be disputed that Newman, perhaps out of generosity to opponents, was often unhappy in his sceptical admissions and unguarded in his statements, and perhaps attached a meaning to his terms which others did not. "It is," says Mr Williams (p. 149) in his defence, "on the perception that, for the individual and for the race, man must be considered as one and that the truth for which man makes is one, that the right use of the reason depends. It is by the perception that action as well as thought takes part in the pursuit of truth . . . in the realisation of type in the individual and in the mass, any proposition becomes 'true' for the whole man or the race."

We are told the Roman Church "gives a line of orientation to the spirit of man, and presents humanity with the only possible basis of belief." But to the impartial observer who studies history, the Roman Church appears to move from without rather than from within, to accept the pressure of the world before making a fresh advance. She waits for assurance from others, and instead of teaching prefers to be taught, as an *ecclesia discens* and not *docens*. The world has educated the Church. And the saints and heroes of Rome have been great not because of, but in spite of, their faith.

It is in the second part of his book that Mr Williams is at his best. There he rises to rare altitudes of thought and eloquence, in truly large and lofty views, which, with the necessary qualifications, all the Christian Churches may thankfully accept. *Fas est et ab hoste doceri.* Though, really, when he writes as a philosopher he writes with a breadth too often conspicuously absent in the Anglo-Catholic communion. It will be matter for surprise, if this powerful and opportune book does not flutter the dovecotes of the Vatican and add another jewel to that great treasure-house, the *Index Expurgatorius.*

F. W. Orde Ward.

Eastbourne.

Problems in Life and Religion.—By the Very Rev. Charles P. Ovenden, D.D.—London: S.P.C.K., 1906.

It is refreshing to hear in this book that quiet note of pastoral watchfulness which is characteristic to-day of the Irish Church. One feels how more truly there, than in England, the Church is national to its adherents who are able not only to accept their membership, but to admit their problems, without loss of trust. Ireland is the refuge and haunting-place of a faith conscious of itself. The wind of the Spirit blows over every heart and leaves it rooted like an impregnable growth in the familiar plot and soil of its religion. And the writer of the book seems to feel this, and remembers, that while he is Dean of Clogher, he is above all Rector of Enniskillen, with soothing words for those who are both hearing him and asking him questions. He has given us a little bundle of eirenika in controversies of mind; and one feels that they have supplied a satisfaction

to those who stand with him to praise and pray. They appear to meet, as it were, a certain wistfulness of wonder that such subjects should be so perplexing: they do not face—perhaps they were not meant to face—the agony of not knowing why, the piercing consciousness of doubt.

And for those who have stood at the doors of their church and looked out on the cold stretches of unlit hillside, these essays in the solution of Problems, with all their thoughtfulness and sincerity, will stir up some irritation. That is the peril in a work dealing with vexed questions when it is written for the brethren of one's own sect, or for those who share in one's manner of viewing things, and is sent out by publication into the world. To attack a problem and hurry on, leaving it half-dead or only lightly wounded, will of necessity prove exasperating to any for whom on a day this problem acted like a scourge to their soul-sensitiveness or drove them once afar from happy paths.

Is it really enough, for instance, to answer the cry of the "Problem of Sorrow" by describing the Book of Job as "the best solution of the mystery of the sorrows of the righteous which was ever written by man"? Surely that is to exalt agnosticism into a comfortable saying which is entirely unacceptable to human nature; entirely unacceptable, it would have been thought, to the author of the Book of Job himself, who backs doggedly at the last chapter (as the Book now stands, and as no doubt Dean Ovenden regards it) into the confidence that God rewards the righteous with earthly joys, a confidence which Job is represented as never deserting, but, though God slay him, trusting in his final vindication when his redeemer "shall stand up at the last upon the earth." This is reply to wonder and hesitation to understand, but no reply to *anguish*. And are not the records of the offering of the love of Jesus infinitely greater and truer than this "best solution"?

Again, in a very interesting chapter on "The Justice and Equity of God," we are specially invited to consider the Parable of the Labourers as a difficulty in the way. There are many who will not see eye to eye with the Dean in his exegesis of that parable. Did the Lord really mean to draw a distinction between those who "went, not for bargained wages, but because they obeyed His call, leaving the whole question of reward to His generosity," and those who "allowed the spirit of bargaining to enter into their minds"? And would this satisfy the genuine doubter, if it were the case? Work, argues the Dean, varies in its value before God according to the height of the motive with which it was undertaken: and therefore, though this the Dean does not say, the reward will also so vary. But the sting of the problem concerned, and the expressed fact of the parable itself, is that the reward does not vary,—it is the same. In its ultimate signification it is, as it has been said, one reward for all, even God Himself. The whole notion of values appears to some as lying altogether outside the idea of work. Was it merely a voice crying in the desert when the man of Khartoum wrote in his diary, "No work is indispensable before God"? The greatness of work is the work: *varying values* strikes a false

note, and any practical system which includes it leads to the supposition that there *is* an arbitrary mind governing the vineyard of man's labour. Dean Ovenden seems to admit the mistake of man putting values to work; but when he teaches us that God does so, he is simply inviting us to do the same, as well as we can.

It is one thing to write for those who believe, and another for those whose cry is, Help thou my unbelief: and for such of the latter as may read this book, it is little assistance, for example, towards belief in the dogmatic view which the Dean takes of the truth of the Resurrection of Christ when it is said that "the opponents of Christianity and those who try to explain away the reality of the Resurrection, have to explain the fact of the continued existence of the Christian Church from that time on until now." This is not a real step in the direction of a proof; the sort of explanation which is mentioned was never demanded for the continued existence of Buddhism or Mahommedanism. Is there not something better to be said in the interests of the fact of Christianity?

And in conclusion, may it not be hoped that the whole subject of problems in life and religion can be best dealt with by making their very existence the only real problem? The thought has revealed itself to many struggling minds that they stand at the intersection of a number of planes; but no thought rises to the greatness of the number. Problems, inadequate conceptions, perhaps evil itself, are the effect of one plane-consciousness acting upon another; but they are only problems in reality as long as the mind insists on regarding itself as equiplanar, and this the mind is disposed to do. To be erectly perpendicular on one plane is a great achievement, and philosophy works at it laboriously. But by mental and spiritual readjustment the man makes himself erectly perpendicular on another plane. *To be able* to do this well is a still greater achievement. It means a particular "habit of mind" which is still regarded here and there as a strange thing for a man to have. It means incessant energy towards inner-self-equipment. But it means also the peace of God which passes all understanding, and it means rest to the spiritual nerve.

CECIL BROOKE WELLAND.

PADDINGTON GREEN, LONDON.

On a Series of Automatic Writings. Part liii., *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research.*—By Mrs A. W. Verrall.—Glasgow: Robert Maclehose & Co. Ltd., 1906.

MRS VERRALL'S record of her automatic script is a very important and instructive addition to the literature of extra-marginal psychology. In these cases it is essential—if we are to obtain reliable data from which to draw inferences—that the writings shall be analysed, classified, and arranged for publication by a mind trained to investigation and to the impartial weighing of evidence. The requisite critical faculties are rarely found coexisting in the same person with what are known as psychic

gifts; and it is therefore an exceptionally fortunate circumstance that an experienced investigator and member of the Council of the S.P.R. should develop graphic automatism, and should be willing to record her results in scientific fashion in the interests of this research.

The detailed and complex nature of the evidence renders it almost impossible even to summarise any of the incidents, and the purposes of a short review will best be served by giving general impressions. Briefly, then, I would say that the case for some kind of supernormal psychic activity seems to me practically conclusive. It is almost impossible, after a careful reading of the volume, to resist the conclusion that, even apart from other evidence, telepathy at least is all but proven. The coincidences between Mrs Verrall's script and the script (or in one instance the trance-speech) of other sensitives, produced at or about the same time, seem in many cases to be too remarkable to be attributed to chance; and if we cannot so attribute them, there appears to be no satisfactory explanation except the hypothesis which assumes some supernormal transmission of thought between the sensitives concerned. As is usual in such cases, the writing frequently purports to come from a disembodied consciousness; and though it contains some notable mistakes and failures—almost inexplicable, it must be admitted, on the *prima facie* supposition—there is yet a good deal of matter which, though far from conclusive, is still rather strongly suggestive of some supra-mundane source.

If the evidence now accumulated seems to necessitate at least the hypothesis of telepathy, it is perhaps not inadmissible to speculate as to the bearing of that hypothesis on the problems of religion and philosophy. In this connection much depends on whether or not the phenomena turn out to be dependent on physical agencies. If thought-transference is an affair of brain-action and ether-waves, it need not have any great effect on our metaphysical conceptions. But if it is not so conditioned; if it operates in some super-physical medium—and there are certain features which point in this direction—it can hardly be doubted that the acceptance of such a hypothesis will be fraught with the most momentous consequences. It will break down, as Myers has said, the materialistic synthesis of man; will introduce us to a new environment which may be a "spiritual world"; in short, will supply a rational, scientific basis for religious hopes, feelings, and beliefs. The presumable consequences being so great, we may well pause long and thoughtfully before allowing ourselves to formulate a definite conclusion; we must make very sure that the hypothesis is adequately supported by objective facts before "letting down the bars" between our souls and the object of their emotional desire. But it does certainly seem to me that Mrs Verrall's record brings us at least a step nearer to some conception of the Universe which shall be at once scientific and religious—which shall unify in a higher synthesis the hitherto mutually exclusive activities of rationalism and piety.

J. Arthur Hill.

Bradford.

The Scientific Creed of a Theologian. A Plea for a Mutual Understanding between Science and Christianity.—By Rudolf Schmid, D.D., late Court Chaplain. Translated from the second German edition by J. W. Stoughton, B.A. (Camb.).—London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

The standpoint of this volume is interesting mainly on two accounts. The author has occupied a high position in the German church, which lends special significance to his plea; and the plea itself is characterised by a considerable breadth of view. Dr Schmid refuses to keep his science and his Christianity in two compartments of the brain. Nothing, he properly insists, can be true scientifically and false from the religious point of view, or *vice versa*, and it is therefore incumbent on Christianity to adjust both aspects of truth, the more so that such an adjustment, in the author's judgment, cannot fail to enrich genuine religion. He carries his argument through with much spirit and acuteness, holding the balance fairly between the extremes of the Monists on the one hand and the literal Biblicists upon the other.

In the first chapter he discusses the two creation-narratives of Genesis, inferring that the Old Testament in general does not exclude the idea of an evolutionary origin for man any more than it posits a conception of God irreconcilable with a fair view of the inviolability of Nature's laws. Then, after sketching the rise of the Darwinian hypothesis and its modifications in recent science, he proceeds to examine the problems of providence, of answers to prayer, and of miracles, in the light of contemporary scientific research. This forms the heart and core of the volume. Opinion will probably be divided upon his success. Occasionally, as *e.g.* in refusing to take the six days of creation as literal days, he seems to occupy rather shaky ground. He holds also firmly to the resurrection of the body. But it is admitted that the miracle-narratives may have been coloured and heightened in the course of tradition, and acceptance or rejection of the virgin-birth (pp. 208 f.) of Jesus is pronounced irrelevant to genuine Christian faith. Whatever may be thought of certain details in the book, however, the spirit of it is beyond reproach. Dr Schmid writes of what he knows. He does not belong to the class of theologians who, with facile eloquence, accept scientific conclusions of which they are practically unqualified to judge, and then try to exploit them in the interests of a preconceived creed. His book is mediating in a good sense of the word, and its pages inspire the reader with a feeling of confidence in the justice, if not always in the persuasiveness, of the writer's intellect. For these reasons a welcome must be extended to the volume. It seems eminently fitted to meet the needs of those who, in this country no less than in Germany, have vague perplexities about the exact bearings of biological and anthropological research upon the spiritual inheritance of Christianity.

James Moffatt.

Dundonald.

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[Review will follow.]

14 *Lambelet* (*E.*) Les limites de la puissance de Dieu d'après une nouvelle théorie. La Liberté chrét., Sept. 1906.

[Criticism of a deistic theory of W. Monod, who, under the influence of Richard Jeffries, would rule God out of nature.]

17 *Rashdall* (*H.*) Causality and the Principles of Historical Evidence. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vi., 1906.

[That every event must have a cause or sufficient reason is undoubtedly a necessity of thought; on the other hand, the law of the Uniformity of Nature is no necessity of thought, but a mere postulate of scientific reasoning. If the Uniformity of Nature is no self-evident axiom, we have no right to say that a miracle is *a priori* an impossibility.]

26 *Lofthouse* (*W. F.*) Ethics and Atonement. 302p. Methuen, 1906.

[Maintains that the doctrine of the Atonement is not an artificial theorem, but has its roots in the foundations of all human life and is really the highest expression of the law of moral and social progress.]

Pullan (*Leighton*) The Atonement. (Oxford Lib. of Prac. Theo.) 262p. Longmans, 1906.

60 *Anon.* The Gate of Death. A Diary. 231p. Smith, Elder, 1906.

[Thoughts recorded by a literary man during the passage from the "gate of death" to convalescence amidst the quiet surroundings of a Sussex parsonage.]

63 *Palmer* (*W. Scott*) The Resurrection of the Body. Cont. R., Oct. 1906.

[The immortality of the *earthly* body=the special share which as body the meaning of the scattered material particles has obtained and taken in a man's immortality.]

65 *Hyslop* (*J. H.*) Science and a Future Life. 369p. Putnams, 1906.

[Summarises the most important work of the S.P.R. with reference to the problem of a future life.]

Miles (*Eustace*) Life after Death: The Theory of Reincarnation. 180p. Methuen, 1906.

[Writer adopts his theory as more useful and more comforting and inspiriting than any other he is familiar with.]

Paget (*Lady*) Reincarnation. 19th Cent., Dec. 1906.

Fechner (*G. T.*) On Life after Death. Trans. by H. Wernekke. Revised ed. 134p. Kegan Paul, 1906.

80 *Turner* (*C. H.*) The History and Use of Creeds and Anathemas in the Early Centuries of the Church. (Church Historical Soc.) 121p. S.P.C.K., 1906.

Connolly (*R. H.*) The Early Syriac Creed. Ztschr. f. d. neutest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1906.

[Gives three tentative reconstructions of the Syriac Creed: from Aphraates, *The Acts of Thomas* and the *Doctrine of Addai*, together with creedal statements from Philoxenus, Isaac of Antioch, and the "Apology concerning the Faith," from the Codex Sin. Syr.]

E ETHICS. 1–9 *Practical Theology*, *Christian Ethics*, *Transition to General Ethics*, 10 *Theories*, 20 *Applied Ethics*, *Sociology*, 23 *Economics*, 27 *Education*.

6 *Alston* (*Leonard*) Stoic and Christian in the Second Century. A Comparison of the Ethical Teaching of Marcus Aurelius with that of Contemporary and Antecedent Christianity, 147p. Longmans, 1906.

Bernard (*E. R.*) Great Moral Teachers: Eight Lectures delivered in Salisbury Cathedral. 174p. Macmillan, 1906.

[An attempt to exhibit clearly the differences and correspondences in principles and method between Confucius, Gotama, Socrates, and Christ in their aspect as moral teachers.]

10 *Hobhouse* (*L. T.*) Morals in Evolution. A Study in Comparative Ethics. 2 vols. 392+301 p. Chapman & Hall, 1906.

[An attempt to approach the theory of ethical evolution through a comparative study of rules of conduct and ideals of life. Review will follow.]

M'Taggart (*J. E.*) The Ethics of Henry Sidgwick. Quar. R., Oct. 1906.

[A careful analysis of Sidgwick's ethical teaching. His position was one of ethical hedonism, viz., that we *ought* not to aim at anything, unless by doing so we shall produce more pleasure than we should produce by any other course open to us.]

Solomon (*J.*) Is the Conception of "Good" Undefinable? Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vi., 1906.

[Criticism of Mr G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*.]

Leighton (*J. A.*) Ethics, Sociology, and Personality. Phil. R., Sept. 1906.

[The ultimate centres of ethical judgment and action are persons, and, since persons judge and act in accordance with rational principles, they must be members of a rational order.]

Barry (*D.*) The Basis of Justice. Irish Theol. Quar., Oct. 1906.

[Strict justice cannot have regard only to man as individual, but as a social being also.]

Besse (*C.*) Lettre de France: L'agonie de la morale. Rev. Néo. Scol., Aug. 1906.

[Refers to many writers who are said to be bringing about the death of morality, *e.g.* Boutroux, Levy-Bruhl, etc.]

Dumas (*G.*) Les conditions biologiques du remords. Rev. Phil., Oct. 1906.

[Remorse not the invariable and simple experience defined in treatises on morality, but has to do with organic and nervous conditions. Experimental results proving this.]

20 *Deploige* (*S.*) Le conflit de la Morale et de la Sociologie. II.: La conception sociologique de M. Durkheim. III.: La Science des Mœurs et l'Art Moral. Rev. Néo-Scol., Aug. 1906.

Brown (*W. Jethro*) The Austinian Theory of Law, an Edition of Lectures I., V. and VI. of Austin's "Jurisprudence" and of Austin's "Essay on the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence," with Critical Notes and Excursus. 383p. Murray, 1906.

Macgregor (*D. H.*) Industrial Combination. 245p. Bell, 1906.

Crackanthorpe (*Montague*) Population and Progress. Fort. R., Dec. 1906.

Paulhan (*F.*) L'échange économique et l'échange affectif: Le sentiment dans la vie sociale. Rev. Phil., Oct. 1906.

Wrixon (*Sir H.*) The Pattern Nation. 172p. Macmillan, 1906.

[An argument against socialism.]

Devas (*C. S.*) Is Socialism Right after all? Dub. R., Oct. 1906.

Millar (*F.*), *ed.* Socialism: Its Fallacies and Dangers. Cheap ed. 96p. Watts, 1906.

Wells (*H. G.*) Socialism and the Middle Classes. Fort. R., Nov. 1906.

Kirkup (*T.*) A History of Socialism. Rev. ed. 406p. Black, 1906.

Malcolm (*Ian*) Is the Party System Honest? Fort. R., Oct. 1906.

Marshall (*P.*) The Ethical Aspect of Boycotting. Irish Th. Quar., Oct. 1906.

23 *Chamorel* (*G.*) L'Évangile et la lutte économique du temps présent. La Liberté chrét., Oct. 1906.
[An able exposition of the causes of the socialistic movement and the attitude of the workers towards organised religion. The writer's sympathies are those of our Christian socialists.]

27 *Smith* (*G. B.*) Truthfulness in Teaching the Truth. Biblical World, Oct. 1906.
[In Bible teaching moral truth is to be emphasised, the conformity of will to right ideals. Correctness of doctrinal definitions is secondary.]

Hayllar (*F.*) Christianity and the Child. Indep. R., Oct. 1906.

Coulton (*G. G.*) Religious Education before the Reformation. Cont. R., Oct. 1906.

Coblenz (*F.*) Biblical Criticism in Religious Instruction. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1906.
[It is unavoidable and beneficial. The subject matter and method of treatment are fully indicated for primary, secondary, and advanced classes.]

Forsyth (*P. T.*) Church, State, Dogma, and Education. Cont. R., Dec. 1906.
[Some concessions and replies to the Bishops of Birmingham and Southwark.]

Zimmern (*A. E.*) Oxford in the New Century. Indep. R., Oct. 1906.

Pijper (*F.*) De beste vruchten van het universitaire onderwijs. Th. Tijd., July 1906.
[Not the acquisition of knowledge, but the power of independent thought.]

Anon. Irish University Education and the Reform of Trinity College, Dublin. Church Q. R., Oct. 1906.
[Supports the demand for a Roman Catholic University, and pleads for such reorganisation of the Divinity School of Trinity College as would restore it to a primary place.]

Hinkson (*H. A.*) Dublin University in her Relation to Ireland. Catholic World, Oct. 1906.

Barker (*J. Ellis*) Education and Miseducation in Germany. Cont. R., Oct. 1906.

30 *Bosanquet* (*Helen*) The Family. 344p. Macmillan, 1906.
[An attempt to bring together the materials for an estimate of the meaning and importance of the Family as an institution in human society. Review will follow.]

98 *Bell* (*E.*) Why do Animals Exist? 16p. Humanitarian League, 1906.

F PASTORALIA. 2 *Sermons.*

Kernahan (*Coulson*) The Duel. 90p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.
[The duel is that between God and Satan.]

2 *Caird* (*John*) Aspects of Life: Twelve Sermons. 304p. Allenson, 1906.
[A new edition of Caird's first volume.]

Black (*Hugh*) Edinburgh Sermons. 300p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

Selby (*T. G.*) The Strenuous Gospel: Sermons. 425p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

Iverach (*J.*) The Other Side of Greatness, and other Sermons. 269p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

Gordon (*G. A.*) Through Man to God. 395p. Longmans, 1906.
[A series of sermons based on the idea of the Incarnation of God as the perfect man, in all men as moral beings, and in all good men as the life of their life.]

Paget (*F. E.*) Helps and Hindrances to the Christian Life: Plain Village Sermons. Vol. I.: Advent to Whitsunday. (Skeffington's Sermon Lib., Vol. V.) 230p. Skeffington, 1906.

Gladden (*Washington*) The New Idolatry. 237p. Pitman, 1906.
[Addresses on American Mammon Worship.]

Vaughan (*Bernard*) The Sins of Society. 272p. Kegan Paul, 1906.

Ovenden (*C. T.*) Problems in Life and Religion. 217p. S.P.C.K., 1906.
[See p. 464.]

Peabody (*F. G.*) The Thirst for the Living God. Homiletic R., Oct. 1906.

Walters (*C. Ensor*), *ed.* The Social Mission of the Church: Sixteen Addresses by Free Church Ministers. 239p. Nat. Counc. of Evan. Free Churches, 1906.

Wagner (*C.*) Wayside Talks. 234p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 *English.*

Koenigsberger (*Leo*) Herman von Helmholtz. Trans. by Frances A. Welby. Pref. by Lord Kelvin. 457p. Frowde, 1906.

Dey (*S. C.*) Raja Ram Mohan Roy's Labours. Hindustan Rev., July 1906.

Liber (*M.*) Rashi. Trans. from French by Adele Szold. (Jewish Worthies Series.) Vol. II. 278p. Macmillan, 1906.

2 *Hutton* (*W. H.*) William Stubbs, Bishop of Oxford, 1825–1901. (From the "Letters of William Stubbs.") Abridged ed. 264p. Constable, 1906.

Maitland (*F. W.*) The Life and Letters of Leslie Stephen. 510p. Duckworth, 1906.

Gasquet (*Abbot*), *ed.* Lord Acton and his Circle. 460p. Allen, 1906.

Elton (*Oliver*) Frederick York Powell. 2 vols. 461+464p. Frowde, 1906.

Lydekker (*R.*) Sir William Flower. (Eng. Men of Science.) 191p. Dent, 1906.

Fletcher (*J. M. J.*) Mrs Wightman, of Shrewsbury. The Story of a Pioneer in Temperance Work. 300p. Longmans, 1906.

Pierson (*A. T.*) James Wright of Bristol. 274p. Nisbet, 1906.

Clifford (*C.*) John Oliver Hobbes (Mrs Craigie). Catholic World, Oct. 1906.

Hicks (*E. L.*) Sir Wilfrid Lawson. Optimist, Oct. 1906.

H HISTORY. x *Persecutions* C *Christian* M *Mediæval* R *Modern* 2 *English.*

Ward (*A. W.*), *and others, eds.* The Cambridge Modern History. Vol. IV. The Thirty Years War. 1023p. Clay, 1906.
[Contains articles, *inter alia*, on *The Protestant Collapse* (1620–30), by Dr Ward; *Richelieu*, by Stanley Leathes; *Presbyterians and Independents*, by Dr Prothero and Colonel Lloyd; *Mazarin*, by S. Leathes; and *Descartes and Cartesianism*, by Professor Boutroux.]

Acton (*Lord*) Lectures on Modern History. Ed. with Intro. by J. N. Figgis and R. V. Laurence. 382p. Macmillan, 1906.

Reinach (*S.*) Une Prédiction accomplie. R. de l'Hist. des Rel., July–Aug. 1906.

[The reference is to Vettius' interpretation of Romulus' augury—the twelve vultures he saw signifying a duration of 1200 years for Rome. "From the year 95 B.C. to 527 A.D., we follow the trace of a prediction which was fulfilled to the letter, and which must have weighed heavily on the *morale* of educated Romans whenever the destinies of the Empire seemed at stake."]

Anon. The Beginnings of Britain and Gaul. Church Q. R., Oct. 1906.

Durell (*J. C. V.*) The Historic Church. An Essay on the Conception of the Christian Church and its Ministry in the Sub-Apostolic Age. 328p. Clay, 1906.
[The period dealt with is the second century.]

v *Connolly* (*R. H.*) St Ephraim and Encratism. J. Th. St, Oct. 1906.
[St Ephraim held no abnormal views on the subject of Christian marriage.]

x *Ramsay* (*W. M.*) Pagan Revivalism and the Persecutions of the Early Church. Interp., Oct. 1906.
[Evidence from inscriptions showing the State as instigator of persecution and as using pagan revivals as an instrument.]

C *Blunt* (*W. F.*) The Fulness of Time. Interp., Oct. 1906.
[The opportuneness of Christ's advent.]

Spence-Jones (*H. D. M.*) The Golden Age of the Church. 470p. S.P.C.K., 1906.
[The Dean of Gloucester deals here with the fourth century.]

Delehaye (*H.*) Notes sur un manuscrit grec du Musée britannique.
Anal. Bolland., tom. xxv. fasc. iv.
[MS. 36,589, a menology for February, a parchment MS. of 11th–12th century.]

Delehaye (*H.*) Catalogus codicum hagiographicorum græcorum bibliothecæ comitis de Leicester Holkhamiæ in Anglia.
Anal. Bolland., tom. xxv. fasc. iv.

Poncelet (*A.*) Catalogus codicum hagiographicorum latinorum bibliothecarum Romanarum præter quam Vaticanæ IV. Codices bibliothecæ Alexandrinæ.
Anal. Bolland., tom. xxv. fasc. iv.

M *Lanciani* (*Rodolfo*) The Golden Days of the Renaissance in Rome. From the Pontificate of Julius II. to that of Paul III. 352p. Constable, 1906.

De Smedt (*C.*) La Santa Casa de Lorette.
Anal. Bolland., tom. xxv. fasc. iv.
[Review of Canon Ulysse Chevalier's book. Reviewer and author agree in holding the story legendary.]

Görres (*F.*) Der echte und der falsche Victor von Cartena.
Ztschr. f. wiss. Th., Heft 4, 1906.
["A church-historical and patristic problem of the Early Middle Ages."]

R *Holzinger* (*H.*) Ein Ulmer Bericht über Luther in Worms.
Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 1, 1907.
[The text of the document, relating the events in Worms, is printed, and its authorship discussed.]

Loetscher (*F. W.*) Schwenckfeld's Participation in the Eucharistic controversy of the 16th Century (*continued*).
Princeton Th. Rev., Oct. 1906.

Knappert (*L.*) Geschiedenis van de hervormig binnen Leiden van den aanvang tot op het beleg. IV. and V.
Th. Tijd., July and Nov. 1906.

Jundt (*A.*) La controverse entre protestants et catholiques sur les 95 thèses de Luther. Rev. chrét., Oct. 1906.

Berbig (*G.*) Der Anbruch der Reformation im Kreise Weimar.
Ztschr. f. wiss. Th., Heft 3, 1906.
[A letter of 1525 from an Erfurt priest describing the assembly of clerics summoned by Prince John of Saxony, and the admonitions and directions given to them.]

v *Ramsay* (*W. M.*), *ed.* Studies in the History and Art of the Eastern Provinces of the Roman Empire. 391p.
Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.
[A collection of papers bearing on research in Asia Minor done by seven members of the University of Aberdeen, and edited for the Quatercentenary of the University.]

1 *Nielsen* (*Fredrik*) The History of the Papacy in the 19th Century. Trans. under the direction of A. J. Mason. 2 Vols. 378 + 481p. Murray, 1906.
[Carries the story down to Pius IX.]

Veen (*H. J. v.*) De Oorsprong van het beginsel der armoede in de Dominicanerorde.
Th. Tijd., Nov. 1906.
[Historical study of the origin of the principle of poverty in the Dominican order.]

2 *Hall* (*Sir S.*) A Short History of the Oxford Movement. 267p. Longmans, 1906.
[A layman's attempt to give an unbiassed account of the Oxford Movement.]

Shepherd (*J. H.*) Introduction to the History of the Church in Scotland. 207p.
S.P.C.K., 1906.

74 *D'Alviella* (*Goblet*) A Travers le Far-West, Souvenirs des États-Unis. 236p.
Weissenbruch, 1906.
[An interesting study of American life and religion.]

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C *Fathers* 2 *R.C. Church* 3 *Anglican.*

Krüger (*P.*) Philo und Josephus als Apologeton des Judentums. 26p.
Dürr'sche Buchh., 1906.

Gore (*Bp.*) The Homilies of S. Macarius of Egypt. J. Th. St., Oct. 1906.

C *Gilbert* (*G. H.*) Justin Martyr on the Person of Christ. Amer. J. Th., Oct. 1906.

Heinisch (*P.*) Clemens von Alexandrien und die einjährige Lehrtätigkeit des Herrn.
Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 4, 1906.
[Clement, in holding this view, was independent of the Gnostics. No tradition seems to lie behind his view, which appears to depend solely on Luke iv. 19.]

Hitchcock (*F. R. M.*) The Confession of S. Patrick. J. Th. St., Oct. 1906.
[A discussion of a few difficult passages bearing on the Saint's life.]

Nairn (*J. A.*), *ed.* De Sacerdotio of St John Chrysostom. 192p. Clay, 1906.
[A volume of the Cambridge Patristic Texts, edited by the Master of Pembroke College.]

Boehmer (*H.*) Zu dem Zeugnisse des Irenäus von dem Ansehen der römischen Kirche.
Ztschr. f. d. neutest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1906.
[Attempts an interpretation of the much disputed passage, *Adv. Hæres*, iii. 3. 2, by comparison with iv. 26. 2.]

Mercati (*G.*) A Supposed Homily of Eusebius of Cæsarea. J. Th. St., Oct. 1906.

Winstedt (*E. O.*) A Note on Cosmas and the *Chronicon Paschale*.
J. Th. St., Oct. 1906.

1 *Dräseke* (*J.*) Zu Bessarion und dessen neuen Briefen.
Ztschr. f. wiss. Th., Heft 3, 1906.

2 *Heywood* (*W.*), *trans.* The Little Flowers of the Glorious Messer St Francis and of His Friars. Intro. by A. Ferrers Howell. 230p. Methuen, 1906.

R. E. Non-Catholic Work in Franciscan Studies. Catholic World, Sept. 1906.

French (*F. G.*) A Companion to Thomas à Kempis and the Imitatio Christi. 61p.
Marlborough, 1906.

Montmorency (*J. E. G. De*) Thomas à Kempis, His Age and Book. Ill. 312p.
Methuen, 1906.

[An attempt (1) to trace the line of spiritual thought which led to the *De Imitatione Christi*, and (2) to analyse that treatise in considerable detail so as to exhibit the body of doctrine it contains.]

Anon. Thomas à Kempis and the Brotherhood of the Common Life.
Church Q. R., Oct. 1906.

[A study of Thomas' two books, *The Founders of the New Devotion* and *The Chronicle of the Canons Regular of Mount St Agnes*, chiefly for the light thrown on Thomas himself.]

Anon. Gregory the Great.
Church Q. R., Oct. 1906.

Taunton (*E.*) Henricus R. *versus* Thomas Becket. 19th Cent., Dec. 1906.

Williams (*W. J.*) Newman, Pascal, Loisy, and the Catholic Church. 316p.
Griffiths, 1906.

[See p. 462.]

Turner (*C. H.*) The *Liber Ecclesiasticorum Dogmatum*. J. Th. St., Oct. 1906.

[A letter from Fr. Puller on the authorship; a specimen of the text of the *Liber*, and a newly discovered document showing borrowings from the *Liber*.]

Benson (*R. H.*) The Report of the Ritual Commission. Dub. R., Oct. 1906.

Vigouroux (*F. G.*) and *Janssens* (*L.*) Decisions of the Biblical Commission.
Irish Th. Quar., Oct. 1906.

[Latin text, by the Papal *Consultores ab Actis*, of the decisions regarding the Pentateuch.]

Sabatier (*Paul*) The Religious Movement in France. Cont. R., Nov. 1906.

[Deals with the first general meeting of the French Bishops, the Encyclical *Gravissimo*, second meeting of the Bishops and their joint Letter, Appeal of a group of French Catholics to Pius X., the outlook.]

Allo (*B.*) Nos attitudes en face de la vérité. R. du clergé français, Oct. 15, 1906.

[A plea for liberalism by the Fribourg professor and for mutual tolerance between "militants" and "intellectuals." No truth is dangerous for him who really understands it.]

3 *M'Donald* (*W.*) Doctrine and Discipline in the Anglican Church.
Irish Th. Quar., Oct. 1906.

[*A propos* of the recent report of the Royal Commission. There is no rule and authority common to the scattered communions to which Ritualists appeal; and you cannot appeal to the Church of the first six centuries unless you are ready to admit that the Kingdom of God is no longer to be found on earth.]

Anon. The Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline. Church Q. R., Oct. 1906.

[Giving a general support to the findings of the Commission.]

4 *Walker* (*Williston*) John Calvin, the Organiser of Reformed Protestantism, 1509–1564. (Heroes of the Reformation.) 474p.
Putnam, 1906.

Albrecht (*O.*) Katechismusstudien.
Th. St. u. Knit. Heft 1, 1907.

[First article, dealing with Luther's "Haustafel," which is described as one "Katechismustafel" among others. Its origin, date, and relationship are inquired into.]

Anon. L'Assemblée de Jarnac.
Rev. chrét., Nov. 1906.

[Official report of the proceedings of the Protestant Synod, which has averted the threatened rupture.]

Monnier (*H.*) La crise du protestantisme.
Rev. chrét., Oct. 1906.

[Stating and developing those principles of difference in French Protestantism which the Separation Law has made acute, and which threatens to split that communion into fragments. The writer prays for union.]

6 *Newman* (*A. H.*) Recent Changes in the Theology of Baptists.
Amer. J. Th., Oct. 1906.

L LITERATURE. 2 *English* 3 *German* 5 *Italian* 9 *Classical*.

Keary (*C. F.*) Some Thoughts on the Technique of Poetry. Fort. R., Nov. 1906.

Anon. Literary Criticism, Esthetic and Psychological. Edin. R., Oct. 1906.

Yeats (*W. B.*) Literature and the Living Voice. Cont. R., Oct. 1906.

Grierson (*H. J. C.*) Periods of European Literature: The First Half of the Seventeenth Century. 388p. Blackwood, 1906.

2 *Repplier* (*Agnes*) The Choice of Books.
Catholic World, Oct. 1906.

[Chiefly a lament that there is so little English literature marked by the grace and amplitude of Catholicism.]

Hunt (*T. W.*) The History of English Lyric Poetry. Biblio. Sacra, Oct. 1906.

Lee (*Sidney*) Shakespeare and the Modern Stage: With Other Essays. 251p.
Murray, 1906.

Tolstoy (*Leo*) On Shakespeare, I.
Fort. R., Dec. 1906.

[Gives reasons for the belief that Shakespeare cannot be recognised either as a great genius or even as an average author.]

Sheehan (*Canon*) Early Essays and Lectures. 354p. Longmans, 1906.

V *Brookfield* (*Frances M.*) The Cambridge "Apostles." 370p. Pitman, 1906.

Mackail (*J. W.*) The Genius of William Morris. Indep. R., Oct. 1906.

Perry (*Bliss*) Walt Whitman: His Life and Work. 318p. Constable, 1906.

Anon. Characteristics of Mr Swinburne's Poetry. Edin. R., Oct. 1906.

Gribble (*Francis*) Sir Leslie Stephen.
Fort. R., Dec. 1906.

W *Harrison* (*Frederic*) Memories and Thoughts: Men, Books, Cities, Art. 433p.
Macmillan, 1906.

Hankin (*St John*) Puritanism and the English Stage. Fort. R., Dec. 1906.

[A plea for an Art Theatre like the Freie Bühne in Germany, which would help to restore the habit of theatre-going in a large and intelligent class of the community.]

Jones (*Henry Arthur*) Corner Stones of Modern Drama. Fort. R., Dec. 1906.

3 *Lindsay* (*J.*) Lessing's Philosophy of Religion. Biblio. Sacra, Oct. 1906.

Clay (*H. A.*) The Inner History of Tristan and Isolde. Fort. R., Oct. 1906.

4 *Macdonald* (*Frederika*) Jean Jacques Rousseau: A New Criticism. 2 Vols. 418+405p. Chapman & Hall, 1906.

Maeterlinck (*M.*) The Measure of the Hours. Fort. R., Nov. 1906.

Maeterlinck (*M.*) My Dog. Trans. by A. Teixeira de Mattos. Ill. by G. V. Stokes. 63p. Allen, 1906.

5 *Carroll* (*J. S.*) Prisoners of Hope. An Exposition of Dante's Purgatorio. 511p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

[Follows the general plan and method of the author's book on the *Inferno*. It is an exposition, canto by canto, designed to bring out the ethical significance of the *Purgatorio*.]

Sinowitz (*M.*) Weitere Beweise zu dem Schlüssel von Dantes Alighieris Werken. 36p. Clecner, 1906.

Selfe (*Rose E.*), *trans.*, *Wicksteed* (*P. H.*), *ed.* Villani's Chronicle: Selections from the first Nine Books of the Croniche Fiorentine of Giovanni Villani. 461p. Constable, 1906.

Anon. Æneas Sylvius and Nicholas de Cusa: Symbols of the Renaissance. Dub. R., Oct. 1906.

8 *Dowden* (*Edward*) Henrik Ibsen. Cont. R., Nov. 1906.

Symons (*Arthur*) Henrik Ibsen. Quar. R., Oct. 1906.

9 *Jackson* (*H.*), *and others.* Prælections delivered before the Senate of the University of Cambridge, 25, 26, 27 Jan. 1906. 164p. Clay, 1906.

[Dr Jackson on *Plato's Cratylus*, Dr Adam on *The Doctrine of the Soul from Pindar to Plato*, and three other expositions.]

Thompson (*J. W.*) Vergil in Mediæval Culture. Amer. J. Th., Oct. 1906.

50 *Baugh* (*C. D.*) Philosophy of Omar Khayyam and Schopenhauer. West. R., Nov. 1906.

70 *Vincent* (*Leon H.*) American Literary Masters. 518p. Constable, 1906.

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4 *Hinduism.* 7 *Judaism.* 9 *Demonology.* 12 *Occultism.*

Woods (*J. Haughton*) Practice and Science of Religion. A Study of Method in Comparative Religion. 123p. Longmans, 1906.

[Lectures at the General Theological Seminary in New York.]

Rivers (*W. H. R.*) The Todas. 755p. Macmillan, 1906.

[Review will follow.]

Frazer (*J. G.*) Adonis Attis Osiris. Studies in the History of Oriental Religion. 355p. Macmillan, 1906.

[Review will follow.]

Ramsay (*Sir W. M.*) The Peasant God: The Destruction and the Restoration of Agriculture in Asia Minor. Cont. R., Dec. 1906.

[Lecture to British Association.]

Bouché-Leclercq (*A.*) Histoire des Lagides: Les Institutions de l'Égypte Ptolémaïque; 1st part. Vol. III. 416p. Leroux, 1906.

Wundt (*M.*) Apollonius von Tyana. Prophetie und Mythenbildung. Ztschr. f. wiss. Th., Heft 3, 1906.

[A study and interpretation of his oracles.]

Delaporte (*L. J.*) Noms théophores en Assyrie a l'époque des Sargonides. R. de l'Hist. des Rel., July–Aug. 1906.

Capart (*J.*) Bulletin critique des Religions de l'Égypte, 1905 (*concluded*). R. de l'Hist. des Rel., July–Aug. 1906.

1 *Smith* (*S. C. Kaines*) The Elements of Greek Worship. 154p. Griffiths, 1906.

2 *Petrie* (*W. M. Flinders*) The Religion of Ancient Egypt. (Religions, Ancient and Modern.) 98p. Constable, 1906.

4 "*Barhaspattyah.*" The Jyotisha Vedanga Explained. Hindustan Rev., July 1906.

5 *Carus* (*Paul*), *ed.* T'ai-Shang Kan-Ying P'ien. Treatise of the Exalted One on Response and Retribution. Trans. by Teitaro Suzuki and P. Carus. Ill. 139p. Kegan Paul, 1906.

Carus (*Paul*), *ed.* Yin Chih Wen. The Tract of the Quiet Way, with Extracts from the Chinese Commentary. Trans. by Teitaro Sazuki and P. Carus. 48p. Kegan Paul, 1906.

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Cranmer-Byng (*L.*), *Kapadia* (*S. A.*), *eds.* The Way of the Buddha. By H. Baynes. (Wisdom of the East Series.) 132p. Murray, 1906.

Speijer (*I. S.*) Buddhistische elementen in eenige episoden uit de legenden van St Hubertus en St Eustachius. Th. Tijd., Sept. 1906.

Slater (*T. E.*) The Higher Hinduism in Relation to Christianity: Certain Aspects of Hindu Thought from the Christian Standpoint. 291p. Elliot Stock, 1906.

[This work was submitted in 1899 to the Saxon Missionary Conference at Leipzig, in response to an invitation for a Missionary Prize Essay on Hindu Religion and Philosophy from a Christian point of view, and is highly commended by the examiners.]

Bishop of Madras. The Village Deities of South India. 19th Cent., Oct. 1906.

Conway (*Moncure D.*) My Pilgrimage to the Wise Men of the East. 416p. Constable, 1906.

Pasteur (*Violet M.*) Gods and Heroes of Old Japan. Ill. by Ada Galton. 176p. Kegan Paul, 1906.

7 *Goodrich-Freer* (*A.*) Notes from Jerusalem. Bibl. World, June 1906.

[A few recent instances illustrating the levirate marriage, the redemption of the first-born, circumcision, and a wedding.]

Hyamson (*A. M.*), *ed.* The Jewish Literary Annual. 168p. Routledge, 1906.

[A series of essays on Jewish religious education in England.]

Strack (*H. L.*) Jahrbuch der evangelischen Judenmission. Band i. 124p. Hinrichs, 1906.

Abelson (*J.*) Maimonides on the Jewish Creed. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1906.
[Translation of Chap. X. of the *Sanhedrin*, in which M. enunciates his thirteen articles of Jewish belief.]

Poznański (*S.*) Karaite Literary Opponents of Saadiah Gaon in the 11th Century. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1906.

Sassoon (*D. S.*) An Autograph Letter of a Pseudo-Messiah. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1906.
[With facsimile and translation. This recent pretender, Mari Shooker Kohail, was a Yemenite Jew.]

Hirschfeld (*H.*) The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1906.
[Introduction, text, and translation of Sa'adyâh's Commentary on Leviticus.]

Cowley (*A.*) Bodleian Genizah Fragments. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1906.
[Descriptive introduction and texts.]

Friedländer (*I.*) A Muhammedan Book on Augury in Hebrew Characters. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1906.
[A fragment from the Cairo Genizah, the earliest known specimen of "prophetic augury," of Islamic origin, and copied for Jewish use. Text and translation are given.]

Dembitz (*L. N.*) Babylon in Jewish Law. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1906.
[The writer, as early as 1901, called attention to the connection between Babylonian and Mishnah Law. He here goes through the provisions of the Hammurabi Code, and exhibits their striking parallelism with the Mishnah. The consequent influences will be given in a later number of the *J. Q. R.*]

Volz (*P.*) Ein heutiger Passahabend. Ztschr. f. d. neutest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1906.
[Describing two recent celebrations of the Passover at which the writer was present.]

Perles (*F.*) Das Jüdische in Cohen's Ethik. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1906.

Bock (*F.*) Mendelssohn's Phädon und sein Platonisches Vorbild. 30p. Plauen, 1906.

Montague (*E. R.*) Tales from the Talmud. 290p. Blackwood, 1906.

8 *Syed* (*Ameer Ali*) Islam. (Religions, Ancient and Modern.) 78p. Constable, 1906.

9 *Hamilton* (*Mary*) Incubation, or the Cure of Disease in Pagan Temples and Christian Churches. 223p. Simpkin, 1906.
[An historical sketch of the development of the practice of *Tempelschlaf* by a Carnegie Research Scholar of St Andrews.]

12 *Waite* (*A. E.*) Studies in Mysticism and certain Aspects of the Secret Tradition. 348p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

Probst-Biraben. L'extase dans le mysticisme musulman: Les étapes du soufi. Rev. Phil., Nov. 1906.

P PHILOSOPHY. 10 ·· *Metaphysics*, 21 *Epistemology*, 33 ·· *Psychical Research*, 40 ·· *Psychology*, 60 ·· *Logic*, 70 ·· *Systems*, 90 ·· *Philosophers*.

10 *Ermoni* (*V.*) Nécessité de la métaphysique. Rev. Néo-Schol., Aug. 1906.

13 *Shenstone* (*W. A.*) The New Physics and Chemistry: A Series of Popular Essays on Physical and Chemical Subjects. 360p. Smith, Elder, 1906.
[A series of interesting essays on Matter, Motion and Molecules, Recent Theories of the Ether, Modern Theories of Light, Radium, The Origin of Life, etc., originally contributed to *Cornhill Magazine*.]

Henslow (*G.*) The True Darwinism. 19th Cent., Nov. 1906.

14 *Boodin* (*J. E.*) Space and Reality. i.: Ideal or Serial Space. ii.: Real Space. J. of Phil., Sept. 27, Oct. 25, 1906.

15 *Jevons* (*F. B.*) Timelessness. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vi., 1906.
[As they are given in appearance, succession and simultaneity contradict each other. As an appearance, that is, time contradicts itself. If, then, reality does not contradict itself, we are forced to see in time the false appearance of a timeless reality.]

Perry (*R. B.*) The Knowledge of Past Events. J. of Phil., Nov. 8, 1906.

16 *Mallet* (*E.*) La philosophie de l'action. Rev. de Phil., Sept. 1906.

19 *Pitkin* (*W. B.*) Continuity and Number. Phil. R., Nov. 1906.
[Arithmetical continuity, even when correctly stated in its simplest logical form, throws no light upon the meaning of geometrical and physical continuities.]

21 *Hollands* (*E. H.*) The Relation of Science to Concrete Experience. Phil. R., Nov. 1906.
[Hegel has set forth the most profitable way of approaching this problem. The sciences are not superseded or rejected by metaphysics. On their own level they retain their relative truth as accounts of reality.]

Nunn (*T. Percy*) The Aims and Achievements of Scientific Method. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vi., 1906.
[The aim of the scientific process is to render the Objective in its actual determinations intelligible; the achievements are the further objective facts and determinations which its hypotheses bring to light.]

Mentré (*F.*) La philosophie des sciences d'après Cournot. Rev. de Phil., Sept. 1906.

Kozlowski (*W. M.*) L' "a priori" dans la science. Rev. Phil., Oct. 1906.
[Two kinds of *a priori* truths in science: (i) the historic *a priori* introduced consciously and deliberately, forming scientific principles and postulates; (ii) the psychological *a priori* introduced unconsciously under the form of fundamental concepts.]

Tavani (*F.*) On a Certain Aspect of Reality as Intelligible. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vi., 1906.
[An existent is an event in respect to time, a distinct entity in respect to space, and a percept in respect to self. As an event it realises a correspondence with time as its concept, and similar correspondences are realised with concepts of space and of self.]

Wernick (*Georg*) Der Wirklichkeitsgedanke, ii. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxx. 3, 1906.
[Refutes the doctrine that the estimate of reality depends upon feelings of constraint or ideas of them. Criticism of Idiogenetic Theory. The thought of reality has its origin in perception and is to some extent the result of Association.]

Russell (*B.*) The Nature of Truth. Mind., Oct. 1906.
[Reply to Joachim.]

Bergson (*H.*) L'idée de néant. Rev. Phil., Nov. 1906.
[The idea of absolute nothingness is an idea destructive of itself, and therefore absurd.]

26 *Rickaby* (*Joseph*) Free Will and Four English Philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill). 234p. Burns & Oates, 1906.
[Review will follow.]

Gueutin (*G.*) Le libre arbitre.
Rev. de Phil., Nov. 1906.

Wallis (*Prediger*) Die Willensfreiheit wiefern es sie gibt und nicht gibt.
Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 1, 1907.

27 *Hodgson* (*Shadworth H.*) Teleology.
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vi., 1906.
[No ultimate speculative answer to the question Why? or What for? is conceivable, save one which is drawn from the nature or content of consciousness, as distinguished from its genesis; and such a conceivable speculative answer is far beyond the reach of our human speculative powers. The teleologic feelings and ideas of Persons form our practical *nexus* with those parts of the Universe, which, speculatively and positively, are unknowable.]

33 *Bozzano* (*Ernest*) Mrs Piper and the Subliminal Consciousness.
Annals of Psy. Sc., Sept. 1906.

Richet (*Charles*) The Future of Psychology. Annals of Psy. Sc., Oct. 1906.

Hill (*Arthur*) What is Telepathy?
Annals of Psy. Sc., Oct. 1906.

Verrall (*Mrs A. W.*) On a Series of Automatic Writings.
Proc. S.P.R., Oct. 1906.
[See p. 466.]

35 *Vaschide* (*N.*), *Meunier* (*R.*) La mémoire des rêves et la mémoire dans les rêves. 1st Art. Rev. de Phil., Oct. 1906.

40 *Wundt* (*Wilhelm*) Völkerpsychologie. Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythus und Sitte. Bd. ii., Th. 2. 489p. Engelmann, 1906.
[This volume of Wundt's important work deals wholly with the various representations of the soul in primitive culture.]

42 *Prince* (*Morton*) The Dissociation of a Personality. A Biographical Study in Abnormal Psychology. 579p.
Longmans, 1906.
[A study of disintegrated personality, as exemplified by the very remarkable case of Miss Beauchamp, who, in addition to the original or normal self, may be any one of three different persons. The author is physician in the Boston City Hospital.]

Norris (*E. A.*) Self as a Developed Feeling Complex. J. of Phil., Sept. 13, 1906.

51 *Bos* (*C.*) Des éléments affectifs de la conception. Rev. Phil., Nov. 1906.

52 *Frischeisen-Köhler* (*Max*) Die Lehre von der Subjektivität der Sinnesqualitäten und ihre Gegner.
Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxx. 3, 1906.
[In view of the strong opposition recently to the theory of the subjectivity of sense qualities, the author reviews the evidence for and against the theory, without himself coming to any decision.]

53 *Hicks* (*G. Dawes*) Sense-Presentation and Thought.
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vi., 1906.
[Sense-presentations are not themselves, as contents, existent facts, but manifestations of existent facts, as the latter are discriminated by apprehending minds. From sense-contents, as thus understood, an effort is made to show that thought-contents are derived by a process of natural evolution.]

Foston (*Hubert*) The Constitution of Thought. Mind, Oct. 1906.
[Abstraction and generalisation and their prototypes are alike to be understood as governed by the presence of an ulterior goal of interest, significance in fact.]

Arnold (*F.*) The Given Situation in Attention. J. of Phil., Oct. 11, 1906.

De la Grasserie (*R.*) Les moyens linguistiques de condensation de la pensée.
Rev. Phil., Sept. 1906.

Pitkin (*W. B.*) The Relation between the Act and the Object of Belief.
J. of Phil., Sept. 13, 1906.

54 *Rignano* (*E.*) Une nouvelle théorie mnémonique du développement.
Rev. Phil., Nov. 1906.
[Analysis of Richard Semon's work on Memory.]

55 *Bradley* (*F. H.*) On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary. Mind, Oct. 1906.
[A hard division between the real and the imaginary is not tenable. The imaginary is made by exclusion from my real world. It rests in the last resort on a felt difference from a felt unique quality, and this is a difference in content. That world of fact, however, which we so confidently contrast with the imaginary, turns out, when we take it absolutely, to be false appearance.]

57 *Pierce* (*A. H.*) Emotional Expression and the Doctrine of Mutations.
J. of Phil., Oct. 11, 1906.

60 *Schiller* (*F. C. S.*), *Bosanquet* (*B.*), and *Rashdall* (*H.*) Can Logic abstract from the Psychological Conditions of Thinking?
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vi., 1906.
[A Symposium. Professor Bosanquet argues that Logic must abstract from the psychological conditions of thinking by showing what they are as imperfect efforts of mind to assert its own nature, and how the mind leaves them behind, and thrusts them aside, in its complete working.]

Macleane (*Douglas*) Reason, Thought and Language, or The Many and the One. A Revised System of Logical Doctrine in relation to the Forms of Idiomatic Discourse. 598p. Frowde, 1906.
[The ideal which the author sets before himself is that of a Logic which shall be more consistently formal than the Aristotelian and scholastic tradition, yet in intimate touch with the realities of human thought and language.]

61 *Mansion* (*A.*) L'induction chez Albert le Grand *fin*. Rev. Néo. Scol., Aug. 1906.

64 *MacColl* (*Hugh*) Symbolic Reasoning-VIII. Mind, Oct, 1906.
[Main subject of this article is Paradoxes.]

Newlin (*W. J.*) A New Logical Diagram. J. of Phil., Sept. 27, 1906.

71 *Baillie* (*J. B.*) An Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience. 364p.
Macmillan, 1906.
[Review will follow.]

Creighton (*J. E.*) Experience and Thought. Phil. R., Sept. 1906.
[In order completely to transcend dualism and attain to a standpoint that is really organic or functional, it is necessary to regard experience as the process through which a subject expresses and realises a rational life.]

Dewey (*John*) Experience and Objective Idealism. Phil. R., Sept. 1906.
[Objective Idealism moves backwards and forwards between two inconsistent interpretations of *a priori* thought. The practical work of revising and correcting experience could not be done by the idealists' *a priori* thought. Idealism affords no explanation of ideality. Did purpose ride in a cosmicautomobile towards a predestined goal it would not cease to be physical and mechanical in quality because labelled Divine Idea or Perfect Reason.]

Russell (*J. E.*) Objective Idealism and Revised Empiricism. Phil. R., Nov. 1906.
[Reply to Dewey. What we call "divine purposes" need not be "automatically injected" into our human world in order to be with us; nor need they "ride in a cosmic automobile to predestined ends." Why cannot our own purposes ride in the same "cosmic automobile," and be inseparable from the purposes that include and complete them?]

72 *Stout* (*G. F.*) Neo-Kantism as represented by Dr Dawes Hicks.
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vi., 1906.
[(*a*) The unity of consciousness cannot be the ground of that very unity in the object which is itself an essential precondition of the unity of consciousness. (*b*) No one can be immediately acquainted with anything which does not at the moment form part of his own mental life.]

Hicks (*G. Dawes*) Reply to Dr Stout.
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vi., 1906.
[(*a*) Kant's argument is concerned with the ultimate connections involved in knowledge as such, and therefore it is legitimate from one point to regard A as the precondition of B, and from another point of view to regard B as the precondition of A. (*b*) Immediacy in sense-perception is an immediacy of relationship to the *real thing* perceived, and not of recognition of the psychical state occurring in consequence of stimulation.]

Paulsen (*F.*) Kant, philosophe du protestantisme. Rev. chrét., Sept. 1906.

74 *Rogers* (*A. K.*) Professor James's Theory of Knowledge. Phil. R., Nov. 1906.
[That knowledge has *results* is what any philosopher might, probably would, be glad to assert. But common sense would hold that it is just because knowledge as such does not add to the facts, but recognises them as they are, that it is able to lead to effective changes.]

Russell (*J. E.*) Solipsism: The Logical Issue of Radical Empiricism.
Phil. R., Nov. 1906.
[Radical empiricism contains no principles by means of which it is logically admissible to reach other reality than the individual's own experience.]

Pitkin (*W. B.*) A Problem of Evidence in Radical Empiricism.
J. of Phil., Nov. 22, 1906.

Rusk (*Robert R.*) Der pragmatische und humanistische Strömung in der modernen englischen Philosophie. 80p.
Frommann, 1906.
[A critical examination of the contentions of "pragmatism."]

Russell (*J. E.*) The Pragmatist's Meaning of Truth. J. of Phil., Oct. 25, 1906.

77 *Le Dantec* (*F.*) Les objections au Monisme. 2e Art. Rev. Phil., Sept. 1906.
[Answers Vignon's objections in *Rev. de Phil.*, Mar. to July 1904.]

79 *Moore* (*G. E.*) The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception.
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vi., 1906.
[The theory that nothing exists except when it is perceived is no objection (even if it be true) to the supposition that colours, for example, do exist. All serious objections to this supposition rest upon the assumption that, if a certain kind of thing exists at a certain time, in a certain place, certain other kinds of things cannot exist at the same time in the same place. But even if we grant such initial assumption, we shall only be entitled to conclude that *some* sensible qualities, which we perceive as being in a certain place at a certain time, do not exist in that place at that time.]

84 *Barker* (*E.*) The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. 559p. Methuen, 1906.
[An important work, begun seven years ago, as an introduction to Aristotle's *Politics*. Review will follow.]

Stewart (*J. A.*) Plato's Doctrine of Ideas. Mind, Oct. 1906.
[A plea for the employment of Psychology to control conclusions as to the meaning and scope of Plato's doctrine drawn by scholars from the literary data.]

Vailati (*G.*) A Study of Platonic Terminology. Mind, Oct. 1906.
[An inquiry relating to the first phases of the development of the distinction expressed in modern Logic by opposing the connotation of general terms to their denotation.]

90 *Adam* (*Charles*) and *Tannery* (*Paul*), *eds.* Œuvres de Descartes, tome viii. 758p.
Cerf, 1905.
[This volume of the great edition of Descartes' works, published under the auspices of the French government, contains the Latin text of the *Principia*, the *Epistola ad Vœtium*, the *Querela Apologetica*, and the *Notae*. There is prefixed a Memoir of Paul Tannery.]

91 Spinoza's Religious philosophie nach Chr. A. Thilo. 80p. Beyer, 1906.

94W *Gibson* (*W. R. Boyce*) Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life. 176p.
A. & C. Black, 1906.
[Review will follow.]

V ART. 83 *Sacred Music.*

Gaultier (*P.*) La critique d'art.
Rev. de Phil., Oct. 1906.

Gaultier (*P.*) Qu'est-ce que l'art?
Rev. Phil., Sept. 1906.
[Art is the beauty of nature transformed, interpreted, and expressed by man.]

Martin (*F.*) Chronique artistique.
R. du clergé français, Nov. 1, 1906.
[Review of recent works on ecclesiastical painting and architecture, including Séaille's *Léonard de Vinci*.]

Walters (*H. B.*) The Art of the Greeks. 293p. Methuen, 1906.

Anon. Greek Art and Modern Craftsmanship. Edin. R., Oct. 1906.

Gronau (*G.*) Michael Angelo. Trans. by Helen Chisholm. (Newnes Art. Lib.) 47 Plates. 19p. Newnes, 1906.

Moore (*Sturge*) Correggio. 276p.
Duckworth, 1906.

Marillier (*H. C.*) Rossetti. (Miniature Series of Painters.) 112p. Bell, 1906.

Knight (*William*) Edward Burne-Jones.
Fort. R., Oct. 1906.

Phythian (*J. E.*) George Frederick Watts. 191p. Grant Richards, 1906.

1 *Mohammad* (*N.*) Upper Indian Architecture. Hindustan Rev., July 1906.

Sybel (*Ludwig von*) Christliche Antike Einführung in die Altchristliche Kunst. Bd. 1. Ill. 310p. Elwert, 1906.
[The first volume of this important work deals with (1) introductory questions—the literary sources, etc.—and (2) the Catacombs.]

83 *Anon.* The Romantic Element in Music.
Quar. R., Oct. 1906.

Anon. Some Tendencies in Modern Music. Edin. R., Oct. 1906.

M'Afee (*C. B.*) The Worshipful Element in Music. Homiletic R., Nov. 1906.

G. D. H. and J. H. W.

THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE AIM OF THE NEW THEOLOGY MOVEMENT.

THE REV. R. J. CAMPBELL, M.A.

THE prominence which has been given during the last few months to what has now come to be called the New Theology is a not unhopeful sign of the times, although the discussion has not up to the present been very illuminating or free from acrimony. The majority of those taking part in it appear to have been possessed by the idea that the present writer sat down one morning to invent a new theology, and managed to complete his task before luncheon—no one, presumably, having ever heard of the name or the movement before. One has occasionally suspected during the controversy that some of the critics were not quite so ignorant as they made out: to belittle the importance of a subject by representing it as the hare-brained *obiter dictum* of some individual is an ancient device and a useful if not very honourable weapon. But the air is clearing a little, and the general public, or that portion of it which is taking an interest in the matter, is coming to see that the title New Theology belongs to a movement which depends upon no one personality and no one church; it is a spiritual quickening, a renewal of life and energy within the various Christian communions and even beyond them.

Where the name came from no one seems to know. It was in use more than a generation ago as indicative of the attitude of some, chiefly in the Congregational churches of New England, who felt that the Christian fundamental of the immanence of God ought to be the regulative principle of an effective gospel and a living theology. In this country the name has been spontaneously applied of late to the teaching of those evangelical preachers who have been placing this principle in the foreground of their pulpit ministrations. Of these the present writer is only one, and he has never adopted the name New Theology as descriptive of his attitude: the name has been thrust upon him by others, just as the now historic names of Puritan and Quaker were originally thrust upon their wearers. If he had been able to choose, he would have preferred some other name—if name there had to be,—for in his judgment the word "new" has incidentally done some harm by creating the impression that the New Theology involves a breach with historic Christianity, which is utterly untrue. Another misconception, frequently put forward, is that the New Theology is a freshly formulated statement of belief on a credal basis, and with no more intrinsic authority or promise of permanence than, say, Dowieism. How far these notions are from the truth will gradually become clearer as the dust of controversy settles. The New Theology, like the Humanism of Dr F. C. S. Schiller and his coadjutors in the realm of philosophy, represents a method rather than a system to which all its adherents must subscribe. Those who maintain that the Christian religion, and even the venerable creeds, ought to be interpreted in terms of the divine immanence in the universe and in mankind are users of this method, whether they employ the term New Theology to describe it or not. In applying this method they must inevitably sweep away many of the misleading and inadequate statements of belief which in the popular mind are supposed to be synonymous with Christian truth. It is the popular theology of the churches with which the New Theology comes into conflict.

But its emphasis is positive, not negative; it is a return to simplicity of statement and to the preaching of an ethical gospel. Like Humanism, it discards every *theologoumenon* which has not a practical ethical value.

Up to the present the name New Theology seems to have been restricted for the most part to the teaching given from some evangelical Free Church pulpits, especially of the Congregational order. There is no absolute reason why it should be so, and perhaps the tendency will not continue; for the same movement exists in other churches, even the Roman Catholic, and is rising spontaneously everywhere. The name matters little, but there seems to be a clear and real need for a drawing together of those who are adopting the attitude indicated above. If this drawing together could be accomplished, the gain to spiritual religion would be enormous. The name New Theology might then be dropped, and some more comprehensive designation adopted.

Such a drawing together has already been attempted in a tentative fashion, and, before going on to indicate the lines on which it seems desirable that a wider society should be formed, it may be as well to tell here briefly the story of the New Theology League, as it was called. For the past year or two various approaches have been made to the minister of the City Temple, chiefly by young Free Church ministers, asking that some kind of organisation might be formed to bring together in an unpretentious way a number of those throughout the country who were in general sympathy with his teaching. While more than willing to encourage the formation of such a society, he was unwilling to assume personal responsibility for it, as the organisation thereof might prove to be a heavy burden. In the end, however, a private meeting was summoned at the City Temple, to consider the possibility of uniting for the free discussion of religious questions on the basis of a common sympathy with the standpoint of the New Theology. At this meeting it was evident that the majority, including the present writer, were in favour of an organisation

which, with as little machinery as possible, might include members of all denominations and of no denomination, so long as they were desirous of unfettered converse in regard to the fundamental problems of religion; in a word, what was wanted was a society with the platform of the HIBBERT JOURNAL. Others thought that it would be better to restrict membership for the present to those in fellowship with Congregational churches, as it was quite probable that before long advocates of the New Theology might find themselves in the position of having to contend for a footing within Congregationalism itself. The title, New Theology League, was provisionally adopted, and a committee appointed to revise the whole proceedings and bring up a report to a future meeting. It was clearly understood that nothing was finally settled at this preliminary meeting, not even the name of the new society. By a curious and unfortunate coincidence, the New Theology controversy broke out within a few days after this meeting was held, and when the appointed committee met it found itself the centre of a storm. The fact that such a society was in process of formation was immediately made public, together with a number of incorrect statements as to its aims and objects. To all outsiders it appeared that the society was formed in consequence of the sudden publicity given to the New Theology movement, whereas it was nothing of the kind; it was the outcome of repeated requests for the formation of some kind of a union which might enable preachers of the New Theology to meet and know one another. In view of the undesirable notoriety now given to its doings, the committee was undecided as to what course to take. Some were for militant action against the denominational assailants of the New Theology, while others were as strongly of opinion that anything divisive was more than ever undesirable. When, a week later, the original meeting reassembled to receive the committee's report, the public controversy had become so acute that it was unanimously decided to take no further steps which might tend to

provoke animosity, but to continue quietly with the endeavour to form a society for the encouragement of progressive religious thought. This description was not intended as the name of the society itself, but a declaration of the purpose for which it was founded. As the name New Theology League had not, in the first instance, been definitely decided upon in any case, it was now, under the circumstances, abandoned as being provocative. If the New Theology controversy had not arisen, there would have been nothing provocative about it.

The little society thus formed will no doubt continue in a quiet way, providing a means for fraternal intercourse among its founders and their friends, but it is not and never will be a fighting organisation. There are plenty of societies like it existing among Free Church ministers and others for various purposes. The object of the present paper is to point out the need for some effective method of bringing together on wider lines the men who in various religious communions are in sympathy with the standpoint of those Free Churchmen who are adherents of the New Theology. It is impossible for the present writer to undertake such an organisation, and quite undesirable from many points of view. The little society whose brief history has just been narrated is not what is wanted for this more comprehensive purpose. What is wanted more than anything else is some means whereby liberal-minded Catholics, Anglicans, Evangelical Free Churchmen, Unitarians, men of science like Sir Oliver Lodge, ethical teachers like Dr Stanton Coit, and pioneers of social reform like Professor Henry Jones and Mr Keir Hardie can get together on a common platform and understand more fully their common aims. Can this be done? If so, will some organising genius, well known to the public, and in bad odour with none, arise and do it? More can be done by personal touch than by any amount of printed matter, even though it were all of the HIBBERT JOURNAL order. The urgent need of the hour is the need for a strong assertion of our fundamental Christian unity, or at any rate of the idea

of social brotherhood based upon spiritual sanctions. This spirit seems to be in the air just now, and it ought to find some kind of collective expression.

Some will maintain that this has not necessarily anything to do with the New Theology, but it has, and a great deal too. The one great word of the New Theology is unity, the unity of the individual with the race, and of the race with God. Its aim is as clear as moral conviction can make it—namely, the realisation of a kingdom of God, a spiritual brotherhood, exalting and fulfilling all the throes and strivings of the nations in the political, social, and scientific world to-day. It is a recognition of the all-sufficiency of the religion of Jesus for our moral and spiritual needs, and a perception of the essential oneness of all forms of faith in which this ideal finds expression. The adherent of the New Theology tries to get beneath every venerable statement of Christian belief, and bring to light the essential truth implied in it. He does not admit that there can be any dissonance between science and religion, for their field of action is the same. Religion is the soul's response to the universe, and science is only the mind trying to understand the universe. As soon as religion becomes theology it must either consist with science or be foredoomed, for the universe explored by science is, after all, the very universe which calls the soul to prayer. A theology in conflict with the scientific method is therefore, in the nature of things, an inadequate expression of religious experience, and even a clog upon it. The rehabilitation of religious faith which is now upon us involves a recognition of the sacredness of science. The only theology that will hold the field in the immediate future will be that of science, and science can no more contradict the findings of the highest human experience than it can deny its own method.

It is just the same in the region of sociology and its practical aims. It is an extraordinary thing that socialism should ever, in any of its manifestations, have become materialistic, and the fact that it should have done so is an indictment

of the churches. Whence springs the deep-seated hostility of so many of the representatives of labour to the churches? It can only be from the fact that organised religion has, in the immediate past, lost sight of its own fundamental, the divineness of man. Practical materialism in the churches has led to theoretical materialism in the masses. If the *ecclesia* of Jesus had all along been proclaiming both by precept and example the ideal of universal brotherhood, and the possibility of realising the kingdom of God on earth, the unprivileged could never have looked for any other leader. But suspicion and mistrust have been born of the unfaithfulness of Christians to their own first principle. Why in the world have we been pressing dogma to the front, when there were wrongs to be righted and men to be redeemed from the dominion of forces that brutalise and degrade their nobler nature? The obvious, glaring thing in the world of human affairs to-day is that the Church has been trying too long to save men from suffering in a world to come, and has been only partially concerned about the root-causes of suffering in this. Faith has too often been deprived of its moral content, and spoken of as if it had only an intellectual content. The man at the bottom of the social ladder sees this with the clearness born of adversity, and hates what he thinks to be the insincerity of organised religion. Then, too, the fact is beyond dispute that the movement towards social emancipation is now international, and recognises itself to be such. It is far ahead of the churches in this respect; in fact, it is the true Church, the organisation which is doing the work the churches ought to be doing, realising the kingdom of God. The socialist workman in Philadelphia feels himself nearer to the workman in Berlin than he does to the plutocrat in the next block. Here is the greatest and most promising of the forces making for universal peace. What are we to call it? If this movement be not guided by the spirit of Christ, there is no other movement that is. The professed materialism of so many of its adherents is only incidental, and due to the moral apathy of

the churches more than to any other cause whatsoever. But it cannot continue; no movement so intrinsically spiritual can continue without recognising itself for what it really is. The touch of religious faith would make it irresistible.

Here, then, is the true mission of the churches to-day—or, if the churches fail to realise it, the mission of the man of faith, wherever he may be found. He may call his views by what name he pleases, but they are the New Theology, the gospel of the kingdom of God. It is a deplorable perversion of the truth to say that the Church exists to secure a blessed immortality for a select few of the human race. The Church has nothing whatever to do with getting men into heaven; her work is to get heaven into this world. It ought to be plain to any ordinary intelligence that to talk about saving men from God is ridiculous, and worse than ridiculous; it is one of the unconscious blasphemies of theology. To preach that salvation is obtainable by believing something, and is a kind of insurance policy for the life to come, is even worse. Thank heaven! the churches are beginning to wake up to it, and to see that the one thing which justifies their existence is their success in making men willing to manifest the love of God. The gospel we have to preach is very simple, and it is the same gospel in every church, Catholic or Protestant, where the spirit of Jesus is really to be found. The Reformation of the sixteenth century was a moral rather than an intellectual revolt. Intellectually, the forms in which it clothed religious faith were worse than those it replaced. A similar moral revolt is proceeding now against Protestantism itself. Can the preaching of the New Theology, the gospel of the kingdom of God, avail to save it? If not, let it perish. Churches or no churches, this is the gospel of the future. The vast international labour movement is an expression of it, and once that movement becomes aflame with religious zeal, all the forces of harm and hate will go down before it. To kindle that flame is the object of the preachers of the New Theology. They know quite well what they are doing, and why they are

doing it. It is the word of God to the present age, the peal of the New Reformation. Nothing can stand in its way for long. All archaic presentations of Christianity which are inconsistent with this all-comprehending purpose out of which Christianity originally sprang must go; we have no use for them, they belong to the lumber of a bygone age. We have to preach the kingdom of God, and nothing else. The one thing we have to get men to see is that, to know God, and to be happy here or in a world to come, they must be unselfish, and that no other kind of worship and no other kind of creed are worth taking into account. Set the world on fire with this kind of faith in God, and we have saved it; it is the only reason for which churches exist, or ought to exist.

It is well that so many faithful and loyal members of the churches are coming to see it, and are preaching the truth with fervour and clearness. There is no church where this movement is more marked at present than in the venerable Church of Rome herself, the mother-church of Western Christendom. The very same movement which in a somewhat different form is represented in this country by the New Theology is proceeding in Italy and elsewhere under Roman Catholic influences and under another name. The fact that this is possible, without the conscious and direct co-operation of its promoters with progressive Protestantism, is evidence that the Divine Spirit is operating in the same way throughout Christendom. There has recently appeared in Italy the first number of a magazine called *Il Rinnovamento*, which is described as a critical review of ideas and facts. It is a striking production, and the first number shows what a vast reinforcement the ideal of a progressive Christianity is going to receive from the midst of Catholicism. It has been started by three sincere, courageous, open-eyed, and competent young men. They have the support of many non-Catholic contributors, including, apparently, Dr Edward Caird, who has permitted the introduction to his work on the *Evolution of Religion* to appear as an article. The leader of this little band,

and the author of the introduction, is Tommaso Scotti, the future Duca Scotti, one of the chief nobles of Lombardy. This introduction is a noteworthy piece of work, especially as proceeding from the pen of an earnest Catholic. The following paragraphs show clearly the purpose and standpoint of the writer:—

"In noi Cristianesimo è Vita: è inesauribile aspirazione, è speranza, è anelito di tutto l'essere verso ciò che nella vita partecipa dell' eterno; è esaltamento progressivo di noi stessi in una ricerca appassionata e a volte angosciosa del vero; è un protendersi e un vivere dell' anima nel futuro. Invano noi lo rinchiuderemmo in alcuni sistemi intellettuali come in espressioni definitive del suo sviluppo; esso è per sua natura in un continuo divenire che spezza gli antichi involucri per ricrearne perennemente dei nuovi, che plasma e riplasma le forme attraverso le quali si comunica all' intelletto umano; in un moto perenne di rinnovamento, come se un divino artefice nella creta molle cercasse di esprimere senza posa e insoddisfatto sempre un suo ineffabile ideale."[1]

This passage might have been written by Auguste Sabatier himself, for it breathes the very essence of the religion of the Spirit. The emphatic assertion of the impossibility of permanently enclosing religious experience within any intellectual system of belief is striking as coming from a Catholic. How the author reconciles such a statement with the duty of obedience to ecclesiastical authority is not easy for an outsider to understand. In the paragraph immediately preceding this one, the writer maintains that men are comparatively indifferent to the outsides of ideas, and that our religious conceptions ought not to be fettered by external dogmatic authority. Apparently, in his view, the teaching church ought to guide but not to control her children.

[1] "For us Christianity is Life; it is inexhaustible aspiration; it is hope; it is a craving of the whole being for that which, in life, shares the nature of the Eternal: it is the progressive elevation of ourselves in a passionate and sometimes painful pursuit of truth; it is the soul's projection of itself, and its life, in the future. Vain were the attempt to shut up Christianity in any intellectual systems as final expressions of its development; by its nature it is in a state of continuous growth which breaks up the old envelopes in order to create for them a perennially new content, which shapes and reshapes the forms through which itself is communicated to the intelligence of man—a perennial movement of renovation, as though a divine worker in the yielding clay were seeking without rest or final satisfaction to express his ineffable ideal."

This appears to be the writer's meaning in the following paragraph also:—

"D'altra parte non vorremmo che questo amore di verità nella libertà, generasse in alcuni il dubbio di un nostra distacco dalla tradizione religiosa. Anzi ci preme dichiarare che il cattolicesimo è la naturale base della nostra ricerca; che noi lo sentiamo come il punto di partenza della nostra indagine; e che degli stessi confini del suo dogma abbiamo bisogno come di fondamenti secolari della nostra vita spirituale." [1]

But the most thorough-going adherent of the New Theology could say this too, every word of it, provided the writer would admit a wider connotation of the term Catholicism. There is such a thing as the Christian consciousness; it is not a fancy but a fact. And there is such a thing as the Catholic temper of mind, the desire to seek unity rather than division, and to believe in the essential solidarity of the Christian witness in all ages. We have had enough of protest and division; what we want now is a drawing together of the Christian forces of the world on an ethical basis. If the paragraph just quoted means no more than a recognition of the fact that Christian experience is not atomistic, but the outcome of a constant and unbroken spiritual witness and holy fellowship, we can gladly endorse it. The writer and his coadjutors are evidently trying to lay bare the moral and spiritual values presumed in the venerable creeds of the Church. In so far as that is the case, their work may fairly be described as a New Theology movement within the Roman communion—a further evidence that the Spirit of God is moving on the face of the waters, and preparing the world-wide spiritual quickening which shall result in making modern civilisation a true Catholic church, a City of God.

That this movement has long been in progress in the Church of England everyone must admit. In that communion the dislike to the word Protestant does not necessarily

[1] "On the other hand, we would not that this love of truth in freedom should produce in anyone a suspicion of our detachment from traditional religion. Rather do we feel bound to declare that Catholicism is the natural base of our inquiry; that we recognise it as the point of departure for our quest; and that we need the very limitations of its dogma as the temporal foundations of our spiritual life."

involve high and dry sacerdotalism; rather, it betokens a desire to recognise and insist upon the fundamental unity of Christendom in regard to the moral and spiritual realities summed up in our common experience of Christ. Probably Dr Rashdall and the school represented in *Contentio Veritatis* would willingly admit this. The same can be said of the Free Catholic movement in which Unitarians are taking part. While the formal unity of Christendom is neither possible nor desirable, a practical concentration of all the Christian forces for the realisation of the main purpose for which the Church of Christ exists ought now to be within sight. Whatever name we give to the movement which is rising spontaneously from so many different quarters, we can gladly and thankfully recognise that it is of God, and do our best to further it.

The ethical and spiritual reawakening of Christendom is at hand. "The law and the prophets were until John: from that time the gospel of the kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into it." We want a Christian unity based upon a recognition of this all-important truth. We want a practical assertion of the fact that the Church has no meaning and no function if it be not this. We want effective declaration of the truth that God is seeking manifestation in this way, and that the Christ is present in all His saving fulness in every effort put forth for the healing of the wounds of mankind and the realisation of a spiritual brotherhood on earth as in heaven. We want this ancient ideal preached as a new evangel. We must show the masses that we are in earnest, and to do so we must let other objects sink into the background: "Seek first the kingdom of God." We must be simple and sincere if we would really help those who are simple and sincere. When we use the word sin, let us show that we mean selfishness; and when we proclaim a gospel for sin, let us begin by being unselfish ourselves. Where is the good of talking to men about sin while we have plenty and they are starving? The real sin consists in doing nothing to alter such a state of things. When the man with a burdened conscience comes to us for

relief, let us tell him that we all bear the burden together, and that until he becomes a Christ all the love in the universe will come to his help and share his struggle. His burden is ours—the burden of the Christ incarnate for the redemption of the world. There is no want within the range of human experience which this gospel will not meet. It is the proclamation of our oneness in God. Never since the nascent days of the Christian evangel has that gospel been preached with fervour and clearness by an undivided church.

If the Church will unite to preach it now, the future is glorious. It can be preached under any or all of the existing ecclesiastical forms, but it must be preached; the world is waiting for it. The unprivileged masses of every nation in Christendom are yearning for it and ready to respond to it. They do not know—how could they know?—that the Church originally came into being for this end and for no other; so in their hunger for a purer, nobler social order they have turned away from the Church, and many of them are making the mistake of thinking that they can live by bread alone. Let the prophets come forward and tell them the truth, the truth that the hither and the yonder are one, and that man is worth the saving here because he has an immortal destiny, and must begin somewhere if he is to reach the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ in "the one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves."

R. J. CAMPBELL.

THE AIM OF THE NEW CATHOLIC MOVEMENT.

LATINUS.

THE intellectual revival which has characterised the opening years of the century within the Catholic sphere has to some extent been made known to the English public by the efforts of sympathetic Protestants like M. Paul Sabatier and the Rev. A. L. Lilley, and the few Catholic writers of independent mind who are to be found amid the constrained and artificial conditions of English Roman Catholicism. The present purpose is to study from a specifically Catholic standpoint certain fundamental tendencies in this revival, particularly in their bearing upon the ethical and social development of the Latin nations, of which Northern critics have been apt to form so pessimistic an estimate. The appearance in English garb of Fogazzaro's great religious novel, *Il Santo*, affords suitable occasion for such a study, and his writings may conveniently be used for purposes of illustration.

The revival of which we speak is clearly distinguished from all preceding movements of a liberalising tendency in the Catholic Church by its essentially scientific character. Its essence may be defined to consist in the application of the scientific and inductive method to the subject-matter of every department of religious study. French by origin, the movement was not slow to cross the Alps to the sister-land of Italy, as it will undoubtedly in time make its way across the much less easily penetrated barrier of the Pyrenees into old-world Spain. What some ecclesiastical writers are pleased to call

the "poison" of critical notions about the New Testament has made its way into the seminaries of Italy, those diocesan strongholds of the Counter-Reformation which the Fathers of Trent planned like a chain of military blockhouses to hold the land against modern ideas. To the younger clergy, and to those of the faithful laity who by their education are not strange to the science of the age, the new movement has come as a veritable gospel, as glad tidings of exceeding great joy, inspiring the hope if not the assurance that the long night of intellectual torpor and ignorance is over and the dawn of intellectual enlightenment is at hand; that the retention of the Faith no longer implies self-banishment from the noblest natural activities of man—the activities of the speculative reason—but is rather at once a stimulus and a guide in the unceasing pursuit of the ideal in thought and conduct for the individual, the nation, and the race. The movement, then, has an essentially religious as distinct from an apologetic value; that is to say, it tends not merely to conserve existing religious beliefs as legacies from the past, but to infuse into them fresh life and vigour from the realities of modern experience; and it is principally this aspect of the movement that Fogazzaro has set himself to depict.

No man could be better equipped for exhibiting the religious value of the new Catholic thought than the great and wholesome novelist who, in *Daniele Cortis*, first set before his countrymen the ideal of a healthy religious patriotism combining the practice of Catholic piety with unswerving acceptance of the political achievements of the *risorgimento*. That was in the days when the faithful, outside Italy at any rate, were apt to suppose that Italian patriotism was incompatible with loyalty to the Church. The attitude of Pius X. has changed all this, and the practical suppression of the prohibition *ne elettori ne eletti* has substantially achieved for Italian Catholics that reconciliation which Manning long since foresaw but of which he was not destined to witness the realisation.

It is in such circumstances that Fogazzaro, who, as a Senator of the Italian Kingdom, has realised in his own person the ideals which he set before his readers a decade ago in *Daniele Cortis*, has taken up his powerful pen as an exponent of the progressist spirit in Catholic thought. In *Il Santo* the Catholic intellectual revival finds an adequate artistic expression. Here for the first time its ideals are depicted by a great literary artist in living colours that appeal to the vast religious public which lies beyond the range of any work of purely abstract thought. The book signifies the emergence of the Catholic revival from the study and the lecture-room to the market-place, from the world of thought to the world of practical activity, individual and social.

To pass to a closer scrutiny of the thought which finds expression in *Il Santo*, it may be noted in the first place that the general tenor of the book supplies the answer to the numerous cavillers who even now find it difficult to see in the scientific method of modern Catholics anything more than an ingenious theological device to bolster up ecclesiastical absolutism by insincere concessions to the modern spirit. Protestants, both orthodox and rationalist, have been so long accustomed to regard Roman Catholicism as something altogether outside the intellectual pale, thinkable only for uninstructed or superficial or over-strung natures, that it is not wonderful that the ordinary observer should fail to grasp the far-reaching character of the critical thought of the new school. In point of fact, the necessity for action and initiation in every department of life follows not merely incidentally, in the sense that a man who is active in one way may be expected not to remain passive in any direction to which he may turn, but inevitably, and for reasons intimately bound up with its philosophy of religion and life.

Thoroughness and sincerity is the note of this philosophy throughout. First and foremost, it will have done once and for all with that timorous and pitiable system of concessions and half-truths, than which nothing has tended more to dis-

credit religion among serious thinkers. As M. Paul Desjardins in his *Catholicisme et Critique* (an admirable appreciation of the epoch-making work which Abbé Loisy has accomplished for religious and scientific truth) has well said, we do not make concessions to truth; we simply recognise it. Nay more, if we are lovers of truth we welcome it, and if we believe that God is truth we see in each new acquisition of science an addition to our knowledge of God. Professor St George Mivart, who in a certain nervous solicitude about truth broke somewhat brusquely with traditional Catholicism at the end of his life, spoke finely of the consolation he derived from the contemplation of the Majestic God of Science; and it can hardly be doubted that in respect of the idea which men form of God, religion owes an immense debt to modern scientific investigation. It is not that the conceptions of the highest theological or mystical genius, a St Thomas Aquinas or a St Theresa, fell short of what is worthy in this respect, but that these conceptions remained the property of a few choice spirits whilst the ordinary believer persisted in a crude and dangerous anthropomorphism. If, as certain critics suggest, the Hellenic culture of St Paul had some share in introducing among the primitive Judæo-Christian community a certain philosophic conception of God that was lacking in the national cult of Jehovah, may not modern Christians gratefully acknowledge that the theory of evolution in biology and the results achieved by the inductive method in history, have profoundly modified and are profoundly modifying the traditional religious conceptions of the Divine Nature and its Activities? What the present situation demands is no longer "concessions" to science, but an honest renovation of the whole religious system in the light of scientific knowledge. It is no use trying to twist facts to suit theories derived from a past which was destitute of the knowledge we now possess; what we have to do is to adjust our theories to suit the facts. The scientific and surely also the religious merit of the new Catholic school is that it does seriously set to work to reinterpret the Catholic

religion in the light of modern science; to construct, according to the needs of the time, a philosophy of religion; to effect a synthesis of the data afforded by the religious experience of mankind stored up for the guidance of the individual in the Catholic Church, and the facts of history, biology, and the other sciences.

For the purposes, then, of such a synthesis, the unity of truth may be regarded as a central principle, and this thought is clearly expressed by Fogazzaro in the following passage:—

> "Jesus Christ said, I am the Truth; yet there are many good and pious people who 'divide' the truth in their hearts, fearing that truth will destroy truth, opposing God to God and teaching men to this effect. They call themselves faithful, understanding not how poor and cowardly is their faith, how foreign to the spirit of the Apostle which proves all things. Worshippers of the letter, they claim to force upon grown men a nourishment of babes that grown men reject; they do not understand that though God is infinite and unchangeable, the idea that man forms of Him grows from age to age, and that it is the same with Divine Truth."

Theology then must take account of the non-theological sciences, because religion to be satisfying must view life as a whole and must explain its meaning as a whole. But though all truth is ultimately one, the methods by which knowledge is acquired in the different sciences are not the same. In the physical and mathematical sciences conclusions are imposed upon the mind by a purely intellectual process; as Abbé Laberthonnière puts it, *pour ainsi dire brutalement.* On the other hand, with the metaphysical and moral ideas to which order religion belongs, assent is free, precisely as the Vatican Council teaches. That is to say, here the process by which truth is reached is no longer purely intellectual, for there is no freedom to dissent from purely intellectual reasoning; no one is free to dissent from a proposition of Euclid, nor is there any moral merit in assenting to it. Religious faith is meritorious just because the assent is free, and in order to be free it must be other than purely intellectual. The theologians who regard it as purely intellectual must face the conclusion that the reasoning by which men are convinced of the truths

of religion is of an inferior order to that by which they are convinced of truth in other departments, and such is in fact the unconscious attitude of most religious people. Faith, then, implies a consent of the will, an active co-operation of our whole nature with an agency which is exterior to us, an assimilation by the individual organism of the nourishment which is introduced from without. This view of religious assent explains the results given by the historical method in the study of religion. We find (as M. Leroy has so admirably shown in his essay, *Qu'est-ce qu'un Dogme?*) that the dogmas of religion are expressed partly in popular language (*e.g.* the Fatherhood of God, the Divine Sonship) and partly also in the language of some particular philosophy which held the ground when the dogma was enunciated (*e.g.* the Christology of the *Quicunque vult*, and the explanation of the Real Presence as Transubstantiation in terms of the Scholastic Metaphysic). Catholic thinkers thus speak of dogma as being psychological in that it reflects the psychology of those who enunciate it and those for whom it is enunciated. But it does not follow—and this is where the Catholic differs from the Rationalist—that dogma represents nothing more than the speculations of the past, or that religious belief is an incubus and a difficulty in the search after truth.[1] On the contrary, what is important in dogma is the mysterious underlying reality which it contains. This reality is apprehended differently by different ages and different persons; it is in itself always the same, and it is only our conception of it that changes. The dogmas are relative, but they contain the absolute, and are indeed conditions under which the absolute is made known to us in so far as we can know it. And so far from Faith being a hindrance, it is a help in the search for truth; for inasmuch as in this order of ideas truth is not apprehended by a purely intellectual process, a certain orientation is a necessary condition of fruitful research: we must be sure of the direction even if we cannot see the goal. Thus, as

[1] Laberthonnière—*Essais*, and sundry articles.

Laberthonnière says, there is a sense in which those only can truly seek who have already found. "Let us, then" (in the words of St Augustine, which Laberthonnière takes as the motto for his *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*) "seek as they seek who have to find, and let us find as they find who have still to seek; for it is said: 'the man who has arrived at the goal is but at the beginning.'"

He then who thus conceives of religion will rid himself of that fallacy of finality, and all that narrowness of vision and pettiness of mind aptly described by a French writer as the tradition of the little books that make God little, which vitiates popular religious belief in the eyes of those who know enough to know how little can be known. The limits of human knowledge have often been pleaded by the theological apologists in the cause of superstition and obscurantism; rightly considered, they afford the most powerful argument that can be adduced in favour of the new method. Because the subject-matter of religion is the Infinite, we must look for no finality in religious ideas. Sure of the direction let us not delude ourselves by fancying we can see the goal; our goal is but a beginning, and we find but to seek the more. Thus it is well said that true faith is agnostic rather than gnostic, and

> "I hold it a nobler thing to sail
> Over an unknown sea,
> Than to pray to God to rend the veil
> That shrouds the mystery."

Yet we would go forth into the Unknown not as individuals following our own caprice, but as members of a society obedient to a common impulse. And if the Master bids us launch out into the deep, it is that we may sail not in some crazy craft of our own fashioning, but in the bark of Peter grandly constructed by the labour of the ages in accordance with the designs of the great Architect Himself.

If, then, we break with Intellectualism, it is not in order to fall into the opposite error of Fideism; on the contrary,

the result is to liberate the human mind from those cramping restraints which the theological tendencies of modern post-Tridentine Catholicism undoubtedly imposed upon it; to restore the healthy intellectual activities which are necessary to the full development of our nature; to incorporate into the mystical Body of Christ the great achievements of modern thought and science, as Hellenic culture was incorporated in the Primitive Age, and as the Aristotelianism of the Jewish and Mohammedan philosophers was similarly incorporated in the mediæval period.

But the practical results of the new method are by no means confined to the intellectual revivification of Latin Catholicism, great as that achievement may in itself be. The more we recognise the insufficiency of a purely intellectual assent, the more we emphasise the importance of moral values in religious belief. Religion certainly is not morality alone, but the intellectualists and the traditionalists "are responsible," as Fogazzaro teaches, "for a fatal perversion of the Faith, which corrupts the whole religious life; for the Christian who by an effort bends himself to accept what they accept and reject what they reject, fancies he has thereby done the chief thing for God's service; whereas, on the contrary, he has done less than nothing, because he still has to live his faith in Christ's word and doctrine, to live the *fiat voluntas tua*, which is everything. Few Christians know to-day that religion is not principally an adhesion of the intellect to certain formulas of truth, but that it is principally action and life according to this truth, and that sincere Faith carries with it something more than negative religious duties and obligations to ecclesiastical authority."

It may be claimed that in the passage just quoted Fogazzaro accurately diagnoses the evil from which the Catholic nations have been suffering. Intellectual inertia has been accompanied by a kind of moral atrophy, so that, just as was the case with the Græco-Latin Christians of the fourth century compared with the Arian or Pagan Germans,

the morality of Catholic nations to-day is often inferior to that of the Protestant nations. Apart from questions of positive breaches of the moral law, it is obvious that the Protestant nations have easily surpassed the Catholic in material well-being and the political power that depends upon it. When every allowance is made for the charm of the Catholic type of character, the simplicity, the aptitude for supernatural experience, above all, the human sympathy and lovableness that must strike every impartial Northern observer who comes into contact with the warm-hearted races of the South, the fact remains that under the system of the Counter-Reformation the Catholic nations have yielded the hegemony of the world to the nations which have adopted the Reformation; and this must imply a deficiency on the Catholic side in certain qualities which make for success in life, and which cannot be wholly destitute of positive moral value. The real causes of this admitted practical inferiority of the Catholic nations would seem to lie in the habit of passive obedience, the loss of personal initiative, and the enormous importance attached to right belief as compared with right conduct. Thus Zola was not far wrong when he exclaimed that the nations which accepted the yoke of Clericalism (wrongly identified by him with Catholicism, of which it is but a perversion) came to be eaten up with vermin.

No social organism can permanently tolerate within itself an unhealthy element; either the organism will be destroyed or the mischief will be eradicated. Thus, in the Latin nations the Revolution marks the revolt of human nature against certain repressive and anti-social tendencies of the Counter-Reformation that were felt to be intolerable and destructive of life. Given the conditions imposed by the Counter-Reformation, the Revolution was the necessary result of a blind but perfectly natural racial instinct of self-preservation. And if to-day the great Catholic nations are rapidly recovering lost ground and are rich in the promise of a glorious future, it is thanks to the Revolution, of which,

now that the "fool fury" of destruction is over, the permanently valuable and essentially conservative results are secured for Frenchmen by the Third Republic and for Italians by United Italy. But the official Church has stood aloof from these great works of liberation, whence has resulted, to the incalculable loss of the Latin races, a fatal opposition between the political and religious ideals, and the organisms in which they respectively find expression. A whole host of activities, ethical, social, political, have grown up, which have too long remained foreign to the Catholic Church. The Catholic thinkers of to-day by their ideal of Christianity as a life to be lived, by their conception of Christ as the Life, are preparing the way for the incorporation of all healthy human activities of the practical, as well as of the intellectual order, into the mystical Body of Christ.

Hence an ardent longing to throw themselves into good works, in something more than the conventional religious sense of the phrase, is a necessary characteristic of this school of thought. "We desire communion with the living Christ," exclaims Fogazzaro, "all we who feel the conception of the Way, the Truth and the Life growing large within us, dilating our hearts and our minds, and bursting the swathing bands of these old formulas that oppress and stifle us and would stifle the Church if the Church were mortal."

This liberation of thought, then, will be accompanied by the liberation of the will, and the new religious mentality will not merely effect the intellectual revivification of Catholicism but will complete the moral regeneration of the Catholic nations by ending that opposition between the social and religious ideals which has so long retarded progress. Then the Revolution will no longer be looked upon as the enemy of Christ, but will pass into the category of those great movements of the human mind which have been assimilated by, and yet have modified and enriched, the Catholic Church.

But all this implies plainly a reconsideration of the idea of

authority, a readjustment of the relations in which the individual is conceived as standing to the institution. This problem, so full of difficulty for the Catholic thinker, has been faced by Fogazzaro. In beautiful imagery he likens the Church to a celebrated spring whereunto thirsty pilgrims resort, only to find a basin full of stagnant water disagreeable to the taste. The living spring is beneath the basin, but they do not discover it. The pilgrims, in their disillusionment, address themselves to a quarryman working hard by in a subterranean gallery. The quarryman offers them pure water. They ask the name of the spring. "It is the same as that of the basin," says he. "In the sub-soil all this water forms but a single stream. He who digs, finds."

"You are the thirsty pilgrims," continues the teacher; "I am the humble quarryman; and the stream hidden in the sub-soil is Catholic Truth. As for the basin, it is not the Church; the Church is the whole field through which run the living waters. If you have addressed yourselves to me, it is because you knew in an unconscious fashion that the Church is not the hierarchy alone, but the universal assembly of the faithful, *gens sancta*, and that from the bottom of the Christian heart may gush the living water of the spring itself, of Truth itself. . . . . The Church is the hierarchy with its traditional concepts, but she is also lay society perpetually in contact with the reality of things and perpetually re-acting upon official theology; the Church does not die; the Church does not grow old; the Church has the living Christ in her heart rather than on her lips; the Church is a laboratory of truth unceasingly at work, and God ordains that you shall remain in the Church, that you shall work in the Church, that in the Church you may be fountains of living water."

Again, in a passage of great interest, Fogazzaro not only pleads for the right of personal initiative and independent action, but even hints at the possibility of certain changes in the administrative system of the Catholic Church.

"The worst is, the suppression of the ancient, holy Catholic liberty, the desire to force submissions that are not of obligation and retractions that are contrary to conscience; the desire, the moment a group of men combine for a good work, to assume the command of them, and if they decline such command, to refuse them all countenance. The tendency, again, to extend religious authority beyond the religious domain; Italy knows something of that, and the whole Catholic world too. Nay, the spirit of domination seeks to capture the Holy Father himself. Let him not yield to it! To him belongs the government of the Church; let him not suffer his power to be a cloak for secret agencies. Let him have public counsellors, and let these be the Bishops

united in national councils. Let the people have a voice in the election of the Bishops, and let the Pope choose men beloved and respected by the people. And let the Pope leave the Bishops all the authority compatible with that of Peter."

The Protestant, eager to detect a rift in the imposing unity of Catholicism, must beware of construing this passage as evidence of a feverish and revolutionary desire to throw the existing organisation of the Roman Church into the melting-pot. There is, however, beyond doubt among the Catholics of Europe a growing reaction against what is felt to be the excessive governmental tendencies of the Counter-Reformation—the eclipse of the episcopate, and the centralisation of authority in a bureaucracy organised after the fashion of civil despotisms. The triumph in the great civilised communities of the principle of the separation of Church and State is drawing the attention of thoughtful Catholics to the question of the manner in which Bishops are to be appointed. Is the patronage over which the State formerly exercised at least some control to be left wholly to the Papal bureaucracy, or can some means be devised for restoring to lay society that voice in the nomination of its pastors of which it has never hitherto wholly been deprived? Granted that the direct election of Bishops failed to work well as the Church emerged from its primitive condition as a little close community of saints amid an unbelieving world, it must be remembered that in mediæval and later times the Government more or less effectively represented the laity and the ancient right of lay election. Can any substitute be found for the old machinery in the great Catholic countries to secure the appointment to the episcopate of men of proved intelligence and force of character, men thoroughly representative of their age and their race, fitted to furnish a real and effective senate of Christendom for the guidance of Christian society internationally federated under the primacy of the Holy See? May it not be, that as the administrative system of the Counter-Reformation would seem to have been largely in-

fluenced in its development by the example of the Renaissance despotisms, democracy, that great fact of modern social life, may in its turn contribute something to the development of the Church as an external and social organism? Surely, in this age of growing international concord and human solidarity, it is the Italian bureaucracy of the Vatican, rather than the great Roman See itself with its historical primacy and splendid descent from Imperial Rome, the City of the World, that excites hostility both within and without the Catholic sphere; and Fogazzaro has done well and courageously to draw attention to this aspect of the case. The Catholic whose obedience is not servile need not fear to speak out on these matters, scorning the imputation of disloyalty with which certain Catholics habitually seek to overwhelm and silence every independent voice. And such an one will recognise that the current dislike for freedom of speech in the Church is often due less to the spirit of domination than to a certain meticulous fear of inconvenient admissions which is incidental to the atmosphere of petty controversy wherein religious people, to their intellectual and spiritual detriment, too often have to live.

The same note of fearless but reverent and loyal Catholic criticism, inspired by deeply religious as well as humanitarian sentiment, is struck by Fogazzaro in the following passage, in which the Saint adjures the Pope to leave the Vatican. "Leave it, Holy Father; but for the first time, at least for the first time, leave it for a work of your ministry! Lazarus suffers and dies every day; Jesus Christ calls for help in all poor human creatures who suffer. From the galleries of the Vatican I behold the lights of another palace of Rome. If human suffering calls in the name of Christ, may be yonder they will answer No! but they will go. From the Vatican they will answer Yes! to Jesus Christ, but they will not go. What will Christ say, Holy Father, in that terrible hour? These words, if they were known to the world, would draw on me the abuse of those who most loudly profess their

devotion to the Vatican; but no abuse and no fulminations that may be launched against me should stay me from crying to the death, 'What will Christ say? Yes, what will Christ say? It is to Him that I appeal.'"

Is there, then, in any sense for the Catholic an appeal from the Church to Christ? In view of the existing situation, the question is a vital one for all who within the bosom of the Church try manfully and honestly to face the intellectual problems of our time.

In the first place, the actualities of such spiritual experience as he may be capable of acquiring will teach the Catholic student to distinguish religious values; to discriminate with unerring instinct between the essential and accidental; to *know* according to the true Christian gnosis what things they are that really and eternally matter; and so to attain to the calmness of judgment, and peace and serenity of mind, that characterise a Faith whose vision pierces through the changing phenomena of this finite world to the immutable and infinite reality beyond.

It is shown by Loisy in his great and illuminating commentary on the Fourth Gospel that the worship in spirit and in truth which is the ideal of the Christian gnosis in no way excludes the external cult; similarly the Catholics who pursue the same ideal to-day, value and revere the Sacraments and all the beautiful symbolical rites of Holy Church as the normal channels of communication with the Divine, as the stepping-stones whereon holy and humble men of heart may rise towards God. Yet a sane appreciation of the externals of worship will by no means blind such Catholics to the desirability of purging popular devotion of a certain overgrowth of fancifulness or sentimentality which, as Fogazzaro truly says, is as deleterious as interior piety is helpful to spiritual life and progress.

If, indeed, by an appeal to Christ is meant an appeal to the historical record of Our Lord's earthly teaching as constituting in itself a conclusive rule for the settlement of all questions of

religious philosophy and of the external cult, such a course is plainly inadmissible for Catholics. This is the substance of Loisy's answer to Harnack, wherein he shows that Catholicism rests not merely upon the earthly ministry of Jesus, but also upon the continuation of that teaching by Him as the Lord Christ triumphant over death in His Resurrection. The faith of the Catholic, therefore, who follows the scientific method is not in the least disturbed by such questions as whether or in what sense Jesus can be said to have founded the Church or the Sacraments, or to have inculcated this or that theological dogma. For the Catholic, Church and Sacraments and dogmas all represent the work of the Living Christ. And let it not be supposed for one moment that by virtue of this theory the Catholic substitutes the Church for Jesus, or shows indifference to His earthly ministry. Nay, such an accusation may justly lie rather with those who see in Our Lord's earthly life only a continual theophany, who think of Him principally as a Man-God changing the nature of elements and restoring the corrupt dead to physical life, or again, perhaps, solely as the Sacrificial Victim immolated on the Cross. When the heat and dust of the present controversies is over, one of the great and lasting services which the present movement will be found to have rendered to the Catholic Church will be the restoration to its rightful place in Catholic devotion of the earthly ministry and human personality of Our Lord. Between the career of Jesus of Nazareth and the action of the risen Christ there can be no breach of continuity: the Church of Christ in its continual movement must always remain true to the direction given it by Jesus in His earthly life; and in so far as it deviates in any particular from that direction, such deviation must inevitably be corrected not by individualist heresies or revolutionary change, but by the action of God in Christ slowly asserting itself in the corporate life of the Church.

It would seem, then, that there is an appeal to Christ in so far as the standard of Christian practice requires constant

adjustment and correction by comparison with its Divine original; and this adjustment and correction are to be accomplished without disruption of the corporate unity of Christian society, for to dissolve that unity is, in the Catholic view, to dissolve Christ Himself.

But because Christ is the Life and His Church a living organism, and because life implies continual change and process and adjustment, there is also an appeal to Christ in the sense of the assurance of a fuller explication of the *depositum fidei*, to be realised perhaps in the life beyond, perhaps also for future generations here on earth, but in any case in God's own time inevitably, as God is Truth and cannot deceive or be deceived. And thus the Christ to whom we appeal is the Christ of the future, the Christ who is the Arbiter and Judge of all, of whom we predicate in those moving words of our Credo wherein we link our Faith to that of the first Christians: *Et iterum venturus est cum gloria judicare vivos et mortuos, cujus regni non erit finis.*

If it be objected that the doctrine of the Infallibility of the External Church is inconsistent with these ideas, the reply is that decisions of the Church which seem at the time of their pronouncement to be definitive and conclusive may yet be found to require and to admit of an interpretation which invests them with quite another character.

The case of Galileo, as Father Tyrrell (*Lex Credendi*, p. 60) and other Catholic writers (*e.g. Dublin Review*, April 1906, p. 264) have shown, proves that decisions of the highest ecclesiastical authority, plainly purporting to stand upon doctrinal grounds, may turn out to be scientifically erroneous, and yet to have had in their day a distinct religious value as a protection for simple and uninstructed minds. But if it is legitimate thus to distinguish the religious and scientific values of ecclesiastical decisions, we must recognise that this is a principle to be applied with great caution and discrimination, remembering always that truth cannot permanently be divided; that religious truth cannot be opposed to scientific

truth, and that when this last is indisputably established, it must take its place with other truths in the religious synthesis. In religion as in life generally, the false and the true often co-exist, and it is only by a slow and painful process that we learn to sift them apart. Indeed, by a strange paradox, error even assists the growth of truth ; it is only when its erroneousness is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the common religious consciousness that persistence in error becomes a lie. Thus, it is found in history that beliefs which have now disappeared were once necessary to the upbuilding of religious truth ; as, for example, the primitive belief in the imminence of Our Lord's second coming. This belief was to a great extent the scaffolding, as Dr Oscar Holtzmann puts it, by which the edifice of Christian faith was reared, and which could be taken down or allowed to fall away, when it had served its purpose, without destroying or even permanently injuring the building. May there not be other beliefs dear and sacred to the Christian heart which in their turn too may fall when, and only when, the Master Builder has finished His work, to leave the building itself uninjured and revealed in all its divine beauty ?

Again, if it be objected that other "liberalising" movements in the Catholic Church have been attended with failure, and if the enemies of the Church seek to confute us by pointing to the fiasco of Lamennais and the partial failure of Montalembert, the reply is that the present circumstances are entirely different from those which obtained half a century ago. Then it might be possible for clever men to school themselves to a rigid adherence to the old tradition, and by the exercise of much dialectical ingenuity to think out how not to think, to create for themselves a kind of intellectual walled garden wherein to dwell apart. But for this generation the definite triumph of modern science in the world of thought, and democracy in the world of action, have rendered such an attitude of mind once and for all impossible. Half a century ago evolution was unproven, and Biblical criticism was in a tentative and conjectural stage ; in politics the Temporal

Power still held Rome for absolutism, and democracy was suffering from a partial check. To-day, evolution, the great results of Biblical criticism, and democracy are all acknowledged facts, and in the light of them the need for religious reconstruction is patent and indisputable.

Nowhere is the triumph of democracy more complete than in the two great Catholic nations of Latin race, and it is they among all the peoples of Christendom who are leading the way in that new synthesis which is most correctly described as a task of rejuvenation and renovation. This task the Catholic Church is uniquely fitted to undertake by reason of her historic continuity; her secular experience of crises not less serious and accommodations and assimilations of no less magnitude than any that are called for to-day; the inexhaustible treasury of her spiritual riches amassed throughout the ages from all quarters; her profound sense of the mystery of things and of the nearness and reality of the invisible world. Above all, she is fitted for this task by reason of her splendid assertion of the principle of oneness or solidarity: the oneness of human nature, justifying the external cult no less than interior piety and consecrating the senses and emotions in the service of the spirit; the oneness of God and Man, whereby God co-operates with Man and men with one another in the spiritual evolution of the individual and the race; and (in the Communion of Saints) the oneness and co-operation of all the sons of God, living and departed, in this world and the next. Finally, the very logical completeness of Latin religion as an intellectual system, combined with these spiritual qualities, gives promise of that thorough renovation as opposed to half-hearted compromises and concessions, which the facts of life demand.

It would appear, then, that both in the circumstances of the time and in the nature of Latin religion there are forces that make strongly for the realisation of the ideal of faith without superstition and obedience without servility, which leaders like Fogazzaro and Laberthonnière set before the

Catholic world. And it may be permissible to say that in pursuing this ideal they are truly working to promote that visible Kingdom of God, for whose coming the Lord taught His disciples to pray: *Adveniat regnum tuum!* For this Kingdom of God would seem to be rightly conceived as also a republic of spirits, in that its rule is founded upon the free consent of the governed; none are coerced, nor are any excluded from the Kingdom save by their own act. Liberty is its rule, but in its divinely ordered and disciplined society, service is the condition of liberty. As it is said, *servire est regnare*: by service alone the Christian becomes free. Christian liberty is not licence, and does not by any means exclude authority. And as our obedience is not servile, so our authority is not tyrannical, but is the means for safeguarding and securing liberty. It is to liberty in this sense alone that Catholics aspire: that liberty which is the heritage of the sons of God, the burgher-right of the citizens of the Heavenly City.

LATINUS.

A REFORMED CHURCH AS AN ENGINE OF PROGRESS.

SIR OLIVER LODGE.

"Religion was once the pillar of fire which went before the human race in its great march through history, showing it the way. Now it is fast assuming the rôle of the ambulance which follows in the rear and picks up the exhausted and wounded. This, too, is a great work, but it is not sufficient. And when religion has disburdened herself of all her dead values, she will once more, in intimate association with ethics, rise to be a power which leads men forward."
—HÖFFDING.

IN a former article (HIBBERT JOURNAL, October 1906), I urged that the re-creation and continuance of a truly national Church must involve a great simplification of Church enactments, so as to leave fair freedom of interpretation concerning the meaning of Christian ceremonies; and that the way to reform lay through a movement of breadth and incorporation, which should consolidate the now prevalent desire for greater tolerance and union.

In the belief that the subject is of great importance, and that the time is nearly ripe for reform, I now wish to proceed further in the same direction, and to urge that, putting less trust in oaths and formularies, we should cease attempting to bind by anticipation revolting and unwilling spirits, and show more faith in living humanity—especially in the kind of humanity which feels called to work in the Christian vineyard. There need be no forced alteration of procedure in religious services, but there should be large avoidance of compulsory uniformity. We must admit the existence of worshippers of different types, we must realise

the need for growth and development, and must encourage loyalty to the spirit of truth — especially among those who co-operate in good works; in the assurance that, by those who do the works, all essential doctrine will be sufficiently accepted, without compulsion, in due time.

It may seem inappropriate, and in strict sense impertinent, for a student of science to feel strongly on such topics, but it is an inappropriateness not without precedent. The general welfare of humanity, and the stability of advancing civilisation, are themes of interest to all, whatever our special studies may be; and before now a prophet of Art has felt constrained to urge that artistic development must be stunted, and the highest art impossible, until social conditions are improved. So also some writers and speakers, with the ear of the populace, condemn a peaceful absorption in scientific pursuits, amid the surrounding mass of poverty and misery, as a mark of selfishness and hard-heartedness. What is the good of abstruse scientific theories, they say, when what people need is wholesome food and warmth and decent homes! And the thoughts of many a would-be student are perturbed in the same way. These good and sympathetic people vicariously feel the pressure of life so keenly that no occupation save relieving the pain seems worth while. Their lives and sympathies are so absorbed and exhausted in the tormenting problems of a great city, under present conditions, that they grow to regard the multifarious interests of the world through the perspective of the victim on the rack, to whom but one thing is needful.

But I lay no particular stress on a likelihood of injury to knowledge, through prevalent lack of sympathy with pure science and ignorance of its intrinsic value, nor on any other merely intellectual obstacle; that is not the sort of thing which paralyses activity and acts as a constant sore. If society were in a healthy condition, if the development and elevation of man had not to take a secondary and quite subordinate place to the development and accumulation of property, a few generations

of better education could easily mend it on the intellectual side; but it is the greedy and essentially uncivilised condition of what prides itself as the most practical part of society, and the consequent deep-rooted and unadmitted canker eating into the bones of the social organism, that is disquieting and oppressive.

It is against all this that a National Church is or should be fighting. If these evils are to be uprooted, I cannot see how the uprooting can be done by a single reformer or prophet—a Carlyle or a Ruskin—here and there; they must be attacked by an organised army of workers and thinkers, imbued with the right spirit, informed as to the real facts, devoted to the cause of goodness, and trained for the detection of long accustomed errors and for the development of human life.

An efficient contingent of such an army exists, or should exist, in the churches of every denomination. Here are men picked out, we must suppose, for their keen perception of right and wrong, for their enthusiasm and longing after higher life,—men who are subjected to special training for the work, and then sent as missionaries throughout the whole range of society, to preach Christ's Gospel and to bring the Kingdom of Heaven into realisation upon earth. Here should be a general staff of commanding power, if only it be in real touch with the people, if only it realises the extent and the quality of its mission, and is properly prepared to cope with it. But it must concentrate its weapons upon the enemy, and must not employ them in internecine warfare. An army whose officers dispute among themselves, whose horse and foot are in conflict, and whose artillery is trained upon its engineers, is not an efficient instrument of conquest.

Those who realise to some extent what a power for good a truly National Church might be, and how with comparative ease the earnest religious spirit of England could absorb and utilise the energies of such a Church—a truly Christian and truly comprehensive Church, with the best men attracted, not repelled, the present narrow mechanical uniformity superseded

by breadth and liberality, with errors of past history discarded, mean jealousies extinguished, and differences composed—such persons may feel that the reform and strengthening of the Church is perhaps the best though not the most direct route towards elimination of the wrongs and amelioration of the evils of our social state. At present many of the thinking workers are alienated from what they imagine is religion; and a cry for general secularisation is gaining ground. The State may be rightly urged to have nothing to do with controversial religion; but the elimination of religious disputes and the elimination of religion are not necessarily the same thing. The cessation of all recognition of religion itself by the State is certainly not a step in the right direction.

The cry for disestablishment is not loud just now; but it is liable to be raised at any time, so long as the present condition of special privilege continues. The cry is really a cry for more equality of treatment—for more national recognition all round. Only a few want to separate all religion from the State; though many might rejoice at freedom from so-called Erastian control. A section of Presbyterians north of the Tweed may feel conscientiously opposed to State-connexion of any kind, and some Nonconformists may imagine that they feel conscientious objection; but that is not the real bugbear in England; it is the limitation and narrowness of the connexion that is really objected to. Broaden the Church out till it is truly national, by removing the preposterous coercion in detail which is now nominally exercised, —and the grievance disappears. The National Church could then absorb the best activities of all denominations, and the nation would be strengthened on its highest side to an incalculable extent. Efforts at betterment of human conditions are precarious and difficult and rather blind, so long as mutual hostility or suspicion persists among the branches of the Christian Church.

Either corporate action towards amelioration is impossible, or the Church, in the most comprehensive sense, should be the

most powerful army for good in existence. Its ministers are like officers distributed throughout the country, with social prestige and the attentive ear of a large proportion of the more leisured and opulent classes; these officers should be engaged, even more than at present, in training and enlarging and disciplining the forces of progress, ready for a re-birth of society.

Herein lies, I believe, the most vital reform of all; but it is not a reform that can be procured by direct aim; it must arrive spontaneously after attraction of the best and ablest men to the ministry. The nation should demand the Ministry of its best men—in the Church as well as in the Cabinet.

And the reform contemplated should be real and genuine; the confession of sin repeated in ecclesiastical buildings should be no conventional and meaningless chant, nor should it be supposed to apply only to individual and personal sinfulness; it should above all, in collective worship, apply to collective sin,—to that sinfulness of society which Christ would denounce if he came again among us. The vigour of that denunciation would, I expect, eclipse anything now heard from pulpits; though it would, I believe, take a different and unexpected direction, and concern itself less with the weaknesses and follies and half-repented sins of humanity, than with the greed, the selfishness, the sheer individualism and mammon-worship which excite but occasional reprobation; it would attack the heartless and contented acquiescence in conditions which debase the soul of a people and erect the extravagant luxury of a few on the grinding poverty of many.

In that sense an acknowledgment of fault is indeed urgently and constantly needed; but the feeling should be driven home and made real; confession should never be allowed to degenerate into an easy perfunctory form. The selfishness of society is the really burning sin of our time, and it is the more dangerous because so generally unrecognised. It has been unrecognised in the chancel as well as in the nave—it seems never to have been adequately recognised by an Established

Church as a whole—and to this one cause such a Church is thought to owe much of its impotence; to this is due much of the mistrust of the Church by the people, who have found it in the past often against themselves, and siding with the rich and powerful;—an attitude singularly different from that of its Master. That inspired song the "Magnificat" struck the keynote of primitive Christianity.

Let us freely and heartily admit that a great internal effort is now being made to revive the early spirit in the Church—the spirit of brotherhood and social work. But yet there is room. The enthusiasm and exertion of some Anglican leaders are beyond praise, but their spirit has not yet permeated the whole mass. Wherever the right spirit exists the people respond to it, as they did in 30 A.D. Christ's teachings frequently dealt with the subject of riches, even then, when vast accumulations were hardly feasible, save in a form accessible to the ravages of moth and rust; but with the invention of stocks and shares the possibilities of property have enlarged, and his denunciations now might be unexpectedly welcomed by some who do not profess and call themselves Christians. There are men — men of influence among the artisans — who openly scoff at what they call religion, who nevertheless plead "not guilty" for the down-trodden victims of pernicious surroundings; who emphasise the fact that we *are* our brothers' keepers; who really long for a fairer and wholesomer setting for the life of human beings, and who have been repelled from Christianity, not by the teachings of Christ himself, but by the confusions and errors of his nominal disciples. These men call out for the clergy to be "converted to Christianity." What do they mean? It were perhaps well for ministers of all denominations to consider what they mean.

Doubtless in so speaking they are to some extent making the mistake illustrated by the above-quoted objection to unharassed scientific work. For just as strenuous intellectual concentration needs eyes temporarily shut to the mass of

avoidable misery and pain—pain caused by human stupidity and by almost inhuman selfishness, to which everyone must shut his eyes at times, or life were impossible—so the clergy must at times possess their souls in peace and comfort; they have to minister to believers and sinners and saints, as well as to contend against hypocrites and pharisees and servants of Mammon. The Church cannot *only* struggle and fight, it must sometimes stretch out its hands toward the further shore, unhindered by differences and controversies, and unburdened by the sense of social misery and degradation. Not all services need be mission services; every now and then saints may allow their souls to expand in mystic worship of the Supreme, and may aim at devout contemplation and ecstasy; on certain days their "Divine Service" may be limited to the ecclesiastical and esoteric kind which now all but monopolises that splendid name.

But that must not be the chief employment of their lives; not while present evils continue. The Church must be militant if it is to become triumphant; it must learn strategy, and must throw its forces in the right direction. Right belief is intensely important, but is slow of attainment, and for the present right action is more prominently called for. It is no time for vegetating and leaf-development: it is fruits that will be looked for. There must be far less of "Whosoever will be saved must thus *think*," and far more of "Whosoever will save others must thus *do*." God's in His heaven truly, but all is not right with the world. Books written to-day immerse us, and rightly immerse us, in a welter of poverty and misery. The bitter cry of the victims of competition, of the outcasts of civilisation, and of the children who are born to sin and wretchedness, when they are not born to death,—the cry of multitudes with hardly any chance of decent happiness and no outlook upon the beauty of this world,—this cry must be singing in the ears of God till He cannot hear the chants of the churches, however musically they may be intoned, however frequently they may be repeated, and however completely the

ornaments-rubric may be obeyed. The spirit of greed is abroad; its net has gathered human beings together in heaps, has removed them from the fields and hedgerows, and has forced them into crowded dens. With success this spirit is doing devil's work; it and its ally, smug self-satisfied stupidity, are the modern fiends; the Satans which the Church is fighting are for the most part extinct.

What we have to learn is that the will of God is to be done on earth; that the Kingdom of Heaven is to be a present kingdom, here and now, not relegated always to the future. Eternity is not something in the future, any more than it is something in the past: it extends into the future and it extends into the past—without limit both ways,—but *this* is eternity, this moment we are alive, and the message of Christ relates to "*is*," not to "*will be*." We are to realise the highest here. If not here in this condition, why anywhere in any condition? For wherever we are will always be "here," and the time will always be "now." As soon as God's will is done on earth as it is done in heaven, a great part of the distinction between the two states of existence is abolished. That diminution of distinction is what the terrestrial Church has to strive to accomplish; that is the ultimate object of its inspiration and its labour: the ideal is to be made real, the world is to be transfigured and transformed. The task of the priest is the reconciliation, in our consciousness, of self, the world, and God.

It is with a knowledge of a mass of feeling and effort, some of it at present soured and hostile towards what it used to hear preached from pulpits of nearly every kind, but genuine in its aims and its love for humanity, that—using the word "Church" in the broadest sense, as the combined and corporate society of good men in action, men whose lives and energies are devoted to the highest aims, in the spirit of real and effective and universal Christianity—I urge that if the nation is to be regenerated, it must be regenerated through the agency of The Church. There must be a union of effort among all who are casting out devils in the one Name.

But how great a change is needed! Contrasting the work that is to be done with the means adopted in too many cases for avoiding the doing of it, a prophet would be justified in exclaiming to the churches, and to the Church of this country, "Awake thou that sleepest and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee life!"

Changes Needed.

If I were challenged to say wherein I think that an improvement might be made in the regulations and arrangements for a National Christian Church under present conditions, I should emphasise three things:—

First, more spontaneity and less monotony in Church service of all kinds, and the abandonment of mechanical uniformity in worship.

Second, more liberal education for Ministers; and the broadening and simplification of tests, so as to exclude as few good men as possible.

Third, and consequent upon these two, clear-sighted recognition of the signs of the times, study and enlightened encouragement of true beneficence, and stalwart opposition to all abuses of power.

I hesitate to enter into detail concerning these things, and yet I feel impelled to make the attempt; so, if I proceed, I will do so straightforwardly and without expressed apology.

Rubrics.

First, concerning regulations for the services of the Church. Here I plead not for legislation, but for the absence of legislation—for the removal of the close and definite legislation which exists now.

Permissively the Prayer-book can remain unchanged, with merely a substitution of "may" for "shall," and with the occasional iteration of words stating that for many centuries such and such was the practice of the Church,—thereby indicating a respect for historic continuity; but all sentences

laying down a prescribed procedure, not as advisable only, but as compulsory—so that any the least variation from it becomes an illegality to be proceeded against in law courts—should surely be cancelled.

Within the Church itself some rules can be laid down, as from time to time may be thought wise by the several branches, but they will not be burdensome upon the conscience. In the Episcopal branch the Bishops will naturally have paternal authority, which doubtless they will exercise with moderation and wisdom; in the Presbyterian branch the Presbytery will have appropriate authority; in the Congregational branch, it is to be presumed, the Council; and so on. Details of practice and use of formularies would thus be decided on by eligible and sometimes competent bodies, who can readily modify them from time to time, and can leave what elasticity they think wise; and Parliament would be relieved of a burdensome and archaic responsibility.

The Prayer-book, considered as a legal document, was drawn up on the assumption that any freedom or elasticity or spontaneity in conducting a service was sure to be misused—not through malice and wickedness, but through ignorance and stupidity. It is, in fact, founded on mistrust of intellectual or spiritual competence,—mistrust which tends to justify itself by reaction of the mechanical system itself upon those constantly subjected to its constricting influence. It is also based on the idea that religious feeling is a proper subject for legislation, and that it is possible to coerce men's beliefs, to govern their inclinations and control their consciences, by a system of rigid rubrics and regulations; whereas it is notorious, and almost proverbial, that if the will to break law is active, the most carefully drafted clauses have extremely little binding force. For their interpretation depends in no sort on the intention of those who framed or of those who authorised them; their interpretation can be garbled to suit an emergency, or can be adapted to a changed system of opinions.

For instance, the Thirty-nine Articles, agreed upon by Con-

vocation in 1562 "for the avoiding of diversities of opinions," were for the most part drawn up by Protestants as a bulwark against the Church of Rome—a defence against any approach to the doctrines of that Church in certain well-known and famous controversies:—such as, Scripture not the rule of faith; faith not the sole instrument of justification; infallibility of general councils; purgatory, pardons, relics, invocation of saints; five additional sacraments; transubstantiation; the sacrifices of the Mass. But Cardinal Newman, while still a minister of the Church of England, was able to show, in his famous Tract 90, that the wording of the Articles, when taken in conjunction with the similarly Protestant "Homilies," did not, as a matter of fact, exclude the interpretation regarded as baneful by those who formulated them; in fact, that the Articles lent themselves to Roman interpretation. They did not indeed suggest such an interpretation on their surface, but they were patient of it. He argued this with extreme ingenuity, and some special pleading, but, as I think, with a good deal of success. Certainly he has had followers who have largely availed themselves of the unexpected and welcome elasticity in the direction of Romanism, thus unexpectedly discovered in, or extracted out of, or perhaps foisted into, what was intended to be a rigidly Protestant document and scheme of Protestant theology.

And so it will always be with a living and growing church, or any other organism—quite irrespective of the rights and wrongs of any particular controversy or school of thought. If the thought or school exist, if living and earnest people feel that truth and progress lie in a particular direction, then, however ultimately mistaken they turn out to be, no system of formularies can bind them; they will not thus hand over their conscience and their judgment to the custody of a past. They can be loyal to a living and present spirit in the Church to-day, but not to dead formularies. These they will either ignore, or will take in a non-natural sense, or will twist till they mean the opposite of what they were intended to mean.

A form of words is usually capable of interpretation in accordance with a living will; but if not, it is either ignored or altered.

History is familiar enough with obsolete and repealed statutes: why should the statutes which regulate so vital a thing as the professed National Religion alone be free from reconsideration and amendment? If non-alteration be regarded as necessitated by some theory, that theory is a superstition; the only justification for rigid adherence to fixed forms is the practical danger of licence and unsettling of faith that might result from freedom. That is a point of policy on which it is possible for reasonable people to take opposite sides, at any particular juncture or crisis; but it will be generally admitted that a faith dependent for its maintenance on blinkers and fetters is not likely in a progressive age to last many generations. Anchorage to a submerged rock is not safe amid rising waters.

Wider Education.

We need only refer in very general terms to the sort of education appropriate to a candidate for the Ministry of the Gospel. He must be instructed in professional subjects, of course—I say nothing about those; but it is plain that if he is to have any influence on the thought of his time, he must not be ignorant of that thought. If he is to mix with people, and adapt himself to various conditions of men, he must be able to retain their respect. Immersion in the atmosphere of scholastic theology alone will not suffice. The Bible is a literature with which he must be familiar, but he must not be a man of one book. If he knows only the Bible, he will not know that. A broad and general education should be his, and the discoveries of his age should not be alien to him. In the course of his career he is bound to meet argumentative sceptics; men sometimes of narrow sympathies, but occasionally of fairly wide reading. These he should be able to encounter on their own ground.

It is true that to take a leading position—and to grasp a considerable range of human knowledge—is not given to all; there must be some whose lives are cast amid simpler surroundings, and who feel more at home there. That is well; but we are considering the ideal up to which a few can be trained, while the majority will rise towards it as far as they can, though they fall short of attainment. The ideal for a minister of Christ to-day is not represented by that held out in the charge of the Ordination service, "apply yourselves wholly to this one thing, and draw all your cares and studies this way"; it is not enough, nor is it even wise, to limit study to one thing, and to forsake and set aside all other studies. Certainly something just and needful is intended, by that warning against worldly cares and studies, but it is liable to be misunderstood. And even in affairs of business, it may be argued that as so many of the clergy have to address men of business, it would be wise for them not to be wholly ignorant and incompetent in that atmosphere. It is no easy service which the nation demands of its religious teachers—it is the highest and most difficult possible; and the very best and ablest men are needed for the work, if it is to be done properly. At present many are deflected to other careers. In some cases the deflection is due to attraction elsewhere; but in too many it must happen that a faithful and competent man is either consciously or unconsciously repelled, by the demands and injunctions placed in his way, to scare his present conscience or to snare his future one. He knows that the critical spirit is not the spirit of worship; but he knows also that, however successfully his critical faculty may be put to sleep for a time, it will rise and torment him later on, if he abandons his birthright of growth and freedom. So he chooses another vocation.

Tests.

And now, what about tests? What tests should be applied to candidates for ordination, so as to exclude self-

seeking hypocrites and stealthy infidels? Whatever words are used, the test-formula should be said by the candidate himself, not by another for him; and it should be said without prompting. The amount of memory needed, for a simple rehearsal like that, is not too much to expect from a man to whom preaching and the cure of souls is to be entrusted. A simple form should suffice: why should not the following be held sufficient?—

Here, solemnly in the face of this congregation, I declare before Almighty God, to whose holy will I entirely submit myself, that I long for Christ's ideal of the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth; and, God helping me, I will with all my power and ability strive to this end and to no other, with such wisdom as it may please the Holy Spirit to confer upon me; for whose guidance I will always pray to the Father, in the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Such a declaration, made in full voice and with uplifted hand, would be far more solemn and impressive, as an answer to the question whether he thinks he is truly called to the ministry of the Church, than the present curious expected answer, "I think so."

Some further declaration on the secular side, against the domination of any foreign potentate in this realm, and some precautionary statement against Jesuitical interpretation and underground scheming, would seem to be necessary also. Moreover, it would be desirable so to legislate that no weapon of superstition could ever be wielded, by Church authority, so as to inflict on the laity that element of compulsion from which the clergy had been freed. It is to be hoped that certain anti-English practices will never be permitted in the National Church, however comprehensive it may become.

Divine Service.

The popular notion of Divine Service makes it consist of a multiplicity of so-called "services," which are often no service at all, but recreation or sensuous enjoyment to those

engaged in them;—a kind of service perhaps as unacceptable to the Deity, under existing circumstances, as those other religious ceremonies inveighed against by the first Isaiah, in a period of less opportunity and responsibility than the present, when, as now, it could be said of a large part of society, "every one loveth gifts and followeth after rewards . . ." and the cry of the oppressed is not heard even at the temple altars:—

"To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices . . who hath required this at your hands . . . Bring no more vain oblations; incense is an abomination unto me . . . Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth: they are a trouble unto me; I am weary to bear them. . . . When ye make many prayers I will not hear. Your hands are full of blood. Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do well; seek justice, set right the oppressor, relieve the oppressed."

The Church was not founded by temple services, nor will it grow in that way. An exceptional Forty Days, for the strengthening of the soul, and invigoration or insurance of its dominion over the body, must be wholesome and right; and other times of seclusion, as means to ends, are more than justified; but it is as means to an end that they should be regarded,—and the end is nothing less than the reform of social abuses, and the rescue of humanity from the damning conditions of hopeless and degrading squalor.

The kind of society which allows its children to be befouled and degraded and brought up in an atmosphere of crime, is the kind of society that should be dealt with by the aid of a millstone and a rope. If it uses its fresh human material as manure, it may flourish in a rank way, it may shoot up a coarse and luxuriant growth, it may yield a crop of millionaires; but some kinds of fruit are too expensive for rational cultivation, some are not altogether wholesome: there are trees which must be hewn down and cast into the fire.

Religious bodies may pride themselves on the soundness and orthodoxy of their beliefs; but "he that doeth righteousness is righteous"; and supposed good beliefs are no compensation for bad results, either in society or in an individual.

To speak strictly, such results are inconsistent with healthy beliefs—"do well will follow thought" if the thought be of the right kind; and there is high authority for the uselessness of merely crying Lord, Lord! It is deeds far more than creeds that are wanted now; or rather, it is creeds interpreted and acted out in deeds. We have to *discover*, but we have also to *realise*. We do not want matter without form, any more than we want form without matter. An idea must be incarnated before it is effective. That is how Christianity was founded, when the Logos was made flesh,

> "And so the Word had breath and wrought
> With human hands the creed of creeds
> In loveliness of perfect deeds
> More strong than all poetic thought."

Nothing less than a re-incarnation of the Logos will re-invigorate the faith of Christendom and carry forward the salvation of mankind. That is the meaning of the Second Advent. The second incarnation will be in the hearts of all men—a reign of brotherhood and love for which the heralds are already preparing their songs: already there are "signs of his coming and sounds of his feet"; and upon our terrestrial activity the date of this Advent depends. It is in our power to make ready the way; that is what our enlightenment and education and privileges are for. Man, though a little lower than the angels, is a messenger and servant of God just as truly, and his high mission is manifest. We as a nation have gone already into the ends of the earth; let us see to it that we understand and carry out rightly our great commission, in no narrow and iconoclastic spirit; remembering that, unless we set things right at home, our teaching will be ineffective, and sarcasm will be the emotion excited by our example.

Re-incorporation.

This article ought to close with practical suggestions as to how Nonconformist bodies are to be re-incorporated into the National Church; but that must be left to others. To me it seems that, as soon as artificial restrictions and disabilities are

removed, the re-incorporation will be almost automatic—or would be so were it not for the question of pre-restoration endowments. If a money question is all that would then hinder union—if there is nothing more serious and fundamental than property to be considered—it would be a fact worth finding out.

My attention has just been called to certain articles on Church and State, issued in 1891 by Dr Martineau as vol. ii. of his collected *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses.* Some of them deal with this very matter, especially the essay called "The National Church as a Federal Union." He pointed out the inconsistency of a church priding itself, simultaneously, both on its rigorous uniformity and on the width of the range of its belief; and says that while the acts of uniformity remain, the work of the Church will be honeycombed by the canker of unveracity and self-sophistication.

I will not repeat his arguments and proposals, the latter of which were said by Dr Fairbairn, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica,* to be impracticable; for whether those particular proposals are hopeless or not, the spirit of his vision of the unity of Christendom—the longing to see the various folds all one flock, in accordance with the parting prayer of Christ, "for them which shall believe on me . . . . that they all may be one"—remains as real as ever. Moreover, many of the Churches are riper for union now; and I will quote the concluding words of the preface to the volume containing Martineau's ecclesiastical essays:—

"I cannot withdraw a protest, however hopeless it may seem, against allowing the Christian Church to remain a mere cluster of rival orthodoxies, disowning and repelling each other; while, in the inmost heart of all, secret affections live and pray, with eye upturned to the same Infinite Perfection, and tears let fall for the same universal sorrows."

OLIVER LODGE.

THE LIVING CHURCH.

THE REV. FRANK ILSLEY PARADISE,
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IT is a notable feature in the theological unrest of to-day that no serious attempt has been made to define the nature and functions of the Church. It has indeed been assumed by the official class that the Church is a body, the being and authority of which exist quite apart from the conditions of social or intellectual life. We have a clear picture of such a dominant institution in the fourth or the thirteenth centuries. We see the figures of its great teachers or statesmen. We see this powerful body grappling with the pressing problems of mind or State. We hear the tone of assured authority and of definite policy in the voice of inspiration or guidance to a people who walk in the light or are upheld by the strength of the Church. We recognise that its claim of authority to teach the truth rests not upon assumption, but upon the actual possession of intellectual leadership. We recognise that its commands are enforced by the strong arm of its power. If it could lead the blind; if it could instruct the ignorant; if it could protect the weak; if it could support the poor; if it could hold affection and devotion through appeals to the imagination and the spiritual hunger of men; if it could compel obedience and conformity by the awful power of excommunication; if it could direct the teaching of schools and universities; if it could control the policies of nations, and bring the secular arm to the upholding of its will, then such

a Church was indeed a Church of authority, and heresy and schism were cardinal sins.

It need hardly be said that such a picture is as like any institution which exists to-day as is a painting of Fra Angelico like an impressionist nature scene of Monet.

The claims of authority are still sounding, but an authority which cannot be upheld by force or supported by public sentiment speaks to unheeding ears. The Church of which we hear so much led the world because it possessed the highest intelligence, the greatest resources, the most effective power in leadership that the world then knew. For more than four centuries now the supremacy of this Church over the thoughts and wills of men has been openly challenged. There has been a titanic struggle. Little by little the Church has been robbed of its earlier sources of strength and authority. In a new social order it has become an alien. No words can too strongly picture the immensity and the completeness of this social and intellectual revolution. The formularies, the liturgies, the hymns, even some of the prayers, that are steeped in the sentiments of the ages, are largely foreign to our thought and expression. We come into an unfamiliar atmosphere when we enter one of the historic churches. We pass from the bright day of the scientific and commercial age in which we live into the dim light, into the shadows and misty heights, into the beauties and dignities and memories of the mighty temple of a former faith. And it is all ours, ours by heritage, by spiritual kinship, by the unbroken succession of sainthood, by those elemental spiritual endowments, those everlasting sentiments and emotions, which cling like ivy to the temple of God through all the changes of time and fortune.

Now these common and enduring sentiments are social factors which must be reckoned with. The service and achievement of the past cannot be ignored. If it is true that human interests and religious motives have sifted into other channels of activity, it is because the spirit of human service

is no longer confined to the Church. That spirit has been its supreme gift to mankind.

And yet it is the anomaly of religious life to-day that the Church can give no clear and acceptable definition of its powers, its functions, or its limitations. There are, in the Protestant world at least, three conceptions of this sacred institution which cannot be brought into agreement.

1. The conception of the Church as a divinely endowed body—entrusted with a deposit of revelation, powers, polity, orders and sacraments—all of which are independent of the conditions of life, and rest upon a commission given by God through Christ.

We need not follow here the steps by which the historic Church passed from a spiritual fellowship into a great empire. The day is gone when the supreme service of the Church to mankind can be ignored, or the amazing genius of its scholars and statesmen belittled. It was through no accident that the Church inherited the spirit of the Roman world, and interpreted its teachings in the language of a noble philosophy. But the problem that is set for this generation to solve is to find the adjustment of this mighty institution to a world of life and thought that is quite unlike that into which it was born.

We are immediately concerned with the claim of the historic Church to possess a deposit of truth which is entrusted to its keeping, and which it is commissioned to teach with the authority of God. This revelation is apart from and above all speculations of human understanding, and is therefore to be received by an act of intellectual surrender, called faith. The summary of this divine knowledge is crystallised in the two creeds of Christendom. Its unquestioning acceptance is the condition of salvation.

That this has been for centuries the attitude of the Church whose forms of worship, whose doctrines and traditions we inherit, cannot be questioned. "Doctrines," says Anselm, "may be speculated upon; but, insomuch as faith precedes

knowledge, such speculations may never concern themselves with the foundations of truth." The dictum of the great Archbishop is the teaching of all doctors of the school of Scholasticism. Its spirit has flowed down through the centuries. This teaching created a conformity of thought which is still the dream of scholastic minds. It made free inquiry into religious truth a mortal sin. It shut away the Bible from the people. It invested the priesthood with magical gifts and gave to the Church imperial powers.

In our day such a faith must make a religion of specialisation. It can appeal only to certain temperaments; nor can it be nourished in the atmosphere of democracy. Its submission to outward authority; its detachment from the actual experiences of life; its subtle but unreal speculations, are the fruits of a kind of training which is utterly repugnant to a system of free education.

Nor can we forget that this authority of the Church—the loss of which many deplore—rested upon a unity of conditions which no longer exists,—a monopoly of knowledge; possession of the channels which disseminated the intellectual life of the age; a priesthood trained under one dominating system; power to direct and check all scientific speculation; control of all schools and universities; a people accustomed to authority and guidance, and the mighty weapons of the Church itself to save or to destroy.

As we contrast these conditions with those of our own time, it is evident that all efforts to bridge the intellectual chasm between the present and the ages of faith are futile. The irreconcilable difference lies in the seat of authority—for the mind of the youth of to-day is trained, through every hour of its most plastic period, to look for authority in no outward form, but in the inner structure of things. The voice of authority is in truth itself; and wherever truth leads, thither must the disciple follow.

What, then, is the place of the historic Church in the life of to-day? Has it no being; no mission; no authority; no

revelation, apart from the crystallised forms of life which it assumed under the stress of certain outward conditions and of inward temper, which have now passed away?

To this question it would appear that the immediate answer of the ecclesiastical world is that the integrity of the institution, the saving power of its revelation and the divineness of its authority, are woven into the very texture of its formularies and organisation; and that, apart from the historical cast of its life and thought, it can have no being.

But to those who believe that the Church is the living witness of God, it seems clear that while it holds fast to the experiences and revelations of other ages, it must have such flexibility and power of adaptation that the symbols of its faith become, amid all changes of inward and outward life, the beacon lights which guide the minds and souls of men to God.

2. To large bodies of men it is clear that Anselm's conception of the historic Church has little enough in common with the thought and spirit of our time. We are reaping the fruits of Protestantism. The ancient symbols and formularies are not of vital moment, probably, to most of us. We are under other influences. Training, taste, circumstance have largely given the conditions and limitations of our lives. There is—or used to be—in the various Protestant bodies, distinct emphasis upon great and true ideals, which nevertheless broke the line of historical continuity and tended to separateness,—such ideals as free will, individual salvation, election, predestination, immersion, universal salvation, etc. Doubtless most, if not all, of these great words had as a basic idea the belief that the Church was a body of elect—or of selected souls—within the world; and that its own special possession, in grace or doctrine, was quite apart from the life or knowledge of the world without. Unquestionably, the tendency of Protestantism has been towards division and over-accentuation of certain elements of truth. The weakness of Protestantism has been an inability to see life as it is and

in the whole. It has been other-worldly in the sense that it has underestimated the relation of religious faith to the complexity of the human mind and the needs of the human soul, here and now. As in the historic Church, so also has the great note of Protestantism been conformity, but conformity without a sense of historicity, with a false perspective and unreal value; and so in its life the stream of human consciousness has been broken. The various bodies of Protestantism have never become Catholic or universal in spirit or aim. Their appeal has always been and must always be to peculiar natures or to special times. They are inherently provincial; and in place of the great conceptions and the superb ambitions of a universal Church, they tend at last to absorb their energies in the pursuit of the minor virtues and in the propagation of sectarianism. Towards some of these religious bodies the great world of thought and action has not only a sense of aloofness, but a feeling of contempt. The splendid vision of a world empire has shrivelled up into so small a thing. In the absorbing activities of the world's life, with its pressing and frightful problems, the ecstasies and the satisfactions of such a religion seem most unreal. It has the detachment from the world of Browning's Lazarus without his supreme experience. This is the failure of Protestantism. It has ended, as protests do, in the birth of the spirit of division. A Church without a vision cannot be the Church of the future.

3. Perhaps the most interesting feature in the religious life of to-day is the immense amount of religious interest and activity outside of any organised Christian body. Indeed, there is a marked spirit of antagonism among many thoughtful and earnest people towards any institution which claims to be the sole dispenser of spiritual gifts and the arbiter of man's ultimate destiny. Spiritual forces are becoming more and more recognised as existing in the nature of things. The field for the play of the supernatural is being recognised as co-extensive with the Universe. And in many and many a soul, aglow with light and warm with devotion, is a vision of a

mystical and spiritual fellowship which unites the followers of Christ of all names into a religious family. Even more, the ties of this union reach out until they include all those, of all races and faiths, who live in the spirit and walk as yet by faith. To these exalted spirits—who recall the figures of the Roman Stoics of the time of the Antonines—the outward means of grace and the forms of organised institutional life seem of little moment. They are bound together by no outward coercion, but by the unseen ties of spiritual sympathy and companionship. Before their imaginations is ever the immortal picture of Jesus and the wanton woman in the shade of the Syrian well.

This, surely, is a vision of a universal Church—the noblest conception of Christian discipleship. And yet our minds turn sadly from it, as from a Utopian dream. By its very nature it is selective. Its appeal can be heard only by trained and attentive ears; its power and charm are only for those rare souls which live in the spirit. Such cannot be the Militant Church of Christ, the struggling, fighting, erring Church, whose supreme aim is to uplift and save the weak and ignorant and sinful. In all great faiths there is the higher "gnosis," which rare souls attain unto. But no faith ever became a mighty, uplifting, and binding force which did not develop institutional body and organisation, which did not convey its revelation through forms and symbols, and rites and sacraments. It is thus that the spirit is communicated from soul to soul.

Of at least two of these three conceptions of the Church it may be said that each has this high motive; to bring to a world, lost in sin, the saving grace with which it is endowed. Its mighty enterprise has been to redeem the world by some alchemy which it alone possessed. This has been the Church's great mission through all time. It is bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. It is shown in its doctrines, its rites, its worship—and, moreover, it is the justification for its being. But meanwhile the lost world has gone on enlarging the

borders of the field of its higher activities. It has indignantly snatched education from the grasp of the Church. It has assumed the burden of every form of philanthropic activity. It has extended the range of interests in life for the poor. It has built up government, established law, extended and protected industry and commerce. It has built hospitals, orphanages; and now, without the inspiration and help of the Church, it is facing the great problem of industrial democracy.

Now all of this is clearly the work of beneficence. It is inspired and directed by the Christian motive. And yet, for the most part, this beneficent activity is not directly influenced by the Church of to-day; and it must be acknowledged that some steps in human development and progress have been reached after fearful struggles between an enlightened world and a darkened Church. The claim that Christ is sponsor for one sort of good and not for another, or that the work of Christ can only be done under one patronage or through one channel, will no longer influence thoughtful minds. To be sure, religion will always be a specialty to certain temperaments; and we may picture, if we will, two Christian forces working side by side for a common end, yet without sympathy or co-operation. But it seems clear that we are driven by the logic of life to a definition of the Church which embraces the interests of the whole world, and which includes every beneficent form of human activity—which is, in short, "the whole of human society organised for the spiritual ends of man."[1]

The conception of such a Church is not a loose and vague sentiment. It is rather a recognition of the clear line of development in the historic Church.

The growth of the little brotherhood of Jesus into the realisation of the dream of Hildebrand was through the development of its own inner life. The early disciples easily crossed the frontier of Jewish nationalism and planted the seeds of its faith in Greek and Roman soils. It found a natural

[1] See the Article on "Church and World" by the Editor in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for October 1906.

adjustment to the conditions of life in this larger world, and at the very beginning justified its claim of a divine mission by giving moral and spiritual values to experiences through which the world was passing. It built its structure upon the ruins of the fallen empire because it rightly interpreted the human need for order, law, and government.

If at the first the appeals of the new faith were most quickly heeded by the poor and downtrodden it was because that faith gave a new worth and dignity to human life. Thenceforth it became its mission to protect the weak, to enlighten the ignorant, to care for the wanderer—to be, in short, a well-ordered and spacious and sheltering home for the souls of men. Within that home the individual man found himself clothed with a new dignity, and his life ennobled with new knowledge of its sacredness and responsibility.

Not less near to the earth was the Church when it accepted its mission to guide the minds of men through the confusion and darkness of error and ignorance into the light of the truth committed to its keeping. But its dogmas grew out of its life —out of the danger of threatening heresy, out of the need of expressing its revelation in the terms of philosophy or life that were familiar to men—out of the need of interpreting at their highest spiritual values the experiences through which men were passing.

It taught with authority, and this authority was hidden in its passion to bless and heal.

It was with a true instinct of human needs also that the Church proclaimed the supreme authority of the moral law. In the trying experience of the first two centuries not all the malice and hatred of Jew or Pagan could detract from the charm and beauty of the Christian ideal of character. The defensive armour of the early Christians was their innocence and their love for one another.

The institution which uplifts the teaching of Jesus as the standard of individual and social life, which restrains its disciples from sin, which has power to lift the burden of

remorse, which leads men into a love of righteousness—such an institution has a never-ending mission in the world.

It is historically true that the powers of the Church grew with its opportunities to give a moral and spiritual interpretation to the experiences of life. Its polity, its formularies, its liturgies, developed under the stress of its inward passion to bring the truth of God to bear upon the needs of men. Its dogmas, like its forms of organisation, have a history. The great teachers of the past were men whose personal characteristics and limitations are clearly revealed in their teaching. If Hermas may say, "God created the world for the sake of the Church," Clement of Alexandria may define faith as "the attitude of receptivity towards truth."

The line of development of the historic Church has been to interpret the conditions of every age by the doctrine of Jesus Christ and by the spirit of His life. The unending struggles for freedom of conscience against the tyranny which had usurped the throne of Christ are the undying witnesses to the vitality of the Church's faith and to its divine mission in the world.

There is a true line of succession. It is the line of spiritual experience. That which the Church has been in former ages —the spiritual interpreter of human life—it may be in the present. To break this line of development is to deny the reality of the moral achievements of other generations, and is to take away all assurance and confidence in seeking to follow the will of God. If the past is dumb; if each new generation begins anew its toilsome search for truth; if authority, which has tested its power through stress and strain, has no command over us, then we live in a world of illusion.

It is the highest act of faith to-day to hold unwaveringly the belief that the institution which once had power to bring order out of chaos, light out of darkness, moral motive out of wickedness—which flooded human life with the radiance of a divine revelation—has yet power to answer the questions of the mind and still the troubled waters of the soul.

The Church is called the "body of Christ"—His eyes, His voice, His hands, His feet. It is called the "living witness of God" in the world of ignorance and sin and sorrow. These are universal figures, and reveal a spirit and a purpose. Their meaning must change with man's change—enlarge with man's growth. They can be stated in no one language, and defined in the terms of no one philosophy. They are symbolic expressions, pictorial terms. We use them as the carriers of our thought or emotion.

When the creeds were forced upon the Church, it was under the stress of impending danger, the danger of disbelief in the eternal and all-powerful God, and in the true sonship of Christ. That is still the danger which confronts the Church to-day—a danger within and without. How are we to meet it? We have had put into our hands these ancient symbols which in countless struggles have been the watchwords of faith. They are steeped in religious sentiment, as old violins are in harmony. They are intelligible symbols to all Christendom. They carry into the human mind suggestions that are indefinable. They are still the universal watchwords of the faith. And in the largest possible interpretation of the Church's mission and destiny, those symbols will remain the messengers of the divine spirit to the souls of men. When we have grasped the idea that the Church is called to bear witness to the true life of God and the true sonship of Christ—that it must at last embrace "the whole of human society, organised for the spiritual ends of man"—then the questions of metaphysics and the niceties of definitions grow insignificant before the sublime and compelling purpose for which the Church exists.

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THE NEW STOICISM.

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WE have it on the authority of the Rev. R. J. Campbell that the term "New Theology," applied to his teaching by the newspapers, is not originated by him, and suggestions have been made in various quarters as to the affinities of this "New Theology" to other forms of Christian teaching. But I have nowhere seen it suggested that the specific doctrine which seems most characteristic of this school of thought is to be identified with the teaching of one particular school of philosophy in antiquity. That such is my belief is indicated by the title that I have put at the head of this article.[1]

I hope that in calling the New Theology a form of Stoicism I shall not seem to any readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL to be casting any slur upon it. It ought surely to be evident to students of philosophy, especially after the illuminating chapters in Caird's *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* and Dill's *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, that the name of Stoic is one which carries no reproach. But the world at large, I am afraid, is too ill-informed as to the teaching of this school to be capable of rendering to it the respect which is its due. Even students of philosophy and theology are apt to pass it by as the doctrine of "queer people" who had not found their way to consistency

[1] Sir Oliver Lodge, in his "Suggestions towards the Re-interpretation of Christian Doctrine" (HIBBERT JOURNAL, April 1904, p. 474) recognises that the doctrine has been preached and practised "by some mighty ones even before the advent of Jesus of Nazareth," and refers to Plato (*Symposium*, 192–212).

of thought or expression, and whose doctrines, in so far as they are intelligible, are calculated to excite but a cold admiration. The Stoic "apathy" strikes the modern reader as a thing to shiver at; and there is, indeed, in this respect nothing analogous to Stoicism in the theology of Mr Campbell; but we do no justice to ancient Stoicism if we content ourselves with merely shivering at it, as I shall try to indicate below. My object, however, is neither to defend nor to attack; the question which I propose to discuss is a purely historical one, with which my own personal admiration for the Stoics has nothing to do, though it may have had something to do with my writing the present article.

The doctrines which I include under the name "New Stoicism" are: (1) those of the Rev. R. J. Campbell, so far as they are known to me from casual newspaper notices, and from the anonymous work entitled *The Creed of Christ*, which has been publicly accepted by Mr Campbell as being in part an expression of his views;[1] (2) those of Sir Oliver Lodge, as expressed in a series of articles in the HIBBERT JOURNAL. My justification for putting these doctrines together as expressions of one and the same point of view is that Sir O. Lodge is recognised by Mr Campbell as an ally, according to a reporter in the *Daily Mail*.[2] But it by no means follows that Mr Campbell agrees with Sir O. Lodge in all points, nor have I any warrant for thinking that Sir Oliver would subscribe in all particulars to *The Creed of Christ*. I must therefore speak rather of the tendencies of a school of thought than of the doctrines of particular persons, and guard myself from misrepresenting anyone's special attitude by quoting my authority for each point of doctrine to which I refer.

The fundamental article of faith of this school is clearly the doctrine of the Immanence of God, interpreted in a special

[1] "A considerable portion of it has already entered into my pulpit teaching, which is the same thing as to say that most of the ideas herein set forth are already in the air."—The Rev. R. J. Campbell, in the *Daily Chronicle*.

[2] *Daily Mail*, 12th January 1907: interview with Mr Campbell.

sense—that of "the essential oneness of God and man."[1] "There is no real distinction between humanity and Deity."[1] "The seat of religious authority is within not without the human soul."[1] "Every individual consciousness is a ray of the universal consciousness and cannot be destroyed."[1] "Jesus was divine, but so are we. His mission was to make us realise our divinity and our oneness with God."[1] "It is the gospel of the humanity of God and of the divinity of man."[2]

The same point of view looms large in *The Creed of Christ*. The conception of God as an indwelling spirit is defined in such passages as the following on the "Higher Pantheism":—"The conception of God as a Father was balanced in His [Christ's] mind—balanced, and in some sort elucidated—by the conception of God as an Indwelling Spirit. It is not the universe as seen by man's bodily eye that is divine; . . . if we are to see the universe as it really is we must look within. . . . Primarily then, and also finally, man must seek for God in his own soul. If and so far as he can find God there he will find Him elsewhere; and the nearer he grows, by the expansion and evolution of his own inner life, to the God within, the wider is the world that he sees to be illuminated by God's presence; . . . for if God the Father is the true Light of nature, God the Indwelling Spirit is the true self of man."[3] "To grow in grace, to become the God that one really is (though now 'in the germ'), to earn the right to say, 'I and my Father are one'—this is the kingdom of God, and this is the whole duty of man."[4]

Sir Oliver Lodge sets forth the doctrine of the Immanence of God in the universe as a whole, but *par excellence* in man, in the following passages:—"The nature of God is displayed in part by everything, to those who have eyes to see it, but is displayed most clearly and fully by the highest type of exist-

[1] *Daily Mail*, 12th January 1907: interview with Mr Campbell.
[2] Second interview with Mr Campbell, *Daily Mail*, 23rd January 1907.
[3] *The Creed of Christ*, pp. 106 and 107.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

ence."[1] "This idea—the humanity of God and the divinity of man—I conceive to be a truth which constituted the chief secret and inspiration of Jesus: 'I and the Father are one.'"[1] In the same article he speaks of "the divinity of Jesus and of all other noble and saintly souls, in so far as they too have been inflamed by a spark of the Deity."[2] And again man is described as "a spark of the divine Spirit never to be quenched."[2] God is spoken of as lamenting "the rebellious and misguided activity of the free agents brought into being by Himself as part of Himself; He enters into the storm and conflict, and is subject to conditions as the Soul of it all."[3] "This is the revelation of Christ. This was the idea which he grasped during those forty days of solitary communion, and never subsequently let go."[3] "The Christian God is revealed as the incarnate spirit of humanity, or rather the incarnate spirit of humanity is recognised as a real intrinsic part of God: 'the Kingdom of Heaven is within you'—surely one of the most inspired utterances of antiquity."[4] And in another article[5] Sir Oliver quotes with approval, as an expression of his own optimistic creed, the well-known lines of Pope:

> "But parts of one stupendous whole
> Whose body Nature is, and God the soul."

Now all this—excepting, of course, the statements referring to Christ—seems to me to be pure Stoicism, even down to its metaphors. The differentia of the above doctrine of the Divine Immanence is that God is not merely *in* the human soul, but partially *identical* with it.[6] I recognise, of course, that the same phraseology often covers entirely different meanings: I am well aware that when Sir Oliver Lodge speaks of "ether"

[1] HIBBERT JOURNAL, April 1906, p. 653.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 655 f. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 658.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 659. See also HIBBERT JOURNAL, April 1904, pp. 469, 470.
[5] *Ibid.*, January 1905, p. 331.
[6] In two of the above quotations the doctrine seems to be guarded by the words "in so far as"; and there is also a latent difficulty in God's lamenting the rebellious activity of a part of Himself. But the teaching of these passages, taken together, seems to be free from ambiguity.

he means something which agrees with the Stoic αἰθήρ only in name. And it is obvious that to the modern mind, with all the developments of modern and ancient philosophy behind it, terms must be fraught with a fulness of meaning and association which cannot have been present to a Stoic of the first century of our era. But I confess I do not see where the essential difference comes in between the doctrine of Immanence as interpreted above and that fundamental article of the theology or physics [1] of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius according to which man's rational soul is not merely god*like*, or capable of attaining to likeness (ὁμοίωσις) to God, or akin (συγγενής) to God, as Plato had taught, but actually a "chip" or "fragment" or emanation of Deity.[2] "Unitarianism," says Mr Campbell, "makes a great gulf, and puts man on one side and God on the other": [3] it appears, then, that he goes further than Martineau in identifying God with man, or man with God.

There is, indeed, little or no religious feeling to be found in the fragmentary quotations which are all that we have to represent the pantheism of the early Stoics—always excepting the hymns of Cleanthes; but a new element entered into the teaching of Poseidonius, due to the influence of Platonism; and the Neo-Stoicism of the first and second centuries A.D. developed into a fervidly religious philosophy, in the fullest sense of the term. It is to this latter form of Stoicism that I refer in this article.

To the Stoic, every part of the universe was a part of God; but man's reason was a part of Him in a higher degree than all else in the universe—severed, indeed, from Him, yet not so far severed but that it might be, and was, identified with Him; so that we sometimes find the Stoics applying to the human reason the very term God (θεός). In their materialistic

[1] The Stoics, like the early philosophers of Ionia, treated theology as part of physics, *i.e.* as a doctrine of the constitution of the universe and the nature of man.

[2] The Stoic terms were ἀπόσπασμα and ἀπόμοιρα and ἀπόρροια.

[3] *Daily Mail*, 12th January 1907.

terminology (derived from Heracleitus), mind was the pure fire or æther which constituted the ultimate reality of the universe; matter was the debased or disintegrated form of it; and the "God within" was of the etherial fire. That some degree of separateness of the soul from God was recognised by the Stoics must be admitted. Otherwise they would not have taught that at death the soul maintains its individual existence for a certain time, *i.e.* until it is ultimately absorbed into the Deity (at the ἐκπύρωσις or development of the universe into its highest form): an absolutely inseparable part of the Deity would necessarily have been conceived as incapable of retaining its identity even for a limited period after separation from the body. They might, consistently with their principles, have taught a permanent identity of the soul after death. But the separation was conceived as between two bodies having a common substance, not as a difference of nature; and some degree of separateness seems to be an inevitable postulate of any theory that identifies the human with the divine without giving up entirely the belief in the freedom of the will and moral responsibility. The "New Stoicism" would probably go farther rather than less far in this direction than the Old. "Sin is an offence against the God within."[1]

What will probably be felt as a greater difference between the two doctrines is the materialistic theory to which, as indicated above, the Stoics frankly held; yet I doubt whether this difference is really fundamental. The materialism of the Stoics simply spelt monism, *i.e.* it was due not to any kind of ethical materialism, but simply to the desire to find unity in the universe, and their adoption of "rational fire" (πῦρ νοερόν) as the fundamental constituent of all that is brings them curiously into line with Sir Oliver Lodge's doctrine of ether as a substance in which matter and mind find their ultimate unity.[2] "This dependence of the spiritual on a vehicle for manifestation is not likely to be a purely temporary condition:

[1] Mr Campbell, in *Daily Mail*, 12th January 1907.

[2] Hibbert Journal, October 1906, p. 194.

it is probably a sign and sample of something which has an eternal significance, a representation of some permanent truth." "Though it by no means follows that mind is dependent on matter as we know it, it will probably be still by means of something akin to matter—something which can act as a vehicle and represent it in the same sort of way as matter represents it now—that it will hereafter be manifested."[1] The Stoics conceived of their ether as existing at various degrees of tension. "At the highest grade of tension the πνεῦμα (the term usually employed in this connexion) acts as the world-soul (*anima mundi*) super-sensuous and ethereal, occupying the same relation to the universe as the individual soul to the human organism. . . . Thus the doctrine accounted for the existence of as many kinds of being as there might be kinds or degrees of tension" (Rendall, introduction to his translation of Marcus Aurelius, pp. liv.–lviii.). But their use of the term "God" was not consistent. Sometimes it denotes the soul of the universe, sometimes the totality of existence, and the two conceptions are curiously blended in the following passage:—

"What is God? The mind of the universe. What is God? The whole of what you see and the whole of what you do not see. We do not ascribe to Him the magnitude which is His due—a magnitude beyond which thought cannot go—unless He alone is all things and informs His handiwork within and without. What then distinguishes God's nature from ours? In man mind is the nobler part; in God there is no part that is not mind. He is all reason" (Seneca, *Nat. Quæst.*, i., Prol. 11–17).

The following passage may be taken as illustrating the relation of God to man:—

"God is near thee, He is with thee, is within thee. Yes, Lucilius, a holy spirit has his seat within us (*sacer intra nos spiritus sedet*), the watcher and keeper of our good and our evil (deeds?); as he is treated by us, so he treats us. None is good without God: can anyone rise above fortune unless by His help? It is He that gives great and exalted counsels. In every good man dwells a god (*quis deus incertum est, habitat deus*, a quotation from Vergil). When one enters a forest peopled with aged trees of extraordinary height, the branches of which thickly laid one above the other shut out the light of day,

[1] Hibbert Journal, January 1906, p. 319 f.

at that moment the loftiness of the trees, the silence of the spot and the awful shadow, so dense and unbroken upon the open plain, make your heart confess to a power divine. When you see a man intrepid in danger, inaccessible to passion, happy in adversity, calm in the midst of the tempest, regarding his fellow-men as it were from a higher altitude and the gods as equals, is not your heart filled with reverence for him? Will you not say, 'Here is something too great and lofty to be supposed to be of the same nature as the poor body in which it resides; it is not of earth, the power of God has descended upon this man. . . . As the rays of the sun touch the earth indeed, but reside in the place from which they are emitted, so the great and holy spirit, which has been sent down in order that we may know the divine more nearly, holds converse with us indeed, but maintains his connexion with his source (*hæret origini suæ*); on this he is dependent, to this his regard is directed, towards this he strives; in man he dwells as a better (*melior*) . . . . And the better part of man is that which is man's own—his mind and the perfected reason in his mind" (Seneca, *Epist. to Lucilius*, xli. 1–5, and part of 8).

The last part shows that Seneca, spite of some ambiguous phraseology, is identifying reason with Deity, though not with the whole of Deity; *cf.* *Epist.* lxvi. 12: "Reason is nothing else than a portion of the divine Spirit enveloped in a human body." If Seneca had meant immanence in a different sense, he would have spoken of the divine Spirit as dwelling not in the body, but in the mind of man.

The "God within" (ὁ ἔνδον θεός or δαίμων, τὸ ἐν σοὶ θεῖον) is a constantly recurring theme of Marcus Aurelius:

"You forget man's brotherhood with all mankind, not by blood or physical descent, but by community in mind: and yet again that each man's mind is God, an efflux of Deity" (Marcus Aurelius, xii. 26; I quote from Rendall's translation).

"He lives with the gods who ever presents to them his soul acceptant of their dispensations and doing the will of that *daimon* which Zeus has given to each man for his controller and governor, a fragment of himself—that is, the mind and reason of each" (*ibid.*, v. 27).

"It is the good man's distinction to keep the God implanted in his breast unsoiled, unperturbed by any tumult of impressions, keeping His watch serene, a seemly follower of God, not false to truth in utterance or to justice in act" (*ibid.*, iii. 16; *cf.* ii. 13, 17; iii. 5, 6, 7, 12; v. 10; viii. 45; xii. 1).

And he recognises that "the most precious organ we possess" exists in bad as well as in good men (*ibid.*, x. 13): the "God within" may be either kept pure or debased.

Epictetus has the same doctrine of the relation of God to

man; the souls of men are "bound up with and united to God as parts and fragments of Him" (*Diss.*, i. 14. 6).

"God is within and is your *daimon*" (*ibid.*, i. 14. 14; *cf.* ii. 8. 11, and Plato, *Timæus*, 90, A–C).

That the same doctrine was held by the writers of the middle Stoa is shown by Cicero and Horace: *Deum te igitur scito esse* (*Somnium Scipionis*, 18); *Dominans ille in nobis Deus* (*Tusc.*, i. 30, 74; *cf.* i. 26, 65, v. 13, 38; *De Offic.*, iii. 10, 44; *De Sen.*, 21, 78, etc.); *Divinæ particula auræ* (Hor. *Sat.* ii. 2, 79; here *aura* translates πνεῦμα). Participation in the *divina mens* and *igneus vigor et cœlestis origo* is extended by Vergil to the lower animals (*Georg.*, iv. 219–227; *Æn.*, vi. 724–732). The caricatures of Stoic paradoxes which Cicero and Horace are fond of drawing have blinded many readers to the deep sympathy which both these writers have with the essentials of Stoicism. Horace in one passage goes the whole length of the Stoic paradox that it is as great a sin to steal a single bean as to steal a thousand bushels (*Epist.*, i. 16. 55 f.).

It may be objected that this doctrine is much older than the Stoics, and it is quite true that the Stoics owed much to their predecessors. There was also a deep vein of mysticism in the Greek nature: the germ of it is to be found in the ecstatic cult of the Thracian Dionysus and the mysticism of the Orphic sects. Heracleitus of Ephesus also had anticipated the Stoic doctrine in principle. Euripides had taught that the soul is akin to the αἰθήρ.[1] But it was the Stoics who developed their doctrine as an integral part of a system of thought, which, in its later form, may be described as mysticism propounded in terms of Heracleitean physics; and it was from the Roman Stoics that it passed to the modern world.

But I do not for a moment mean to suggest that the "New

[1] *Cf.* too frag. 1018, ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεός, and *Troad.* 879, *Hel.* 1014 f. This doctrine was apparently derived immediately from Diogenes of Apollonia, who had called the "air within" (*i.e.* the soul) μικρὸν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ: see Mr Adam's recent Cambridge Prelection, where reference will also be found to Pindar's frag. 131, and to Socrates as reported in parts of the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon (p. 48 f.).

Theology" is directly borrowed from Stoicism. On the contrary, I should be inclined to suppose that the influence of Stoicism has here been mediated by modern literature and modern theology and philosophy. Stoicism has been in the air for so long, and has permeated modern thought and terminology in such a way, that the precise course of its influence can in most cases be only surmised. But I will quote a few evidences that the presence of Stoicism may sometimes be detected in places where it would *a priori* be least expected; and first in Shakespeare. In the *Tempest* (ii. 1. 278) Antonio says: "But I feel not this Deity in my bosom." Will anyone maintain that the poet is here propounding a theory of conscience devised by himself? Hardly in a context like that. The phrase "Deity in my bosom" enters into the speech of Antonio as something ready-made, just as the "music of the spheres" enters into the speech of Lorenzo in the *Merchant of Venice* (v. 1. 60–65); and the immediate source of both these ideas can be looked for only in one quarter. Stoicism has coloured Shakespeare's whole ethical ideal. When he wants to describe an ideal type of humanity (Horatio), he turns to the Stoic "wise man":

> "A man that fortune's buffets and rewards
> Hast ta'en with equal thanks: and blest are those
> Whose blood and judgment are so well commingled
> That they are not a pipe for fortune's finger
> To sound what stop she please. *Give me that man*
> *That is not passion's slave,* and I will wear him
> In my heart's core, aye, in my heart of heart."

Horatio is indeed, as he himself says, "more an antique Roman than a Dane." I have elsewhere called attention to the fact that all the leading ideas of Portia's great speech on mercy are to be found in the *De Clementia* of Seneca.[1] When Chapman sets himself to draw the character of Clermont d'Ambois he turns to or calls to mind his Epictetus.[2] Pope is

[1] *Congress of Arts and Science, St Louis,* 1904, vol. iii. pp. 189 f.; *National Review,* June 1906, pp. 682 f.

[2] See notes by H. Richards in Boas' edition of *Bussy d'Ambois* and *The Revenge of Bussy d'Ambois* (Heath & Co., 1905).

full of Stoic terminology, *e.g.* he has introduced it into his ode called *The Dying Christian to his Soul*, in the original of which (Hadrian's *Animula vagula, blandula*), I find no trace of Stoicism:

> "Vital spark of heavenly flame,
> Quit, O quit, this mortal frame."

Wordsworth and the Wordsworthian conception of nature seem to me to be deeply tinged with Stoicism,[1] though my colleague, Professor Churton Collins, informs me that there is no proof that Wordsworth had ever read a line of any professedly Stoic writer, adding, however, that it is at least possible that he had read Jeremy Collier's translation of *Marcus Aurelius* and Mrs Carter's *Epictetus*, which were popular books of the day; moreover, he may have known something of Stoicism through Coleridge. Here is an illustration from Carlyle (*Sartor Resartus*, Book I., ch. 8): "We are—we know not what;—light-sparkles floating in the æther of Deity." Emerson's *Divinity School Address* of 1838 is so permeated with the doctrine of the "Indwelling Supreme Spirit" that it might almost be called an exposition of Stoicism.

The great note of Stoicism is its modernity. The great principles of humanity, of the brotherhood of the whole human race, of the divinity of nature as a "*templum deorum immortalium*" (Seneca, *de Benef.*, vii. 7. 3), of Church as distinct from State, were voiced, or at least anticipated in principle, by Stoicism. Its gist may be summed up as a doctrine of the God within issuing in a creed of social brotherhood.[2] Its

[1] *E.g.* the famous passage in *Tintern Abbey* and many passages in the fourth book of the *Excursion*: *e.g.*

> "Conscience reverenced and obeyed
> As God's most intimate Presence in the soul
> And His most perfect image in the world."

> "By Thy grace
> The particle divine remained unquenched."

[2] Mr Campbell has emphasised the relation of his teaching to modern social movements. "We look upon ourselves as representing in the sphere of

influence on pulpit oratory was noticed by Sir Thomas Browne (*Religio Medici*, part i.): "And truly there are singular pieces in the philosophy of Zeno and doctrine of the Stoics which I perceive, delivered in a pulpit, pass for current divinity." If the same thing is to some extent true at the present day, need we be surprised? It may, indeed, be partly due to forces now at work in the religious world that a tendency towards Stoical ways of thought is making itself felt. The old Stoicism of Alexander's empire was a movement in which the human spirit burst the bonds of the old Greek city-state, and embraced a larger conception of citizenship—a poor substitute, according to most historians, for the intenser patriotism of the classical age of Greece. Is there not something analogous to this in the movement which we are witnessing in our day—a movement away from the narrowing bonds of sect and towards a more comprehensive conception of a "city of God," in which all those who are true to themselves and the light that is in them shall find themselves united as brethren?

One word in conclusion. In saying that the relation of God to man in the recently emphasised aspects of theology is Stoic, I do not conceive myself to be saying that it is not Christian. Christianity on its philosophical and ethical side is clearly akin to Stoicism, as St Paul himself seems to have recognised, if the words attributed to him in Acts xvii. 24–28 may be accepted as representing what he actually said when he stood on the Areopagus. Nor is this surprising: all the Stoics of note prior to the Christian era were of Oriental origin. The cradle of Stoicism was that Greater Greece of which Palestine formed a part. What is noteworthy, then, in the form of doctrine here under discussion, is not that it has affinities with Stoicism, but that it seems to go farther in the direction of Stoicism than the doctrine of such theologians as, say, Martineau or Illingworth. Shall I misrepresent the

religion the same movement that in the sphere of politics and sociology is making for a better social order" (*Daily Mail*, 12th January 1907).

facts if I say that any doctrine of Immanence approaches Stoicism in proportion as it regards God as transcending man only in the sense in which a whole transcends its part?

E. A. SONNENSCHEIN.

BIRMINGHAM.

Postscript.—Sir Oliver Lodge, after reading the above article, remarks, "I would only like you to make it clear that I at any rate do not mean *identity* of human and Divine, unless you are willing to say that an atom of oxygen is 'identical' with the atmosphere." I gladly quote this statement, with a view to avoiding a possible misunderstanding. Nor did the Stoic point of view involve an identity, but only a partial identity, of God and man: that is to say, they conceived man's rational soul as identical not with God but with a part of God. Whether Sir Oliver would accept this statement I do not know. In his mind, doubtless, the word "atmosphere" connotes rain and storm and sunset beauty, together with sound waves and other effects far transcending the possibilities of an atom.

Dr J. Rendel Harris calls my attention to the fact that early members of the Society of Friends "made their leading doctrine of the 'Inner Light' very near to the doctrine of the Divine Immanence, though they did not equate God and the world or God and man"; and he refers me to William Penn's *The Christian Quaker and his Divine Testimony Vindicated* (1674). On turning to this most interesting and learned (though in some respects uncritical) book, I find to my surprise that Penn not only identifies the "Inner Light of the Gentiles" with the Christian revelation of God to man, but quotes a long array of passages from Greek philosophers, including the Stoics, in support of this identity.

BETWEEN DEATH AND LIFE.[1]

I LAY upon the edge of Death, looking out.

The world within the four walls of that room of pain was grown unreal; the chairs and tables, the chest of drawers, the wardrobe, stood mere phantoms of themselves through which I saw. There was no thickness to them. As shapes without solidity or substance, they shifted as a breath upon the water, as ghosts in a dream. The book-case and the pictures, the oaken bed-rail, and the scarlet eiderdown upon it, the very walls themselves were just little bits of mist upon the Great Beyond. But Death was real.

From time to time the faces of my nurses bent down above me; and the sea of pain, in which I lay, rolled, a great wave from end to end, submerging me. Yet even pain had lost its live intenseness. The doctors came and watched; one whom I loved stayed by me; and all to me were as shadows on the background of Eternity. They were not unreal, but I saw them, not set in time and space, not standing on solid floors within a bedroom's walls, but clean-cut against Infinity; and their familiar selves, uprooted from their earthly setting and moving against the vastness of that Great Beyond, showed incongruous. And only that which sat behind their eyes, and watched me as I lay, belonged to Death and me.

In this unreal world there was no time, no sense of present, past, or future, but one all-embracing *is*. Nor in this timeless *now* was there any sense of space. The things that once had

[1] The Editor is in a position to state that what follows is a genuine record of experience.

made locality, I saw transparent. Behind, before, beyond, and through them all was the vastness of infinitude.

So I lay upon the edge of Death, looking out. And dying was not strange at all, but natural as the most familiar act of life, and Death was very beautiful. It lay just there, that Great Beyond, and I saw it as one sees the earth at sunrise from the window of a tower; yet how it was is difficult to tell, for things outside of this world are outside of this world's speech; yet I knew that it was infinite, eternal, and I was part of it. I, who in my living life had clung so hard to personality, had said there was no "*after*" if the ego ceased to be, I, as I, did not exist. The individual was too little. And yet I was. And immortality, a continued being, an everlasting sleep, the continuance of self, annihilation even, or any other of the things which we desire or fear while this world shuts us in, just didn't matter, for whatever was in that Beyond I knew was surely *best*. Then I, to whom trust was difficult and reason always insistent, I trusted—trusted even the pain of the one who, loving, must live without.

So I lay and looked at Death, and it was to me as looking at a land all bathed in sunshine, full of life, and loving. There was no fear, for Death and I belonged.

It was for a space which men call seven days that I lay looking at Death, so close, that the living thought I could not live. Then slowly the vision of that sunlit land was covered up. The little bits of mist that were the things of earth grew thicker, grew solid. They shut out that Great Beyond. They shut in space and time. They made once more the human world. I came back to life and found it beautiful, more beautiful and more joyful than before, because my eyes had seen the vision of that beauty and that joy which we call Death. Always I had loved the beauty of the world, but now it was all filled from end to end with the joy which is eternal. The colours showed more rich, more intense. They were not changed in shade but changed in substance, as eyes are changed when love shines through.

The outlines were purer, cleaner. They had been fresh-washed in the spring of being. And the grass and trees, the stones and mould, the very cups and saucers, had more meaning. They were all full as they could hold of life and radiance.

And I knew when I thought about it that the things which matter in this world are love and truth. Love which is love, and kindness which is love, and pity which is also love, these matter. And truth matters supremely. The being what one is and not pretending, the "talking with naked hearts" together, the seeing of things in time and in eternity, so that their values get a just perspective. Then conventions and society etiquette and all the things with which we hide ourselves from one another, or hide us from ourselves because we are afraid, became to me impossible. They showed so wasteful of true life and being, so needless too, for why should we fear misunderstanding?

And I noticed how the living, and I too before among them, will not call Death by his name: they speak of him as a "something happening," as a "loss"; they will not say to die, for consciously or unconsciously, to the living to die is to be buried, it is coffins, corpses, cemeteries, but to the *dying* Death is so little of these things that to name them is no effort. The living, though they know that it is not so, think of the cold, rigid body as sentient still. Their dead are there, sharing the discomforts of the funeral, feeling all the dampness of the grave. But to the dying, and to those who have come back, these things are not Death at all. You cannot think you have even the smallest share in them. And all sorrow for the dead was clean struck out. Grief for the living, for those who must still live without, was there, but altered somehow by that deep, still trust, and all the vastness of infinitude.

I had come back to life, and moved once more among the living, and the difference was immense. The men and women showed so beautiful, the joy of life so great. For from

out the world evil as such had disappeared. It was no longer there. It had grown transparent, and I saw through. Cruelty there was still, and drunkenness, misery and crime. But they were not real like love, which is the cause of all things, or like truth, which is the very mode of being, for they could not always be. And the only real things, the only things which matter in this world, are those which last.

So I came back to live a life among men, and the familiar sights and sounds made up once more the dear familiar world. Then one day, at the twilight, as I sat looking out at the shining green fields and the deep purple woods to where the pink clouds of the sunset slept in a sea-blue sky, the greatest change of all the changes Death had made struck sharply on me. And it was this. These pale, pink clouds, this sea-blue sky at which I looked, were no longer to me as the lid of all the world. They were the sky and clouds of *earth*. The sky and clouds which wrap this little earth, oh! such a little earth, and hide from it the great, deep, real world outside.

Then the spaces of the stars had meaning to me. They were no longer words. For I saw this world of ours, this little earth, lying as a drop of water on the hand of God. And its littleness, its very insignificance, was somehow good.

PERSONALITY IN GOD, CHRIST, MAN.

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It is in accord with the tendency of modern thought to insist on as exhaustive and accurate knowledge as possible of all the facts before any theory is formed, that psychology is coming to be more and more acknowledged as an indispensable auxiliary to theology. In determining what religion, or even the Christian religion, is, the testimony of the Holy Scriptures or the speculation of the philosophies is not regarded as final. The appeal is always to actual experience. What is distinctive of the mode of human life called religious or Christian? What does Christianity do for any man by way of inward change? How does it affect his memory of the past, his expectation for the future, his thoughts, feelings, wishes in the present? In any attempt at theological restatement this legitimate demand must be recognised and satisfied.

There is one conception which psychology, if it is to be at all an adequate interpretation of human consciousness, must carefully examine. This is *personality*. Human consciousness is not atomic, but organic. It is neither a succession of states nor a combination of faculties. There is one self, identical in all changes, manifest through all phases of the inner life. This unity of consciousness is presupposed in all mental phenomena, and cannot be explained as their resultant. Personality is an ultimate datum for psychology. If psychology is to be helpful to theology, it is in the analysis of this conception that we may look for most furtherance. The writer

of this article has found so much light thrown on some of the problems of theology by this conception of personality, that in what follows he ventures to indicate some suggestions towards theological restatement to be looked for from this source.

I. Without attempting to give an analysis of personality in the technical language of psychology, the writer may offer such an account in popular speech as may serve the immediate purpose. The first feature of personality to which attention may be called is *unity*. Mental phenomena—thoughts, feelings, wishes—are presented in great variety within the field of consciousness, and yet amid all the variety there is unity. It is the same self which thinks, feels, wills. But this is not all; the older psychology so spoke of the faculties of the soul as to give the impression of coexistent yet separate activities, and thus the self appeared as a combination of distinct faculties. But the unity of the inner life is so complete that, while we may distinguish phases of manifestation and operation, it is undesirable to speak of faculties. Thought, feeling, will so blend in the common life that we must always think of personality as unity amid all variety.

There is not only variety in the mental phenomena which coexist in consciousness, but there is also a succession. There is a changeful stream of consciousness. Past, present, future are distinguished. We fully live only in the present, although we may retain something of the past in memory, and anticipate something of the future in hope. This escape from the immediate present before and behind points to the second feature of personality to be noted, that is, *identity*. The same self persists through the changeful years. The youth anticipates the triumphs of the man as his own gains. The old man looks back on the joys of his boyhood as his own good. The evil deed leaves an imperishable regret; and the good deed remains as a happy memory. There is inward development as well as outward change; tastes, habits, beliefs come and go, even the character may be transformed; and yet the subject of these numerous variations preserves *identity*.

More emphasis is laid by psychology now than formerly on desire and action rather than on thought. The end is living, and not thinking. Thinking even is determined by the needs of life. "The selective interest," says Ward, "which we may fairly take as characteristic in some measure of all experience, leads to the remark that experience as a process may be further defined as a process of self-conservation, and so far justifies us in describing it as life, or *βίος*. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the objects of experience are not primarily objects of knowledge, but objects of conation, *i.e.* of appetite and aversion. For though an object must be cognised before it can be liked or disliked, still it is to interesting objects that the subject mainly attends, and it is with these, therefore, that the subject acquires a closer and preciser acquaintance" (*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. 131). We may add to *unity* and *identity*, as the third feature of personality, *practicality*.

Conation implies an end sought, striven for, aimed at. The ends men are conscious of setting before themselves are numerous and varied; but all may be embraced in one aim, self-realisation. *Personality* is not made in man, it is still in the making. Man grows in wisdom and grace as well as in stature. The process of life is not only continuous, it is also progressive. Acts form habits, and habits fix character; the mind not only increases its content, but also improves its capacity; moods become dispositions. *Development* is the law of human personality. To begin with, personality is a possibility to be realised, and a promise to be fulfilled. It remains a *unity*, but it becomes an always more complex unity. It preserves its *identity*; but this is not the sameness of the unchanged, but constancy in change—the new the unfolding of the old. Its *practicality* may appear concerned with many things, but the aim in all is its own *development*.

Human personality is not disembodied spirit; this development is conditioned by the growth of the body. All mental activities have their organic accompaniments. There is what has been called a *psycho-physical parallelism*. Materialism seeks

to resolve mental states into physical antecedents. But it is generally recognised that the brain does not and cannot explain the consciousness; the transition from chemical processes to thoughts, feelings, wishes is unthinkable. On the other hand, mind is conscious of directing and controlling body; and "volition counts for something as a condition of the course of events." "Matter is the vehicle of mind, but it is dominated and transcended by it." Thus speaks Sir Oliver Lodge. He even declares that the incarnation of the soul in the body may not be complete. "It is quite credible that our whole and entire personality is never terrestrially manifest" (*Life and Matter*, p. 123). We may then affirm the *transcendence* of personality of its physical organ.

At the same time there can be no doubt that the development of the personality, even if only partially incarnated, is very largely conditioned by the physical organism. Consciousness does not retain the content of the whole past; but memory may recall much of it. There can be no doubt whatever that memory depends on organic modifications. The feelings and desires that emerge in consciousness are not wholly determined by antecedent states of consciousness, but are in measure due to bodily conditions. But there seems to be even mental process which does not emerge in consciousness, although the result may. There is what Hamilton called "mental latency," what Carpenter has called "unconscious cerebration," and what James prefers to call "subconscious" or "subliminal" processes.

This latency may be regarded as having two forms. That which has been reality for consciousness may survive in the subconsciousness, and may under due stimulation be revived for consciousness. But also there may be possibility of faculty and relation realised in measure in the subconscious, which on its emergence in consciousness may be the revelation of new reality. The flash of genius in resolving the problems of thought and life may not be as unprepared as it seems. The conversion of the soul may be sudden only in the consciousness

of the change. In that subconscious region too there may be contact with an environment of which the consciousness gains only brief glimpses. The soul may be drawing draughts of refreshment from the fountains of eternal life, when it knows not, but in the strength of which it may go for many days. There is thus in personality *possibility* which consciousness does not exhaust.

II. When we turn from these obscure regions, where we can only imagine and conjecture, we find that in the clear light of consciousness personality always presents to itself an *ideal.* It knows that it is not what it ought to be. The mind of man seeks truth, the perfect accord of his thought with reality as it is. Man cannot penetrate the inmost essence of the world. It is to him *phenomenon,* that which appears; he is desirous of reaching the *noumenon,* that which is. His senses cannot get beyond the *phenomenal,* and so by thought he seeks to conceive the *noumenal.* The possibility of his mind would be fully realised if he could think everything just as it is. The will of man seeks self-control—not only mastery over circumstances, but also consistency of character, the subordination of all desires, appetites, and passions to the end for the whole personality which is recognised as good. The heart of man has yearnings that seek satisfaction; happiness or, to use a more appropriate term, blessedness is the aim. Men do seek satisfaction in many forms—pleasure, wealth, position, power, fame; but the exclusive pursuit of any of these always ends in disappointment, and often in failure in what are universally recognised as the higher elements of life. *Ideality* is a necessary characteristic of personality. It knows itself a possibility unrealised, a promise unfulfilled. But this is not all. The *ideal* comes as a *categorical imperative.* It is not only possibility, but duty; not only promise, but obligation. Human personality is conscious that the call of the ideal is authoritative. The mind ought to seek truth, and the will the good; and only as this duty is done can happiness or blessedness be gained. The real self is not the self already

attained, but the self that is to be. The self as it is in memory and character is contrasted with the self revealed in the ideal; is condemned by it; but is destined for identity with it.

But in this affirmation we have already assumed a characteristic of personality which is the subject of debate—*liberty.* Kant has shown that the first postulate of the *categorical imperative* of the *moral law* is freedom. Man must be able to do what he knows he ought to do. Duty is not physical necessity, but moral necessity; its realisation must be willed. In two respects what has already been said appears to throw some light on this problem of freedom. It has already been shown that mind is not in absolute dependence on body; that personality transcends its organ. In the discussion of this question, then, we are beyond the region of physical causality. Action is not the necessary consequent of organic conditions. But we must not treat the mental as though it were but a counterpart of the material. We must *not* carry natural law into the spiritual world, for that is simply to confuse fundamental distinctions. The self that thinks, feels, wills is not merely the sum of thoughts, feelings, volitions. Even the fact of subconscious processes discredits the assumption of determinism that choice is the result of the strongest motive. This fact at least introduces an element of the incalculable in all human action. But can we so modify the statement as to affirm that action is the resultant of all the subconscious and conscious processes? That, it seems to the writer, is forbidden by this *ideality* of human personality. It not only transcends its organ; it also transcends its own empirical reality. The realised self, conscious or sub-conscious, is not the whole self. In its ideals the self is conscious of its own unrealised possibility. That possibility is not merely the resultant of its empirical reality. Memories, opinions, habits, character do not constitute it what it is; for the ideal by its very nature transcends all these. Liberty, then, is not indeterminate action, but action determined, not by the empirical, but the ideal personality.

This ideal personality, this unrealised possibility, this unfulfilled promise, may, however, act in disregard of its own distinctive law. The freedom from limitation by empirical reality which it enjoys in order to realise its ideals progressively, it may abuse in order to give false emphasis, undue influence, to what contradicts its ideals. Falsehood, hate, wrong are acts of this ideal personality which contradict what is its very essence; it is as the possibility and the promise of truth, love, goodness that the personality is undetermined by what it has already empirically become. The consequence is, and that necessarily, that in the abuse of freedom is its own limitation, its own ultimate extinction. Wrong acts fix wrong habits, and these increasingly become a fetter to the freedom that the personality still retains. Should the ideal be altogether abandoned, the freedom that conditions its realisation would also be lost. In *conversion* the ideal so vigorously reasserts itself, that the fetters of the empirical self are broken, and freedom is in measure regained.

Through its ideals and the liberty by which they are realised the personality is taken altogether out of the region of phenomenal reality, and its categories. *Effect* as the sum of the conditions which we call *cause* is a conception which does not apply to the action of the personality; for the self does not pass over into, and cease to be, in its action. There is an infinitude about personality which distinguishes it from even the experience and the character of the self. Hence, if you knew the past experience and the present character of any man, you could not infallibly conjecture his future conduct, as has often been assumed. If his personality is but feebly developed—that is, if ideals are not being realised by him—then undoubtedly this forecast might be attempted with more prospect of success; but if he is fully living in his ideals, his personality will so develop as to be immeasurably more than a mere resultant of what he has been and now is.

The second postulate Kant assigned to the moral consciousness — *immortality* — also results from this conception of

personality. If the personality transcends its organ, if it transcends even the empirical self, if its ideals place its essence in a reality *noumenal* and even *supernatural*, nothing hinders the assumption that the realisation of its possibility, the fulfilment of its promise, may take place under other conditions than this present bodily life affords. Nay, the hindrance that the life here and now often offers to the realisation of the ideal self surely points to a realm in which all the conditions will be more favourable, in which the personality will possess itself and command the conditions of its realisation more fully than now.

III. We have hitherto been discussing personality as it is in human consciousness. We have seen how, if we follow its testimony to its last implicates, we are led out of the phenomenal into the noumenal region. We may now ask ourselves whether personality can be the clue that will lead us right through the labyrinth of the Universe. In other words, is the ultimate reality of the world personality? Can God be spoken of as personal? It is quite evident that there are characteristics of human personality which cannot be ascribed to God. All that is involved in what Professor Lodge calls the incarnation of personality is necessarily excluded from God. His mental operations do not depend in any way on any *organic changes*. But even in human personality that dependence is only relative, and God's transcendence of any organ of His activity may be conceived absolute as man's is not. Again, there can be no *subconscious processes* in God; but this is not to deny, but to affirm, His personality. This *subconsciousness* is a limitation of personality in its full sense. Perfect self-consciousness—that is, consciousness of the total reality which constitutes the self—is the ideal for personality. That there should be no condition of the life of the self not known and understood—that is the aim of all personal development on its intellectual side. *Development* is also by its very nature excluded from the divine. The temporal must have its roots in the eternal, and

the finite in the infinite. The eternal is, and does not become; the infinite is ever whole, and does not grow. In this development the human personality is conditioned intellectually and morally by the existence of the *not-self*. Nature and society are both necessary to the intelligence and character. But this dependence on the *not-self* belongs to human personality, and not to personality as such. We cannot ascribe the conditions of development to God who eternally and infinitely is.

Nevertheless, this does not involve that He cannot be personal. The conception of the *absolute* is that of reality which has all the conditions of its own existence in itself, and is not dependent on that which is not itself. What does even human personality strive for? Is it not that all that is alien to, should be assimilated in its reality? The self seeks to know the world as it knows itself; it seeks to be determined wholly by motives and reasons that belong to itself. Not personality, conditioned in its development by the not-self, is *ideal*, but personality which possesses and controls all that determines in any way its existence. God in this respect is more truly and fully personal than man is. If there be no development in God, He must be conceived not at all as *possibility*, but altogether as reality. If the ideal of human personality is attributable to God, it must be as perfectly realised. He is eternally what man seeks and strives in his conditioned personal development to become.

What hinders our conceiving the ultimate reality as truth, goodness, love? In the first place, if we do not so conceive God, then we do rob these ideals of human personality of their absolute authority. They claim man as the highest possible and conceivable. The perfect accord of thought and being, of will and end, of the need and the gain of life: this has an eternal and infinite value, this surely may be ascribed to the divine. If the ultimate reality be this, then man in seeking and striving for this is not pursuing his own imagination and his own invention, but is gaining possession in ever greater completeness of essential existence: is making his

own life more and more ultimately real. If, secondly, it be objected that even what is ideal for man may not really have infinite and eternal value, but only appear so to him, then it must be retorted, that unless an intolerable scepticism is to paralyse our aspiration and endeavour, we cannot believe that our ideals do so mock us.

Truth is the *infinite* and *absolute* in thought. It is thought that has no external limitation of ignorance or obscurity; it is thought that fully possesses its whole content, to which facts, laws, causes, reasons, ends form a perfectly harmonious, transparent, luminous system. Goodness is the *infinite* and *absolute* in will. It is will that is ever realising all its ends, that is ever commanding all the conditions of its activity, that has established a perfect accord between what is and what ought to be. Love is the *infinite* and *absolute* in feeling. It is life gained in being given; it is a self-communication that is a self-preservation; it is a generosity that blesses itself in blessing others. It is a happiness that is intensified by diffusion, the *intention* of which does not lessen with its *extension.* While the infinitude and absoluteness of God exclude the conditions and limitations of human personality, which have already been indicated, its *ideal,* which is its essential reality, is not excluded, but only perfectly realised, in the divine.

There are some thinkers who would speak of God as the Spirit of truth, goodness, love, and yet would refuse to call Him personal. But is not this an attempt at making an imaginary distinction? Can we conceive *spirit* otherwise than as *subject,* as the unity and the identity of the self? If God be truth, He thinks; goodness, He wills; love, He feels. Can thought, volition, emotion, or affection be detached from a subject? They have meaning only within self-consciousness. The characteristics of human consciousness—unity and identity—must be assigned to the divine self-consciousness. Above all local and temporal conditions God is eternally and infinitely one and the same; in Him is no division and no change. There is oneness and sameness amid the fulness and wholeness

of His life. And that life can be most adequately described in those ideals which give to the life of man its loftiest meaning and its greatest worth, the truth of the mind, the goodness of the will, the love of the heart. We may then truly and fitly speak of God as personal.

IV. May this conception of personality as common to God and man help us to conceive the union of God and man in Christ? The difficulty of the traditional Christology is that it places side by side in the person of Christ the human and the divine nature, and the duality of nature is never merged in the unity of the person. Generally the integrity of the humanity has been sacrificed to the completeness of the divinity. An impersonal humanity is assumed by the personal *Logos*, or Word of God. Sometimes Jesus acts as man, and sometimes as God. Or His humanity is ignorant of what to His divinity is intelligible. When we apply this Christology to the Gospels, we do not know whether Jesus is speaking with the authority of God or the limitation of man. While in former times the manhood was as a rule allowed to fall into the background, and the Godhead came always to the front, at present the tendency is so to assert the humanity as to obscure the divinity.

We need a restatement of Christology which will not start with abstract definitions of divine and human natures, and then attempt by many ingenious expedients to reconcile the contradictory attributes; but will begin with the historical reality, the self-consciousness of Jesus, and from the data thus afforded will draw its conclusions regarding the kind and the degree of union between the divine and the human in His person. In this modern Christology the conception of personality must take a very prominent place. If God and man are both personal, there is in the nature of each the bond of union. Neither God nor man needs essential change to become one. If still more human personality is in the course of development in order to realise progressively the ideal which is eternal reality in God, then human personality is not mutilated but completed by participation in the life of God,

and divine personality does not assume a mode of existence alien to its own in sharing the life of man.

Infinitude and *absoluteness* are the characteristics of the mode of personality in God. In Him personality is self-existent, self-determined, and self-limited. It is evident that neither infinitude nor absoluteness can be characteristic of the mode of personality in man. Jesus always confessed His dependence on His Father; the terms Father and Son would have no meaning at all, if dependence had not marked the life of Jesus. In relation to the world, the divine personality is *omnipresent*, *omniscient*, and *omnipotent*; the mind and the will of God are expressed and exercised in the Universe, but not limited, by its finite, relative conditions. There is no space distribution and no time succession in God, as in the world; and therefore the immanence of the divine intelligence and the divine energy is not conditioned as the Universe is; but God in His perfection always is, knows, and works in every span of space and every moment of time. Man is in being, knowing, and doing conditioned and limited by time and space. Not only is the totality of his knowledge and power limited, but he never possesses his mind and strength fully. His whole personality cannot be concentrated in any one moment of experience or activity. We do not in the Gospels find any claim made by Jesus to these divine attributes of omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence. In *the days of His flesh* He was localised in a body; He confessed limitations of knowledge and sought information from others; His miraculous power was dependent on prayer to God, and hindered by unbelief in man. If we duly consider, we shall recognise even that His moral development through temptation and trial would have been impossible without such limitations and conditions, that His filial relation to God could be real only as God taught Him what He knew, gave Him His works to do, imparted His fulness of life to Him. Not only in order to be manifest as human personality, but even to show divine personality in filial relation, these attributes must be laid aside in the Incarnation.

But if God is essentially perfect personality, truth, goodness, love, and if the ideal was reality in Christ, while it is only very partially realised in other men, may we not affirm that, without possessing or exercising these attributes of the divine mode of personality, He nevertheless shared what is essentially the life of God? It is as knowing, trusting, loving, and serving God as Father that Jesus claims to be Son. It is to a false metaphysics that we owe the assumption that ethical sonship, sonship revealed and realised in the entire personal development, is something else and less than an ontological sonship might be. If spirit be the ultimate reality, then there can be nothing more real than the sonship of Jesus as expressed in His self-consciousness. It is with God as Father—that is, with wisdom, goodness, and love perfect and communicative—that Jesus knew Himself to be one in His thoughts, feelings, aims, deeds; and it is vain to conceive a unity with God more real than this. In this personal union of God and man there is essential union.

The human personal development in Jesus was not arrested, or diverted, or mutilated by this union with God; but its possibility was realised, and its promise was fulfilled. Jesus was perfect man in being Son of God; for it was no alien relationship He assumed, but it was mankind's destination to God He accomplished. His mind was no less human in its operations because it was the channel of divine truth; His will was not less man's free will because it was exercised in doing the righteousness of God; His heart was not less what man's may be, because it received and diffused God's fatherly love. Receptivity for God is not the contradiction but the completion of human personality; for man is not meant and is not made to realise the ideal which is reality in God as an isolated, independent individual. God has not so made man that He Himself should be external to man. The individuality of man as creature does not, and cannot, mean absolute exclusion of the Creator. It is in fellowship with God, then, that man is to show the likeness of God. Jesus, in becoming

more and more the Son of God, became not less but more perfectly man. As His receptivity for the divine communication was truly human, it was a developing one. The Incarnation was, as Dorner has insisted, *progressive*; the union of man and God in Christ was conditioned by the laws and the stages of human development. The child Jesus did not know the divine wisdom or exercise the divine power given to Him beyond the measure of His childhood. As the possibility of the human personality was realised, so the closeness, the compass, and the content of its union with divine personality advanced and increased. It is only by such a conception of the Incarnation that we can fully recognise the reality of the humanity of Jesus without obscuring the divinity. Personality as common to God and man; human as completed only in divine personality—these must be fundamental principles of our Christology.

Not only in Christ is human personality destined for this completion. In Him men are called to become sons of God. What distinguishes Him from all His brethren is that it is through faith in His grace that this union of man with God is mediated. His receptivity is fully developed, the divine communication of life is fully made; in Him it hath pleased God that the fulness of the Godhead should dwell bodily (that is, under the conditions of Incarnation), and we may now receive of that fulness. It is in fellowship with the living Christ that human personality attains its completion; the life in the Spirit is a new creation in comparison with the creation subject to the bondage of corruption, but it is also the full consummation of human destiny. The ideal becomes progressively reality in man through the Spirit of God, and thus human personality becomes more and more fully an image of divine personality.

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THE NEUROTIC THEORY OF THE MIRACLES OF HEALING.

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To anyone who has followed the development of progressive criticism upon the subject of the New Testament miracles it will be apparent that there is now substantial agreement upon three points.

The first point concerns the historical character of the recorded occurrences in general. They are no longer accepted "*en bloc*" or rejected "*en bloc*," but they are sifted and separated, and the conclusion is reached that it is impossible to disentangle the narrative of the life of Christ from all the mighty works which are attributed to Him.

Professor Gardner tells us that "there can be no doubt that any attempt to eliminate from that life, as recorded in the gospels, all that is extraordinary and unusual in the relations of our Lord to the visible world, must result in its complete dissolution into myth and fancy." With this judgment may be put the dictum of the author of the article "Jesus" in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, who says, "The healing ministry, judged by critical tests, stands on as firm historical ground as the best accredited parts of the teaching."

Here we have a second point. Not only are we to recognise that wonderful works are too closely interwoven with the historical narrative to be dismissed wholesale, but we are to recognise that the irreducible residue which fair criticism cannot dissolve is that which is constituted by the

miracles of healing. Professor Harnack is in close accord with the writer whose words have just been quoted. He writes as follows: "That the earth in its course stood still; that a she-ass spoke; that a storm was quieted by a word, we do not believe, and we shall never again believe; but that the lame walked, the blind saw, and the deaf heard will not be so summarily dismissed as an illusion." (*What is Christianity?* p. 28.)

If the critics who admit the historical credibility of certain of the wonderful works, and who limit their credence to the works of healing, had stopped here, the establishment of their contention would only have involved the consideration of data of a textual or literary character. The criticism which their opponents would have urged against them would have raised for discussion such questions as the following:—Did Jesus Himself give any intimation of His own feeling that His powers were limited to one class of mighty work, to the exclusion of others? Did His disciples notice any habitual limitation in the exercise of His powers? Did the Jews ever contrast the restricted sphere of His command over nature with the greater wonders wrought by Moses and the prophets? Is there any evidence pointing to the actual performance of miracles of healing in the early stages of the ministry, from which, by process of natural exaggeration and accretion, the belief in greater miracles might seem to have gradually grown up? Is there any textual evidence in favour of miracles of healing having been genuine occurrences, which cannot be equally well adduced in favour of those other wonderful works which have been called (to distinguish them from the works of healing) "cosmical miracles"?

But progressive criticism, besides affirming its acceptance of the position that not all the miracles are unhistorical, and of the further position that the healing ministry is historical, has practically committed itself to a very bold and sweeping article of belief concerning the nature of the cures which composed this ministry of healing. It has adopted, with

much assurance, the opinion that the diseases which were healed were what doctors commonly speak of as functional diseases of the nervous system, and that the production of a strong mental impression was the means by which the miracles of healing were brought about. Upon this point there seems to be a practical unanimity no less decided than that which has been reached among critics of the liberal school upon the other two points. Thus Dr Abbott tells us that the mighty works were simply "acts of faith-healing on a mighty scale." The *Encyclopædia Biblica* lays it down that "it is quite permissible for us to regard as historical only those of the class which even at the present day physicians are able to effect by psychical methods." Principal Estlin Carpenter (in the *First Three Gospels*) says, "The real force which worked the patient's cure dwelt in his own mind: the power of Jesus lay in the potency of his personality to evoke this force."

These writers have, in fact, made up their minds to the acceptance of a certain particular opinion concerning the nature of certain particular cases of disease which are described in the gospel narratives; also they are prepared with an opinion as to the mode of operation by which these diseases were cured. Such being the case, we might have expected to find a minute and detailed study of at least the most typical instances, and some attempt to show that the accounts which we have of the ministry of healing really do indicate that such was the pathological and clinical character of the diseases, and such the method of cure. The writers have adopted what may be called, for brevity, the Neurotic Theory. It is for them to show by an actual examination of the records that the ministry of healing which is admitted "to stand on as firm historical ground as the best accredited parts of the teaching," consisted in the curing of neurotic patients by strong mental impressions. Have they done so? It cannot be said that the data are insufficient for the formation of a judgment upon the question, for the critics have formed one; and if the history

of the cures even approximates in detail the best accredited parts of the teaching, then at any rate there is not a complete dearth of material upon which to base an opinion.

It is not too much to say that no one of the writers who has pinned his faith to the Neurotic Theory has made any attempt to carry it out in detail. We are offered a number of quite commonplace allusions to the power of mind over body, and we find a complacent conviction expressed in several ways by several writers to the effect that a certain class of disorders, which are vaguely alluded to as "nervous," are promptly curable by emotional methods. But we do not find any recognition of the fact that only a small portion of the diseases to which human flesh is heir are nervous diseases; and that of nervous diseases, again, only a very small and unimportant group admit of cure in this way.

What the critics have to do if they wish to convince their readers of the Neurotic Theory of the miracles of healing is nothing less than this:—

1. They must show that the diseases which Christ is said to have cured were of the kind which experience proves to admit of psychical treatment.

2. They must show some good grounds for the assertion that the way in which the cures of the healing ministry were effected was the way by which at the present day such cures are effected when what has been called moral therapeutics has been the method employed.

We may fairly demand something more than loose talk about the ignorance which is common among primitive people concerning nervous disorders, and about the look and tone of authority which are supposed to have been instrumental in the production of the mighty works of healing. It is not too much to ask that such records as have come down to us shall receive the same kind of attention as that which we should bestow if we found the narratives of cures in any other ancient literature, or if they came to us from Lourdes, or from the faith-healing hospital of Bethshan. Were the cases of cure many or few?

Of what sex were the sufferers? Are we told anything of their ages or of their life-history? What were the recorded conditions under which the cure took place? Can we, in any of the cases described, arrive at a diagnosis of the disease; and if so, were they of the sort which faith-healing cures, or not?

Such are some of the questions which must be asked and answered if the advocates of the Neurotic Theory are in earnest about the matter.

Let us suppose that a medical reader were asked to cast his eye over the gospel of St Mark, and to notice any details in that gospel which might be taken to throw light upon the question as to what the acts of healing were. Let us further suppose that such a reader is justified in assuming an amount of historical foundation in the stories of the miracles of healing which is at least not wholly incomparable with that which is supposed to belong to the best accredited parts of the teaching.

At the outset such a reader could not fail to be struck by one remarkable fact, namely, that if the record is worth anything as history, these works of healing represent, not merely occasional occurrences, or sporadic and isolated instances, but a continuous and habitual activity. Whether we draw our conclusions from the course of the narrative itself, or whether we accept it as a fair inference from the impressions which the contemporaries of Jesus formed about Him, we cannot well admit that He healed the sick without also admitting that this healing was but a part of the ordinary routine work which He felt Himself called upon to do. But if this is admitted, then we cannot for a moment suppose that the cures were one and all cases of faith-healing. It is impossible to imagine that clinical material (to borrow a convenient medical phrase) of this particular kind was scattered up and down Palestine in such abundance, to the exclusion of diseases of more ordinary types. We cannot believe that not only the examples of healing which are individually described, but also that large numbers alluded to as "laid in the market place," or referred to elsewhere as more or less numerous, were

every one of them instances of the not very large group of diseases which admits of cure by "powerful impressions." Nor will any modification of this supposition overcome the difficulty. Shall we suppose that Jesus did effect some striking cures by "moral therapeutics"? If that were so, rumour of these mighty works would quickly spread, and, as a direct consequence, every sort of sufferer from every sort of disease would seek His aid. And more especially there would be among them all those who suffered from ailments of a chronic or incurable character. But then quickly enough would follow the discovery that the powers of healing were available not for all, but only for a small and limited group of disorders; for in any casual collection of sick people, though there might be perhaps here one and here another suitable patient for a faith-healing exhibition, the majority would be unsuitable. What, then, of the failures?

The difficulty here referred to has not been wholly overlooked, and it is worth while to notice how the attempt has been made to meet it. "Did a kind of instinct (asks Dr Abbott) tell Him that the restoration of a lost limb was not like the cure of a paralytic, not one of the works prepared for Him by His Father?" and again, "Experience and some kind of intuition may have enabled Him to distinguish those cases which He could heal from those (a far more numerous class) which He could not."

The suggestion would not commend itself to a medical reader as a very happy way out of the difficulty. The naïve supposition that in cases of disease which require unusually minute and scientific investigation diagnosis was made "by a kind of instinct" or "some kind of intuition" is quite on a par with the innocent conception of the nature of diseases of the nervous system which Dr Abbott shows elsewhere. Dr Abbott would hesitate to allow that Jesus had a kind of instinct to guide Him safely concerning the Davidic origin of a psalm or the date of the taking of Jerusalem. Why should he imagine that he was less likely to be at fault in the

presence of equally difficult problems of another kind? The assumption of an infallible capacity for discrimination which could arrive at correct conclusions without the use of any of the methods and appliances of scientific medicine is merely to substitute one kind of "supernaturalism" for another. A miraculous faculty of diagnosis is no easier of acceptance than a miraculous cure. A "kind of instinct" is an absurd supposition. And the neurotic hypothesis fares no better if we test it by the individual and particular cures which are recorded in the gospel narrative.

In the gospel of St Mark they are as follows:—

1. The man with an unclean spirit healed in the synagogue on the Sabbath (Mark i. 23).
2. Simon's wife's mother healed of a fever (Mark i. 29).
3. The healing of the leper (Mark i. 49).
4. The paralytic let down through the roof (Mark ii. 4).
5. The man with a withered hand healed on the Sabbath (Mark iii. 1).
6. The healing of a man with an unclean spirit (Mark v. 2).
7. The healing of the woman with an issue of blood of twelve years' duration (Mark v. 22).
8. The healing of the daughter of the Syrophœnician woman (Mark vii. 25).
9. The healing of a man possessed of a deaf and dumb spirit (Mark vii. 32).
10. The healing of a blind man (Mark viii. 22).
11. The case of the man whose son had a dumb spirit (Mark ix. 15).
12. The healing of blind Bartimæus (Mark x. 47).

It will be noticed that several of the instances of healing here given are cases of "possession by spirits," the spirits being described as "unclean" or as "deaf," or as "deaf and dumb." It is, of course, well known that, in accordance with the current demonology of the place and time, almost any disease might be attributed to spiritual agency; but it is probable that the prominence of mental symptoms was the characteristic which

chiefly determined the diagnosis of "possession." Accordingly we may suppose that the "possessed" formed a somewhat heterogeneous group of cases. Among them would be cases of congenital mental deficiency, cases of lunacy arising in adult life, cases of epilepsy, cases of mental development arrested owing to the incidence of early deafness, and probably cases of general mental inadequacy, such as are found in our time and country living always on the margins of lunacy and criminality. All these would in various degrees be unmanageable, and many of them would present the characteristic disregard of decency which marks the same types at the present day. Some of them, no doubt, would only show the unclean spirit of the harmless imbecile who had never acquired the elementary manners of orderly life. Others, perhaps, would show the violence and foulness of speech and habit which are common in certain forms of insanity, in which the grace and self-control of normal life has become wholly lost.

Now, it is common for advocates of the neurotic hypothesis to suppose that because an affection is predominantly psychical, it is therefore capable of immediate cure by what is called "moral impression." Dr Abbott assures us that "paralysis, mental disease, and various kinds of nervous disorder are all susceptible of emotional cure." But unfortunately this view of the case rides roughshod over experience. The persons who may be fairly supposed to have constituted the bulk of the "possessed" are not, as a matter of fact, the sort of persons to be straightway healed by a word.

Doubtless personal and emotional influences are important factors in the treatment of these unfortunate beings, especially when these influences are brought to bear in a systematic manner and over a prolonged period in institutions wholly given up to the work; but these are not the subjects among whom to look for examples of faith-healing; and, it may be added, they are the subjects who lend themselves least of all to the modern remedial measures of hypnotism and suggestion.

Another group of cases in the ministry of healing are

included under the general term paralysis or palsy. Here, again, we have to do with the nervous system, and accordingly we are again offered the Neurotic Theory.

Now, it is quite true that cases are to be occasionally met with in which the most conspicuous symptom of motor paralysis, namely, an inability to move the limbs by voluntary effort, is found to be curable by a strong mental impression. Let us see whether the cases of paralysis which we have recorded by the writer of St Mark's gospel are of this kind or not. In other words, were they cases of what is called hysterical paralysis or functional paraplegia, or were they cases of paralysis dependent upon structural disease of the spinal cord or other part of the motor nerve system?

In the first place, we may note that whereas hysterical loss of power to move, or functional paraplegia, is comparatively rare, genuine paralysis from structural disease or injury is a common disorder. In the next place we have to remember that this so-called hysterical paralysis is almost always met with in women and girls. Hence, in the absence of any other details to guide us to the true pathology, we might conclude, judging merely from these facts as to its mode of occurrence, that it is at least more likely than not that any case of paralysis of the male sex would prove to be one of genuine paralysis. Now, in a case of true paralysis resulting either from tubercular disease of the spine or from some serious injury, or from inflammatory or atrophic changes in the cord, we have to deal with a pathology which entirely removes these cases from those which faith-healers cure. When the delicate and complicated structure of nerve cells and nerve fibres is gone, and its place taken by mere scar tissue and inflammatory material, it is as absurd to suppose that an emotional shock could restore normal physiological function as it would be to suppose that an inspiring thought could add to a man's weight or height.

In the story of the paralytic who was borne of four, and who was let down through the roof, we have very little detail given us. Certainly there is a complete absence of any indica-

tion that the case was one of merely functional or hysterical paralysis. On the other hand, we have no mention of wasting, contraction, deficient development of limbs, or of any other feature upon which to found a decided opinion whether the loss of motor power was occasioned by structural disease or not. We can only say that the sex of the sufferer and the greater frequency of paralysis from organic disease both favour the guess that the patient was suffering from true paralysis, and not from its neurotic counterfeit.

In the story of the man with the withered hand it is probable that we have to do with another case of paralysis; and if so, we may assume with considerable confidence that the case was one of "infantile paralysis." This is the affection to which at the present day nearly all the instances of "withered hand" or of "withered leg" are owing. A child who has been in good health, or has suffered perhaps from a few days of feverishness, is found to have lost power in an arm or leg. The limb hangs flaccid and motionless. The muscles are found to be wasting when the limb is examined a week or two later, and the limb to be cold. For a month or two there may be a little recovery of movement. This soon stops, and the arm or leg remains ever after more or less powerless, and shrunken and cold. Normal growth is largely checked, and, in addition to the actual atrophy and arrest of development, various contractions and deformities become established as time goes on. After death the muscles are found to have become much diminished and shrunken, and throughout a certain portion of the spinal cord, corresponding with the affected limb, destructive changes are found to have occurred where the normal structure of ganglion cells and nerve fibres is replaced by the remains of the inflammatory process which has been the cause of the palsy. Such is the ordinary history of a withered hand. Here the very word "withered," which aptly describes the condition of the limb, is the most appropriate description of the result of the process which has taken place. If such was the pathology of the case described in Mark iii. 1, it is needless to say that

although it belongs to the group of the nervous diseases, it does not belong to that class of nervous disease which admits of treatment by moral impression or emotional shock.

If now, from the instances of diseases of the nervous system, we turn to the other cases of healing, we still find very little to suggest to us that they were cases of the kind which nowadays form the standing advertisements of the faith-healer. Peter's wife's mother, we are told, was sick of a fever. Neither the age of the patient nor the ailment suggests that her illness was only "on the nerves." Febrile diseases are common in all countries, since infection and septic absorption are common in all countries, and these are not conditions which have shown themselves to be suitable to the treatment by what are called psychical methods.

We have instances of the healing of the blind. Now, there is an affection which is mentioned in books upon diseases of the eye which goes by the name of "hysterical amblyopia," and which is generally found in young people, and these almost always of the female sex. It need hardly be observed that in Syria, as also elsewhere, other causes of blindness are vastly more common, and in both the instances which are recorded in St Mark's gospel the patients are of the male sex and not young. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably suppose that the patient of Bethsaida or blind Bartimæus were sufferers from hysterical amblyopia.

Another example of healing mentioned in the same gospel is that of the woman who had an issue of blood. It is uncertain whether we ought to understand by this expression that she was a sufferer from hæmorrhoids, or whether we ought to assume that she was the subject of one of the diseases peculiar to women. In neither case, however, can we suppose that the ailment was one of the kind peculiarly amenable to psychical treatment.

Very similar observations might be made with reference to leprosy and its cure. It may be admitted with much probability that the Jewish diagnosis of the disease was not

very strict or scientific; but whatever different affections were included, it is likely that they agreed in having some more or less conspicuous cutaneous symptoms. The Greek word λέπρα seems to have referred to the scaly surface often noticed; and it is at any rate probable that many cases of persistent eczema, and some of psoriasis, lupus, and syphilis, were included under this name. Now there is not one of these diseases which admits of instantaneous cure by means of a strong mental impression.

It appears, then, that whether we test the Neurotic Theory by the general references to the exercise of powers of healing, or by the accounts of special cases of the exercise of these powers, the result is the same. We do not find reason to believe that the works of healing were instances of faith-healing. The cases are too numerous, and they are not of the sort among which we look for cures of the faith-healing kind. How, then, are we to account for the confidence with which so many critics have asserted the Neurotic Theory? Probably the consideration which has weighed most with them has been the fact that faith of some kind is expressly mentioned as a condition upon which the works of healing in some cases depended. But are we justified in assuming that the term faith, as it occurs in the gospel narratives, has the same significance which it bears when we are talking of modern Christian science and faith-healing? A little consideration will show that the two things are not identical.

Let us take for comparison a simple and yet typical instance of nineteenth century faith-healing, such as most doctors of experience in general practice know well enough. A girl had suffered from an injury to the foot causing temporary lameness. She took to a crutch and said she was perfectly unable to use her foot. She persisted in this belief after repeated assurances that the foot ailed nothing. She was advised to see Sir James Paget, and she promised to put implicit confidence in his opinion and to act upon it. She went to his house, explained her case, and was informed by

him that there was nothing the matter with the foot. She thereupon threw down her crutch, walked across the room, and left his house without it. Here we have a typical case of faith-healing. The lameness from which the girl suffered was (to use popular phraseology) "on the nerves." In other language, the obstacle which prevented her from walking was not a structural defect in any of the organs concerned in the act of walking. What bound her freedom of movement was her own invincible conviction of her inability. This inhibition was only removed at last by the authoritative assurance of the eminent surgeon. She had faith in him, and her cure was straightway accomplished. The natural history of all cases of this kind was well epitomised many years ago by Dr Moxon in the saying, "In so far as the disease is a lack of faith, just so far is cure of the disease a case of faith-healing."

Now we may say truly enough of the patient here described what Principal Estlin Carpenter would have us believe of the gospel cures: "the real force which worked the patient's cure dwelt in the patient's own mind." Supposing that the girl had not known Sir James Paget, and that some one perfectly ignorant of surgery had personated him, and had uttered the requisite authoritative dictum, the result, we cannot doubt, would have been the same. In cases of this kind faith in an impersonal source of healing may often be no less effectual than faith in a personal healer, as may be seen in the cures wrought by relics and by holy wells. But is this the kind of cure by faith which the gospel writers mean when they connect the recovery from a disease with the presence of faith on the part of the sufferer? What the authors of the gospel narrative had in view when they ascribed a cure to the presence of faith, and when they attributed absence of cures to the absence of faith, was something quite different from this. They regarded the cure as a free gift granted by the healer in recognition of the presence of faith. If any doubt could remain upon this subject, it should be finally set at rest by recollecting that when a cure was stated to be due to faith, it

was not by any means always due to faith on the part of the diseased person, but might be due to faith on the part of one who was interested in the patient.

The narrators of these wonderful works do not draw any distinction between the cures due to faith in the mind of the patient, and those which occurred in response to faith in the mind of the patient's friends. Yet, if we are to accept the canon of the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, while we are to retain our belief in the cases of direct faith-healing, adopting, in accordance therewith, an appropriate view of their pathology, we must reject those cures which were produced by vicarious faith, for the *Encyclopædia* teaches us to regard as historical "only those of the class which, even at the present day, physicians are able to effect by psychical methods."

But if the Neurotic Theory of the miracles of healing, popular though it is among many critics, will not stand examination, what will be the result of its disappearance?

A clear issue will be raised. Should the critics have the courage of their convictions when they declare that they cannot disentangle the narrative of the life from all the mighty works, and when they roundly assert that the healing ministry stands on as firm historical grounds as the best accredited parts of the teaching, then the partisans of a more conservative position may very fairly demand that the attempt to draw arbitrary lines of distinction between one kind of mighty work and another shall be given up.

If the dropsy which was cured was real dropsy, and the withered arm a real withered arm; if the blind old men were not the subjects of hysteria, and the sick folk who were laid in the streets were not all neurotics, then we can no longer accept the works of healing as historical and reject the so-called cosmical miracles. One who could rejuvenate at a word a strand of atrophied nerve might bring about the wasting of a fig-tree in a moment; and it would be rash to say that he might not command the winds and the waves, or raise the dead to life.

The history of the early attempts to save the historical character of the creation narrative may have a lesson for the present interpreters of the gospel story. We cannot call a narrative historical, and yet decline to accept as true all the details of the narrative one after another.

If the Neurotic Theory is to be taken as giving the true account of the facts, then we can only say that the narratives of the Synoptics are historically worthless and misleading, for by no honest means can the details which are given in these narratives be made to support the theory.

There are difficulties, no doubt, in the acceptance of these narratives as historical, and there are difficulties in the assumption that they are constructions. The Neurotic Theory accepts both these positions at once, and avoids the difficulties neither of the one nor the other.

REGINALD JOHN RYLE.

BRIGHTON.

THE FORGIVENESS OF SIN.

THE VERY REVEREND CHARLES T. OVENDEN, D.D.,
Dean of Clogher.

SIN against God may be regarded from two points of view: either as a personal offence which causes Him to be angry, or as a breach of His moral law, analogous to a violation of physical law. According as men have thought of sin in either of these ways, their views of the possibility of the forgiveness of sin have been widely different.

In olden times the various deities were regarded as superhuman men, who were affected by human desires and passions, and who were jealous and sensitive concerning the attention paid to their dignity by their worshippers. When they were offended, it was necessary to appease their anger by presenting gifts, and by offering prayers of praise and flattery. The priests were looked on as intermediaries who understood the art of managing the tempers of the gods so as to obtain their pardon and good-will, for they were supposed to be much more sensitive as to their personal importance than concerning any injury which man did to his fellow-man.

This conception of deity which came down to men as an inheritance from very ancient times exercised a powerful influence on the Jewish conception of the mind of Jehovah, and on what we may call the corrupt Christianity of the dark ages.

The Jewish prophets protested against the lower popular

view. In the opening chapter of the Prophecy of Isaiah we read his vehement protest in the name of the Lord against the system which made a multitude of sacrifices and the celebration of solemn services a substitute for righteousness and holiness of life. He exclaims, "Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil; learn to do well."

His main thought is that no forgiveness of sin could be expected unless there was a corresponding determination to forsake sin utterly, but that when this condition was fulfilled the forgiveness of sin presented no difficulty. "Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow." In the dark ages absolution from the punishment of sin was made easy by the payment of money to the priests. They were supposed to have the power of managing God and turning away His anger from the sinner who gave a liberal donation to the Church, or presented a costly gift of candles for use at the altar. The Reformers protested against this system, knowing that God valued righteousness more than any offerings presented as a substitute for it.

But they saw no difficulty in the forgiveness of sin on the condition that repentance was genuine. In modern times this view has been worked out to its logical conclusion, and used to show that the Christian doctrine of the Atonement is unnecessary.

It is said that we as men would not keep up a resentment against anyone who expressed sorrow for his offence against us; why, then, should we suppose that God was less generous than man, so that He needed to be propitiated by atonement and sacrifice before He would lay aside His anger against a sinner? It is pointed out that in the parable of the Prodigal Son the father received his son into favour on his repentance, without any mediator being required to make peace.

Still more recently, another school of thought, viewing sin as a breach of the moral law analogous to a violation of physical law, has raised a different objection to the Christian

doctrine of the Atonement. The researches of modern science suggest that law and order prevail in every known portion of the universe. It was formerly held that the weather and the winds were absolutely capricious and under no law. But now it is recognised that every calm and every breeze and storm are the result of law, operating with the same certainty as the law of gravitation. The weight of the air in a certain region compels the wind to blow or not to blow in another place. Even what seem to be accidents or chance can be calculated accurately by insurance companies, who arrange the amount of their policies on the knowledge that the law of average is constant and may be reckoned on.

It is also known that men's actions, and the result of those actions, fall under the law of cause and effect, and that an act having produced an effect, that effect can never be undone. Its consequences work on according to law, without reference to the regret or the repentance of the person who did the act. Therefore it is said that the forgiveness or remission of sin is a vain imagination, being physically impossible. Some persons shrink from the idea of the eternal punishment of sin as being incredible. It is answered that the eternal punishment of an evil act is the only thing credible, for that its consequences must, by the great law of the universe, go on working out the result in perpetuity. We know for certain that there is no such thing as forgiveness of an offence committed against physical law. Whether a man who cannot swim falls into deep water because he neglected to keep his balance or because he stumbled over an obstacle, or whether he throws himself in on purpose, in each case the result is the same. The water has no forgiveness, even though he deeply repents of his act when struggling with death until he sinks to the bottom. If a workman, meaning no harm, handles a charge of dynamite carelessly, he is killed by the subsequent explosion just as surely as if he were shot dead by a wilful murderer.

These instances might be multiplied indefinitely. We

know that the only way to escape from the ruthless penalty exacted by physical law is to obey it scrupulously and implicitly.

On investigating breaches of the moral law, we find that they work out results in a similar manner. Nearly every sin which can be named involves an injury done to some person. For instance, a man addicts himself to strong drink, and thereby ruins his health, and brings disgrace and misery upon his whole family. He repents of his sin and prays to God for forgiveness, but a doctor whom he consults tells him that his internal diseases, brought on by drink, are incurable. He dies soon, and leaves his widow and orphans broken-hearted and in want. Another gratifies his propensities to immorality, and brings ruin and desolation into a house which was once pure and happy. His subsequent repentance and reform are utterly powerless to undo the evil which he has wrought. Nothing that he can do can ever restore the peace and innocence which he has destroyed.

The moral law works out the dreadful consequences of sin with the same persistency as the physical law. These are facts which we cannot ignore.

Where, then, may the sinner, burdened with a sense of guilt and tortured by the anguish of remorse, look for forgiveness and redemption from sin and its consequences? Some may say lightly that God can forgive him, even as a man forgives his fellow-man. This is true as concerns sins against God only; for instance, in the case of sins which have gone no further than the intention to commit them; but when we contemplate sins by which harm has been done, we are at once confronted with grave difficulties.

Man's forgiveness of a sin which involves an injury done even to himself is strictly limited. In the case of the Prodigal Son the father could forgive him freely, because the sin of ingratitude and waywardness was committed only against himself.

So if two men quarrel in a private room and a blow is

struck, the injured person can forgive his assailant if he apologises. But the case is different if the assault is made in the public street. The man who made it is arrested and brought before a magistrate, and the person who was assaulted is bound over to appear as a witness.

The magistrate sitting on the bench has no power to forgive and let off any prisoner who is brought before him and convicted of crime. The law must take its course, and all people know that it is essential to the safety of the community that it should do so. The magistrate knows further that, as a righteous judge among men, he must pronounce a righteous and just sentence. How, then, can God, the greatest and most just of all judges, let off guilty sinners at the final assize in presence of those whom they have blasted and ruined by their wickedness?

These are grave questions in practical life which demand an answer, and who can answer them satisfactorily? One answer is offered in the form of the doctrine of the Atonement, which, let us note, is a very different thing from various explanations which have been given as to how the atonement made by Christ operates. On investigation we may find that the revolt of men's minds against this doctrine, as being opposed to reason and conscience, degrading to the character of God, and even, if true, a violation of justice, has been, not against the doctrine as given in the gospels, but against certain theories which have been built up by men who have used it as a foundation for their own conceptions. When a theory is propounded which is contrary to reason, it is defended on the ground that a doctrine which is "above reason" may nevertheless be true. This must be admitted; but it is one thing to admit the reasonableness of a theory or explanation which is well within the grasp of the human intellect, and another to admit that some facts are "above reason."

Many of the explanations of the Atonement are such that no reasonable thinker can hear them without a feeling of revolt. It is said, for instance, that "justice required a victim."

When expressed in plain words, that means that when a murder has been committed, a just judge would give sentence that somebody must be hanged for it, whether he be guilty or not. The inherent sense of justice planted by the Creator in our hearts tells us that it would be better far that a hundred guilty persons should escape punishment rather than that one innocent person should suffer.

Under the Jewish law innocent animals were offered in sacrifice, but the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews clearly shows that these sacrifices were regarded as typical, and that the Jews believed that it was "impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin." In another sense, these sacrifices were regarded as the offering of a man's possessions to God as a present, whether of animals or of the fruits of the ground. Canon Mozley, in his sermon on the Atonement, says, "For the great development of the idea of atonement, understood nakedly as vicarious punishment, we have to go to the new world. When the Spaniards conquered Mexico, they found a gigantic and elaborate system of human sacrifices which exceeded all that had appeared in history. The annual ceremonies of sacrifice consumed several days, and the immolations of victims counted not by thousands but by tens of thousands." This expiation of sin was conducted by the government for the good of the people, and blood flowed in such torrents that not a single sin could escape expiation. The essential difference between such sacrifices and the doctrine of the atonement made by Christ, as believed by the Church, is that in the former case the victims were compelled to die, all the while struggling against their murderers; whereas Christ, as a shepherd, laid down His life *voluntarily* for His sheep. Compulsory death, and laying down life for the good of another, are so far apart in their moral aspect, that they may be contrasted, but not compared, the one with the other.

It is obvious that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews did regard Christ's death as a voluntary offering of His own

blood to God as an atonement for sin, and he speaks of it as a fulfilment of the type expressed in the Jewish sacrifices of animals: "Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us." It is also admitted that the doctrine of the Atonement was definitely taught by St Paul, but it is contended that these were doctrines evolved and elaborated by men out of the fact of the tragic death of Christ on the cross, but that there is no evidence in His teaching, as recorded in the gospels, that He, the simple Prophet of Galilee, ever regarded His approaching death in the light of an atonement. Let us examine how far this contention rests on fact.

It is recorded by St Matthew that, at the Last Supper, as He gave the cup to the disciples, saying, "Drink ye all of it," He added, "For this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins." St Mark records the same fact almost in the same words. On an earlier occasion He described to the disciples the main object of His mission on earth in the words, "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom (λύτρον) for many." The late Provost Jellett points out that this word λύτρον occurs four times in the Septuagint, once in the book of Exodus, twice in the book of Numbers, and once in the book of Proverbs, and in all these cases with a similar meaning, viz. something which was paid to avert from an offender either the punishment of the law, as in the Pentateuch, or personal vengeance, as in the book of Proverbs. "Ye shall take no satisfaction (λύτρα) for the life of a murderer" (Numbers xxxv. 31). "He will not spare in the day of vengeance. He will not regard any ransom" (λύτρον), (Proverbs vi. 34, 35). The classical use of the word is more general; it usually refers to ransom paid for the deliverance of a captive. We are therefore driven to the conclusion that our Lord believed and taught that His death would avert a calamity from "many," and at the Last Supper

He defined deliverance from the calamity as "the remission of sins." Therefore those who regard the death of Christ only as a glorious end to a perfect life, or a magnificent exhibition of divine patience, are right so far as they go, but they do not express the full significance of His death which Christ himself attached to it. The coming of a great conqueror, who by the might of his own arm should deliver the helpless, was foreshadowed by the prophet Isaiah: "I looked, and there was none to help; and I wondered that there was none to uphold; therefore mine own arm brought salvation." These words form part of the vision of the mighty conqueror coming from Edom, with crimsoned garments from Bozrah. Edom was the old, persistent enemy of Israel, the type to them of the kingdom of darkness and wickedness, the source of marauding hordes which came against them constantly to destroy their peace. The great deliverer, marching in the greatness of his strength, had gone down there alone to do battle against the destroyers of Israel, determined that, although they had failed to effect deliverance, he would, by the strength of his own arm, bring destructions to a perpetual end.

The prophet beholds him in a vision returning to Jerusalem as a conqueror, exclaiming, "I have trodden the winepress alone; and of the peoples there was no man with me: yea, I trod them in mine anger, and trampled them in my fury." Even thus did St Paul behold the far-reaching effects of Christ's crucifixion on the cross; "Having spoiled principalities and powers, he made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it."

This is the ground of the Christian's hope that a deliverer has appeared. Apart from that hope, what is our position?

We work out our logical conclusions in our efforts to solve the mystery of sin and the possibility of redemption and forgiveness, and we arrive at a blank wall which we cannot pass.

But, we may ask, is there anything beyond that blank wall? Is there an intelligence and a power in the universe higher and greater than our limited reason?

There are many considerations which lead us to the conclusion that there may be.

Men have groped after the nature of God in the study of inanimate nature. They have found there the law of cause and effect,—ruthless law,—which gives no indication of any forgiveness of the slightest breach of its enactments. They have turned their eyes inwards to study their own minds, and they discover there caprice and personal interests at war with law and justice. They find human nature crying out for pardon for sin committed which has been bitterly regretted, searching for forgiveness and justice combined, if anywhere they may be found. From remote antiquity there come down fables of creatures in distress, of champions who set out to deliver them, and of deliverance achieved by the self-sacrifice and the sufferings of the champions. Are these fables dreams? All dreams are based on facts in life. These fables or dreams could never have taken form unless in real life there had been persons in distress whom champions by self-sacrifice did deliver.

Human longing for deliverance from sin, nay, for a deliverer able and willing to enter the lists as a champion, ready to fight the monster to the death, must have its counterpart somewhere in reality. Some fragmentary reflections of that great reality have appeared in episodes of human life, but these episodes are, indeed, a limited experience.

It is well to remember that all human experience is limited. Pantheism is a system of religion which teaches that the revelation of God is to be found in the phenomena of nature. We ask, what nature? Is it to be supposed that God is confined to the little speck of nature which we can see with the naked eye? or that He is confined within the slightly larger circle which we can survey through the spyglass of human philosophy? Some say that the universe is transcendental, that is, wider than our experience, but capable of being interpreted by human thought. Christianity proclaims that the mansions of God are transcendent, that is, altogether beyond the power of mankind to conceive, even

in the highest flights of his imagination; that the breadth and length, and depth and height of the love of Christ which *passeth knowledge* can only be discerned by faith. Faith enters largely into the highest realms of advanced science. There are many phenomena the reality of which is fully admitted, although no account can be given of their origin or of the reason for their existence. For instance, gravitation is known to be a fact, although no one has yet explained how it originated or why it exists. The existence of ether pervading all space is admitted as a fact, although its existence is only an inference. No one can explain the reason for various chemical affinities, yet they are accepted as facts. It is contended that no theological doctrine ought to be believed unless it is fully explained, but such unbelief would not be tolerated for a moment in the world of science.

In this life of limitation we can only catch glimpses of the transcendent universe in which God reigns. We obtain a glimpse of mercy at one time, of justice at another, and, again, of the existence and the power and the wonderful influence of a Mediator and an Intercessor. We know that we ourselves, and the best of men, are affected by His influence.

Take as an illustration a case in which a criminal stands before a judge. Some man, known to be disinterested, known also to be thoroughly good and righteous, appears to plead for him, not as a paid lawyer, but as one who offers to bear in his own person the penalty which the guilty man deserves to suffer. The intercessor and the criminal are two distinct persons. There is no confusion of justice. The intercessor who offers to pay a heavy fine has the merit of his goodness, the criminal has the demerit of his own guilt. But the fact that a disinterested offer has been made, so that the criminal may be pardoned, places him in a different position in the mind of the judge than he had before the offer was made. He is, in a manner, consecrated by the love of him who freely offers to endure a very severe penalty as the price of his redemption. In an ordinary trial at the court of petty

sessions, if a clergyman appears to say a word for a poor person who has been indicted, and offers to pay his fine, a very great change is felt to have taken place in the court as regards the prisoner. This well-known fact explains the constant appeals to the clergy to act as intercessors for the members of their congregations who have got themselves entangled in legal proceedings. This illustration is only a fragment of a great idea, for it is necessary in it to regard the judge and the intercessor as two distinct persons.

But in the doctrine of the Atonement the Intercessor is one with the Judge. Jesus said, "I and my Father are one." It represents, therefore, God himself bearing sin's tremendous load, in order that He might lift the burden of it off His sinful child, who, if left unaided, must have been crushed by it. This, we admit, is an unfathomable mystery, but no doctrine which was not a mystery could be propounded as a solution of the equally unfathomable mystery of evil and all its necessary consequences.

A modern writer, in rejecting the whole Christian doctrine of the Atonement, speaks of "the ignominy of ransom" as a degrading idea, unworthy of the dignity of humanity. One could hardly conceive a more perverted thought. Indeed, if the expression, which he marks as a quotation, be considered in connection with the context in which it occurs in *Measure for Measure*, the thought is not only perverted, but revolting.[1]

When a wounded soldier is carried out of the line of fire by a noble comrade who pays the forfeit of his life by being shot dead himself, is there any idea of the ignominy of receiving life through his action? Would the rescued soldier think that he had suffered an indignity to his honour? On the contrary, he would feel that any dignity he possessed was but a dim reflection on him of the sublime heroism of the

[1] "*Isabella.* Ignomy in ransom, and free pardon,
Are of two houses: lawful mercy is
Nothing akin to foul redemption."
Measure for Measure.—Act II., Scene IV.

man who at the cost of his own life redeemed him from death.

That is, and must be, the mental attitude of every pardoned and redeemed sinner towards Christ.

The extent of man's redemption, if it is to be real, is a thought which must also be considered.

The punishment of sin is twofold: either the permanent degradation of the sinner who falls so low in the scale of being that he feels no compunction for the ruin and grief which his sin has brought on another, or the darkening of his whole life by a constant, never-ending regret for a deed done which he can never undo. Forgiveness can go but a short way in removing the anguish of remorse. Take the case of a man who in a fit of drunken frenzy throws a bottle at his child, which strikes her on the eyes and blinds her for life. When he is sober he sees what he has done, and becomes broken-hearted. He repents bitterly and implores her forgiveness, which is granted. His wife, seeing the agony of his sorrow, forgives him too. He confesses his sin to God, and believes that God has granted him absolution; but how far can this complete forgiveness enable him to forgive himself? As he sees his daughter in after years groping her way through the house, he realises that he has brought on himself an endless sorrow.

How much worse must be the anguish of a man who, repenting of his youthful sins, knows that by his act some poor girl has been driven to suicide in her despair. Redemption must be larger and greater than forgiveness if it is ever to undo the awful consequences of sin. Isaiah said, "He shall see of the travail of his soul and be justified." There is hope in those words that not only the sinner, but also those sinned against, shall have at last a share in eternal redemption. St Peter's redemption from sin was complete only when he knew that his denial had done no harm to his Master, and when he received from Him not only forgiveness, but restoration to his commission in the words "Feed my sheep."

One thing we know, viz., that the knowledge of Christ's redeeming love has raised men to a higher level of moral excellence than any sense of conscious virtue.

St John represents redeemed humanity filled with unspeakable, adoring gratitude, which was the highest thought in their eternal exaltation. Their song of exultation was not in glorification of themselves, but of Him through whose self-sacrifice alone they had attained to glory. They sang a new song, saying, "Thou art worthy." "Thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood." Their theme of joy and rejoicing was the far-reaching effect and the glory of the Atonement. Again, they sang with a loud voice, "Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing."

The words of praise and adoration are piled up one upon another, and yet they are not sufficient. The singers numbered ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands. But more was to follow. Theirs was, as it were, a verse in the anthem, to be followed by a mighty chorus of joy and praise. "*Every creature* which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, heard I, saying, Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever."

That vision was, we may hope, a forecast of the fulfilment of the words of Isaiah: "I looked and there was none to help; and I wondered that there was none to uphold; therefore mine own arm brought salvation."

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THE SINLESSNESS OF JESUS.

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For many ages the sinlessness of Jesus was not a doctrine to which the Church appealed for support when its credentials were demanded; the attacks of the sceptic were met either by the infallible authority of the Church or by the supernatural in the documents of Christianity. The line of argument pursued by Paley was characteristic of the defence of Christianity till half a century ago; it was, however, full of difficulties for the average doubter, in consequence of the intricate historical investigations, which, even when accomplished, remained uncertain.

The development of the rational spirit and the difficulty of historical research above mentioned led many to place less emphasis upon the miracles of Christ, and more upon his person. The term "miracle" had been confined mostly to events in the physical world; it now began to be taught openly that "moral and spiritual forces act no less in conformity with moral and spiritual laws"; and that if supersession of physical laws prove the presence of divine power, so must any supersession of the laws of the moral and spiritual world prove the action of the same power. Godet put it thus:—The supernatural in its highest form is not the miraculous, but holiness.

Chief among these new evidences was the sinlessness of Jesus. Here was an instance, it was said, of deviation from what we know of moral laws; and this moral miracle was

supposed to receive explanation by the physical miracle of a virgin birth.

This seeming liberalism satisfied many until recently. The work of modern criticism has done and is doing for Jesus what it has done for Abraham: after being relegated for many centuries to realms non-human, the godlike of the past are coming into our midst again to inspire and strengthen their brethren. With this return many are asking—Can the sinless really inspire the sinful? Can I, who have fallen into a deep sin, and am lying down where I fell in the cursed inaction born of the paralysing sense of constant falls, be inspired to action and eternal life by one who, though he may have been tempted in all points as I am, yet never knew my present condition of failure? Was he really without sin? Can the negation be demonstrated?

Sometimes these doubts have led men to search the Gospels for something to find fault with—a mean, despicable work—and having found some word or action not all they have deemed harmonious with their ideal Christ, they have, with harshness and irreverence, showed the world their more human (!) Christ, only to drive their audience away from them and from him. Pécaut and Renan made some "painful efforts," to use Keim's just phrase, in this direction,—to find blemishes in the best picture in the gallery of the Universe. We have no gratitude for such.

To do battle with such men as Pécaut and Renan came forth warriors like Godet—warriors whose armoury was filled with documents, whose shot was texts. Whatever be the issue of the controversy, at the present day an appeal to a text in the Epistles of John or Paul does not carry final conviction with it. Neither do the Johannine words, "Which of you convinceth me of sin?" stand for much while their historicity is being questioned. Strauss, however, in his *Leben Jesu*, has mentioned a line of defence which has in it an element of strength, and which many have adopted. The passage stands thus:—

"In proportion as a man makes progress towards moral perfection, the instinctive sense, by which he detects in himself the slightest deviations from such perfection, becomes more and more acute."

Applying this law to the character that has been portrayed of Jesus in the Gospels, we find that if his consciousness of evil was like our own, then he made no progress to moral perfection, for the acute sense of sin, so prominent in the saints of the Church, is lacking in him. The inference, taken generally, is that he had no sin to be conscious of. We never hear him saying, "God be merciful to me a sinner."

This brings me to the main purpose of this paper. Can we account for this lack of the sense of sin, assuming that the portrait drawn for us by the Synoptics is not an idealisation?

In order to do this, I will question first of all the crux of Strauss' argument—Is the sense of sin a necessary attendant to holiness? Should the sense of sin have such a prominent place in our consciousness as the Church has taught? Is not the deep or acute sense of sin that many feel to be the sign of holiness, nought but a sign of morbid and sometimes cowardly relations to life? I am answered that the awful nature of sin is such that it forces itself to the front when we would be holy,—when we would do well, evil is present with us.

This leads to a further question needful to answer before we can answer the last: Is sin the terrible thing that theology has defined for us? Is there not an element in sin which lessens the responsibility of the doer? Sin is something other than selfishness and rebellion against God. Sin is a blunder. It was doubtless this irresponsible element in sin that once made Sir Oliver Lodge, in this Journal, affirm that, as far as he could judge, "it was not likely that a Deity operating through a process of evolution could feel wrath at the *blind* (italics mine) efforts of his creatures struggling upward in the mire."

A sin is a blunder, and those who are wise learn from their mistake. Sin can become more than this when it is deliber-

ately done for the sake of its unnatural enjoyment. Then it is worthy of the "woes" of a righteous Jesus.

Turning to what we know of Jesus, I think we shall find some warrant for assuming him to be not only the Saviour from sin, but also the Saviour from the sense of sin.

In order to understand his relation to his own conduct, we will notice how he viewed sin in the conduct of others. Unlike modern revivalists, we never see him making much ado over man's sin; as a preacher, he did not feel that it was his work to convict men of sin. When a case of "conviction" came before him, he dispersed the conviction as quickly as possible by saying, "Thy sins are forgiven thee." Repentance was to him a call to draw the convicted one away from her sins to the loving labour of ministration to him.

I would like here to digress, and say that the absolution which Jesus gave to sinners is no proof of his deity, in the old acceptation of that doctrine. It was no special prerogative of the Deity to forgive sin. The Roman Catholic priest is not so far astray as many Protestants think on this doctrine. Nathanael Schmidt, of Cornell University, in his article on the "Son of Man" in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, endeavours to show with some likelihood that Jesus gives us warrant to forgive sins—that every son of man has power on earth to forgive sins. His interpretation based on the Aramaic only confirms the impression of the writer, that Jesus did forgive and was desirous that we also should forgive one another our trespasses—that the sense of sin might not be great to us. Jesus seems to have been aware of what many of us are only beginning to learn—that, to use Emerson's words, "the less we have to do with our sins the better." He who does not blot out with good works the sense of sin that might paralyse him does not rise to the highest life. If a man took his stand for righteousness, Jesus did all he could to inspire, never to damp his ardour by reminders of his failures. The denial of Peter was not an opportunity for Jesus to rebuke, but to draw his attention to the ideal of a self-denying ministry.

Jesus had two ways of dealing with sin, ways made distinct by the nature or degree of the sin. Sometimes, as with his murderers, he forgave because "they know not what they do." At other times, as when in the presence of Pharisaic hypocrisy, he was full of terrible denunciations. This first relation he had to sin supplies us, I think, with the solution of our problem—Why did Jesus lack any *manifest* sense of sin? That Jesus nowhere gives utterance to a cry for mercy does not prove that his every thought and action was perfect and that he was sinless; it but shows that he knew his Father so well that wherever a blunder occurred in his life he was conscious of the love that pardoned it. He felt it was far more in harmony with the will of God to enjoy the life divine which came from the sense of love's pardon than to dwell on the thought or action which was the stepping-stone to that life. As he made progress towards moral perfection, the instinctive sense by which he detected in himself any deviation from his ideal, instead of becoming more and more acute, was kept, as far as he was able, out of his consciousness. He believed that the sense of sin was no part of his real life; that sin, by its very negation, had no right to any thought even from one who was seeking to do the will of the Father. He refused to show to the world the unreal side of his being. He lived and moved and had his being, like ourselves, in God, and the consciousness of this life was all he desired; it alone could inspire to nobler action and loftier ideals. He who was tempted in all points as we are not only increased in wisdom and stature, but grew also in the nurture and *admonition* of the Lord.

Of recent years we have heard a certain section of the Church deploring the lack of the sense of sin. The Methodists are disusing their penitent forms; ministers no longer bewail their sinful condition from the pulpits; there are fewer Pauls among our great saints calling themselves the chiefs of sinners, and the experiences of Bunyan in *Grace Abounding* are not any longer typical of the modern Church.

This to some few is significant of the end of the world and reign of evil, but to the wiser and more Christian it signifies a higher life—in fact, the Christ-life. Many of our saints to-day belong to the "once-born" category, and have never known the mental wretchedness which sin is supposed to make prior to conversion. They seek to dwell in the constant light and strength of God's love. Examples of this type of goodness can be studied at leisure in Professor James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, the chapter dealing with it being aptly called "The Religion of Healthy-Mindedness." I remarked at the beginning of this short paper that the godlike of the past are now coming into our midst; it remains for me to emphasise this return in regard to Jesus. We are stronger, and know we can become yet stronger, seeing one overcome the world by no power but what is common to us all. Only thus can he be our Exemplar. When we see one human life refuse the illusions of space and time, with their limitations, and affirm in his own being the eternal life; when we see one human life turning all moral blunders, sins, and weaknesses, by a "saintly alchemy," into elements of holiness, we are impelled onward to that life when sin will actually be no more.

"What if I fail of my purpose here?
It is but to keep the nerves at strain,
To dry one's eyes, and laugh at a fall,
And baffled, get up and begin again.
So the chace takes up one's life, that's all.

. . . . . .

"No sooner the old hope goes to ground
Than a new one, straight to the self-same mark
I shape me—
Ever
Removed."

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THE CHRIST OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

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A BRISK discussion took place some years ago as to whether a novel should have a purpose. "See the inartistic, namby-pamby stuff," said the one party, "which is produced when your novelist tries to advocate temperance or social reform or some theory about women. He pretends to come open-handed; but all the time he is keeping one hand behind him; and all the time you can see that he is doing so, and it makes him awkward and you disgusted. You demand to have your pill and your sugar separately." "Well," says the other party, "the thing, it is true, may be done badly; but without a purpose your novel degenerates into a newspaper. You merely bind together some scenes and conversations and call them a story. But they are a bundle of sketches with no unity. They are not even a chronicle, for that has in it the unifying thread of time. True art will no doubt keep a purpose, where it is in well-ordered society, not thrusting itself forward in long-haired men and short-haired women, but hidden, yet dominant in every act and word. A novel without a purpose is like a life without a career. In order to be a story it must have something to say. Merely to record facts without pointing out their significance, is to be simply a car-conductor's bell-register."

A recent writer in the London *Spectator* has been extending this view to history. It is impossible, he maintains,

for true history to be uncoloured. Take, on the one hand, the historian who aims to show events in the bare, cold light of science, and, on the other, one who is so much interested in a man or a cause that he follows its leading and sees events in its light; and you are more likely to learn the real state of affairs through the latter than through the former. For in the latter case the historian's "control," as the Spiritualists would say, can be seen, generally plainly seen, and its influence allowed for; while in the former case the historian has not sympathy enough with his man or his time to enable his imagination to reconstruct its inner life. For it is imagination that must take data and rebuild the past. The copying, or even the sifting, of records is not sufficient. To fill the dry bones of the past with life requires almost as much creative power as to shape life out of the duties and events of the present. Both demand a hold upon ideals and a constant adjustment of facts to them. And this necessitates imagination. Imagination has its dangers, its tendencies to romance and to preaching; but it has its compensations. Like oxen, it makes a muss, but also wealth. "Where no oxen are, the crib is clean; but much labour is with the strength of the ox."

Such considerations occur to us as we consider the Gospel of St John, especially its differences from the Synoptic Gospels. In no part of it are these differences more apparent than in the chapters from the fifth to the eleventh. Compare this section with almost any part of the Gospel of St Mark, for example. The latter is comparatively simple of thought, not analytic, not theologic. There is an atmosphere about it that is fresh, glad, young. You can see the blue lake sparkling in the morning sunshine, and the golden fields of Galilee, rich with lilies and vocal with birds. It is concerned with facts ungarnished, unrelated to any scheme of thought. The utterances of Jesus in it are deep and spiritual, but there is in them no touch of mysticism; they say little about His nature, or His relation to men or to God.

On the other hand, the tone of the Fourth Gospel is

mature, meditative, mystical. The life it reflects is subtle and complex. It is full of theology. The events it narrates are given apparently not so much for their historical value as for a purpose, a purpose of instruction and edification. It appears as if aiming to set forth and illustrate a theory. Its gaze is dreamy, far-distant—so far that on its horizon the line between earth and heaven is indistinguishable. The Synoptic Gospels are full of brief, epigrammatic sayings of Jesus, and of stories of His, illustrating the Kingdom of God. The Fourth Gospel, with one possible exception, contains no parable, and the discourses of Jesus in it are involved in style, and are occupied with setting forth the spiritual relations of men to Him, and His relations to His Father. The Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel are not merely different; they are in some respects contradictory. In the Fourth Gospel there is no development in the history of Jesus' public ministry. His Messiahship is at once announced by John the Baptist, recognised by the disciples, and exhibited to the multitudes assembled at Jerusalem. On the other hand, in the Synoptic Gospels His Messianic character is unfolded only gradually. Those who discover it are bidden to keep it concealed. His closest disciples are slow to recognise it, and it is openly announced only at the close of His career. Again, the character of the life is different which the followers of Christ will share through their connection with Him. In the first three Gospels it is a blessed existence in some distant sphere in the future. The present is only preparatory to it, for this life will pass away before the Kingdom of Heaven will begin. In the Fourth Gospel the reward of the followers of Christ is eternal life; and this is conceived not so much as waiting upon a future day as a matter of here and now, for it consists of union of spirit with Him. The Christ of St Luke places the resurrection and the moral assessment of life far distant at the world's end. St John makes the Christ repudiate this view, and declare that He is Himself the resurrection and the life, and that belief in Him carries life with it immediately.

Such differences and contrarieties must spring from a difference of view in the writers. They must have regarded Jesus differently, and they must have had different aims in writing. To examine the aim of each of the first three writers is not our object at present. But in the case of the author of the Fourth Gospel we cannot but suspect, before we reach the end of his book, that he has a special purpose; and when we reach the last chapter but one we find it distinctly stated. "These things are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing, ye might have life through his name."[1] His work, then, is not a biography of Jesus, not a history of the events of His time; but the author aimed to demonstrate that Jesus was the Messiah and the Son of God, and this not so much for intellectual conviction as for spiritual edification. He alone speculates on the relation of Jesus to the Almighty Creator. He alone sees in Him the representative in human conditions of a side of God's nature which for ever existed. The Synoptists exhibit Jesus as preaching the truth. The Fourth Evangelist regards Jesus as being Himself the truth, the eternal Thought and Reasonableness of God. It is not merely the case with him, as with the others, that following Christ's precepts will result in a life which exemplifies that of Jesus; but with him Jesus is Life itself, all that gives wealth, joy, and worth to existence. Christ is not only an objective, historic being who once lived and died, but He is the subjective principle of life within the soul. The First and Third Evangelists give traditions of the birth of Jesus, though even they ignore them afterwards and sometimes contradict them. The Second Evangelist hears the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ in the voice of John the Baptist. But the Fourth Evangelist could have nothing to do with traditions of the birth of Jesus, for to him the history of the Christ went back through the ages and began in the beginning with God.

When we have apprehended how widely different the por-

[1] St John xx. 31.

trait of Jesus is which is given in the Fourth Gospel from that of the other three, we hastily turn and ask, "Is it authentic?" With the genuineness of the Fourth Gospel we have no concern. For the question of genuineness deals with authorship—was the work actually that of the writer to whom it is assigned? That is a matter for the historic investigation of scholars, and forms no part of our inquiry at present. It has, it is true, a bearing upon the value of the Gospel. If it was the case that the Gospel was not written until the second century, its testimony would stand upon a somewhat different basis from that of one who might have been an eye-witness of the events described. How far credibility is affected by considerations of date and authorship is a matter for nice judicial estimation.[1] But such investigations we shall not attempt. We will let the author be who he might. Our interest is rather with the question of authenticity. How far does this represent the real Jesus of Nazareth; or, on the other hand, how far was it owing to the peculiarities of the author, whoever he was? This special tinge which the Fourth Gospel has throughout, is that the artist's colouring, or is the portrait trustworthy? May we assume the historic character of the Gospel?

I think we must answer in some respects, No. When an author disclaims the writing of history, we may not hold him to historic accuracy. He has his face set in another direction. Moreover—and this applies to other parts of the Bible as well—the conditions of what we know as historic accuracy did not then exist. There were no means of making immediate and exact reports of conversations or events. When recorded afterwards, it was their substance which the writer endeavoured to embody, not their form. The discourses of historic persons in ancient writings, for example, are rarely authentic in form. The author takes certain utterances which may have been

[1] The external evidence for the genuineness of the Gospel of John is well set forth in *The Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, by Professor Ezra Abbot, D.D., LL.D.; Geo. H. Ellis, Boston, 1880.

genuine, or certain ideas appropriate to the occasion, and weaves from them a speech which he puts into the mouth of the one he is describing. This is noticeable in some of the speeches in the Book of the Acts. Tertullus, a noted orator, is hired to conduct the case of the Jews against Paul. To justify engaging a professional advocate the speech must have been a long one. It takes less than one minute to read it. The part of a long and weighty speech which would be apt to be retained in memory would naturally be the opening rather than the after-parts; and in the Acts the preamble of this speech occupies almost half of the whole. Such an instance shows that in the Bible, as in other ancient writings, speeches especially were freely treated. And this we must bear in mind in considering the speeches of Jesus, and especially those given in the section from the fifth to the eleventh chapters of the Fourth Gospel. It adds to the improbability of their stenographic accuracy that the style of them is wholly different from the utterances of Jesus as given in the other Gospels. The brief, pithy sentences and vital metaphors which the earlier Gospels ascribe to Him all bear one sharp and individual stamp; but these are widely different from the close involutions of argument of the Fourth Gospel and the intricacies of metaphysical thought underlying them. And what is true of historic data and of style may also be true in some respects of the underlying theology, for it is conditioned in part by them. Was this theologic view of Jesus a peculiarity of the author, or was Jesus in reality the mystic being here portrayed?

The evidence to decide this must be largely internal; that is, we must take features which seem unquestionably historic, and see whether others which are asserted harmonise with them. If they do not melt into a unity, the presumption is that they were inaccurately reported or come from the peculiarities of the author.

There is a mine of evidence, apart from the four Gospels, which has in recent years been—literally—excavated. The

Sayings of Jesus and the Fragment of a Lost Gospel which were discovered at Oxyrhynchus, in Egypt, by Messrs Grenfell and Hunt in 1897 and 1903, cast suggestive light upon the question we are considering. As in the case of the Fourth Gospel it is immaterial to our purpose whether the author was St John or not, so here the authorship of these Egyptian manuscripts is a question for archæologists rather than for us. But to us it is interesting to know that in the second century of the Christian era—for to this period the collection of Sayings is assigned—the tone, the atmosphere of the utterances ascribed to Jesus was imaginative, speculative, mystical. For example: "Jesus saith, Wherever there are two, they are not without God; and wherever there is one alone, I say, I am with him. Raise the stone, and there thou shalt find Me. Cleave the wood, and there I am." "Jesus saith, Let not him who seeks cease until he finds; and when he finds, he shall be astonished; astonished he shall reach the kingdom, and having reached the kingdom he shall rest." "His disciples say unto Him, When wilt Thou be manifest to us, and when shall we see Thee? He saith, When ye shall be stripped and not be ashamed."[1]

Many an earnest Christian, on learning that fresh sayings ascribed to Christ have been discovered, would hasten to them, eager to find additional touches to complete here and there the portrait of his Master. But he would, not improbably, turn away in disappointment, feeling that they have nothing to give him. He would notice that the tone of these is like that of the Fourth Gospel, especially that of the section from the fifth to the eleventh chapters. And this would awaken the discovery that, while he has supposed he ought to prize this Johannine account of Jesus, it has, in fact, stood with him upon a somewhat lower plane than the other narratives. His awakened consciousness would contrast it with that of the Synoptic Gospels. "How much nearer to

[1] *New Sayings of Jesus, and Fragment of a Lost Gospel.* Edited by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt. Published by the Egypt Exploration Fund, 1904. Pp. 38, 13, 42.

Jesus I can come through those simple narratives of what He said and did, than through these metaphysical discourses! These have about them a flavour of Oriental mysticism; those belong to the real world of to-day. These might have fallen from the lips of a speculative dreamer, sitting aloof from the world as a hermit; those bear the marks of living contact with things and men. Those I certainly find more fruitful, more edifying." The devout reader would be right. The idea of Jesus which he will construct from the first three Gospels will be more to him for devotional purposes than the theology he may extract from the Fourth and regard as orthodox. And he will be right also in classing these new Sayings of Jesus with those of the Fourth Gospel. The tone and atmosphere of them is the same. They are recondite, speculative, mystical. And it is this that constitutes their main value. For this furnishes a link of presumptive evidence for the authenticity of the utterances of the Fourth Gospel. If localities so wide apart as Ephesus and Oxyrhynchus have yet a common type in their portraiture of Jesus, it is probable that there was at least a foundation for this in fact. Even if the words attributed to Jesus were not the very ones He uttered, the tone of them, the line of thought, were probably His; for tone and tendency, besides being more important than words, are more likely to be correctly remembered. Common traits found in different traditions speak with a cumulative weight of testimony. It is, therefore, probable that the theologic utterances ascribed to Jesus represent a note in reality characteristic of Him.

The testimony to the authenticity of the Gospels as a whole is somewhat different in character from that of other books of antiquity. It does not consist, with them as with others, mainly of the opinions of this and that man as to a literary matter, in regard to which he is believed to have had knowledge and to have been trustworthy. But it represents the belief of the whole body of Christians as to events which were

to them of vital importance, and for the historicity of which in general they were ready to lay down and did lay down their lives. And this consideration becomes still stronger in the case of the Fourth Gospel, the more plainly its difference stands out from the other three. The greater the diversity between its portrait of the Master, who was the centre of the whole Christian Church, and that of the other Gospels, so much the more difficult must it have been for that Johannine portrait to be generally received unless it had been handed down from the beginning as authentic. As one of the strongest testimonies to the resurrection of Jesus is the birth on Whitsunday of the Christian Church, springing from the newly awakened belief of His disciples that their Master was with them; so it is a weighty indication of the authenticity of the special characteristics of the Fourth Gospel that they were accepted by men who were vitally concerned in judging them, and who, in accepting the different view of their Master presented in the Fourth Gospel, showed that they were compelled to regard it, though modifying their previous views, as authentic and important.

There is no likeness of Jesus which can reasonably claim to be an authentic representation of His personal appearance. Yet there are multitudes of likenesses of Him—in frescoes, on engraved chalices and glass pateræ, on face-cloths, in bas-reliefs and mosaics. It is remarkable that almost all these have a common type. The face is oval, with high cheek-bones; the hair wavy, parted in the middle, and falling on the shoulders; a slight line of hair on the upper lip, and from ear to ear below the chin; the nose straight, the eyes solemn and sad. These characteristics are present in almost every picture of Christ. One such representation might well be inaccurate; but taken together, they furnish a strong presumption that in the type of appearance they present we have a trustworthy likeness of Jesus. The features of a composite photograph are not those of any of the individuals composing it; but if they belong to a common stock, the type resulting will be authentic.

So the similarity of different historic traditions in regard to the tone and character of the utterances of Christ, tends to establish their authenticity. The fact that Egypt in the second century used, in painting His words, the same colours as the Fourth Gospel, which, whether springing from Ephesus or not, yet had undoubtedly an Asiatic origin, renders it probable that many of the sayings of Jesus had in fact this speculative, transcendent tone.

While the Eastern side of the Roman Empire has thus been giving its testimony to the likeness and manner of Christ, a voice from the West is at least interesting in this connection, and may perhaps tend to confirm the conclusion here reached. In the Vatican Museum there are preserved the bases of many pateræ or sacramental cups, the bodies of which have been broken and lost during the ages since they were deposited in the Catacombs. The bottoms of them, however, were preserved by the fresh mortar on which they were placed, a layer of which was spread as a lining to the tomb. These bases are engraved with emblems and scenes of the Christian faith. Here Christ is pictured at the resurrection of Lazarus, with the woman of Samaria, as the Good Shepherd, the true Vine, at the marriage of Cana. It is noticeable that all these events are narrated in the Fourth Gospel only; and, moreover, there is no representation here of the Nativity, the Transfiguration, or the Ascension, events which are described in the Synoptists but not in the Fourth Gospel. This indicates that the community in which these pictures originated, not only knew the Fourth Gospel but had a special regard for it and considered it trustworthy. More than this, it indicates, if the first three Gospels were known, that the Fourth was regarded as a source of information concerning Jesus superior to them in authenticity. The patera containing the representation of the water turned into wine gives a curious indication of the date at which the written Gospel appeared. Instead of the six water-jars mentioned in the Fourth Gospel, seven are represented here. This shows that

the Gospel was known, in substance at least, at Rome before it appeared in written form. For after it had appeared, no one would have ventured to change the number six, even in order to substitute the sacred, symbolic seven, which in the absence of a manuscript seemed the appropriate number. Here, then, is the Roman Church of the early second or even late first century, by its emphatic recognition of this Gospel, endorsing as authentic a tradition which gives to the utterances of Jesus a tone of metaphysical speculation.[1]

There is in the New Testament another source of information in regard to Jesus besides the Gospels. Half a century at least before the writing of the Fourth Gospel, and a quarter century or so before the earliest of any of our four, St Paul began sending epistles to his distant friends. He made no attempt to describe the events of the life of Jesus, for he was but little interested in them; but Jesus' character impressed him profoundly. Now it is most significant that with him too, as well as with the author of the Fourth Gospel, it is the subjective, spiritual side of Christ with which he is mainly concerned; it is Christ's part in the great world-process of union between God and man. He contemplates Jesus as embodying the human side of God and the divine side of man. "Christ" with him has passed from a title of Jesus of Nazareth to a designation of the ideal man, the consummation of all that is best in the world, the typical instance of the possibilities of the soul and of the human race. He is the spiritual expression of humanity. He is the complete embodiment of God under human conditions. At one time St Paul refers to Jesus as a historic person who lived and died at Jerusalem. At another time Christ is a spiritual being but external to the soul, the giver of all its true life. Again He is within the soul, its very life and essence. From one to another of these great conceptions he hurries, as it is now

[1] A discussion of the authenticity of the likenesses of Christ, and a picture of the patera referred to, may be found (the latter, p. 91) in *Rex Regum*, by Sir Wyke Bayliss: Geo. Bell & Sons, London, 1898.

this, now that aspect which attracts his attention at the time. They tangle his thought into inextricable sentences. The mystery of the mingling of human and divine in the soul of the individual and in the race so overcomes him that he bursts out into poetry and a torrent of prepositions: "For of Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all things: to whom be glory forever. Amen."

The similarity of these two conceptions, those of the Fourth Gospel and of the Pauline Epistles, of course suggests the question whether the later was borrowed from the earlier. But this is a question of little importance. Whether the Fourth Evangelist came across this view in his travels among those Churches of Asia which St Paul had founded; whether it was struck out in his conflict with Gnostic speculation as the only method of reconciling the infinity of God with the finiteness and evil of the world; or whether it came to him after long years of quiet meditation as the necessary development of certain germs of character he had seen or learned of in Jesus of Nazareth—such considerations are of secondary importance. The significant thing is that he deliberately adopted it, endorsed it, and made it the basis of his portrait of his Master.

Portrait—that is the word we must keep in mind in considering this Gospel. It is not a photograph of Jesus; it is a portrait. How do a portrait and a photograph differ? The one gives the fact of the moment and from one point of view. Place yourself at the camera and put your sitter in a given position, and this photograph is precisely what you see. It is the scientifically correct record of these particular conditions; but as a complete report of the man it may be gravely inaccurate. "He never takes well," we say of this or that person, "his face has so much expression." Where a subject is complex, the photograph, by recording only one aspect, may convey an absolutely false impression. But the portrait-painter endeavours to show the full, the real man. The greatness of a Rembrandt or a Watts portrait does not lie in the

fact that it tells us of what colour the subject's eyes were or what kind of a coat he wore. We care very little whether the artist was historically accurate in these details or not. But we stand in amazement at seeing a human soul gazing at us from the canvas—a soul calm or frivolous, humorous, vain, or profound. It is the man himself that we see; not his clothes, not his appearance at one time or under special circumstances, but the composite, complete man. Before the artist can create his likeness he must create *him*. The sitter presents himself before the artist's judgment-seat, and the artist gives sentence upon him with every stroke of his brush. "Your character is thus and so. You are a coward here, a hero there. Thus I strip off all accidentals of time and circumstance, and behold, your real self stands revealed." It must require much confidence to have one's portrait painted by a great artist.

It is such a likeness of Christ that the Fourth Gospel gives us. St Mark, with his loving eye for details, records this and that circumstance which we welcome as furnishing the fact-basis for our conception of our Lord. And then comes St John; and upon this background he paints so wonderfully that we behold the light of the knowledge of the glory of God beaming forth in the face of Jesus Christ. It is a presumption in behalf of the accuracy of his portrait that it is not a summary of facts, but it is the impression which Christ made as a whole upon an artist of constructive imagination and profound spiritual insight. The greatness of the character thus revealed is, it is true, not of itself a proof of its historic accuracy. Moving as it is, it might yet be no revelation of the historic Jesus, but a product merely of the writer's lofty imagination. But when we see that the figure it presents is the Jesus of the Synoptists, raised to a higher degree of spiritual development; when we see this conception prevalent in Egypt, Asia Minor, and perhaps Rome; when we find it buttressed by the First Epistle of St John and the later epistles of St Paul—then we feel we have a right to

reckon as evidence for its accuracy its mastery over our souls and its call upon our worship. We recognise that the author has attained his purpose. "These things," he said, "are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through His Name." Life does, in fact, come to us through the name he has written large.

This conception of the author of the Fourth Gospel bridges a chasm between men and God, and adds a wealth to spiritual life whose absence would have left it poor. If we had possessed no more than the first three gospels we should have had indeed a wonderful Christ, an example and an inspiration. But He would have been a historic being only; we should have had no warrant for identifying Him with the divine life of our souls, dwelling with us and abiding in us. But the Christ of the Fourth Gospel is the connecting link between the outward and the inward, between the historic and the spiritual. He is the representative in bodily conditions, in terms of time and space, of that human side which existed forever in the nature of God. The life of Jesus was in time; but the divine sonship, the existence in God of a human side, was independent of time and humanity, being eternal. This was authentically exhibited in Jesus, as portrayed in the Fourth Gospel. Not that He is Himself the Almighty; for neither in this Gospel nor elsewhere in the New Testament is it asserted as a theological proposition that Jesus is God. But He is the representative of God. If God had lived, a man on earth, He would have done just as Jesus did. He showed thought and love and goodness as existing forever in the bosom of the Father, and constituting in Him the ground of connection with humanity. And, on the other hand, He showed this same goodness and thought and love as the true nature of men, and constituting in them the ground of union with God. He brought God down to men, and raised men up to God. And as He is God's representative, so whatsoever things in the world are true, pure, just, lovely, these are His representatives.

In Him is life, and the life is the light of men. The Soul of the world, all the calls to noble desire, all that makes life worth living—this is the presence in the world of the Spirit of Christ. It is such a conception of Jesus as this that is the characteristic gift to us of the Fourth Gospel. If this Gospel had been lacking, we should indeed have found the conception in the Pauline and Johannine Epistles. But it would have been more difficult of apprehension, less clear and apt for common needs, more abstract and less illustrated through a person; and personality is ever necessary as the mediator of eternal truth.

There are many men for whom this conception is the link which they are unconsciously seeking between two severed sides of life. On the one hand stands ecclesiastical religion, with its proclamation of a historic Jesus. It points through the worship of the ages back to a date in time and to certain events in history, and assures us that eternal salvation for the soul is in some way dependent upon these. On the other hand, the soul which has entered into its closet and shut its door and communed with its Father in secret, knows that its welfare is dependent upon this inward union with God. If salvation is always salvation from sin and not some hypothetical gift in the future, then uprightness, truth, efficiency, love, are forms of soul-salvation. But these are spiritual conditions and of the present. How can they be contingent on historic events long past? What has Jesus of Nazareth to do with my spiritual life to-day?

A connection between ethical and historical religion many persons frankly deny, and many others eagerly and vainly seek. The majority of men yield some observance to what they regard as the dictates of religion; but with the majority this has nothing to do with personal uprightness. The bandit who attends mass and confession before going out to commit murder is not necessarily a hypocrite. He has simply never felt any connection between ecclesiastical observance and spiritual status. The many religious persons outside the

Churches — more to-day than ever — are bent on pursuing steadfastly the life of the soul. But they see the Churches, as they think, hopelessly wedded to ceremonialism and the worship of the past, a matter in which they have no interest, and, as they suppose, no concern. And so they keep their way, and let the Churches take theirs unshared. But the rejection of historic religion has always left spiritual life poor, though the poverty often requires more than a generation to assert itself. If to-morrow the Gospels were discovered to be false, the spiritual life of the world would remain; but it would be weaker in motive-power, narrower in range, with fewer questions answered, with fewer questions which it cared to ask. And so with those who have little or no hold on historic Christianity spiritual life may be real, but it is apt to be thin; saving them indeed from much of evil, and therefore affording a measure of salvation, but feeble and with narrow horizon, not calling upon that strongest of the directive powers, a clear purpose intelligently and deliberately held. There must be a motive-power sufficient to hold fast to righteousness not only one who is already stirred by an ethical impulse, but his children and theirs. This can only be found in the corporate wave of spiritual effort which surges upward throughout the world, and has surged through all time. And of this the climatic instances are Christianity and Christ.

Insistence is laid by the Churches on the necessity of salvation; by the believer in ethical religion, on the necessity of personal character. The latter says to the former, "If your salvation which you talk about is other than the perfection of personal character, keep it; we want nothing to do with it. If you had anything to contribute to the development of humanity, we would listen to you." Too often the Churches are slow to see that in this protest men are in reality clamouring for that very doctrine of the Incarnation which ecclesiastical religion professes, but which it has too narrowly apprehended; since in reality the Incarnation, while centring

all religion in Christ, recognises Christ as the ideal of perfected humanity, and therefore a spiritual presence in the soul as well as a being in history. The endeavour, which we find so prominent in the apostolic age, to demonstrate that Jesus was the Christ, is but a form of this necessity which the thoughtful world is feeling to-day more than ever—the necessity of discovering an essential link between historical and spiritual religion. If the Johannine endeavour[1] had never been carried out, there would have been less ground on which to base the conviction that for the spiritual life of humanity Jesus Christ is not a luxury but a necessity.

The question is sometimes asked, "How do we know that Jesus will not be superseded in that unique position which the Gospel of John assigns Him, just as He Himself superseded the prophets which were before Him?" Or, to put it in theological language, "How do we know that He is God's only Son?" Certainly He is not such in the sense that God has no other sons; for we too are sons of God as really as was Jesus. But certainly He is, in the sense that His revelation of God is unique and final. However this may be further developed—and St Paul points out how one may "fill up that which is behind of the sufferings of Christ"—He cannot be superseded. Development must consist in applying in new departments this same idea of God which Christ set forth. This renewal of the Incarnation is the Christian's path in every age for following his Master. And in every noble man or woman we find a partial incarnation of Christ. But its fundamental lines cannot be changed. For the united Christian consciousness—perhaps one may say, the consciousness of the whole world—asserts that Christ's conception of God is the deepest, the highest, the truest, and therefore the ultimate conception. There are some things in which finality has been reached. Goodness will undoubtedly show itself differently under different conditions; but our idea of the nature of goodness can never be reversed. So Christ's conception of

[1] St John xx. 31.

God may be amplified, but it can never be altered. It is final. He is the only-begotten Son of the Father.

Belief in God depends more upon moral than intellectual grounds. It is founded upon the insistence of the soul that the highest intellectual and moral ideal shall be real. The cogency of this demand will therefore be in proportion to the urgency with which the moral pressure is felt. So belief in the authenticity of St John's conception of Christ will depend largely upon whether such a conception is demanded by one's spiritual nature. To some, the figure which appears in the Synoptists may be a sufficient explanation of the person of Christ and of the way of their own approach to God; for whatever theological position is taken, these two are inevitably bound together. Others, to whom it seems that there must of necessity have been a human side in God from all eternity, that this must of necessity have become at some time embodied as completely as is possible under human conditions, that this ideal must stand in vital connection with the life of their own souls to-day—such will recognise in the portrait of Christ, drawn by the author of the Fourth Gospel with the purpose of presenting to the soul its Master, features intrinsically probable as those of the historic Jesus of Nazareth, and essential to the Saviour of the world.

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THE THEOLOGY OF "THE AVERAGE MAN."

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THE student who shuts himself in his study with his books, who peers into the problems of life and thought as they are transcribed on the written page, never had a better time or a greater opportunity than the present. He may make himself acquainted with all the best that is thought to-day, with all the best that has ever been thought, on the deep things of nature, of man, and of God. His material is endless and inexhaustible. Far from the madding crowd, in the cloistral seclusion of his library, amid the silence and the sunshine of some sylvan retreat, he may probe deeply into the mysteries of life and of death. He may fashion his mind into a sharp instrument and his soul into a thing of beauty in the happy fellowship of choice and congenial spirits.

And to such an one there may be great comfort and joy as veil after veil is lifted from the things hidden from the foundation of the world. As new theories are built up on gathered facts, and established on more facts and wider generalisations, and light up with their growing assurance of proof the darker recesses of human thought and the marvels of the world, he may well imagine that the world is near to the glorious vision of Truth, full-orbed and splendid, and himself become a thrilled and expectant watcher at the shrine; having kept his vigil through the night of illusion, waiting near the dawn for the

day when the shadows shall flee away, and the Eternal Reality appear unveiled before the astonished souls of men.

But if some day he should leave the seclusion of his study and the silent fellowship of the wise, thinking to share the joy of the hour of revelation with his fellows in the great world outside; if he should pass out and beyond the palace-gates of the stately fabric of theory and syllogism, of truth and beauty, in which his soul has dwelt apart, and join the busy tides of life that sweep through the streets of the city; he will soon begin to think that his vision of the near approach of the millennium of Truth is the last and the saddest of all illusions. He will find that the wise and understanding are the few, while the foolish and the ignorant are the many; that the great world is thinking of and caring for other things than truth and beauty and the vision of the Eternal; that the things which seemed to him so real and near in the seclusion of the study wear a far-away look, and have lost their feeling of actuality. He will be a stranger in a strange land. He will hardly understand the patois of the world. He will be jostled and hustled by the rough and eager crowds as they hurry backward and forward in fevered haste, seeking and snatching at what must seem to him the mere shadows of things. As he listens to the talk of the men and women around him, he will hear hardly any reference to the radiant realities which have grown to be his world: of the great news of the "dawn" which he expected to hear reverberating through the earth he will catch scarce an echo. They sing, not the songs of happy expectation, but the songs of Saturnalia. As he looks into their faces he will see, not the light of victory and truth, but the lustreless shadow of disappointment and dissatisfaction, of hopes unrealised and broken aspirations. He will read in the eyes of many who pass him the story of unsatisfied desire, of passion that has burnt itself out, the fever of excitements that consume the soul to ashes. He will be met by the dull and soulless stare of those who eat and drink because there is nothing better to do, and who to-morrow expect to die.

But if our watcher from the shrine will be patient for a while, if he can still keep his faith secure, and wait, and listen, he will win his reward. For things are not altogether as they seem in the busy world into which he has passed. There are depths of thought and emotion which the swirling currents at the surface hardly would suggest—his plummet line will sound them presently. There are whispered questions passed from heart to heart in the hushed moments that fall mysteriously upon the noisy crowd—he will catch the look of them in the eyes of the questioners if he will wait and watch. There are signs that the souls of men are conscious of their need, in spite of the self-satisfied cry that "all is well"—he will discover them if he have human sympathy. There are sighs and furtive tears amid the noisy songs, that tell of vague and unrealised desires; there are knees that bow not to Baal shrines; there are those who feel the darkness in which their soul is shrouded and are waiting for the dawn, though they know not whether its signs lie east or west.

The world is not as careless of higher things, as atrophied of soul, as irresponsive to the finer appeals, as hopeless, as hardened as it seems. Those in the crowd have not had the chance of meeting with their soul which the thinker has enjoyed in his solitude. It is the opportunity they lack; it is an interpreter they need.

All this the watcher from the shrine has to learn. We shall form false estimates of the nearness or delay of the millennial dawn if we inhabit only one region of thought and experience. From the clear vantage-ground and rare atmosphere of Pisgah the Promised Land looks nearer than it is; from the camp below it seems more remote than is the fact.

It is difficult always rightly to estimate the interest that the average man takes in religion, and especially in theology. Looking at the facts from one point of view, it would seem as though he is caring less and less for the one, and has quite lost all interest in the other. If we listen to the dismal utterances of a certain school of prophets, religion is fast losing its hold

on the multitude, and will soon cease to be a force of any account in the life of the world. All spiritual phenomena that do not bear their own hall-mark of genuineness they regard as but a strategical device of the father of lies to mislead the unwary; they have their backs to the wall, and feel that they are fighting a losing battle. Or if we pay heed to the shrill war-songs of certain militant sceptics, religion, it would appear, is being quickly and ignominiously chased off the field, a defeated and discredited remnant; while theology is at its last gasp, its "truths" no better than old wives' fables, its formulæ of no more value than the "fee-fi-fo-fum," the mock incantation of a nursery rhyme, its surviving students fossils from an almost prehistoric age. That is the latest news from the seat of war, as joyfully proclaimed in a press which, in spite of its name, is not always rational.

But, on the other hand, there are facts which make us pause before accepting this estimate of the position. If "official" Christianity is losing its hold on the mass of men and women, if its authority is less and less regarded, yet there is no doubt that the last quarter of a century has witnessed a striking renaissance of the spirit of religious inquiry. Though comparatively fewer people are skilled in the science of theology, the number of those who think and talk about the facts with which theology deals has increased tenfold. It is no longer only the orthodox member of a church who claims to have a stake in theological questions; the man in the street has put in his claim. The books which pour in a steady stream from the press, in which religion and religious questions are discussed in a popular form, are eagerly read; they clearly find a public ready and waiting to greet them. All this seems to suggest a very-much-aliveness for a corpse that is only awaiting decent burial. The shrill notes of the hot-gospellers of unbelief, the very vehemence of their shouts of victory, make one wonder whether there may not be a good deal of "Dutch courage" in their demonstrations of triumph, and suggest the possibility of a doubt lurking

somewhere in their consciousness, as to whether religion is after all so far *in extremis* as they would fain imagine.

The probability is that, although the affirmations of faith are less dogmatic and authoritative, and the note of certainty in matters of religion is less insistent than before, and fewer people are to be found who will gaily and light-heartedly profess their unquestioning acceptance of that philosophy of all things in heaven, and on earth, and under the earth which has passed under the dignified title of orthodoxy, there is a vastly increased multitude of average men and women who are genuinely and personally interested in matters of faith. The company of seekers after truth has been largely and widely recruited in recent years. Though they do not accept the old formulæ, and their terminology is scientifically loose and unconventional, yet their faces are turned to the sun; their thoughts run toward the things that are unseen and eternal; they feel the pull of the mystery of life and of death; they are gradually and unconsciously constructing a theology for themselves, a theology that expresses itself in the terms of the life they live and the things they know, and that has an element of reality, of verve, of intensity and robustness which is eloquent of its living power.

There is one element, perhaps a predominating element, in the religious consciousness of the average man, which expresses itself in several ways: *he is deeply suspicious of formal doctrine.* He sees in the doctrines of the Church the fetters which have held his soul in bondage, the lash of the whip with which authority has kept him under its tyranny: strange and inexplicable formulæ, rigid and cast-iron creeds, systems and schemes of theology, things which he did not understand, but which were supposed to have some magical power, beneficent to those who humbly accepted their divine authority, fearfully destructive to those who dared to reject or even question them. That is how he has thought of religious doctrines. But now he thinks he has found out this tyrant. It is all a mere bogey. It has been a clever device of Church and priest to

keep his soul in subjection and to extract his tithes, especially to extract his tithes. A mere jangle of words that means nothing, that has no relation to reality; cobwebs spun by human spiders, of use only to catch the souls of men like unwary flies. He will have none of it. He, at any rate, will not walk into the theological parlour. Indeed, there is no fear of that; the whole business has no interest for him, except to give point to a jest. It is all so remote from his daily life and the things that are actual to him. If a preacher has a reputation for being doctrinal in his sermons, he gives him a wide berth; he wants to keep awake. If a book has a suspicion of theology in its title, he will keep his shillings for something that is more likely to be of use to him.

Yet the strange thing is that, with all his deep-rooted suspicion of theology and doctrine, the average man is himself intensely theological. He has his own thoughts about God and man, and the relation of the one to the other, which he will state to you on the slightest provocation. His mind is a busy workshop of doctrines; he is constantly shaping and re-shaping them in his own fashion; he is making a brave effort to express and interpret his experience, to relate it to the enfolding mystery of which he is conscious.

How are we to explain this aversion to formal theology and doctrine of the man whose intellectual and spiritual instincts are so actively theological and doctrinal?

1. First of all, it is due to a misconception of the nature and function of doctrine—a misconception for which partly the professional theologian is to blame and partly the average man himself. Creed, formula, and doctrine have been held up to men as possessing some special virtue in themselves apart from their relation to truth and experience; as constituting in themselves a region of experience and reality, rather than as being the simple expression and interpretation of experience; as possessing some magical virtue essential to the well-being of the human mind and soul. To accept doctrines, to recite creeds, to repeat formulæ blindly and without under-

standing even the words of them was the mechanical device by which salvation could be won, and grace mediated, and spiritual security achieved.

Even to-day there are thousands of people who imagine, and hundreds of teachers who insist, that the main thing in religion is the dutiful acceptance of doctrine, creed, and formula. This passive acquiescence is the sign of a true religiousness of disposition. It is a case of shut your eyes and open your mouth, and see what Mother Church will give you. The man who hesitates is lost, and the man who not only hesitates but rejects is more lost than the human imagination can conceive, and the ingenuity of language has been elaborated in the vain attempt to picture his ultimate fate.

Such a view of doctrine and theology was quite easily accepted in the days when the average man had not acquired the passion for "knowing the reason why" of things, when magic was recognised as one of the elemental forces of life and nature. It was just as easy to believe that the formula of the theologian should possess virtue in itself as the formula of the wizard, and it was a great deal more respectable. The doctrines of the Church were, for the average man, exactly in the same category as the incantations of the magician. Each represented mysterious and hidden potencies, the one beneficent and divine, the other malignant and infernal.

But since the spirit of inquiry has become the spirit of the age, since the average man demands to know the "reason why," asks for "proof" and "evidence" and "credentials," the wizardry of theologian and magician has lost its spell, its power has gone; men have awakened to the fact that the doctrines of the one and the incantations of the other are in themselves only words, both equally harmless, both equally without any semblance of magical power. So the average man laughs at the one and the other, regards them as fond imaginations of the days of ignorance; while for the doctrines of the theologian he adds the feeling of resentment and contempt, because their tyranny has been more wide-reaching

and more absolute. The fact that escapes his recognition and invalidates his judgment is this:—that with whatever magical power theological doctrines may have been invested, and however resolutely they may have been used by priest and Church to compel his thought along certain lines, they are in their origin and nature the product of a process in the minds of their framers exactly similar to the process which is in progress in his own mind. He is making doctrines, constructing a theology to-day, just as were the men of 1500 years ago. A doctrine is simply a statement of an interpretation of the facts of experience. It is of value as it leads us to a true and satisfactory explanation of the facts, and by the power of whatever truth it possesses energises the life. Its virtue and usefulness lie entirely in this direction, and not in any self-contained magical power. The average man, when he is suspicious of doctrine as such, is blind to its historic background; he views it out of perspective, he ignores its human element as completely as he who claims for it some divine and inherent authority. The tyranny of it lies not in its legitimate use, but in its misuse.

The first, and perhaps the fundamental, cause of the popular suspicion of doctrine is this misconception as to its origin and function which authority has created, and from which the average man, as the result of centuries of habit, has failed completely to free his mind.

2. Another fruitful cause of the popular suspicion of theology and doctrine lies in the remoteness of its terms and methods of thought from the modern atmosphere and attitude. I well remember a learned doctor of divinity who, in cold blood, would repress the eager onrush of the minds of his students towards live problems of thought, in order to haggle, for the all too brief hour devoted to the divinity lecture, over the question as to whether theology is a deductive or an inductive science. I remember, too, how he would frown upon any expression of the students' fresh thought, unless it were phrased in the formal and conventional terms of his own

thirty-year-old divinity lectures. He imagined that he was keeping his young men sound in the faith by choking off somewhat ruthlessly their cheap desire (as he would regard it) to be up to date. But if any of them have escaped the petrifaction of their thinking power, and are able to understand and sympathise with the living thoughts of live men, it is by the mercy of God and their own exuberance of intellectual vitality.

It is still the case that a terminology is used in the exposition of doctrine which has little or no significance for the average man, which suggests nothing to his mind that is of vital interest—words upon which the dust of centuries lies thick. Phrases are retained which suggest an attitude to the problems of life with which he has no sympathy, and only produce a feeling of unreality in his mind. If one speaks, for example, of "original sin," he turns away, because he does not want to be bored with talk upon what he is quite firmly convinced is a mere figment of the unromantic theological imagination; an issue that is dead, and ought to have been buried centuries ago. However living the question may have been to the men of a thousand years ago, who concerned themselves, he thinks, with quaint and curious discussions, for him, the man of to-day, it is dry bones. But if one had spoken to him about "inherited tendencies," the influence of ancestry in the life and character of the individual, he would have pricked up his ears, recognising a live issue that interests him deeply, in which he is personally concerned, upon which he has done some hard thinking on his own account, and which he would eagerly discuss with you. The root facts which create the problem of inherited tendencies are exactly the same as those with which the theologian concerns himself when he discusses the question of original sin. It is the phrase used to describe the set of facts which in one case stifles and in the other stimulates his interest.

The average man to-day loves actuality; he is immersed in the facts of his own daily life and experience. He meets in

that daily life more problems than he can settle, the days and hours are crowded with affairs, life is short and fleeting; he wants to settle his own problems, he cannot spare time to worry over the problems that absorbed his forefathers; he thinks they are quite different problems. To merely apprehend them he has to learn a language that repels him with its archaism. To read a theological treatise is like walking through a museum of antiquities. He does not quite realise that it is only the terms that are different; the facts and problems are the same. His forefathers found themselves face to face with the same phenomena, only they expressed them differently and approached them from a different point of view, and followed a different intellectual method in discussing them. The root facts, the fundamental questions of life and destiny, are much the same all the world over and in all ages; the same radiant hopes, the same spectral fears flit through the minds and hearts of men. What is needed nowadays is to bring the modern mind and the mind of the ages of the past into vital relation with each other, to translate the wise thoughts of ancient days into terms of modern experience, to make men feel that all the way along theology has been dealing with living problems. The medium through which the modern teacher or preacher will reach the hearts of living men is a living language. He must adapt himself to the modern attitude, and adopt modern intellectual methods. Therein lies his only chance of arresting the attention of the average man, and of guiding his thoughts and helping him in the life he lives.

3. Again, the average man is prejudiced against theology and doctrine by reason of the note of *finality* with which they have been presented to him. "This is the true account of the matter," he has been told; "and since truth is always truth, any other account which falls short of or goes beyond this must be false."

The possibility of a wider outlook, of changing points of view, has been continually ignored; the influence of the elements of educational bias and variation of temperament

in the interpretation of the facts of experience (even the probability of wide differences in experience itself) has been neglected by the theologian. "What is true to me now must be true to all men, and eternally true": that is the argument which has ever been the fatal barrier to progress in our perception of truth. It is an argument which, in time past, men were willing to receive, but now its validity has gone. The immense and rapid advance in the realm of knowledge in recent years, the dramatic lifting of the mists of ignorance and the revelation of a world of marvel which, through all the centuries of the past, has been lying hidden from human ken, has completely dissipated the idea that any limit can be set to knowledge. The region of ascertained facts is ever broadening in every direction: the astounding discovery of to-day will to-morrow open the way to some discovery still more astounding; so the marvel of the world grows from day to day. And as with knowledge in the realm of the seen and temporal, so with faith in the realm of the unseen and eternal. The doctrine of finality in faith has gone for ever. As God is more wonderful and inexhaustible than His creation, so the possibilities of progress in our faith in God are more plainly illimitable than the possibilities of progress in knowledge of His creation. For any individual or any church to lay down any hard and fast barrier, and declare that truth cannot pass beyond it, is sheer blasphemy, involving as it does the limitation of the Eternal. Faith is the most disruptive of all forces; it breaks down all barriers, it laughs to scorn all ring-fences of church and creed. Church and creed must march with faith, or they will get left on the road that leads to truth, and will themselves become a lie.

It must be acknowledged that the characteristic conservatism of the Church has not seldom hardened into an attitude of resolute opposition to progress in theology and doctrine. The claim to infallibility and finality of judgment which the Church of Rome makes is only the clear and definite and fearless expression of a claim which all churches have more or less implied as

attaching to their own teaching. The Protestant bases his doctrines on the Bible, and feels he can therefore claim for them the element of finality—"God is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever; God's Book must be the storehouse of truth, which likewise is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Whatever doctrine comes out of the Bible must therefore, in the very nature of things, be final and eternal." He does not always (he does not ever when he argues thus) perceive that he is transferring his claim to finality from the Bible to his doctrine, which is, after all, only *his* interpretation of what he finds in the Bible. The very claim to this finality which he makes on behalf of his Bible is nothing more than the expression of his own judgment, since the Bible does not make any such claim for itself; and a very complete knowledge of the history of the origin and becoming of the Bible is sufficient to destroy the claim.

All this view of things has somehow worked itself into the consciousness of the average man. He is more than half convinced that nothing is final in this world. He has learnt enough of evolution to realise that the world and human life, and our knowledge of both, and of the Eternal Something that lies behind all, are ever moving forward, that progress is essential to life, that finality is only "sepulchre" written differently. He has an instinctive belief in the "one far-off divine event," and he knows that we have not as yet attained to that happy goal; and the goal, when it is attained, will be found to be the starting-place for further adventure into fresh woods and pastures new. Though perhaps he does not put it quite in this way, he feels that our perception of absolute truth can only be relative after all. The only possible consummation in truth is God Himself, and His finality is so inexhaustible that, losing itself in His infinity, it annihilates itself. "The thoughts of men must widen with the process of the suns": if the average man is to be brought into sympathy with the theology of the Church, the attitude of finality must be relinquished once and for all by both Church and theology.

4. Similarly, the note of authority which has so entirely dominated the enunciation of doctrine and theology has done almost as much as anything to induce the suspicion of the average man. He begins to feel that it is time he should be allowed to think for himself in matters of religion. He resents being spoon-fed with "authoritative utterances" of Church and priest. He has indeed grown so bold as to suggest an inquiry into the *locus standi* of the "authority" itself. He is asking for credentials. There are some strange facts in the life-story of authority which he feels want clearing up.

In the days of mediæval ignorance authority might have some place and function. But the average man to-day is not as his brother of five hundred years ago. He has learnt a great deal, and chiefly he is learning how to think, how to discriminate between truth and error. That faculty is no longer the exclusive possession of a few specialists.

Besides, he is realising that truth must be *true to him* before it can ever have any real power over him; and it can only be true to him after a process of assimilation. There is an element of personality which has to be taken into account and provided for before truth can become really effective in a man's life. It is just that element of personality which authority ignores or crushes down. The average man feels that he has been a child long enough; now he has become a man he wants to speak as a man, to feel as a man, to think as a man. The strings which tie him to the apron of Mother Church are strained to the breaking-point. Whatever happens, he is going to look into things for himself. Strange reversal of the old order, authority is itself brought to the judgment bar of the man in the street, and has not only to justify itself, but to make good its assertions by evidence and proof! The sooner the Church drops her claim to lord it over men's consciences, the better it will be both for herself and for the average man. She may lead where she cannot drive him, and he is badly in need of guidance. If his deep-rooted suspicion of Church and creed, of theology and doctrine, is

ever to be eradicated, the note of authority must be eliminated. The divine persuasiveness, "Come now, let us reason together," must take the place of, "If you would be saved, it is above all things necessary that you believe what I tell you."

As a Christian minister, my work brings me in close and daily contact with the type of the average man whose attitude toward theology and doctrine I have endeavoured to express. In familiar intercourse and conversation, if one will only lay aside the "professionalism" of which the average man is so shy, he will talk freely with the Christian minister, as between man and man, of the things that are in his mind. And in that traffic of ideas there is forced upon one the consciousness that, as far as religious faith is concerned, "the fields of the world are white unto harvest," and wait to be reaped by the man who will bring to the task a well-trained intelligence, sympathy with the modern mind and a correct psychological appreciation of it; who will assume no airs of superiority for himself or his church; who will discuss matters of faith with the same frankness and freedom as he discusses other matters of common interest. Those who go down into the highways and hedges and seek to compel men, with the compulsion of sweet reasonableness, to come into the kingdom, know that this is the only line which promises success. Let us give up all assumption of external authority and finality for our message, let us drop those forms of speech which, however useful to ourselves as technical symbols, have no meaning for intelligent men of the world, and seek to commend the message by the inherent reasonableness, the inevitability of it, expressed in simple, direct, and living speech.

And to those who are leaders in the realm of theology, to whom we look for guidance and inspiration, I would especially appeal, asking them to help us in the direction in which help is supremely needed. *The* problem of theology to-day is not to adjust the boundaries between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Men have ceased to care very much whether they are the one

or the other. That old warfare is as dead as the tournament. The problem of theology is to relate the facts and experiences of life and thought and emotion as we know them to the Eternal Realities that lie behind. What we need from our masters of theology is some practical guidance toward a lucid and convincing spiritual interpretation of the facts of life and experience to-day. The theologian who lives in the intellectual and spiritual atmosphere of the last millennium or even of the last century, who ignores the thoughts and questions of the men of to-day, however logical his reasoning and flawless his philosophy, will be "ploughing a lonely furrow"; and that is as profitless a proceeding in theology as it is in politics. We look to-day for some great thinker, who, bringing the wisdom gathered from the wise and great of the past, with a keen intellectual training, a logical, alert, and practical mind, an eye for reality, a sympathetic heart, will step down into the arena of the world's life, and teach men how to resolve the experiences of their daily life, how to read their own thoughts, how to penetrate through the veil of the seen and temporal that presses so closely upon them and see the things which are eternal; how to win the vision of God as they walk along the highways of life.

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WALSALL.

WHAT DO RELIGIOUS THINKERS OWE TO KANT?

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KANT'S position in the history of thought is in some respects peculiar. He is both the prophet of a new speculative age, and the last and most illustrious representative of the older one. He moves to and fro across the border-line between two worlds, and to regard him as in the main belonging to either of them does injustice to some aspects of his work. If in certain of his salient notions Kant is the herald of the nineteenth century, yet in all his writings we find ideas as well as limitations of view which are characteristic of the century before. While in his treatment of knowledge and morality he transcends the old dogmatism and rationalism, on the other hand, the social and evolutionary aspects of reason and conscience, and the historical development of experience, lie beyond his intellectual horizon. And it is a consequence of this presence of diverse tendencies within it which makes it difficult for anyone to accept the Kantian work as it stands. This philosophy can never be an assured resting-place of thought; its inconsistencies are too palpable. But in spite of this, and indeed to some extent because his thought does not form a systematic and consistent whole, Kant has always continued to exercise a living influence on philosophy. As one of his biographers justly remarks, he "left behind him no system, but he threw out suggestions of matchless fertility."[1] Indeed, it is by the suggestiveness

[1] Wallace's *Kant*, p. 219.

with which he handles problems, and by the breadth and sanity of his outlook rather than by the precise results at which he arrives, that Kant is still a centre of light and interest for various schools of thought. At the present day the Absolute Idealist and the Pragmatist, who have no dealings with one another, both quote the philosopher of Königsberg in support of some of their cardinal tenets. And the Agnostic cites the same authority in favour of his contention that knowledge cannot transcend the bounds of experience. The many-sidedness of Kant's thoughts, which are not subjected to the criticism and modification requisite to the development of a harmonious unity, explains the appeal he makes to diverse orders of mind.

What is true of Kant's influence in general is, on the whole, true of his influence on religious thought. Fertility of suggestion is the note of that influence. But, while we associate Kant's speculative influence largely with his *Critique of Pure Reason*, his influence on religious thought has been rather through aspects of his general philosophy than by any direct treatment of religion. I fancy that many who study Kant have never read the treatise on *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, and are satisfied with knowing its contents at second hand. The very title indicates that the author stands remote from the modern psychological and historical treatment of religious experience. And we feel, on closer acquaintance, that its value rather lies in the fact that it is a significant illustration of Kant's principles and methods, than because it offers solutions of religious problems which we could now entirely accept.[1] Yet he does lay stress on one idea which constantly reappears in later discussions of the subject, the idea, namely, that it is possible to distinguish an essential and

[1] That Kant's treatise on religion did not have any great effect on religious thought is partly due to the fact that it marks the close of an epoch. Hegel and Schleiermacher, who afterwards gave a powerful stimulus to theology, each in his way turned from the abstract to the historic point of view—Hegel to the study of the development of the religious spirit in time, Schleiermacher to reflection on the living consciousness of the Christian Church.

non-essential element in existing religion. And for Kant this meant Christianity. The truth of a dogma depends upon its coincidence with the judgments of the moral self, and the claim to be based on revelation cannot be conceded to any religious doctrine which conflicts with the moral law. For the ordinary ritual of religion Kant had a slender respect. "Everything outside of a good life by which man supposes he can make himself well-pleasing to God is superstition." The religious consciousness is an advance on the moral consciousness simply because it regards all our duties as "commands of God."

There is a certain degree of truth in this simple and severe conception of religion. Duty, as the poet tells us, is the

"Stern daughter of the voice of God."

The moral consciousness has been the reformer of many a decadent faith; and where religion is at discord with morality the spiritual house is divided against itself. Yet the truth in Kant's conception is no doubt partial. For religion must be in harmony with morality not because it is a kind of appendage to it, but because the higher religious consciousness, while it transcends, also includes the moral consciousness within itself. Religion on the Kantian view becomes, as Dr Caird has said, a kind of external complement to morality.[1] This appears very clearly in the curious and artificial method by which Kant derives the idea of God. He tells us that the moral consciousness demands that the highest good be realised. But it is necessary to such a good that virtue be combined with happiness. In other words, the satisfaction which flows from the fulfilment of our desires must blend with that fulfilment of our higher nature which is attained through obedience to the moral law. And as there is no necessary connection between the moral law (which belongs to the intelligible world) and happiness (which belongs to the phenomenal), the coincidence of the two can only be secured by a Being who acts under moral law and is also the ground and cause

[1] *Phil. of Kant*, vol. ii. p. 564.

of nature. God is thus the teleological ground which we postulate to ensure the necessary union of virtue and happiness.[1] Here God is not construed as the ground of the moral law; that stands on its own sure basis. But He is brought in after an external fashion in order to guarantee that the moral good shall likewise be the greatest good, and so combine happiness with itself. This transition to the idea of God is very awkward and artificial. Psychologically, of course, it could not be defended as a description of the process by which men have actually reached the idea of God. Kant might reply that he was here dealing with the logic of the moral reason, which does not depend on particular psychological experiences. But the difficulty would remain that the inference carries no conviction of validity to many who understand it. For God, on this theory, has no direct and fundamental relation to the spiritual life in man. Nor is it easy to see why, on Kant's own principles, there is any necessity for making the postulate at all. What convincing reply could he give to one who argued thus? "Moral conduct, I agree, is an essential duty. But the reality and value of my moral duties in no way depend on their being regarded as commands of God. As for happiness, it is a minor matter which pertains to the phenomenal world. An empirical and sensuous product which, on your own showing, does not belong to the real world at all, is a slender and uncertain basis on which to ground the momentous inference that God exists. I therefore decline to make the inference, and maintain that religion is not essential, for it is neither the ground of moral obligation, nor does it affect the inner worth of the man who reverently obeys the moral law." From the Kantian standpoint it would be hard to show that this argument is unsound. That Kant was insincere in postulating God no one will suppose. But the drift of his teaching was to

[1] Kant sets forth very clearly the teleological function of the idea of God in the preface to the first edition of his *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*.

absorb religion in morality; and we learn without surprise that he personally stood aloof from the ordinary exercises of religion.

Yet Kant's theistic argument, so artificial in its presentation, has in a modified form had a wide vogue. Thus Ritschl and his School argue that it is the limiting and restraining power of the world on the freedom of the self-conscious individual which impels him to seek help through a Reality above the world, *i.e.* God.[1] This movement of the spirit Sabatier terms the *salto mortale* of faith. Here the idea of God has the function of solving the contradiction which the individual experiences between his inner freedom and his external environment. But while this theistic inference is not so artificial as Kant's, it shares the great defect of the latter. For, on either theory, the relation of God to the spiritual life of the individual is only indirect. The idea of God is primarily a *Hilfsvorstellung* towards the attainment of certain empirical ends; therefore, in the degree that these ends are attained, the idea ceases to be necessary. The Kantian and Ritschlian theories both err in making the conception of God depend on particular empirical conditions—the desire for happiness in one case, the longing for deliverance from external constraint in the other. And one cannot think that, as reasons why we ought to postulate the idea of God, they are valid. But, if we discard the artificial form of Kant's argument, and take it along with the Ritschlian statement, we may admit that they have some *psychological* significance: they describe certain features of the religious consciousness. For, without doubt, man's longing for happiness, and his desire to be delivered from the tyranny of his material environment, have been motives which operated in forming and giving content to his conception of a divine Being or Beings. But the working of psychological motives is something very different from an act of the moral reason by which it posits a valid object of faith. Of course, so far as Kant was concerned, the psychology of religion did not

[1] A view also shared by Lipsius.

come within his ken. Nor did it occur to him to test his religious postulate in the field of psychology. Here, as in other points, Kant was unconsciously governed by the views and methods of the eighteenth century.

Much less, we repeat, by his formal treatise on religion than by these profound and suggestive ideas which appear in his general philosophy has Kant influenced the subsequent course of religious thought. It is the great merit of Kant that, in the course of his speculations, he opens out new lines of thought and puts forth ideas whose vitality is proved by the fact that they are still fresh and fruitful. It is worth while considering, in some detail, how this holds in the matter of religion.

1. In the first place, Kant rendered a marked service to religion in his epistemology, which definitely limited the province of science. His main thoughts in this connection have been widely reproduced by theologians and philosophical defenders of religion. For all who have entered into the Kantian analysis of experience, the futility of attempting to explain mind by matter, or of seeking to interpret thought by mechanical principles, is perfectly clear. The synthetic unity of self-consciousness is implied in the existence of an orderly world in space and time which the materialist and realist regard as an independent fact. No part of Kant's criticism is more convincing than where he shows that experience is not intelligible, if it be dogmatically construed as impressed on the mind from without—a fallacy from which Berkeley's idealism was not free. The coherency and validity of temporal and spatial experience depend on the constitutive activity of self-consciousness in general. So it involves a *hysteron-proteron* to apply principles, valid in the sphere of external experience, to criticise the Self which these principles already imply. The result of Kant's discussion was to show that the methods of science are not absolute: they are valid in their own sphere but not beyond it. Thus the materialistic argument against religion is ruled out of court as having no relevance in the

field. Those who have learned the lesson taught by Kant can always give a sufficient answer to those who contend that mind is no more than a function of the brain, and that spiritual experience is the product of physiological processes.

At the same time, Kant's service to religion by his theory of knowledge is not bound up with all the details of that theory. There is a good deal in the Kantian epistemology which few will now accept as it stands. As a theory, it is too complicated and artificial; and one can sympathise with a characteristic passage by Dr Schiller, in which he adjures the "mighty master of both worlds" to say if it were not possible to construct his theory of knowledge more simply.[1] But, when all is said, it remains the enduring merit of Kant to have made clear that it is an inadequate and one-sided view of the world which regards it in isolation from self-consciousness. In other words, the causal-mechanical interpretation of experience is abstract, and so comes short of the truth. For, while it establishes a connection between phenomena as given, it neither tells us how they come to be given nor the end to which they are moving. The problem of ultimate origins and destinies lies beyond the legitimate domain of natural science. And it is just in this region beyond that the religious spirit moves. So recent theologians, both at home and abroad, are wont to urge, quite in the spirit of Kant, the necessary limitations of the scientific point of view, and its inadequacy to the criticism of the religious consciousness. Moreover, there has lately been a significant recognition by certain men of science of the abstract nature of scientific explanation. According to Mach, Poincaré, and others, the so-called laws of nature are descriptive formulæ, justifiable working conceptions rather than explanations. For facts which the scientific man properly rejects as irrelevant to the purpose on hand are, in the long run, not irrelevant. So science, it is conceded, supplies us with good working rules

[1] *Personal Idealism*, pp. 78–9.

by which we can manipulate nature, not with explanations in the strict sense of the word.

In close connection with this insistence on the limitations of natural science, many theologians have followed the lead of Kant in emphasising the distinction between the causal and the teleological point of view.[1] Agreeing, for the most part, with Kant that natural science cannot legitimately use the notion of *end* in the explanation of phenomena, they go beyond the letter of the Kantian system in giving the category an immanent or constitutive value in the domain of history. The meaning of history must be read in the light of the goal to which it moves, and human progress cannot be understood apart from human destiny. In this connection the idea of the kingdom of God, as a teleological conception, has been strenuously urged by modern theologians. The Divine Kingdom is the guiding idea of human development to the realisation of which history is moving. But the very sharpness of the contrast between causality and teleology, nature and history, constitutes a difficulty in the face of the principle of continuity. This problem the theologians who draw their inspiration from Kant do not solve any more than he did; and often they do not seek to deal with it at all.

2. This leads us naturally to the statement of the second line of thought by which Kant has greatly influenced religious thinkers. I refer to his distinction of the practical from the theoretical reason, and the correlative conception of faith as contrasted with knowledge. Knowledge, it is well to remember, is not for Kant the only, nor even the most important, function of the subject. We fail to do justice to his limitation of the province of knowledge and his criticism of the speculative reason, if we do not regard them as stages to the vindication of the rights of practical reason and the reality of freedom. For the aim of Kant's argument is to show that the active moral consciousness cannot fall within the phenomenal world in space and time, nor be subject to its mechanical

[1] Ritschl, Lipsius, Sabatier, Rauwenhoff, to name only a few.

necessity. The negative and sceptical aspects of his thought are subordinate, and the reality of the moral will is fundamental. Man, conscious of determining himself to act, is in contact with what is real. But, in reflecting on himself through the forms of sense and understanding, he can only know himself as part and parcel of the phenomenal world, and therefore not in the truth of his being. The self, then, which is immediately conscious of itself as free, or self-determining, is not the empirical but the intelligible self, and the noümenal, or intelligible, must be thought as condition of the world of sensible experience. In being conscious of himself as acting freely in accordance with the laws of his inner being, man is likewise conscious that he exercises the pure causality of reason, which causality makes possible the derivative causality manifested in the form of necessary connection in space and time.

After vindicating the reality and primacy of the moral self as will acting under the idea of freedom, it remained for Kant to ask what claims this intelligible self made on the world, as the outcome of its own constitution. In this way the practical reason will cast light upon life and the destinies of man. The Postulates of practical reason are the demands which flow from the inner nature of man, and they are the expression of the necessity he is under of connecting the moral consciousness with the view of the world as a whole. Moreover, we must remember that for Kant this demand, which utters itself in the Postulates, is far more than the expression of emotional desire: it springs, he says, "not from the subjective ground of our wishes, but from an objective motive of the will which binds every rational being." The important point for our purpose at present is to recognise that, according to Kant, the moral will posits for its coherent working the reality of God as the Supreme Good, an idea which, on theoretical grounds, proved indefensible. That is to say, follow out the demands of the moral consciousness, and you will find that in the end they imply God. And, in some sense, we must *know* God, if the

idea is to be of practical value. But Kant insists it is knowledge only in a *practical* relation:

"If we try to extend our knowledge to a theoretical relation, we get the idea of an intelligence which does not think but perceives, and a will which is directed to objects upon the existence of which its own satisfaction does not in the least depend. But these are all attributes of which we can form no conception that enables us to have a *knowledge* of a Supreme Intelligence."[1]

This practical knowledge which is not theoretical Kant terms moral conviction or faith: and in the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* he explains that he had to abolish the so-called knowledge of pure reason, in order to give its proper place to faith. The difference between knowledge and faith is defined by the different objects to which they apply: knowledge is of experience in its phenomenal form, while faith apprehends the noümenal or real that lies beyond space and time.

In drawing this distinction, Kant is not to be credited with the intention of setting up a dualism of reason; for in the end he regarded it as the same reason, which in one aspect was theoretical and in another practical. But it is also clear that he held the distinction was necessary and valid, and that we could not translate faith into pure rational or speculative insight. Faith fulfilled an indispensable function in the economy of the moral life; it was the legitimate expression of the self as will. This idea of a higher office of faith in contrast to knowledge has been widely accepted and put to service by religious thinkers. It will be said that the distinction is far older than Kant, and even goes back to the πίστις and γνῶσις of the Alexandrian theologians. The point, however, is that faith is not for Kant simply undeveloped knowledge, but is distinguished from it by the way it originates and the objects to which it is directed. And it is no doubt largely owing to their conviction that post-Kantian Idealism had failed in its splendid effort to merge faith in knowledge, that theologians returned to Kant and emphasised the distinction he drew.

[1] *Critique of Prac. Reason*, bk. ii. cap. ii. sec. 7. Professor Watson's translation.

The new movement, however, allowed the intellectual aspect of his theory (which appears in his treatment of the will as reason) to remain in the background, while it set the demands of the feeling and volitional self-consciousness in the foreground.[1] And faith, whose office with Kant was practically limited to the affirmation of the reality of certain ideas, has been treated as the specific instrument of moral and religious knowledge. Hence, it is argued, there are two orders of knowledge, the scientific and the spiritual, which are sharply differentiated. The scientific mind deals with the world of outer experience, exhibiting the connection of things and establishing the reign of mechanical determination. The religious mind, on the other hand, has its sphere in the free, inner life of the subject, with its desires, needs, and aspirations. The pious heart, we are told, is sure of its object by faith, and is not concerned with scientific proof: for such proof cannot create piety where it does not already exist, and where it does exist the proof would be superfluous, even were it possible. Instead of trying to justify Faith on intellectual grounds, we are taught to seek its warrant in the normal demands of the feeling and acting self.[2]

The historical genesis of this significant theological movement was, as we have already suggested, occasioned by the reaction against Absolute Idealism in Germany, and by distrust of the speculative methods in theology. The demand for

[1] No doubt Kant, as Pfleiderer says, failed to recognise the importance of imagination and the emotions as elements in the religious consciousness. *Vide Development of Theology*, p. 18.

[2] This point of view is well represented by A. Sabatier; *vide* his *Philosophie de la Religion*, and especially the section entitled "Théorie critique de la connaissance religieuse." Quite recently M. Loisy has urged the claims of faith as against *historical* knowledge. He apparently holds that Christian beliefs, like that in the Resurrection of Christ, cannot be known to represent historical facts: which means that historical criticism does not warrant our treating them as true. Nevertheless, to the living faith of the corporate Church they are truths, not illusions. If Loisy be right, human nature is strangely divided against itself. His view, though more sincerely urged, reminds one of the contention of the later Schoolmen, that what was true in theology might be false in philosophy.

reconstruction on more sober lines was in the air, and the philosophy of Kant seemed to offer a suitable basis for a new beginning. So theology fell in with the general movement "back to Kant," and developed, in the way we have seen, his distinction between knowledge and faith. Nor can it be denied that, after certain modifications, the Kantian standpoint seemed to offer special advantages to the theologian who wished neither to ignore historical criticism nor to break profoundly with the orthodox creed. Doctrines whose validity thought failed to substantiate might be justified by religious faith. And the same spiritual principle, provided with its own proper sphere, enabled the theologian to close the door of the spiritual edifice against the unwelcome intrusion of the metaphysician. All that was necessary was to correct Kant's abstract treatment, and to bring his principle into vital relation with historical experience. So the Christian consciousness was represented as putting forward its own postulates and affirming them by faith.

This Neo-Kantianism in theology is now represented in France and Great Britain as well as in Germany. Among ourselves Hegelianism had a kind of Indian summer a generation after its light had faded in the land of its birth. But now the reaction has set in, and in theology as well as philosophy newer methods are being followed. Nor is this to be regretted, for the later theology emphasises aspects of religious experience which had been too much neglected. Reflective people had grown weary of the "rational proofs" of the older theology. The familiar parade of reasons in the form of "evidences" had turned out curiously impotent to create belief in those who had not the "will to believe." Wherefore it was natural that many should be attracted by the idea that the better justification of religion is to be found in the contents of the religious consciousness itself. And even those who are doubtful about the rôle of faith in the new theology can still see in the spiritual consciousness which it seeks to construe a fruitful subject for reverent psychological study.

3. In a development of his philosophy which closely connects itself with the foregoing subject, Kant must likewise be credited with greatly influencing religious thought. I refer to his insistence on the reality and importance of the world of moral values. The distinction so frequently drawn now between fact and value may be traced back to Kant. For it is really the distinction between knowledge and faith in another aspect. No doubt Kant does not ordinarily use the word *value* in this reference; but when he speaks of ethical *ends* he practically means the same thing.[1] For the end denotes a value to be realised—a value that stands in contrast to what is, and which is valuable because it embodies what somehow satisfies the acting subject or practical reason. The personal reference is essential; and so one can understand how Kant was led to deny the immanent use of the category of end in nature, and to restrict it to the moral world.

The significance of the idea of value in the Kantian system is apt to be obscured by the way in which it is reached. Here, as elsewhere, Kant neglects psychology, and treats the formal principle of ethics in abstraction from its material or content. From the pure idea of the moral law, the universal imperative of duty, he seeks to deduce the conception of moral agents who are ends in themselves, and who form in their relations to one another a kingdom of ends or moral values. The psychological development has certainly not been in this way, but from value to its projection as end, and from ends to their unification under the conception of a moral law. Kant regarded the moral imperative as a practical, synthetic *a priori* principle; and it might be urged that, if psychologically later (ὕστερον γενέσει), it is logically prior to the notion of end (πρότερον φύσει). But in that case the law should be shown to be immanent in the growth of moral experience; and this Kant could not do, for with him the law is a pure form, which we may typify but cannot realise in the natural or sensuous world. It is due to Kant's formal and unhistoric method that

[1] *Vide* Höffding, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 349.

he fails to realise the genetic function of value in relation to moral law. But there can be no question of the stress he lays on the reality and importance of the realm of moral values. These are not of sensuous origin. They spring from the intelligible nature of man: they proceed from a causality which is free, for it acts in accordance with a law which is the expression of the truest character of the agent.

Though he himself does not say it in so many words, we can see that Kant uses the idea of value to express the nature of God. The pure reason yields the regulative idea of an unconditioned Being who is the ground of all conditioned realities. The practical reason, again, postulates God as the Cause who consummates the union of the rational and empirical character—who brings about the combination of virtue with happiness. But "the postulate of the highest derived good is at the same time the postulate of the highest original good." That is to say, practical reason postulates God as a Supreme Value in virtue of the fact that He brings about the *Summum Bonum*. And, though Kant does not seem to have remarked it, the idea of God as an ethical postulate does not strictly coincide with the unconditioned Being yielded by the pure reason. In the one case we have the conception of a supreme Reality, and in the other of a supreme Value. Implicitly, at all events, Kant here made the fertile suggestion that the moral consciousness could give a valid content to the idea of God, which the speculative intellect could not supply. With the great idealistic thinkers, on the other hand, the notions of reality and value coincide. Plato's Idea of the Good is at once the absolute Reality and the absolute Value which is the measure of all other values. Hegel, who insists on the thorough continuity of the theoretical and practical reason as exhibited by the dialectic, puts forward the same claim for the Absolute Idea. Kant, in making what amounted to a refusal to fuse into one the problems of existence and of value, opened out a line of thought which has been widely followed

in a later day. Among earlier thinkers, Herbart, whose treatment of the problem of existence had yielded an irreducible surd or real, sharply distinguished from it the problem of appreciation. Afterwards Lotze, developing the idea of the value-judgment as the expression of the spiritual and emotional self-consciousness, gave a new clearness to the religious significance of the principle. For he urged that the idea of God as the ultimate Reality must not only meet the claims of reason, but also satisfy the demands of the spiritual nature.[1] Aided by the work done by Kant and Lotze, Ritschl and others then took up the principle of the value-judgment and applied it with great energy and suggestiveness in the domain of theology. In his hands it became an instrument which enabled the theologian to dispense with metaphysics, and to build up a system of Christian doctrine which claims to be the reflection of the practical demands of the Christian consciousness. Ritschl would interpret the idea of God through value-judgments only, in the end going beyond Kant to deny reason even a regulative function in this reference. Ritschl's view of the theological function of the value-judgment has won a wide acceptance. And religious thinkers like Pfleiderer and Siebeck, who are far from sharing the Ritschlian antagonism to speculative philosophy, fully recognise that the value-judgment has an indispensable office in giving content to the conception of God.

It would fall beyond the scope of this paper, even were the writer competent, to enter into recent psychological theories of the nature of value, and their applications in the field of economics and ethics. Nor can we do more than refer to the important distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values. Indeed, the principle seems in a way towards becoming part of the cultivated thought of the time, and we may note how writers of different schools, who have dealt with religious problems, agree in giving a place of more or

[1] It may be doubted if Lotze's speculative construction of the idea of God coheres with the ethical content he would read into it.

less importance to the value-judgment. Thus, Professor Royce, in his lectures on *The World and the Individual*, admits the need of a provisional distinction between the world of description and the world of appreciation; though, of course, as his theory of reality is a form of monistic idealism, he denies that there is a dualism between them. Not long ago Professor James gave us a remarkable study of religious psychology in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. In this volume the author was not primarily concerned with the validity of religious experience, but we can gather how he regards the question. The standard he would apply is one of value rather than rationality. The explanations of religious phenomena are of the nature of hypotheses, not conclusive inferences. We can only determine the rank of a religion, or a phase of spiritual experience, by its practical value, by the way the thing works and the effects it produces. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Professor James's pragmatist treatment of the varieties of religious experience is a striking illustration of a tendency, on the side of philosophy and not of theology, to translate the problem of rationality in religion into one of valuation. Another application of the value-judgment to religion has been recently put forward by the well-known Danish thinker Höffding. While he inclines to a speculative result termed "critical monism," he asserts that we cannot show *how* the principle of continuity holds between fact and value. He agrees that it is the nature of the religious consciousness to express itself in value-judgments. His distinctive point of view is, that he regards the essence of religion to be "faith in the persistence of value" in the world-process. Religion, that is to say, centres in the inner conviction that throughout the development of experience in time the good maintains itself. It is an illegitimate use of the principle of analogy to personify the ground of this good as a Person. To use the phrase of James, this is an "over-belief," which Höffding thinks critical reflection cannot justify. Mythology and theology are stages in the progress of the

religious consciousness which reflective thought must dissolve into symbolism of the Reality we cannot define.

A point common to many writers, who have laid stress on the function of the value-judgment in religion, is their agreement with Kant, that speculative thought cannot justify the idea of God which faith demands. Such assurance as we can have comes through the practical reason. But those who agree with Kant in this conclusion are by no means at one about the theological inferences which may be evolved from the value-judgments of religious experience. While churchly-minded thinkers offer us a renovated theology which is said to reflect the normal Christian consciousness, those whose attitude is more negative and critical treat the religious valuations of the subject rather as matters for psychological study than as carrying with them any secure reference to objective reality. The somewhat discordant results which are reached by this method are, in part at least, due to the method itself; and this defect arises from the rigid separation of the theoretical from the practical reason in dealing with religion—a separation which had its historic origin in the work of Kant. Therefore those who have found deliverance, through the value-judgment, from the perils of speculation must recognise that they have only exchanged one danger for another. For if you exclude reason from religion, the hazard is great that theology will in the end be reduced to a phenomenology of the religious consciousness, and the "things in heaven" to empty "objects of desire." In dealing with religion, reason and faith, the theoretical and the practical consciousness, must supplement one another. And though we cannot establish the continuity of fact and value, we are entitled to hold that the distinction does not rest on a dualistic difference. For both judgments are functions of the same self-conscious personality, which cannot finally be divided against itself. It is the whole self and not a part which manifests itself in the religious consciousness; and in the working of the value-judgment thought itself is active.

4. I go on now to note a final aspect in which Kant has greatly affected religious thought. Yet here again the matter is not new, but a special side of what we have already been discussing. Ideas of value have a personal centre and ground; and I refer to the high importance Kant assigned to personality, and more definitely to the moral personality. Even in his theory of knowledge the significance of the self is paramount. In the Kantian epistemology the dross is mingled with the gold, but an all-important truth is duly brought out—the truth that the world of experience is not impressed on the mind from without, but is built up by the synthetic activity of the self-conscious subject. In the moral sphere there is a corresponding insistence on the spontaneity of the self. The law, with the realm of ends or values connected with it, is the expression of the legislative ego. The good does not come to us as a fact from without, but depends on the law, which in turn rests on the freedom of the moral self. For Kant, the supreme principle of morality is the autonomy of the will. Freedom, he expressly declares, is the key-stone of the whole system of pure and practical reason. In the consciousness that he is not mechanically determined but determines himself, man has the assurance that he exercises a causality of reason, and is a member of an intelligible world. No doubt the stress Kant lays on the negative aspect of freedom helps to make his conception abstract and individualistic. For he tends to regard it as an elevation above the sway of causality in time, and he never overcomes the separation he made between the intelligible and the empirical world. Yet of the reality of freedom Kant felt sure; it was bound up with the moral consciousness of man.[1] "Autonomy," he declares, "is the foundation of the moral value of man and every rational being." Man who exercises the causality of reason, and has the power of moral initiative, is a being of high worth.

[1] *How* freedom is possible Kant says we cannot show, but we can defend the idea against objections. *Metap. of Morality*, section on "The Limits of Practical Philosophy."

Persons are "objective ends," for which no other end can be substituted. Hence the form of the categorical imperative, which bids us treat humanity in our own person, or in that of another, always as an *end*, never as a mere *means*. All through the ethical writings of Kant there runs a feeling of intense reverence for the worth of human personality. If man trembles as he recognises his shortcomings, it is not before an alien authority, but before the moral law, which is the voice of his inmost self. Living amid a world of phenomena which eludes the endeavour of reason to find its comprehensive explanation, man in the inner consciousness of his freedom is essentially real. Indeed, it would be true to say that Kant lays such stress on the freedom and independence of the moral agent, that he precludes himself from bringing morality into a vital relation with religion, where the consciousness of dependence is fundamental.

Nevertheless Kant's insistence on the value of personality has had a large and altogether salutary influence on philosophic and religious thought. As against all forms of pantheism and mysticism which tend to weaken the sense of personality, he calls attention to fundamental moral facts—facts which, if they are to be explained, ought not to be explained away in the process. No doubt the lack of consistency between the various elements which form the structure of the Kantian philosophy prompted the endeavour to solve these differences through a monistic principle of unity. But we are true to the spirit of Kant when we contend that the moral personality of man must not be emptied of value as a consequence. During the last century the two most important attempts at a comprehensive theory of existence were the movements we may broadly term Scientific Evolution and Absolute Idealism. Judged by the foregoing test, both are found wanting. The former, indeed, has never succeeded, the effort of Mr Spencer notwithstanding, in turning the edge of the Kantian criticism which shows that the self is not the product of reality but constitutes it. And, in the endeavour to elicit the *ought* from

the *is*, it conspicuously fails. Religious thinkers, who have learned the lesson taught by Kant, have successfully defended the rights of the spiritual self against the assaults of scientific materialism. And, as against the naturalistic tendency to evolve the concept of moral value out of lower elements, the moral teaching of Kant has proved a sound tonic. The position of Absolute Idealism is different. From one point of view it is the outcome of a genuine effort to give coherence and completeness to Kant's work. But, whatever other objections may be raised against this philosophy, perhaps the most serious one is that it gives neither a satisfying meaning nor value to the personality of man. For the individual, instead of being something to himself, has his reality and worth only in a Universal Consciousness, whose partial and transitory reflection he is. Strictly interpreted, the truth of the individual must be the form of self-consciousness in general; and the apparent differentiation of individuals can only be due to the spatial and temporal medium in which the Absolute realises itself. The logical conclusion is candidly drawn by Mr Bradley, when he reduces all mundane persons and values to appearances which are somehow absorbed and transmuted in the ineffable Absolute.

That this form of idealism has frequently been presented in a very interesting and fascinating form is true, and it is also true that genuinely religious men have believed that the facts of the religious consciousness could be adequately construed under this speculative system. A closer and more critical examination of the phrases used by Absolute Idealists, in order to determine their real meaning, has, we venture to think, tended to dispel the belief. And there is ample evidence at present that many feel the need of a revised idealism which will relate itself more intimately to the facts of finite experience. In this connection the growth of the movement termed *ethical* or *personal* idealism is significant. It is a token that thinkers are no longer straining with the old ardour to scale the high peaks of speculation, from whence

they can see and appreciate all the kingdoms of the world, but are coming back to follow the safer path of which Kant was the pioneer in an earlier day. The practical and spiritual aspects of the conscious self are being set in the light; and if unification is still held to be the goal of thought, it is recognised that no unification can be valid which does damage to the realm of personal values. For the moral self-consciousness demands to be real. Here the influence of Kant is, to borrow an image from Plato, like a breeze from wholesome places bringing health. Of nothing was Kant more sure than of the fundamental fact of moral freedom, which carried with it the truth of the moral law and the imperative of duty. And these are values which bespeak the inner value of that personal life which connects and gives living utterance to all forms of worth. An idealism which seeks above all to be true to the moral and spiritual self does homage, in fact if not in word, to the memory of Kant.

GEORGE GALLOWAY.

Castle-Douglas, N.B.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

OUR FINAL VENTURE.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1907, p. 241.)

As a worker for many years in the field of science, I venture to demur to Professor Campbell Fraser's assertion that the universe is not reasonably interpretable in the absence of "Active Intelligence or Spirit at the root of all." He inquires whether, without a "spiritual" basis, "the physical cosmos may not suddenly become physical chaos." But what is "chaos"? Cosmogonists in early ages imagined a primeval chaos; but I am not aware that any thinker has ever offered the slightest evidence of such a thing, or even of its possibility. Some scores of millions of years ago, if we may judge by our study of the Archæan rocks, chemical and physical laws were identical with those whose operations are described in modern class-rooms. After working continuously and invariably for (say) fifty millions of years, there is no rational probability that natural laws will suddenly change, that sulphates will flash into silicates, or that water will cease to dissolve alkaline carbonates. A universe working in accordance with uniform laws would appear less likely to fall into "chaos" than a universe guided by "spirit"; for "spirit," being a free agent, may conceivably alter its plans, while no proof has ever been given that a natural law possesses the power of self-change. The available evidence is all the other way.

Again, I am unable to admit that "'explanations' of natural science are necessarily unsatisfying," unless they lead back to "an uncaused or finally satisfying cause." The oft-repeated inquiry of inquisitive childhood, "Who made God?" has never been answered. And yet the question is every whit as pertinent as the query, "Who made the universe?" Our ingrained anthropomorphism, inherited from primitive ancestors, has been persistently imagining a cause like ourselves. Even Professor Fraser's "spirit" is endowed by him with the human qualities of goodness, love

equitableness, and veracity. But the "spirit" supposition immensely complicates the "riddle of the universe." On Dr Fraser's hypothesis, we have (1) the mystery of a self-existent spirit, (2) the mystery of the creation of a universe out of nothing, (3) the mystery of the action of spirit upon matter, and (4) the mystery of "Omnipotent Goodness" causing pain and waste. On the monistic supposition, we have the one primal mystery of the existence of a universe of matter and force. As a student of science, I feel bound to prefer the hypothesis which involves the fewest assumptions. In strict logic I am permitted no other alternative, unless I fall back upon nescience. A universe based upon four inexplicables would seem to be much less rational and satisfying than a universe based upon one. To describe this view as "shallow" is simply to beg the question. We have only to do with the facts as we find them; and speculations on the "may be" do not strongly appeal to the reason.

CHARLES CALLAWAY, M.A., D.Sc.

CHELTENHAM.

THE ENTANGLING ALLIANCE OF RELIGION AND HISTORY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1907, p. 258.)

PROFESSOR LOVEJOY'S strong article in last number on this subject might well have been rounded off with a similar treatment of the entangling alliance of religion and the theological speculations of a bygone age. It would be difficult to decide whether Christianity has been weighed down more by the load of alleged historical fact it has been made to bear, or by the dogmas of the creeds. These have been used by the Christian Church in all its branches to stamp on the world-consciousness of all generations, conceptions which grew out of the reaction of the human spirit upon an environment which it is impossible for us to realise. Such an attempt looks like questioning the fact of the continuous moral government of the world. Surely it is now an ineradicable conviction of every thinking man that the only revelation or manifestation of the Divine is in the regular processes of Nature, in the course of human history, and in the best thoughts of the best minds in philosophy and literature. Surely also it is true, as the author of *Ecce Homo* said, that the true Bible of each nation is its own history and literature. Is it not plainly seen from the Book of Genesis or the *Iliad* of Homer down to the latest copy of *The Times*, that the real life-course of each nation is distinctly and distinctively marked with the features of its own past and its own spiritual idiosyncrasies? It is a vain attempt for any institution to seek to stereotype the world's thought for all time. Each age as each individual must work out its own salvation; and it can only, or at least best do so, by living its own life, cherishing the beliefs that are the outgrowth of the spirit of its own time, and incorporating therewith whatever that belongs essentially to all time has come down from the life and thought of the past. We can still

respond to the touches of universal human nature in the poetry of Homer, in the great thoughts of Isaiah and the other Hebrew seers, in the tender wisdom of Jesus of Nazareth; but we cannot be tied down to the metaphysics of Paul and the doctors of the early Church, any more than to that of the Scholastics, or Descartes, or Kant, or Hegel. There lies the secret of the Christian Church's failure. That it has miserably failed through all those ages must be evident to any one who opens his eyes to facts in the lives of all the nations of Christendom. In these late years pagan Japan shows a higher ideal of life and civic duty than any one of them all. Contrast the spirit of the Christian populations in the states on the Pacific slope just now with that of patient Japan. In London, from the luxury and immorality of the upper classes to the miseries of the East End; in the worship of the dollar and all that it leads to in New York and other American cities; in the Stock Exchanges and markets throughout the world's commercial union; in the fierce and growing strife between labour and capital; in the horrors that are being perpetrated every hour in Holy Russia in the name of orthodox religion—there is too plain evidence that the Pauline theology has done little during well-nigh two thousand years to curb the wild-beast passions of men. Where do we behold the unifying influence of the crucified Christ? Alas! the churches have preferred the husk to the precious kernel of Christian truth, and failure has been the inevitable result.

If the Church is ever to be a real power in the world again, she must jettison the Pauline metaphysics and seek inspiration from the best thought of our own time. Neither the Hebrew race nor any individual of it has ever been gifted specially with Divine inspiration. Now, as then, an Idealist philosophy teaches us that in the Divine we live and move and have our being. Is it to be supposed that after so many centuries of Divine guidance of humanity we are less able to form conceptions of the Divine mind and the ways of Divine Providence than the men of that ruder time? It is to be feared the reconstruction of belief cannot be looked for from bishops who pin their faith to the linguistic accomplishments of Balaam's ass, and regard that myth as the narrative of a forth-putting of Divine power and an essential part of Divine revelation. Such are the absurdities that result from the influence of the dogmatic creeds even on educated minds. Well do I remember how one of the strongest intellects in the Scottish Church, equipped cap-à-pie from the armoury of Paul's Epistles, used to wrestle audaciously with the Almighty in his prayers; and crowded congregations, instead of seeing any profanity in such an approach to the Deity, stood and listened with such awe as might have become the Holy of Holies. The clergyman was perfectly logical. If there was needed a vicarious sacrifice on the cross to appease Divine justice, anthropomorphism was not going a great way farther in supplementing the sacrifice with a close argument addressed to the Divine intellect. Happily, between the lines of such a paper as that of Mr Campbell in your issue of last month there are glimmerings of a worthier

conception of Divine things. Mr Campbell sees merit—and I share his opinion—in the Hebrew mother offering with pious devotion her own child in sacrifice to her tribal god, not to procure any forgiveness, but as an offering of what was dearest to her. If she had offered her own child to appease her own wrath, there would have been an analogy to the orthodox view of the sacrifice on the cross. That was no sacrifice to "satisfy Divine justice," as the Shorter Catechism has it, for the benefit of Christian children; rather it was a sacrifice to melt to love the hearts of men. "We must throw over all that covenant theology," the broad-minded biographer of Dr Chalmers once said to myself. In a school examination, I happened to be seated next a clergyman who is still one of the brightest ornaments of the Scottish pulpit. A little child was repeating from the Catechism that awful utterance, "Every sin deserveth God's wrath and curse both in this life and in that which is to come." My clerical friend whispered, "Isn't that horrible?" Alas! his words were only whispered in my solitary ear. They should have rung forth in the General Assembly.

D. Balsillie.

London.

THE FAILURE OF THE FRIARS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1907, p. 296.)

I.

Mr Coulton has constituted himself *advocatus diaboli* against the Franciscan Friars. He admits that "the friars . . . . are now recognised on all hands as the greatest of all Church reformers during the first fifteen centuries," yet at once proceeds to show how little claim they have to the respect of posterity.

I have no quarrel with any man who assumes the rôle Mr Coulton has taken upon himself. It is well that both sides of a question should be set before the thinking public, and I have hitherto fondly imagined that no man who has read my own contribution to the study of Franciscan history would accuse me of burking unpleasant questions. In my essay on "The Spirit and Genius of the Franciscan Friars" which precedes the translation of Eccleston in my book, *The Friars, and how they came to England*, I have discussed the question of the decline of the friars and pointed to the reasons of the decline. Yet Mr Coulton speaks of me as *suppressing* some words in my translation of Eccleston in order to conceal the fact that the reform of the Franciscan Order was already a pressing and dangerous duty even in Eccleston's days. It is true that in my translation of Eccleston I have by some inadvertence put "reform" simply, instead of "reform of the Order." Had Mr Coulton simply pointed out the omission, I should have thanked him. But he tells his readers I have "suppressed" the words in order to conceal an ugly fact, though any reader will see

from the context that the word "reform" can only refer to the reform of the Order. Moreover, as I have already said, in the Introductory Essay I have discussed the decline of the friars.

I might, indeed, retort that he who would impute dishonesty to another should look to it that he give the other no colour of a claim to call his own honesty in question. Yet has Mr Coulton so dealt with his quotations from early Franciscan and other books that one who did not recognise the strength of his prejudice might call in question his sincerity. Thus he translates a passage from Eccleston which runs: *sic crescent superfluitates in ordine*, by "self-indulgence will grow in the Order." "Self-indulgence" is surely too emphatic a rendering of *superfluitates*, especially when one takes the context in which it appears. A man may have a coat beyond what he really requires for his bodily health; but if he were Mr Coulton's friend, would Mr Coulton apply to him the word "self-indulgent"? But the word "self-indulgence" happens to suit the author's purpose in his indictment of the friars.

But we will come to more serious inaccuracies. He tells us: "The *Chronicle of Meaux* (R. S., ii. p. 323) informs us quite casually that twenty-five men and eight women of the Spiritual Franciscans were burned 'in England in a certain forest' about the year 1330." One asks oneself whether Mr Coulton has really read the *Chronicle of Meaux* to which he gives so exact a reference. For what says the *Chronicle*?

"In anno Domini 1330 in Narbona, in Carcasona, in Tholosa, in Gerunda, in Bononia, in Thauro, in Neapoli, in confinibus Allemaniæ et Burgundiæ *et in Anglia in quadam sylva*, combusta sunt viri 55 et mulieres 8 ejusdem ordinis et erroris." I need hardly point out the extreme vagueness of the entire statement, and especially of this reference "in England in a certain wood"; nor do I know any English chronicle which bears out this statement. I only point to Mr Coulton's misquotation of the *Chronicle*.

His perversion and mutilation of the words of St Bonaventure are, however, even more serious. He quotes the saint as saying: "their familiarities with women are rapidly making them 'wearisome and contemptible,'" etc. But St Bonaventure says nothing of the kind. He speaks of "familiarities," not of "familiarities with women"; and if Mr Coulton's acquaintance with Franciscan literature were wider than perhaps it is, he would know that the word "familiarities" signifies too much concern with the worldly affairs of secular men. So it is used in the constitutions of the Order. To understand the significance of the word as thus used, one must remember how frequently the friars were employed as negotiators and secretaries by men of rank and position. Moreover, the saint does not say that these familiarities were making the friars "wearisome and contemptible in divers parts of the world." The whole passage in which Mr Coulton professes to sum up the Epistles to the Provincials and the *Quæstiones circa Regulam*, is simply a garbling of the saint's words, as though one would take the letters of the alphabet and toss them up and then declare the resultant order of the letters the authentic sequence.

One word more and I have done with Mr Coulton's indictment, at least for the present. Throughout his article he speaks of "the Spirituals" as though he were referring to the whole body of friars who were zealous for the stricter observance; whereas, in fact, he confounds them with the fanatical and quasi-political sects in the Order which incurred the wrath of Pope John XXII. This fanatical party had no more to do with the body of the Strict Observance than the Communards had to do with the French army of defence in 1871. Mr Coulton has made much of the measures taken by the Pope and the Order to put down this particular sect; but he does not add that where those fanatics obtained a predominant power, they drove the friars who were not with them out of their convents, as happened even "on the confines of Burgundy," about the same year that the *Chronicle of Meaux* speaks of certain Spirituals being put to death in that very region.

The history of the Franciscan Order in the fourteenth century has yet to be written, and when it is, it will present one of the most human documents in the history of Christendom in its strange intermingling of heroic aspiration after the ideal, with the weakness to which human nature is subject: this much we can say with tolerable certainty. But the historian who sets himself to unravel the entangled threads will need a very full measure of the historical sense, and a greater impartiality than Mr Coulton exhibits. There is perhaps no more difficult incident in history to judge rightly, since the documents are all highly coloured by party prejudice, whether they emanate from one side or the other.

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II.

Mr G. G. COULTON's article on "The Failure of the Friars" is likely, in view of the debatable nature of its contents, to give rise to a good deal of discussion. No one, we imagine, will question that there were many *individual* failures amongst the friars—men who walked unworthily of their holy calling, and whose lives were a scandal to Christendom. Some few may grant that even as a body they failed to reap the full measure of spiritual good, which might reasonably have been expected from the movement initiated in the Mediæval Church through their zeal and energy; but that they failed to the extent suggested by Mr Coulton, no sober and unbiassed historian will, we think, acknowledge. At least this seems certain: the evidence presented in the *Hibbert Journal* is too flimsy to carry conviction to any student of Franciscan history.

The thesis Mr Coulton endeavours to establish rests upon what purport to be three undoubted historical facts: (1) The moral degeneracy of the friars as a body; (2) the character of the written "Rule"—which, as is alleged, was a deviation from "that evangelical freedom and simplicity in which lay the real strength of his (Francis') first teaching"

(p. 298–299); and finally, (3) the papal policy, which "clipped the wings of Franciscan reform" and made the typical friar "the willing tool of a worldly Papacy—the Jesuit of the Middle Ages" (p. 306).

The two latter propositions spring from an entirely false view of St Francis' life and work; they represent a misconception devoid of any really historical basis. It has become the fashion among a certain section of non-Catholic writers to describe the Saint of Assisi and his early companions, as a body of spiritual knights-errant, who espoused the cause "of evangelical freedom and simplicity," and waged war on Roman Catholicism. This is evidently Mr Coulton's view; for he compares them with the Wesleyans of a later age. Accordingly, they formed originally (*i.e.* before the papal policy domesticated them, and presumably catholicized them) the nucleus of a sect antagonistic in its ideals and aspirations to the Roman Church. So false is this view of St Francis, that I make bold to challenge Mr Coulton to adduce from mediæval records evidence, which will convince any unbiassed mind, that the *Poverello* was anything else but a loyal and loving son of the Catholic Church;—that the Franciscan movement in its very inception was anything else but Catholic in tone and character;—or that the Franciscan reform, as the writer prefers to characterize it, was ever intended by St Francis and the early friars to be a reactionary protest against Roman Catholicism. Until such evidence, in support of this prejudiced view of history, is advanced by Mr Coulton, serious scholars must hesitate to believe that "the failure of the friars," if a failure they really were, was due either to the Rule drawn up by St Francis, or to a papal policy which deftly wove around a nucleus of sectaries the meshes of an effete Catholicism.

There remains "the story of Franciscan decay" which, Mr Coulton tells us, "may be found in the plainest characters within a few dozen pages of St Bonaventura's works." There are other documents too, but they merely "corroborate the saint's assertions." Whether or no "the story of Franciscan decay" be true or false, I do not purpose to discuss: all I wish to do is to place before the readers of the *Hibbert Journal* some of the evidence adduced from St Bonaventura, and thus enable them to compare the original with Mr Coulton's presentation of it.

"From his (St Bonaventura's) two *Epistles* to the Provincials of the Order, and his *Quæstiones circa Regulam*, we see," writes Mr Coulton (p. 298), "how near the friar of the second generation stood already to the sturdy religious vagrant of Chaucer and Erasmus. He speaks of the idleness and viciousness of many, and the commercial spirit of the Order as a whole. Their importunate begging and legacy-hunting, the extravagance of their buildings and private expenses, their familiarities with women, are rapidly making them 'wearisome and contemptible in divers parts of the world.' . . . So writes St Bonaventura."

The indictment is sufficiently strong, I grant, to warrant the conclusion that the tree of Franciscanism was decayed; but it is contained in Mr Coulton's presentation of the evidence, and not, I submit, in St Bonaventura's.

In the first place, it is well to inform readers of the *Hibbert Journal*,

that the two *Epistles*, from which this extract is made up, were written in the year 1257, *i.e.* four years after the notorious Brother Elias' death (1253). They were written by the Saint on the morrow of his election to the generalship, and at a crisis in the development of the Order. The latter had fallen upon evil days: for, Elias and his supporters had endeavoured to introduce a spirit of relaxation contrary to the original traditions of the saintly Francis. In this connection, it is a noteworthy fact that Elias was defeated and deposed (1239) by the whole Order assembled in general chapter: hence, if we may believe contemporary evidence, Father Cuthbert's contention—which Mr Coulton dismisses in a note on page 304—holds good: at that period the relaxed friars *were* certainly in the minority. Be this, however, as it may, the evil seeds sown by Brother Elias, and his handful of followers, were fructifying in divers parts of the world. In these circumstances, well understood by St Bonaventura, and by those whom in his two *Epistles* he addressed, but of which Mr Coulton seems strangely oblivious, the newly elected general felt himself compelled by the responsibilities of his high charge to utter a protest against the evils that were then undoubtedly existing; these were the scandals he inveighed against; these the blots that tarnished the glory of the Order (*cf.* Ep. I. sect. i. and ii.). The Saint enumerates ten—which we will presently refer to. Meanwhile, it is stated "in the plainest characters" by the Saint (*cf.* Ep. I. sect. ii.) that these evils did not infest *the whole body* of the friars. Let the reader judge for himself. "Sane perquirenti mihi causes cur splendor nostri Ordinis *quodam modo* obfuscatur, Ordo exterius inficitur, et nitor, conscientiarum interius defœdatur, occurrit," etc. The italics are mine, but I insert them to show that the Saint qualifies to some extent "the story of Franciscan decay." Mr Coulton has suppressed the words italicised, and has thus altered the real meaning of St Bonaventura's words. In Section iii. of the same *Epistle*, the Saint's words are still more emphatic. After enumerating the ten causes of the *partial* decay of the Order, he adds: "Licet autem plurimi reperiantur qui non sunt culpabiles in aliquo prœdictorum, tamen omnes involvit hœc maledictio, nisi a non facientibus, his qui faciunt resistatur." Acting on the principle embodied in these last words, the saintly general urges all the Provincials to stamp out the evils he mentioned. On the evidence, then, of St Bonaventura, the decay was only partial. His *Epistles* are merely the practical application in the concrete of a principle obvious in itself, to wit, that in every large body of men there are always, as there certainly were then in the Franciscan Order, certain disintegrating elements which, if not suppressed, will gradually destroy the whole.

Little space is left to me to deal with some of the blunders which occur in Mr Coulton's enumeration of the causes of Franciscan decay. He tells us that St Bonaventura "speaks of the idleness and *viciousness of many*." Yet in the original the text runs thus: "Occurrit *quorumdam* fratrum otiositas, quœ est sentina omnium vitiorum, qua plurimi consopiti monstruosum quemdam statum inter contemplativam et activam eligentes,

non tam carnaliter, quam crudeliter, sanguinem comedunt animarum." Mr Coulton summarizes this detailed statement (in which the general was describing a *particular* form of idleness, and in which, it will be noticed, there is no mention made of the "*viciousness of the many*") in such sweeping terms, that the reader is left to conclude that the majority of the friars were "wastrels" and "scoundrels." We find it hard to believe that a Master of Arts should so misconstrue an obvious text; but prejudice accounts for many otherwise inexplicable blunders. The preconceived theory of "the failure of the friars" could scarcely have been proved from contemporary evidence, unless that evidence were manipulated, and twisted out of its natural and obvious meaning. As an example of this manipulation, let us take the next paragraph of "The Story of Franciscan Decay." "Their (the friars') importunate begging and legacy-hunting, the extravagance of their buildings and private expenses, their familiarities with women, are rapidly making the friars 'wearisome and contemptible in divers parts of the world.'" True, the saint does speak, but always in qualified terms (which are conveniently omitted in Mr Coulton's *précis*), of all these things; but he does *not* say that these faults "are rapidly making the friars wearisome and contemptible in divers parts of the world." As a matter of fact, Mr Coulton has in this passage pieced together two wholly different contexts, and thus, consciously or unconsciously, heightened the effect of the whole. Apart, however, from this, Mr Coulton has also misinterpreted the Saint's expression, "*familiarities with women.*" Had he taken the trouble to read his Bonaventura,[1] he could have easily found out that this expression had in mediæval times a much wider extension than it has in modern parlance. In these days it usually betokens a low degree of sexual depravity; not so in mediæval language.

With regard to the *Quæstiones circa Regulam*, if Mr Coulton will read very carefully the chapter he quotes (xix.), as well as the preceding and following chapters (xviii. and xx.), he will see that St Bonaventura is not speaking of the *Friars Minor*, but of *Religious Orders in general*, so that the evidence he advances therefrom is not *ad rem*.

Whilst we were studying this article of Mr Coulton's we were forcibly reminded of a remarkable passage written elsewhere[2] by the same writer. "Whether a writer's prepossessions," he writes, "be pro-mediæval or anti-mediæval, he can count upon a sympathetic public of his own, and upon comparative immunity from criticism, since his separate blunders, unsupported by references, can be traced and exposed only with the greatest difficulty; and in the present state of public opinion, nobody thinks the worse of him for making the most sweeping statements without adequate documentary vouchers." Precisely: we cannot help thinking that when Mr Coulton wrote his article on "The Failure of the Friars," he "was counting upon a sympathetic public of his own," and was reckoning on

[1] *Cf.* "The Exposition of the Rule," chap. ix.

[2] *From St Francis to Dante*, p. 9.

"the present state of public opinion." We fancy, however, that in choosing the *Hibbert Journal* as the medium for giving expression to his "sweeping statements," he has once more made a mistake.

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THE NEW THEISM.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1907, p. 361.)

I.

However sympathetic one may feel towards the main trend of thought in the article of the Rev. Carl S. Patton, there remains a lingering impression that there is an overstatement of the importance to future thought of the idea of the Immanence of God.

It is clearly an overstatement to say that the greatest gain of theological thought in recent times lies in the *substitution* of the idea of Immanence for Transcendence. The doctrine is not new, but it does come, in the light of modern knowledge (with its physical and psychical studies), like a new discovery, and with a new illumination on the relation of God to men, history, and all created life.

The Roman and Imperial idea of the transcendent God has too long dominated Christian thought. The majestic conception of God, high and lifted up, whose train fills the Temple of Creation and before whose presence souls veil their faces, has too long overshadowed the thought of the God who is in all things and through all things.

It would be a worse error if the due proportion is not preserved of both ideas in relation to God. The pendulum of thought may swing, but it ought to be balanced if the dial-plate is to give the accurate record of progress. In all clear thinking the conception of Transcendence ought to have an adequate place in relation to Immanence.

As a matter of fact, does the idea of Immanence convey anything more than the effort to express the inexpressible relation of God to His Universe? The supreme question does not lie here; it rather lies in the fuller investigation of what is entailed in the conception of personality. On this question, one finds the whole article very inadequate, if indeed not confused. The reasoning (p. 366) reaches this dictum: "The Universe is an Infinite self, and this self we call God."

Is the Universe infinite apart from God, or because God is included in it?—and if because He is included, in what sense is He included? Is the Universe infinite because God is immanent in it? Is God infinite when He is limited by that which the article itself implies He is immanent in?

Modern psychology is pledged to Personality, and prepared to assert it, if necessary, against the Universe; and the future of illuminating in-

vestigation lies rather in the direction of a clearer conception of what is entailed in the assertion of self-determination, valid will, and directed energy in relation to that Personal Being we call God.

A blend of old Hellenism and modern neo-Hegelianism from the starting-point of Divine Immanence is no sufficient philosophic basis for the revolutionary hopes with which the article closes. If moral attributes have always been assigned to God, they have been so assigned to a God who is more than the Infinite-Universe-Self. Polytheism gives place to Monotheism, but it is a Monotheism in which God is conceived as the Master and not the slave of His own Universe; a Monotheism that recognises the God who is in all things and through all things, but who is also Lord of all in Love.

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II.

If the precedent set by Mr Patton and by many others is extensively followed, we shall certainly have some writer winning for himself a reputation for daring originality by publishing a compendium of the *Summa Theologica* under the title of *The New Pantheism.*

Mr Patton thoroughly grasps—what it requires no little study to grasp, and what is *the* crucial point in the philosophic defence of Theism—namely, that if Finite existence really "stood off" against God, then God would be neither Absolute nor Infinite. But this is a point of which Catholic theologians have never been in any danger of losing sight. Thus, to give an instance which happens to be to my hand, St Thomas argues (*Contra Gentiles*, Lib. ii. Cap. xii.): "Quod relationes dictæ de Deo ad creaturas non sunt realiter in Deo," because "relativa secundum suum esse ad aliud quodammodo se habet . . . . cum nec esse nec intelligi sine eo possit," and he concludes that (Cap. xiii.) these relations "ei attribuantur solum secundum intelligentiæ modum." Now this imperfection of our thinking whereby we think of creatures as "standing off" against God is not evaded in the old theology, for that theology *explains* both why we so think of God and why and in what direction our conception falls short of the reality. To know God completely as He is in His essence is possible only to God Himself. Our own conception of God is elaborated from the imitations "ad extra" of His essence which are the essences of creatures. Therefore that which is the direct object of our thinking when we think of God is always, even at the highest, an imitation of the Divine essence. The Divine essence in its integrity is incommunicable, and is, therefore, not *perfectly* imitable,—may I say that it is of necessity more or less *falsified* in its imitations? Now, an analysis shows that we have to think of God as relative to creatures, just in so far as our representation of God is inadequate to the reality—that is, in the end, just in so far as our representation of God is self-contradictory. From this concomitancy of variation we are entitled

to conclude that the inadequacy of representation is the cause of the attribution of real relation. Therefore, though we cannot free ourselves from, we can yet be aware of this falsification. We cannot know God as He is, but we can know in what direction our conception falls short, and by allowing for this we can attain what I can only describe as a conception of what our conception of God would be if it were adequate. Just so a being who could only think straight lines would see a regular polygon, according to the increase in the number of its sides, approaching to a limit not directly thinkable in terms of straight lines, and, by considering the trend of the modification his conception underwent as it approached the limit, he would comprehend the law of modification, and then by applying this law to the limiting modification he would obtain an indirect conception of the limiting nature.

In a way like this theology finds a means to conceive of Finitude as not standing off against God—as nothing apart from God and yet as not God. If the essences of "Finites" are considered merely as typical possibilities, they belong to the order of thought, and as such are, in reference to the Divine intelligence, necessary and eternal. If, however, they are considered as finally determined and as having being in their own natures, then they belong to the order of being; and the relation which, in the order of thought, is one of logical priority, becomes when translated into the order of being one of entitative priority, *i.e.* of causality; and because God and God alone is the whole cause of creatures which yet are not God, we emphasise His complete causality by generalising it against cases of incomplete causality, *i.e.* cases where there is a pre-existing material cause. We say, therefore, that God produces Finite existence out of—nothing. And as the completeness of the Divine causality requires the absence of a material cause, so also this same completeness requires the absence of any necessity to create—because the ground of such necessity would be equivalently a con-cause with God. We should, therefore, conceive of God as Creator of the world "ex nihilo," and as having that sort of freedom in respect of creating or not creating which we seem to ourselves to have in those matters in which we may without any sin or even imperfection either act or abstain from acting.

GERALD CATOR.

A GRAVE PERIL TO THE LIBERTY OF CHURCHMEN.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1907, p. 343.)

DR RASHDALL'S account of the case of *Ditcher* v. *Denison*, mentioned by him in this article, is inaccurate.

(1) He says of Denison's appeal to the Court of Arches: "No scruples about the sacredness of episcopal authority or the profaneness of lay intrusion into spiritual judicature prevented the accused champion of spiritual independence from appealing to the lawyer and keeping his archdeaconry" (p. 350).

But until after 1874, the Court of Arches was regarded by most High Churchmen as a perfectly valid spiritual court. If space permitted, I could give quotations from their writings proving this, and also a number of instances in which Mackonochie and others scrupulously obeyed adverse decisions of the Court of Arches while defying those of the Privy Council.

(2) A more important mistake is made by Dr Rashdall when he says: "Every party of the Church of England has been brought before ecclesiastical tribunals, and has been condemned: every party in the Church of England has appealed to a secular court, and been acquitted."

In only two cases, so far as I am aware, have doctrines distinctive of the High Church party been attacked in the courts, and in neither of these do the facts agree with Dr Rashdall's statement. In the case of *Sheppard* v. *Bennett* the doctrines attacked were not condemned but acquitted by the ecclesiastical tribunal, and the secular court merely upheld the acquittal. So those who deny the jurisdiction of the Privy Council can still point to a judgment in their favour by the ecclesiastical court. The other case is that of Archdeacon Denison, whose doctrine, it is true, was condemned by an ecclesiastical tribunal, but was not acquitted by a secular court, because no point of doctrine ever came before any such court. Denison protested that the proceedings had not been begun within the two years (from the committal of the alleged offence) laid down by law. And this technical point was the *only* question which came before either the Court of Arches or the Privy Council. In both courts it was decided in the Archdeacon's favour. In the Privy Council judgment it is expressly stated that their lordships give no opinion on the doctrinal questions in the case, but confine themselves to the legal technicality. (See Moore's *Privy Council Cases*, vol. xi. p. 324.)

GORDON CROSSE.

1 CLOISTERS, TEMPLE.

ETERNAL PUNISHMENT.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1906, p. 119.)

(1) Mr St George Stock objects that to make my argument complete I should have postulated the natural immortality of the human soul. "Otherwise (he writes) God is made out a monster, if He keeps a damned soul alive for ever, when by His fiat He could put it out of pain." Will I assert, he goes on, that the indestructibility of man's soul is an article of the Christian faith?

Certainly I did postulate such natural immortality, and I hold it to be taught not only by Christian faith but by sound philosophy. I assume the soul to be a spiritual substance which could cease to be only by an act of annihilation—the direct opposite of creation, which it contradicts and seemingly stultifies.

(2) Mr Shields, recognising punishment for sin as inevitable and just, insists that we are not logically forced to regard it as *eternal*. Reason, he says, makes it clear that there must be a reckoning for evil-doers, but also justifies the belief that the end of punishment is not only to vindicate the moral law, but also to reform the offender. The "pain of loss" itself, he argues, must be an incipient turning to God, a movement in search of Him; and hence may we not trust that even for the reprobate there will still be a way of salvation?

To this I would answer that such an argument assumes the offender to be capable of reformation, and that the pain of loss includes in some measure the element of love of good. But how, if the sinner be confirmed in evil, and if in his anguish for his loss there is nothing of love of God or goodness, but only hate?

Were there no such offenders there could be no damnation; for God, the source and paragon of all goodness, could not repel a soul in which any spark of goodness remained. On the other hand, a soul confirmed in evil could be made capable of salvation only by being made afresh—which would be something far beyond re-creation; for such a soul would be made not out of nothing, but out of the ruins of its own self, vitiated and corrupted by its own perversity.

(3) Mr Roberts finds fault with my statement that as to the punishment of hell nothing is matter of *faith* for Catholics except the pain of loss. The Church, he maintains, is absolutely committed to belief in "positive punishments." This he holds to be proved, despite the unanimous teaching of theologians to the contrary, by that of "her ordinary and universal magisterium," of which he cites two instances, evidently considered to be conclusive—namely, the Athanasian Creed, which declares that the wicked shall go "into eternal fire," and a Constitution of Pope Innocent IV. laying down that the impenitent sinner "gehennæ ardoribus perpetuo cruciatur." It is not very clear why he has thought it necessary to go so far. The phrases quoted are taken from the New Testament,[1] and cannot possibly have been overlooked by the theologians when speaking as they do.

What is more important, Mr Roberts seems to assume that by "the pain of loss" is to be understood only the subjective element, the self-inflicted anguish of the soul because of that loss. But there is an objective element as well. Just as the man who has reduced himself to beggary, or ruined his health, or put out his eyes, besides the tardy regrets that may torment him, experiences positive sufferings entailed by such deprivation, so the soul which expels God, its supreme sustenance and comfort, will experience torment of which the most terrible we can know or imagine—that of fire—is the nearest and most proper description.

It is, therefore, as no mere "figment of the imagination" that this is employed, but it is not to be presented as matter *of faith*. And without going beyond what *is* of faith, there is quite enough for those who can think what it means. "We need not rack our brains (says one writer) to

[1] Matt. xxv. 41; Jude i. 7.

devise images of physical torment, which may or may not be accurate: the *pœna damni*, if we will only try to realise it, is quite enough."[1]

"Not many nights ago (writes another), I awoke with an indescribable sense of mental anguish, during which I realised to the full the possibility of hell apart from physical pain, anguish so intense that any suffering of the body would have been a relief. Indeed, for the moment, I was as though separated from my body, as well as separated by walls of darkness from my fellow-men. I was abandoned to myself as to an evil companion whom I loathed, and with none, not even a devil to hear my cries. . . . I needed no devil to torment me, only myself."[2]

I may note that I do not speak, as Mr Roberts represents, of the pain of loss as being "self-inflicted," in the sense that it consists only in the subjective torment of fruitless longing for what can never be attained, but as *self-imposed*, inasmuch as it is inevitably entailed by the deliberate choice of evil of which the sinner has been guilty.

The question raised by Mr Roberts regarding the dogmatic authority to be attributed to the opinions of theologians, as illustrated by that which he quotes from Suarez, is too large a one to be discussed here. Suffice it to say that such opinions do not constitute an article of faith; that they are confessedly subject to change as time goes on; and that, as a matter of fact, they have so changed in various instances.

JOHN GERARD, S.J.

THE ZOROASTRIAN MESSIAH.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1906, p. 156.)

ADMITTING that the Bishop of Salford's explanation of the Avestan Saoshyant as equivalent to the Greek σωσ-οντ- (σώσων), "He that shall come to save," *benefacturus*, is the correct one, I presume this does not exclude the possibility that the Mazdean Saosh- may have been originally a borrowing from the more ancient Babylonian *shawash*, the sun, just as *Kôsh*, the name of Ethiopia (2 Kings xix. 9), arose from *Kewôsh*, Babylonian *Kiwash* (*Kimash*)—Hilprecht, *Explorations*, 742. However this may be, the fact remains that this deliverer is conceived as of a solar nature. He will arise "from the region of the dawn" (*Vendîdâd—Farg.* xix. 5). It is this interesting point in comparative religion that my article endeavoured to develop. The similar ideas that gathered round the Hebrew and Christian conceptions of the Messiah might be further illustrated by the mediæval address to Christ in the greater Antiphons of Advent (Dec. 20), "O Oriens, splendor lucis eternæ et Sol Justitiæ, veni et illumina sedentes in tenebris et umbra mortis."

A. SMYTHE PALMER.

[1] Oxenham, *Catholic Eschatology*, p. 74. [2] *Proteus and Amadeus*, p. 161.

REVIEWS

The Knowledge of God and its Historical Development.—By Henry Melvill Gwatkin, M.A., Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History, and Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge.—In Two Volumes. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1906.

These volumes contain the substance of the Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 1904 and 1905. And the freshness and charm with which the lecturer has dealt with his subject should procure for them an abundant welcome in a much wider circle. To have broken new ground in a field so diligently cultivated by highly-skilled labourers as that of Natural Theology is of itself no small merit.

Since the lectures were delivered they have undergone considerable change, both through rearrangement and expansion. The lecture form, however, has been retained throughout, and the general interest of the whole is certainly not diminished thereby. The deed of foundation under which the Gifford Lectureship is held lays down the somewhat stringent condition that the subject shall be treated "as a strictly natural science, without reference to or reliance upon any supposed exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation." Upon a thinker so strongly theistic and Christian in his point of view as Professor Gwatkin, this condition must have proved a real and irksome restraint. He does his best, however, both to observe it loyally and to evade it practically. Animated by the former spirit, he ascribes, by a curious periphrasis, the principle that "he that loveth his life is destroying it, while he that hateth his life in this world to life eternal shall keep it safe," to "one in the olden time"; while, on the other hand, the reader is constantly being informed of the things that might have been said if conditions had allowed—in a way which reminds us irresistibly of the child who, when she felt wicked, was not to use naughty words, but to repeat "Jerusalem." A bolder freedom of interpretation would have saved both the reader and the writer much standing on tiptoe to peep over the hedge, and would have been not less loyal to the founder's real aim. Yet, in spite of this, the volumes before us are a strong and highly ingenious piece of work. The author has such full and easy command over his material, his stores of knowledge are so ample, and his style is so clear, incisive, and fruitful in suggestion, that the reader will not find many dull or dark pages in the whole book.

The work is divided into two approximately equal parts, the one speculative, the other historical. Under the first head are considered the different methods and phases of revelation,—revelation in nature, and in man, through inspiration, prophecy, and miracle. Under the second we have presented to us a rapid survey of the development of religious ideas in primitive religion, in Greece and Rome, in the Old and the New Testament, the early Church, Pagan and Christian Rome, the Reformation and modern times. These various chapters are characterised by the keenness and quickness of perception, and the sharp decision of opinion and judgment which distinguish the trained and mature student. In some cases, indeed, we are given too many results and too few processes, and the author's conclusions, rather than the reasons that have led him to adopt them, are offered for our acceptance. But no doubt the extensive field to be covered made this in large measure inevitable. And it would not be easy to speak too highly of the candour and fairness, the varied learning and skill with which the general argument is conducted, nor even of the broad and catholic spirit in which the various views and periods are discussed. At least no one but a Roman Catholic, or a High Churchman, or a Higher Critic, would have any reason for complaint. The errors and delusions of the Latin Church, however, are exhibited with such unsparing candour and directness that it will be surprising if her defenders do not enter the lists in her cause. "For the last six hundred years or so," we are told, "the testimony of history is clear against her as the chief promoter of rancour and divisions among Christian churches, of wars and bloodshed among Christian peoples, and I, for one, believe that the verdict of history is the voice of heaven." "The modern Church of Rome has contributed little new truth to the conception of revelation, or indeed to Christian thought in general." "As a church, the Latin Church is dead,—dead in the same sense as the Church of Annas and Caiaphas was dead." "An infallible church must go on setting truth and reason at defiance in intrigues for political supremacy, till she either breaks in pieces or sinks into some gulf of anarchy. Meaner churches may repent and amend; but for Rome, reform is suicide." At the end of the fifteenth century the "Church was the chief demoraliser of the world. She had guided it for centuries, and this was her account of her stewardship." "The Latin Church is the mother of most of the prevailing scepticism. She has to answer not only for the scepticism of her own direct teaching, but largely also for the scepticism which other Churches have carried over from her, and for the scepticism of the reactions which her teaching has provoked, and still provokes, inside and outside her own communion. Many of her bitterest enemies take her word for it that religion is unreason, and, for that cause or on that excuse, reject it with abhorrence. Yet once again, if there is any truth in religion, none but the highest ideals can be true, and irreligion lies in following the lower in preference to the higher, and the high priest of irreligion calls himself the Vicar of Christ." "Modern Rome speaks even truth in the spirit of untruth." Where plain speaking is so much the

order of the day, we are not surprised to hear that the Tractarian movement "was conceived in scepticism and born in sophistry," or that some of the methods of the higher critics show an "astounding licence of reckless theorising, forced interpretations, contempt of evidence, and systematic disregard of common-sense." These emphatic deliverances prove that even a staid student of history may have very decided opinions, and no fear of expressing them.

Perhaps the most attractive feature of the book is the earnest and sustained effort which Professor Gwatkin makes to combine the best modern thought upon religion and the philosophy of religion with the substance of the old historical faith. His insight, ingenuity, and breadth of treatment in this high and difficult task often compel one's admiration. The analysis of revelation, the discrimination of what is essential from what is adventitious in it, the defence of a special or central revelation, and the elaboration of the conditions which such a revelation would probably fulfil, are marked by all the vigorous thinking and ready resource of the most enlightened apologist. We are not, indeed, convinced that the new and the old elements are as successfully combined as the author imagines. And while acknowledging the highly stimulating character of the argument as a whole, we may notice what we regard as weak points in it.

In the first place, then, for one who holds such a broad and liberal view of how much the revelation of God includes, Dr Gwatkin has curiously limited the field within which he seeks to apply his principles. All true thought, he constantly insists, is God's revelation of Himself to and in man. "In nature, life, and history, God is making Himself known to men." Yet, in illustrating this principle from the great drama of history, the author confines himself, with an occasional incidental excursion into other fields, to the history of the Church, though in the Church's history in the main, according to his own argument, the leading of the Spirit of God is generally more conspicuous by its absence than by its presence. Surely there were many movements during the centuries surveyed in the book in which the growth of man's thought about truth and goodness, or (what is the same thing) in which God's continuous revelation of Himself was patent and unmistakable,—movements in literature, art, science, philosophy, the growth and decay of nations, the rise and fall of governments. It might even be possible to show that these apparently profane and secular causes did, in the scheme of providence, exert a more vitalising and purifying influence upon the traditional, or at least upon the real, religion of men than the offices of the Catholic Church or the decisions of Councils. At the lowest, this wide circle of interests, and its effect in broadening and deepening religious thought, deserved much fuller notice than the author has given it.

Secondly, it is more than a venial error to attribute, as is frequently done here, great effects to a single cause, in cases where a multitude of causes were present and operative. In vol. ii. p. 273, for example, we are

told, "It is plain matter of history that modern science is the nursling of Christianity. . . . The principle of science—the unity of Nature—was taken over from the Christian doctrine of the unity of God; the purpose of science—the betterment of man's estate—from the Christian doctrine of the dignity of man; and the method of science—the investigation of facts instead of the invention of theories—from the methods of study called for by the historical facts alleged by the Christians." This exaggerated claim is, indeed, somewhat toned down in the next sentence. "If these conceptions were not quite unknown in ancient times, they were very much more firmly held in the seventeenth century; and the change can hardly be accounted for without the influence of Christianity." Yet one still feels forced to ask, why then did science not arise centuries before it did? Similarly, on pp. 290 ff., the modern movement toward democracy is ascribed to Christianity. "The movement began with Christianity, and for more than a thousand years Christianity alone kept any life in it. . . . It is a simple matter of history that the Lord's Supper has been by far the most powerful of the influences which have tended to level class prejudices. It comes out strongly in the early Church. If slavery was not abolished, the sting of it was drawn when the slave was fully recognised as in spiritual things his master's equal." If this were so, the principle took an immensely long time to discover itself, and the wasp enjoyed a long tenure of life after its sting was drawn. It is just one of the gravest charges against the truth of the dominant religion that it countenanced and supported slavery as a divine institution in society so long and so strenuously. To the same class of overweighted causes belong the assertion (p. 112) that "the Council of Nicæa saved not only Christianity, but the political freedom of a distant future"; and that "Hegel's great thought, viz. Evolution, was the offspring of the Reformation" (p. 264). These and similar statements seem to me to be so sweeping and incapable of proof, to be, in fact, so much in the air, that they hardly supply a basis for argument. To single out of the hundred and one causes which brought about democratic government, the abolition of slavery, or the conception of evolution, one special element, and name it *the* cause, seems strangely out of harmony with fact. Is all the labour and travail of man's spirit to go for nothing, and is God's thought working within man so feeble that the decision of a Church council might have bound his soul in chains for ages? We cannot so read history, or so interpret the God of history. These extravagant claims for Christianity, which would bring under it "by hook or by crook" whatever God during the ages has taught man of Himself and of the world, are neither good logic nor good history, and are more likely to provoke dissent than to enhance reverence. Indeed, much of the same objection applies to the so-called "return to the person of Christ." It is not really simply a return, but a reading out of (and in some cases a reading into) His life the best thoughts, principles, and moral and religious intuitions that are the garnered wisdom of the ages. The evolution of intelligence and spiritual instinct to discern these

meanings in the simple words and deeds of Christ is as much an inspiration and revelation as was that of the seer of the past, and it should be so regarded. Men have found in these later days a new world of meaning in the Gospels because they have been "taught by the Spirit" what to look for.

Thirdly, the author's view of revelation, while it is worked out with great care and skill, does not seem to hang well together. He begins his exposition by pointing out that revelation should not be limited to a particular set of truths or to special persons. All that any one knows of the true and the good is a revelation granted to him by God. Thus the discoveries made by an individual's own thought are not something different from, still less something opposed to, God's revelation or inspiration. The two are but opposite sides of the same fact. The one is the human, the other the divine aspect. And the attainment of truth in any sphere implies both. Some individuals and nations are indeed more gifted than others, that is to say, they are favoured with fuller and higher revelations than their fellows, though their vision may not only be very discontinuous, but may even at its highest be mingled with many baser elements. This is true, for example, alike of the Jewish prophets and of the Greek philosophers. "All the better philosophers started with two clear convictions—that there is a spark of the divine in man, and that the laws of the world which he discovers are divine thought. . . . The two together amount nearly to what we meant by saying that God's image within recognises God's truth without. This, as we have seen, is revelation; and it is none the less revelation for coming to us in one way rather than another. So long as we recognise both its elements, we may take it either from the divine side, as the Jews did, or from the human, like the Greeks. Either plan has its advantages; and if the Greek method lends itself to irreligion, it is no way irreligious in itself. Greek and Jew alike broke down in the end; but if we compare the later philosophy with Pharisaism, we may fairly question whether it was the greater failure of the two" (i. 296). Yet, after showing this, Dr Gwatkin proceeds (ii. 16 ff.) to maintain that the central idea of the religion of Israel, the idea of a holy personal God opposed to sin, was a special, non-national revelation, due to "some particular divine or providential guidance," not the outcome of natural evolution. But would there be anything less "divine" or "providential" in an idea which was the growth of a people's life and thought than in one which started unbidden into one man's mind or heart? Would God's care for Israel have been less convincingly proved if He had allowed the vision to break upon the mind of a whole people than if it were given only to one great man? Neither does it seem possible to found an argument on the special nature of the method by which the prophet received a distinctive and nobler message than his fellows. In this sense every function is "special." But it is not therefore distinct from the general system, or to be contrasted with it. It is a part, a function of the larger whole. The thumb is special in the body, so also is the eye or the brain; but it

is not therefore to be treated as something different in nature from the whole. The message of the prophet was truly divine, not because it was a non-national product, but because it was the religious genius of his race working itself out to richer issues in and through him. The same defect seems to me to vitiate Professor Gwatkin's defence of a "special" revelation, and of miracle as "personal" divine action. The falsity is not in what is asserted, but in the negative which is implied. However, any adequate discussion of this would carry us too far. Only, I may be permitted to say that throughout the author seems to be torn between two conflicting principles. He desires to maintain both the essential unity of the divine and the human, and also their distinction and separation. From the one side he asserts that what is truly human is at the same time truly divine; from the other, that what is only human cannot also be divine. I fear we cannot have it both ways, but must make our choice between the old dualism with its transcendent God, and the new idealism with its immanent Spirit.

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The Todas. By W. H. R. Rivers.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1906.

ON a plateau of the Nilgiri Hills, cut off from the rest of Southern India by steep slopes covered with dense malarious jungle, live the Todas, Kotas, and Badagas, while on the slopes wander wild jungle-folk, the Kurumbas and Irulas, relics of the ancient aboriginal population, who are much feared for their supposed magical powers. The Todas are a purely pastoral people, who are concerned solely with the care of their buffaloes and with the complicated ritual which has grown up in association with these animals: they number about eight hundred persons. The Kotas, who are about half as numerous again as the Todas, are artisans and mechanics; while the Badagas, some thirty-four thousand in number, are chiefly agriculturalists. The Todas are acknowledged to be the lords of the soil, and, owing to this division of labour, they are freed from tilling the soil or mere manual labour. It is very frequently the case that a pastoral people over-lord, through force, agriculturalists and artisans; but here their dominance is of a more subtle order.

The Todas are divided into two groups, the Tartharol and the Teivaliol, each of which is subdivided into a number of exogamous clans. The groups are endogamous so far as marriage is concerned, but by no means so in regard to the recognised custom of obtaining supplemental spouses. There is complete social intercourse between the two groups; but the highest grades of the priesthood can be filled only by members of the Teivaliol, although the dairies at which they officiate belong to the Tartharol. Although the Teivaliol hold the highest dairy offices, and

while holding them have a very high degree of sanctity, it is quite clear that, apart from the holding of these offices, they have no sanctity whatever, and become ordinary persons the moment they cease to hold office. There is not the slightest trace of the belief that their right to perform the highest priestly rites gives them any superiority, nor do they assume any. Whenever Dr Rivers asked a Tarthar man why he regarded his division as superior, he always answered: "We have the *ti* (the highest ritual dairies), and we appoint the Teivaliol to act as our servants." Dr Rivers discusses this matter at some length, and it looks as if these two groups are the survival of two original Toda immigrations, of which the Tartharol were the earlier and more powerful. When the Teivaliol (who appear to be darker and to have a lower type of face) arrived, it seems possible that they were placed by the Tartharol in those priestly offices, which, though honourable, involved many hardships and restrictions, and were assigned dwelling-places and pastures in a comparatively limited district of the hills.

The Todas are a typical polyandrous community. When a woman marries a man, it is understood that she becomes the wife of his brothers at the same time; in a few cases the husbands are not own brothers but clan-brothers; no difficulties or disputes arise. Recently there is a tendency for polyandry to be associated with polygyny: when there are two brothers, it does not seem that each takes a wife for himself, but rather that they take two wives in common; probably eventually each brother will come to regard his wife as his own, and, if this happens, the custom of monogamy among the Todas will have been developed out of a stage of combined polyandry and polygyny. Allusion has already been made to the recognised union between men and women, mainly between the two groups; under all circumstances children born from such unions belong to the mother's husband's clan, and not to her clan or that of her spouse.

About the seventh month of pregnancy an interesting ceremony is performed, the essential element of which consists in the husband giving to his wife a miniature imitation bow and arrow. This is of the greatest social importance, as the fatherhood of the child entirely depends upon it. The man who gives the bow and arrow is the father of the child for all social purposes, and is regarded as such even if he has had nothing to do with the woman before the ceremony. Usually he is the eldest of the brother-husbands; but in the case of non-fraternal polyandry, it is arranged that one of the husbands shall perform the ceremony, and, until another husband gives a bow and arrow, all the succeeding children are regarded as his, even should they be born long after his death. Even a young boy can give the bow and arrow.

The secular and religious life of these interesting people centres round their buffaloes. These are of two kinds, the secular (cows and bulls) and the sacred (cows only), both of which are tended entirely by males. The former are looked after by ordinary men, and the churning is done in the

village dairy; the sacred animals are attended by men specially set apart, who form the Toda priesthood, and the milk of the sacred animals is churned in dairies which are regarded as temples. The Teivaliol possess only one class of sacred buffalo, with a comparatively simple dairy ritual; whereas the Tartharol have several classes of sacred buffalo, with more complex dairy rituals which culminate in the *ti*. The lesser dairies have a simplified ritual, but it is not surprising that even for these it is sometimes difficult to find priests who will undergo the wearisome monotony of the ritual and the seclusion from their fellows that this cult entails.

Those who are interested in ethics will find that the peculiar social system of the Todas has resulted in an ethical code which is strangely different in some important respects from that of most other communities; indeed, Dr Rivers says: "It is doubtful whether crime can be said to exist among the Todas"; they "have a code of offences against the dairy, but these must be regarded as sins rather than as crimes, for they are neither investigated nor punished by the civil authority, but are punished directly by the gods."

The Todas show undoubted signs of the influence of Hinduism on their religion; but in the past this has been slight, though it may be increasing at the present time. The true Toda gods are definitely anthropomorphic beings, who have a very definite association with the hills of the Nilgiri plateau; they seem to be a development of hill-spirits, but some appear to be deified men who were apotheosised as heroes, not as ancestors. There is little to support the idea that the gods are personifications of the forces of Nature, and it seems probable that the buffalo was never regarded as an actual god.

The Todas exhibit a stage of religious belief in which gods, once believed to be active and living among men, have become shadowy beings who intervene in the affairs of men in a mysterious manner, and chiefly in the case of infraction of the laws which they are still believed to have given. Their present religious state seems to be one in which ritual has persisted, while the beliefs behind the ritual have largely disappeared. The dairy utterances, which were probably at one time definite prayers calling on the gods for health and protection, are now on their way to become barren and meaningless formulæ. Dr Rivers repeatedly draws attention to the probability of the ritual having killed the spirit of religion, and in its turn it is becoming perfunctory. The Todas, in fact, show us in little the general traits characteristic of the degeneration of religion.

As an example of scientific method, this is the best socio-religious monograph of a special community yet published. The reader is continuously impressed with the extreme conscientiousness of Dr Rivers; most authors have a tendency to slur over imperfections in record or weaknesses in argument, but he draws attention to them. Whilst studying the Papuans of Torres Straits, Dr Rivers recorded complete genealogies of every family of a community as far back as memory carried, and utilised the information thus gained for the elucidation of the system of kinship, the regulations of social life, and for the status of the performers of social and religious duties.

The value of this new departure in the technique of sociological field-work can scarcely be over-estimated, and one can see in this monograph how it has given definiteness, and at the same time a sort of personal note, to the investigations. Dr Rivers gives in his Preface the broad lines upon which he has acted, and these can but receive the heartiest commendation. What we need more than anything else in ethnology is *the intensive study of limited areas.* No true student will blame an investigator for giving too much detail; for, in order to get a thorough grasp of the thought and action of a given people, all the facts and factors must be known, and a detail which seems insignificant to one student may be illuminative to another. Although alive to the interest and value of comparative studies, Dr Rivers has wisely held himself under restraint; but we hope these discussions are merely deferred until he has more first-hand evidence to offer us. Premature synthesis is worth very little; and though the scientific investigator endeavours to see the bearings and significance of his facts while he is collecting them, he realises that it is the often tedious details which make for thoroughness in work.

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Cultes, Mythes et Religions.—Par Solomon Reinach. Tomes I. et II. Paris, Leroux.

In these two handsome volumes are bound up seventy articles contributed to French magazines, as well popular as learned, in the course of the last five years. Mr Reinach's readers and admirers are not surprised to find that the ground they cover is extensive and varied. He discusses totemism and tabu, the theory of sacrifice, the origin of marriage, art and magic, Celtic mythology, Greek mythology and art, the evolution of religion, the ethics of Mithraism, Babylonian myths and the first chapter of Genesis, Judaism and the Inquisition, the internal emancipation of Judaism, etc. etc.

Out of all this array of subjects there are some to which he seems to attach particular importance. We refer to the theories of totemism and tabu and the theory of sacrifice. Not that he lays claim to have formulated these himself. "Had I done so," he assures us, "I should have been one of the greatest men of my time." Some of the applications are his own, but the main principles set forth in this set of articles are the result of the investigations of British scholars—of Frazer, Jevons, Robertson Smith, etc.: investigations which Mr Reinach has been the first to make known to the savants of the Continent. The points which he urges on their attention, and to which he returns again and again, might be summed up as follows: Man—that is to say, primitive man—has three main characteristics. In the first place, he has the feeling of religion or scruple. No one any longer believes, with Gabriel de Mortillet and Hovelacque, that the man of the quaternary period was without religion. It was thanks to this feeling that the clan did not perish through internecine warfare. It is expressed in its

essence in the "Thou shalt not kill" of the Scriptures, or, to use a colloquial phrase, in the English "Hands off!" In the second place, primitive man was an animist. We should note here that animism as Mr Reinach understands it, is not the animism of Mr Herbert Spencer, or Professor Tylor, including in its full development the belief in souls and in a future state, in controlling deities and subordinate spirits. It is the animism in which Mr Spencer disbelieves, the projection of the human personality on to surrounding animals and objects. Thirdly and lastly, as far back as we can trace him, man was a social being: he sought from the first the company, the friendship, the protection of his peers. Animist as he was, it was but natural that he should enlarge the circle of these true or supposed relationships, that he should carry them into the animal kingdom, the vegetable kingdom, or even in some cases into the mineral kingdom. The object in question—in the first place it was always the whole species—was what is known as the totem. It became, as it were, enrolled among the members of the clan, and was protected by the same scruple or religion which secured the continued existence of the clan itself. It is to this "hypertrophy of the social instinct" and the ensuing tabus that Mr Reinach, like Mr Jevons, attributes the domestication of animals and the cultivation of crops. But while the animal or vegetable totem, regarded as a storehouse of strength and holiness, was respected for the most part, on rare occasions it was eaten ceremonially by the men of the clan as a means of sanctification. These banquets tended to become more and more frequent and to degenerate into mere orgies. At the same time, however, the tradition of the totem sacrifice, of the eating of the divine principle, was never lost. In it Mr Reinach, following Dr Robertson Smith, sees the origin of the rites of theophagy or communion.

In these views there is food for controversy, and Mr Reinach's position has already been assailed, notably by Mr Lang in the *Athenæum*. To these objections—which, with characteristic open-mindedness, he recapitulates in the preface to Volume II.—he attaches varying degrees of importance. In the matter of the totem-sacrifice he stands firm. In reply to Mr Lang's challenge to point to one undoubted example of the rite, he cites a case of the sacrifice and manducation of the totem among the Australian natives of to-day, and claims to have derived further support for his theory from a closer analysis of Greek ceremonies founded on such rituals, *e.g.* in his articles on "The Death of Orpheus" and "Zagreus, the horned Serpent." At this point those who are still unconvinced might ask to be assured that the eating of the totem by men of the Arunta tribe—he must surely be referring to this—is a legitimate instance. The totem is killed in the usual way, at the opening of the season for that particular food, ostensibly with a view to securing a good supply of it. This being so, they would ask whether we are justified in assuming here a case of totem-sacrifice as it was understood by Robertson Smith. If we are not, they would deny that the Greek ceremonies can be explained by reference

to rituals existing to-day. Until they are possessed of fuller information than that to hand at present about the practices of the Arunta and other living totemists, they would probably prefer to suspend judgment in the matter.

On the other hand, Mr Reinach sees justice in the contention that the domestication of animals, if it is to be regarded as a by-product of totemism, must be supposed to have arisen, not in a small clan, but a large tribe occupying an extended territory, and to have spread thence to neighbouring peoples. Under no other circumstances could the animal have escaped being destroyed by the worshippers of other totems. At the same time, he makes light of the objection that the Australian totemists are not known to have pet animals or plants, or that the Bantu, though they have domesticated sheep and oxen, are called after wild animals only. He remarks very justly that the Australians have no animals they can domesticate, and that among the South African natives the very fact of domestication may have struck a blow at totemism. His theory is undeniably tempting, especially in its modified form; it seems far more adequate than the theory of Galton, according to which domestication was due to the savage's love of making pets, or that of Lord Kames, according to which his motive was amusement. For all that, it is unlikely that the last word has been said on the subject: it is still beset with difficulties—difficulties almost as great as those which beset the rise of agriculture or the discovery of metals. Mr Reinach's remarks on this latter topic are particularly interesting. Primitive metallurgy he regards as a chapter in the history of religion. He no longer holds that men lit upon gold, silver, etc., by a happy chance. Their first operations with minerals had a religious, not a practical bearing. They were the result, not of chemistry proper, but of the chemistry of religion, alchemy, a science which is usually associated with the decline of classical civilisation, but which must have flourished centuries before. Under the processes of smelting and fusing was the idea of a marriage between two divine substances, a hierogamy which may be compared to grafting in the vegetable kingdom. The compounding of bronze, which remained sacred long after it came into general use, was a case in point.

Another important group of articles is that which relates to Celtic mythology. Of these the longest and most elaborate is that on "Totemistic Survivals among the Ancient Celts." Other valuable papers are those on Sucellus and Nantosvelta, the mallet-god and his consort; on the Orbis Alius of the Druids; on Tarvos Trigaranus, the bull with the three cranes; and on Teutates, Esus, Taranis, etc. The latter, who appear in the well-known lines of Lucan,

> "Teutates horrensque feris altaribus Esus,
> Et Taranis Scythicæ non mitior Arâ Dianæ,"

the mythologists have always regarded as the great gods of the Gauls, a sort of Panceltic divine triad. This view Mr Reinach disputes, and

shows conclusively, we think, that Teutates, Esus, Taranis were not Panceltic but local, the gods of tribes living between the Seine and the Loire, and that there is no ground for thinking that they were associated in a triad, or had any special connection with Druidism. For our own part we were most attracted by the article on the Virgins of Sena. According to Mr H. Martin and Mr d'Arbois de Jubainville, there flourished among the Gauls nine virgin priestesses. On the well-nigh inaccessible islet of Sena, off the coast of Cornouailles, in Brittany, they controlled the winds, they cured diseases, foretold the future, and changed themselves into what animals they pleased. According to Mr Reinach, the Gauls, when we hear of them, had no such priestesses. He reminds us that the only evidence for the former view is one passage in Pomponius Mela, an orator who compiled a geography. Now, the ancient geographers, who understood the *Odyssey* literally, were for ever seeking to determine the exact whereabouts of the places mentioned in it. Thus there was much speculation as to Aea, the home of Circe, the island opposite the entrance to Hades: some were for placing it to the east, some to the west of the known world. According to a view which was widespread in the Roman period, the spot where Ulysses invoked the dead and consulted Tiresias was at the extreme end of Brittany, "extremum quâ pandit Gallia litus" (Claudian, in *Ruf.*, i. 123). By the extreme end of Brittany must have been meant the headland of S. Matthieu, or the headland of Raz. Mr Reinach has no doubt that it was the latter. Once this identification was made, the island of Sena, which is over against Raz, could easily be made to correspond to Aea. The discovery was probably older than Mela or his Greek original. That Sena should be thought of as inhabited by virgin priestesses endowed with miraculous powers, was, under these circumstances, only what might have been expected. On this wise Mr Reinach explains away a statement which derives no support from any other classical author. This silence is the more significant because Cæsar and Tacitus make a special point of the rôle played by priestesses among the Germans and the universal veneration in which they were held. It is none the less certain that Veleda, the name of one whom Tacitus describes as "apud plerosque numinis loco habitam," is not Germanic, but Celtic (*cp.* Irish "fili," poet): Ogmic genitive "velitas." What is perhaps more worthy of mention is, that women claiming to control the winds have always been known among the Celts—the Manx have such a person to this day—and that they were more often associated with the coast of Armorica (*vide* allusion to the Guernsey sibyls in the "Helgi Lays," Rhys's *Celtic Heathendom*, p. 198). This fact may have made it all the easier to place the abode of the departed and the island of Aea in that region. It does not invalidate Mr Reinach's main conclusion. His argument seems to us as sound as the setting forth of it is admirable.

For want of space, we are unable to do more than allude in passing to a few of the other articles in this brilliant collection. We have already mentioned two of those on Greek mythology—*i.e.* "The Death

of Orpheus" and "Zagreus, the horned Serpent," in connection with the totem-sacrifice. Those who are acquainted with Miss Jane Harrison's *Prolegomena* will be interested in comparing, or rather in contrasting, her view of the Orpheus legend with that of our author.

Criticism is represented by some discussions of passages in the *Æneid* and *Pharsalia*, and archæology by the papers on the god Telesphorus, who is proved a northerner; on the birth of Plutus, represented on the Rhodian Vase; on the birth of Athena; on Apollo Opaon at Cyprus, etc. That on the Hermaphrodite of Pont-Sainte-Maxence is particularly instructive. Of those that remain, the ones that will appeal to the greater number are, we think, the papers on the first chapter of Genesis, on Judaism and the Inquisition—Mr Reinach dispels a good many illusions on this subject,—and the papers of a more general character on the Evolution of Religion and the Progress of Humanity. It is interesting to note that our author is not of those who hold that the one effect of sacerdotalism was to retard development. In the early stages, at any rate, he holds that the effect was to further it. Had it not been for the priest who systematised the tabus, primitive man must have fallen a victim to his own terrors, and metaphorically speaking—literally in some cases—would have been unable to move hand or foot.

It only remains for us to express our sincere admiration of Mr Reinach's work. It is hard to say by what one is most impressed: by his originality and suggestiveness, by the erudition which enables him to approach each subject in the spirit of the specialist, or yet by his power of lucid exposition or his extraordinary charm of style. One thing is certain: his readers are sure of the best, and that in its most attractive form.

Myvanwy Rhys.

Oxford.

Adonis, Attis, and Osiris: Studies in the History of Oriental Religion. By J. G. Frazer, D.C.L., Litt.D.—Pp. 339. 1906.

This recent treatise, following close upon the publication of Dr Frazer's *History of Early Kingship*, is one more proof of this writer's remarkable industry and productivity, and it will certainly enhance his reputation for encyclopædic study, attractive exposition, and power of picturesque description. It has not much that is new to offer to the special student of early Mediterranean religion, and anyone who has studied Dr Frazer's earlier works will be familiar with the main theory presented in this. But to one not yet conversant with his views it might be recommended in preference to the *Golden Bough* or to the other treatise mentioned above; for it deals with phenomena more comparable and of more limited range than those handled in the former, and it is built on a much more substantial basis than the latter. For we may call this new work a study in "proximate" anthropology, the saner comparative method demanding that

our first comparison should start with and from adjacent districts. And Attis-Adonis and Osiris are leading figures of Anatolian and Egyptian religion, and undoubtedly very similar in many points of personality, myth, and ritual. The writer prefaces his account by insisting on the part that physical geography and landscape features have played in giving shape and colour to the religious imagination. It would be difficult, no doubt, to work out this idea in regard to the complex of beliefs in the higher speculative religions, but it is properly and easily applied to the examination of such Nature-religions as those with which he is dealing. And his nature-studies of Anatolian scenery are of such freshness and charm that we must regret that he has not been able hitherto to study as a traveller and eye-witness.

The main religious thesis to which he devotes himself may be summarised thus: these three cults present us with the figures of gods who probably began as tree-spirits, but, as man advanced from the pastoral to the agricultural stage, became corn-spirits, the incarnation of the life of corn; and each of them must die a violent death, the manner of their death being suggested, as that of John Barleycorn was, by the violent processes of reaping and threshing the grain; each is the lover or spouse of a great goddess who predominates over them and mourns their death, and whose predominance was the reflex in religion of a matrilinear social system in which women were the superior sex: each of them rises again from the dead, and their resurrection is manifested or symbolised by the growth of corn, and in itself guarantees to their worshippers the hope of their own resurrection: finally, each of them is served by a king-priest who, like them, must periodically die a violent death.

The exposition displays the erudition, both literary and archæological, that we are familiar with in Dr Frazer's writings; also, in spite of certain irrelevant chapters, a more orderly method and relevance than he usually observes. Much in his account of these religions is true and has long been known to be true. The whole of Anatolia—noticeably St Paul's own city of Tarsos—was devoted to the belief in the death and resurrection of a divinity, which also permeates the Egyptian religion. And undoubtedly Osiris moved and lived in the corn, and Attis was supposed to reside in a tree and was at times explicitly identified with the corn of the harvest. Yet the more cautious student of Mediterranean religion will hesitate before drawing the conclusion with Dr Frazer's confidence that these divinities were, therefore, aboriginally nothing more than tree-spirit or corn-spirit. He should take warning from the fate of the solar mythologists, who disappeared at last because they tired us too much. The vegetation-spirit, like Robespierre's "Etre Suprème," will suffer by too constant evocation. Dr Frazer is not a close student of Greek religion, or he might have corrected his too narrow estimate of Attis by pondering on the very similar traits of Zeus. Zeus lived in a tree at times [Ἐνδένδρος], he was a god of the harvest-field, he died in Crete and went underground and became a nourishing "chthonian" deity; yet we are not

likely to be convinced that the Aryan Zeus was aboriginally a tree or corn-spirit. Dr Frazer's limited conception of Attis leaves unexplained the Phrygian worship of Attis as Παπαῖος the Father-God and the Bithynian cult of Father-Attis on the mountain-top.[1] It may well be also that he takes too narrow a view of Isis (p. 284), as in his last edition of the *Golden Bough* he took of Demeter and Kore, believing them all to have been evolved from the rustic corn-mother, corn-maiden, and corn-fetich; the theory does not work well in explaining the complex character of the Hellenic goddesses, and does not appear necessary for the explanation of Isis. Here as elsewhere in this book one may feel that the writer might have modified his views with advantage, if he had been familiar with Professor Dieterich's valuable treatise, *Mutter Erde*.

His exposition of the great religious idea of the death and resurrection of the God is clear and sound and rests on solid evidence, and his knowledge shows itself fuller and more exact in regard to Anatolian than in regard to Greek religion. The predominance of the goddess in many districts of Asia Minor may be admitted, but it is doubtful if Egyptologists would admit that Isis was predominant over the gods in the older periods of Egyptian cult.

Of much less value are the sociological hypotheses that he associates with the religious facts. Here the weakness of his work and method is most manifest. He entangles us in a series of hypotheses seductive to the imagination, but so hypnotising to the ordinary reader that his sense of reality and solidity is likely to fail, and only the careful critic remains conscious that the whole airy fabric may rest on one dubiously interpreted fact. Thus, a statement in Aulus Gellius, that the Flamen Dialis at Rome resigned his holy office if his wife died, is the only evidence quoted there for an important theory concerning the predominance of the goddess and the female in early Roman religion and society. A much simpler explanation is that such a bereavement would render the Flamen ceremoniously impure and, therefore, unfit[2]: it is very likely that same kind of rule applied to the Flaminica his wife, who was bound, as Gellius goes on to say, by almost the same ceremonious rules as her husband.

Nor has he any direct or convincing evidence for his theory, which is one of the main pillars of his construction, that the priest-king in these regions, who certainly at times personated the god, was actually put to death in this character. The story of Crœsus suggests, as I pointed out long ago,[3] the burning of a god, but scarcely suggests the periodical and regular burning of kings. The fact that the priest of Cybele at the spring festival in Rome drew blood from his arm is a simple case of blood-communion or covenant, not necessarily the relic of a human sacrifice. Dr Frazer, like many scholars of an older generation, is too apt to see traces of human

[1] *Vide* ch. iii. p. 179.

[2] The same idea explains why in certain Greek ritual only a παῖς ἀμφιθαλής, *i.e.* a boy who had both parents alive, an auspicious boy, could officiate.

[3] *Class. Rev.*, 1898, p. 376.

sacrifice where there are none; as, for instance, on p. 65 he conjectures that the burning of animals in the festival of the Pyre at Hierapolis was a substitute for the burning of men. The hypothesis seems to assume that any animal sacrifice might anywhere be regarded as a surrogate for human; but such an assumption would be rash and uncritical. Curiously enough he does not seem to have noticed a passage at the end of Lucian's *De Dea Syria*, from which he is there drawing his account; in *c.* 58 Lucian tells us that certain fanatics at Hierapolis did at a certain festival offer their children, calling them "oxen"; it seems that so far were animals from being "surrogates" for human victims that the exceptional human victim was a surrogate for the animal. The best example that he could have quoted of the periodic immolation of the king comes from a region adjacent to Egypt, and by a strange fatality Dr Frazer, who knows his way better than most of us on the far trail round the world, has missed it. Diodorus Siculus (3, 6) informs us that the kings of Meroe in Æthiopia were appointed by the priests and by a Divine call, and were bound to commit suicide when the priests chose to send them a message bidding them do so; no king had ever disobeyed, until Ergamenes, reigning in the time of the second Ptolemy—"having," as the compiler with unconscious humour remarks, "a taste of Hellenic culture and having learned philosophy," abruptly ended the traditional observance: on the receipt of the usual message he mobilised his army and massacred the priests. But the rule of a priest-king who must be periodically slain is not likely to have been a universal institution.

Dr Frazer exercises, no doubt, great influence on the anthropological studies of his University. It would, therefore, be a great gain both to himself and to them if he would reconsider his whole view as to the relations between the matrilinear society and ancient religions, and would present to himself and critically investigate these leading questions: (*a*) Is a matrilinear society necessarily matriarchal? (*b*) Are the examples of the predominance of the goddess in either matrilinear or matriarchal societies sufficiently numerous to establish an induction? (*c*) Can it be shown that the religious imagination of the female has always a bias towards the female divinity? I have puzzled over these problems for some time, and have elsewhere expressed the conclusion that there is no necessary causal connection between the predominance of a great goddess and matrilinear society.

Yet in spite of certain defects and hasty assumptions this book well deserves success and a grateful recognition.

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Le Dogme de la Rédemption, Essai d'Étude Historique.—Par l'Abbé J. Rivière.—Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre.—Pp. xii + 519.

The Christian Doctrine of Salvation.—By George Barker Stevens, Ph.D., D.D., LL.D.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.—Pp. xi + 546.

The emphasis and the scale of treatment are very different in these two books. One is predominantly patristic and mediæval, and sets severe limits to the activity of speculation in matters of faith; while the other reveals on almost every page a deeper reverence for the free life of the reason and conscience than for formulated doctrine or ecclesiastical tradition. For most purposes they must be looked at apart, or as a study in contrasts; but in the light of this divergence the testimony is all the more impressive, which they bear to the claims of historical method in the study of Christian doctrine. Even for the Roman Catholic writer, far as he is from belonging to the school of the Abbé Loisy, the formula *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, is no longer valid. Though he may refrain from expressing it in that way, he recognises that the history of doctrine is a branch of the history of human opinion; and, if he is still convinced that the process of development has been simply one of formulating through the clash of human thought and experience what was implicit from the beginning, he does not shrink from exposing the fallacies of judgment, the crude errors, the whimsical fancies of the religious imagination which have marked the way. His quarrel, indeed, with some of the most trenchant modern critics is not their unorthodoxy, but their failure to grasp the fact that their reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Atonement in terms of ethical experience is simply, in many of its essential features, a return from the errors of Protestant scholasticism to the profoundly spiritual faith of the Catholic Church.

The Abbé Rivière is acute enough to see that the challenge offered to traditional dogma by historical criticism and religious experience can only be met in one way. Writers like Harnack and Auguste Sabatier must be overcome on their own chosen ground of history and reason. The world is too wide awake to-day for any shirking of the issue, even if we can suppose that there are still serious minds who desire to do so. Accordingly, the Abbé Rivière summons all his powers of reasoning and a vast store of patristic scholarship to his aid to prove that they are wrong. He begins by a brief exposition of what the Catholic doctrine of the Atonement really is. We may summarise some of the chief points in a few words. The mystery of Redemption involves the idea of substitution, and that in the sense that the Saviour has literally suffered in our place: "Cette idée de substitution est l'âme de la prédication et de la piété chrétienne—et avec raison; car elle représente pour ainsi dire le côté extérieur et sensible du mystère." While, however, a real change is thus effected in our relations to God, we must not fall into the error of supposing that the love of God towards us is in any sense the result of Christ's redeeming work: "Dieu a éternellement et réellement aimé les hommes, même coupables, même avant

la passion : sinon, comment aurait-il seulement voulu les racheter ? L'amour de Dieu n'est pas un effet de la Rédemption : il en est la cause." In opposition to all attempts to rationalise the mystery of Redemption, and in distinction from all subjective theories, which seek to interpret it in terms of human experience or of a change wrought within the spiritual consciousness of the believer, the Catholic doctrine asserts its essentially objective character : " Est-il besoin de dire que nous admettons que la mort de Jésus-Christ est le plus sublime des exemples, la plus féconde source d'amour ? . . . . Mais à cette idée nous donnons un fondement réel, en faisant de la mort du Sauveur l'expiation providentiellement voulue de nos péchés. Le rationalisme fait consister toute l'influence de la mort du Sauveur dans une impression subjective : nous lui conservons une efficacité objective ; à un fait de solidarité humaine nous substituons un mystère de solidarité surnaturelle." It is only what may be called the fundamentals of the doctrine which occur in this sketch, given as it is, in comparison with the historical exposition which is to follow, with a severe economy of words. The author may plead, however, that it is sufficient for his purpose, and he is evidently anxious to avoid the crude realism of many popular Catholic writers on the subject. He is quite severe in his disapproval of some expressions, which he quotes both from Bossuet and Bourdaloue. " Ce Dieu sanguinaire et cruel n'est pas le Dieu de la raison, encore moins de l'Évangile. Mais la doctrine catholique n'est pas responsable de ces excès."

Now there are two lines of attack which have been pushed forward by historical criticism against the plea that the doctrine of Atonement, as formulated by the Abbé Rivière, has been a normal and legitimate development in Catholic theology from the primitive facts of the Christian Revelation. The first of these is the contrast insisted upon so frequently between Greek theology, preoccupied with the thought of Divine immanence and the doctrine of the Incarnation, and Latin theology, with its habit of approaching the relation between the Divine and the human *ab extra*, and its severely legal categories of thought. The other is the prevalence in theological thought during the patristic and mediæval periods of the idea of a ransom paid to the devil as the necessary price of human deliverance. The object of the Abbé Rivière's book is to meet these historical arguments on their own ground, and in face of these variations to exhibit the Catholic doctrine of Redemption, in the form in which he has portrayed it, as a legitimate and consistent development. It may well seem a formidable task, and we doubt whether, with all his learning and his keenness to press home every point of vantage, he can be awarded many of the spoils of victory. But in saying this we do not wish to deny the interest and importance of his work from a historical point of view. It is a learned study in some of the by-paths of religious thought and belief. Many things may be of value historically which are of little worth dogmatically, and the Abbé Rivière is not the first writer who has forged weapons out of his own scholarship, which may be more effective in the hands of his opponents than in his own.

Passing over his discussion of the contrast between Greek and Latin theology with the one remark, that the various modifications which he introduces do not invalidate the distinctness of the emphasis and the difference of atmosphere—and that is the essential point,—we come to his special treatment of the theory of a ransom paid to the devil. Here he has written a chapter on the curiosities of human belief, and he has succeeded in showing that the thought of the Middle Ages on the subject of the Atonement, as in so many other directions, was far less uniform than is usually supposed. These varieties of presentation have, however, one essential feature in common. They are dominated by the idea, which to the modern mind has become purely mythological, of a transaction with the devil. Most, if not all, of his readers will be in agreement with the Abbé in his destructive criticism of this type of doctrine; but it is only by a *tour de force* than he can treat it as an aberration or "sport" of no profound significance, "dont la singularité même fait ressortir le développement authentique et continu du tronc doctrinal qui la supporte." We can assign its place in the growth of Christian thought, and we can account for its gradual disappearance as more spiritual conceptions emerge; but we cannot see how its almost unchallenged occupation of the Christian mind for centuries, even when the most generous allowance is made for the coexistence with it of more evangelical ideas, is compatible with a process of necessary and continuous doctrinal development within the borders of an infallible Church.

The Abbé Rivière has set himself strict limits in his task. He has selected two special points of attack for detailed historical treatment; but the doctrine itself, which he is concerned to defend, is left in his pages unshielded from the still more damaging influence of the subjective theories of atonement. He dismisses them, indeed, with the statement, which betrays a singular lack of insight, that they confine the meaning of the death of Christ within the limits of an example of goodness; but he does not seem to be aware, that it is just in connection with all objective or transactional theories of the Atonement that the most searching difficulties are felt. If he could prove all that he desires in regard to historical development, the momentous question would still remain, Is the doctrine true? Is it in harmony with the primitive data of the Christian Revelation in the New Testament? Does it satisfy the ethical and spiritual needs of human nature?

It is the prominence which is given to these questions, and the clearness with which the relation is grasped between truth of doctrine and the realities of human need and experience, which give a characteristic colouring and a distinctly personal note to Dr Stevens' book. For him traditional theories and ecclesiastical definitions are of quite secondary importance. His final appeal is to ethical reality and the words of Christ. We shall accordingly do him no injustice if we confine our attention chiefly to the five chapters at the close of the volume, where he attempts the task of reconstruction, and lays bare for us the sources of his own trust and

the essential truth of experience, which all the theories of the atoning work of Christ have sought to interpret or express. It would, however, be unfair, if we did not call attention in a few words to the spirit in which the whole study has been conceived. It is an admirable illustration of historical method. It treats even the most venerable doctrinal formularies, as the historian is bound to do, as human documents subject to the evolutionary process, with a certain relativity to the place and period of their origin. The dogmatic inference to be drawn from this attitude of mind will not be the same in all cases, but its tendency is in the direction of the complete abandonment of doctrinal infallibility. Historical facts which have a permanent spiritual significance, and the experience whether of the individual or the Church, are prior to any interpretation which a group of thinkers at any given period may place upon them; and accordingly the task of reconstruction is imposed upon us alike by the ordinary conditions of human intelligence and by the progressive life of the Church itself, when it becomes aware of a new environment or a change of attitude towards the facts of Revelation or its own tradition. Christian doctrine has been studied in this way for a long time in some of the German universities, and Dr Stevens' book is a significant illustration of the rapidity with which, after much characteristic suspicion and delay, the new method is being accepted in the theological literature of England and America.

No one can complain that Dr Stevens conceals his meaning in a cloud of vague phrases. He is a mediating theologian in a better sense than that. He rejects all transactional theories of the Atonement because they do not really interpret the facts, and for himself they have no ethical reality. "I am led to the conclusion," he says, "that the only ground of forgiveness is the divine grace, and that in no sense is God compelled to punish, or to do something which is the equivalent of punishing, before he can forgive. There is forgiveness with him not because he has been propitiated, but because he is the gracious God whose mercy endureth for ever. Christ's mission to earth is not to make God willing to save men but to make men willing to be saved. In him the grace of God that brings salvation appeared to all men. He did not come to procure, but to proclaim and bestow forgiveness. Salvation is grounded in the divine nature. God saves because he loves. The fact that he saves requires no other explanation than that it is his gracious will and nature to save men —and is capable of no other. All the mechanisms of expiation and satisfaction which men have interposed between the divine love and human salvation, would be themselves preposterous and impossible except on the supposition that they have their spring in the divine love." Further on, in the striking chapter on the Necessity of Christ's Death, he links this thought of divine love with the message of the cross. "The question, in what sense he died for men, is the question in what sense he gave his life for them, and that again is synonymous with the question, in what sense he came to minister. Jesus himself coupled all these

expressions together, and in his thought and teaching they explain each other. Death, for him, stood in no contrast to life; it was the completion of life. His death was a part of his ministry, his service, his self-giving for the ransoming, that is, for the saving, of many. Why, then, did he give his life? Was it that he might influence men? That he might reveal God in his compassion or disclose the evil of sin and so condemn it? We can see all these results—and others—as the fruits of Jesus' self-giving, but, so far as we know, he presented no analysis of the particular objects of his self-devotion. It is not the manner of self-effacing love to announce the specific purposes which it expects to secure by its services. Especially incongruous is the idea that Jesus proposed to display the divine love in order to impress men, as if a mother were to say to herself: 'I will so love this child of mine as to impress him with the evil and shame of disobeying me.' Love is no such analysing, calculating prudence. Love gives because it is its nature so to do, and Christ gave himself for men not that he might reveal, display, or secure something, but because he was a great lover of men, and great love means self-absorption in service and sacrifice for its objects. He gave himself for mankind, because for love it is supremely blessed to give." And again: "Christ lived, laboured, suffered and died, not to make God willing to save, but to show how willing he is, and to make his eternal willingness effective—really to accomplish what God in his holy love desires to do."

These passages give clear expression to the central features of Dr Stevens' position; but a momentous inference hangs upon them, which is dealt with specifically in the chapter on Eternal Atonement. He there quotes with approval the statement of Dr Fairbairn that "theology has no falser idea than that of the impassibility of God." In other words, the love of Christ is the reflection of the love of God; the sympathy of Christ is for us the earthly embodiment of the sympathy of God; the suffering of Christ expresses in a real way the suffering in the heart of God. Or, to quote Dr Stevens himself: "There is an activity of God in all history of which Christ's earthly work is a historical expression. His saving mission is a transactional expression of eternal atonement." There is no need to dwell upon the truth which this form of doctrine attempts to conserve, and the spiritual instincts which it satisfies. The objection that it implies, as Dr Stevens himself points out, the passibility of God, and therefore technically is heresy, may not be of much moment, especially in view of the waning influence in theology of metaphysical abstractions and the logical inferences which are based upon them. But it is worth while to point out that language of this kind should be used with great reserve, and with a strict regard to its symbolical character, if we are to escape the dangers of a crude anthropomorphism. For a spiritual religion it is safer to use the symbolism of love, of course with reverent insistence upon all the rich content of love, than the symbolism of suffering, which in popular speech degenerates too readily into theological materialism. The metaphors of our religious vocabulary exercise a subtle tyranny over the imagination, and may easily

take us much further than we intend to go in the direction of the sensuous and the sentimental.

Dr Stevens is quite aware that the chief criticism of his position may be summed up in the word subjectivity; but, being a bold thinker, he makes no attempt to shirk the consequences. Instead of this he turns upon his critics and asks them what, after all, they mean by this constant dwelling upon the word objective. For those who stand immovably in the ancient ways, and believe that the atoning death of Christ made something possible which before was impossible, or, in other words, created a new fact in God, and changed radically his relation to mankind, the meaning is definite and obvious; but Dr Stevens is quite justified in his attitude towards a large number of mediating theologians who insist upon keeping the word, while the real weight of their thought and appeal is given to the subjective side, to the impression which is made upon the believer, to the change wrought, not in God, but in the human soul.

We have called attention already to the superficial criticism of the Abbé Rivière, to the effect that a subjective theory of the Atonement reduces the life and death of Christ simply to an example of moral excellence. No criticism could in reality be more ineffective when it is applied to the deeply spiritual type of thought which meets us in these pages. Even those who are most emphatic in their dissent must concede some admiration to the high qualities of religious earnestness and of practical insight into the realities of Christian experience which they display. In spite of his subjectivity—or shall we not rather say because of his uncompromising grasp of all that subjectivity involves and makes possible?—it is one of the conspicuous merits of Dr Stevens' book, that Christ, in his life and passion and death, is never a mere example, an objective fact of ancient history without any vital significance for religion. The Christ without has become the Christ within, a divine power of grace and love in the soul, the pledge of forgiveness and the hope of glory. It is only through this profound interpretation of Christian experience that the facts of the Gospel can have a permanent and essential meaning for the doctrine of Redemption.

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Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life. By W. R. Boyce Gibson.—London: Adam and Charles Black, 1906.

Seldom does it happen with us that an account of the life and philosophy of a thinker is published during his lifetime. This high compliment has, however, been conferred on Professor Eucken of Jena, and those who are acquainted with the subject of Mr Boyce Gibson's work will readily agree that the tribute is well merited. Professor Eucken belongs by birth, as the author observes, to a branch of the Teutonic family which is closely related to the English people, and in his thinking he is even more closely

related to us. He has, in fact, more affinity with English than with German philosophy. At the present time Germany has many specialists but few philosophers, and while for science specialism is an advantage, it is a doubtful gain to philosophy; for philosophy is apt to forget her task of thinking things together, and may fail to see the wood for the trees. But Eucken's thought "aspires to represent a philosophy of life and of reality as a whole," and in this respect "the philosophy is like the man."

Eucken's philosophy might be designated personal idealism; not, however, the personal idealism current amongst us—of which he would not approve—but "his own personal idealism." He believes in a spiritual interpretation of the universe, and holds that the spiritual principle must realise itself, or, rather, be realised in persons. His words recall such a passage in T. H. Green's Prolegomena as: "The spiritual progress of mankind is an unmeaning phrase, unless it means a progress *of* personal character and *to* personal character." English philosophy has, however, gone on the assumption that absolutism and personality are mutually incompatible; but, for Eucken, no such opposition exists. Personality is with him the only means whereby the ultimate principle can find expression, and personality is only fully attained when it expresses the absolute. By thus recognising the part which personality plays in human progress he escapes the charges usually levelled at the English absolutists.

The negative moments in his philosophy are the same as those of English personal idealism—the rejection of materialism and a distrust of intellectualism. But he does not, like the English personal idealists, seek refuge in voluntarism. "Voluntarism," he says, writing to the author, "I have always kept at arm's length, and insisted that it could do no more than replace one form of one-sidedness by another." And we have heard him assert that, if he thought the alternative a necessary one, he would prefer intellectualism to voluntarism. Nor does he attempt to save personality by setting limits to the spheres of nature or history. For him, its purpose is to appropriate the blind forces of nature and history and to give them a new value. The spiritual world is not something added to a complete natural world but is the product of our creative activity; and in this process lies the essence of freedom. The problem of freedom is not whether this or that act is determined; it is the question of the possibility of man's spiritual life. Thus the philosophy of personality is at the same time a philosophy of freedom.

This free appropriation of the lower by the higher is the method applied by Eucken to all the problems which confront the philosopher, and he reserves for it the title "noological." He rejects the two equally one-sided methods of philosophical construction: the cosmological, which treats of the world out of relation to the individual consciousness; and the psychological, which treats of the individual out of relation to a world, and substitutes the new method which comprehends and transcends both —deriving it from the conception of *spirit* or spiritual life in which the opposition of the world and the individual soul is overcome. If we may

apply to this method a category, it might be termed "mutual involution." It is not quite new amongst us, for Professor Jones has independently been urging it in another connection in this Journal.

The new method has been most fully developed in its religious application, and has produced important results. Each moment is regarded as the moving image of eternity, and the past is not admitted to be wholly irrevocable but is considered to be capable of reinterpretation and transformation. This enables us to realise philosophically the possibility of forgiveness and redemption, and suggests a proof of immortality. If immortality is to be proved, it must be shown to be involved in the "here" and "now"; a cross-section of our present experience must be made to reveal it. In accordance with this principle the author concludes that "it seems imperative to grant that our present time-experience must express in germinal form any type of eternity-experience that is destined to transcend it." If we accept the new point of view, many of the ordinary antinomies are resolved: "the problem of personality is at the same time the problem of the absolute, and the problem of immanence is essentially that of transcendence. Human freedom, truly interpreted, is seen to imply the Divine omnipotence, not as a mere postulate, a mere hope, a desire, or even a belief, but in the sense of the higher pantheism, as an intimacy closer to us than breathing and nearer than hands and feet. And yet this self-surrender through which we realise our spiritual absoluteness, our religious infinitude, far from cancelling the privacy of our spiritual experience indefinitely raises and refines our spiritual sensibility."

The inability of English personal idealism to account for Christianity and the extravagances in religion to which it gives countenance, are in striking contrast to Eucken's conclusions, and indicate the inadequacy of the conception on which this form of English philosophy is based. A true doctrine of personality would find in Christianity its sublime illustration, and in Christ a philosophical necessity. For in Christianity we have a religion, dissolving at the hands of abstraction, taken up and reincarnated in human personality and thus acquiring a new and fuller significance. The development of Eucken's thought leads him in this direction. His philosophy "is essentially a Christian philosophy of life: a restatement and development in philosophical form of the religious teaching of Jesus."

The author has suggested extensions of the method in other spheres. Where it breaks down, he shows that it has not been consistently applied, and his criticisms generally point to a fuller application. Eucken "aims at developing, not a new category but a new culture, and holds that it is the privilege of philosophy by penetrating to what is most inward in human nature, to bring a religious inspiration to bear upon the problems of the world of human labour." In so doing, he takes a more optimistic view of the possibilities of philosophy than the English idealists. It may even be thought that he has taken a too optimistic view, but through his

sustained and heroic appeal to what is most spiritual in man he has ennobled the significance and mission of philosophy. We are indebted to the author of this work for so ably introducing Professor Eucken to the English people. Indeed, for such a task it would be difficult to find one better qualified by knowledge and power of sympathetic criticism than Mr Boyce Gibson.

Robert R. Rusk.

Cambridge.

Adventus Regni. (Being Sermons, chiefly on the Parables of the Kingdom, preached at St Mary's, Paddington Green.)—By A. L. Lilley.—London: Francis Griffiths, 34 Maiden Lane, Strand, W.C., 1907.

It is the aim of this book to present the kingdom of God as the deepest requirement of man's religious consciousness, and to interpret this requirement by bringing the great message of Jesus home to the reason and the will. The method of treatment is happily adapted to the end in view, for the starting-point—the Parables—is common ground, fertile and familiar, and yet so varied in its nature as to ensure a varied development of the main theme. The canon of interpretation which Mr Lilley applies to the Parables will also commend itself as intrinsically sound. The Parables, we read, "are not to be pressed in allegorical detail, but to be taken rather as stories pointing a definite moral, which alone is to be translated into spiritual terms" (p. 9). There can, therefore, be no point-to-point correspondence between the parable and its spiritual equivalent. The "sign" does not reflect the truth like a mirror, but interprets it afresh in its own individual way.

The Parables are treated in the gospel order. The start is thus made, very appropriately, with the three which apply the symbol of natural growth to the religious life—the Sower, the Wheat and the Tares, and the Grain of Mustard Seed. We are thus made to realise from the very outset (1) that "religion is a life into which we have to grow" (p. 102), and that it "must be a growth just because it is a real fact of human life" (p. 20); and (2) that "a real revelation of God must be always changing; changing as man changes; changing not in the way of arbitrary variation and waywardness, but in the way of growth" (p. 20). Thus Religion and Revelation have their common fountain-head in the growing spiritual intimacy between God and the soul, an intimacy limited only by man's imperfection, for "it is our share in the great partnership of life that will always determine God's share in it" (p. 50). No conviction that does not spring from the necessities of this intimacy can be truly called religious, no dogma that does not grow to the form of this conviction can be worthily theological. And yet the kingdom of God within us, "like everything divine, must be capable of the condescension of coming down to earth" (p. 121); the Great Hope that springs from God's communion

with the soul is also "the hope that will transform the world for us and through us" (p. 27).

In the parable of the Grain of Mustard Seed, this Great Hope is presented as the universal message which redeemingly reaches man *qua* man. Man can be defined only in relation to it. "The day of man's birth was not the day when his body emerged from some lower animal form, but the day when the seed of the great hope was first sown in his inner life" (p. 18). In the parable of the Leaven and the Lump, we see how the Great Hope works. It works as the disintegrating ferment that sets free man's love of a common good. As the leaven breaks through the arid self-sufficingness of the separate grains of unleavened meal, so the Great Hope wrestles with our selfishness. It works within our individualisms, drawing from the native depths of our being that larger love whose growth in human experience *is* the Coming of the Kingdom.

In the parable of the Wicked Servant, the "gift" of the Great Hope is connected with the doctrine of Forgiveness. The forgiveness of God is identified with His forthgivingness. "Just here," we read, "lies the secret of our need of forgiveness, and of that certainty of God's forgiveness which the best men have asserted to be their most intimate religious experience. They have not meant, I think, that they had felt their debt to be cancelled. They have felt that something had come to them which for the first time enabled them to pay their debt. They have not felt that all the unfulfilled or violated obligations of the past had suddenly been obliterated, but that they had gained a new power of meeting obligation, which had so transformed their lives that the past seemed as though it had not been" (p. 55). And this new power can act itself out afresh only in "the mercy, the deeper intelligence, the practical brotherhood which we show towards others" (p. 51). Thus the forthgiving of ourselves in the interests of the Common Good is the continuation of the process whereby God Himself forgives. Just as all the narrower legal rights and claims depend for their meaning and validity on the natural bonds of human justice and affection, so morality itself is rooted in religion. "No greater or more disastrous mistake has ever been made than that which separates the moral from the religious life of man" (p. 49).

It is the essential mission of the Church to proclaim the Great Hope, and to release the selfishness of men into the freedom of spiritual endeavour. It cannot, therefore, claim that men should conform to any external order. Mr Lilley points out in a fine passage how men inevitably degenerate when they obey the appeal to conform. "If men are asked only to conform, they will speedily demand something to which they can conform in reality. The definite rule, the formal observance, will take the place of the arduous moral effort to which they ought merely to minister" (p. 124). The New Unity in Christendom, which "is coming faster than men think," will not mistake conformity for unity. "It will welcome large efficient varieties of order and worship, and intellectual statement of belief, and will tolerate even extravagances if they should seem to minister

anywhere to the real life of the Spirit" (p. 144). "Men of good-will must be left free to settle for themselves how they will work for the advancement of the kingdom. On all of us there rests the great obligation of placing it in the forefront of our aims and hopes, of being ready to sacrifice all to its claims. It is certain that men will meet that obligation best in the atmosphere of freedom. The only unity that is possible or that is desirable is the unity of will, of purpose, of sacrifice. Probably never again will the attempt be made to regiment men in the pursuit of the highest aims. Those who are pursuing them are already together. They draw to one another by an instinct of mutual recognition. . . . It is in the eternal realities in which the best men believe that they will find their meeting-place, though the expression they will give to those realities will be as different as their intellectual equipment and their mental atmosphere. The future of religion is bound up with the recognition of these elementary facts. If they could but be frankly recognised, there would again be one Church of Christ, the real Catholicism would have been born" (p. 36).

In the course of working out his central theme, Mr Lilley has many striking things to say concerning specific aspects of Christian discipline; *e.g.* concerning Obedience, which he describes as "never the registering of another's will, but always the challenging of it, and the making it our own through that challenge" (p. 71); and of Love, of which we read that it is the secret of life "just because it is the harmony of sacrifice and satisfaction" (p. 104). But the main significance of this volume does not lie in any charm of thought or of phrase. It must be sought in the intrinsic value of its spiritual message. The *Adventus Regni* is a stirring appeal to the faith and reason of men to seek God, the Spirit, in their spiritual experience; and in and through the search to find and know each other in ways so deeply intimate that differences of persuasion pass into the very supports and means of fellowship. It points to the Church, which, with a native inevitableness, must emerge, and is even now emerging, from these humanising sympathies, linking Protestant and Roman Catholic, Unitarian and Evangelical in spiritual fellow-feeling. It finds in that love which so transfigured the life and thought of Jesus as to flash from His humanity a superhuman splendour, the power that can also transfigure and redeem the world, and in place of the belittling conflict of the creeds, bring in the comradeship of thought that thinks neither for self nor for sect, but only for the Kingdom. To know that love is the last problem of Self-Knowledge. Just as the loyal enactment of this elemental passion in social practice is at once the hardest and the sublimest privilege of our human nature, so to think its meaning out is the profoundest, and I would venture to add, the most imperative problem of Systematic Philosophy.

W. R. Boyce Gibson.

London.

Hebrew Religion, to the Establishment of Judaism under Ezra.—By W. E. Addis, M.A.—Pp. xvi and 316. London: Williams & Norgate. New York: G. P. Putman's Sons. 1906.

To write a short and good history of the religion of the old Hebrews is not easy, but this task Mr Addis has performed successfully. His book has the advantages of condensation without its chief disadvantages; he is clear-cut and positive, yet not obscure or dogmatic—he is able to state in a general way the grounds of his representation of the history. Though he modestly disclaims originality (as, in fact, there is not much room for originality in his theme), his narrative has vitality, and he not infrequently, by his method of statement, throws new light on some point. His discussion is marked by the precision that his volumes on the Hexateuch would lead us to expect. While maintaining in general the modern orthodox Christian point of view, he deals freely with the Old Testament material, accepting fully the critical conclusions of Wellhausen, Robertson Smith, and Driver, and, it is satisfactory to observe, renouncing Winckler's recent theories. He treats the stories of the Hexateuch as legendary, and recognises the fact of development in the Old Testament religion. Among the particularly good points of the volume may be mentioned the account of the probable origin of the cult of Yahweh, the characterisations of the prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah I., Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Isaiah II. (Isa. xl.–lv.) and of the book of Deuteronomy, and the sketch of the growth of the ritual law. On these points he is cautious, discriminating, clear and broad. An excellent feature of the book is the occasional comparison of Hebrew cultic usages and ideas with those of the Greeks and the Romans. In reckoning up the influences favourable to the establishment of Yahwism in Israel (p. 121 ff.), should not the priests be mentioned (in addition to the kings and the prophets)? In regard to the origin of Israelite prophecy, it might be well to call attention to the story of the Egyptian Wenamon, who was sent to Byblos in the time of Ramses XII. (about 1100 B.C.) to get cedar-wood, was seized and imprisoned by the prince of the city, and was rescued through the intervention of a young noble who fell into an ecstasy and demanded his release. It may perhaps be inferred from this incident that such prophecy was a Canaanite institution, and passed naturally into Israel; and it is worthy of note that the ecstatic utterance was here employed in defence of an unfortunate man.

Mr Addis recognises the crudeness of the beginnings of Yahwism, and he avoids the view (not uncommon) that a peculiar moral power resided in the mere name Yahweh. But, in accord with a number of critics, he assigns Moses a rôle (pp. 61–77) that seems not to be warranted by the data. He regards him, for example, as monolatrous, and the establisher of monolatry in the Israelite cult. Yet he holds that we have not a single word from Moses, not even the decalogue of Ex. xx., Deut. v. (the composition of which he puts in the time of Manasseh), and not any trustworthy statement to the effect that he enjoined the sole worship of

Yahweh. One form of the tradition represents Moses as the introducer of the Yahwistic cult, and as he who united the tribes in the worship of the god of Sinai. But to accept a national god is not to forbid the worship of other gods, and the history down to the sixth century shows that the people (the prophetic and old nomadic circles excepted) did not look on heterolatry as incompatible with loyalty to Yahweh. In fact, down to the time of David and Solomon, and later, the strict monolatrous conception did not exist among the Hebrews; it was, indeed, not in accordance with the ideas of the time, and there seems no reason to refer it to Moses. The strict nomadic group rejected everything Canaanite, but there was no doctrine of monolatry. Nor is there any ground for supposing (as Mr Addis does) that Moses emphasised the function of Yahweh as god of war. Yahweh, as tribal or national god, stood for everything that concerned his people; since war was the most important business of the early time, he appears often as "man of war"; but throughout the history the quality of his on which stress is laid varies with the needs of the people. He becomes moral when the people become moral, and not till then. Another point (p. 56) that is often overstated is that the unity of the tribes was due to their worship of the same deity. Unity in a group of communities is the result of general sameness of customs and ideas which has come from social intercourse: religion is one element of life, doubtless a powerful one; another is language; and there are others in the form of social customs and habits of thought.

The Old Testament religious customs are well described in general by Mr Addis. The Sabbath (p. 86 f.) he properly regards as originally an unlucky day, a "crass superstition," later fashioned by the Jews into a beneficent institution. A few of his minor points appear to be doubtful. Images of deities are in one respect "secondary" (p. 37), but they are common in low tribes, occur early in Hebrew history (Judg. xvii. *al.*), and may well have antedated the conquest. Robertson Smith's theory of sacrifice, approved by Mr Addis (p. 40), is open to serious objections: it has no historical support, and does not account for the facts. Sacrifice in the Old Testament is a traditional custom, accepted by the people (though not by the earlier prophets) as the specific and effective mode of propitiating the deity. The only popular explanation of its efficacy indicated in our texts is that it furnished food to the deity—there is no hint that it was regarded as communion of man with God. Mr Addis holds that human sacrifice was not common among the early Hebrews (p. 42 f.); his ground, however—the pride and joy felt by the Israelites in their eldest sons—is hardly decisive, for the passage cited in proof (Gen. xlix. 3) is comparatively late; and, on the other hand, the stories of Abraham and Jephthah, and the law requiring first-born sons to be redeemed, may point to a very early practice that had been given up before the composition of our earliest documents. The expression "to fill the hand," used for the consecration of priests, probably means not to pay the priest his stipend (p. 101), but to commit to his care the apparatus of sacrifice. A compari-

son between the Babylonian and the Hebrew stories of the flood reveals the more refined character of the latter; but one is not justified in saying that we herein find "a fair and equitable standard by which to measure the vast superiority of Hebrew religion" (p. 129). The difference of date must be taken into consideration—the Babylonian story belongs to an earlier cultural period than the Hebrew; the latter has been revised by writers of the prophetic circle. If Isa. viii. 16 is genuine, it furnishes an interesting proof of the fact that the prophets of the eighth century gathered about them bands of disciples, and these might be supposed to record and hand down the Master's teachings (p. 179). But the expressions "bind up the testimony" and "seal the tora" awaken doubt; it was the fashion to "seal" in the second century, but not in the eighth—the prophets of this latter period were anxious rather that their words should be spread abroad. It is not probable that certain Hebrew names of trees (*elah*, *elon*, *allon*) are formed from the name of deity (*el*), because men saw in them manifestations of divine life (p. 28). In very early times all trees were potentially divine, as were many other objects; but it is not likely that any one object would receive its name from its divine character (compare, for example, ancient names of rivers and mountains). However, while exception may be taken to these and a few other points, they leave the essential value of Mr Addis's volume unimpaired.

Crawford H. Toy.

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Free Will and Four English Philosophers.—By Joseph Rickaby, S.J.—London: Burns & Oates, 1906.

Dr Joseph Rickaby, S.J., has written a vigorous and interesting book, in which he has set forth his own ideas on Free Will and has combated those of four great English philosophers—Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Mill. The method adopted, though fair enough to the writers criticised, is a little trying to the reader. It is to quote a passage verbatim from the author under consideration, and then to discuss it. In this way we get a kind of intellectual sandwich, in which the philosophers supply the meat and Father Rickaby the bread, while a flavouring is thrown in every now and then by other quotations, especially from St Augustine. This creates a sense of scrappiness, which is the chief defect in the volume. It also tends to obscure the issue. For between Hobbes putting his own sense upon words, not that of his adversary, and Father Rickaby craving permission to do likewise (p. 10), it is a little difficult sometimes to know exactly where we are.

The *fact*, we are told in the preface, that man has free will is certain, though the *how* may be doubtful. Father Rickaby is more anxious that his readers should not be determinists than that they should accept his

particular explanation of how our wills are free. That explanation is as follows:—The will is not independent of motives. If we are to act at all, the will must be struck by a motive, which raises in us a "spontaneous complacency." This complacency is a fact of physical sequence. But there is no need to act at once upon a given complacency. You can just wait and let other motives present themselves. When at last some particular complacency is accepted by the person, that is an act of free will. Free will then lies in the power which we seem to have of choosing between motives. This is practically the position of Locke, which makes it the more surprising that Father Rickaby should bring the charge of shallowness against that great philosopher. Locke certainly seemed to be throwing some light upon the matter when he pointed out that to ask whether man's will be free was improper, the real question being whether the man himself be free; and further, when he remarked that a man "could not be free, if his will were determined by anything but his own desire guided by his own judgment" (Essay II., 21, § 71).

The only freedom that we want, or ought to want, is the freedom to do right. For therein lies man's highest good, and whatever interferes with that is a shackle upon his soul. We want to be attracted to good with the certainty wherewith the lodestone is attracted to the pole: the misfortune is that we are not; our souls wobble and waver instead of pointing true. Oddly enough, it is this very oscillation and divergence from the true goal which is contended for so passionately under the name of Free Will, as though it were the Great Charter of human rights and dignity. "A perfect apparent good," says Father Rickaby (p. 6), "does not leave the will the liberty of refusing." Neither, we may add, does a perfect apparent evil leave it the liberty of accepting. Freedom is defined by our author as "the not being under constraint to reject any but sheer evil, or choose any but sheer good" (p. 80). Its dwelling, then, is in some borderland between the clear daylight of Goshen and the gross darkness of Egypt—some region of mists, where we are liable to confuse between shadow and substance. Freedom thus appears to be another name for error.

"Free will is not indifference to motives: it is absence of any absolute constraint from the particular motive that is uppermost in the mind at any given moment" (p. 196). This is well said. We are not constrained by our motives, but have power to choose between them. A motive is not a mechanical force which acts by way of impulse. It is something which presents itself as desirable, but which need not be willed. We may embrace it and make it our own, or we may resolve to resist its attraction. In the feeling that it is open to us, if we will, to adopt either course, and that consequently we have only ourselves to blame if we choose wrongly, lies the strength of the Free Will position. This is a feeling which it is highly desirable that everyone should entertain in his own case. It is not so necessary to entertain it in the case of others. We may heartily agree with this sentence: "Good grammar

and sound psychology concur in proclaiming that it is not my business to calculate what I *shall* do, but to decide what I *will* do" (p. 144). That moral effort is not futile is the point that is worth contending for. If to hold this be to hold the doctrine of Free Will, then we all are, or ought to be, supporters of that doctrine. When Mill made his admirable remark that, though Necessarians may have had a stronger sense of the importance of what human beings can do to shape the characters of one another, yet the free-will doctrine had fostered in its supporters a much stronger spirit of self-culture, he made it because it was true. If he was inconsistent in making it, it was better that he should have a passing glimpse of the truth than that he should never come in sight of it at all. But was he inconsistent? Father Rickaby thinks he was. Mill himself said that he was not (*Logic*, vi. 2, § 1).

The doctrine opposed to Free Will ought not to be called Necessity, or even Determinism, but simply Causality. It asserts that in moral action, as elsewhere, the same cause produces the same effect. Mill admits "the power of the mind to co-operate in the formation of its own character" as among the circumstances of an action, "and by no means the least influential" (§ 3). The same thing was laid down long ago in guarded language by Aristotle: "For we are in a certain way co-operating causes in the formation of our own character, and it is in consequence of that character that we propose to ourselves such and such an end" (*E. N.*, iii. 5, § 20).

It is not for me to attempt to settle a secular question, especially in the short space allotted to me. But before closing I should like to put the problem in a way which may help the reader to make up his mind whether he is really an adherent of Free Will or of Causality. Is it possible for the same man under precisely the same circumstances, external and internal, to behave in two different ways? He who answers "Yes" to this question is holding the doctrine of Free Will, he who answers "No" is asserting that of Causality; and one or other of these two answers must be true. Father Rickaby says: "It is essential to free will that two men in the same situation should not inevitably make the same choice" (p. 120). But more than this is essential if the doctrine of Causality is to be denied. What has been said must hold true of the self-same man. As to this Father Rickaby declares himself as follows: "An act of the will is free, when the agent might have abstained from eliciting it, the circumstances relevant to the act remaining the same." On the other hand, the doctrine of Causality asserts that, unless there were some difference in the circumstances, the agent would have acted as he did.

After discoursing on these high themes it is lamentable to have to drop into trivialities. But the critic must do his duty. Why is Locke spelt without an *e* on the title-page? Why is the first line of Vergil misquoted by Hobbes—"Tityre, tu patuli," etc.—without remonstrance from Father Rickaby? What is there to justify the translation "to aim and throw it" in the fifth chapter of the third book of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*? And why is the passage quoted as from the seventh chapter? We ask

these questions with rhetorical surprise, well knowing all the time that the simple answer to them is—"Humanum est errare."

ST GEORGE STOCK.

OXFORD.

The Ultimate Problems of Christianity: Angus Lectures delivered in 1906 by John Clifford, M.A., D.D., LL.D.—Pp. xx+358.—London: Kingsgate Press.

THE increase of accurate knowledge has in recent years brought many facts to light which have been regarded, both by avowed Christians and their opponents, as invalidating traditional Christian doctrine. Defenders of Christianity have therefore been driven to ask whether the traditional view of their religion is the only possible view; and also whether, in case there should be some form of Christianity other than the traditional, this form would be capable of accommodating the discoveries of science. This is the ultimate problem which is now exercising theologians of all types, and it is with this problem that Dr Clifford deals in the stimulating and buoyant book before us.

No scientific faculties have brought stronger criticism to bear upon traditional Christianity than those of history and comparative religion. It is therefore with these, but mainly with the former, that Dr Clifford occupies himself, and the result of his investigation is to maintain that essential Christianity is in no sense imperilled by these sciences. Indeed, so triumphant is his dialectic that he sees in them the most convincing witnesses on behalf of the Christian faith. How does he do this? By the investigation of the sources of Christianity and the appraisement of the contents of that Christianity revealed in the sources. The sources are: 1, The ideas of Jesus; 2, the impression produced by the personality of Jesus on His friends and foes; 3, the revelation of "His innermost life" given to His disciples during the "Great Forty Years." These our author regards as the sole sources of the Christian religion. Obviously this excludes at once from Christianity all traditional elements known to arise after the apostolic age. During the course of his discussion Dr Clifford vigorously attacks the Catholic position as stated both by such Romanists as Abbé Loisy and by High Anglicans. He approximates indeed very nearly to the position of Harnack, whom he quotes freely and with approval.

But Dr Clifford does not content himself with a mere reference to the apostolic age. He is constantly pressing to the conclusion that no documents or institutions, however ancient, are the true source of Christianity, but only the historic Christ. His object is not to limit the sources of our faith to a particular period, but to a particular person. The ideas of *Jesus*, the impressions produced by *Jesus*, the influence of *Jesus*—in short, the consciousness of Jesus, is the source of Christianity.

A similar result is arrived at when Dr Clifford handles the second part

of his theme, that of the appraisement of the contents of Christianity. The source of Christianity being the consciousness of Jesus, the content of Christianity must be unfolded from that consciousness. This content is a certain view of the "scheme of things," a definite conception of God as a "loving, holy, redeeming and regenerating" Father, and a belief in man as the potentially holy son of God. In other words, Christianity consists in a life in which the world is viewed from the standpoint of Jesus: in which God is trusted with the filial love experienced by Jesus: and in which man rises to the moral spiritual stature of Jesus. The content of Christianity, like its source, is the consciousness of Jesus. The last words of the book are "Jesus is all, and Jesus is enough. Oh, that Christian men could be content with Jesus! That is life for you and me and all men!"

The ground which Dr Clifford covers in this book is very broad. He reviews briefly, and with remarkable insight, nearly every current theological controversy, and shows points of contact with all recent theological literature. It is not, however, its technical interest alone which makes the book valuable, though its varied materials are welded into a consistent and convincing whole with great skill. It is rather the burning and optimistic passion and faith of the writer that makes the volume glowing and attractive. The book is a revelation of its author's ardent soul as well as an admirable discussion of complex questions.

Perhaps his optimism makes Dr Clifford give to certain tendencies of the present day antagonistic to Christianity a less prominent place than they deserve. "The science and philosophy of the age," he says, "move with ever-increasing momentum towards the acceptance of the world-view of the Christianity of Jesus Christ." And again, "The modern mind, broadly speaking, regards it (the movement expressed by such writers as Ibsen, Nietzsche, G. B. Shaw, etc.) as abnormal; and after listening to its painful dirge, passes on to the sunnier heights of reason, science, faith, and hope." This certainly is rather daring. But if one is constrained to take a more cautious view of the present triumphant progress of Christianity than that of this book, it is with the most cordial thanks to Dr Clifford that one accords to the book a very high place among recent theological apologies. It will be an inestimable boon to any reader desirous of facing boldly and honestly the critical problems before religious men. It will stimulate faith and increase knowledge, and is written in so glowing, readable, and untechnical a style as will make it as welcome to the layman as to the theologian.

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Baumann (*J.*) Über Religionen und Religion. 192p. Beyer, 1905.

1 *Inge* (*W. R.*) Personal Idealism and Mysticism. The Paddock Lectures for 1906. 186p. Longmans, 1907.

["At the very heart of religion is the conviction that our reason is a reflection of the absolute Reason, our interests identical with those of the great system of which we are a part. The rational is real, not assuredly because our thought determines reality, but because reality determines thought."]

Oesterley (*W. O. E.*) Religion a Permanent Need of Human Nature. (Judaism and Christianity, Short Studies.) 37p. Longmans, 1906.

2 *Blewett* (*G. J.*) The Study of Nature and the Vision of God: with other Essays in Philosophy. 365p. Toronto, Briggs, 1907.

[The first two essays deal with the antithesis between Idealism and Mysticism, the first outlining in simple form the Idealistic position, whilst the second treats of the Metaphysic of Spinoza. The remaining papers are studies in the history of Idealism, with special reference to the conflict of tendencies mentioned.]

Balsillie (*David*) Mr Mallock and the Reconstruction of Belief. Fort. R., Mar. 1907.

[An adverse criticism.]

Pearson (*Norman*) Some Problems of Existence. 168p. Arnold, 1907.

[Sketches "the outlines of a theory which philosophy and religion may be able to accept, and science need not reject." Postulates (1) the existence of a Deity; (2) the immortality of man; (3) a Divine scheme of Evolution.]

Daxer (*G.*) Eine neue Kritik der theologischen Erkenntnis. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 2, 1907.

[Hostile criticism of Lipsius' *Kritik der theologischen Erkenntnis.*]

Piat (*C.*) La logique de l'athéisme. Rev. prat. d'Apologétique, Jan. 15, 1907.

[Three steps in this logic—from the affirmation of self to the negation of God; from the negation of God to the negation of all else; from this final negation to the affirmation of God.]

Stimson (*H. A.*) A New Oxford Movement. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1907.

[The reference is to the philosophical school represented by J. K. Illingworth.]

3 *Curtis* (*Adela*) The New Mysticism. Six Lectures. 196p. Curtis & Davison, 1907.

O'Donnell (*M. J.*) Faith and Will. Irish Th. Quar., Jan. 1907.

[An attack on the "will to believe." Faith is intellectual assent based on rational conviction. The writer disapproves of the new school among Catholics that would appeal to will and heart rather than convince the reason by logical argument.]

Ward (*F. W. Orde*) The Problem of Personality. (Essays for the Times, No. 26.) 57p. Griffiths, 1907.

[We all dip into the same general fund of ethical and other qualities, but by no possibility can any two of us construct our characters in exactly the same way. And the difference of the arrangement in each alone constitutes the individuality.]

5 *Harrison* (*Frederic*) Positivists and Dr Coit. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1906.

[Repudiates Coit's declaration that Positivists represent Humanity as the equal of God.]

8 *Forrest* (*A. A.*) The Cry "Back to Christ": Its Implication. Amer. J. Th., Jan. 1907.

[It is unscientific and pre-evolutionary. Scientific attitude would preserve the values of the old, perhaps find a new and deeper significance, but would never reach a static ultimatum.]

Porter (*F. C.*) The Sufficiency of the Religion of Jesus. Amer. J. Th., Jan. 1907.

[Sufficiency affirmed, and the "return to Christ" upheld.]

10 *Hume* (*David*) Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Reprinted, with Intro. by Bruce M'Ewen. 299p. Blackwood, 1907.

Halleux (*Jean*) A propos d'un livre sur l'existence de Dieu. I. Rev. Néo-Scol., Nov. 1906.

[Refers to Sertillanges' book *Sources de la croyance à l'existence de Dieu.*]

Sertillanges (*A. D.*) La connaissance de Dieu. Rev. de Phil., Dec. 1906.

Vorges (*Domet de*) Dieu infini. Rev. de Phil., Dec. 1906.

[Refutes the doctrine of a finite God.]

Gardair (*J.*) La transcendance de Dieu. Rev. de Phil., Feb. 1907.

Sertillanges (*A. D.*) Réponse à M. Gardair. Rev. de Phil., Feb. 1907.

Ballard (*Frank*) Theomonism True: God and the Universe in Modern Light. A sequel to "Haeckel's Monism False." 523p. Kelly, 1907.

[An attempt to present in popular form the philosophical grounds of Theism. M'Taggart's recent work, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, is severely criticised.]

11 *Anon.* The Age of Reason. Edin. R., Jan. 1907.

[Examination of the writings of Mr John Morley.]

15 *Otto* (*Rudolf*) Naturalism and Religion. Trans. by J. A. Thomson and M. R. Thomson. Introd. by W. D. Morrison. 385p. Williams & Norgate, 1907.

[An extremely able vindication of spiritual religion by a distinguished German scientist. Author examines very carefully the scientific evidence for Evolution, and argues that it is not incompatible with a teleological interpretation of the world.]

Lodge (*Sir Oliver*) The Substance of Faith allied with Science: A Catechism for Parents and Teachers. 135p. Methuen, 1907.

[A Catechism, the clauses of which are intended to be consistent with the teachings of Science, as well as with those of Literature and Philosophy, and to lead up to the substance of a religious creed. Each of the clauses has an explanatory chapter attached to it.]

Lodge (*Sir Oliver*) The Influence of Psychical Research on Religious Belief. Homil. R., Jan. 1907.

Tennant (*F. R.*) Points of Contact between Theology and Science of the Present Day. II. Interpreter, Jan. 1907.

Salmon (*G.*) Evolution and other Papers. 146p. S.P.C.K., 1906.

B BIBLE 1 *Old Test.* 5 *New Test.* 9 *Apocrypha.*

Margoliouth (*D. S.*) Biblical Criticism in the Eleventh Century. Expos., Dec. 1906.
[By Moslems.]

a *Sayce* (*A. H.*) The Archæology of the Cuneiform Inscriptions. 220p. S.P.C.K., 1907.

Lods (*A.*) Le Culte des Ancêtres dans l'antiquité hébraïque et ses rapports avec l'organisation familiale et sociale des anciens Israélites. 156p. Fischbacher, 1906.

Winckler (*Hugo*) Die im Sommer 1906 in Kleinasien ausgeführten Ausgrabungen. 28p. Peiser, 1906.

Smith (*E. M.*) The Zodia, or the Cherubim in the Bible and the Cherubim in the Sky. Ill. 377p. Elliot Stock, 1906.

c *Waller* (*G.*) Biblical Concordance on the soul, the intermediate state, the resurrection. 78p. Simpkin, 1906.

h *Baumstark* (*A.*) Abendländische Palästinapilger des ersten Jahrtausends und ihre Berichte. Eine kulturhistorische Skizze. 94p. Görresgesellschaft, 1906.

Sanders (*F. Knight*), *Fowler* (*H. Thatcher*) Outlines for the Study of Biblical History and Literature. With Maps and Charts. 233p. Smith, Elder, 1907.

Wright (*G. F.*) Scientific Confirmations of Old Testament History. 400p. Biblio. Sacra Co., 1906.

Meyer (*E.*) Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme. 576p. Niemeyer, 1906.

i *Grafe* (*E.*) Das Urchristentum und das Alte Testament. 48p. Mohr, 1907.

Jarrel (*W. A.*) The Bible verbally inspired. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1907.

Beachey (*R. W.*) God, Man, and the Garden. Puzzles, Problems, and Parables solved by the Word of God. 270p. Elliot Stock, 1906.

k *Budde* (*K.*) Geschichte der althebräischen Litteratur mit einem Anhang: Apokryphen u. Pseudepigraphen von A. Bertholet. 449p. Amelang, 1906.

q *Rix* (*H.*) Tent and Testament: A Camping Tour in Palestine, with some Notes on Scripture Sites. Ill. 312p. Williams & Norgate, 1907.
[An exceedingly valuable aid to biblical study, illustrated with a large number of very excellent photographs.]

Ewing (*William*) Arab and Druze at Home: a record of travel and intercourse with the Peoples east of the Jordan. Ill. 180p. Jack, 1907.

v *Pells* (*S. F.*), *ed.* The Old Covenant, commonly called The Old Testament. Trans. from The Septuagint by Charles Thomson. 2 vols. 2nd ed. Hove, 1907.
[Thomson's was the first English translation of the LXX, published in 1808 at Philadelphia.]

y *Tandy* (*G.*) Elementary Studies in Biblical Criticism. II.: The Question of Authorship. Interpreter, Jan. 1907.

Jülicher (*Adolf*) Neue Linien in der Kritik der evangelischen Überlieferung. (Vorträge des Hessischen und Nassauischen theologischen ferienkurses, Heft 3.) 76p. Töpelmann, 1906.
[Lectures on (1) The Epoch, 1901; (2) Wrede; (3) Wellhausen; (4) Harnack; (5) New Lines of Investigation.]

Anon. Recent Developments of Old Testament Criticism. Quar. R., Jan. 1907.
[Discusses the work of Cheyne, Driver, Winckler, and others.]

Knight (*H. Theodore*) Criticism and the Old Testament. A Popular Introduction. 170p. Elliot Stock, 1906.

Mann (*Newton*) The Evolution of a Great Literature. Natural History of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. Rev. ed. 409p. West, 1906.
[Aim is to present within small compass and for the use of the general reader the main conclusions of advanced scholarship touching the composition of the various parts of the Bible.]

Selleck (*Willard Chamberlain*) The New Appreciation of the Bible: A Study of the Spiritual Outcome of Biblical Criticism. 409p. Univ. of Chic. Press, 1907.
[Author has had in view the needs of ministers, teachers, young people, parents, and thoughtful people generally.]

Horton (*J.*) Tekel, or the Wonderland of the Bible. A Sequel to "My Search for Truth and what I Found." 439p. Welby, 1906.
[A thoughtful examination of the Old Testament narrative.]

l *Boylan* (*P.*) Evolution and Assyriology. Irish Th. Quar., Jan. 1907.
[Recapitulates the opposing views of the Wellhausen School and the Assyriologists as to the development of the Hebrew religion.]

Cook (*S. A.*) Old Testament Notes. Expos., Nov. 1906.
[Largely a review of Baentsch's *Altorientalischer und israelitischer Monotheismus.*]

a *Anon.* The Assuan Papyri. Church Q. R., Jan. 1907.
[Examined for information as to the community of Jews settled there, and which was founded by the fugitives of the sixth century who fled from Jerusalem, taking Jeremiah with them (Jer. xliii. 4–6).]

Lods (*A.*) Le Panbabylonisme de M. Jeremias. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., Sept. 1906.
[A hostile criticism.]

Sayce (*A. H.*) A Babylonian Tourist of the Abrahamic Age and his Map of the World. Amer. Antiquarian, Nov. 1906.
[Description and translation of a cuneiform text recently published by the British Museum.]

Johns (*C. H. W.*) Statistics of Sabbath Keeping in Babylonia. Expos., Nov. 1906.
[Reasons to show why so far the statistics have been useless to prove whether a Babylonian Sabbath, in the Israelitish sense, was kept.]

f *Dunbar* (*J. W.*) Beatitudes of the Old Testament. 236p. Oliphant, 1906.

h *Foakes-Jackson* (*F. J.*) Israel and Babylon, ii. Interpreter, Jan. 1907.

St Clair (*G.*) Israel in Camp: A Study. J. Th. St., Jan. 1907.
[Astral theories applied to the personalities and histories of the patriarchs, the calendar practice and religious ritual of Israel.]

Lesêtre (*H.*) Les récits de l'Histoire sainte: les Hebreux en Égypte.
R. prat. d'Apologétique, Nov. 15, 1906.
[Dealing apologetically with the story of Joseph and the multiplication of the Hebrews in Egypt. Inaccuracies in the numbers are acknowledged. In subsequent Nos. other like narratives are similarly treated, *e.g.* The Crossing of the Red Sea, The Plagues, etc.]

Cook (*S. A.*) Notes on Old Testament History. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1907.

Winckler (*H.*) Altorientalischer Geschichts-Auffassung. 66p. Pfeiffer, 1906.

Winckler (*H.*) Religionsgeschichtlicher und geschichtlicher Orient. Eine Prüfung der Voraussetzungen der "religionsgeschichtlichen" Betrachtung des A. T. und der Wellhausen'schen Schule. 64p.
Hinrich, 1906.

Spiegelberg (*Wilhelm*) Die Schrift und Sprache der alten Ägypter. 32p.
Hinrich, 1907.
[A popular account of the character and history of the Egyptian language and writing.]

Smith (*G. A.*) The Jewish Constitution from the Maccabees to the End.
Expos., Oct. 1906.

Smith (*G. A.*) The Jewish Constitution from Nehemiah to the Maccabees.
Expos., Sept. 1906.

j *Noordtzij* (*A.*) Musri (*slot*).
Th. Tijd., Jan. 1907.
[Conclusion of a series of articles against the theory of Winckler, Hommel, and Cheyne.]

k *Proctor* (*H.*) The History of the Hebrew Alphabets. Amer. Antiquarian, Nov. 1906.

m *Giesebrecht* (*F.*) The Moral Level of the Old Testament Scriptures.
Amer. J. Th., Jan. 1907.
[Rated at a high value.]

q *Bönhoff* (*Dr*) Die Wanderung Israels in der Wüste. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 2, 1907.
[With special reference to the question of the geographical situation of Sinai.]

r *Beet* (*J. A.*) The Holiness of God and of the Godly. Expos., Dec. 1906.
[Discusses the Biblical teaching, especially of Leviticus.]

Hutton (*A. W.*) Hebrew Religion.
Liberal Churchman, Jan. 1907.
[Review of Addis' work under the above title.]

König (*E.*) The True and Permanent Significance of the Old Testament.
Bibl. World, Jan. 1907.

y *Wiener* (*H. M.*) Some Fatal Weaknesses of the Wellhausen School.
Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1907.
[Writer draws wide conclusions on slight grounds.]

2 *Mangenot* (*E.*) L'authenticité mosaïque du Pentateuque. 334p. Letouzey, 1907.

Beer (*G.*) Saul, David, Salomo. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, ii. 7.) 80p. Mohr, 1906.

B *Restelle* (*W.*) Traditions of the Deluge.
Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1907.
[Collects the various versions current among the races, and finds that they support the historical character of the narrative in Genesis.]

Sayce (*A. H.*) New Light on Genesis xiv. Homil. R., Feb. 1907.
[From the cuneiform inscriptions.]

D *Bullard* (*H. N.*) The Gospel in Leviticus. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1907.
[An appraisement of gospel elements in Leviticus, by the light of its use in the N.T.]

I *M'Neill* (*A. H.*) Israel in the time of the Judges. Interpreter, Jan. 1907.

K *Schäfers* (*J.*) 1 Sam. i.–xv. literarkritisch untersucht.
Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 1, 1907.
[1st Art., analysing ch. i.–vii.]

N *Barnes* (*W. E.*) Not a Gloss. (2 Kings xv. 30*b*.) J. Th. St., Jan. 1907.

Thackeray (*H. St. J.*) The Greek Translators of the four books of Kings.
J. Th. St., Jan. 1907.

3p *Huizinga* (*A. V. C. P.*) Is "Proverbs" Utilitarian? Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1907.
[No.]

B *Gordon* (*A. R.*) Job.
Expos., Feb. and March 1907.
[Seeks an interpretation of the book's message.]

F *Gray* (*G. B.*) The Alphabetic Structure of Pss. ix. and x. Expos., Sept. 1906.

4H *Duckworth* (*H. T. F.*) The Origin of the Book of Daniel. Expos., Sept. 1906.
["The acts, prophecies and visions of Daniel in the sixth century" were orally preserved, and written down, with other matter, in the fourth century in the idiom then current.]

I *Pusey* (*E. B.*) The Minor Prophets. With a Commentary Explanatory and Practical, and Introductions to the several Books. Vol. i.: Hosea. Vol. ii.: Amos. Vol. iii.: Joel and Obadiah. 381–351–364p.
Nisbet, 1906.

R *Oesterley* (*W. O. E.*) Codex Taurinensis (ϒ), vii. J. Th. St., Jan. 1907.
[Greek text of Zephaniah.]

6 *Interpreter.* The Fourfold Portrait of the Heavenly King as presented in the Gospels. A New Translation of the Gospels with the Authorised and Revised Versions, Quotations from the O.T. Scriptures, and Parallel Passages arranged to facilitate comparison of the Gospel Narratives. 306p.
Elliot Stock, 1907.

Hart (*J. H. A.*) The Scribes of the Nazarenes. III.: The Reed and the Courtier.
Expos., Mar. 1907.
[Matt. xi. 7 *f.*, Luke vii. 24 *f.* The Reed=the Zealot; the Courtier=the Herodian.]

Bardenhewer (*O.*) Die Evangelien.
Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 1, 1907.
[An anniversary address, descriptive and introductory in character.]

Morrison (*W. D.*) "Jesus."
Liberal Churchman, Jan. 1907.
[Reproducing the views of Neumann and Bousset of the person of Jesus in their books under the above title.]

b *Hole* (*William*) The Life of Jesus of Nazareth. Eighty Pictures. With Pref. by Archdeacon Sinclair, and Intro. Note by Prof. G. A. Smith.
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1907.

Knight (*H. J. C.*) The Temptation of our Lord: considered as related to the Ministry and as a Revelation of His Person. (Hulsean Lectures, 1905–6.) 210p.
Longmans, 1907.
[Review will follow.]

Reid (*John*) Jesus and Nicodemus: A Study in Spiritual Life. 288p. Clark, 1906.

Garvie (*A. E.*) Studies in the "Inner Life" of Christ.
Expos., Nov., Dec., Feb., 1906–7.

[The Foreshadowing of the Cross; the Foregleams of the Glory; the Agony in the Garden.]

Redpath (*H. A.*) Christ the Fulfilment of Prophecy. Expos., Jan. 1907.

r *Kinnear* (*J. Boyd*) The Teaching of the Lord, contained in the Gospels, brought together under its principal heads. 258p. Smith, Elder, 1906.

Walker (*W. L.*) Christ's Preaching of the Kingdom. Expos., Jan. 1907.

Metcalf (*A.*) The Parousia *versus* the Second Advent. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1907.

[The early and still current conception of a Second Advent, in the material order, was not taught by Jesus, and cannot rightly be deduced from the Gospel discourses on the Last Things.]

Toner (*P. J.*) The Soteriological Teaching of Christ. Irish Th. Quar., Jan. 1907.

[Defends the authenticity of the Gospel account of Christ's utterances about his death, and its atoning effect, and upholds the genuineness of the Eucharistic texts.]

C *Aicher* (*G.*) Mt. 5, 13: Ihr Seid das Salz der Erde? Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 1, 1907.

[For "salt" read "mill-stone," an original פלח having been corrupted to מלח.]

Chase (*F. H.*) The Lord's Command to Baptise. J. Th. St., Jan. 1907.

[Continues the Bishop of Ely's discussion with the Dean of Westminster (July 1905, Jan. 1906). Dr Chase still maintains εἰς=into, and has the sense of "incorporation."]

D *Bennett* (*W. H.*) The Life of Christ according to St Mark. Expos., Oct., Dec., Feb., 1906–7.

Burns (*Cecil Delisle*) The Use of Names in the Gospel of St Mark. Cont. R., Mar. 1907.

Harris (*J. Rendel*) Sons of Thunder. Expos., Feb. 1907.

[The title indicates a mythological reference, and = the Dioscuri or Heavenly Twins. The "Sons of Zeus" is equivalent to "Sons of the Sky," and so to "Sons of Thunder." James and John received the title from "being twins or looking like them," not from their temperament.]

E *Bacon* (*B. W.*) Lucan *versus* Johannine Chronology. Expos., March 1907.

Bernard (*J. H.*) The Magnificat. Expos., March 1907.

Hart (*J. H. A.*) Scribes of the Nazarenes. 2: The Gospel according to Luke and the Descent into Hades. Expos., Jan. 1907.

Ramsay (*W. M.*) Professor Harnack on Luke. Expos., Dec., Feb., 1906–7.

[H.'s conclusion in his *Lukas der Artzt der Verfasser des dritten Evangeliums*, etc., is welcomed, but his general principles and methods are criticised.]

Johnson (*H.*) The Spirit of the Early European Missionaries: A Study in St Luke's Gospel. Interpreter, Jan. 1907.

[Estimates the character and spirit of the Gospel.]

Spitta (*F.*) Die chronologischen Notizen und die Hymnen in Lc. 1 u. 2. Ztsch. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 4, 1906.

[The narrative of the Virgin Birth (i. 34–37) is an interpolation, and the conclusion from its chronology that six months separated the birth of Christ from that of John the Baptist is thus baseless. There was direct Roman administration between the death of Herod and the subsequent settlement; then took place the census under Quirinius and the birth of Jesus at Bethlehem. The hymns are purely Jewish compositions.]

Scott (*Ernest F.*) The Fourth Gospel: Its Purpose and Theology. 379p. Clark, 1906.

[Assumes the results of more advanced critical investigation as to authorship.]

F *Baines-Griffiths* (*D.*) The Gospel of Cana: The Christian Affirmation of Life. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1907.

[The Christian Gospel is optimism.]

H *Grey* (*H. G.*) A Suggestion on St John xix. 14. Expos., Nov. 1906.

[Proposes to alter the text, so as to bring the hour specified into agreement with the synoptists.]

Harris (*J. Rendel*) The Pool of Bethesda. Expos., Dec. 1906.

[John v. 4 is a gloss of the nature of folk-lore. The glossator rightly marks the occasion of the miracle, viz., the annual Water-Festival held there at the New Year. Parallels are adduced. The writer notes that Westcott had already identified the Feast with the New Year Feast of Trumpets.

N *Holtzmann* (*H. J.*) Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu. 100p. Mohr, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

R *Armstrong* (*W. P.*) The Resurrection and the Origin of the Church in Jerusalem. Princeton Th. Rev., Jan. 1907.

[Examines the Scripture evidence, and the effect of the Resurrection on the faith of the first Christians.]

W *Tillman* (*F.*) Hat die Selbstbezeichnung Jesu "der Menschensohn" ihre Wurzel in Dn. 7, 13? Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 1, 1907.

[Discussion and rejection of the grounds on which Zahn holds that the title Son of Man does not depend on the passage in Daniel.]

Ward (*F. W. O.*) The Parable of the Parousia. Interpreter, Jan. 1907.

[The eschatology is to be interpreted spiritually, not literally.]

7h *Ramsay* (*W. M.*) Pisidian Antioch. Expos., Jan., March, 1907.

Ramsay (*W. M.*) Tarsus. Expos., Sept., Oct., 1906.

A *Waitz* (*H.*) Die Quelle der Philippusgeschichten in der Apostelgeschichte 8, 5–40. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 4, 1906.

[In this passage, as in v. 5–9, 11–13, 18*b*–19*a*, 20–24, the writer to Theophilus incorporates a document of Hebrew origin, which was a "Petrusgeschichte" in its first form.]

B *Author of "The Faith of a Christian."* The Fifth Gospel, being the Pauline Interpretation of the Christ. 223p. Macmillan, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

D *Kittel* (*G.*) Zur Erklärung von Röm. 3, 21–26. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 2, 1907.

H *Round* (*Douglass*) The Date of St Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. 72p. Clay, 1906.

[The purpose of this essay is to endeavour to establish that the Epistle was written before and not after the Council of Jerusalem (Acts. xv. 6–29).]

J *Thomas* (*W. H. Griffith*) The Doctrine of the Church in the Epistle to the Ephesians. Expos., Oct. 1906.

M *Mackintosh* (*R.*) The Anti-Christ of 2 Thessalonians. Expos., Nov. 1906.

N *Harris* (*J. Rendel*) The Cretans always Liars. Expos., Oct. 1906.

[The quotation (Titus i. 12) is from Epimenides, and the occasion of the charge by him was the Cretan legend of the death and burial of Zeus in Crete. From him, too, probably was quoted, "In Him we live and move and have our being."]

Anon. The Authorship of the Pastoral Epistles. II.: The Language and Style. Church Q. R., Jan. 1907.

[A detailed examination of the peculiarities of

diction, the result being that "the list is reduced to zero." The spuriousness of the Epp. is a mare's nest of the critics.]

U *Moffatt* (*James*), *ed.* The Epistle of James. (Lit. Ills. of the Bible.) 139p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

Martin (*G. C.*) The Epistle of James as a Storehouse of the Sayings of Jesus. Expos., Feb. 1907.

Paret (*E.*) Nochmals das Zitat in Jak. 4, 5. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 2, 1907.
[The "Scripture" referred to in James is Gen. iv. 7.]

Y *Gregory* (*C. R.*) Critical Note, 1 John v. 7, 8. Amer. J. Th., Jan. 1907.
[A glad recognition of R.C. contribution to the free criticism of the passage.]

Z *Mayor* (*Joseph B.*) The Epistle of St Jude and the Second Epistle of St Peter. Greek Texts, with Introduction, Notes, and Comments. 239p. Macmillan, 1907.
[Holds Peter ii. not to be by the Apostle, but argues for the genuineness of the Epistle of St Jude.]

8 *Moira.* The Cryptogram and its Key in the Epistles to the Seven Churches in Asia. 106p. Elliot Stock, 1906.

Barns (*T.*) The Number of the Beast; a Warning against Mithras Worship. Expos., Mar. 1907.

Scott (*C. A.*) Dr Swete's Edition of the Apocalypse. Expos., Jan. 1907.

9 *Genung* (*J. Franklin*) The Hebrew Literature of Wisdom in the Light of To-day. A Synthesis. 409p. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906.

Hart (*J. H. A.*) The Prologue to Ecclesiasticus. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1907.

Martin (*F.*), *ed.* Le Livre d'Hénoch, traduit sur le texte éthiopien par F. Martin, L. Delaporte, J. Francon, R. Legris, J. Pressoir. 471p. Letouzey, 1906.

Pope (*H.*) The Third Book of Esdras and the Tridentine Canon. J. Th. St., Jan. 1907.

Bartlet (*V.*) Melito on the Muratorian Canon. Expos., Sept. 1906.
[Arguing for Melito's authorship.]

Harris (*J. Rendel*) The Use of Testimonies in the Early Christian Church. Expos., Nov. 1906.
[Instancing cases where the Fathers quote, not direct from O.T. Scripture, but from these controversial manuals of Testimonies against the Jews. Similar cases occur in the N.T. writings.]

Eberharter (*A.*) Textkritische Bemerkungen zu Ekkli. Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 1, 1907.

Winstedt (*E. O.*) A Coptic Fragment attributed to James, the Brother of the Lord. J. Th. St., Jan. 1907.
[Description, text, and translation.]

k *Connolly* (*R. H.*) The Original Language of the Syriac Acts of John. J. Th. St., Jan. 1907.
[An original Syriac composition, the Gospel text used being the Diatessaron.]

C CHURCH 14 ·· *Social Problems*, 20 ·· *Polity*, 42 ·· *Liturgical*, 50 ·· *Sacraments*, 60 *Missions.*

2 *Thomas* (*J. M. Lloyd*) A Free Catholic Church. 117p. Williams & Norgate, 1907.
[Review will follow.]

14 *Bussell* (*F. W.*) Christian Theology and Social Progress. (Bampton Lectures for 1905.) 343p. Methuen, 1907.
[Review will follow.]

16 *Cardigan* (*Earl of*) The Church of England: A Plea for Reform. 19th Cent., Mar. 1907.

18 *Batiffol* (*Pierre*) Questions d'Enseignement Supérieur Ecclésiastique. 354p. Lecoffre, 1907.

28 *Wilkinson* (*J. Frome*) Government and Discipline in the Church of England. Cont. R., Feb. 1907.

40 *Biggs* (*C. R. Davey*) Public Worship in the Book of Common Prayer. 202p. Longmans, 1907.

Beresford-Cooke (*Ernest*) The Sign of the Cross in the Western Liturgies. (Alcuin Club Tracts.) 35p. Longmans, 1907.

41 *Gilmartin* (*T. P.*) The Unity of Mass Liturgies. Irish Th. Quar., Jan. 1907.

42 *Anon.* The Mozarabic Rite. ii.: The Mozarabic Mass. Church Q. R., Jan. 1907.
[Treated in connection with Dom Ferotin's recent work on the Mozarabic Rite.]

Bishop (*E.*) "Spanish Symptoms." J. Th. St., Jan. 1907.
[Dealing with the questions raised by the presence of Spanish liturgical elements in the Book of Cerne.]

60 *Maclagan* (*P. J.*) Christian Missions and the Civil Power in China. Cont. R., Jan. 1907.

Mabie (*H. C.*), *and others.* Has Christianity the Moral Right to supplant the Ethnic Faiths? Amer. J. of Th., Jan. 1907.
[A missionary symposium.]

Anon. The Real Yellow Peril. Church Q. R., Jan. 1907.
[The peril is real only so far as China is and remains heathen. England's dealings with China in the past are bitterly censured.]

D DOCTRINE 10 ·· *God*, 22 ·· *Christ*, 60 ·· *Eschatology*, 70 ·· *Faith*, 90 *Apologetics.*

Forrest (*David W.*) The Christ of History and of Experience. Third series of Kerr Lectures. 5th ed. 489p. Clark, 1906.

Major (*H. D. A.*) The Treatment of Dogma in our Teaching and Preaching. Interpreter, Jan. 1907.

Anderson (*Sir R.*) Christianised Rationalism and "The New Theology." 200p. Shaw, 1907.

h "An Unorthodox Churchman." The Religion of the Spirit. A Modern View of Christian Doctrine and Observance. 104p. Arrowsmith, 1907.

Galton (*Arthur*) The New Theology. Indep. R., Mar. 1907.
[The theology of the past was too much inclined to think the Godhead was converted into flesh. The New Theology desires, rather, that our common manhood should be taken into God.]

2 *Anon.* Catholic Authority and Modern Society. Edin. R., Jan. 1907.
[A study of Liberal Catholicism.]

M'Ginley (*A. A.*) The Profit of Love: Studies in Altruism. With Pref. by G. Tyrrell. 305p. Longmans, 1907.

4 *Brummelkamp* (*A.*) Revision of Art. 36 of the Confessio Belgica. Princeton Th. R., Jan. 1907.

[The section which declares it to be the magistrates' duty "to prohibit and extirpate all idolatry and false religion," has lately been deleted from the Confession.]

12 *Meyboom* (*H. U.*) Loman redivivus. Th. Tijd., Jan. 1907.
[Adverse criticism of W. B. Smith's book, *Der vorchristliche Jesus*.]

13 *Stalker* (*J.*) What is "the Communion of the Holy Ghost"? Expos., Sept. 1906.
[Primarily an "imparting" by the Holy Ghost.]

14 *Wright* (*H. W.*) An Immutable Absolute or a God who strives? Amer. J. Th., Jan. 1907.
[The former less intellectually difficult, the latter more practically valuable.]

20 *Slattery* (*Charles Lewis*) The Master of the World. A Study of Christ. 298p. Longmans, 1906.
[Review will follow.]

Seaver (*Richard W.*) To Christ through Criticism. 211p. Clark, 1906.
[Review will follow.]

26 *Beeching* (*H. C.*), *Nairne* (*A.*) The Bible Doctrine of Atonement. Six Lectures. 110p. Murray, 1907.

32 *Starbuck* (*E. D.*) Re-inforcement to the Pulpit from Modern Psychology. II.: The Doctrine of Original Sin. Homil. R., Dec. 1906.

33 *Eck* (*H. V. S.*) Sin. (Oxford Lib. of Pract. Theo.) 241p. Longmans, 1907.
[Aim simply and solely a practical one. Experience has led the author to the conclusion that the real troubles and difficulties of the vast majority of lives are moral rather than intellectual. Book divided into three parts, dealing with original sin, actual sin, and the way of recovery.]

60 *Gould* (*S. Baring*) The Restitution of All Things; or, "The Hope that is Set Before Us." 181p. Skeffington, 1907.

71 *Lafsberg* (*C.*) Das Alte und Neue Testament als Menschenwerk oder Wahrheit und Dichtung im Bibelglauben. 651p. Pierson, 1906.

81w *Malden* (*R. H.*) Quicunque vult salvus esse. J. Th. St., Jan. 1907.
[The object is to show that *salvus esse* and *salvari* are identical in meaning.]

E ETHICS. 1–9 *Practical Theology*, *Christian Ethics*, *Transition to General Ethics*, 10 *Theories*, 20 *Applied Ethics*, *Sociology*, 23 *Economics*, 27 *Education*.

6 *Muzzey* (*David Saville*) Medieval Morals. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1906.

Köster (*Adolph*) Die Ethik Pascals. Eine Historische Studie. 172p. Mohr, 1907.

10 *Macmillan* (*Michael*) Bacon's Moral Teaching. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1906.

Lovejoy (*Arthur O.*) The Desires of the Self-Conscious. J. of Phil., iv. 2, Jan. 17, 1907.
[The self-conscious agent not only chooses ends, but also contemplates himself as in the act of choosing and of realising them; he desires not merely valuable goods to be attained through his action, but also approvable qualities of the self to be manifested *in* his action. The idea of ought gets its meaning from this contrast.]

Russell (*Bertrand*) The Development of Morals. Indep. R., Feb. 1907.
[A criticism of Mr Hobhouse's book.]

Hobhouse (*L. T.*) Sociology and Ethics. Indep. R., Mar. 1907.
[Reply to Russell.]

Davies (*Arthur Ernest*) The Good and the Bad. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1907.
[Moral action is always social when the social is defined by means of the constitutive ideas which are the organic law of the moral community.]

Naville (*Adrien*) La Morale Conditionnelle. Rev. Phil., Dec. 1906.
[Discussion of Lévy-Bruhl's *La Morale et la Science*.]

Wodehouse (*Helen*) The Idealist and the Intuitionist. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1907.
[Proposes to bring out the contrast between the two schools by a few definitions of important terms, definitions such as idealists might accept, whereas intuitionists certainly could not.]

Christie (*Mary*) A Tardiness in Nature, and other Papers. Ed. with Notes and Memoir by Maud Withers. 331p. Univ. Press, Manchester, 1907.

Knight (*G. T.*) The Praise of Hypocrisy; an Essay in Casuistry. 85p. Open Court Pub. Co., 1906.

20 *Sorley* (*W. R.*) Ethical Aspects of Economics, i. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1906.
[Economic facts are imbedded in a larger mass of facts which is to a great extent capable of being described as moral. Moreover, if we raise the question of the importance of economic goods in life as a whole, we raise a question not of extrinsic but of intrinsic value or worth.]

Seligmann (*R.*) Der ökonomische Güterwert als Wille zur Arbeit, i., ii. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 4, 1906; xiii. 1, 1907.

Lishman (*W. E.*) Reflections on Kidd's "Principles of Western Civilisation." Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1906.

Carlton (*Frank T.*) Humanitarianism, Past and Present. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1906.

Garner (*James W.*) Political Science and Ethics. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1907.

Gray (*B. Kirkman*) The Ethical Problem in an Industrial Community. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1907.

Olivier (*Sydney*) White Capital and Coloured Labour. (The Socialist Lib., iv.) 176p. Indep. Lab. Party, 1906.

Kellcher (*J.*) The Ethical Aspect of Boycotting. Irish Th. Quar., Jan. 1907.
[A defence.]

Bascom (*J.*) Æsthetics and Ethics. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1907.

Bayet (*A.*) Sur la distinction du normal et du pathologique en Sociologie. Rev. Phil., Jan. 1907.

Richard (*G.*) Les Obscurités de la Notion Sociologique de l'Histoire Sociologie et Axiologie. Rev. Phil., Dec. 1906.

24 *Arnold* (*G. F.*) Psychology applied to Legal Evidence and other Constructions of Law. 470p. Thacker, 1906.

Howerth (*Ira W.*) War and Social Economy. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1906.

27 *Barth* (*P.*) Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung, v. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxx. 4, 1906.
[Deals with the formation of the Christian society in the Roman Empire and of the society of the German peoples in the first half of the middle ages.]

Haldane (*R. B.*) The Dedicated Life. An Address delivered to the Students of the University of Edinburgh, Jan. 1907. 29p. Murray, 1907.
[A dedicated life is one that is with all its strength concentrated on a high purpose. The

University becomes, at its best, the place where the higher ends of life are made possible of attainment, where the finite and the infinite are found to come together.]

Asquith (*H. H.*) Ancient Universities and the Modern World. 26p. Maclehose, 1907.
[Lord Rector's Address at Glasgow.]

Darroch (*Alexander*) The Children. (Social Problems Series.) 133p. Jack, 1907.
[Deals with the Meaning, End, and Aim of Education.]

Anon. Irish University Education. II.: A University for Cork. Church Q. R., Jan. 1907.
[Strongly recommends a self-governing University for Munster.]

Foster (*Sir Michael*) Education, Elementary and Secondary. 19th Cent., Mar. 1907.

Oliphant (*James*) Parental Rights and Public Education. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1907.

Henson (*Hensley*) The National Church and the Education Bill. Indep. R., Feb. 1907.

Buckham (*J. W.*) Modern Theological Education. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1907.

Rauschenbusch (*W.*) The Influence of Historical Studies on Theology. Amer. J. Th., Jan. 1907.

Looten (*C.*) Le cours de vacances de Cambridge. Rev. du clergé français, Nov. 15, 1906.
[The writer, dean of the faculty of letters at the Catholic University of Lille, describes a summer session at Cambridge, and in outlining the courses gives interesting sketches of English politics, religious movements, literature and art, of the selected period.]

28 *Hobson* (*John A.*) The Ethics of Internationalism. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1906.
[The freedom of nationality, so far from being impaired, is actually fed and ripened by the establishment of international relations upon a just basis.]

Addams (*Jane*) Newer Ideals of Peace. (Citizen's Lib.) 261p. Macmillan Co., 1907.

30 *Donaldson* (*James*) Woman; Her Position and Influence in Ancient Greece and Rome, and among the early Christians. 278p. Longmans, 1907.
[A valuable piece of work by the Principal of the University of St Andrews. Partly a reprint of articles in *Cont. R.*]

De Selincourt (*Basil*) The Ethics of Passion. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1907.
[Discusses the institution of marriage.]

Takakuso (*Junjiro*) The Social and Ethical Value of the Family System in Japan. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1906.

F PASTORALIA. 2 *Sermons.*

Black (*H.*) Personal Religious Influence. Expos., Sept. 1906.

Brastow (*L. O.*) The Modern Pulpit: A Study of Homiletic Sources and Characteristics. 473p. Macmillan Co., 1907.

Anon. Psalms of the West. Cheap ed. 146p. Longmans, 1907.

De Witt (*J.*) Relations of Church History to Preaching. Princeton Th. Rev., Jan. 1907.

Ward (*F. W. O.*) The Stature of Christ. Expos., Nov. 1906.

1 *Chant* (*Mrs Ormiston*) The Prodigal. 76p. Milner, 1907.

2 *A Kempis* (*Thomas*) Meditations and Sermons on the Incarnation, Life, and Passion of our Lord. Trans. by Dom Vincent Scully. 487p. Kegan Paul, 1907.

Montefiore (*C. G.*) Truth in Religion, and other Sermons. 296p. Macmillan, 1906.

Holland (*H. Scott*) Vital Values. 227p. Wells Gardner, 1907.

Wilberforce (*Basil*) Sanctification by the Truth. 285p. Elliot Stock, 1906.

Westcott (*Bishop*) Village Sermons. 376p. Macmillan, 1906.

Mayor (*Joseph B.*) The World's Desire: and other Sermons. (Eng. Preachers.) 178p. Griffiths, 1907.

Huntingdon (*W. Reed*) The Gospel of the Infancy. A Sermon preached in Grace Church, New York. 26p. Sherwood, 1906.

Watson (*Frederic*) The Seven Words from the Cross: A Course of Meditations. Ed. by C. B. Drake. 111p. Skeffington, 1907.

Spurgeon (*C. H.*) The Old Gospel and the New Theology. Twelve Sermons. Passmore & Alabaster, 1907.

Shaku (*Soyen*) Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot. Trans. from the Japanese MS. by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki. 220p. Open Court Pub. Co., 1906.

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 *English.*

2 *Bastide* (*Ch.*) John Locke. Ses Théories Politiques et leur Influence en Angleterre. 397p. Leroux, 1907.

Stalker (*J.*) Robert Rainy. Expos., Feb. 1907.

Thurston (*H.*) The Late Lord Acton. Catholic World, Dec. 1906.

Taunton (*E. L.*) A Great Leader. Catholic World, Dec. 1906.
[A eulogy of the late Lord Acton.]

Anon. Lord Acton and the "Rambler." Dub. R., Jan. 1907.

Cecil (*Lord Hugh*) Lord Rosebery's "Randolph Churchill." Dub. R., Jan. 1907.

H HISTORY. x *Persecutions* C *Christian* M *Mediæval* R *Modern* 2 *English.*

Whish (*C. W.*) The Ancient World: A Historical Sketch, with Comparative Chart of Principal Events. With special chaps. on the Bible Lands. 345p. Luzac, 1906.

Grote (*G.*) A History of Greece, from the Time of Solon to 403 B.C. Condensed and ed. with Notes and Appendices by J. M. Mitchell and M. O. B. Caspari. 840p. Routledge, 1907.

Lichtenberg (*R.*) Beiträge zur ältesten Geschichte von Kyprus. 78p. Peiser, 1906.

x *Peeters* (*P.*) Une Version arabe de la Passion de sainte Catherine d'Alexandrie. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxvi. fasc. 1.
[Introduction, text, and translation into Latin.]

Delehaye (*H.*) Le Témoinage des Martyrologes. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxvi. fasc. 1.
[Exhibiting the nature and value of the evidence.]

C *Harnack* (A.) L'Evangile de l'amour et l'assistance. R. du christianisme social, Nov. and Dec., 1906.
[An examination of the practice of the early Church in assisting needy brethren.]

Vielhaber (*G.*) De codice hagiographico C. R. Bibliothecæ Palatinæ Vindobonensis. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxvi. fasc. 1.

M *Chapman* (*John*) The Condemnation of Pope Honorius. Dub. R., Jan. 1907.

Moretus (*H.*) Les deux anciennes Vies de S. Grégoire le Grand. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxvi. fasc. 1.
[The two writers, viz., the V. Bede and the monk of Whitby, are independent of each other. The author thus agrees with Dom Butler against Frs. Ewald and Thurston.]

R *Thiele* (*E.*) Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des Johann Agricola von Eisleben. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 2, 1907.
[Notes entered on the margin of a Hebrew Bible which Agricola bought from Henry of Zutphen. Now first published. They are mainly personal, and show great bitterness against Luther.]

Lomas (*Mrs S. C.*), *ed.* The Edwardian Inventories for Huntingdonshire. From Transcripts by T. Craib. (Alcuin Club Collections.) 87p. Longmans, 1906.

Knappert (*L.*) Geschiedenis van de Hervorming binnen Leiden van den aavang tot op het Beleg., vi. Th. Tijd., Jan. 1907.

Hoskins (*J. P.*) German Influence on Religious Thought and Life in America during the Colonial Period. Princeton Th. Rev., Jan. 1907.

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C *Fathers* 2 *R.C. Church* 3 *Anglican.*

Benson (*R. H.*) The State of Religion in England. Catholic World, Jan. 1907.
[The Anglican Church is paralysed by its dependence on a dead past, and divided through lack of a modern authoritative voice. Nonconformists, now politically powerful, are otherwise, from their utter incoherence, of no importance. The Roman Church alone has the future in its hands.]

C *Conybeare* (*F. C.*) The Gospel Commentary of Epiphanius. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 4, 1906.
[Translation of some passages from an Armenian Codex of Venice.]

Souter (*A.*) A Tenth-Century Fragment of Tertullian's *Apology*. J. Th. St., Jan. 1907.
[Collation of text of this Zurich MS. with Oehler's text.]

Harris (*J. Rendel*) Irenæus: On the Apostolical Preaching. Expos., March 1907.
[An account of the newly found Latin treatise of the Father.]

2 *Ter-Mĕkĕrttschian* (*Karapet*), *Ter-Minassiantz* (*Erwand*), *Trans.* Des Heiligen Irenäus; Schrift zum Erweise der Apostolischen Verkündigung. Mit einem Nachwort und Anmerkungen von Adolf Harnack. 137p. Hinrich, 1907.

Boehmer (*H.*) Zur altrömischen Bischofsliste. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 4, 1906.

Rashdall (*Hastings*) A Medieval Herodotus. Indep. R., Feb. 1907.
[Review of Coulton's *From St Francis to Dante.*]

Robinson (*Paschal*), *ed.* The Golden Sayings of the Blessed Brother Giles of Assisi. With a sketch of his Life. 141p. Dolphin Press, 1907.

Robinson (*Paschal*) The Writings of Saint Francis of Assisi. Trans. into English. With Intro. and Notes. 208p. Dent, 1906.

Anon. The Spiritual Maxims of Brother Lawrence; together with the Character and Gathered Thoughts. Trans. into English. (Heart and Life Booklets, 12.) 58p. Allenson, 1907.

Kelso (*J. B.*) Mediæval Mariolatry. Princeton Th. Rev., Jan. 1907.

Vacandard (*G.*) Léon XIII. à l'École de Bossuet. R. du clergé français, Dec. 1, 1906.
[Leo agrees with Bossuet, against the mediævalists, in holding that the civil power is supreme in civil affairs.]

Choupin (*Lucien*) Valeur des Décisions Doctrinales et Disciplinaires du Saint-Siège. 388p. Beauchesne, 1907.

Saltet (*Louis*) Les Réordinations. Étude sur le Sacrament de l'Ordre. 419p. Lecoffre, 1907.

Barry (*W.*) The Liturgy of Toledo. Dub. R., Jan. 1907.
[An account of the *Liber Ordinum.*]

Balfour (*Reginald*) René Bazin's Apology for French Catholics. Dub. R., Jan. 1907.

Anon. The Ecclesiastical Crisis in France. Quar. R., Jan. 1907.

Kent (*W. H.*) The Gaelic Revival. Dub. R., Jan. 1907.

3 *Anon.* Lay Readers and their Work. Church Q. R., Jan. 1907.

Dawes (*J. S.*) Freedom from Creeds. Liberal Churchman, Jan. 1907.
[A plea for the excision of the Creeds from the public worship of the Anglican Church.]

4 *Jüngst* (*J.*) Pietisten. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, iv. 1.) 80p. Mohr, 1906.

Wernle (*Paul*) Paulus Gerhardt. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, iv. 2.) 68p. Mohr, 1907.
[Written in view of the 300th anniversary on March 12 of this year, of Gerhardt's birth.]

5 *Dale* (*R. W.*) History of English Congregationalism. Completed and Edited by A. W. W. Dale. 787p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.
[The editor has revised this history and added two chapters on Modern Congregationalism and the International Council of 1891. There is also an Appendix of authors referred to or quoted.]

9 *Albright* (*M. C.*) The Common Heritage. A Series of Essays. 137p. Headley, 1907.
[Review will follow.]

L LITERATURE. 2 *English* 3 *German* 5 *Italian* 9 *Classical.*

2 *Seccombe* (*T.*), *Nicoll* (*W. Robertson*) The Bookman Illustrated. History of English Literature. 2 vols. 529p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1906.

Canning (*Albert S. G.*) Shakespeare Studied in Six Plays. 545p. Unwin, 1907.

Tolstoy (*Leo*) On Shakespeare and the Drama, ii. Fort. R., Jan. 1907.
[Continues an unfavourable estimate of Shakespeare.]

Guiney (*L. I.*), *ed.* Thomas Stanley. His Original Lyrics, Complete in the Collated Readings of 1647, 1651, 1657. 131p. Tutin, 1907.

Raleigh (*W.*) Samuel Johnson. (Leslie Stephen Lecture, 1907.) 27p. Clarendon Press, 1907.

Lang (*Andrew*) Shelley's Oxford Martyrdom. Fort. R., Feb. 1907.

Gribble (*Francis*) Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. Fort. R., Feb. 1907.

Prothero (*R. E.*) The Growth of the Historical Novel. Quar. R., Jan. 1907.

3 *Davidson* (*Thomas*) The Philosophy of Goethe's Faust. Ed. by C. M. Bakewell. 158p. Ginn, 1907.

4 *Anon.* Some Modern French Literature. Church Q. R., Jan. 1907.

Lecigne (*C.*) De l'égotisme à l'action. R. du clergé français, Jan. 1, 1907.
[Appreciation of the literary work and development of Maurice Barrès.]

5 *Lapham* (*L. E.*) Fogazzaro and his Trilogy. Catholic World, Dec. 1906 and Jan. 1907.
[An account of *Il Piccolo Mondo Moderno* and *Il Santo*.]

Manning (*W.*) "The Saint," by Antonio Fogazzaro. Liberal Churchman, Jan. 1907.
[The book is regarded as a manifesto of Liberalism in the Roman Church, and as largely applicable to the English Church.]

Ménégoz (*E.*) Le Symbolo-fidéisme de Fogazzaro dans *Le Saint*. Rev. chrét., Jan. 1907.

8 *Archer* (*William*) Ibsen's Imperialism. 19th Cent., Feb. 1907.

9 *Tucker* (*T. G.*) Life in Ancient Athens. The Social and Public Life of a Classical Athenian from Day to Day. (Handbooks of Archæology and Antiquities.) 212p. Macmillan, 1907.

Lang (*Andrew*) Homer and His Age. 348p. Longmans, 1906.

Campbell (*Lewis*) Paralipomena Sophoclea: Supplementary Notes on the Text and Interpretation of Sophocles. 302p. Rivingtons, 1907.

Warfield (*B. B.*) Africa and the Beginnings of Christian Latin Literature. Amer. J. Th., Jan. 1907.

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4 *Hinduism.* 7 *Judaism.* 9 *Demonology.* 12 *Occultism.*

Dennett (*R. E.*) At the Back of the Black Man's Mind. 303p. Macmillan, 1906.
[Object of book is two-fold—(*a*) to show that concurrent with fetishism there is in Africa a religion giving us a much higher conception of God than is generally acknowledged by writers on African modes of thought; and (*b*) to make clear the vital importance of the kingly office to the African communities.]

Ramsay (*W. M.*) The Permanence of Religion at Holy Places in the East. Expos., Nov. 1906.
[Narrates from personal experiences details of local cults persisting from ancient times in spite of Moslem prohibition.]

Cabaton (*A.*) Raden Paku, Sunan de Giri. Légende musulmane javanaise. R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Nov. 1906.
[Text and translation.]

Stead (*A.*) Japanese Ethics and Religion. Hindustan Rev., Sept. 1906.

Revon (*M.*) Le Shinntoïsme (*continuation*). Rev. de l'Hist. des. Rel., Sept. and Nov. 1906.

1 *Fairbanks* (*A.*) The Message of Greek Religion to Christianity To-day. Biblical World, Jan. 1907.

5 *Bendall* (*C.*) and *Poussin* (*L. de la V.*) Bodhisattva-Bhūmi; a text-book of the Yogācāra School. Le Muséon, vol. vii. No. 3, 1906.
[Described as an English summary, with notes and illustrative extracts from other Buddhistic works.]

Wogihara (*U.*) Bouddhisme; Notes et Bibliographie. Le Muséon, vol. vii. No. 3, 1906.
[Described as: Some contributions to the study of the Sikṣāsamuccaya from the Chinese sources.]

7 *Neubauer* (*A.*), *Cowley* (*A. E.*) Catalogue of the Hebrew MSS. in the Bodleian Library, ii. 560p. Frowde, 1906.

Cowley (*A.*) Bodleian Geniza Fragments. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1907.

Elbogen (*I.*) Studies in the Jewish Liturgy. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1907.

Ginsberg (*L.*) Geonic Responsa, xiii.–xv. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1907.

Rapaport (*Samuel*) Tales and Maxims from the Midrash. (The Semitic Series.) 264p. Routledge, 1907.

Joseph (*Morris*) The Message of Judaism. 351p. Routledge, 1907.

Magnus (*Laurie*) "Religio Laici" Judaica: The Faith of a Jewish Layman. 178p. Routledge, 1907.

Henriques (*H. S. Q.*) The Political Rights of English Jews. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1907.
[Their historical development.]

Schanfarber (*T.*), *Hirshberg* (*S.*), *eds.* Year-Book of the Central Conference of American Rabbis. Vol. xvi. 343p. Block Pub. Co., 1906.

Biddle (*G. E.*) A Theist's Impressions of Judaism. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1907.
[A glowing panegyric.]

8 (*E.*) *Blochet* Études sur l'ésotérisme musulman. Le Muséon, vol. vii. Nos. 3 and 4, 1906.

Ebersolt (*J.*) Un nouveau manuscrit du rituel d'abjuration des musulmans dans l'Église grecque. R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Sept. 1906.

Weir (*T. H.*) Higher Criticism and the Koran. Cont. R., Mar. 1907.

P PHILOSOPHY. 10 ·· *Metaphysics*, 21 *Epistemology*, 33 ·· *Psychical Research*, 40 ·· *Psychology*, 60 ·· *Logic*, 70 ·· *Systems*, 90 ·· *Philosophers.*

Fullerton (*G. S.*) An Introduction to Philosophy. 322p. Macmillan Co., 1907.
[Written for those who cannot attend formal courses of instruction, and who, nevertheless, are interested in philosophy. It aims to show the nature of reflective thinking, to give a general

view of the main philosophical problems, and an account of some of the more important types of philosophical doctrine.]

Pflaum (*C. D.*) Bericht über die italienische philosophische Literatur des Jahres 1905. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxix. 1, 1906.

Berolzheimer (*F.*) Bericht über Rechtsphilosophie aus den Jahren 1899–1906. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 1, 1907.

10 *Koigen* (*David*) Jahresbericht über die Literatur zur Metaphysik. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 4, 1906.

[Deals with Stern's *Person und Sache*, and Bilharz's *Lehre vom Leben*.]

Ormond (*A. T.*) Concepts of Philosophy. 753p. Macmillan, 1906.

[The doctrine of this book is that consciousness, when adequately conceived, is the great reality. This doctrine, however, can only be maintained when consciousness is identified with the energy or activity that becomes aware of itself and its object, and not simply with that awareness itself.]

Lagrésille (*Henry*) Monde Psychique: Les Ordres des Idées et des Ames. 654p. Fischbacher, 1906.

Cator (*Gerald*) The Structure of Reality. Mind, Jan. 1907.

[It is postulated (*a*) that Reality is intelligible; (*b*) that whatever appears to be, is. And the attempt is made to show that while the first postulate implies the spiritual nature of the Absolute, the second secures the reality of the finite.]

12 *Albee* (*Ernest*) Descriptive and Normative Sciences. Phil. R., Jan. 1907.

[There are no distinctively normative sciences in the conventional sense of the term "normative." All sciences, *qua* sciences, have to do with the real, though each regards reality from an abstract point of view, that becomes in a sense normative for its own procedure.]

Aster (*E. von.*) Über die erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen der biologischen Naturwissenschaften. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxx. 4, 1906.

[Whilst Darwin explains every change mechanically, Pauly, following Lamarck, assumes an original purposiveness in the reactions of organisms. Author maintains, however, that there is an objective purposiveness as well as a subjective, which alone Pauly admits, and that the teleological treatment of organic nature must be based on objective purposiveness.]

Le Dantec (*F.*) Méthodes artificielles et naturelles. Rev. Phil., Feb. 1907.

[Extract from a book, *Eléments de philosophie biologique*, shortly to appear.]

Rousmaniere (*F. H.*) A Definition of Experimentation. J. of Phil., iii. 25, Dec. 6, 1906.

Frischeisen-Köhler (*Max*) Über die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, ii. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 4, 1906; xiii. 1, 1907.

[A critical examination of the second part of Rickert's work, which deals with the aims and logical forms of the historical sciences.]

13 *Bon* (*Gustave Le*) The Evolution of Matter. Trans. from 3rd ed., with introd. and notes by F. Legge. 457p. Walter Scott, 1907.

[All matter is radio-active, and this radio-activity is but a step in the process by which it gradually sinks back into the ether from which it was originally formed.]

Lodge (*Sir Oliver*) Electrons, or the Nature and Properties of Negative Electricity. 245p. Bell, 1907.

[Based upon a lecture given to the Institution of Electrical Engineers in 1902. Many additions have been made, and some of the difficulties recently promulgated concerning the possibility of an electric theory of matter are touched upon.]

Le Dantec (*Felix*) The Nature and Origin of Life, in the Light of New Knowledge. Intro. Pref. by R. K. Duncan. 266p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

Lock (*R. H.*) Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, Heredity, and Evolution. With Portraits and Diagrams. 316p. Murray, 1906.

Schallmayer (*W.*) Auslese beim Menschen. Eine Erwiederung. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxix. 2, 1906.

[Reply to Vierkandt's critique of the author's book, *Vererbung und Auslese*.]

15 *Marshall* (*H. R.*) The Time Quality. Mind, Jan. 1907.

[Timeness is a general quality of all presentations, of a three-phased nature; in reflexion at least one of these phases (pastness, presentness, or futureness) must usually be predominant; and such predominance necessarily excludes the prominence of either of the other two in connection with the same presentation.]

21 *Meinong* (*A.*) Ueber die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxix. 1 and 2, 1906–7.

[An important article. Prof. Meinong defends his view of Gegenstandstheorie as constituting a special branch of science on the ground (*a*) that there are objects (Gegenstände) the treatment of which brings to light problems that are dealt with by none of the recognised sciences, and (*b*) that there is a fundamental antithesis in modes of knowing of which as yet no sufficient account has been taken.]

Wernick (*Georg*) Der Wirklichkeitsgedanke, iii. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxx. 4, 1906.

[Discusses the function of the laws of association in the formation of the idea of reality.]

Sellars (*R. W.*) The Nature of Experience. J. of Phil., iv. 1, Jan. 3, 1907.

Tawney (*G. A.*) Constitutive Consistency. Phil. R., Jan. 1907.

[The concept of constitutive consistency contains three demands, three necessary forms of the objective contents of experience—continuity, discreteness or exactness, completeness.]

Hadelin (*P.*) Une théorie intuitioniste de la connaissance au xiii^e^ siècle. Rev. Néo-Scol., Nov. 1906.

22 *Prichard* (*H. A.*) A Criticism of the Psychologists' Treatment of Knowledge. Mind, Jan. 1907.

[Psychologists treat knowing as if it were a special kind of object, instead of being just that which is opposed to an object as the apprehension of it. They treat the apprehension of an object as if it were itself an object. The consequence is that they fail to describe knowledge altogether.]

24 *Forsyth* (*T. M.*) The Conception of the Unknown in English Philosophy. Mind, Jan. 1907.

[All our experience implies a beyond—an unknown correlative to the known; but in order to be anything for experience at all, the beyond must be continuous with experience.]

30 *Binet* (*A.*) The Mind and the Brain. (Inter. Scient. Series.) 280p. Kegan Paul, 1907.

Thomson (*W. Hanna*) Brain and Personality, or the Physical Relations of the Brain to the Mind. 320p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

["By a human brain we mean one which has been slowly fashioned into an instrument by which the personality can recognize and know all things physical." "It is the will alone which can make material seats for mind."]

33 *Myers* (*F. W. H.*) Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death. Ed. and Abridged by L. H. Myers. 488p. Longmans, 1907.

Balfour (*Rt. Hon. G. W.*) Presidential Address to Society for Psychical Research. Procs. S.P.R., xix. 42, Feb. 1907.

[Suggests three propositions:—(1) Direct telepathic action between mind and mind is a phenomenon which might reasonably have been anticipated on grounds independent of experience; (2) The comparative rarity of observed cases is no proof that the action is not universal and continuous; (3) The human organism is polypsychic, and telepathy probably plays an important part in the relations between the controlling self or soul and the other psychical centres associated with it.]

M'Dougall (*W.*) The Case of Sally Beauchamp. Procs. S.P.R., xix. 42, Feb. 1907.

[The relation of Sally to the other personalities can only be explained by applying the telepathic hypothesis in the form in which the interaction is taken to be purely psychical, an immediate action of one soul upon another.]

Laurent (*Emile*) Telepathic Manifestations. Annals of Psy. Sc., Feb. 1907.

Fotherby (*Henry*) Animal Electricity and Magnetism. Annals of Psy. Sc., Feb. 1907.

Sidgwick (*Mrs H.*), *and others*. Richard Hodgson: In Memoriam. Procs. S.P.R., xix. 42, Feb. 1907.

35 *Vaschide* (*N.*), *Meunier* (*R.*) La mémoire des rêves et la mémoire dans les rêves. 2nd art. Rev. de Phil., Dec. 1906.

40 *Mitchell* (*W.*) Structure and Growth of the Mind. 512p. Macmillan, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

45 *Weyer* (*E. Moffat*) A New Search for the Soul. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1907.

Joachimi-Dege (*Marie*) Das Wesen des menschlichen Seelen- und Geisteslebens, i., ii. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 4, 1906; xiii. 1, 1907.

[An exhaustive treatment of Berthold Kern's book with the above title.]

48 *Cutten* (*G. B.*) The Psychology of Alcoholism. Introd. by Prof. Ladd. 273p. Walter Scott, 1907.

James (*William*) The Energies of Man. Phil. R., Jan. 1907.

[Suggests the problem—Can anyone refine upon the conceptions of mental work and mental energy, so as to be able to throw some definite light on what we mean by "having a more elastic moral tone," or by "using higher levels of power and will?"]

49 *Van Biervliet* (*J. J.*) La Psychologie Quantitative. Rev. Phil., Jan., Feb., 1907.

53 *Keyserling* (*Hermann Graf*) Ein Beitrag zur Kritik des Glaubens. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 4, 1906.

[Grounds existential judgments on belief.]

Petronievics (*Branislav*) Über die Wahrnehmung der Tiefendimension, i., ii. Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 4, 1906; xiii. 1, 1907.

Sheldon (*W. H.*) Some Inadequacies of Modern Theories of Judgment. J. of Phil., iv. 4, Feb. 14, 1907.

[The judgment has two mutually conditioning sides, function and structure: and the problem is not adequately conceived till we study both sides *as* conditioning each other.]

Woodworth (*R. S.*) Imageless Thought. J. of Phil., iii. 26, Dec. 20, 1906.

[Gives instances from introspective observation of thought without images.]

54 *Kuhlmann* (*F.*) Problems in the Analysis of the Memory Consciousness. J. of Phil., iv. 1, Jan. 3, 1907.

55 *Ribot* (*Th.*) Essay on the Creative Imagination. Trans. by A. H. N. Baron. Kegan Paul, 1906.

[An analysis of the creative imagination based on the lines of experimental psychology.]

Hoernlé (*R. F. A.*) Image, Idea, and Meaning. Mind, Jan. 1907.

[It is absurd to say that the individual mind is conscious of *signs only* and not of their meaning. Consciousness of meaning is primary and fundamental, and the distinction of sign and meaning is a product of reflexion. The distinction between idea and reality is not a distinction between a mental fact which has meaning and a mental fact which has no meaning. All ideas refer to objects.]

57 *Stumpf* (*C.*) Ueber Gefühlsempfindungen. Z. f. Psych., xliv. 1 and 2, 1906.

[An important article in support of the position that the sensuous feelings are a class of sensations, which in all essential features are similar to the other classes of sensations.]

59 *Stout* (*G. F.*) The Nature of Conation and Mental Activity. Brit. J. of Psych., July 1906.

[An important article. Agrees with Bradley in regarding conation as a complex unity, combining many distinguishing aspects or features. But differs from him in holding that the conative complex contains a simple and unanalysable element uniquely characteristic of it—an element which Professor Stout describes as a felt *tendency* towards the production of a certain result.]

Thorndike (*E. L.*) The Mental Antecedents of Voluntary Movements. J. of Phil., iv. 2, Jan. 17, 1907.

60 *Luquet* (*G. H.*) Logique Rationnelle et Psychologisme. Rev. Phil., Dec. 1906.

[Criticism of Couturat.]

Marbe (*Karl*) Beiträge zur Logik und ihren Grenzwissenschaften. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxx. 4, 1906.

[Deals with (*a*) Characteristics of notions; (*b* Wundt's critique of author's treatise on judgment; (*c*) Meaning of words and theory of the notion.]

71 *Ölzelt-Newin* (*Anton*) Die unabhängigen Realitäten. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxix. 2, 1906.

[Tries to show the possibility of a philosophical refutation of subjective idealism.]

72 *Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften*. Kant's Werke. Bd. vii. 429p. Reimer, 1907.

[Contains *Streit der Fakultäten* and *Anthropologie*, edited by Vorländer and Külpe respectively.]

Bauch (*B.*) Chamberlain's Kant. Kantstudien, xi. 2, 1906.

Hauck (*P.*) Die Entstehung der Kantischen Urteilstafel. Kantstudien, xi. 2, 1906.

Meinecke (*W.*) Die Bedeutung der Nicht-Euklidischen Geometrie in ihrem Verhältnis zu Kant's Theorie der mathematischen Erkenntnis. Kantstudien, xi. 2, 1906.

Frost (*Walter*) Kant's Teleologie. Kantstudien, xi. 3 and 4, 1906.

[An exhaustive and valuable article.]

Tumarkin (*A.*) Zur transscendentalen Methode der Kantischen Aesthetik. Kantstudien, xi. 3 and 4, 1906.

Sänger (*Ernst*) Kant's Auffassung von der Bibel. Kantstudien, xi. 3 and 4, 1906.

Medicus (*F.*) Kant und die gegenwärtige Aufgabe der Logik. Kantstudien, xii. 1, 1907.

Cassirer (*Ernst*) Kant und die moderne Mathematik. Kantstudien, xii. 1, 1907.
[Has reference to Russell's work on the *Principles of Mathematics*.]

Ewald (*Oskar*) Die Grenzen des Empirisums und des Rationalismus in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Kantstudien, xii. 1, 1907.

Skala (*Richard*) Zum "kritischen Idealismus." Arch. f. system. Phil., xii. 4, 1906.
[Criticises Kinkel's contention that for critical idealism the process of knowledge is an infinite process, through which and in which the objects of knowledge are themselves produced and created.]

Kinkel (*Walter*) Zum "kritischen Idealismus." Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 1, 1907.
[Skala confuses critical idealism with subjective idealism.]

73 *Talbot* (*Ellen B.*) The Fundamental Principle of Fichte's Philosophy. (Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 7.) 146p. Macmillan, 1906.
[A study of Fichte's principle of the Ego or the Moral World-Order.]

Nohl (*Herman*), *ed.* Hegel's theologische Jugendschriften. 415p. Mohr, 1907.
[The text of some interesting works of Hegel not before published, entitled *Das Leben Jesu*, *Die Positivität der christlichen Religion*, and *Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal*.]

74 *Schiller* (*F. C. S.*) Studies in Humanism. 492p. Macmillan, 1907.
[Review will follow.]

Russell (*J. E.*) Pragmatism as the Salvation from Philosophic Doubt. J. of Phil., iv. 3, Jan. 31, 1907.
[Pragmatism has not as yet succeeded in offering a doctrine of knowledge which can save from scepticism.]

Van Cauwelaert (*F.*) L'empirio-criticisme, i. Rev. Néo-Scol., Nov. 1906.

76 *Fischer-Planer* (*Ernst*) Vererbung psychischer Fähigkeiten. Zugleich eine Entgegnung auf. Ein neues Argument gegen den Materialismus. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 1, 1907.

Hill (*J. Arthur*) The Fallacies of Materialism. Indep. R., Jan. 1907.

79 *Montague* (*W. P.*) Current Misconceptions of Realism. J. of Phil., iv. 4, Feb. 14, 1907.
[Realism=the view that things do not depend for their existence upon the fact that we know them, that consciousness is not a creator or sustainer, but the illuminator of the objects over which it plays.]

80 *Lloyd* (*A. H.*) The Poetry of Anaxagoras's Metaphysics. J. of Phil., iv. 4, Feb. 14, 1907.

90 *Lilly* (*W. S.*) Spinoza and Modern Thought. Fort. R., Jan. 1907.

Bastian (*Albert*) Quellen und Wirkungen von Jakob Böhmes Gottesbegriff (Schluss). Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxix. 1, 1906.
[Compares Böhme's idea of God with that of Descartes, Malebranche and Spinoza, and discusses the influence of Böhme's idea on the Post-Kantian philosophy.]

91 *Burke* (*J. Butler*) "Mind and Matter"; or, Leibniz and Modern Thought. Mont. R., Mar. 1907.

92 *Vorges* (*Domet de*) Les manuscrits inédit de Maine de Biran. Rev. Néo-Scol., Nov. 1906.
[An appreciative estimate.]

94W *Sichler* (*Albert*) Über falsche Interpretation des kritischen Realismus Wundts und Beurteilung von O. Pfisters kritischem Transzendental-Realismus. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 1, 1907.

Dorner (A.) Eduard von Hartmann. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxix. 1, 1906.
[A careful estimate and criticism of Hartmann's system of philosophy.]

Robet (*H.*) Un métaphysicien Américan, Josiah Royce. Rev. Phil., Feb. 1907.
[An appreciative study of Royce. Although claimed by the pragmatists as one of them, Royce is not really a pragmatist.]

V ART. 83 *Sacred Music.*

Raymond (*G. L.*) The Essentials of Æsthetics in Music, Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture. 423p. Murray, 1907.

Bertrand (*A.*) Esthétique et Psychologie. Rev. Phil., Jan. 1907.
[Discusses views of Maine de Biran on the fundamental problems of Æsthetics.]

Boucaud (*C.*) L'Être et l'Amour: Étude Philosophie Esthétique. Rev. de Phil., Jan. 1907.

Anon. Tradition in Art. Edin. R., Jan. 1907.

Herford (*C. H.*) Ruskin and the Gothic Revival. Quar. R., Jan. 1907.
[Ruskin, by shattering the old prosaic antithesis of the beautiful and the useful, gave a higher consecration both to labour and to art; and instead of abandoning the palace of art, drew it within the scope of the highest ethical idealism by turning it into a workshop.]

Hincks (*Marcelle Azra*) The Dance and the Plastic Arts in Ancient Greece. 19th Cent., Mar. 1907.

Rea (*Hope*) Titian. (Miniature Series of Painters.) 55p. Bell, 1906.

Nordau (*Max*) On Art and Artists. Trans. by W. F. Harvey. 351p. Unwin, 1907.

23 *Anon.* Gothic Architecture in England. Church Q. R., Jan. 1907.
[In connection with Bond's book with the above title.]

40 *Baughan* (*E. A.*) Back to Gluck. Indep. R., Feb. 1907.

83 Hymni Latini. 134p. Clowes, 1907.
[Contains the original Latin form of all the hymns in "Hymns Ancient and Modern" (in its recent edition), which are versions from the Latin.]

Barker (*A. Leigh*), Compiled by. The Hymnal Appendix. A Supplement to "Hymns A. and M.," "Church Hymns," "The Hymnal Companion." 122p. Skeffington, 1907.

G. D. H. and J. H. W.

THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

JOHN WATSON.

SIR EDWARD RUSSELL.

THE death of Dr John Watson — divine and story-teller, preacher and speaker, shrewd thinker and perfect talker, gay wit and master of irresistible pathos, fearless alike in belief, in hypothesis, and in investigation—has drawn forth innumerable ardent expressions of admiration and affection. These were due alike to his gifts and to his graces, and to one grace which was also a gift—the power of inspiring friendship. John Watson had thousands of friends who had never seen him. They were fascinated "upon instinct," and if ever they came to know him they found that the instinct had been true. If they were worthy, the friendship became mutual, for he was a born friend as well as a born winner of friends. If, in writing or speech, he described something beautiful, his readers and hearers loved, not only it, but him. His amity and his inexhaustible interest in his fellow-men had a critical side, which sometimes just missed being saturnine. It was really half melancholy, half humorous. His sense of humour saved him from sentimentality, as from most errors of judgment, and from nearly every error of heart; though his insight into

things was occasionally softened by a simplicity difficult to realise in a man so perfectly informed and practised in scrutiny.

I have said that he was a born friend. I may add that he was a born confessor. Infinitely and incessantly playful as he was in conversation with all and sundry, he was instantly grave at any call for seriousness, and never more sympathetically than upon any mooting of actual or supposed moral perplexity. Nothing pleased him better than to descant with friends on the quasi-confessor function, which he held was in one way or another inseparable from the pastoral office. I remember occasions of delightful talk—all wit and gaiety laid aside—when he pathetically expatiated on the experiences of one to whom, in intellectual difficulty or in straits of conduct, men and women were drawn by his office and personality.

I am led to dwell on the more personal traits of John Watson partly because I was intimate with him, to my own joy and great benefit, partly because more public characteristics have been copiously eulogised wherever English is written and read, and partly because in the happy history of the HIBBERT JOURNAL circle Dr Watson's kind, wise counsel is among the most delightful reminiscences of their undertaking. John Watson was among the first to welcome the idea of the establishment of such a publication. His adhesion gave strength to the project. Let thinkers face thinkers, thoughts face thoughts, in an ordered forum, in lucid statement and courteous controversy. Let all convictions, all worthy speculations, all claimed discoveries have free course in an intellectual and devout arena. Such was the principle, the plan, that appealed to John Watson's individuality.

Obscurantism, whether prompted by fear or by quietist policy, never got access to his mind. Undeniably, indeed, he had, as a divine, an optimist persuasion that the faith, as held by cultured Christians in his own time, would not be substantially disturbed by any new suggestions of belief or scepticism. But it is equally certain that Watson would have followed new light whithersoever it might have led him. No conjectured or

proffered new opening of thought had any terrors for him. As befitted a Highlander, he loved vision. He believed in vision. His vividly changeful countenance often wore the expression of vision. He seemed to peer into the vague. And he obtained acquisitions so. But they were less mystical than might have been expected. There were rather an increase of simple but thought-out strenuousness; a reasoned spirituality, manifested in a manly imitation of Christ; an evidenced sense of the joy of conscious life in the right way; a participation in the solidarity of the Christian communion; a temperamental absence of that introspective occupation of experience which used to be the essential evangelical habit. Thus, though it was often seen that John Watson "had been in the mount," and still oftener (in the pulpit) that he *was* in the mount, the actual outcome in his teaching was rather prophetic ethical energy than prophetic afflatus.

While scrupulous in avoiding any taking of sides, John Watson, at least twice—once in municipal and once in Imperial politics—performed acts of rare and salutary public courage.

His constant good-nature was strongly though delicately salted with lively criticism of character. It never blunted or muffled his merry perception of the amusing aspects of things and men. Yet he hardly ever hurt anybody's smaller susceptibilities, and he was tenderly sensitive, and anxiously and sadly, to any suspicion that he might have done so. When his censures were serious indeed, no afterthought troubled him. He was rarely provoked except by moral obliquity or cynical defiance of moral principle. Even an obviously dishonest sophism in controversy tickled rather than angered him. He thought it only entertaining; wondered that any clever man could say anything so thin; presumed that every one would see through it.

Such was our dear too early lost friend and colleague, in the aspects, public and personal, which were most germane to the enterprise carried on in these pages; to which enterprise he was ever faithful and helpful.

EDWARD RUSSELL.

IMMORTALITY.

JOSIAH ROYCE,
Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University.

ALL questions about Immortality relate to some form of the continuance of human life in time, beyond death. All such questions presuppose, then, the conception of time. But now, what is Time? How is it related to Truth, to Reality, to God? And if any answer to these questions can be suggested, what light do such answers throw on man's relation to time, and on the place of death in the order of time?

Secondly, all questions about Immortality relate to the survival of human personality. But, what is our human personality? What aspect of a man do you want to have survive? In considering these two sets of questions, I shall be led to mention in passing several others, all of which bear upon our topic.

My honoured colleague, Professor Münsterberg, in his recent little book on *The Eternal Life*, has raised in a somewhat novel form an old issue regarding the metaphysics of time, and has applied his resulting opinion to our problem of immortality. The real world, he has said,—the world of the absolute—is an essentially timeless world—a world of meanings, of ideal values—a world where there is no question of how long things endure, but only a question as to what value they have in the whole of real life. In this genuinely real world of ideal values everything has eternal being in accordance with its absolute worth. A value cannot be lost, for it

belongs to the timeless whole. But the ordinary point of view, which so emphasises time, as most of us do, is merely a quantitative view—a falsification, or at least a narrowing, of the truth—a transformation of reality—a translation of its meaning into the abstract terms of a special set of concepts—concepts useful in our human science and in our daily business, but not valid for the student of real life. Matter, indeed, endures in time; but then matter is a conceptual entity, a phenomenon, a creation of the scientific point of view. A man endures in time while his body lives; but this is only the man as viewed in relation to the clocks and to the calendars—the phenomenal man—the man of the street and the market-place, of the psychological laboratory and of the scientific record, of the insurance agents and of the newspapers. The real man whom you estimate and love is not this phenomenal man in time, but the man of will and of meaning, of ideals and of personal character, whose value you acknowledge. This real man is—what he is worth. His place in the world is determined not by the time during which he endures, but by the moral values which he expresses, and which the Absolute timelessly recognises for what they eternally are. This real man does not come and go. He is. To say that he is immortal is merely to say that he has timeless value. And to say that is to express your love for him in its true meaning.

Hence, as Professor Münsterberg holds, the whole problem about immortality is falsely stated in popular discussion. Revise your view of time. See how time is but an appearance belonging to the world of description, that is, the world of conceptual clocks and calendars, and then the real man is known to you, not as temporally outlasting death, but as, in his timeless ethical value, in the real world of appreciation, deathless. For he belongs to the realm of meanings; and the timeless Absolute of real life neither waits for him to come, nor misses him after his death as one passed away, but acknowledges him in his true value as what he is, the real

person, whose eternal significance as little requires his endless endurance in the unreal conceptual time of the calendar and of the clock-makers, as this same significance requires him to have a taller stature than he has in the equally unreal conceptual space of the metric system and of the tailor's measuring-tape.

So far my colleague, as I venture to restate his view. I do not agree with him in the way in which he has formulated and applied this view. Yet I think that Professor Münsterberg is at least in one respect justified in printing his essay. He is justified, namely, in calling our attention to the fact that, in order to discuss immortality exhaustively, we must include in our discussion some view of the sense in which time itself is a reality. And I also think that my colleague's view of time, although not mine, contains an important element of truth. Let me try to suggest what this element is.

I need not say to theologically trained readers that you cannot well conceive of God without supposing the Divine Being to be otherwise related to time than we men just now are. To view the Deity as just now waiting, as we wait, for the vicissitudes of coming experience that are floating down the time-stream towards him, to conceive the divine foreknowledge merely as a sort of clever computation of what will yet happen, a neat prediction of the fortunes that God has yet to expect—well, I cannot suppose any competent theologian to be satisfied thus to conceive of the divine knowledge of time, or of what time contains. If God is merely the potent computer and predicter, whose expectations as to the future have never yet been disappointed, then he remains merely upon the level of a mighty fortune-teller and fortune-controller—a magician after all. And not thus can you be content to conceive of the divine omniscience. If the question arose: Why might not God's foreknowledge some day prove to have been fallible? Why might not revolving time force upon him unexpected facts?—then you would certainly reply:

"If God, as God, absolutely foreknows, that means, properly viewed, not merely that he skilfully anticipates, or even that he mightily controls fortune, but that time, present, past, future, is somehow his own, is somehow at once for him, is an eternal present for which he has not to wait, a total expression of his will which he not merely remembers or anticipates, but views in one whole, *totum simul*, as St Thomas well insisted."

God's relation to time cannot, then, be merely our own present human relation. We expect what is not yet. But if God is God, he views the future and the past as we do the present. And in so far Professor Münsterberg's view is indeed well founded. The lasting or the passing away of things as we view them does not express the whole divine view of them. What has, for us men, passed away, is, for the divine omniscience, not lost. What is future is, from the divine point of view, a presentation. Time is in God, rather than is God in time. Some such view you surely must take if God is to be conceived at all.

But if God views facts as they are, this indeed implies that death, and the passing away of man, and the lapse of countless lives into what we call the forgotten past, cannot really be what we take these things to be—an absolutely real loss to reality of values which, but for death, would not become thus unreal. As a fact, I do not doubt that the least fact of transient experience has a meaning for the divine point of view—a meaning which we very ill express when we say of such a fact: "It passes, it is done, it is no more." In reality—that is, from the divine point of view—there can be no absolute loss of what is once to be viewed as real at all.

Now so far, using, to be sure, for the moment, theological rather than my colleague's metaphysical terms, I suggest a view about time which is obviously close to that which Professor Münsterberg emphasises. Nevertheless I do not agree with him that, by means of such considerations, we can completely define the sense in which man is immortal. I

turn, then, from this first naturally vague effort to hint that our human view of time is inadequate, and that even our present brief lives have a divine meaning which no human view of their transiency exhausts,—I turn, I say, from this glance into general theology, back to the problem about time, as we men have to conceive time. We talk of to-morrow, of the time after death, of the future in general. In that future, we say, we are to live or not to live. Every such formula, every such hypothesis presupposes some sense in which our words about the future can have truth, even to-day—presupposes then some doctrine about what time is, and about how the past and future are related to the present. We must therefore ask again, but now in a more definite way, What reality has time, whether for the universe or for us?

It requires but little reflection to see that, in our ordinary speech about time, we are accustomed to use obscure, if not contradictory, language. We often ascribe true reality to the present only, and speak as if the past, as being over and done with, had no reality whatever; while the future, as yet unborn, we hereupon view as if it were also wholly unreal. The present, however—this only real region of time—we often speak of that as a mere point, having no duration whatever. Yet in this point we place all reality, and meanwhile, even as we name it, this sole reality vanishes and becomes past. Time, however, if thus defined, consists of two unreal regions, which contain together all duration—all that ever has been or will be; and time in addition to these, its unreal halves, contains just one real instant, which itself has no duration, and which is thus no extended part of time at all, but only a vanishing presence. Thus, after all, there remains, when thus viewed, no real region in time at all. Nothing is; all crumbles. Such a view has only to be explicitly stated in order to be recognised as inadequate; as a fact, such a view is a mere heap of false abstractions. Moreover, we ourselves not only frequently assert, but almost as constantly deny, this interpretation of

time. For the past we view, after all, as a very stern and hard reality. What is done, is done. The past is irrevocable, unchangeable, adamantine, the safest of storehouses, the home of the eternal ages. Moreover, you can tell the truth about the past. Hence the past is surely not unreal in the sense in which fairyland is unreal. A man who practically treats the past as unreal, becomes *ipso facto* a liar; and you might in fact define a false witness as a man who tries to make the past over at will, not recognising its stern and unalterable truth. On the other hand, the future indeed is not thus irrevocable; but it has its own sort of very potent and recognisable being. You constantly live by adjusting yourself to the reality of the future. The coal strike threatens. You wish that your coal-bins, if they are not full, were full. For next winter, after all, is a reality. Thus then, the two regions of time, the past and future, are not wholly unreal. For the truthful witness the past is a reality. For the faithful maker of promises, the future is a reality. As for the present,—after all, are many dreams less real than is the *mere* present? Fools live in the present, and dream there, taking it to be the real world. But whoever acts wisely, knows that the present is merely his chance for a deed; and that the worth of a deed is determined by its intended relations to past and future. Not the present, then, of our flickering human consciousness, is the temporal reality, so much as are the past and the future. Life has its dignity through its bearing upon their contents and their meaning.

We see from these illustrations, I hope, that much of our common speech about time is belied by our practical attitudes towards time. Truthful reports and promises, serious deeds and ideals, prudence and conservatism and enterprise, all unite to show us that the reality of time is possessed especially by its past and its future, over against which the present is indeed but vanishing. And now what, after all, do such illustrations teach us regarding the true meaning of our conception of time?

I answer at once, dogmatically,—but, as I hope, not without some suggestion of the reason for my answer:—Time, to my mind, is an essential practical aspect of reality, which derives its whole meaning from the nature and from the life of the will. Take away from your conception of the world the idea of a being who has a will, who has a practical relation to facts; take away the idea of a being who looks before and after, who strives, seeks, hopes, pursues, records, reports, promises, accomplishes; take away, I say, every idea of such a being from your world, and whatever then remains in your conceived world gives you no right to a conception of time as any real aspect of things. The time of the timepieces and of mechanical science, the time of geology and of physics, is indeed, as Professor Münsterberg maintains, but an abstraction. This abstraction is useful in the natural sciences. But it has no ultimate meaning except in relation to beings that have a will, that live a practical life, and that mean to do something. Given such beings, it can be shown that they need the conception of the time of mechanics or of geology in order to define their relation to nature. But apart from their needs, time is nothing. The time regions, already mentioned in this account, get their distinct types of reality solely from their diverse relations to a finite will, and, for us, to our own finite will. The past is that portion of reality where, to be sure, deeds also belong; but these past deeds are presupposed by my present attitude of will as already, and irrevocably, accomplished facts. As such they are the acknowledged basis upon which all present deeds rest. That is, then, what I mean by the past, viz. the presupposed and hence irrevocable basis on which my present deed rests. I say, "So much is done." The will, therefore, presupposing the past, asks, "What next?" and is ready to decide by further action. The future is equally definable solely in terms of the will. The future is the region of the opportunity of the finite will. The future also, indeed, contains its aspect of destiny—as, for example, next winter's chill. But it likewise contains the chance of deeds yet undone, and so

incites the will. As for the present, it is the scintillating flash of the instant's opportunity and accomplishment. It too is meaningless except for the deed, be this deed a mere act of attention or an outward expression. In terms, then, of my attitude of will, and only in such terms, can I define time, and its regions, distinctions, and reality.

Time then is, I should say, a peculiarly obvious instance of the necessity for defining the universe in idealistic terms—that is, in terms of life, of will, of conscious meaning. Burdened as we all are by the mere concept of the time of the clock-makers and of the calendars, by the equally conceptual time of theoretical physics and of daily business, we are prone to forget that it is the human will itself which defines for us all such concepts, which abstracts them from life, and which then often bows to them as if they were indeed mere fate. If you look beneath the abstractions, you find that time is in essence the form of the finite will, and that when I acknowledge one universal world-time I do so only by extending the conception of the will to the whole world. If I say: "There is to come a future," I mean merely: "My will acknowledges deeds yet to be done, and defines as the future reality of the universe a will continuous with my will—a world-will in whose expression my present deed has its place. The unity and continuity of the time of the universe are definable only through the practical relation of my will to this world-will. My deed has its place in the system of the world's deeds. The will that is yet to be expressed in the future is inseparable in its essence from the will which even now, and in my present deed, acknowledges this future as its own. As appears from these forms of expression, I am in philosophy an idealist. This is no place to set forth lengthy arguments for idealism. I have to sketch and to speak dogmatically. But the conception of time is peculiarly good as an illustration of the need of idealism.

My result is, so far, that time is indeed indefinable and meaningless except as the form in which a conscious will-process

expresses its own coherent series of deeds and of meanings. And so, if all the finite world is subject to one time-process, this assertion means merely that all our wills are together partial expressions of a single conscious volitional process—the process whereby the world-will gets expressed in finite forms and deeds. A complete argument for idealism would, of course, have to develop and to supplement this interpretation of time in many ways. But here is a hint of idealism.

A result so stated is, I admit, not at first sight at all decisive as to any question of personal immortality. Yet I hope that the reader will already see how a doctrine of this sort, dogmatically as I have to state it, fragmentarily as I have to suggest my reasons for holding it, must have some bearing upon the problem as to how and whether a personal survival of death is a possibility. One is too much disposed to view the time-process as an utterly foreign fate, physically forced upon unwilling mortals, who can only lament how youth flies, and how the good old times come again no more, and how the unknown future, vast and merciless, is impending and is yet to engulf us. What I now point out is that all such abstract conceptions of the fatal, external, physical, inhuman, unconscious reality of the world's time-process are inadequate. As we have seen, in our sketch of a few such false conceptions, they appear in various, in paradoxically conflicting forms, which sometimes treat all time as unreal except the present, and sometimes view the past and future as an iron reality of blind fate. As a fact, so I insist, we concretely know time as the form of the will. We define the time-relations practically, and in terms of deeds done and to be done. If we generalise our time-experience, so as conceptually to view the whole world as expressing itself in a single temporal process, our generalisation means this: that the entire world is the expression of a single will, which is in its totality continuous with our own, so that the past and future of our personal will is also the past and future of this world-will, and conversely.

The lesson, however, is already this: If, as is very obviously true, there was a time when I personally did not exist, then that was because the world-will did not then yet need, and so did not yet involve, in its own expression, and as a part thereof, my personal deeds. If, on the other hand, the time is to come when I, in my private personality, shall have become extinct, that can be only because the world-will as a whole, after my passing away, is thenceforth to presuppose all of my personal deeds as irrevocably done, and is to have no longer any need to include my further choices. Assume, for the moment, that this is to be the case. This world-will, however, is in any event not foreign in nature to my own will, but is continuous therewith; just as continuous, namely, as the real time of my own consciousness is continuous with the real time of the universe. If I die, then, and finally cease, that will be because a will—a conscious will—a will essentially continuous with my own—a will now expressed in my consciousness, but sure to be for ever expressed in *some* consciousness—a will that now includes all my hopes and my meanings—must some day come to look back upon my personal life as an expression no longer needed. My extinction, then, if it comes, will be at all events a teleological, not a merely fatal process—an inner and purposive checking of the very will which now throbs in me—a checking which will also be a significant attainment—not a blind passing away, due to the mere fate that, in time, all becomes unreal. "Our life," said wondrous old Heraclitus, "is the death of gods; our death is the life of gods." And Heraclitus meant by these words that if indeed all passes away, and if we pass too, that can only be because that very divine life which now lives in us will, living in other divine forms, accomplish the very meaning which it now partially accomplishes in us, by expressing itself otherwise, and yet as the very life which is now ours. "For we are also his offspring."

Considerations such as these are indeed but highly fragmentary. They certainly do not by themselves give any

adequate notion of immortality. They have been emphasised by many thinkers who thereby meant merely to make light of personal permanence. Nevertheless, to conceive time as the form of the will, and universal time as the form of the world-will, and our lives as linked to a conscious world-will by precisely as close a link as binds the time of our consciousness—to conceive of all this, I say, is to be helped to a sort of introduction to a more definite view of our problem. In time you are at any rate not lost as the snows are lost when they melt; or engulfed as the mountains are engulfed when they are washed away and sink, as sediment, into the sea. For the world-time is also the time of your consciousness; and, in precisely as genuine a sense, the world-will is your will. If you ever become extinct, that will occur only as a single deed, or as a partial expression, becomes extinct for the doer who, presupposing that very deed, bases his own further expression upon the acknowledgment, the valuation, and the memory of the past deed itself. The question whether such extinction will occur at all thus gets its proper teleological formulation. You will die, not as blind fate determines, nor merely because time flies: you will die, if at all, because the world-will needs no more of your personal deeds, except in so far as they are henceforth merely presupposed.

So far, then, I suggest what might be called a voluntaristic theory of the time-process. I understand, I may say, that Professor Münsterberg would in large measure agree with even this account of the time-relations as due to, as expressions of, the significant attitudes of a world-will. The point where my colleague and I are at variance is now ready for a clearer statement than is the one so far given in this discussion. The difference relates to the way in which this entire will-process, this whole expression of significant activities in the universe, appears when viewed, so to speak, *sub specie eternitatis*, that is, in its wholeness, as God must be conceived to view it—or as any one ought to view it who does not confine himself to the abstract concepts of the clock-

makers and of the calendars, but who considers real life as it genuinely is, in its veritable meaning.

The time-process is the form of the will. Past and future differ as deeds yet to be done differ from presupposed and irrevocable deeds. The present is the vanishing opportunity for the single deed. The time-distinctions, then, are relative to deeds and to meanings. Grant all this for a moment. What follows? Does it follow that whoever views the world-life as it truly is, sees the whole world as a timeless totality, consisting simply of meanings, of acts, of will-attitudes, whose relations are not temporal, but significant? Does it follow that endurance in time is no test of the worth of a personality, any more than colossal stature is needed as an attribute of a great personality?

I cannot agree to such a conclusion, in the form in which Professor Münsterberg states it. First, then, as to the supposed timelessness of the world of real meanings, let me use an æsthetic example. Music, which Schopenhauer called an image of the will, is in any case essentially an art that expresses beautifully significant musical meanings in temporal order. Abstract, however, from the time-form of music, and what is left of any musical form whatever? If the gods listen to music at all, they must appreciate its sequences. Wherein consists, however, a true musical appreciation? Whoever aimlessly half listens to the musical accompaniments of a dance or of a public festival, may indeed be so absorbed in the passing instant's sound that he gets no sense of the whole. True listening to music grasps, in a certain sense as a *totum simul*, entire sequences—measures, phrases, movements, symphonies. But such wiser listening and appreciation is not timeless. It does not ignore sequence. It is time-inclusive. It grasps as an entirety a sequence which transcends any one temporal present. In this grasping of the whole of a time-process one gets a consciousness of a present which is no longer merely a vanishing present, but a time-including, a relatively eternal present, in which various vanishing instants have

their places as relatively present, past, and future one to another.

Well, such a view, as I take it, comes nearer to getting the sense of what real life is than does any view which considers its world merely as timeless. If, then, I try to conceive how God views things, I can only suppose, not that the absolute view ignores time, but that the absolute view sees at a glance all time, past, present, future, just as the true appreciator of the music knows the entirety of the sequence as a sort of higher or inclusive present—a present in which the earlier stages do not merely vanish into the later stages, and yet, on the other hand, are not at all devoid of time-relations to the later stages. For this inclusive view, as I suppose, sees the totality of the significant deeds and will-attitudes as a single life-process—temporal because it is both significant and volitional,—and present, not in the vanishing, but in the inclusive and eternal sense—present not as a timeless whole, but as an infinite sequence—"one undivided soul of many a soul," one life in infinite variety of expression.

For such a view, however,—a view which is not timeless, but time-inclusive—the duration of a given series of will-acts, the wealth, the lasting, the variety of a distinguishable portion of the entire process, might have—yes, must have—a true relation to the degree of the significance which this portion of the whole possesses. A truly great work of musical art must involve a considerable sequence. Its length has a definable relation to its greatness. What is true of a work of art might be true of so much of the world-life as constitutes an individual finite being. There might be significant time-processes—individual lives, so to speak—whose meaning would require them to be endless, and whose place in the whole might demand that, once having appeared, they could never in the later will-activities of the temporal order be ignored, but must thenceforth co-operate—the temporal will-process always including amongst its deeds activities which were not only its own, but also their own.

If such individual lives, distinct in their meaning from other partial expressions of the world-will, endless in their duration from some one point onwards, were actually factors in the world-process, and were amongst the facts which the absolute view of real life had to include, in order to express and to find its own complete truth—how would such lives be related to the world-life in its entirety? How would they be related to that absolute insight, to that divine view, which, in an eternal, that is, in a time-inclusive sense, would see at a glance the entirety of the world-process?

If I try to suggest, however vaguely, an answer to these momentous questions, the reader will understand that I am merely sketching, and am not now trying to prove, what elsewhere I have discussed with tedious detail, and in a far more technical way. Here we have no time to weigh arguments pro and con. I can only outline, in a dogmatic way, my views. I merely suggest a few of their reasons.

I have spoken of a world-will. I have said that to recognise, as we all do, one time-process as holding for all the world, is to recognise the world-will as a single volitional process, in which all our lives are bound up. We are simply different modes of willing, continuously related to one another and to the total world-will which throbs and strives in all of us alike, but which, in endless variety, seeks now this and now that special aim—accomplishes now this and now that special deed—presupposes an infinity of deeds as its own past—goes on to an infinity of deeds as its future—is content to be no one of us, but shows in our social life the community of our endlessly various aims, as in our individual lives it exhibits an endless variety of differentiations and of distinguishable trends of purpose. It is one will in us all; yet I have tried to show, elsewhere, that this does not deprive us of individuality. It needs our variety and our freedom. And we need its unity and its inexhaustible fertility of suggestion. We read the symbols of this inexhaustible fertility when we study nature, and when we commune with man. We acknowledge this

unity whenever we view the time of the world as one time. Our own will to live is the will of the world, conscious in us, and demanding our individual variety as its own mode of expression. We conspire with the world-will even when most we seem to rebel. We are one with it even when most we think of ourselves as separate. Art, ethics, reason, science, service, all bear witness both to our unity with its purposes, and to its need that all unity of purpose should be expressed through an endless variety of individual activities.

I have thus spoken of the world-will as this infinitely complex unity in the variety of all finite wills. I have also spoken of an absolute point of view, which views this entire life of the world-will as one whole. I have used theological speech, and have called this absolute point of view that of the divine being, the point of view of God. Now this is no opportunity to consider either the proofs for the divine existence or the problem regarding the nature of God. I have again to use dogmatic forms of speech. I mean by the term God the totality of the expressions and life of the world-will, when considered in its conscious unity. God is a consciousness which knows and which intends the entire life of the world, a consciousness which views this life at one glance, as its own life and self, and which therefore not only wills but attains, not only seeks but possesses, not only passes from expression to expression, but eternally is the entire temporal sequence of its own expressions. God has and is a will, and this will, if viewed as a temporal sequence of activities, is identical with what I have called the world-will. Only, when viewed as the divine will, this world-will is taken not merely as an infinite sequence of will-activities, but in its eternal unity as one whole of life. God is omniscient, because his insight comprehends and finds unified, in one eternal instant, the totality of the temporal process, with all of its contents and meanings. He is omnipotent, because all that is done is, when viewed in its unity, his deed, and that despite the endless varieties and strifes which freedom and which the variety of individual finite expressions involve.

God is immanent in the finite, because nothing is which is not a part of his total self-expression. He is transcendent of all finitude, because the totality of finite processes is before him at once, while nothing finite possesses true totality.

If one hereupon asks, Why should there be finitude, variety, imperfection, temporal sequence at all?—we can only answer: Not otherwise can true and concrete perfection be expressed than through the overcoming of imperfections. Not otherwise can absolute attainment be won than through an infinite sequence of temporal strivings. Not otherwise can absolute personality exist than as mediated through the unification of the lives of imperfect and finite personalities. Not otherwise can the infinite live than through incarnation in finite form, and a rewinning of its total meaning through a conquest of its own finitude of expression. Not otherwise can rational satisfaction find a place than through a triumph over irrational dissatisfactions. The highest good logically demands a conquering of evil. The eternal needs expression in a temporal sequence whereof the eternal is the unity. The divine will must, as world-will, differentiate itself into individuals, sequences, forms of finitude, into strivings, into ignorant seekings after the light, into doubting, erring, wandering beings, that even hereby the perfection of the spirit may be won. Perfect through suffering—this is the law of the divine perfection.

All these assertions would need, were there time, their own defence. I do not assert them as merely my own. That they are substantially true is what the whole lesson of the moral and religious experience of our race seems to me to have led us to see. That they are necessarily true can, as I think, be demonstrated.

So much, then, for some hint as to how the temporal is, to my mind, related to the eternal.

But what, one may ask, has all this to do with deciding the problem regarding immortality? Much, every way, I reply, if you only add, at this point, a little reflection as to the second of the two questions with which this paper

opened. We have studied our relation to time, and also have considered the relation of time to the divine being. But what, so we asked at the outset, is a human personality?

Incidentally, as it were, we have now almost answered this question, so far as it here concerns us.

A human personality has many aspects, psychological, physical, social, ethical. But a man is a significant being by virtue not of his body, or his feelings, or his fortunes, or his social status, but by virtue of his will. The concept of personality is an ethical concept. A man, as an ethical being, is what he purposes to be, so far as his purpose is as yet temporally expressed. So far as his will is not yet expressed his life belongs to the future. All else about him besides his will, his purpose, his life-plan, his ideal, his deed, his volitional expression—all else than this, I say, is mere material for manhood, mere clothing, mere environment, or mere fortune. Ignorantly as he now expresses himself, his worth lies not in the extent of his knowledge, but in the seriousness of his intent to express himself. Is he a sinner, then he is not yet true to his own will; that is, he is not yet, in the temporal order, his own complete and genuinely ideal self. For my duty is only my own will brought to a reasonable self-consciousness, and is not an external restraint. Hence the sinner is not yet his own explicit self. His conflict with the world is also an internal conflict—an inner war with his own imperfection. But if one who appears in the outer form of man shows no sign as yet of having any personal ideal, or life-plan, or purpose, or individual will at all, then one can only say, "Since here we find a seemingly blind expression of the world-will, but not an expression that as yet gives an account of itself, we must indeed suppose that some form of personality is here, in this fragment of the time-process latent, but we simply cannot tell what form." In such a case we indeed call the being whom we know in our human relations a person; but he so far appears as a person by courtesy. An explicit personality is one which shows itself through deeds

that embody a coherent ideal—an ideal which need not be abstractly formulated, but which must be practically active, recognisably significant, consciously in need of further temporal expression. Such an explicit personality may be that of a hero, of a saint, or of a rascal. The hero and the saint are simply personalities that are so far expressed in forms whose deeds and ideals have a truer internal harmony. A rascal is a finite personality who is, so far as his personality is yet expressed, essentially at war with himself, as he is with the world. For his deeds are opposed to his true meaning. In so far as he appears to us, as he often does, to be a contented rascal or a joyous sinner, who observes not this essential warfare with himself—in just so far, I say, he is a fool, and accordingly, in just so far he lacks explicit personality; so that, when we judge him as such a joyous rascal, we know not with what personality we are dealing. But the awakened sinner, however obstinate in his wrongdoing, is a consciously tragic figure. He may also be much of a hero. We shall then admire his vigour. But he remains a warfare of ideals and deeds, and is so not yet come to himself. The true hero, the righteous man, the saint—these are personalities on a higher level. But at no one point in time have they attained their total expression. For the dutiful will, in a finite being, is insatiable. It views itself as a dutiful will in so far as it seeks something yet to be done; and it views itself as an individual dutiful will in so far as it consciously says: "Since this is my duty, nobody else in the universe—no, not God, in so far as God is other than myself—can do this duty for me. My duty I must myself do. And wherever in time I stand, I am dissatisfied with what is so far done. I must pass on to the next."

Saints and sinners, so far as they are indeed explicit personalities, that is, finite wills conscious of their own individual intent, agree in being, in the temporal world, practically dissatisfied. The righteous man is dissatisfied with his present opportunity to express his will. He needs yet further future

opportunities to do his duty. The conscious sinner is dissatisfied with the very will which he is at the moment trying to express. Each, as a finite being, engaged in a temporal process, is a person by virtue of his very dissatisfactions. I refer now, by the word dissatisfaction, not to gloomy feelings, so much as to eagerness for further deeds. How we feel is a matter of fortune. How active we need to be, that constitutes our very selves, as now we are. For a finite personality, I insist, is a will to do something. So far as I have something yet to do, I am, however, dissatisfied with the past as with the present. I demand, in just so far, a future—a future in which, since I am now a sinner, at war with myself, I shall come into unity with my own will, and shall discover what it is that I am seeking—a future in which, in so far as even now I know and intend my duty, I shall further express this will of mine in the countless deeds that my personal purpose requires me yet to do.

So much, then, for a hint regarding what a finite personality is. But in view of all the foregoing, how shall we say that such a finite personality is related to the world and to God? I reply: A finite personality, as a conscious expression of the world-will, is, when viewed in time, an expression of what is just now a dissatisfaction—and of a dissatisfaction of this very personality with itself. In so far as consciously sinful, this personality is dissatisfied with what it so far knows about its own will; but in so far as it is a finite doer of deeds, this personality, whether just or unjust, is dissatisfied with what it has so far done to express its will. Hence it looks to the future. And our very conception of the temporal future is due to this our present active dissatisfaction.

That such dissatisfactions should be at all in the world is due, however, as we have said, to that general need which demands that the eternal should be expressed through the temporal, that the divine and absolute should take on human and fallible form, and that the infinite should be incarnate in the finite. Not otherwise than through a divine immanence

however, can I conceive all these finite forms of temporal striving to arise.

What then follows? Does not this follow at once? The finite personality can say: "In me, as now I am, God is dissatisfied with himself just in so far as now he is partially expressed in me. I am a form of that divine dissatisfaction which constitutes the entire temporal order. This is my link with God, that now I am discontent with the expression of my personality."

In me, then, God is discontented with his own temporal expression. This very discontent I myself am. It constitutes me. This individual thirst for infinity, this personal warfare with my own temporal maladjustment to my own ideal—this is my personality. I am this hatred of my own imperfection, this search for the future deed, this intent to do more than has yet been done. All else about me, fortune, feeling, hope, fear, joy, sorrow—these are accidents. These are my clothing, my mere belongings; these constitute the very wilderness of finitude in which I wander. But I,—I am essentially the wanderer, whose home is in eternity. And in me God is discontent—discontent with my waywardness—discontent with the little so far done. In me the temporal being, in me now, God is in need, is hungry, is thirsty, is in prison. In me, then, God is dissatisfied. But he is God. He is absolute. Eternity is his. He must be satisfied. In eternity, in the view of the whole temporal process, he is satisfied. In his totality he attains, and he attains what I seek.

This then is, as I conceive, the situation of any finite personality. How is this divine satisfaction attained? I answer, not by ignoring, either now or hereafter, the voluntary individual expression; for it is of the very essence of personality to define its opportunity, its deed, and its meaning, as individual, as insatiable, and unique. And God, too, so defines them, if he knows what personality is. No; the divine satisfaction can be obtained solely through the deeds of the

individual. No finite series of these deeds expresses the insatiable demand of the ethical individual for further expression. And this, I take it, is our rational warrant for insisting that every rational person has, in the endless temporal order, an opportunity for an endless series of deeds.

To sum up:—Since the time order is the expression of a will continuous with my own, my life cannot ever become a wholly past fact unless my individual will is one that, after some point of time, becomes superfluous for the further temporal expression of the meaning of the whole world-life. But as an ethical personality I have an insatiable need for an opportunity to find, to define, and to accomplish my individual and unique duty. This need of mine is God's need in me and of me. Seen, then, from the eternal point of view, my personal life must be an endless series of deeds.

This is a sketch of what I take to be the doctrine of immortality. The reader will observe that I have spoken wholly of will, of deeds, and of opportunity for deeds. I have carefully avoided saying anything about fortune, about future rewards and punishments, about future compensations for present sorrows, about one's rights to meet again one's lost friends, about any of these better known popular aspects of our topic. As a fact, I pretend to no knowledge about my future fortunes, and to no rights whatever to demand, as a finite personality, any particular sort of good fortune. The doctrine of immortality is to my mind a somewhat stern doctrine. God in eternity wins the conscious satisfaction of my essential personal need. So much I can assert. But my essential personal need is simply for a chance to find out my rational purpose and to do my unique duty. I have no right to demand anything but this. The rest I can leave to a world order which is divine and rational, but which is also plainly a grave and serious order.

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DIVINE IMMANENCE.

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THERE are certain respects in which the functions of both the Church and the State become more difficult as civilisation advances. They stand, each in its own way, for the unity of all the legitimate interests of a people. As the State must protect them, so religion must give them its final sanction. As the State must provide the sphere for secular enterprises, so religion must dedicate them to the highest end, and by making them into a service which is supreme, give them deeper validity and a new worth.

But the advance of civilisation implies increased variety of more far-reaching interests, and their closer organisation. A time comes when the spirit of an age reaches after so many forms of good, and entertains projects so vast and varied, that the task of uniting and guiding them is supremely difficult. It would sometimes seem as if the State and the Church must merely look on at the play of forces which they cannot control. Democracy has arrived, and, under most complex conditions, is moving toward social results that can neither be defined nor appraised; the State, it is said, must yield to its demands, and religion must give it its benediction. The learning of the people must also be free. The Church, we are told, must not meddle much even with the education of little children; above all, it must lay to heart the sharp lessons that its resistance to science has brought. Religion must make concessions to the truths of science and accommodate itself to the new times.

But we have little respect for the religion of an individual if it makes concessions to his secular interests and accommodates itself to his activities. The personal religion that concedes is salt which has lost its savour. And is it certain that the religion of a nation can be different in this respect? Must not it, too, in order to be religion, inform, inspire, and guide? Surely, the religious thought of the day, if it is failing to lead, and merely trying to follow, has yielded up its true function and fallen away from itself. The voice of religion must ever be authoritative. If it speak at all, it must speak in the name of the nature of things. The convictions at its heart it must believe to be the Will of God; and if it opens its lips to prophesy, it must be with a "Thus saith the Lord."

It would thus appear that the religious thought of the day can neither resume its ancient authority nor live without it. Its position is undeniably difficult.

But if it can be fairly described as determined by the ideas of concession and accommodation, its position is not only difficult but untenable. Religion cannot give over the substance of life to the secular powers and itself survive on forms. It must either resist these powers as wrong, or it must welcome them as right and make them active elements in its own life. It must either convert the world from its evil, or be itself once more converted by the good that is working in the world. It must not make concessions to truth and right; it must recognise them. But to recognise new truth is to adopt it; and to adopt it is to revise old presuppositions and to reconstruct the ancient faith; for we do not learn by merely adding new truths to old.

This need of reconstruction, we are told on all hands, is now patent and indisputable. The new methods of organising secular knowledge and of seeking the truth, and the new sense of a broader justice which is moving blindly about the heart of modern democracy, are proving themselves right in the main. Religion must adopt these modern methods, and these larger aspirations for a more universal social good, and make

them parts of its own substance. Its own thought must be inspired by the idea of Evolution, and the pulse of the better social life must beat in its own arteries. Only by these deep changes can it fit itself once more to inspire the thought of the age and guide the nation's practice.

But such inner reconstruction demands great wisdom, and almost greater courage. For religion cannot be renewed except at its source. It must attain a nearer and truer view of God. Mankind has never civilised itself except by humanising its God. Such a task, undertaken of deliberate purpose and by the dry resolve of any individual or Church, seems not only rash but irreverent. In such high regions wise men move with diffidence. They proclaim no "New Theology." They come not to destroy but to fulfil. And they come in obedience to a necessity which is prior to their own will and greater. The reluctance of the Church at any time to reconstruct its faith is more than pardonable; it is right. It should not do it if it can avoid the doing of it—and live. The new truth must appear to it as a Gospel, and it must feel that *not* to preach it is its own most real "woe" and lasting doom.

The religious thought of a people, like its churches, must be flooded with light from without. It must be almost passive at first. Specific methods of seeking particular truths and particular social and political ends, must approve themselves in the lower courts before gaining its final and supreme assent. The attitude of the leaders of religious thought towards the workers in the secular fields of thought and practice must be like that of Gamaliel. They must wait. "Ye men of Israel, take heed to yourselves, what ye intend to do as touching these men. . . . Refrain from these men, and let them alone: for if this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought: but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it; lest haply ye be found even to fight against God."

But once new ways of thought and practice have approved themselves in the secular spheres, the reconstruction of the

faith can be undertaken without either rashness or irreverence. The change of view, even if it involves a new conception of God, becomes little more on the part of the faith than explicit consent to what has already been done. Then, indeed, should its recognition of the truth be frank and its adoption thorough—"lest haply it be found even to fight against God."

Now, in my opinion, such a time has arrived for religious thought in this country. So completely has the idea of Evolution, in one or other of its many forms, justified itself as an instrument of inquiry—and no human thought is more than such an instrument—that it has not only been applied to the sacred book, to the history of belief, and the innermost contents of religious faith, but it is already modifying our conception of God. At the present day, it is hardly too much to say that "Deism" is no longer a living faith. We have learnt at last that to place God in a region beyond the boundaries of the finite world, and outside the life of man, is to relegate Him to the empty realm of the unknown. Deism, we are fully aware, leads to Agnosticism; Agnosticism, we know, is only negation arrested in mid-career; and we are no longer willing to worship we know not what, nor to give to we know not what the name of God.

The centre of religious interest has moved. Those who seek God seek for witnesses of Him in the bountiful earth and the broad sky, and in the widening marvel of human history. Many believe that all that is, and has been, and is yet to come is not too vast to reveal Him. To manifest Himself He requires not only the single human life, but every life in all the vast context of its antecedents and consequences. Evolution has been silently habituating us to the conception that what is, was; and that what will be, is. It has brought the "End," the final goal, to the beginning of things, and made all the expanse of the natural creation and the moving panorama of human history its declaration and manifestation of itself. All is one scheme, and God is the meaning of it. Thus,

almost without knowing it, we have come to adopt the conception of God as immanent. It was implicit all along in the idea of Evolution.

This new conception brings troubles enough, it is true. But with it nevertheless we are engaged. *It*, and not any other, is the living hypothesis of present religious thought. Nor can religious thought set it aside till we have ceased to believe in the conception of Evolution; and that conception, up to the present at least, sits securely on the throne of the modern mind, directing all its main endeavour after truth.

On the other hand, let me repeat, this conception of Immanence, like that of Evolution itself, is only an instrument of inquiry. It is a hypothesis seeking to ratify itself within the facts, and therefore on its trial. It is still being applied, and in process of being verified; and there are facts to which the application is very difficult, and which throw doubt upon its truth. For is there not error in the world, and sin? How can we, it may be asked, identify God with the Natural Universe? Is the Universe not indifferent to moral good, either utterly blind or utterly hard of heart? What manner of God is He who could be one with the life of mankind, whose history is not sordid, only because it is tragic?

The conception of Immanence, it may be urged, can be maintained only by one of two methods. We must either raise the finite to the level of the infinite, or reduce the infinite to the level of the finite. But the religious consciousness revolts against both of these courses. The former it has never adopted. Even Pantheism is not a simple identification of God with nature and man. On the contrary, the Pantheist, in the process of gaining his conception of God, so far from worshipping Nature as it stands, has to negate it. In itself finite being is to him appearance and illusion.

And when Pantheism, having gone its full round, reinstates the finite which it has negated, it is only as a manifestation, and a shadowy one at that, of the veiled mystery of the substance that is eternal. And, even so, the excessive

emphasis which Pantheism has placed on the identity of God and Nature has proved dangerous to religion. Has it not depressed the vital ardour of whole races of men, obscured the distinction between right and wrong, and taken the enterprise out of morality? And what is religion at its best except morality—the morality which welcomes art, and in comprising every form of secular good contributes to it new beauty and strength—perfectly certain that the Good eternally is, and is being realised anew in finite spirits?

The second method, namely, that of reducing God to the level of finite souls, is still more incompatible with the religious consciousness. It even sacrifices Immanence in securing similarity. This method has been followed by certain recent writers on philosophy. In their ardour for separate personalities and for "real evil," they have denied the omnipotence and perfection of God. God, according to Dr M'Taggart, is to be conceived, "not as omnipotent, but, at the least, as much more powerful than any other being," . . . . "not perfect, but, at the least, of such a nature that he would be rightly judged to be more good than evil."[1] Dr Rashdall distinguishes between God and the Absolute, and makes the absolute consist of a society of God and other souls. Professor William James would have a multiplicity of Gods. We are told also that "reality consists of eternal souls without gods"—at which one may rejoice, if the best we can say of the gods is that they would be rightly judged to be more good than evil.[2]

The religious consciousness of mankind has, during the course of its long history, uttered itself in strange forms. But when a temple is built to one or more of such gods as these, the nations of the earth will surely flock together, if not to share in the worship, at least to hear the service, to observe the rites, and to marvel at the chief-priests.

[1] *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 186.

[2] This is a most restrained testimonial to the Divine Being. Would it, one wonders, secure him a College Fellowship or an American degree in divinity?

Meantime, I am tempted to believe that the responsible and earnest religious thought of this age will seek some other way of admitting the reality of evil and genuine freedom of choice—a way that is compatible with the Divine Immanence *and* the Divine Perfection. Such a way it is indeed seeking already, by the aid of the conception of Transcendence. Not in *mere* transcendence, it is true; for mere transcendence is the mere difference of the infinite from the finite, as mere immanence is their simple identity. Mere transcendence removes God beyond the ken of man, and makes Him the negation of all we know. It pronounces the finite world undivine, shuts it down under a hard, limited horizon, robs it of all its suggestiveness, and lightens it of its freight of meaning; and it leaves man's spirit secular, uninspired, alien to its God, and bereft of the splendour of its spiritual possibilities.

Unless my analysis of the religious consciousness is altogether false, it must endeavour somehow to maintain *both* the Immanence and the Transcendence of God. It can yield up neither of the two conceptions, except with its own life. Actual living religion, the religion which is both trust and devotion, requires a God who is very near to man, the life within his life, the truth, the inner essence, the very substance of his being; and yet it demands a God who transcends finite reality, and from the very fulness of His perfection is known by us only as in a glass, darkly.

The purpose of the serious and responsible religious reflection of our day, it seems to me, is simply to justify these demands of the religious consciousness, if that be possible. The present problem of religious philosophy—of the metaphysics which Aristotle called Theology—is that of showing the relation of these conceptions to each other. It is not that of proving that God is immanent as merely the same as finite reality, nor that He is transcendent as merely different. *Both* of these conceptions it finds borne in upon it by habits of thought which at present seem, as we have seen, to be universal in their sway. For Evolution implies them

both; it implies a Universal End that is present in the finite, and yet only in process, and, therefore, not fully expressed in the finite. The problem of religious philosophy is to reconcile these conceptions, and, believing *that*, to show *how* they inhere in the same subject. Philosophy may indeed seek to deny the validity of the religious consciousness, and endeavour to explain religion away as one of the errors of the infancy of the human spirit. But if it accepts religion as an intrinsic and constituent fact of the rational life of man, so that for man to be is to seek to know and serve the Best he knows, then it must accept these apparently opposite conceptions that God somehow dwells in all things, and yet somehow transcends them.

Now, the ordinary religious consciousness, like the ordinary consciousness in all its activities and forms, is abstract and incoherent. It does not bring together the conceptions which it employs, nor, as such, does it feel the need of doing so. It entertains its vital truths one at a time, according to the pressing want of the moment. At one time it is filled with the sense of the nearness and omnipresence of God. "The eternal God is thy refuge, and underneath are the everlasting arms." "If I ascend up into heaven, Thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold, Thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me."

At another time it is God's transcendence and His exceeding glory that overflows and well-nigh overwhelms the spirit. His loving-kindness and most intimate nearness is forgotten in the presence of His majesty. "As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are My ways higher than your ways, and My thoughts than your thoughts." "Behold, God is great, and we know Him not, neither can the number of His years be searched out." "To whom then will ye liken God, or what likeness will ye compare unto Him? . . . . Have ye not known? have ye not heard? hath it not been told you from

the beginning? have ye not understood from the foundations of the earth? It is He that sitteth upon the circle of the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers; that stretcheth out the heavens as a curtain, and spreadeth them as a tent to dwell in." In the presence of such thoughts of God all continuity with the finite seems to be dissolved: there appears to be no way from the transient to the eternal, from the relative to the absolute, from that which seems at times to be emptier than vanity to His infinite substance. Such are the successive attitudes of the ordinary religious mind.

But, when reflection enters, with its broader survey of experience — or when the ordinary consciousness becomes reflective — one idea is held up in the light of another. Experience, striving to become systematic, becomes aware of contradictions. The antagonism of conceptions is felt, and felt as grievous, too grievous to be borne; for rational spirit cannot rest divided against itself. This is the attitude of the religious consciousness in our day. It has become reflective, and it is not at rest. It is striving to hold the conceptions of Immanence and Transcendence together, and in confronting this difficulty philosophical reflection is endeavouring to meet a legitimate and even the imperative demand of the sound and sane religious spirit.

Many are the methods of solving the difficulty which philosophy employs to-day; and there is much confusion and contradiction, bringing with them to many good men uncertainty of mind, a sense of insecurity in matters of faith, a spirit of fear and distrust, perhaps even at times a conviction of inexpugnable ignorance, with the indifference or despair which follow. Multitudes of devout men know not where to find the pure springs of spiritual truth at which they may quench their thirst. Still, it is not a time for despair. Rarely has the search been more earnest or more general. And beneath all the confusion and controversy, there is surprising unity of purpose and of ultimate conviction. To read the more speculative religious literature of these days is to be impressed

profoundly with the fact that, although their methods of demonstration and immediate results differ irreconcilably, the philosophers and theologians are endeavouring to establish the same final truths. They are all trying to maintain the idea of God as both immanent and transcendent. Compared with this identity of final purpose, the difference of method is of little consequence, and the controversies should bring no deep anxiety. There is only one way of building the temple of truth, as there is only one way of erecting the edifice of social life. It is not built in silence, of stones ready-made, like the temple of Solomon, but "hammer and axe and tools of iron must be heard in the house while it is in building." I think the times are hopeful. The thirst of good men will be quenched. A modern prophet, with the spirit of Elijah in him, would bid us be of good cheer: "Get thee up, eat and drink; for there is a sound of abundance of rain."

First of the methods employed to maintain the immanence and transcendence of God are, as usual, the methods of compromise, those most akin to the ways of the irreflective consciousness. The ideas are held intermittently, and applied partially:—

1. God is regarded as immanent in man but not in nature. Nature is the sphere of Mechanism and of blind Necessity. It is indifferent to the ends of spirit, as Arnold believed, or even, as Huxley thought, directly antagonistic to them. Nature is not only the arena of a ruthless struggle, but the immoral abettor of greed and aggressive strength. Man the microcosm must challenge the macrocosm, and run directly counter to the scheme of things, if he is to learn and practise goodness. Spirit can reveal itself and repeat itself only in spirit: nature can stand no such strain. Religion, thinks Lotze, implies that the spirit of man is impressed from another source, and that within it are awakened sensations of another kind than those which come from nature.

2. We have precisely the opposite theory. God is held to be immanent in nature but not in man "The whole external

universe (external, I mean, to self-conscious beings) we unreservedly surrender to the Indwelling Will, of which it is the organised expression." But, "At the boundary of the proper Ego, the absorbing claim of the supreme will arrests itself, and recognises a ground on which it does not mean to step." "The voluntary nature of moral beings must be saved from Pantheistic absorption, and be left standing as, within its sphere, a free cause other than the divine, yet homogeneous with it."[1] "God," says Dr Rashdall, with a redundancy of judicious caution, "is certainly limited by all other beings in the universe, that is to say, by other selves, in so far as He is not these selves."[2] And if we speak at all of the absolute, we must speak of it as "consisting of God and the souls," as "a society in which each must be taken with all its relations to the rest."

> "God whose pleasure brought
> Man into being, stands away
> As it were a handbreadth off, to give
> Room for the newly-made to live,
> And look at him from a place apart,
> And use his gifts of brain and heart."[3]

The second class of theories maintain the Immanence of God both in man and in nature, but they maintain it in different ways.

1. By the first, God is represented as somehow one with man and nature, but as transcending them by occupying also some wider region beyond. He is their veritable source and substance, and also something more, for He "overpasses them in his being, action, and perfection." Neither immanence nor transcendence is explained, but He is called "substance" and "cause"; and therefore His immanence does not arise out of His transcendence, nor His transcendence out of His immanence.

2. Finally, God is immanent in man and nature as the

[1] Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 176.
[2] *Personal Idealism*, p. 390.
[3] Browning, *Christmas Eve and Easter Day*.

unity beneath their difference, the reality which is manifested in the dual aspect of subject and object. In Him, man and nature, all finite things, come together, not as merely aggregated in an external synthesis, but as transmuted. All things exist in Him, but nothing exists in Him as it is apprehended by our discursive and abstract thinking. All we know, all we strive to be by means of knowledge, morality, and the love of beauty, are but appearances of a reality beneath, and, in these appearances, that reality does not appear as it is. In their relation to God, our knowledge and morality, in all their content, are translated into a language which we cannot understand. "All things come together in the absolute," but not without suffering change, into something new and strange.

Now each of these views has its own peculiar defects. For instance, the first two set up a dualism between man and nature, and render the possibility of any experience, religious or other, quite unintelligible; the third constructs the conception of God from two incompatible elements, the one finite and known, the other indefinite and unknowable; and all three leave the natural or human merely natural or human, and make the indwelling of God of no real account. The fourth, on the other hand, so transmutes finite things in bringing them together in the Absolute, as to make them mere appearances as we know them, and real only as we cannot know them. True or real immanence, the immanence which gives significance and reality to finite being, and does not again withdraw them, is secured by none of these theories. But, either the idea of immanence is a sentimental concession to religious thought and quite otiose, or it wrecks the finite. And because the immanence is thus either unreal or destructive of the finite, the transcendence of the finite is also an empty notion.

Nothing whatsoever except confusion is gained, for instance, by the direct identification of "natural law" with "divine casuality," as is done in the theory of Dr Martineau. God immanent in nature is only nature over again—*Deus*

sive Natura. The conclusion is reached by the dogmatic suppression of difference, and the theory is on the level of that of the Stoics, who represented the universe as a manifestation of Divine reason, and of a "fiery breath" which is the quintessence of all matter. On the other hand, if we make the indwelling of God significant, after the manner of the last of these theories, the sphere of the finite sinks into a realm of illusions, where "appearance" seems to have set up for itself and to exist *in virtue* of the contradictions through which it is finally to delete itself. And transcendence on such a view becomes the meaningless transcendence of the unknowable over the merely apparent.

The fact is, that there lurks in all these theories a fatal inconsequence. They would reach the conception of Divine Immanence from premisses which imply mere opposition between the finite and the infinite. From such premisses nothing can follow except either the suppression of difference or external synthesis. Were the theories strictly consistent, their logic, which is the logic of *mere* difference or of *mere* unity, and cannot accept unity *in* difference, would compel them either to make the infinite invade and supplant the finite, or to retain the finite by limiting the infinite and making it finite too. These categories are categories of exclusion. A little reflection shows that by them God is really confined in man, or in nature, or in an empty region beyond, which is to make Him finite; or that natural reality becomes an unsubstantial appearance of an absolute which does not appear.

So far as the relation of God to man is concerned, this, the inevitable issue of such a logic, has already become tolerably plain. The accent of one theory, namely, that of Mr Bradley, as generally understood, falls so heavily upon the phenomenal aspect of finite spirit that its characteristic and essential activities, those by which it strives to attain knowledge, goodness, and beauty, are processes necessitated by a division between the real and ideal. These processes continue only in virtue of a contradiction, and must come to an end in achieving

their aim. The aim does not seem to be present in the process, and the process is both impossible and perishes in its own completion. This is to stultify the finite. On the other hand, so sharp is the accent of Dr Martineau, Dr Ward, Professor Wm. James and others, on the notion that the moral nature of man can retain the integrity of its freedom and responsibility only if there is attributed to it a volitional activity which is wholly private, that God is ousted from the moral world.

Herein lies the main value of the recent movement in philosophy, which takes the forms, or the names, of Pluralism or Pragmatism, or Personal Idealism or Humanism. In it, with more or less completeness, the results of the categories of separation and exclusion are being made plain. Starting from the pre-conception that spirits, or persons, or wills, or subjects must be ontologically separate, writers of this school have represented God "as limited by all other beings in the universe"; they have denied His omnipotence and perfection; they have distinguished between Him and the Absolute, and made the Absolute a society; and they are, somewhat timidly as yet, reviving Polytheism, and, I presume, on their way to instituting a Pantheon of Troglodyte deities, in which every god and goddess will have that moderate degree of virtue which will entitle us to say that "fairly judged they are more good than evil."

But the religious consciousness has no use for such gods as these, however much they may be multiplied, and however harmoniously they may be associated together. God, as a rule, stands to man as a symbol of perfection; and when man finds that his God is imperfect, he usually becomes an Atheist: Religion cannot compromise its God.

There is the same impossibility of compromise in knowledge and morality as there is in religion. Knowledge seeks nothing less than *the* truth, and morality aims at realising *the* Good. Each act of knowing the truth and of doing the right is, in its particular context, an attempt to attain what is taken as Absolute. This is recognised, in a way, by those writers of this school who endeavour to find a way from individual to uni-

versal experience; and who, for that purpose, assume the possibility of interaction amongst wills originally atomic in their isolation, and would enable the intelligence to set up conceptual relations which, though they correspond to no existential universals, still seem to be valid and useful. A more resolute adherence to the individualistic premisses leads to making each individual spirit the author of its own experience, in the sense that it makes its world on the model of its own needs and purposes; so that there are as many worlds as there are "purposes," and as many gods as there are persons. And to these results Pragmatism points.

Now when philosophical presuppositions, the more faithfully they are followed, lead to such consequences as these, they invite re-examination. If it be true that the ontological seclusion of personalities makes it impossible to maintain amongst men that community of ends which knowledge and morality imply, and compels us either to deny the indwelling of God in man or human freedom, either His immanence in nature or the existence of evil, then we must revise the assumption of ontological seclusion.

Religion, at any rate, rests upon a presupposition which, whether it be true or false, is at utter variance with this method and theory of exclusion. Under all its variety of forms, religion has always one characteristic which is obvious enough—it is always a life, and always a devout or devoted life. It is the life given away as particular and exclusive in its ends, and taken up again as universal and comprehensive. Self-will is dethroned, and the will of the Ideal—of the Best which man knows, and which he always calls his God—rules in its place. Personality survives the change, deep as it is. If it has died, it has risen again. "It is sown in corruption, raised in incorruption; sown in dishonour, raised in glory; sown in weakness, raised in power; sown a natural body" hungering after natural satisfaction, "raised a spiritual body" thirsting for righteousness, truth, love, and rejoicing in the service which is perfect freedom.

Religion demands difference, for it is spiritual communion, but it demands unity too. Communion is not possible if there is mere difference or mere unity, blank sameness or utter diversity. A man can commune with himself only because he can distinguish himself from himself and be the object of his own contemplation. He can commune with nature or with God only because there underlies his difference from them some form of ontological continuity.

In religious communion the only division that disappears is the division between what is secular and what is sacred. There is merging of ends but not of persons. The religious spirit does not live to itself at one time and to God at another. The man of God fulfils the duties of his station, pursues the arts of life, secures his own ends, and fulfils the will of God in one and the same process. The purposes remain his own, although they are transfigured by their relation to the Absolute Will, obedience to which is his "meat and drink," and the very substance of his spiritual personality. Of his very will, the essence of his active being, he does not say "It is my will and not God's," or "It is God's will and not mine." Somehow or other the integrity of his personality and the freedom of his will remain intact, and yet he can say "it is God which worketh in me, both to will and to do of His good pleasure."

It may be difficult to see how this is possible; but that the religious consciousness demands this deep identification of wills and still retains their independence is undeniable. Not less undeniable is it that, on the theory of "atomic" personalities, such identification is impossible: that God cannot be immanent in man, nor, indeed, exist for man, and leave him man. The independence which rests on exclusion forbids all communion between man and the world, between man and man, and between man and God. The whole fabric of our spiritual life crumbles into fragments at the touch of this personal atomism.

May it not be worth our while, then, to look at the problems of our spiritual life in another way? The path of ontological severance being blocked, may it not be asked

whether, after all, there may not be a truth which we can ill do without in the Idealism which maintains that neither knowledge, nor morality, nor religion can come either from mere unity or from mere difference; but that unity exists only in difference, and difference in unity; that the Universal reveals itself in the particular; that God is immanent in every element of finite being, and makes it all the more real on that account?

Supposing, for a moment, we look as frankly as we may on facts which are relatively simple and near. The mechanical categories of exclusion seem to me to be very inadequate if I apply them even to natural life; I can make no progress if I am asked to reply to questions couched in terms of 'Either,' 'Or.' If I am asked whether it be the tree or its environment of sunshine and rain and soil which grows the fruit, I cannot truthfully answer that it is the one and *not* the other. If I am asked whether it is the body or the particular organ that breathes, or propels the circulating blood, or assimilates the food, I cannot say that it is the one and *not* the other. If I ascend to the products of self-consciousness and ask who has made my experience, enabled me to know some true things and to do some right things, I cannot say that it is I and *not* my society, nor that it is my society and *not* my self. All the negatives are false.

On the other hand, it appears to me that if we observe the manifestations of the spirit of man, his knowledge, or his art, or his character or his social world, we shall find what look like universals immanent in the particulars, unities existing in and by virtue of differences, and differences deriving their very nature through the unities. A piece of music is not an aggregate of sounds; nor is a picture a collection of colours; nor is a geometrical demonstration a succession of statements and nothing more. The demonstration is the exhibition of the truth of one hypothesis and of only one; the work of art is the embodiment of one conception, and the expression of one mood. Here lies, in all probability, the reason why one artist cannot continue another's work; why there are poems,

like some of those of Coleridge, which will remain fragments till the end of time, and

"Thy Campanile is still to finish."

The artist's spirit and his sublime mood having passed away, nothing new can be added. The added elements cannot become parts of the work of art. They stand outside of it. They are incongruous, harsh and repellent excrescences. The elements or parts derive all their value and their meaning from that which dwells in them. The particular note makes its joyous or pathetic appeal because it is part of a great musical movement. Take it out of the movement and you deprive it of its beauty; put a different note in its place and you may ruin the movement. The particular curve, or arch, or turret lends its beauty to, and it also borrows it from, the edifice as a whole. Tear the porter-scene in *Macbeth* out of its context and it becomes poor comedy; leave it in its context, where it represents the idle common world in contact with the terror and the tension of the scene of murder, and it both gains and gives tragic value.

I do not see how it can be denied that in all these instances the unity of the whole is immanent in all the parts; or that the unity is as real as the particulars in which it is expressed; or that the universal or unity and the particulars derive their being from one another; or that, when sundered from one another, they are aught but unreal abstractions. Nor do I see how the logic of exclusion, or of merely external synthesis, can do justice to such facts.

It does not follow, of course, that any such universals or unities express themselves in rational subjects. The products of spirit may be in this respect different from the producers. Indeed, it is urged that selves or persons must be impervious. Knowledge, art, morality, religion may have an objective and therefore a universal character, nevertheless they must be acquired or possessed by individuals in their singleness and separateness. All the possibilities and responsibilities of spirit imply that it is solitary. It may be set like an island

amongst the encircling seas of circumstance; but however the waves wash around it, they cannot break over it and overwhelm it. Its knowledge is all its own. No other spirit can do its duties, or perform its acts of devotion to its God. Righteousness is like the everlasting mountains, securely and restfully real amidst all changes, but it is real only because realised, and permanent only through being re-perpetuated in the righteous deeds of independent wills.

Now, such arguments as these are unanswerable if the assertion of unity or immanence carries with it the denial of difference. For the differences *are* real, the activities of each subject *are* its own, and no one thing is another thing, or fulfils *its* function. But I am not concerned to deny difference; nay, I go all the way with the critics in asserting it. What I *am* concerned with is the assumption implied, that the mere assertion of difference and distinctions is tantamount to the denial of unity, and that we are shut up to the choice between the exclusive alternatives of abstract unity and abstract difference.

But I find my "self," when I observe it, more than a mere "*thing*" shut up within itself. My "self" seems to know, which implies a relation to objects; it seems to will, which is again a relation to objects—for volition both formulates its ends and carries them out by the help of the circumstances in which it is placed. Indeed, the unique feature of the rational self or subject is that it cannot be particular. It is not at all except as it experiences, and experience is never without content. Spirit is spirit only in so far as it individualises the world of objects within itself, making their meaning the content of its knowing and willing. "What is that which retains a plurality in its plurality, and yet unifies it through relation, but consciousness? We know consciousness as that . . . . in which a manifold is united in the experience without ceasing to be manifold."[1] The self-conscious subject is the one reality which in possessing its world of objects holds itself

[1] Green's Works, vol. ii. p. 16.

apart from it. It is the supreme instance of a universal which is immanent throughout its content, and still leaves its content with all its differences real.

Is it only other persons, then, whose independence we destroy when we know them, or act by reference to them? The communion between selves is more intimate than their communion with nature. Whichever of the activities of spirit we consider, whether it be cognition, feeling, or volition, and whichever of the expressions of spirit we contemplate, whether it be art, or religion, or morality, or knowledge, the interaction of persons with persons is more significant, and their interpenetration more full and deep, than any other. But if between man and nature there is no absorption of the one in the other when we know or will, why should it be assumed that there must be absorption of spirit by spirit? The history of human society gives no support to such an assumption. On the contrary its progress is intelligible, as I have urged before in this JOURNAL, only as the parallel growth of universal order and individual liberty. The organisation of the social forces becomes more complete, and co-operation in the pursuits of ends which are common because they are individual too becomes fuller, *pari passu* with the wider range of the individual wills. And the cause of this is evident. The individuals express *themselves* in these social forces; and the social forces are the content of the individual wills.

In the light of these instances it seems to me that we can see in some dim and imperfect way how God may be immanent in man, and man be man all the more for His indwelling. The religious consciousness, which, as we have seen, ever appears to itself as "doing the will of God" and living the life of God, is no exception to the ordinary consciousness as it reveals itself in its secular activities. As the will of society lives again in the will of the good citizen, so does the Will of God realise itself anew in the will of His servants. Only, when we ascend from the idea of ordinary citizenship to the conception of membership in the Kingdom of God,

the range of our spiritual opportunities is inexpressibly extended; for we become participators in a far vaster enterprise, and organs of a greater cause. And our power is also greater. The citizen of an earthly State is as invincible as his State so long as he is within his duty; for, ideally at any rate, his State is at his back. The devout man, doing his Divine Master's will, is as invincible as his God. "If God be for us, who can be against us?" "Nay, in all these things, we are more than conquerors through Him that loved us." Power passes from will to will undiminished, and knowledge, goodness, and love from spirit to spirit. God is not less God because we kindle our flame at His sun, nor is our light the less our own because it is borrowed. For when spirit borrows it appropriates; when it appropriates it assimilates; and what it assimilates becomes itself without ceasing to be another's.

. . . . . .

"There's a fancy some lean to and others hate
That, when this life is ended, begins
New work for the soul in another state,
Where it strives and gets weary, loses and wins;
Where the strong and the weak, this world's congeries,
Repeat in large what they practised in small,
Through life after life in unlimited series;
Only the scale's to be changed, that's all.

"Yet I hardly know. When a soul has seen
By the means of Evil that Good is best,
And, through earth and its noise, what is heaven's serene,—
When our faith in the same has stood the test,—
Why, the child grown man, you burn the rod,
The uses of labour are surely done;
There remaineth a rest for the helper of God;
And I have had troubles enough for one."[1]

Tennyson, in like manner, seems to contemplate for the soul of man a series of ascending lives of struggle and attainment, ending finally in some far-off future with "absorption in the Divine." The conception of final absorption is a favourite conception of devout spirits.

But I should like to cast doubt upon it. It seems to me

[1] Browning, *Old Pictures in Florence.*

to be the outcome of the old, persistent error that the Immanence of God and the independent personality of man are somehow at war. But it is not justified by any analogy that we can draw from our nearer experience. What our experience here seems to teach us is that, as different persons participate more deeply in the same truth, and learn more fully to know and to perform in their particular context and station the duties that the *same* universal good through city, or State, or mankind prescribes to them, their individuality deepens. They become more *themselves* in becoming liker God. In the harmony of the future each particular note will retain its own full value. There is no tension so strong as when great personalities contend for different ends; there is no harmony so deep as when they pursue the same purposes. It would seem to me that we must allow every good man to sing each note full-throated, to play his own part to the uttermost, if the harmony of the Divine service is to be perfect Praise. I am tempted to believe that there is a higher for man and a greater for God than absorption. Whether we should, or should not, consider that God Himself evolves through His participation in the life of His children and His indwelling, I do not ask. In either case His love is not less, nor His light nor His power, if they are reflected back upon Him from spirits that in devoting themselves, regain themselves, and in giving themselves to His service have, without end, ever greater selves to give.

I have left myself no space to consider the relation of the Divine Immanence to the Divine Transcendence; and can only indicate the conclusion which seems to me to follow. It is that the Immanence which I have been trying to consider itself implies Transcendence; and that the two conceptions are but different phases of the same truth.

If, once more, we take the products of our own spirits and the nature of our own self-consciousness as our clue, we shall find some hint of the way in which He who lives in all things may transcend all things. Self-consciousness is always its own con-

tent and more; for it is the content gathered into a diaphanous unity. The very intimacy of its indwelling in every element of its experience makes it transcend that experience. It has invoked the order of its experience; it has generated and it sustains its parts.

"If it be asked," says Aristotle, "in which of two possible ways the nature of the universe contains the good and the best, whether as something separate, existing independently in itself, or as the order of its parts, the answer is that, as in the case of an army, it must be in both ways at once. For the excellence of an army lies in its order, and it is separately embodied in the general. It lies, however, more in the latter than in the former; for the general does not exist because of the order, but the order because of him."[1]

"We may compare ourselves," says Plotinus, "to a chorus which is placed round a Choragus, but which sings out of tune so long as it directs its attention away from him to external things; but when it turns to him it sings in perfect harmony, deriving its inspiration from him." "In the choral dance we behold the source of our life, the fountain of our intelligence, the primal good, the root of the soul."[2]

We can believe in a God who is transcendent *because* He is immanent; in a Choragus in whom dwells the whole harmony, and who bids each soul pour forth its unrestrained music. Nature to the devout soul is flooded with His presence, and its beauty is all a-blush with His love. The strange places of the human heart; the intricacies of man's joys and sorrows, of his pain and sin; the brittleness and brevity of his natural life; the glory of his moral nature, its promised sovereignty over itself and its world, and his spiritual splendour—God dwells therein; and, dwelling therein, transcends it.

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[1] Quoted in Caird's *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. ii. p. 18.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 224.

DIVINE IMMANENCE AND THE CHRISTIAN PURPOSE.

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THE Christian purpose has been differently interpreted at different times. In the Eastern Church human nature was believed to be essentially corrupt and doomed to perish unless transformed and made immortal by its union with divinity. And so it was thought that the great purpose of Christianity was to unite God and man, and thus save men from eternal death. In the West the emphasis fell upon human depravity and the consequent need of atonement, that one might be freed from the punishment due for sin. So both in East and West Christ was looked upon as a Saviour, in the one case primarily from eternal death, in the other from eternal punishment. It is true that salvation was never thought of as exclusively physical or legal. An ethical element was always present. The transformation of human nature by the divine indwelling meant man's change from a sinner to a saint; and if he were to enjoy the benefits of Christ's atoning work, he must do penance by virtuous deeds. The life of heaven is a life of holiness, and in holiness is found its preparation and its precondition. But, even so, in traditional Greek and Roman Catholicism the supreme purpose of Christianity was eschatological—to rescue men from this perishing world, and give them eternal life in another and better sphere. In this matter, moreover, the Protestant Reformers followed their Catholic

ancestors. With the same belief in the depravity and worthlessness of the unredeemed man, they agreed in regarding him as an heir of death and damnation, and they saw in the removal of the divine wrath the great purpose of Christianity and the great mission of Christ.

But with the spread of the modern spirit the emphasis changed. Our age is distinguished from the Middle Ages by a different estimate both of humanity and of the world. The old belief in the total depravity and utter worthlessness of the natural man has widely broken down, and with it the old spirit of other-worldliness, which viewed the present life as without value in itself, and significant only as a probation for the life to come. By the Socinians of the sixteenth century, and after them by the Rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth, the ideas of original sin and eternal punishment were repudiated, and religion was looked upon as a means of promoting human virtue. Man has the ability to live righteously, but he needs light as to his duty, and particularly the mass of men need stronger incentives to goodness. Like the rationalistic apologists of the second century, Justin Martyr and the rest, the Rationalists of the modern age saw in religion, above all else, a bulwark of morality. By it are revealed divine sanctions attending virtue and vice, and by it, therefore, the world is in some measure restrained from sin. The contrast between this and traditional views, both Catholic and Protestant, is very great. But this was only a step in the process of change. The spread of the modern spirit meant also, as I have said, a growing emphasis upon the worth of the present world, and a growing loss of interest in the future. The rise of the scientific temper and the decadence of belief in the supernatural are but another aspect of the same thing. This world, with all its varied phenomena, becomes supremely interesting, as it was not in the Middle Ages; and to investigate the forces which are at work in it, and the laws under which they operate, becomes one of the most engrossing of occupations. And as this study is pursued with ever greater diligence, the old assumption of supernatural

interferences in the established order of events is found to be unnecessary. Eclipses, earthquakes, comets, and other like prodigies are brought within the sphere of natural law, and miracles are confined to a single age in the past, the age of Christianity's birth, or are repudiated altogether. These are but phases of the one great movement, the movement out of which our modern world has come. If religion is to seem worth while in such a world, it must have meaning primarily for the present. Its claims must not be based upon the advantages it offers in another life. To test such claims is beyond our power, and only an age in which truth is accepted solely on external authority will recognise their validity. Is religion efficient for good, here and now? This is the only valid test, and alone suited to the days in which we live. Both ethical and of present worth religion then must be if it is to appeal to the modern world.

But this is not all. One of the watchwords of the modern age is unity. Leibnitz, with his monads, was the typical philosopher of rationalistic individualism. With the revival of Spinozism toward the end of the eighteenth century began the sway of modern monism. To the unity of substance for which he stood, Herder added the unity of force, Spinoza being read in the light of Leibnitz's dynamic conception of the world. And with the unity of substance and of force was combined, under the influence of the growing theory of evolution, the idea of a unity of process running through all nature and life. As in the philosophical sphere, so also in the scientific, unity of substance, unity of force, and unity of process became the established creed, science following the lead of philosophy in this case as in so many others. Carried over into the realm of human life by Herder and many others, this principle of unity meant the oneness of the entire race. From the most ancient times to our own, from the most barbarous to the most highly civilised, from one end of the world to the other, the race is bound together by invisible ties, and no people and no individual can live of himself or

unto himself alone. And when with this is joined the humanitarianism of the eighteenth century, which voiced itself most passionately and effectively in the writings of Rousseau, we have the materials of the modern social ideal, which has been growing clearer and more definite, and finding ever wider acceptance, until now it dominates the world of moral aspiration and effort. To be ethical to-day means not merely to be upright, pure, and faithful in one's individual life, but to promote, so far as in one lies, the well-being of the world. We are judged not by our quality as isolated moral units, but by our contribution to the common life of man. And so religion, if it is to appeal to this age and stand the modern test, must make for social, not merely individual, regeneration; must promote public, not merely private, virtue.

And now, what of the Christian purpose? What it meant in other days we have already seen; and to multitudes, both Catholics and Protestants, particularly to those of the latter who are under the control of the evangelicism of an earlier generation, it still has the same meaning. It is above all else to save men's souls for a blessed immortality in another world. But Christianity has felt the influence of the modern age, and, in spite of the large amount of mediævalism which still clings to it, many of its leaders, and probably still more of the rank and file, are interpreting the Christian purpose in accordance with the modern spirit, and are recognising it as, first and foremost, the establishment of the Kingdom of God on this our earth. And this does not mean that Christianity has capitulated to the modern world, and has given up its own platform in order to adopt alien principles. On the contrary, the recognition of this purpose as Christian means the re-discovery of the real Gospel of Jesus, for this was His purpose too, as we are now beginning clearly to understand. Going with the modern age, we are going back to Christ Himself. This is one of the most striking facts in history. That our age, so widely out of sympathy with the traditional Christianity of more than sixteen centuries, should

find itself increasingly in sympathy with Jesus, whom traditional Christianity was supposed to represent and reproduce, seems strange enough, but is not difficult to explain. It is often said nowadays that only an Oriental can truly understand Jesus, who was Himself of the East. But this is entirely to misinterpret Him.

He did not start with the pessimistic view of man and with the despairing view of the world which were so common in the orientalised paganism of His day, and which perpetuated themselves in the Christian Church. To Him man was by nature a child of God, and the earth was the scene of God's kingdom. He saw good in the weakest and the vilest. He saw worth in birds and flowers, and beauty in all things. The pall of the decadent civilisation of the antique world had not enveloped Him, and He knew nothing of the awful drama of redemption, with Himself as central figure, conceived by Eastern and Western fathers, who were oppressed by the depravity of man and the corruption of the world. Given such a world, the only thing to be desired is escape from it. Given such a humanity, its only hope is in supernatural interferences and cataclysms. But not thus did Jesus picture the world, and not thus did He judge humanity. Pessimism, hopelessness, despair, whether it afflicts the individual or society, is a disease; and Jesus, the ideal man, was a sound man, endowed with the enthusiasms, the hopes, the faiths of youth and health. With the modern age the Western world entered again upon a period of youth, marked by optimism, confidence in man, joy in the present, love of nature, quick human sympathy and devotion to the rights of man, enthusiasm for ideals, and faith in the possibility of their realisation. With all its disillusions and seasons of pessimism, sometimes real, oftener affected, the Western world has still the spirit of youth; and it is only such a world that can fully understand the buoyancy, the hopefulness, and the joyful trust of Jesus; that can appreciate His faith in the godlikeness of man and in the manlikeness of God, and His confidence in the

possibility of making this earth itself the Kingdom of Heaven. "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect"—was ever braver word spoken to man?

And then, to the great good fortune of the days in which we live, at the time of the new outburst of idealism and youthful vigour marking the romantic period of European history, at a time when the world was peculiarly fitted to understand, the enthusiasm of Jesus came, through the birth of the modern historic spirit, a new interest in Christian origins, and so in Jesus Himself. The modern study of the life of Christ, carried on in a period thus in sympathy with Him, has resulted in a fuller knowledge of His ideals and purposes than the world has hitherto had, and has given Him an influence never before approached. We know to-day that the great effort of Jesus was not no save men out of the perishing world, but to save the world itself, to establish the Kingdom of God here and now by promoting the spirit of love between man and man, that they should live with each other as brothers, sons of a common Heavenly Father; that sympathy and service should everywhere take the place of indifference and selfishness; that rivalry should give way to helpfulness, and competition to co-operation. It was to build this kingdom that Jesus laboured, and to the same service He summoned His disciples. And so the modern ideal of service is the Christian ideal. Its existence in our day has made it possible for us the better to understand Jesus, and the ringing of His message in ears thus fitted to hear it has quickened the conscience of the age, and inspired not Christians only but multitudes of others to give themselves to it with a new devotion. The future is in God's hands, and may well be left with Him. Our business is with the present. Social salvation is the watchword of Christianity,—a salvation which is impossible for an individual alone, because it realises itself only in a life with and for others. To be in relations not with God alone but with one's fellows, and to serve God in serving them, that is to be a Christian. The service, to be sure, may be of

various kinds—the solitary labour of the scientist or scholar as well as the public labour of the preacher and social reformer; but service there must be, on a large scale or on a small, if there is to be Christian living.

And now, if I have rightly described the Christian purpose, what of Christian theology? The traditional theologies, both Catholic and Protestant, are of a piece with the traditional Christian purpose. At bottom they are true to it, and express it with sufficient accuracy. For that purpose, in spite of divergencies in detail, was after all in essence one, and it was no mere accident and no mere spirit of conservatism that led the Reformers to retain so much of the old system. The underlying interest was identical, and the theologies that gave expression to it were not fundamentally different. But what of that theology to-day? It is rightly felt by many that it is radically out of line with the modern interpretation of the Christian purpose, and that, instead of supporting what we have most at heart, it serves only to obscure and hinder it. If we retain the old purpose, by all means let us retain the old theology, modified here and there perhaps—for there are alien elements in it, representing diverse interests — but in its principal features unchanged.

But how about the purpose which the modern age recognises as alone truly Christian? It is well to make thoroughgoing work of the matter; to see to it that our theology actually expresses our purpose, and is not made up of tenets entirely unrelated thereto, or even inconsistent therewith. We have no business with a theology out of relation to the controlling interest of our lives. It is the existence of such theologies that makes Christianity seem unreal to many persons. Our creeds say so many things and Christians believe so many things quite apart from practical life that the world regards the Church with indifference or suspicion, or, still worse, supposes that these things are in some way bound up with the Christian purpose, and that it cannot be embraced without them,—an idea which is

largely responsible for the number of intelligent and earnest people outside of the Church and out of sympathy with Christianity. Compared with the purpose that controls his life, a man's theology may be of relatively small importance. Provided he gives himself with all his might to a high and noble end, it makes perhaps little difference what he believes. Nevertheless a theology out of relation to or inconsistent with the controlling Christian purpose is fraught with danger, for that purpose demands self-surrender and devotion of a high and strenuous kind, and men will not long give themselves to it if their allegiance be divided.

Feeling the inconsistency between the theology of other days and the Christian purpose of to-day, many theologians have tried in one way and another to revise the old or to frame a new theology of a type fitted to express the modern interest. An attempt of this kind by the Rev. R. J. Campbell, minister of the City Temple, London, has recently come to public notice and excited widespread attention. Mr Campbell's theology is set forth at length in the volume entitled *The New Theology*, and the interest which dominates him appears still more clearly in a brief article in the last HIBBERT JOURNAL on "The Aim of the New Theology Movement." He sees the issue very clearly. The article referred to contains one of the best statements of the true Christian purpose with which I am acquainted. Moreover, he is thoroughly aware of the chasm between the traditional theology and the Christian message. The criticisms in his book upon one and another of the doctrines of the past are for the most part well taken, and go directly to the heart of the difficulty. But when he attempts to formulate a theology which shall be true to the Christian purpose, and shall serve to elucidate and support it, he seems to me far astray. The fundamental truth of his theology is the immanence of God. This gives us, he thinks, a genuinely Christian theology, fitted truly to express the Christian purpose. Of it he says: "Where or when the name New Theology arose I do not know, but it has been in existence for at least one generation.

It is neither of my invention nor of my choice. It has long been in use both in this country and in America to indicate the attitude of those who believe that the fundamentals of the Christian faith need to be re-articulated in terms of the immanence of God." "Its starting-point is a re-emphasis of the Christian belief in the divine immanence in the universe and in mankind" (*New Theology*, pp. 3, 4). "The new theology, like the humanism of Dr F. C. S. Schiller, represents a method rather than a system to which all its adherents must subscribe. Those who maintain that the Christian religion and even the venerable creeds ought to be interpreted in terms of the divine immanence in the universe and in mankind are users of this method, whether they employ the term New Theology to describe it or not" (HIBBERT JOURNAL, p. 482).

There is no doubt that in some respects this kind of a theology is adapted to the supreme Christian purpose which I have already stated, and in which Mr Campbell believes with all his heart. Thus, *e.g.*, that purpose involves social unity, and the conception of divine immanence emphasises unity above all else. As Mr Campbell says, "The one great word of the New Theology is unity—the unity of the individual with the race, and of the race with God" (*ib.*, p. 486). Moreover, the conception of immanence gives a value and sacredness to the present world which the modern Christian purpose demands if it is to be recognised as legitimate. Thus it is a decided improvement at more than one point upon the old theology, but at the same time it fails altogether to express the really fundamental interest. That God is immanent rather than transcendent does not of itself justify or support the Christian purpose. A man may be a monist, or a dualist, or a pluralist, and still be controlled by it. I cannot myself see that a monist is really any likelier to give himself to its accomplishment than a dualist or a pluralist. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of divine immanence grew up independently of any such purpose, and is in general quite indifferent to it. Among its greatest exponents

when it began to replace the old belief in divine transcendence, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, were Herder, Schleiermacher, and Hegel. The characteristic thing about them all was the notion of God as the absolute, of which we are only differentiations. God so considered may be given a moral character of one kind or another—as, *e.g.*, both Schleiermacher and Hegel represent Him as supremely love—but the character is not the cardinal thing, and is not really the essence of the matter. That God is the all-embracing whole, of which men are but a part, and in conscious oneness with which they find their highest life—this is the great truth for which they all stand.

It is frequently claimed that the divine immanence is a fundamental Christian doctrine, but as a matter of fact it is not found in the teaching of the Christ of the synoptic gospels, and upon them alone can we safely build. Much that the conception of divine immanence conserves is taught by the Christ of the synoptists—the nearness of God, the kinship of man and God, the value of the present life—but all this might be taught also by one whose philosophy was of another sort. The modern interpretation of the Christian purpose has come directly from Christ, but not the doctrine of divine immanence, and the former does not need the latter to embody it. The ideal of Christ was not spiritual exaltation, the wrapt contemplation of divine things, and conscious oneness with the absolute, all of which have found emphasis where even a thoroughgoing immanence doctrine has been in control. His great aim, on the contrary, was to promote the Kingdom of God upon this earth, and religious devotion had value to Him only as it forwarded the one great purpose. Wherever and whenever it overshadows that purpose, and seems more precious and more divine than it; wherever and whenever it entices men away from the simple self-forgetful service of the world, it is, from a Christian point of view, a curse, and not a blessing. History has shown that where the immanence of God is emphasised, the tendency is almost inevitably to find

in the consciousness of His presence and in the contemplation of His perfections the noblest of human employments. If the fact that He is within us and that we are but a part of Him is the supreme truth, then the experience of oneness with Him can hardly fail to be to every spiritually-minded man the highest thing in life. And history has shown, too, that absorption in the contemplation of God may distract a man as completely from the Christ-like service of his brethren as absorption in the pursuit of one's own pleasures. There is a religious selfishness no less fatal to the true Christian calling than the vulgar selfishness of the rabble. It is often said that Jesus came to make men more religious. In one sense one might almost say that He came to make them less religious, for He laboured to free them from what was ordinarily called religion in His own day—a fear of God which made necessary religious exercises of one kind or another in order to appease His wrath, and so distracted men from the real duties of life; or a delight in God which took the form of spiritual worship and contemplation, and made all else seem barren and empty. Jesus was a foe of religion in so far as it interfered with active service, just as much as He was a foe of selfishness and greed. If it be necessary to forget God in order to be single-minded in our devotion to our fellows, then let us forget God,—God-forgetfulness in that event is as much our duty as self-forgetfulness. But, fortunately for religion, Jesus revealed a God to remember whom is the greatest possible inspiration to the active service of our fellows, a God whom we know best, whom we worship most devotedly, and into closest communion with whom we come when we give ourselves with completest singleness of purpose to the work of the Kingdom.

The belief in divine immanence may be a magnificent and inspiring thing. If any man has it, and finds it easier to interpret God in its terms, well and good. It is not my desire to condemn it, but only to Christianise it, to urge upon the man who holds it that the immanent God whom he worships be the God whose supreme purpose Jesus revealed.

Not in the fact of His *mere* immanence, but of His purpose, lies the distinctively Christian truth. Other and older faiths have stood for immanence. The Christian faith alone stands supremely for the purpose of God revealed in Christ. So by all means let us go on believing in divine immanence, or in divine transcendence, or in both, as may be most congenial to us, but let us remember that neither of these, but the Christian purpose, is the heart of the Gospel. Both immanence and transcendence are ontological terms, and it is in the ethical, not the ontological, sphere that Christianity moves. If we be monists—and our philosophical needs may compel us to be —well and good; but let us not imagine that in our monism there is theological merit above that of other men who may be in the bonds of dualism or pluralism. The old idea that in the idealism of Hegel, for instance, is to be found a philosophy that is of peculiar sanctity and offers peculiar support to Christianity, an idea apparently shared by Mr Campbell, was long ago exploded.

It is along the path opened by Kant that a theology fitted to the Christian purpose may be found, rather than along that followed by Herder, Schleiermacher, Hegel, and the many modern exponents of divine immanence, philosophers, poets, and theologians. The great religious contribution of Kant lay not in his rationalism, nor in the method by which he deduced the postulates of God, freedom and immortality, but in the fact that he put God into the moral sphere, and interpreted Him exclusively in terms of rational purpose. Fichte, in his notable little essay on "The Ground of our Belief in a Divine Providence," stated the matter still more emphatically; and Ritschl followed the same line, but gave to the purpose of God a Christian interpretation, seeing in the Kingdom which Kant had represented as God's great aim, not a kingdom of virtue and happiness beyond the grave, but the reign of the spirit of love on earth. One may think as one pleases about Ritschl's theology. It is full of defects, and has been made worse rather than better by his followers. But in its inter-

pretation of God in terms of purpose, and in its interpretation of the divine purpose in terms of Christ's ethical message, it points the way along which Christian thinkers who seek a theology that shall support the modern social gospel will do well to travel.

We need a God of purpose, and a God whose purpose is identical with the supreme Christian purpose, and this God we get in the revelation of Jesus Christ. Studying Him, we discover that His great end was the Kingdom of God, the reign of the spirit of love among men, and that He believed this to be the supreme concern of the God whose will was His meat and drink. And the complete victory which He won over the world in spite of His apparent defeat, won through faith in God and through devotion to His purpose, and the victory which we ourselves win when we follow Him in the like trust and in the like devotion, give us the strongest possible guarantee that there is such a God as Jesus revealed, with such a purpose as He fulfilled. Living in faith in Him and in devotion to His will we are victorious, and bringing others to a like faith and devotion we give them, too, the victory. More cogent proof than this we cannot find. More cogent proof than this we do not need. God we need to give the Christian purpose permanence and stability, and we find Him when it vindicates itself as supremely worthful in the experience of Jesus Himself and of multitudes who follow Him in the same way of sympathy and service.

But granting that all this is true, granting that we need above all else a God whose supreme purpose it is to establish the divine Kingdom on earth, what inconsistency is there between this and the doctrine of divine immanence? Why may not the two go together, immanence being interpreted in ethical terms? The two may and often do. And there is no sufficient reason why they should not. But the two conceptions are very differently related to the Christian purpose. The one directly promotes it, the other has no immediate connection with it; and to bind the two together and make them

equally essential, is to commit the same old blunder which our fathers committed. Both may be true, but if we have the divine purpose it is all we need, and this alone should be recognised as the fundamental Christian truth. My criticism of the modern doctrine of divine immanence is not that it is untrue, or that it has not done and may not do great good, but that it fails to give us what we most need. It is undoubtedly one of the means by which the old theology has been undermined and the way prepared for something better, and it has actually made a religious view of the world possible for many a modern man, and given him relief from not a few difficulties.

But it does not offer the only or the most satisfactory relief. The idea of a God whose controlling purpose has been revealed by Jesus, and whose aim it is to promote the reign of love among men, is equally calculated to break the sway of the old theology, and, what is more, directly supports the Christian purpose.

It may perhaps be objected to this view of God that it has too little connection with the modern scientific view of the world to appeal to the mind of to-day. Science has no need of such a God, and its construction of the universe is complete without Him. This is quite true, but neither has science any need of the conception of divine immanence. Its constructions of the universe are complete without it, for the idea maintained by many of its exponents that in the force or congeries of forces which binds the universe together we are to see God, is to degrade the latter term and to take out of it all spiritual meaning. To the man interested in the Christian purpose, a God so interpreted is of absolutely no value, and to read into such a cosmic force the character which we need in God is entirely gratuitous, to the genuinely scientific man absurd. In fact, the hypothesis of divine immanence is as alien to the scientific view of the universe as the traditional idea of divine transcendence. Science finds no God before and above nature, its creator and controller, but science finds

also no God in nature. To put Him within the universe and connect Him with the processes of nature is to invite science to exclude Him altogether, as it has excluded the old miracle-working God of other days. Not in the physical universe, the world of science, but in the realm of purpose, the realm of ethical and spiritual values, is God to be sought. The universe which science knows is sufficient unto itself, and needs no God within or without, but we are to look for Him in the supreme purpose which we make our own, and for which we are ready to live and to die,—the purpose which puts into life values that science can neither weigh nor measure, which makes us denizens of another world than this we see, a world of ideals more precious than all physical goods. To this world the man controlled by the Christian purpose belongs, whether he be philosophically a monist or a dualist. And in the last resort, it is in this world alone that the Christian finds his God. And until the realm of ideals—the realm of ethical values—shall have been destroyed altogether, God will retain His influence in human life.

Do we then need a new theology? Will the Christian purpose be the better forwarded because of it? Whether it will or not depends, of course, upon the theology. By the right theology it may be greatly aided, for if we can reach a consistent and rational world-view in which the Christian purpose, as we interpret it, occupies a central place, that purpose will be tremendously strengthened. Men may and many doubtless will work to promote the Kingdom of God on earth even though they do not call it the Kingdom of God, and do not even believe there is a God. But if we can believe that God is, and that the establishment of the divine Kingdom on earth is His great concern, a power and a grip and a permanency are given to our effort to forward that Kingdom which can be gained in no other way. All the might of an optimistic faith will reinforce our labours and kindle the enthusiasm of others. And, moreover, with such a faith we can be single-hearted in our devotion to a degree not otherwise

possible. If the universe means supremely something else, or means nothing,—if God, if there be a God, is chiefly interested in another and altogether different end,—the Christian end cannot permanently command the undivided allegiance of the world. The purpose and the world-view, if there be any world-view at all, must in the long-run be in line. And so I say the Christian purpose as interpreted to-day needs a theology consistent with it, and with the experience and knowledge of the modern man,—a theology all of whose tenets shall be framed in the light of the one fundamental Christian truth about God, whose controlling purpose has been revealed to us by Jesus Christ, and finds its vindication in the moral ideals and aspirations of the age in which we live.

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THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE CHRISTIAN ETHIC.

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THE question, Can Christian theology stand the test of modern criticism? represents only one side of the problem which has been created by the action of scientific thought upon traditional faith. The other side may be presented thus: Can the Christian ethic still be regarded as the highest form of moral teaching? To many the latter question seems to be of even more vital importance than the former. The Christian religion has in all ages of its history made its appeal to the conscience in the first instance. The appeal to the intellect has always come later. Further, the ethical side of Christianity represents its value for human life, and, more and more, we are coming to realise that our hold upon religion depends upon our conviction concerning this value. To attack faith on its ethical side is therefore the most deadly assault which could possibly be made. If the attack be successful, the meaning is, not that Christian morality is wholly wrong, but that Christianity is only a passing phase in human development, and that mankind is already outgrowing it. It can then no longer claim to be the supreme and final religion.

Nothing has helped so much in the creation of such suspicions as the extraordinary rise of the Japanese power in the Far East. It is rightly felt that the explanation of that rise must be very largely sought in moral causes. The

efficiency of the Japanese is not purely intellectual. It is inspired by a patriotism as splendid as any that history can show, sustained by self-devotion of the noblest kind, and crowned by a magnanimity and a humanity which have not been surpassed by any Western people. Such facts make it hard to maintain that the highest moral attainments belong exclusively to the Christian ethos.

On another side, the sceptical spirit is inclined to assail the Christian ethic. The very elevation of many of the precepts of Christ seems to remove them from contact with ordinary human life. When we are told not to resist the evil man, to turn the other cheek to the smiter, to give the cloak to him who has taken the coat, to give to him that asketh, and so on, we wonder at the greatness of the demand, but reflect on the impossibility, as it appears to be, of such rules being generally obeyed in the world in which we live. Or when we are taught that whosoever will save his life shall lose it, and whosoever will lose his life shall save it, we cannot but think of this world in which progress depends, apparently, on competition, every man striving, and being bound to strive, for success in the struggle for existence. The great rule of dying to live may serve for those exceptional persons whom we term saints, but could not, so far as we can see, be adopted as a principle by mankind in general. We are commonly told in these days, when doubt has been thrown on the traditional dogmas, that Christianity is a life, not a creed. But does not this statement merely serve to accentuate the total unlikeness of the life which is led by those who profess to be Christians to the ideal set before them by the Master? Are these Christians hypocrites, or is the fact simply this, that the standard they profess to set before themselves is an impossible one?

Reflections such as these are passing through many minds. It is therefore a matter of the utmost importance to make a determined endeavour to clear our thoughts on the subject of the ethical teaching of Christianity. And the first question which arises is, where is that teaching to be found? "Back

to Christ" is the principle which must prevail here. For it cannot be pretended for a moment that Christians have succeeded in advancing beyond their Master on the lines laid down by Him. That there has been ethical development during the last eighteen or nineteen hundred years is undoubted. But it has not left Christ behind. So far as there has been advance in the direction indicated by Him, we are still immeasurably behind the ideal He set before us. It is just for this reason that many find the moral teaching of Christ visionary and unpractical. It demands a degree of self-denial which they think impossible, and it preaches an altruism for which society as at present constructed has no use. If, therefore, the advance of ethical development has been away from Christ (supposing for the moment the possibility of this), it is not because it has outdistanced Him on His own lines, but because it has been in some other direction.

Therefore we are safe in seeking the very fullest and loftiest expression of the Christian ethic in the teaching of Christ Himself.

It has often been said that the Christian ethic is too negative. And there can be little doubt that the traditional teaching of the Church (using that word in the widest possible sense) is more or less open to the charge. By a too exclusive insistence on the ideas of sin, repentance, forgiveness, it is to be feared that the Church very frequently led men to think of innocence, purity, freedom from blame as the only characteristics of the ethical ideal. Good works were certainly inculcated, but were conceived too often in a narrow and rigid fashion, whether regarded as meritorious or not. Goodness as the healthy activity of the soul, both blessed and beneficent, and wholly apart from its bearing on the question of salvation or of ultimate rewards, was too little considered. Devotion to the public welfare and duty to the State were frequently left out of account. In some of these respects it is perfectly true that certain phases of Christian moral teaching compare unfavourably with the higher attainments of pagan philosophy.

But it is only because we judge of Christian morality from some of the forms which it has assumed in the Christian community that these imperfections appear serious. When we turn to the Gospels, and frankly and fearlessly take the moral teaching of Christ as it is given to us, we find ourselves in a world in which these difficulties vanish. There may be difficulties of another kind, but these apparent limitations of outlook upon life, the failure to grasp the human problem as a whole, utterly disappear.

It is characteristic of the imperfect apprehension of the moral teaching of Christ which became traditional in the Church that the Beatitudes have been almost universally regarded as a presentation of the ideal character. How this view of them is to be reconciled with their obviously introductory position and with the almost purely negative nature of the characteristics on which they pronounce a blessing is not clear. The manner in which they are given in St Luke's Gospel (ch. vi. vv. 20–26), balanced as they are by woes pronounced upon the positive qualities which correspond exactly with the negative characteristics which are blessed, should have warned expositors that here they had to do with something very different from a carefully complete statement of the ideal. The truth is that they express something far more important than any abstract description of character. What they declare is the preaching of the gospel to the poor. Christ came proclaiming a blessing for all those who had hitherto been forgotten or despised: the poor, the hungry, the wretched, the hated and persecuted. In St Matthew's report, the description which is given of human need in its various forms (ch. v. vv. 3–12) takes on a more spiritual form. To regard this as mere embroidery is surely a mistake. For the blessing which Christ came to give was spiritual, and when He called the needy that they might receive a blessing He implied the existence of spiritual poverty and spiritual hunger. In both cases the meaning of the Beatitudes is that Christ came offering the highest of all blessings to the needy of

every kind, and specially to the miserable whom the world disregarded.

Further, the Beatitudes are introductory to the fullest account of the inner nature of the Kingdom of God which is given us in the Gospels. The trend of modern critical study of the Gospels is in the direction of the conviction that the Kingdom of God (or the Kingdom of Heaven, in the phrase characteristic of St Matthew) is the first great leading conception of the teaching of Christ. However the phrase is to be interpreted, here is the central point of the Gospel as first proclaimed by the Master Himself. A thorough study of all the passages which touch upon this subject reveals the fact that the conception of the Kingdom as presented in the Gospels is many-sided, and that the attempt to define it gives rise to highly controversial questions. Is the Kingdom to be identified with the Church? or, is it to be taken to mean the rule of God in the heart of the individual? What is to be made of the eschatological doctrines which appear so clearly in many places? What is the relation of the teaching of Christ in the Gospels to the thoughts and expectations common among the Jews at that time? Is our Lord's view of the Kingdom but a more spiritual form of the national hope which was then filling the mind and stirring the heart of Israel?

All these questions have been discussed with great learning and from many points of view; but it seems to have escaped attention very generally that Christ's own teaching presents the Kingdom as, in the first instance, an ethical ideal. It is surely to be gathered from the Gospels that the moral teaching of Christ as we have it presented in the Sermon on the Mount is an unfolding of the inner life of the Kingdom as He conceived it. Whether we consider St Matthew's report of the Sermon, or bring together the corresponding passages which are scattered through St Luke, we find that the moral teaching does not stand apart from the Gospel of the Kingdom, but is of its very essence. In the fifth chapter of St Matthew we find a great principle first stated and then illustrated with

instance after instance. The principle concerns the relation of the new Kingdom to the old Law. The Kingdom is not to destroy the Law, but to fulfil it, to draw out its deeper meaning, to reveal the underlying truth. The morality of the Kingdom is to be inward, not outward—of the heart, and not of mere conformity to rule. Its deepest truth is love. In the sixth chapter, the contrast between the moral life of the Kingdom and the practice of the world is kept clearly in view, and in the latter part there is a wonderful treatment of the common daily struggle of human life. How is the work of life to be done? In what spirit, with what motive, is the toil for daily bread to be accomplished?

Here is a question which supplies perhaps the severest test of any system of moral teaching. The ethics of Christianity are at home in the heroics of virtue. They can justify the martyr. But can they supply a motive which can elevate and purify the homeliest of earthly tasks and yet not lose contact with the realities of human life? The answer which Christ gives has often seemed unreal. "Take no thought," He says, "be not anxious for your life, what ye shall eat; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. . . . . Your Father knoweth that ye have need of these things." Such a bringing of faith into the labours and cares of daily existence seems unreal simply because we fail to grasp the teaching of the passage as a whole. For here is no gospel of mere inactivity, no advice to trust in God and let things slide. The calm confidence in the providential care of the Eternal Father is based upon the conviction that "the life is more than meat, and the body than raiment." There is a deeper truth than the struggle for existence. And that deeper truth is expressed with absolute clearness and unfaltering confidence: "Seek ye the kingdom of God, and these things (the necessaries of life) shall be added unto you" (Luke xii. 31; Matthew vi. 33).

The whole passage leads up to this climax. In this statement is therefore to be found the clue to its meaning. Yet how seldom do we find this explanation given!

It is but a small part of the illumination which is shed by this great saying that it shows us at once that we have here no commendation of moral slackness in the performance of daily duties, but rather a principle which gives relief from the worries of life by affording a stronger hold upon the deeper realities. This is true and great, for thus the commonest things are glorified, the simplest duties connected with the loftiest purposes, the humblest life ennobled. But there is also opened to us a larger and grander prospect over the domain of human existence. We are able to see in this great conception of the Kingdom of God the supreme, the absolute motive which can bring together all that is good in human endeavour, from the efforts of the labourer toiling for his daily bread to the most heroic devotion of the saint and the martyr.

We may search the teaching of Christ through from end to end, and we shall find no final and authoritative definition of the Kingdom, nothing to silence decisively the disputes which the critics and theologians have raised as to the signification of the term. While continually preaching the Kingdom, presenting the thought of it in relation to all the needs of human life, raising expectations in connection with it, asserting its claim upon the heart and service of the individual, foreshadowing its relation to human history (as in certain of the parables), He never said exactly what it was. That it was spiritual, a blessing for the soul of every individual who entered it, that it was not wholly disconnected from the Jewish anticipations of a divinely regenerated political order, that it was a rule on earth of the great Father in Heaven and therefore a realm of love—so much is absolutely clear to anyone who compares the Sermon on the Mount with the parables. The Kingdom is therefore the supreme blessing for the individual and for the community. It is an ideal which is both individual and social. Though its content is nowhere fully declared, its union of these two elements is everywhere implied.

Was Christ a socialist? There are many now who tell us

that the socialist creed is the essence of the Christianity of Christ. And it is true that He taught the brotherhood of men as it was never taught before His time, and that the Christian community, when it first organised itself, and while the recollection of its Master's voice was still fresh in its memory, endeavoured to put an end to private property and to hold all possessions in common.

On the other hand, some of our most learned critics tell us that the essence of the Gospel is its message to the individual soul to find God within, and so be at peace; that the socialist interpretation of the Gospel is a mistake. And it must be confessed that Christ taught the value of the individual, the infinite worth of the soul, the necessity of a personal relation to God, the reality of personal responsibility, as these truths had never been taught before. It is not a mistake to say that modern individualism, in the sense of the recognition of the inalienable right of the individual to assert himself, his judgment and his rights, against the community, is the creation of Christianity.

That both these doctrines can be traced to Christ, and that the principles which underlie both are to be found united in His great conception of the Kingdom, are surely profoundly interesting facts.

It is when the Kingdom is regarded as an ethical principle that the full value of these facts appears. For here we find ourselves face to face with the problem which has confounded all modern attempts to create a science of ethics. How to unite the individual and the common good, is, for modern ethics, the problem of problems. That any school of thought has approached its solution by purely scientific methods cannot be asserted. Its practical solution in the social and political spheres is the despair of our statesmen and reformers, though every step in the way of true progress is made in the faith that there is a solution and, we must believe, is an advance towards that solution.

What Christ did was to teach men, with a truly Divine

persuasiveness, that there is a purpose worth living for, an end worth striving for; that that end is the supreme blessing for every individual soul and for all souls; that the simplest life, the most commonplace work, may be so accomplished as to be a step towards it; that in all our praying we should pray for it, in all our working we should work for it; that it is worthy of the greatest self-sacrifice, the most whole-hearted devotion; and that the way to it is the way of love. He called that great end the Kingdom of God, and surely the wisdom of the ages has not devised a better name.

To the writer this seems to be the leading principle of Christ's ethical teaching, and such acquaintance as he possesses with the ethical literature of ancient and modern times encourages him to think that neither have the philosophers done better nor has the world got beyond it.

The truth is that the world is beginning to find in this very conception just the teaching that modern social conditions demand, and just the needful expression of the truths that our best ethical teachers of recent times have, "with groanings which cannot be uttered," been trying to set free from the jargon of the schools.

It will be found, almost without exception, that when the optimist of the present day wishes to describe the end for which he believes he is working, when he thinks of better methods of education, or of improved conditions of existence for the toiling masses, or even of sanitation, or still more when he rises to the great hopes that fill his mind for a higher level of spiritual attainment through loving co-operation, the one phrase which he finds altogether satisfying is the old one from the Gospels. He calls his ideal the Kingdom of God. In the last number of the HIBBERT JOURNAL are several articles which breathe a spirit of confident hope as to the future. The Rev. R. J. Campbell believes that the "New Theology" with which he has identified himself is preparing the way for "an ethical and spiritual awakening of Christendom." It maintains "the unity of the individual with the race and

of the race with God." "Its aim is as clear as moral conviction can make it—namely, the realisation of a Kingdom of God, a spiritual brotherhood, exalting and fulfilling all the throes and strivings of the nations in the political, social, and scientific world to-day." Whether the tenets of the New Theology are more efficient for this purpose than other forms of creed is not a question which concerns us on the present occasion. What concerns us is the inevitableness of this way of putting the case, in view of the thoughts and impulses which are characteristic of the age to which we belong.

When we pass from the first article of the April HIBBERT to the second we find precisely the same phenomenon in a different shape. A Roman Catholic writer presents a view of the outlook which hopeful members of his Church, who adopt a liberal attitude towards modern critical thought, discern for the future of religion. For this writer, not the New Theology, but the old Church, is fitted to be the agency by which the grandest of results is to be accomplished for humanity. The Latin Church is, he thinks, peculiarly fitted for the task "by reason of her splendid assertion of the principle of oneness or solidarity: the oneness of human nature; . . . . the oneness of God and man, whereby God co-operates with man and men with one another in the spiritual evolution of the individual and the race," etc. After this, it is inevitable that he should go on to declare that the progressive forces which he perceives in his Church "are truly working to promote that visible Kingdom of God, for whose coming the Lord taught His disciples to pray: *Adveniat regnum tuum!*"

Thirdly, in the same number of this Journal there is a stirring article from the pen of Sir Oliver Lodge on "A Reformed Church as an Engine of Progress." Like everything else from the same pen, it presents that blending of critical insight with profound faith and hope which always make its writer's contributions to religious thought as helpful as they are stimulating. Sir Oliver Lodge desires a simplification of

forms and a unification of effort which will have the effect of concentrating the forces of the Church upon the great task which is presented by the social conditions of the present day. "What we have to learn is that the will of God is to be done on earth; that the Kingdom of Heaven is to be a present kingdom, here and now, not relegated always to the future." And so he suggests that, in place of the tests now in use, should be substituted a short and simple declaration by the candidate for ordination that he longs "for Christ's ideal of the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth," and that, God helping him, he will with all his "power and ability strive to this end and to no other."

Once again we perceive how inevitable it is, in view of the problems and ideals which belong to our time, that a man whose heart has been stirred by the great human needs and who has felt the influence of the spirit of Christ should fall back upon the conception of the Kingdom as the one adequate means of expressing the aim towards which all sincere effort after the good must strive.

How completely these considerations dispose of the old objection that the Christian ethic is too negative! The illustrations which we have taken from the utterances of some of the most ardent of the many enthusiastic souls who at the present moment feel the need of pressing on to some large and positive solution of the social problems of the age prove that the teaching of Christ supplies exactly the expression which such aspirations demand. No theory of virtue or doctrine of happiness could supply the place of this conception of a great result to be achieved, a result in which mankind both individually and collectively is to find its blessedness, and which, in its relation to the Divine purposes, has a universal value and significance.

Again, when the Kingdom is regarded as the ideal, the apparent unreality of certain of the precepts in the Sermon on the Mount finds a simple explanation. An ideal must always be in advance of every particular stage in the movement

towards its realisation. If its contents can be unfolded at all, they must be more or less out of touch with the conditions which belong to any definite epoch, and must therefore to some extent appear unreal. Now, in the Sermon on the Mount, Christ professedly unfolds something of the ethical content of the Kingdom. "Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the Kingdom of Heaven." Yet of the Law He says, "I came not to destroy, but to fulfil." And after this introduction follow those utterances which have proved so puzzling to the matter-of-fact reader, culminating in the astonishing declaration, "Ye shall be perfect as your Father is perfect."

Surely it is clear that Christ is here contemplating the ideal in all its perfection, working out the principle of love in its relation to human life, and illustrating its operation by reference to certain human and social situations. Such illustrations are bound to contrast so strongly with the facts of our imperfect condition as to appear at times unreal, almost impossible. But, for this very reason, they startle us into attention, they force upon us the supreme principle and make the ideal vivid.

Further, instead of omitting the importance of duty to the State and the consideration of public welfare, this ideal of the Kingdom includes all other means of identifying the interests of the individual with those of the community. It is the most comprehensive expression of the common good. And it is just on this account that all our modern humanitarian and social enthusiasms lay hold upon it and commend themselves to their own consciences and to the world by claiming a share in it.

How wide in its sweep is the great principle which thus comes to light! The carpenter in his workshop, the labourer at his task, the business man in his office, the statesman at his greater duties, the social reformer, all are living for the Kingdom, in so far as their lives are truly motived, as really as the most devoted of religious workers. All true living and

working is for the Kingdom. Whenever a man loses himself in duty, whether with the purpose of doing faithfully the work which lies nearest to his hand, or, inspired by a noble patriotism or by a passion of pity for the miserable, putting his will to some great undertaking, he is seeking the Kingdom. The spirit which glorified the Japanese in their heroic devotion to the cause of their country is not as remote from the Christian ethic as we may imagine. Their success is but another illustration of the truth that they who seek the Kingdom shall find that the other things shall be "added unto them." The best work in the world is done, and the true rewards or results of labour secured, not by those who work for bread and butter, or wealth, or any mere material end, but by those who "seek the Kingdom."

It may seem that here we are passing beyond the domain of ethics and entering that of religion. But it is impossible to separate the ethical from the religious in the teaching of Christ. It is just for this reason that He can solve the problem on which all philosophical systems come to grief. Christ can identify the good of the individual with that of the community without destroying the independence of the former because the Kingdom is no mere state or social organism, but a union of human souls in God. The Fatherhood of God and the supremacy of love are the ruling principles of the Kingdom. Here is the ideal, the eternal thing. Every human society, so far as it attains a true existence, is a temporal and partial realisation of it, deriving whatever of truth and goodness it possesses from "the Father, from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named."

It is just this great substratum of religious faith which makes the Christian ethic supreme and absolute.

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THE FREE CATHOLIC IDEAL.

THE REV. J. M. LLOYD THOMAS.

THE saying that a prophet is not without honour save in his own country and in his own house applies to prophetic epochs no less than to prophetic personalities. The historian could tell of creative and decisive periods which were hardly recognised as creative or decisive at all by the very men who were then forging a new fate for mankind. Only long afterwards, when the issues of that pregnant hour were born and adult, did posterity understand that the age in which those makers and destroyers of systems lived was indeed prophetic, though without honour in its own temporal context.

It does not require a superior discerning spirit to detect that Christianity is now passing through an immensely significant epoch. Yet it may be that it is far more significant than any of us can now realise. At the risk of seeming extravagant, I will confess that I for my part seriously believe that the age in which we are the living actors will some day be declared to have been more decisive for Christianity—more burdened with the things that belong to its futurity—than any period since Constantine and the subsequent Nicene Creed.

In connection with my subject, it is not fantastic or even inappropriate to refer thus to the imperial triumph of the Christian Faith, and to the framing of the Creed. Contrasted with that crisis, our own time presents the full shock of collision. For ours is the day not of the constructing

but of the crumbling of creeds, not of the creation but of the destruction of establishments. The imposing structure of dogma is everywhere falling into ruin. It must be added that many expert theologians have been for a long time perfectly well aware of the fact. But until recently they have more or less successfully suppressed the most alarming symptoms and allayed popular panic by energetic protestations that the ancient building was still secure. This pretence can continue no longer. The impending collapse is obvious even to the untrained observer. Orthodoxy has at last been brought before the tribunal of public opinion, and with specially disastrous results for the Protestant religion.

It is not without significance that Luther, who began the Reformation by extolling Reason as "something divine," should not close his career without calling it "an ugly devil's bride." In so far as he appealed to the principle of free inquiry, he raised a fury which the Reformation movement never quite managed to tame. In so far as he tried to subdue it by setting the authority of the Scriptures against the fanaticism of antinomian sects on the one hand and the absolutism of the Roman Church on the other—a book against a mystic life and a divine institution—he made the final victory of the Church only a question of time. Yet, in so far as he based the life of the Christian on inward experience and evangelical grace, he heralded the advent of the Religion of the Spirit and the downfall of the religions of dogma—his own among them. To-day we see that the Protestantism of the Protestant religion is sick unto death, and the New Theology is only one very small but portentous symptom of a fatal disease. There is no power on earth which can now save Protestantism, as such, from ultimate disruption.

So long, indeed, as it still retained the authority of the Bible and of certain surviving dogmas carried over somewhat mechanically from the old faith, it was protected against the inherent destructiveness of its own individualism. But when

this authority had been completely undermined, it found itself without any spiritual solidarity, without any firm and disciplined body of organic church life to withstand the ravages of its own internal rationalism. Thus, in the fulness of time, it is falling an easy victim to its own intellectual analysis, and we are hardly surprised to see that criticism—the offspring of its own loins—has dealt it a mortal if unfilial stroke.

The Church of Rome is only in some respects more fortunate. For here, as in Protestantism, a rapid disintegration of dogma has already set in. How far this overthrow of the old standards within the citadel of the Ancient Guard can be claimed as a victory for Protestantism it is not easy to determine. It is probable that the Liberal Catholicism which is now so vigorous, not only in America and England, but in France and Italy, would in any case have emerged, even if the Protestant Reformation had never been. The Higher Criticism was rather a direct child of the Revival of Learning than its grandchild through the Reformation. The new Biblical scholarship may be said to have really begun outside Protestantism, and particularly in the admissions of Father Simon and the conjectures of Jean Astruc—both Roman Catholics. The development of philosophy, the progress of natural science, the invention of machinery, the application of steam and electricity, the expansion of commerce, the growth of democracy—all these, though indeed fostered and protected by the atmosphere of the Protestant emancipation, would surely have occurred even if Luther had remained a monk and Henry VIII. had not been "the greatest widower that ever lived." Be this as it may, by far the most suggestive and promising fact in modern religious life is the Liberal movement within the Roman communion.

It is hardly necessary to dwell at any length on the nature of this movement. We have all been made familiar with it by recent articles in this Journal, and by books like those of the Abbé Loisy, by Fogazzaro's novel *The Saint*, by the Rev. A. L. Lilley's articles and translations in the *Commonwealth*

and elsewhere, by Father Tyrrell's masterly expositions, *Lex Orandi* and *Lex Credendi*, and especially his remarkable little brochure, *A Much-abused Letter*, which no theologian or educated layman can afford to neglect. Impressive as the volume of this evidence is—and I have only mentioned fragments of it—we must bear in mind that in the nature of things the movement cannot be one to court notoriety. Roman Catholics are well trained and disciplined, and know when to range and when to come to heel. It is not their habit to break bounds, to seek publicity, or to assert their independence by proclaiming the Protestant right and duty of individual perversity. The Liberals among them have, we may suppose, some of the self-restraint, the prudence, the diplomacy, and even the subtlety with which we credit (or discredit) their Church as a whole. That they still find it discreet to write pseudonymously is a fact that tells its own tale. The magnitude and the power of the new movement cannot, therefore, be estimated by what appears on the surface. The current of its influence runs deep and still. If we are to believe those of their own following who profess to know, theirs is a leaven potent enough in due time to leaven the whole lump.

In the presence of this diffusive and all-pervading energy, it would be as grotesque a piece of stupidity to identify modern Romanism with the Vatican policy, or with Jesuitism, or with the spirit of the Inquisition, as it would be to identify democracy or rationalism with the bloody orgies of the French Revolution, or the Russian people with autocracy and organised massacre. No one in the least degree familiar with the New Catholic tendency can for a moment doubt that its best representatives are the sworn enemies of superstition and of ecclesiastical tyranny, and are animated even to the point of heroism by the noblest progressive ideals. When we read words of such calm and assured determination as were spoken by Don Romolo Murri on the occasion of his recent suspension by the Pope, we cannot but feel that a splendid passion, an intense sincerity, and a magnificent purpose inspire

these ardent Liberals of the Roman faith. Those of us who have our own traditions of struggle for freedom cannot withhold our tribute of admiration. With our own memories of conflict and persecution, we must naturally sympathise with the labours of these earnest idealists, as indeed with the labours of all who are devoted "to truth, to liberty, to religion." Standing outside their visible Church, we are yet one with them in the invisible Church of sympathy and of aspiration towards the same great ends of unity and universality. We can but watch and cheer their brave efforts in a stirring campaign. They have great allies; their

> "Friends are exultations, agonies,
> And love, and man's unconquerable mind."

Those who are pledged to the cause of Liberal Christianity can assure themselves, even if they may not be permitted to assure these others, that in heart and mind and will *they are far nearer to them than either party is to the orthodox Bible Protestant.* In the light of this impressive movement it would seem as if what is called the New Reformation is likely to be more a Catholic than a Protestant Reformation. It is the conviction of the present writer at any rate, that the day must come, and perhaps sooner than we dare hope, when the Liberal Catholic movement will have worked itself consistently through into the Free Catholic movement in which Protestantism and Romanism, carried up into a new religious and undogmatic unity, will be there transcended or reconciled.

I have called special attention to this movement because it is peculiarly encouraging to those whose primary affinities are not with Protestantism or Romanism as such, but with a free and universal Christianity. The disintegration of dogma which means death to the old Protestantism may mean life and liberty to the new Catholicism. When the theological authority of Bible and dogma shall have been completely overthrown, Catholicism may still be found to have what Protestantism has utterly failed to develop—the profound and inspiring consciousness of the continuity and solidarity of the Christian communion,

and of the living authority of the collective corporate Church life, not any longer as something external, artificial, and infallible, but as the religious claim of the spiritual whole on the constituent member, as the moral right of the religious totality to the reasonable obedience and loyal service of the organic part.

Turning now to the Protestant bodies of the extreme left, I would at once express my firm conviction that it is on acquiring, *within the invigorating atmosphere of their assured doctrinal liberty*, this Catholic consciousness of the reasonable and spiritual authority of the corporate Church life, that their future depends. Without it they are irrevocably doomed; with it they may yet, even at the eleventh hour, be saved unto life. They have completely won their intellectual liberty; they have also developed a singularly noble and strenuous type of moral life; they have a rare love of truth and a fine scorn of compromise. But it is their tragedy to have rendered modern Christendom the unique service of working out into the full glare of day the fallacy of religious individualism. It now remains for them to be convinced that their only possible salvation lies in the corporate spirituality of a Catholic life. At the moment they are in a critical condition. As fast as they can gather new allies, old ones are dispersing, either through ecclesiastical despair or moral fatigue, into the sleepy hollow of fashionable Anglicanism or (through idiosyncrasy and caprice as often as through conviction) into Theosophy. Ethicism, Christian Science, Higher Thought, Spiritualism, or some one or other of the innumerable American or Oriental cults. Among many who remain there is but the slightest discipline or combination. External and institutional religion, without which, of course, there can be no such thing as public worship at all, is regarded as something to be dreaded and held well in leash. They feel what Father Tyrrell has aptly described as that "sort of hostility to externalities that renders as excessive a homage to their importance as does the most rigorous defence of them." They have, to a pathetic

extent, lost the vision of the realities of Church life, and are conspicuously lacking in the creative imagination, the poetic and religious idealism that can give meaning and sanctity to the duties and privileges of Church membership. The conception of a holy visible Church on earth hardly comes within their horizon at all, and when it does, it is often so secularised to the level of a club that it fails to kindle the emotions, to win spiritual allegiance, or to command order and discipline. Sermons and books about the Church usually leave these congregations cold, or only irritate them as being something affected, pompous, and unreal. England they know, the Empire they know, but what in the name of common sense is the Holy Catholic Church or the Communion of Saints! The melancholy truth is that among Liberal Protestants generally the grace and the dignity of Church life have all but vanished. They move awkwardly, with embarrassment and constraint, in the cycle of these high conceptions as in the presence of something uncongenial with their practical and moral genius. Timidity, fear, suspicion, mutual distrust break up every attempt at more effective organisation and every element of cohesion, solidarity and corporate life. Sacraments and symbols, special rites and services like baptism, the Lord's Supper, confirmation, ordination, are in grave danger of falling into neglect. Their laymen love to have it so, and their ministers seem powerless to prevent a general decadence of Church tone. Now, it may be safely predicted that, unless there is a change of front, unless they give themselves a new direction, or, to use a term that is rapidly becoming a faded figure of speech, a new orientation, they will become extinct as a Church, and will survive only as the Deists, the Anabaptists, and other obscure bodies in the byways of history. The necessary change of front must, I am persuaded, be in the direction of the Catholic type of religious life. It must be at any rate a movement upward into that corporate ideal in which religious socialism and religious individualism alike will find their true function and harmonious working. Their Church life must

become an organic fellowship and not an atomic aggregation. The Church Catholic must once more be felt as an ideal and a reality which can kindle a glowing response in the hearts of men. It must inflame their emotions, brace their wills, and command their reasonable obedience. The visible expression of this life in worship must become more frankly symbolic and artistic, less puritanic and ascetic. The holiness of beauty, no less than the beauty of holiness, the truth of loveliness, no less than the loveliness of truth, must be unreservedly recognised. The more undogmatic the character of the Church life, the more imperative is the introduction of rich and uniting symbolic forms.

Once more I would urge that, whatever strictures they may be disposed to pass on the past, they must become more consistent evolutionists, and adopt for their own purposes the doctrine of development. The past must be not so much repudiated as reinterpreted; it should come as a live and moving drama, not as a dead and closed chronicle of enacted achievements. It must therefore be assimilated and absorbed into a heightened present. The Catholic past must not only be emancipated, it must emancipate, it must liberate us from the tyranny of the specious present into that eternal religion whose service is perfect freedom. Above all, there must be seen the ideal vision in which the Church may appear as an end in itself, and not only as a means; for the Church Catholic is the highest and most sacred concept of humanity that can ever brighten the mind or thrill the heart. Such a Church is more than a mere medium of religious influence; it is, when all its implications have been worked, thought, and felt out, not a mere means to religion, but itself the living abode of religion; not a mere instrument of a progress in time, but an organism of eternal life and the vital embodiment of our ultimate beatitude. When we permit ourselves to conceive in imagination, a long way after Dante, of the Rose of Heaven (and let the secularistic politician remember that he, too, must have some notion of a Utopia,

of a goal or consummated society), when we think with a strong, religious, consistent movement of thought of the union and harmony of active spirits living in perfected love, do we not then think of that which simply *is* religion—not a mere medium, or means of religious influence, but religious life and influence itself in its supreme expression, that eternal symphony in which the personality of the saint is but a single note? At that level of thought we may safely take up the motto, so dangerous on lower ground, of "the Church for the Church's sake," or what seems at that altitude exactly the same thing, "God for God's sake." This, or something closely allied to this, would appear to be the characteristically Catholic type of devotion and religiousness. The *name* Catholic is chiefly valuable because the *thing* Catholic is still so precious. But precious as it is, it can henceforth only be accepted in a form that is compatible with perfect freedom of thought, and therefore the only Catholic Church that can claim the allegiance of the modern mind is a Free Catholic Church. By this is meant, however, not a vague or featureless universalism, not a cosmopolitan religion artificially pieced together like a mosaic, from selected fragments of all that is best in the great world-religions, but a historic universalism, coloured and veined by the devotional life and traditions of Catholicism, and vitalised by the spirit and continuous current of our ever-living Christianity. For herein is "the truth of humanity."

I have offered a plea here and elsewhere for a Free Catholic Church, but I do not suggest that we should set about organising it on a grandiose scale. In their present mood none of the denominations is humble enough or great enough for the task. Perhaps the best that some of us can do is to prepare ourselves and others to be in readiness to enter it when it takes visible form, and in the meantime to give it a supreme place in our heart's devotion. This Free Catholic Church is already organising itself from day to day in the minds of some of the most earnest and idealistic in all the denominations. But it

would be disastrous to force the pace, or to try to "regiment men" before they are willing to commit themselves. I agree with those who say that the Free Catholic Church is forming itself, not as a separate congregation, but as an inner understanding among existing ecclesiastical bodies. The attempt to manipulate and constrain this inner understanding prematurely into a new Church would be a grave blunder and a hindrance to what we all desire. We do not require any more sects, but rather that the existing sects should cease to be sects at all by becoming integral elements in one federated life, and so constitute a variety in unity. On the other hand, it would be a base and ignoble thing to conclude that all we have to do is to wait passively for this unity to burst miraculously out of the clouds with glory. Truth, beauty, and goodness must be one in God; and if we sincerely and passionately believe in the Kingdom of God, we must try to make them one on earth. It is for the visible Church to rise to the sublime venture of faith and dare all in the conscious effort to realise this divine unification, so that the tabernacle of God may be with men. What then remains for us here and now? This—and how much it is!—that all who accept this Free Catholic ideal should hold it up courageously and always above the noisy tumult of our vain sectarianisms. It remains in a peculiar way the function of the existing undogmatic churches, which have been the first and most consistent in working right through to the other side of the Protestant principle, to avail themselves of their inherited freedom and become now the first also to turn their attention to the Free Catholic principle and make it their own. Martineau, "'our great leader,' as he was fondly called by men who seldom followed him" (to quote a just but stinging phrase of Dr Drummond's), said that "the binding religious fellowship which keeps personal wishes within bounds has died out amongst us." If so, our work must be to revive it and put ourselves in a true apostolic succession to the noble spirit of whom we have never been worthy. We have long enough exploited his honoured name in the interests of a sectarianism

which he abhorred. Let us see if we cannot now let his saintly memory exploit us in the interest of the Catholicity which he loved.

To sum up. Protestantism is now culminating on the one hand in a conception of Christianity as the Religion of the Spirit. But if this Religion of the Spirit is still to be called Protestant, then this paradox is true, that Catholicism is the truer Protestantism, in that it is more faithfully, more thoroughly, and more richly the expression of the Religion of the Spirit than even the best Protestantism that now exists. For Protestantism is ending on the other hand in negation, analysis, and the false mysticism of irresponsible cults. It has become the breeder of our modern antinomian fads, of anarchy, lawlessness, and the proud egotism of the closed and self-centred soul. Not in this, I say, but in a Catholicism which can do justice to the two perfectly reconcilable and even mutually necessary and interdependent ideas of authority and private judgment, of external and internal religion—it is in this Free Catholicism that the Religion of the Spirit can find its only possible mode of manifestation and activity, the only possible organ that is congenial with its own essence and expressive of its own life. For the Religion of the Spirit is not the religion of an indefinitely extended and disembodied ghost, or of that "green gas" in which Mr H. G. Wells put his trust *In the Days of the Comet.* It is not the religion of an attenuated and superfine matter, or some floating but sanctified ether. It is rather the religion of that concrete and eternal life of poetry and art, of history and philosophy, of morality and mystical communion, whose ultimate meaning we try to express by that great and ancient word—God.

J. M. LLOYD THOMAS.

NOTTINGHAM.

TRACT NO. XCI.

THE ARTICLES OF RELIGION FROM AN AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW.

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DURING the sixty and six years that have elapsed since 1841, the meteorite known in ecclesiastical history as TRACT NO. XC. has had ample time to cool. Such was the heat of friction developed by the stone's passage through the Anglican atmosphere, so violent was the explosion caused by its impact upon the hard surface of an Evangelical England, that, for the time being, a fair appraisal of values was impossible. Any attempt to lift and weigh the incandescent mass would have been futile. But patience has now had her perfect work, relative temperatures have quietly adjusted themselves, and it is open to sober-minded critics to subject *Tract XC.* to libration and analysis; hence *Tract No. XCI., or The Same Subject Continued.*

Cardinal Newman has left on record in the *Apologia* a very full and frank statement of his reasons for making the Articles of Religion the subject of a Tract. He had been gradually leading his disciples on, through a sort of enchanted forest, beautiful for leafage and undergrowth, though singularly deficient in guide-posts, until some of them, as he could not fail to discern, were on the point of asking him awkward questions. On the lips of more than one of the devotees there trembled the anxious interrogatory, "Master, whither?"

"From the time that I had entered upon the duties of Public Tutor of my College," Newman writes, "when my doctrinal views were very different from what they were in 1841, I had meditated a comment upon the Articles. Then, when the Movement was in its swing, friends had said to me, 'What will you make of the Articles?' but I did not share the apprehension which their question implied. . . . I had been enjoined, I think by my Bishop, to keep these men straight, and I wished so to do, but their tangible difficulty was subscription to the Articles, and thus the question of the Articles came before me. It was thrown in our teeth,—'How can you manage to sign the Articles? they are directed against Rome.' 'Against Rome?' I made answer. 'What do you mean by Rome?' and I proceeded to make distinctions of which I shall now give an account."

There follow some eight pages of explanation, of a highly interesting character. With Newman's dialectic method in handling the question of subscription, those who have read Tract XC. are familiar. His main thesis is that the Articles do not oppose Catholic teaching, that they only slightly oppose Roman dogma, and that, in so far as they antagonise Rome at all, it is mainly with a view to disowning certain superstitions which are not necessarily a part of the system with which, in the Protestant mind, they are commonly associated. In other words, Newman held that the protest of the English Reformers had been directed not so much against the barque of Peter as against a lot of barnacles encrusted upon the submerged portion of her hull.

This theory of the true bearing of the Articles was not wholly new; what made it startling in 1841 was the fact of its having received, for the first time, the *imprimatur* of an Anglican divine. As far back as in 1633, one Abraham Davenport, a Franciscan Father, known in religion as Sancta Clara, had suggested that at least some of the English Articles might be dealt with in the fashion which Newman, more than two hundred years later, recommended. Eighteen of the famous Thirty-nine Davenport declared to be thoroughly orthodox from the Roman point of view, two he regarded as mere logomachies, while, as to the remaining nineteen, he held that, even if they were not "ambitious of a Catholic interpretation," they were, to use the phrase of the keen analyst who was

to come after, "patient" of such a reading. But Sancta Clara, as has been noted, was a Franciscan; he looked at the question from the other side of the stream from that on which the English theologians were supposed to stand; his advances met with no very cordial reception, and the Articles continued to be regarded by successive generations of educated clergy and faithful laity as the nation's protest against Rome. Sancta Clara and his devices had long been lost out of mind when Newman launched the torpedo destined to blow the Thirty-nine Articles, in their supposed character of a reasoned Protestant eirenic, to shivers.

For really that is what has happened, though the metaphor may seem to some a little violent. A system which has failed to serve the purpose it was originally contrived to answer, may fairly enough be said to have been shivered by the agent which has demonstrated the failure.

And what was the purpose for which the Thirty-nine Articles were originally set forth? The official documents of the sixteenth century supply us with a perfectly clear answer to the question. They were published as having been agreed upon "by the Archbishops and Bishops of both Provinces and the whole clergy, in the Convocation holden at London in the year of Our Lord 1542, for the avoiding of the diversities of opinions and for the establishing of consent touching true religion." Have the Articles, as a matter of fact, accomplished these salutary ends? Has there been any real avoidance of "diversities of opinions"? Has there been any genuine establishing of consent? Not certainly since 1841, whatever may have been the case in earlier years. One may, to be sure, buy at the theological bookshops either Forbes on the Thirty-nine Articles, or Browne; but if he attempts to make the Bishop of Brechin keep step with the Bishop of Winchester, he will meet with only indifferent success. Can two walk together except they be agreed? The prophet Amos thought not.

I repeat, then, that in so far as the accomplishment of their avowed purpose is concerned, the Thirty-nine Articles of the

Church of England have been and are an open failure. They attempted the establishing of a common standard of religious belief with respect to a multitude of details, and it simply could not be done,—could not be done to last. English Christianity owes a debt of gratitude to John Henry Newman for having made this point clear. His logic metamorphosed what had been, for so many years, hypocritically denominated "Articles of peace," into unmistakable articles of war. Ever since his day the cry has been concerning them, "Not peace, but a sword." "How many sacraments hath Christ ordained in his Church?" "Two," answers the ingenuous child, fresh from his Catechism. "Oh, no," interrupts the Anglo-Catholic, backed, as he now contends, by Article twenty-five; "Oh, no; seven, my good child; only you must be careful not to call them sacraments of the Gospel." This is a fair sample of what Tract XC. did for the better explication of those fourteen Articles which constitute what may be called the disputed possessions, as contrasted with the common territory of English and Latin Christianity.

We pass from the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England to the Thirty-eight of the American Episcopal Church, since it is with these latter that the present paper undertakes more particularly to deal. Three questions with respect to the American Articles force themselves upon us:—What is their legal *status*? What, under twentieth century conditions, is their theological value? Why should they continue any longer to be bound up with the Book of Common Prayer? Let us begin with the question of *status*.

So long as the Colonial Church continued under the nominal oversight of the Bishop of London, the Articles, as a matter of course, had for American Churchmen precisely the same binding obligation that they had for English Churchmen, no more no less.

Since no candidate for Holy Orders could be ordained in those days save by a Bishop of the home Church, whom he

must needs cross the ocean to find, every Church of England clergyman exercising his office on this side of the Atlantic must, at some time or other, have actually put his name to the Articles.

During the period, however, that intervened between the overthrow of the British sovereignty on this soil and the firm establishment of an autonomous Church in what the Preface to the Prayer Book calls "these American States," the Articles were, to all intents and purposes, *in nubibus*. Nobody seems to have known precisely where they stood, or what was the exact measure of their binding force. It was evident that to throw them overboard altogether, especially after the bold step taken in the practical repudiation of the *Quicunque vult*, would be a somewhat violent break of doctrinal continuity with the Church of England, while, at the same time, formally to adopt them without some measure of revision was impossible. The twenty-first of the Thirty-nine, for example, literally reeked with the flavour of monarchy, asserting, as it did, that General Councils might "not be gathered together without the commandment and will of Princes." To have sounded that note in the ears of "these American States," in the first flush of their democratic pride, might have subjected White to insult, and Seabury to banishment. In the Book of Articles appended to the American Prayer Book, nothing follows the title "Article XXI. Of the Authority of General Councils" save an asterisk; and if the asterisk be pursued to the bottom of the page, we find the following naïve footnote:—"The Twenty-first of the former Articles is omitted; because it is partly of a local and civil nature" (as if there were anything really "local" or "civil" about a General Council), "and is provided for, as to the remaining parts of it, in other Articles." A happy phrase this—"provided for in other Articles"; it shall be given a broader application presently. The upshot of the debate over the recognition or non-recognition of the Articles was their "establishment," with a few modifications (the most

important of which is the one just noted), by the General Convention of 1801.

It is worth while, before we pass this point, to quote Bishop White. He remarks, in his *Memoirs* (p. 33), that "the object kept in view in all the consultations held and deliberations formed was the perpetuating of the Episcopal Church on the ground of the general principles which she had inherited from the Church of England; and of not departing from them, except so far as either local circumstances required or some very important cause rendered proper. To those acquainted with the history of the Church of England it must be evident that the object here stated was accomplished on the ratification of the Articles." Tiffany, in his History, commenting upon this memorandum, suggestively adds that an attempt, three years later, that is to say, in the General Convention of 1804, to make subscription to the Articles compulsory upon the Clergy, by canonical enactment, failed.

The just conclusion from these historical data would seem to be that, since 1801, the Thirty-eight Articles of Religion have, in some sense, been of binding force upon the consciences of our clergy, though in precisely what sense or to what extent it is not easy to say. Few would venture to assert that they stand on the same footing with the Catholic Creeds in respect to essential dogma; while, on the other hand, few would go so far as to declare them, in round terms, non-obligatory. They would appear to be held, to use a most illusory phrase, forced upon us by the exigencies of these difficult times, "for substance of doctrine," though where the "substance" ends and the "accidents" begin, who shall determine?

And just here would seem to be the proper point for a distinct intimation of the present writer's motive and purpose in opening this subject. We are all of us more or less disquieted by the evident disinclination of the flower of our youth to seek the ministry of religion as their calling in life. Whether or not the same tendency is observable in communions other than our own is a separate question. But,

without going further afield than our own immediate ecclesiastical limits permit, why is it, we may well ask, that with such magnificent sources of supply as our great Schools, Concord, Groton, Southborough, Pomfret, Cheshire, Newport, (not to mention others) afford, the current setting towards Holy Orders should be so sluggish and intermittent? After all due allowance has been made for the fact that many of these boys have been brought up at home in such luxurious surroundings that it is not in them to face possible hardship, it still remains a difficult question, Why do they not in larger numbers flock to the Colours? It is the writer's conviction that in many instances—by no means in all, but in many—the reason is that no clear-cut, frank, direct answer is to be had to the question, To what do I commit myself doctrinally if I enter the ministry of the Church?

The Lambeth Platform, to be sure, has an answer to this question, as clear as a bell. "The Nicene Creed," it declares, is "the sufficient statement of the Christian Faith."

"But what about the Articles of Religion?" urges the level-headed, keen-eyed young college graduate, on the edge of postulancy, though doubtful about candidateship,—"To what extent am I bound by them? They contain, I find, many hundreds of propositions. Must I feel in my heart that I give honest assent to every one of these when I am asked in Ordination whether I will minister the doctrine of Christ, not only 'as the Lord hath commanded,' which would be a comparatively simple obligation, but 'as this Church hath received the same'? Tell me, O Bishop, Guardian of the fold and Shepherd of the flock, tell me, am I bound by an equally strong tie to the affirmation that 'works before justification' have the nature of sin, and to the affirmation 'on the third day He rose again from the dead'?" To which the Bishop, as things now are, can but reply, "You have Burnet and Beveridge, Browne, Forbes and Hardwicke; hear them."

The Articles of Religion, when analysed and classified, fall

into seven groups—the theological, strictly so called, embryological, the anthropological, the soteriological, the ecclesiological, the bibliological, and the sociological. The sections, moreover, follow in the order named. Under the head of Theology, pure and simple, come the first five, with these titles, "Of Faith in the Holy Trinity," "Of the Word or Son of God which was made Very Man," "Of the going down of Christ into Hell," "Of the Resurrection of Christ," "Of the Holy Ghost."

Under the head of Embryology—a word which may be used, for lack of a better, to define the study of sources—are to be classed Articles six, seven, and eight, which deal with the germ-plots of Christian doctrine, the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and the Catholic Creed in its two forms—the so-called Apostolic and the Nicene. Under the head of Anthropology come Articles nine and ten, dealing respectively with Birth-sin and Free-will. Soteriology fills no fewer than eight Articles, namely, the eleventh, Of the Justification of Man; the twelfth, Of Works before Justification; the thirteenth, Of Works of Supererogation; the fifteenth, Of Christ alone without Sin; the sixteenth, Of Sin after Baptism; the seventeenth, of Predestination and Election; and the eighteenth, Of obtaining Eternal Salvation only by the Name of Christ. All these in answer to the question, "What must I do to be saved?"—an inquiry originally replied to, it will be remembered, at a place called Philippi, in fewer words.

Ecclesiology, not in its petty sense of the science of priestly vestments and chancel furniture, but in its dignified and lofty sense of the science of the Church's corporate life, is dealt with in fifteen Articles, to wit, Nos. nineteen to thirty-four, No. twenty-one of "the former Articles" counting zero. In these ecclesiological Articles we have the Church's constituency defined, its authority, as limited by Holy Scripture, declared, its existence in a purgatorial state questioned, its ministry safeguarded, the language of its worship confined to the vernacular, its sacraments numbered, explained, and protected against both misin-

terpretation and misuse, the marriage of its priests justified, its sentences of excommunication made valid, and its traditions and ceremonies given such subordinate rank as rightfully attaches to them. The bibliographical Articles are two in number, and deal with the Books of Homilies and the Book of Consecration of Bishops and Ordering of Priests and Deacons.

Finally, under the head Sociological may be classed the last three Articles, one of which touches upon the power of the civil magistrates, one upon communism, and one upon the lawfulness of making oath in courts of justice.

The Thirty-eight Articles having been thus summarised, it is timely to call attention to the fact that the American Episcopal Church has in its custody three-and-twenty more, namely, the Twelve Articles of the Catholic Creed, and the Eleven Articles of her Constitution or Organic Law. The thesis which this Tract No. XCI. has been written to set forth and to maintain is, that the twenty-three amply suffice for our purpose without the thirty-eight. Suppose we try the several groups just enumerated by this test.

As for the Trinitarian theology, with which the Book of Articles opens, it is evidently identical, in fact almost verbally identical, with the teachings of the Nicene Creed. So much, therefore, may be set down as surplusage.

The open Bible on our lecterns testifies to our respect for the authority of the Book, if it be a "Standard" Bible, and its table of contents will be a sufficient definition of what is held to be canonical Scripture.

Similarly, it may be said of the two Creeds that their very presence in our manual of worship is ample enough proof of our thinking that they "ought thoroughly to be received and believed." This disposes of the trilogy of Articles concerned with the source of authority in religion.

On Anthropology, the next subject treated, it is enough to know that man is undoubtedly a sinner; while, of Soteriology, it is enough to know that Christ is incontestably a Saviour. Upon both of these cardinal points the Creed insists, when of

the Only-begotten of the Father it affirms that "for us men and for our salvation" He came down from heaven. Were we not lost, saving we should not need; were He not Saviour, His coming down had been in vain.

In a Church which, like our own, has committed its organic law to writing, the proper place for ecclesiological teaching is the Constitution; and if the eleven Articles of that document, as we now have it, do not suffice, it would be quite within the power of our ecclesiastical legislature to add a twelfth.

Passing to Bibliography, it is certainly unnecessary to have a special Article of Religion to declare that our Ordinal has nothing in it that, "of itself, is superstitious and ungodly." The fact that we continue it in use ought to be sufficient evidence that we resent such imputation; while, as for the Homilies, since the very Article which commends them also suspends them,—postpones, that is to say, the public reading of them in churches until they shall have been revised,—we need not trouble ourselves about them. It is more than a century since this good resolution was put into print; and though there have been revisions many, we still wait for the homiletical one.

There remain to be disposed of the three Articles designated as Sociological. Of these, the first, "Of the Power of the Civil Magistrates," is a very different thing under its American form from what we find in the corresponding place in the English Book—in fact, may not unfairly be said to teach an opposite doctrine; for whereas the English Article affirms that godly Princes "should rule all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be ecclesiastical or temporal," the American Article quietly observes that "the Power of the Civil Magistrate hath no authority in things purely spiritual" — not a flat contradiction, perhaps, but dangerously near to it.

The second of the Sociological Articles antagonises Communism as taught by "certain Anabaptists." But anarchists, not Anabaptists, are the men with whom we have to do; and,

moreover, if we are to have an Article of Religion to confront each and every one of the economic heresies that disturb our peace, we shall need, not thirty-nine, but a hundred. The Book concludes with the Article entitled "Of a Christian Man's Oath." It confesses that vain and rash swearing is forbidden Christian men, but insists that in a good cause a Christian man may swear if the magistrate requireth it. This is acceptable enough doctrine to all who do not take the Sermon on the Mount too literally; but, in view of the fact that in the Courts of most English-speaking countries, and even in the House of Commons, since Bradlaugh, an affirmation is accepted in place of an oath, the Article has that belated look which befits its position at the end of the column.

This Tract has been written in no acrimonious or destructive spirit. The writer has no wish to contravene a single statement in the Articles of Religion. He candidly acknowledges that Christian men may swear, and he is utterly unwilling that other Christian men should esteem his goods and riches common, touching his own "right, title, and possession of the same." A like cheerful assent he gives to all the propositions of the formulary, as he understands them; for it would be strange indeed if, among the multitude of interpretations now allowed, he should fail of finding the special one suited to the idiosyncrasies of his particular mind. But while this is his present attitude, he recalls the day when it was not. He recalls the day when, to his youthful and untutored vision, the Articles seemed to obscure rather than to elucidate the answer to the question, What is the doctrine of the Episcopal Church? He cannot help being of the opinion that to-day young men in great numbers are similarly embarrassed. They can believe the Creeds, but what are they to make of this lengthy *addendum* to the Creeds?

It may be urged that some *addendum* is necessary, seeing that the Creeds do not interpret themselves. There is truth in this objection, but has the bringer of it considered what an immense amount of interpretative power is stored up in the

historic liturgy of the Church? The Creed, for example, is very concise, very concise indeed in the region of anthropology and soteriology; but the Prayers of the Ages, in a singularly full and satisfactory way, show us how Christians have always thought, or, what is, perhaps, still more to the point, *felt* upon these subjects.

What need of Article twelve, "Of Good Works," when we have learned, on the second Sunday before Lent, to say, "O Lord God, who seest that we put not our trust in anything that we do," and on the thirteenth Sunday after Trinity are again to pray, "Almighty and merciful God, of whose only gift it cometh that Thy people do unto Thee true and laudable service"? It is safe to say that there is not a single Article of the Creed that does not find similar expansion and elucidation somewhere between the covers of the Prayer Book before you reach the Psalter, and long before you reach the Articles.

It is just here that Anglicans enjoy a great advantage over Presbyterians. To-day the Westminster Confession totters to its fall. The Brief Statement will not save it, for the Brief Statement was only allowed to come into existence upon an understanding that for "substance of doctrine" it was to be regarded as a fair exponent of the longer document. Relief obtained on such terms can be but temporary. Only the gnats have been strained out, the camel is left in. But if the Westminster Confession goes to pieces, what have our Presbyterian brethren to fall back upon? They have never conceded to the Catholic Creeds that high place of honour in which Anglicans have always held them. If Westminster fails them, they have no Nicæa to fall back upon. It looks as if it would be a case, as in Paul's shipwreck, of "some on board and some on pieces of the ship." In such an event, may a good Providence so order things that, as happened on the coast of Malta, they shall escape all safe to land,—the land of the historic faith, no island but the continent of truth. Yes, the Creeds suffice. They have outlived many a document like our Book of Articles and the Confessions of Augsburg and of

Westminster, and will outlive many another. The Confessions have their day and cease to be; the Creeds live on—all the days are theirs. The Creeds are like Stonehenge and the Pyramids; —to go at them with hammer and chisel, under a pretext of reparation, were little short of sacrilege. The Thirty-nine Articles are a sixteenth century Episcopal residence of many rooms, some of them much out of repair.

But what shall we do with our Book of Articles if we snip the threads which now bind it up with the Book of Common Prayer? Put it, with reverent and loving hands, in the Archives, I reply—the Archives of English Religion. There are other books to keep it company in that honoured and dignified retirement. There is *The Institution of a Christian Man*; there is *King Henry's Primer*; there is *Nowell's Catechism*; there is *Jewell's Apology*; there are those unfortunate books of Homilies, still unrevised; and there is, if you please, *The Confession of our Christian Faith*, commonly called the *Creed of St Athanasius*.

What a handsome set of Archives they would make, and how happily the Thirty-nine Articles would fit in! *Bibliotheca Anglicana* we will call it, and it shall have glass doors to protect the honoured pages from an otherwise inevitable dust.

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WHO IS THE CHRISTIAN DEITY?[1]

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It may appear an extravagance to affirm that Christendom is now, and has long been, mistaken about the real object of its worship. It imagines this object to be God the Father, of whom the idea came down from the Old Testament dispensation, and whose attributes have been softened by the revelation of the Divine nature in Jesus Christ. Christ is believed to be worshipped only in moments of intense feeling, or in times of trial and calamity, and then perhaps as a subordinate deity. The God of Christendom is still held to be the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

There is evidence that this view is erroneous. Christianity is pre-eminently the worship of Christ. Far away in the background of existence there may be a Power answering to Indian Brahma or Greek Kronos, and conceived as God the Father. But the working, ever-living, and ever-acting Deity is Christ. He is the creator and preserver of the world, the ruler, redeemer, and judge of men. He and no other is

[1] The view expounded in the following paper was suggested to the writer so long as thirty years ago, when he was reading Gregory of Tours, dipping into mediæval literature, and studying Christian iconography as sources for the *Descriptive Sociology* of the French in Herbert Spencer's series. Six or eight years ago, on re-reading Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*, he found the idea explicitly stated by the German philosopher. Three or four years ago he was gratified to discover that James Martineau, in his last decade, put forward the conception as the basis of a reconciliation between Unitarians and Trinitarians.

worshipped as God, hymned, prayed to, invoked. To him have been transferred the attributes of Jehovah. He, and no other, is the Christian God.

Like all religious founders, Jesus rose slowly to his place in history. To his disciples in his lifetime he was a unique man, with an exclusive mission, a Messiahship, and superhuman powers; they spoke of him almost as he used to be spoken of by the Socinians, who refused to call him God, but never called him a man, or almost as the Chinese speak of Confucius, or as the early Buddhist spoke of Gautama. Even after his death he was to Peter still only "a man approved of God." There is a great stride in Paul; though he does once or twice call him a man, the human element has grown shadowy. He had never known Christ in the flesh; he knew only the risen and glorified Saviour. As a Jew, he must have been an earnest believer in Jehovah, and the belief remained, but it had completely changed its character, and was in great, though varying, measure submerged by the wonderful new belief in Jesus Christ. Renan has re-affirmed against Origen that to Paul God was no longer the Jehovah of the Hebrews—stern and terrible, yet long-suffering and slow to wrath. Nor was he the Heavenly Father of Jesus, who provides our daily bread, forgives us our sins, and numbers every hair of our heads. He resembles rather the Greek Zeus—not the Zeus of the Homeric poems, personally intervening, but the Zeus of the early historic period, the ultimate source of all, but the direct agent of nothing. At times he resembles our modern Absolute or Unknowable—the dark, impenetrable background whence issues all phenomenal existence. In addressing the "heathen" peoples of Phrygia, as at Lystra and Derbe, Paul could still preach pure monotheism, but the strain was soon abandoned. In his undoubted epistles he urges believers to pray to God, but it is "for the Lord Jesus Christ's sake." He renders glory to God "through Jesus Christ." He thanks God "through Christ"; he advises the giving of thanks to God "in the name of Jesus Christ." He

knows of the love of God "which is in Jesus Christ." The Romans were to reckon themselves "alive unto God through Jesus Christ." "We have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ." God forgives "for Christ's sake." He that "serveth Christ is acceptable to God." Eternal life is, indeed, the gift of God, but it is "through Jesus Christ our Lord." The gospel of Christ is "the power of God." God is hardly ever mentioned but in connection with Christ. The Father was being superseded by a new deity. In the epistles doubtfully ascribed to Paul, and probably later, there is a great development. Christ is now "the image of the invisible God," though still "a creature." All things "were created by him and for him." In him "all fulness dwells"—"all the fulness of the Godhead bodily"; not only does he embody all such divine attributes as are compatible with a human existence, he possesses all possible divine attributes. If these epistles were written by Paul, they witness to a rapid mental growth, but not swifter or more surprising than Mr Gladstone went through in his middle and later years. If they were written by others, they record the slower development of the Christian consciousness. When a writer speaks in the spurious epistle to Titus of "the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ," we feel that he is on the point of passing to a new order of ideas. In the following chapter he apparently makes the transition, and though "God our Saviour" is still God the Father, who sheds the Holy Ghost on us "through Jesus Christ our Saviour," we may be sure that the exchange of phraseology will end in the confusion of the two persons or the supersession of the first by the second. Of the later New Testament writings, we may say with Didron of Christian iconography, God the Father "almost completely disappears and retires to the second rank. He is rarely seen and seldom heard. The area seems entirely occupied by the Son."

There is a rapid advance in the earliest Christian writers. To Polycarp, as to Melito, Christ is still subordinate; he

commands the faithful to "obey the bishop as Jesus Christ obeys the Father. Let each of you," he adds, "sing with one voice through Jesus Christ to the Father"; the "singing" means right living. Christ has attained a very different position in Clemens Romanus, who concludes a prayer: "We beseech thee to gather us into the kingdom of thy Christ, the God of the whole nature of things, both visible and invisible, and our King." In this prayer and the following doxology God the Father falls into subordination: "By thy Christ, to whom, *with* thee and the Holy Ghost, be," etc.

It was always and everywhere objected to the Christians that they were worshippers of Christ; as Tertullian admits, the reproach was "in every mouth" from Celsus and Lucian downwards. They did not deny it. They defended themselves by saying with Minucius Felix: "He whom we worship is God and not a mere mortal man." Twenty years later Tertullian replies to the same taunt. While he calls it a "mistake, that we are worshippers of a man, and not of the God of the Jews," he hastens to admit that they are worshippers of God only through Jesus Christ. Indeed, in him the two Persons are inextricable: "Christ in God and God in Christ" seem to be a single entity. Twice at least he calls Christ "the God of the Christians," and he contends that "all divinities but Christ ought to be renounced as false." The language of Cyprian is wavering. Sometimes he speaks of God as if he spoke only of the Father, while he names Christ simply "the Lord." But on other occasions he names him "the Lord thy God," "the Lord God of hosts," and (like Tertullian) "the God of the Christians." To St Felix he was the Lord God of Heaven and Earth; to Eusebius, the Universal King and Prince of all things and very God. Only one step more remains: the Father must practically disappear from the Christian consciousness. We shall see that, with the passage of Christianity from East to West, and the conversion of the Western peoples, this final step is taken.

The development of the doctrine was not uninterrupted.

From our present point of view the writings of Augustine present grave difficulties. Jesus Christ is by no means his God. Early a Platonist, he at first conceived his deity philosophically. Passing through Manichæism, he limited yet moralised the Supreme Power. When he became a Christian, he worshipped Jehovah, but a Jehovah with the hard attributes omitted or softened, and the tender qualities of mercy and loving-kindness, equally found in the Psalms and Prophets, brought into the foreground. Christ was the Mediator, the Word, the Son and very God, but he was not *the* God. The apostrophes to God throughout the *Confessions* are not addressed to Christ. Thus he speaks of the Saviour as "thy only begotten." Christ is "thy Christ," or "thy Son, our Lord," or "thy Word." Augustine had not "sought thy way, in Christ our Saviour." The "communion of the Lord's body" is that of a subordinate deity. While most subsequent writers, all of mediæval and much of modern Christendom, ascribed creation to Christ, Augustine "had found thee our creator, and thy Word, God with thee, together with thee and the Holy Spirit, one God, by whom thou hast created all things." He seems to waver between the earlier and the later conceptions of creation, but the earlier prevails. His theology is affiliated on Paul, but he does not follow Paul in leaving God the Father in the background, and making Christ all in all.

Poetry, especially religious poetry, is good evidence of doctrine. Two Christian poets of the fourth century—Paulinus of Nola and Spanish Prudentius—habitually use "God" and "Christ" as identical terms. From both of them passages might be cited to show that by "the true God, the God of the Christians," they signify Christ. Both habitually use "God" and "Christ" as identical terms. Such poetry, says M. Gaston Boissier of the magnificent hymn by Prudentius on the Judgment Day, where *Deus* and *Christus* are employed interchangeably, expresses the inspiration of a whole people. We may add that it reflects their beliefs.

It was to the worship of Christ as God that the Western peoples were converted. A vision of Christ determined the conversion of Constantine, when the bishops declared that "God had revealed himself" to the emperor. Zosimus and Prudentius agree that the question was formally put to the Roman senate by Theodosius, whether Jupiter or Christ should be worshipped as the chief Roman god. The statement is accepted on their joint authority by Gibbon and Milman. It is doubted by Beugnot and ignored by Boissier. At all events, a practically similar issue was debated in other terms when it was resolved to remove the statue of Victory from the hall of the senate. In Norway, far up in the Dovrefjeld, King Olaf the Saint submitted a similar issue—Christ *versus* Thor—to his rebellious bonders. So did Vladimir of Russia, at the end of the tenth century, to his council. So did Edwin of Northumbria, and so did the Onondagas. Always it was Christ who was presented for their acceptance. King Hakon insisted that the Norwegians of Trondjem should believe in one God, Christ the Son of Mary. It was to the worship of Christ that the Franks were converted. It is he who is hailed in the prologue to the Salic law as loving the Franks. Him they wished to avenge because he had been killed in Jerusalem. It was the same among the Celts. In a poem ascribed to St Columba he sings: "My *Drui* (or deity) is Christ the Son of God"; and the Pictish Druids extolled "their own god as more powerful than the God of the Christians," who was evidently Christ. The Welsh saint, Cadoc, labouring as a missionary among the Britons of Northamptonshire, was attacked by Saxons, and died with a prayer on his lips to his "invisible King and Saviour, Jesus Christ." "We believe in and adore the true Sun, Jesus Christ," said St Patrick. It was for Christ and in his name that all things were done. "For Christ" Columba went abroad as a missionary: on the day of his death he heard Christ call him. Tennyson well understood the Celtic theology when he assigned to King Arthur for an aim "to uphold the Christ." The invariable belief reappears among

the conquerors of the Celts. In the procession that attended Augustine's entry into the Isle of Thanet a verger bore a painting of the Crucified, and it was the crucified Christ as God who triumphed. The mother-church of English Christianity was dedicated to "the Holy Saviour, our God and Lord." Paulinus, who introduced Roman theology into England, bade Edwin of Northumbria give thanks to the Lord instead of to Woden for his new-born child. Rædwald, king of the East Anglians, "seemed to serve both Christ and the gods he formerly served; and in the same temple he had both an altar for the sacrifice of Christ and a smaller altar for the victims of the demons." As Renan offered "praise and glory to Christ" when he had finished his *History of Israel*, Bede thanked the "good Jesus" when he finished his *Ecclesiastical History*, whence most of these instances have been taken, and hoped that he might "in due time come to him, who is the fountain of all wisdom, and always stand in his presence who liveth and reigneth world without end." Among the antiphons he used to chant was one for Ascension Day: "O King of Glory, Lord of Hosts, who, as on this day, didst ascend," etc. What a historian says of the introduction of Christianity into Mercia might have been said of all England: "The strife between the creeds of Woden-Christ and of Woden was now decided."

Pope Gregory the First has been described as a continuator of Augustine, but in fact the theological development takes a different trend in the "first and greatest of the Gregories." To him Christ is God Almighty. "For the voice of the Almighty Father is God Almighty . . . . the Almighty Word . . . . who, for us incarnate, lives and reigns with the Father in the unity of the Holy Spirit, God for ever and ever." A benediction in another of his homilies is in similar terms: "What Almighty God through me speaks in your ears, may He speak Himself in your minds, who liveth and reigneth with the Father," etc. In the space of two hundred years there has been a complete transformation. The transition from the Father as Almighty God in Augustine to the

Son as Almighty God in Gregory has been made once for all: the Father and the Spirit are evidently subordinate personages, and the conjoining of them with the Son a mere consecrated formula. Gregory even speaks of Christ as God simply. Other saints have heard Christ call them when death was near: "If it shall please God to call me, ..." writes the Pope. That Christ was the rival of Jupiter, and thus claimed to be the supreme God, is indirectly shown by a letter of Gregory reproaching a Frankish bishop for teaching grammar and literature: "The praises of Christ," he says, "do not admit of being joined in the same mouth with the praises of Jupiter." That he should send "images of God the Saviour and of the holy Mary, Mother of God," foreshadows the time when they two shall be worshipped as sole gods. In another letter the Redeemer is the "maker of every creature," and in still another he is "the Creator." We are not surprised that, with such theological views, Gregory should have given the Mass an immense development and expansion.

The drift of mediæval speculation is in the same direction. One of the profoundest thinkers of the time, Alexander of Hales, defines theology as the science of the Divine substance as known through Christ. While confuting Alexander, Duns Scotus practically agrees with him. He excepts only the begetting of the Son and the truths relating to the Divine will. Yet the former cannot amount to much, and the Logos must surely be conceived as sharing in the Divine determinations. There is in Duns a remnant of Jehovah-worship, together with latent Arianism. How completely identified Christ was with God in the theology of the Middle Ages appears from occasional expressions used by the most eminent theologians. Cyprian had spoken indifferently of martyrs "going to God" and "going to Christ," and in Anselm and Peter the Lombard the terms *in Deum credere* or *in Christum credere* are apparently equivalent. Dante, half theologian and half poet, shows that Christ held in his imagination the place held by the old Roman supreme God when he says that "Jove

was crucified on earth for us." The identification is equally plain in the mediæval devotional literature. All through the *Imitation of Christ* the God appealed to is obviously Christ: his attributes are those of Jesus of Galilee; and the "I" of the compassionate and pleading dialogues in chapters 23, 24, and 30 of the third book is Christ-God. As late as Pascal "the dying Deity" addresses his disciple: "Console thyself; thou wouldst not seek me, if thou hadst not already found me." It is Christ whom he seeks and finds, as it is Christ whom Loti, Bourget, and so many modern pilgrims to Jerusalem seek and do not find.

Popular mediæval literature speaks to the same effect. "I should offend God," says Joinville, "who gave his body," etc. The same historian of the seventh crusade relates of the Bishop of Soissons that he "greatly desired to go to God," and, having attacked the Turks all alone, "they cut him down and put him in the number of the martyrs." When we remember that it was to Christ that the early Christians desired to go at last, and that Christ was in the second century considered as the first of the martyrs, we may readily believe that in the passage cited Joinville meant God. That Christ was merged in Deity is again shown by another allusion of the same writer: "If God died on the Cross . . . ."

A still more popular form of literature—the miracle-plays—is saturated with the same conception. "God and his Mother" are among the chief figures in most of these. If in any of them God the Father is ever introduced, the theme of the play is some portion of the earthly life of the still undeified Saviour.

The popular poetry of the Middle Ages abounds in illustrations of the substitution. It seems impossible to doubt that the "God" there frankly and sometimes grotesquely humanised is Christ. Nothing in the old Hebrew conception of Jehovah could have led to such anthropomorphisation.

Art, in the rude shape of iconography, bears similar testimony. The religious views of the Middle Ages, as

sculptured on cathedral porch or illuminated in missal, are perhaps truer to the beliefs of the period than the traditional opinions of theologians. Well, in these dumb yet speaking expositors God the Father for many centuries altogether disappears. The God of the Old Testament is always Christ. Aged from fifteen to sixty, beardless or bearded, a youth, a middle-aged man, or an old man, he is represented as doing all that in the Old Testament is ascribed to Jehovah. Not till the twelfth century is the existence of God the Father indicated, and then only by a figured hand. Historians like Mr Lecky ascribe his absence to reverence. Was not reverence equally due to his co-equal, Christ, exalted to supreme deity and clothed with all its attributes? It will be said that Christ had lived and been seen as a man. But it is not as a man that he is represented; it is as a god. Nor was the Holy Ghost, who is always pictured, ever seen on earth. Nay, in the two following centuries the feeling of reverence, surely not less profound than in previous periods, did not prevent the Father from being represented side by side with the other two persons of the Trinity. The Father was left out of sculptured portal and illuminated page because he was out of mind. Only in formal confessions of faith, or priest-made prayers, or the speculations of theologians does he hold a place. He was not worshipped. No sacrifices were made to him. No churches were dedicated to him: "the church of God" at Jerusalem, mentioned in a canon of the Council of Clermont held in 1095, was doubtless the church of Christ there. Once more, Christ as God was the true Deity of the Middle Ages.

Books of chivalry testify to the supersession of Jehovah by Christ. In one of the best-known, Johan de Saintré's lady commands him, next to God, to love and obey the Virgin, and to have other saints as advocates with our Lord and Lady. Christ and Mary were the deities of chivalry.

Froissart is equally plain. When the French and the English were besieging a town in Morocco, they were asked by the Saracens why they attacked people who had never

offended them. They replied that "they were come to avenge the injuries done to their God." Upon this, "the Saracens laughed heartily, and said . . . . it was the Jews who had crucified Jesus Christ, and not they." This was crass ignorance, at which Froissart doubtless laughed as heartily as the Saracens; but when, on the following page, Froissart speaks of "God and the Virgin Mary," he speaks in his own name and expresses his own belief. God is for him Christ deified.

An inscription is significant of the belief of the Renaissance. The pedestal of the obelisk on Monte Citorio had on one side an inscription recording its dedication by Augustus Cæsar, Pontifex Maximus, to the Sun. Pius VI. recovered the monument for Christianity by dedicating it, also as Pontifex Maximus, on another side to Christ. Christ had superseded the Sun-god.

Among Catholic peoples this conception has never been relinquished. To the worship of Christ the Jesuit missionaries in old Canada converted the Indians. The great warrior Ahasistari professed his belief in Jesus. After he was baptized he exclaimed, "Let us strive to make the whole world embrace the faith in Jesus." In this faith the missionaries lived. One of the greatest of them, Brebeuf, who may be described as a Christ-intoxicated man, cried, "What shall I render to thee, Jesus, my Lord, for all thy benefits?" and he made a vow before Father and Spirit, who were evidently subordinate personages; his visions were of Christ, of infinite crosses, and of the Mother of Christ. Brebeuf passed away with the name of Jesus on his lips.

The break effected by the Reformation in the development of Christology is more apparent than real. In all the essentials of Christian doctrine Luther is still a Catholic, minus the Pope. He holds the central dogma of Christianity in particular with a tenacious grasp. "This man born of the Virgin Mary is God himself, who has created heaven and earth." He holds with Ambrose and Chrysostom that, even in the midst of the Trinity, the Son has the human body as

a permanent and essential attribute. With perfect consistency, and as if he had seen the transfigured Christ rise into the heavens, he exclaims, "My own flesh and blood sits at the right hand of God and reigns over all." "In the midst of the Trinity" and "at the right hand of God" are, of course, mere phrases, signifying in Heaven, or, as we should now say, in the nature of things. It is according to his human nature that Christ is susceptible of omnipotence and the other divine attributes. "Our flesh and blood is" therefore "the Son of God, yea, God himself." He logically concludes that "out of Christ there is no God, and where Christ is, there is the whole Godhead. . . . . Thou shouldst know of no other God." In the spirit of these utterances the greatest of Lutheran theologians, in the first edition of his work on systematic theology, left out the doctrines of God and the Trinity; to know Christ is the one thing needful. Melanchthon was therefore a worshipper of Christ as God, even if he speculatively admitted the existence of God the Father. This is the corner-stone of Protestantism as well as of Catholicism. Presbyterianism on one side has often diverged into the austere worship of Jehovah, and Boston Unitarianism into the maternal Deity of Channing and the bisexual Deity of Parker ("Father and Mother of our souls"), the latter borrowed from the Roman *Jupiter pater et mater* or from the bisexual Deity of the Stoics. These are aberrations or developments. The orthodox view is expressed by Neander:—

"It is an important fundamental principle that not the doctrine of the Trinity, but that of the historical Christ, is the centre of the Gospel, and that salvation depends . . . . on the acknowledgment of Christ, in whom alone God reveals himself, and by whom alone we attain to the divine life. The article respecting Christ was the original article of faith of the Apostolic Church."

Let us cross the Atlantic and transport ourselves back well-nigh a century. Dr Lyman Beecher, his famous daughter tells us, pictured Christ "as patient with our errors, compassionate with our weaknesses, and sympathetic for our sorrows. . . . . He was ever near us, enlightening our ignor-

ance, guiding our wanderings, comforting our sorrows with a love unwearied by faults," etc.—the very definition of a sympathetic Deity. His daughter Harriet at fourteen years "gave herself to Jesus," as Robert Hall had dedicated himself to God. "I feel that I love God," she said a year or two later; and then she hastens to add, as if she had caught herself tripping, "that is, that I love Christ." She passionately desires that "the Saviour were visibly present in this world," and then she asks her brother: "Do you think that there is such a thing as so realising the presence and character of God that he can supply the place of earthly friends?" Thirty years later the confusion or the identification is still vivid: God took her son, she confessed; and a minute after: "Jesus in love has taken" him. Yet she avers that her "faith in God" never in the least fails; she "rests on Jesus in the innermost depth of her soul." As life went on, and their anti-slavery propaganda raised enemies for both herself and her hardly less famous brother, she perceived that "the world hates Christ," and that there is a spirit working in it "that is not subject to the law of God." The higher life that saints and sages have described is to her "a vivid spiritual life near to and with Christ." The conquest of her nature by the cult of Christ was complete. Her knowledge of this life was absolute.

We wander a few steps from the home of the authoress of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* to the parsonage or the church at Hartford where Horace Bushnell meditated or spoke the inspired meditations that have moved or instructed a great part of the Christian world; and what do we hear? "Love to God" is everywhere spoken of as identical with love to Christ. Conversion to Christ is equivalent to "a new turning to God." The "receiving of Christ" is the same thing as "being filled with God." The "joy of God" is the same thing as the "joy of Christ"; the "peace of God" as the "peace of Christ." The "new life" is the Christ-life. Let the reader scan the volume so named at almost any page, and he will perceive that "Christ" and "God" are interchangeable terms; that is,

they are identical, or Christ is God. Other contemporary theologians speak to the same effect. Christ, says Professor D. W. Simon, "is the beginning, middle, and end of Christianity; who lived before he undertook his earthly mission; who has been living and working ever since; who lives and is working now." To all the Free Churches of England, according to the late Dr Berry, "Christ is the soul and centre of revealed religion." Christ, says another, "is the measure of all things." "We bow before him as the King of Kings," says still another. "Christ's will is absolute," said a Congregationalist minister. The name of Christ is, indeed, everywhere in the addresses of Congregationalists and in Nonconformist literature generally; the name of God as a distinct being nowhere. By them Christ alone is worshipped. The Programme of Christian Union submitted to the Congregationalist Churches of New South Wales in 1904 laid it down that "Christ is Lord" is the sole article to which Congregationalists should return.

It is in our own days that faith in Christ and love for Christ have become the banner of a new religion. The saintly Henry Drummond was one of its chief standard-bearers. At the heart of his faith, we are told, lay "his unreserved acceptance of Christ and of Christ's idea and law of life. . . . . He was through and through, first of all and last of all, a follower and subject of Christ." He confessed that he had "only one passion, that is, Christ." He had but one mode of conversion —he induced doubters to "go in for Christ." "The grace of God" became in him "the grace of Christ." With him, "to serve Christ" and "to serve God" are interchangeable. His mission was "to follow out the religion of Christ," and he himself "followed the personal Christ." He had a message of his own—to introduce men to Christ. Christ alone was the standard. He went back to the faith that founded Christianity, and said with Paul: "For me to live is Christ." His prayers were addressed to the "Lord Jesus," who was "not far from any one of us," and who was appealed to not to take "his

Spirit away from" them. As the "Heavenly Father"—"the Father of Christ"—and that in rare references, the first person of the Trinity almost disappeared from his vocabulary. It is in perfect accordance with the new and yet very old religion that the life preached by the great evangelist of Chicago, who figures in fiction as "John King," should be "the Christ-life." The converted sinner is brought "to know Christ."

Why does George MacDonald leave his church, his country, and his profession? Because he is a worshipper of the younger God, who has in his mind displaced an elder but not a jealous rival. A cento of characteristic utterances might be cited from the beautiful and affecting works that are the truest expression of his real beliefs in the guise of fiction. The new cult is often implied; sometimes it is explicit. "If God had called me," says one of his fictitious characters, "I should hardly have been astonished. . . . . Why should a man fear in the presence of his Saviour?—You said *God*! answered the minister.—God is my Saviour. Into His presence it is my desire to come," answered the deep-thinking youth. In a later chapter of the same admirable book he asks: "Must God be ever on the cross . . . . hang for ever on His cross?" To make the identification more complete, he shows that God is to him, not only the Hebrew or ethnic Deity, but the philosophic concept. "The nature of things, that is, of God," he broadly affirms. He soon reverts to the anthropomorphic view: "Isn't God a man?" asks one of his doubles. Spiritually-minded people "behold the Father in the Son." An inspired cobbler, in his quest of the Holy Grail, had adventured in philosophy—"eh, but it was bairnly philosophy!"—but "learnt to gang straucht to Him Wha's the express image o's person." In Jesus Christ, said his illuminated Aberdonian student, "I see the very God I want. I want a father like him. . . . . No other than the God exactly like Christ can be the true God." A successor of Arnold of Rugby in heart, if not quite in talent, and not at all in leadership—Edward Thring of Uppingham—was said to "see God with his eyes."

So does one of MacDonald's delightful women exclaim: "If I could but see Christ!" Her mentor tells her: "When you understand Him—there is your God!" "Christ is in the world still, and within our call," declares the same expounder of the New Theology. But, if we aimed at including all the characteristic utterances of the doctrine in MacDonald's books, we should never end. Of him, as of Donald Grant, it might be said that the motto, *For Christ, against all the churches*, expressed his mission in life.

We find an unexpected ally in one of the loftiest Christian metaphysicians. In the last years of a long and honoured life, James Martineau put forward Christ-worship as "A Way out of the Trinitarian Controversy." To understand the Father of the early Church, he says, you must go back "till you reach a primeval solitude. Not mere vacancy do you find there, but a poised and brooding cloud. To this dormant potency, that is but does not breathe, theologians gave the name of Father." The Father, "contemplated in Himself, presents only a bare immensity—a dark blank of possibility—the occult potency of all perfection, but itself realises none." The Father, he affirms, is absent from the Unitarian creed. Unitarians, he contends, really worship the Son, though they call on him as the Father. Examine (he would say to the Unitarian) "what you mean when you speak of God: what are the attributes, what the acts, that mark Him to our mind? Creative thought, guiding Providence, redeeming grace . . . . they are the distinctive characteristics of *the second, not* of the first personality. Everything that you can say to convey a just conception of your God—that He spread the heavens—that He guards Israel—that He dwelt in the Human Christ—that He rules the unsuspecting world, and abides with the conscious heart of the Church,—*all* you will discover registered among the characteristics of the Son."

The biography of a leading Unitarian minister furnishes evidence of these propositions. In 1841 James Freeman Clarke founded in Boston "a Church of Christ," which took

Jesus as its Head, as its Master, Teacher, and Saviour, as its Prophet, Priest, and King. He recommended a young minister to "preach Christ" and to "preach faith in Christ as the Omnipotent God." In himself it was a lifelong faith. In 1883 he read before a church congress a paper on "The Historical Christ as the Centre of Christian Theology."

Our missionaries carry the worship of Christ to distant lands. As we saw, it was Christ whom the American Indians were taught to worship. It is Christ to whom Orientals are converted; though certain missionaries of a Calvinistic type deem it urgent to recall to the minds of their converts the elder and forgotten Deity. "Our hearts," says an Indian reformer, Keshub Chunder Sen, "are touched, conquered, overcome by a higher power; and this power is Christ. Christ," he adds in the same strain, "not the British Government, rules India."

Not only to heretics like Swedenborg is Christ the sole Deity. To the metaphysicians who have most deeply sounded the mysteries of the Christian religion—equally to esoteric believers like Hegel and to unbelievers like Feuerbach, as to converted Celt and German, Northman and Russian, Brahmin and American Indian, "Christ is the Christian God."

What, then, is the result of our long inquest? That Christian worship, wherever it is vital and intense, is the worship of Christ. We trace this cult in its Palestinian cradle. We observe it growing into a faith that dwarfs the religion from which it sprang. From that religion it borrows its elements of terror and awe, and as it borrows them, it grows transformed. The new faith has completely absorbed the old, and the new Deity is alternately the old Deity with new attributes added, and a new Deity with old attributes assimilated. The Son of God is, at the height of the Middle Ages, God himself, the sole Deity, in whom God the Father and God the Holy Ghost have all but completely disappeared. From this apex of its development, as is the law of evolutions, the concept begins to decline, detaching one deific attribute after another, till it is apparently reduced to its first estate.

Not so. It has retained that supreme element of godhead which distinguishes from mere hero-worship. Ever as it descends, and as we follow it all over Christendom, we perceive its radical fibre to be this same cult of Christ. It grows ever more human, but the divine element never again disappears. The conquest of divinity has been made once for all, and its inclusion in the cult is definitive. Yet constantly in the background lies that other presence—that of God the Father, the Hebrew Deity, the Ur-God who is the Ultimate of all Aryan religions—Uranus, Saturn, Brahma. In Christendom certain churches and sects have continued to worship this elder Deity in preference to the younger. Augustine and all those churches and sects that have sprung from him—the Dutch Remonstrants, the Jansenists, the Scottish Presbyterians of the older school, the English and American Puritans, and possibly the old High-Church party in the Church of England—have revived the elder faith.

None the less is the foreground filled by the more human, more moving, and not less commanding personality of the Christ-God. But it is not the Jesus of the Gospels alone. It is the Christ of Paul and of the whole subsequent Christian development. All the new attributes acquired by man in the course of centuries have been assigned to the being who impersonates for us the Divine Nature, or essence of things, as discoveries in that nature. The new depths of thought and emotion discovered in Christ by biographers like Lange and Keim resemble the profundities discovered by the Neo-Platonists in Homer and by the commentators in Shakespeare, Goethe, and Browning; they record expansions of human nature. It is therefore, in a daring sense, the spirit of man himself that is worshipped, of man become "the Image of God," his personal and social life penetrated with the spirit of Christ (Hegel says, with Deity), and therefore one with God, as Jesus said that he and his Father were one.

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SYDNEY.

RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP IN EARLY ROME.

A STUDY OF ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT.

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We know certain characteristics of the religious ideas of the Latins and other Italian races allied to them, discoverable not so much from the vague statements of grammarians, philosophers, or Christian fathers, as from survivals in the religious practice of these peoples. That religious practice, in the case of one Italian city-state, we know also in clear outline, though the details are in great measure lost to us; and of the cults of other Italian communities we have some fragmentary knowledge. Thirdly, we know the history of the creeping paralysis which gradually destroyed the religious practice of the Roman state, and with it, of course, the ideas on which it was based.

It has often struck me that it would be worth while to try and piece together these three known things, in an attempt to conjecture what was the effect of State life—of that great advance in the associative principle, in discipline, in the material and opportunity for thought—on the earliest Italian religious ideas. Was there a possibility of development in those ideas, and if so, did the State destroy it? This attempt can only be made in the case of Rome, and there, indeed, only tentatively and hypothetically; for we are confronted by

one insuperable difficulty—that about the process of the formation of the State we know so very little. There is a great gap between the prehistoric age and that of the State which we cannot at present fill. Whether the researches of Dr Frazer, Mr A. B. Cook, Signor Pais, and others into the legends and beliefs of the early Italians will throw any clear light on this dark period remains yet to be seen.

I must begin by carrying the reader back in imagination to the time when the Latin people were forcing their way through the mountains and forests of Italy, and then settling down in the land to which they gave their name. At every step of their way they must have been beset with difficulties and dangers; it lay over mountains, down the swampy valleys of rivers, through large and dense forests. The Italy of that day was, of course, altogether different from the Italy of to-day: I need but quote the words in which the greatest living authority on the subject sums up his researches. "The fundamental difference," says Nissen, "between ancient and modern Italy is that it is now disforested and poor in water, and was then covered with water and woodland." And he is here speaking of the Italy of historical times, rather than of the Italy of the prehistoric age, when it had not even submitted to the cultivating energy of the Latins and their kindred peoples. Even if we leave the rest of the peninsula out of the count, and think of Latium alone, the present condition of the Campagna must not deceive us as to its appearance in those early days. There is a large part of it, seldom visited, which is still wild woodland—that part which Virgil has made the scene of the last books of the *Æneid*, and which Boissier has charmingly described in his *Promenades Archéologiques*.

But what has all this to do with my subject? I venture to think that it has everything to do with it. The peculiar character of a people's religion is sure to reflect their own experience; and if we could always get at that experience, we should be able to explain the religion. In the

long process of migration, and in the constant struggle with the forest and swamp while making the clearings necessary for settlement—while securing a safe dwelling-place for his family, pasture for his flocks and herds, and suitable land for corn-growing, the primitive Latin must have drunk deep of that experience which, if I am right, lay at the root of his ideas of the supernatural. We do not know for certain what deities he brought with him from his original home, or whether, indeed, he brought any in the sense we are accustomed to give the word deity; but we do know (1) that he was to an extraordinary extent the victim of religious awe, anxiety, nervousness, and (2) that the supernatural beings whom he feared were not thought of by him as in any sense like human beings, but as spirits, powers unknown and unseen, who might do him harm unless rightly propitiated. This kind of feeling, this religious awe, is exactly what his experience would be likely to produce.

It needs some power of imagination to realise even faintly the sense of awe that comes upon man, and of course with special force upon primitive man, when he finds himself in a virgin forest, among strange and hostile beings, animal and spiritual. Even the educated man of to-day feels it in some degree. Let me quote a few words of Charles Kingsley, describing his first experience of a virgin forest in the West Indies. "My first feeling," he wrote, "was helplessness, confusion, awe, all but terror: one is afraid at first to venture in fifty yards."[1] Other travellers have described the weird noises that break the awful silence of those forest solitudes, the sudden appearance of strange animals, and so on. Educated man does not now fear spirits, though he inherits the old nervous sensation in some mild degree; but to the Latin explorer, who by entering the forest, and still more by felling and clearing it, violated the abodes of countless spirits naturally assumed to be hostile to him, danger must have seemed lurking at every step. The imagination of the great Italian poet who knew his country and its men and gods so

[1] At Last, p. 128.

well, has caught the feeling exactly in his description of the first visit of Æneas to the site of the future Rome in the eighth *Æneid*. The whole passage is full of Italian feeling, but I must be content with these lines:—

> "iam tum religio pavidos terrebat agrestes
> dira loci, jam tum silvam saxumque tremebant.
> hoc nemus, hunc, inquit, frondoso vertice collem
> (quis deus incertum est) habitat deus, etc." [1]

Now we may guess that this was really the feeling of the primitive Latin, not only by the help of an Italian poet's insight, but from the steps which the Roman and Latin took in similar circumstances, and in later times, to put himself right with the supernatural beings whose abodes he invaded. We can follow these steps in the fully developed religion of his descendants. We can use them as survivals from which, as in his legal and constitutional practice, we can argue back to what he did before Rome existed. I shall give examples of these survivals directly, but it may make them more intelligible if I state at once the direction in which they lead us. They point to the fact that settlement in Latium, and indeed in Italy generally, meant not only the building a house, the planting of land, the introduction of cattle and sheep into hill and forest, but the discovery of the way in which the previous inhabitants—I am not speaking of human beings, but of spirits—might be brought over to the side of the invaders on terms of mutual advantage. They had to be won over, propitiated in such ways as would please them, addressed by their right names, tamed, civilised, so that they might enter into the service of man, while man on his part did them such service as they wished for. In this strange process we shall find that the Latins developed an extraordinary genius, which deeply affected all their later history.

The importance of woods in the religion of the Latins is attested in many ways. Their language is rich in words for woodland country, and one of those words, *lucus*, had a specially

[1] *Æn.* viii. 306 f.

religious meaning: it was probably a clearing—light, as we call it in my part of England—in which a deity had taken up his dwelling, and gave its name to a festival in the Roman calendar, Lucaria. Jupiter himself condescended to live in such places, for we find in Rome itself a Jupiter of the beech-wood (*fagutalis*), and another of the withy-bed (*viminalis*); and the earliest Jupiter of the Capitoline hill actually resided in an oak, which was everywhere his favourite tree. Diana of the grove at Aricia, so familiar to us now from Dr Frazer's *Golden Bough*, is another famous example; Robigus, the spirit of the mildew, lived in a grove near Rome; and I could mention many other cases of deities reclaimed in this way, but yet not torn away from their original woodland haunts. But the actual process of reclaiming them has left traces here and there in the later ritual. The historical Romans took immense care in breaking into a wood, or in dealing with one already consecrated as the dwelling of a deity. Old Cato has preserved for us the formula used by the farmer in making a new clearing: it included a sacrifice, and a prayer beginning, "Si deus, si dea"; for how was he to know the name or the sex of the spirit of the wood he was invading? (We find also the formula, "Sive mas sive femina.") If he wished not only to cut down trees but to dig up the soil, he was directed to offer another *piaculum* or expiatory sacrifice. The Arval Brethren, that curious ancient religious guild whose origin goes back to the earliest life of the Latins, and whose deity never had a proper name, had to offer special *piacula* for the falling of a bough in their grove, or if a tree were blown down, or for any such injury to a tree. If any iron had to be taken into the grove, *e.g.* for pruning, *piacula majora* were called for—a fact which proves conclusively the extreme antiquity of these nervous scruples, and the infinite care taken as the result of them. Surely they help us to realise how the Latin settler, like a traveller of to-day in a land of savages, felt himself surrounded by dangerous beings, and knew not how to propitiate them.

When the clearing for a settlement was complete, the next

thing was to mark it out and protect it from the strange and presumably hostile spirits who still dwelt in the woodland without. Here, without doubt, we may find the origin of the famous Italian practice of *lustratio*, which passed on into the ritual of the Church, and still survives in many places, *e.g.* at Oxford, in the beating of parish bounds. Whenever land or city or army had to be thus lustrated or purified, a procession went round the boundaries, stopping at particular points, and offering sacrifice there with prayer. No doubt the practical Roman mind saw in this process a convenient way of marking boundaries; but the chief object, and the original one, was to prevent evil influences—evil spirits, in fact—from breaking through them. I may combine the two ideas by saying that the origin of *lustratio* was the necessity of marking out the land inhabited by man and his domesticated spirits from the wild woodland, which was the dwelling of wild animals and hostile spirits.

There was at least one deity who seems exactly to represent the attitude of mind which suggested the practice of *lustratio*. Silvanus, as his name implies, was a spirit of the woodland, but he was one who had become half domesticated in historical times. The strange thing about him is that he never became wholly domesticated: he never could be induced to come and live in a temple: he loved his freedom too well, and kept to the woods and thickets. Yet for all this he consented to make himself useful to the settler: he was *tutor finium, arvorum pecorisque deus*:[1] in the writings of the Roman land-surveyors he is specially connected with boundaries. So strongly did this idea of the woodland spirit performing friendly offices impress itself on the Roman mind, that even in the latest days of the Empire and in the remotest provinces—even here in Britain,—wherever the practice of clearing the forest had to be undertaken, we find Silvanus at work. The name might attach itself to some local deity, but there it was, and there was the old idea. Before I leave him,

[1] Hor. *Epod.* ii. 22; Virg. *Æn.* viii. 600. Cp. *Gromatici Veteres*, i. 302.

I must add one word on a point which is of great interest to myself, and may possibly be so to some others. In Cato's formula of *lustratio* the chief god to be invoked is Mars Silvanus, which suggests that Silvanus was originally a cult-title of Mars, and identical with him, but in course of time struck a root for himself and grew up as a distinct deity. If so, the inference is that the great Mars himself, the most Roman of all Roman deities, had his origin too in the process of struggle with the forests and their terrors. If we take a thoroughly good account of Mars and his cult, and go carefully through it, every point will seem to bear out this conjecture, with little or no straining. But I must not digress on this point: I must content myself with throwing it out as a suggestion to be tested.

If such deities as Mars and Silvanus retained something of their wild nature throughout Roman history, there were others more completely domesticated who presided over the work of the farm and the life and duties of the house. Saturnus, the spirit of sowing or of the sown corn, always had a cheerful and peaceful disposition, and so had Consus—at least so far as we can guess—the spirit of the stored corn. The divisions of the arable land, where the allotments of different families met, were marked by altars for the worship of the Lares, each family having its own single Lar; and these Lares (as now seems to me probable) passed by a further process of domestication into the dwelling-house itself. And that dwelling was guarded by spirits perhaps far more ancient than even the clearing: Janus, the guardian of the doorway—always a spot that caused anxiety to the early Italian, as we may see in his method of founding a city; Vesta, the spirit of the hearth and its fire; the Penates, who watched over the *penus* or store-closet. The springs which supplied the settlement also had doubtless each its spirit. All these were domestic and harmless deities; yet even in house and farm the sources of anxiety were by no means wanting. The ghosts of men unburied, slain by enemies or wild beasts, were liable to return to the house,

and had to be driven out again by quaint rites which survived in the Lemuralia of the Roman calendar. The fire on the hearth might go out, and have to be rekindled by a solemn process; the crops which had been raised with difficulty might be attacked by mildew and such diseases as are prevalent in hot climates if the spring is a wet one. And the cattle and sheep, indispensable for leather and wool, might stray into the remote woodland and become the prey of evil beasts, if not of evil spirits.

Under such conditions of life—such constant anxiety as to the good or ill will of supernatural powers—man naturally looked for warning or encouragement to such signs as nature might be thought capable of giving. All agricultural peoples have a tendency to look for omens, and in Italy this tendency has always been peculiarly strong; it is so to this day. We must trace back the augural lore of the Romans, their observation of the heavens, of the lightning flash and the birds' flight, to the great difficulties which beset the farmer at every turn, to his inability to calculate on the conduct of the spirits about him. He snatched at any method of discerning the future, any means of divining the attitude of the supernatural beings concerned with his work and livelihood. Little did he think that his naïve attempts were to develop into a tissue of absurdities, to get hopelessly mixed up with political struggles, in a state that was to conquer and govern the whole civilised world of the West.

I hope I have made it plain, even in this slight sketch, that the life of the settlers in Latium must have been beset by continual anxiety, and that the means of quieting such anxiety were slender. How were the unknown spirits, presumably hostile, to be propitiated as they themselves would wish? By what names were they to be addressed?—if you called them out of their names their feelings would of course be hurt. How were the omens to be rightly interpreted, from which their will might be guessed? How were the proper times and seasons for each religious operation to be discovered? How was a man to rid himself, his house, his stock, his land, from

evil influences? Gradually, no doubt, the heads of families, the council of the little community, would accumulate a store of answers to these and many other teasing questions, and would hand on this store to their successors to be still further increased. But we know of no religious organisation in that early age strong enough to give real relief and comfort to the individual or the community. Nothing that survived in the later history of the *gens* or the *pagus*, which represent in a fossilised form the age of which I am speaking, shows either priesthood or prophet, either religious law or the power of enforcing it. The evidence seems to me to suggest that the Latin farmer had to shift for himself in his dealings with the supernatural beings about him. He must have been continually meeting new difficulties, for which his accumulated lore could supply no remedy. How he *did* meet them, whether by spell and magic, or how far he may have got in the direction of ordered prayer and sacrifice, we cannot tell. But that doubt and anxiety were his continual lot, and that his resources for propitiation were constantly failing him, we may be sure.

Now, this condition of the early Latin mind is exactly expressed by a single word, the most enduring of all the great words bequeathed by the Latins to modern civilisation—the word *religio*. I have lately followed the various meanings of this word throughout Latin literature, and I can speak of it with confidence. *Religio* is a *feeling*, the feeling of awe for the supernatural: that is the root-meaning of it, which never altogether leaves it. I think it will be found that it rarely by itself suggests definite acts of duty: such acts may be the result of the feeling, but *religio* is the feeling only. It never came to be technically used—it is a word of general meaning, while *sacrum*, for example, is one of strict and technical use, some thing or place made over to a deity by special rites and formulæ. *Religiosum* stands in contrast with *sacrum*, as indicating some thing or some place about which there is awe, fear, scruple—such as a spot struck by lightning. In its widest sense, as used by men of letters, *religio* may indeed cover the

whole field of religious usage as well as religious feeling; but it is the feeling, not the usage, which lies at the root of the word. We feel its full force when it is used by a great master of the language, Virgil or Tacitus, to describe those places, outside of all civilisation, which strike awe into the heart of man, and make him yearn for guidance in entering them.

I shall take leave to call the period I have been describing —the dim prehistoric period of the primitive Latin religious ideas—*the period of Religio*; but for the rest of my story we have to do with history and facts. And the first facts that meet us are indeed astonishing. When first the Roman city-state dawns on our view, we see it spring, like Athene from the head of Zeus, in complete religious panoply. It has a religious head, the *rex*, priest as well as king: by his side to aid him is a college of men skilled in all the detail of religious observance, the *pontifices*; and they are in charge of a calendar of religious festivals which by great good luck has come down to us entire. Probably also there was already there the great college of augurs, in charge of what had become a kind of science of the observation of omens. We seem to have before us a period of high religious organisation. We have passed out of the region of *religio* in its root sense into one in which we see the origin of two other famous words, *sacer* and *pius*, which belong to the sphere of ritual and law. Of *sacer* I have already spoken; *pius* is the man who performs definite religious duties, and performs them to the letter, while *impius* is the man who offends against the divine law—unforgiveable, if he so offends wilfully. A certain number of deities have taken up their abode within the city or around it, and are as much its inhabitants, its citizens, as the human beings who live there; and all the relations between the divine and human inhabitants are now regulated by *law*—the *jus divinum*,—just as those between the human inhabitants themselves are regulated by the *jus civile*. *Religio* is there, as the feeling which has given rise to all this organisation—as Cicero says, it is the feeling which produces the *cura* and *cærimonia*, the ritualistic worship

of the divine beings. But it must be already losing its strength, its life: it was, so to speak, a constitutional weakness, and the *jus divinum* is already beginning to act on it as a tonic. Only when the Roman passes into new scenes, where his own deities are not, and where his *jus divinum* fails him, does this weakness again get the better of him. In his own city and land he has no cause for fear or anxiety: his deities are familiar to him, and the constituted authorities of his state know exactly how to deal with them. Doubt has passed into fixed usage, tradition has given place to organisation. Time, place, procedure in all religious matters, are all guaranteed him by those skilled in the *jus divinum*; they know what to do as the festival of each deity comes round, and at the right time and place they do it with scrupulous attention to every detail. For when once the right formula had been discovered and learnt, it must be repeated (so all Italians believed) word for word as each occasion came round, *or religio, the old uncomfortable feeling, would supervene*; and then, like a schoolboy's lesson, it would have to be repeated again from the beginning, and an expiatory sacrifice, *piaculum*, would have to be offered. If we grasp well this elementary fact in the worship of the Roman city-state, we shall see that its main effect would be to destroy fear and doubt in the mind of the individual Roman—*to kill religio in its root-sense.* As the State in our own day has a tendency to relieve families of such duties as the care and education of children, so the State at Rome relieved the family of constant anxiety about matters which they could not sufficiently understand to place themselves out of reach of danger from the spirit-world. The State and its authorities have taken the whole responsibility of adjusting the relations of the human citizen with the divine inhabitants of the city.

Let us take a concrete example of the way in which the new system would work. One of the commonest pests which the Latin farmer had to deal with was the red mildew on the corn. Some evil spirit produced this: how was he to

be appeased, fixed to a local point where he could be invoked at the right time and in the right way? In imagination we may see the primitive farmer settling these points by tradition, but without that confidence that comes of professional knowledge and duly constituted authority. But in the calendar of the earliest city-state we have a festival of Robigus, the spirit of the mildew, on a fixed day, April 25; and we know, too, something of the ritual of that day—the sacrifice of a dog and a sheep by the Flamen Quirinalis, and the exposition of their *exta* on the altar of the deity in the grove which he had been induced to inhabit in the Ager Romanus, five miles out on the Via Claudia of later times. In the time of Ovid, who describes it,[1] this ritual was only a survival, or perhaps a revival, like the kindred rites of the Arval Brethren; but in the early State it was a reality, the priest acting for the whole community, under the supervision of the *rex* and *pontifices*, and relieving individual citizens from all responsibility in regard to it. Their obligatory part in this ritual was simply nil, and all their religious duties on that day were to abstain from civil business.

In no other ancient state that we know of did the citizen so entirely resign the regulation of all his dealings with the gods to the constituted authorities set over him. Within the family, it is true, he used his own simple ritual, the morning prayer, the libation to the household deities at meals; and it is exactly here that we see a *pietas* that seems to have something of an ethical value, and reminds us of modern piety. But in all his relations with the gods *qua* citizen, he resigned himself to the trained and trusted priesthoods, all of them under the supervision of the *rex* at first, and under the Republic of the *pontifex maximus*: and by unquestioning obedience to these authorities he killed the sense of *religio* that was in him.

Let me now turn to ask what was the result of the great change I have been describing on the religion and the character of the Roman people. In other words, what was the influence of the *jus divinum* of the city-state on their moral and religious

[1] *Fasti*, iv. 901 foll.

ideas? I seem to discern two distinct tendencies, the one wholesome, the other paralysing.

First, so far as I can conjecture, there would be a great gain in comfort and confidence. Law has been defined by Mommsen as the interference of the State in the interests and passions of humanity: the *jus divinum* might be defined as the interference of the State in the superstitious fancies of humanity. Fear and doubt, magic and quackery, are eliminated as far as possible by the regulation of the whole relation of the citizen to the supernatural under the guidance of the State and its authorities. Man moves a whole step forward in his attitude to the supernatural, because he has made it at last subservient to his own progress. Not only has he, in advancing to the life of the City-state, made his supernatural neighbours citizens like himself, and learnt how to deal with them as aids to his well-being, but he is beginning to use them by way of sanction for right-doing. Oaths, treaties, the fair declaration of war, and probably in those early times all contracts and covenants between one man and another, were under the sanction of a deity, and the man who broke them was made the property of the offended deity—handed over to it as *sacer*. We seem, in fact, to discern a glimmer of the idea—especially in the worship of Jupiter—of a deity making for righteousness. The result of this, we may guess, is an increased confidence in all the work man has to do; the gods, rightly propitiated, cannot refuse to perform their part, if man performs his. They are now bound up with his interests, they live about him and in harmony with him; he has lifted them out of wild life, where their conduct could not be depended on, into civilised life, where it can be foretold and guaranteed. They are identified with the State and its life and interests.

Even the strictness of the ritual, the *cura* and *cærimonia*, had perhaps some ethical value, for it must have helped to produce that nice sense of duty for which the Latins had their own peculiar word—*pietas*. Care and conscientious exactness in a man's performance of duty to the gods might naturally

tend to produce the same habits in a man's dealings with his neighbour. And I can hardly doubt that some of the most striking qualities of the Roman—qualities which won for him the dominion of the world—are due to the influence of the *jus divinum*; the tendency to confide absolutely in skilled knowledge and experience, to obey implicitly all constituted authority, to hold with infinite tenacity to the institutions of his forefathers, to the *mos majorum*, as handed down to him by those who had discovered the secrets of his social and political life. His instinct of discipline, his conservative conscience, carried him through endless perils to the height of his dominion; when they began to fail him, his prosperity began to fail him too. Augustus and his poets appealed to them again, not wholly in vain. We must never forget, if we would understand Augustus and his age, that the real theme of the Æneid is the victory of *pietas*, of the sense of duty and discipline, over wanton barbarism and individual passion.

Yet it is to this same characteristic feature of the old Roman religion, its embodiment in a *jus divinum*, the complete mastery of it by the State and its officials, that we must ascribe the early stunting of its growth, and its eventual paralysis. That it was so paralysed, killed, fossilised, there cannot be a doubt: long before the Republic came to an end it had ceased to make for righteousness, it had become a series of forms and formulæ, and no prophet had arisen to call on it to awake to new life. Rome produced no prophet: her prophecies were the Sibylline books, and it is most significant that the function of those mysterious volumes was not to stimulate the old religion, but to bring in new gods, new ceremonies, just because the old ones were no use in meeting fresh experiences, fresh troubles. After the war with Hannibal the old gods, with one or two exceptions, fell into neglect, the old shrines crumbled away, and even some of the old priesthoods were vacant. There is a famous case of the priesthood of Jupiter being filled in those days by a young man of thoroughly bad character, who was

put into it by his friends because it might do him good to have duties to perform and restrictions to bind him. There is no need here to prove the truth of this decay and fossilisation: it is familiar to every close student of Roman history. What was the cause of it, but that the letter killeth, that the mere works of the law cannot give life? As the Greek religion was caught in the deadly embrace of mythological fancy, so was the Roman religion caught in a grip even more deadly, that of the law. Religion had become a legal science, without a trace in it of anything spiritual. Nothing can show this better than the fact that long after the life had been crushed out of it, the legal priesthoods remained more flourishing than ever: we see the pontifices and the augurs sitting like ghouls on its tomb.

Whether there ever was enough of life in the old Roman divinities to enable them to develop into permanent sanctions for moral conduct, I can hardly say: it is hard to speak with confidence of the ethical qualities of a fossilised religion. But I doubt whether they ever could have bettered the life of the individual, though they might strengthen and solidify that of the State. In Greece they could do something for him: as Dr Farnell tells us, "The average private man was certainly capable of praying for blessings other than material."[1] But at Rome Cicero tells us explicitly that no one prays or thanks the gods for virtues, which depend on ourselves alone, but for wealth, good fortune, and material happiness (*De Nat. Deor.*, 2, 36, 82).

Thus we are led to the strange conclusion that the very same agent, the State, which had lifted the Roman out of his original condition of doubt and anxiety, eventually destroyed in him the possibility of finding in his religion a stimulus to morality. It has been said lately that Ireland has been the scene of an arrested civilisation. I may use the phrase, and say that Rome was the scene of an arrested religious development. The *religio*, the feeling, was indeed

[1] *Evolution of Religion*, p. 202.

always there, though latent: the Romans were human beings like the rest of us: but looking to Roman history, we find that, when trouble and disaster brought it out of its hiding-place, it seemed impossible any longer to soothe it on Roman principles or by Roman methods. These methods—in a word, the *jus divinum*—had been meant to soothe it, and had indeed so effectually lulled it to sleep that when at last it awoke again they had lost the power of dealing with it. When the craving did at last come upon the Roman, which in time of peril and doubt has come upon individuals and communities in all ages, for support and comfort from the Unseen, it had to be satisfied by giving him new gods to worship in new ways, gods from Greece and the East, half concealed, perhaps under Latin names, but still aliens, not citizens of his State—aliens with whom he had nothing in common, who had no home in his patriotic feeling, no place in his religious experience.

I know well enough that in thus tracing in broad outline the growth and decay of the Roman State religion I have left much unsaid. There were, in fact, other causes, besides that of priestly over-organisation, which contributed to the strange result I have been describing. But in the main that result was brought about by the influence of discipline and routine upon a type of mind naturally weak in independent action, prone to superstition, apt to obey, and most unwilling to rebel. I believe that this discipline and routine, this over-organisation of the *jus divinum*, gradually killed in the Roman mind the germs of religious thought, by divorcing religion from life and morals; so that it became an easy prey to philosophies which it hardly understood, and to foreign forms of religion which reflected no part of its own experience. If we ask why the first great Roman poet spent his magnificent genius in denouncing religion as the root of all evil in human life—it was not simply because Lucretius had found what he believed to be the secret of conduct in a school of Greek philosophy, but because he saw in the State religion only forms, shadows,

unrealities, and outside it a mass of superstition and quackery. If we ask again why the *Æneid* may truly be called a great religious poem, the answer is that after generations of crime and civil war a great poet could reflect the feeling of the best men of his time, that the sense of duty to the gods, the State, and the family is the one thing wanting to make Rome once more happy and prosperous. I said that Rome produced no prophet. But it may be said that Lucretius and Virgil were both of them in a sense prophets: the one appealing to the Roman to shake off the slough of his dead religion—and appealing almost in vain; the other, with a larger view of human life as it then was, urging him by an imaginative example to turn to a living *pietas*—not to the hide-bound *jus divinum*, not to the works of the law, but to the intelligent sense of duty to God and man which had built up his character and his empire.

We have seen that the Roman priesthood reduced religion to a legal science by over-organisation; in this process it also destroyed the wholesome instinct to rebel or doubt, which alone can lead to any real advance even on the old lines. So, too, in the early centuries of our era the work of organisation, forced on the Church by strong necessity, was carried to an extreme and became a ruling passion. It bore again its natural fruit. The great universal Church of Christendom relieved the minds of all devout believers from doubt and anxiety (*religio*) both as to the things of this world and of the world to come, and effectually suppressed all rebellion against its system. But it was carried on by the momentum of its own practice; and in the long run it all but destroyed in men's minds the sense of a real religious experience, and made it almost impossible for Christianity to advance with the advance of civilisation. In the mediæval world, as in the Rome of the Republic, the priesthood excluded the prophet, and the rebel was destroyed out of the land.

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CHARACTER AND CITIZENSHIP IN DANTE.

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No one, I suppose, can read the *Divina Commedia* without feeling that to Dante ethics and politics are very closely related, that in his world government and private life touch one another at every turn, and that the fortunes of states and of sovereigns play a large part in his view of human character and conduct.

As it is one of the charms, it is also one of the difficulties of the *Commedia* that the thread of its argument is so inextricably woven of the diverse strands of ethics, politics, metaphysics, and religion. It is, no doubt, by this very intricacy, by the fusion of personal and political, scientific and transcendental, of crude matter of fact and exalted mysticism, that the great effect on our imagination is produced. To analyse it is, in a measure, to destroy the poetry. Yet, in work so carefully thought out, packed so full of the learning and speculation of the age, it is worth while to try now and again to disengage some of the interwoven threads, to measure, however imperfectly, the relations of some of the various elements which contribute to the total effect. It may well be that in such a process we shall see things in their wrong proportion—we may try to force a consistent theory where there is only a series of broken and inconsequent visions seen at intervals, and never completely harmonised, but the

poet will always have the last word: however fanciful our theory, or however elaborate, the poem itself will laugh at us, and

"arise and unbuild it again."

I have spoken of the *Commedia* only, and this I shall have chiefly in view; but I do not propose to leave out of sight Dante's other writings, without which it is impossible to understand it, and particularly the *de Monarchia* and the *Letters*. I cannot attempt a complete survey; I can only call attention to some of the leading ideas of Dante in regard to the relation of ethics to politics, of character to citizenship.

I. Dante's view of life is governed by a strong conviction of the *divine order*—the rule of Providence in the world, the guidance supplied to men by Him

"qui cuncta sub ordinis pulchritudine ab æterno providit." [1]

It is not merely that Dante has a strong religious sense; it means that to him the idea of *order* is the dominant idea in his view of divine providence. Human society, the possibility of virtue, all the achievements of conduct, are bound up with the idea of an ordered society, conditioned and governed by the controlling power of God. And this society is distinctively political. It is true that in the first and in the last stages of human development the social life is something more or something less than the political society which we call the State. In the natural state of innocence politics do not exist, and yet virtue is possible. In the realised Christian society of paradise, the social bond is something wider than the State, and the individual is face to face with God in the multitude of the blessed. Politics then have no place at either end of the scale, but in the vast and varied scene of human activity between the age of innocence and the society of just men made perfect, the possibility of virtue rests upon a life organised in political form. This idea is so pervading that it hardly needs illustration. Even in the description of the

[1] *De Monarchia*, ii. 4, 72.

society of the saints, which transcends human ties and organisations, the terms of human citizenship and human government are used;[1] and this is no mere metaphor, for the one life conditions and sustains the other. To Dante as to Augustine the human soul upon earth may at any moment be regarded as the citizen of two cities: the city of his birth, in which he spends the days of his pilgrimage, and the city of God, which is realised at moments in vision, and towards which his whole life, if it be well with him, is an ascending progress; at every moment his spirit is in touch with two societies,

"True to the kindred points of heaven and home."

The State, then, furnishes the groundwork for human development in virtue; it also supplies the field for the exercise of the virtues by which character is built up. The State is necessary for man's development, for he is by nature "animale civile."[2] In the life of the civil society *variety* is an essential characteristic; and this is supplied by the providence of God working through the influence of the stars, which direct different men to divers duties.

"Ond' egli ancora: 'Or di', sarebbe il peggio
Per l'uomo in terra se non fosse cive?'
'Si,' rispos' io, 'e qui ragion non cheggio.'
'E può egli esser, se giù non si vive
Diversamente per diversi offici?
No, se il maestro vostro ben vi scrive.'"[3]

"Then he once more: 'Say now, would man lose on earth, if he were not a social being?' 'Aye,' I replied, 'and of this I need no proof.' 'And can he be so, unless in the world below there are various modes of life in various functions? He cannot, if your Master's writings say the truth.'"

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[1] *Purgatorio*, xiii. 94:

"O frate mio, ciascuna è cittadina
D'una vera città."

La Vita Nuova, xxxv. 3: "cittadini di vita eterna."

Il Convivio, iv. 24, 115: "all 'entrare nella città del ben vivere."

Dante makes Hell too a city. *Inferno*, iii. i.

Per me si va nella città dolente.

[2] *Conv.*, iv. 27, 29.

[3] *Parad.*, viii. 115–120. The translation here and in other passages of the *Commedia* is Mr Tozer's.

But the world of men does not understand the teaching of God in nature, and turns men to wrong tasks—

> "Ma voi torcete alla religione
> Tal che fia nato a cingersi la spada,
> E fate re di tal ch' è da sermone;
> Onde la traccia vostra è fuor di strada." [1]

"But ye pervert from his natural bent to the service of religion one who is born to gird on the sword, and make him king who is fitted for the pulpit; and thus your course misses the right road."

Yet it must not be forgotten that if Dante follows Aristotle his master in making the virtues rest upon society and the State, and insists upon the necessity of variety of function, he is also Aristotelian in placing the intellectual virtues above the moral, and in seeing in the activity of the former the highest form of blessedness.

"E così appare che la nostra Beatitudine, ch' è questa Felicità di cui si parla, prima trovare potemo *imperfetta nella vita attiva,* cioè nelle operazioni delle morali virtù, e poi *quasi perfetta nelle operazioni delle intellettuali.*" [2]

In Aristotle his analytical treatment makes the separation of the moral and intellectual life and virtues sharper and more complete. We may conceive the man of ethical virtue rising at moments to a beatific vision in which his moral life is transfigured by a θεωρία of the divine order; but this fusion of the moral and the intellectual which in Aristotle is rather suggested than made clear is to Dante an assured and realised fact. In the *Commedia* the vision of God (now as the fount of justice and government, now as the ineffable light which illumines the minds of men) is never far from any one of those who attain to virtue. The idea of vision, which in Aristotle is almost entirely intellectual and abstract, has become religous and personal. All the faithful share in their degree, and share consciously, in the contemplation of the divine. This interpenetration of divine and human is made possible by the personal links between the higher and lower provinces of the universe. First indirectly through Virgil, the prophet of the ideal civil society, and later through the guidance of Matelda

[1] *Ib.* 145–8. [2] *Conv.*, iv. 22, 201.

and of Beatrice herself, the struggling human soul, the sojourner in the earthly city, is continually kept in communication with the source of order and goodness, *l'Imperadore dell' Universo*, in the vision of whom the poem closes. Thus to Dante the political aspect of the world is never purely political: there is always the wider outlook into the world of religion; as in the Republic of Plato, bnt in fuller and intenser measure, there is a steady spiritual ascent through the poem, in the process of which human conditions and human politics tend to fade into the background, and yet from first to last we are made to feel that the individual in himself is nothing, and that the height of blessedness can only be attained through society and self-surrender. The poet begins his pilgrimage alone, forlorn and miserable; he ends it rapt in contemplation, but a contemplation which has only been made possible by the comfort and sustaining power of those who are citizens with him in the city of God. It is not merely the intellectual vision of Plato, it is the consuming ardour of the love of God, "l'amor della spera suprema," of which the vital principle is that all share the good which grows in sharing,

> "Chè per quanti si dice più lì nostro,
> Tanto possiede più di ben ciascuno,
> E più di caritate arde in quel chiostro."[1]

"For there, the greater the number is of those who say 'ours,' the greater is the amount of blessing which each possesses, and the amount of love which burns in that mansion."

II. It is when we ask *in what forms* Dante's social and political ideas are clothed that their power becomes felt: for here, as in all his work, it is in the vivid power of concrete presentation that his magic lies.

Two ideas control his political theory: (1) The Empire. (2) The City or State.

Both are equally essential to his political view: both colour very strongly his estimate of human merit, and his apportionment of misery and bliss. They are the perpetual instruments

[1] *Purgatorio*, xv. 55.

of God's order in the world, the conditions of just government, and of the training of men in conduct. What are the chief features of this conception, as brought out explicitly in the *de Monarchia*, and expressed or implied throughout Dante's works?

(1) The Empire. To Dante to "think imperially" meant to recognise the will of God in the world. The single ruler who is to be the arbiter of political society is part of the "natural," that is, of the divine order.[1]

This rule is not an end in itself, but the means to universal peace and freedom; in other words, to the moral life.[2] Its instruments are justice and honour.[3] In history it is embodied in the government of Rome, and is glorified and enforced by its great examples. Its spirit is the spirit of self-sacrifice for the common good, the spirit of the long roll of citizens from Cincinnatus to Cato, "severissimus veræ libertatis auctor,"[4] in whose lives and deeds, which are more than human, the glory of Rome is exalted.[5] It is this which gives a heightened interest and value to every mention of the great names of Roman history. Cato, Cæsar, Trajan, Justinian are not merely individual heroes or rulers of an ordinary State, whose ambitions are personal and selfish, but the founders and rulers who have formed the character and moulded the policy of that undying Empire whose work it is to give peace and order to the whole world. This explains why Italy, where the Empire has its proper seat and centre, has such an immense significance in the writings of Dante—charged as it is, not only with all the associations of the ancient Roman Republic and Empire, but also with the ideal mission of the Empire

[1] *Epistolæ*, vi. 8: "ut . . . . ubique, natura poscente, civiliter degeretur."

[2] *De Monarchia*, ii. 5, 34: "omni cupiditate submota . . . . universali pace cum libertate dilecta, ... ut publica pro salute humani generis procuraret (populus Romanus)."

[3] *De Monarchia*, ii. 5, 64: "æquitate et fide."

[4] *De Monarchia*, ii. 5, 133.

[5] *Il Convivio*, iv. 5, 103: "noi troveremo lei (Roma) esaltata, non con umani cittadini, ma con divini."

of his own day as Dante conceived it, to be fulfilled by the coming of a worthy Emperor, who should make Rome once again the governing centre of the world, in a government of justice and good-will. This is what lends such pathetic force to Dante's appeal to Henry of Luxemburg, the ruler to whom he looked for the restoration of the true imperial idea. He describes him as the "servant of God, son of the Church, whose destined work it is to advance the glory of Rome,"[1] "who desires not his own interest, but the interest of the world at large,"[2] whose mission it is to set in order the distresses and divisions of Italy and so "fulfil all justice," that by this means the exiles of Babylon may at last find peace in the citizenship of a renovated Rome.[3]

Dante's sense of the significance of the Empire culminates in the bold passage of the *Paradiso* where he prepares for Henry VII. a seat of high honour in the Empyrean.

The idea of the Empire, Dante tells us, has been dimmed and perverted. On the one hand, the Church has encroached on the power of the Empire, and so has itself become corrupted;[4] on the other hand, the emperors have forgotten the true land of their inheritance and allowed Italy to go to ruin. Finally, individual cities have rebelled and attempted to rival Rome.[5] But the idea of the Empire is still a true one, and may at any moment be restored to life; only that the ideal emperor is wanting.

(2) If in the Empire is to be found the framework and the guiding arbiter of human life, it is in the smaller political organism, the City or the State, that are to be found the school of character and the sphere of conduct for ordinary

[1] *Epistolæ*, vii. 36: "Dei ministrum, et Ecclesiæ filium, et Romanæ gloriæ promotorem."

[2] *Epistolæ*, vi. 183: "non sua privata sed publica mundi commoda sitiens."

[3] *Epistolæ*, vii. 186: "Ac quemadmodum sacrosanctæ Ierusalem memores, exules in Babylone, gemiscimus; ita tunc cives, et respirantes in pace, confusionis miserias in gaudio recolemus."

[4] *Purgatorio*, xvi. 106 foll.

[5] *Epistolæ*, vi. 50: "Quid . . . tanquam alteri Babylonii, pium deserentes imperium nova regna tentatis, ut alia sit Florentia civilitas, alia sit Romana?"

men under everyday conditions. We are startled—Dante meant to startle us—by the denunciations of cities, the scathing phrases that damn Florence or Pisa or Lucca to perpetual shame. It is only intelligible if we remember *what civil life means to him.* It means, in the first place, the school of conduct, the most powerful engine for framing character, the source of "civilitas." It means also the collective force of common life — tradition, examples, great personalities co-operating to produce a type of manners, an ethos. The formal classification of the vices in the *Inferno* and *Purgatorio* have their own history and their own significance; we may quarrel with the scale of punishment, we may wonder at unexpected collocations; the order seems at times artificial and pedantic, and therefore unconvincing: but the passages which introduce the cities of Italy break through these formal barriers, and bring us face to face with a passion which consumes and convinces. If we do not entirely believe in the utter wickedness of the city condemned, we have at least for the moment no doubt of the sinfulness of the sin for which it stands, the degradation of city life, with the personal demoralisation which follows. Half real, half ideal, these cities' names represent the concentrated essence of sin as embodied in a common life, where the forces which should have nourished virtue have wrought poison and corruption. The individual sin is lost in the corporate responsibility of the city which can breed and tolerate such wickedness.

It is in these passages that Dante expresses most strongly the "political" aspect of his theory of ethics: political, not of course in the sense that he classes men or sins by party, but that he sees in the good State the nurse of all the virtues,[1] and in bad cities the most powerful instruments of evil. In the case of Florence, "the well guided"[2] as he bitterly calls it, the

[1] *Purgatorio*, vi. 139:

"Atene e Lacedemone, che fenno
L'antiche leggi, e furon sì civili."

[2] *Purgatorio*, xii. 102: "La ben guidata."

utterances have a special pathos from the fact that it is his own city and that he is an exile.[1] If we ask what the sin of Florence is, we find it is primarily *disorder*, leading to the triumph of evil passions and the destruction of the simple and honest manners of earlier days. The balance has been disturbed by the intrusion of an inferior population, and the disproportionate growth of riches.[2]

Dante, like Plato and Aristotle, believes in a city of limited size and simple life; he has a profound distrust of riches. It is not necessary to enumerate his attacks on Florence; the same spirit pervades them all. Florence, Pisa, Genoa, the Romagna—the sin in all is disorder and selfish greed:[3] in all of them civil confusion is closely bound up with loss of character in the citizens. A *civitas* which fails to produce *civilitas* has no reason to exist. As the city is the nurse of character, so character is the test of the city: "by their fruits ye shall know them!" Nobility is nothing if its life is evil, *se male si vive.*

III. Closely bound up with this idea of the necessity of government and of polity is the high place which Dante gives to justice and law. Justice is the most lovable and the most human of virtues.[4] It is the will of God, pervading the State, and, through it, guiding the individual life; like the justice of Plato, it is the one omnipresent virtue. He can say nothing worse of Florence than that it is far removed

[1] *Purgatorio,* xxiv. 79:

"Perocchè il loco, u' fui a viver posto,
Di giorno in giorno più di ben si spolpa,
Ed a trista ruina par disposto."

Conv., iv. 27, 96: "O misera, misera patria mia! quanta pietà mi strigne per te, qual volta leggo, qual volta scrivo cosa che a reggimento civile abbia rispetto!"

[2] *Inferno,* xvi. 73:

"La gente nuova, e i subiti guadagni,
Orgoglio e dismisura han generata,
Fiorenza, in te, sì che tu già ten piagni."

[3] *Epistolæ*, vi. 151: "Nec advertitis dominantem cupidinem."

[4] *Il Conv.*, i. 12, 69: "Avvegnachè ciascuna virtù sia amabile nell' uomo, quella è più amabile in esso ch' è più umana; e questa è la giustizia.

from justice;[1] and the need for this "bulwark of the city of God" is strikingly enforced in the picture of the soul's progress in the sixteenth canto of the *Purgatorio*.[2]

Perhaps nowhere is the political aspect of Dante's ideal more manifest than in this—that justice is the virtue which he oftenest praises. It follows closely from his view that guidance is a necessity to man—that only ordered society and its laws can produce right habits and right character. This is why, although Cato is praised, Cæsar is among the heroes in Limbo,[3] as founder of the Empire. As laws are the formal expression of justice, "the bond of human society,"[4] the work of the lawgiver is of the highest importance. This accounts for the honour done to Justinian[5] and to Gratian,[6] the Canonist of the twelfth century. For the same reason kings, good and evil, are conspicuous in the *Commedia*, as in the famous description of the Valley of Princes,[7] and in Hugh Capet's narrative of the French monarchy.[8] As goodness and wisdom are rare among kings,[9] so when they appear they win high praise, as in Solomon, who asked for wisdom that he might fulfil his duty as a king.[10]

The ideas of justice and law are thus of the groundwork of his doctrine, and they are never lost sight of. It seems almost true to say that the idea of what is "right" is more

[1] *Paradiso*, xxxi. 37:

"Io, che al divino dall' umano,
All' eterno dal tempo era venuto,
E di Fiorenza in popol giusto e sano."

[2] *Purgatorio*, xvi. 82 foll.

[3] *Inferno*, iv. 123: "Cesare armato con gli occhi grifagni."

[4] *De Monarchia*, ii. 5, 25: "vinculum . . . humanæ societatis."

[5] *Paradiso*, vi. 10:

"Cesare fui, e son Giustiniano,
Che, per voler del primo amor ch'io sento,
D'entro le leggi trassi il troppo e il vano."

[6] *Paradiso*, x. 103:

"Grazian, che l'uno e l'altro foro
Aiutò sì che piace in Paradiso."

[7] *Purg.*, vii. 91–136.

[8] *Purg.*, xx. 43 foll.

[9] *Paradiso*, xiii. 108: "regi, che son molti, e i buon son rari."

[10] *Paradiso*, xiii. 95.

prominent in Dante than the idea of what is "good." This aspect of life is illustrated by the frequency of the images which are concerned with guidance, direction, control—the ship and its helm, the arrow and its mark, the horse and its rider, the bridle and spur.[1] There is always near to Dante the thought of "government," not as to the modern man the "Deus ex machina," to feed and clothe and employ his children, but as the discipline producing that free life which is in its perfection the identification of man's will with God's. In this sense all sins are closely connected with Dante's political theory, for they are all expressions, under different forms, of that perversion of freedom which seeks satisfaction for the individual will in detachment and independence, instead of in conformity with the will of God.

IV. All sins, then, bear a close relation to Dante's theory of government, all are in the last resort social or political—because they arise out of the relations of men in society, and in their turn produce morbid conditions of the body politic. But there are certain sins which from their nature stand in closer connection with political life, and which therefore demand special consideration as distinct from those which are more purely personal. (1) Tyranny. (2) Bribery and Corruption, Simony and Barratry. (3) Faction, Treachery and Treason.

It is because to Dante the consequences of misgovernment —or lack of government—are so fatal and far-reaching that these political sins meet with a strikingly severe condemnation.

(1) Tyranny comes under the head of violence against others in the seventh circle of the *Inferno*.[2] The sin of those who, like Eccelin, turn their power to violent ends is specially repugnant to one who views law and government as above all

[1] *Il Conv.*, iv. 26, 41: "Veramente questo Appetito conviene essere *cavalcato* dalla Ragione. . . . La quale guida quello *con freno e con isproni* come buono cavaliere.

[2] *Inferno*, xii. 133.

a means of peace. Like all injustice Tyranny contains the seeds of its own ruin.[1]

(2) The sin of Simon Magus, punished in the third pit of Malebolge, is one form of the corruption which ruins the body politic, and it is the more heinous because it traffics in places which are not only sacred, as all places of government are, being the means of man's guidance, but have a special consecration as set apart for holy living. Nicholas III. of the Orsini and his companions have sold for gold and silver the highest form of trust that life can offer.[2] It is one aspect of that confusion of Church and State which has corrupted both.[3]

Close to these, and punished in the next pit but one (fifth) of Malebolge, are the Jobbers or Barrators, men who sell justice or office like Fra Gomita of Gallura,[4] and the servant (by tradition Ciampolo) of Thibaut of Navarre, the grotesque horror of whose condition makes their sin at once shocking and ridiculous. There is a homely truth here which makes one feel that, whether the names are specially significant or not in this canto, Dante perhaps more than usual had in mind those sinners of civic life whom he knew well.

In the eighth pit also, that of the Fraudulent Counsellors, the sin punished is one against the body politic. Astuteness turned to false ends, δεινότης, as Aristotle would call it, is the offence which brings low such great men as Ulysses, Diomed and Guido da Montefeltro. The description of the Romagna given in answer to Guido's inquiry shows that we are moving in the region of politics. It is characteristic of Dante that the

[1] *Paradiso*, viii. 73:

"Se mala signoria, che sempre accora
Li popoli suggetti, non avesse
Mosso Palermo a gridar: 'Mora, mora.'"

[2] *Inferno*, xix. 112: "Fatto v'avete Dio d'oro e d'argento."

[3] *Inferno*, xix. 115:

"Ahi, Constantin, di quanto mal fu matre,
Non la tua conversion, ma quella dote
Che da te prese il primo ricco patre!"

[4] *Inferno*, xxii. 82: "vasel d'ogni froda."

sin is traced home to its inner source—the evil heart of man.[1] At the same time another aspect of tyranny is brought out which was not touched on before—its inconstancy in contrast to the immutable laws of justice.[2] Perhaps in the flickering of the flames which wrap them round, some suggestion is to be found of their wavering and deceitful ways; so strikingly exemplified in Guido, who was brought back to a course of sin by Boniface VIII.

"Lo Principe de' nuovi Farisei," [3]

whose enemies were not Saracens or Jews, but near neighbours, —the Colonna. It was for this that Guido was snatched from St Francis by a black cherub, in spite of his earlier repentance.

(3) The ninth pit, of sedition and discord, is again political. If we leave Mahomet and Ali, the religious schismatics, on one side, the sowers of discord are men who have rent States and societies asunder; Pier da Medicina,[4] Curio, who

"il dubitar sommerse
In Cesare." [5]

and Mosca Lamberti, whose saying

"Capo ha cosa fatta" [6]

was the beginning of the feud of Guelf and Ghibelline, through the murder of Buondelmonte—

"Che fu il mal seme per la gente tosca." [7]

This is indeed the classical instance of how closely personal and political causes are interwoven in the Italian world.

The last four cantos of the *Inferno* are above all concerned with breaches of the social bond, for in the ninth circle, at the

[1] *Inferno*, xxvii. 37:
"Romagna tua non è, e non fu mai
Senza guerra ne'cor de'suoi tiranni."

[2] *Inferno*, xxvii. 49:
"Le città di Lamone e di Santerno
Conduce il leoncel dal nido bianco,
Che muta parte dalla state al verno."

[3] *Inferno*, xxvii. 85.
[4] *Inferno*, xxviii. 73.
[5] *Inferno*, xxviii. 97.
[6] *Inferno*, xxviii. 106.
[7] *Inferno*, xxviii. 108.

bottommost Hell, in regions of coldest ice, are found traitors to kin and country, friends and benefactors. In the lowest Hell—the Giudecca—Brutus and Cassius are punished on either side of Judas. To those who held, as Dante did, the equal sanctity for human life of Church and Empire, the moral could not be more sternly and terribly enforced that the unforgiveable sin is the breach of the social tie, and that this is at its height when the sin is at once against a friend who has trusted and against one to whom great issues belong in Church or State—to govern the lives of men.

V. But the interaction of politics and ethics in Dante is much wider than a survey of these specially "political sins" might suggest. There are other points of contact, arising naturally out of the psychological and artistic conditions of his poem. These now demand attention.

Throughout the poem the idea is never lost sight of that the individual and the State are one. Not only is the State the nursing mother of its citizens, the school of their character, but there is a real analogy, as Plato holds, between the State and the human soul; the State is the mind of men "writ large." In both alike the qualities that make for life are the same:—

(1) Unity—whether it be called harmony or justice, or order and discipline.

(2) Purity—freedom from all debasing and corrupting passions.

(3) Activity—for zeal is a necessity of healthy life.

This close parallelism between the individual soul and the soul of a city is characteristic, and throws light on Dante's vivid personification of the great cities of Italy of which I have yet to speak.

Again, the dramatic and personal method of Dante—the method of the *Commedia*—is to set forth the facts of the world in concrete and visible form, and, as the commanding facts are the moral facts, his method is to portray character

and action in *great personalities*. The method is that laid down in Aristotle's *Poetics*, which demands for tragedy that characters should be dignified and considerable — it is the method of Shakespeare, whose tragedies are never exhibited in the circumstances of squalid or humble existence, but in a Hamlet, a Macbeth, or a Lear. The Greek tragedian drew upon the mythology of his people; Shakespeare on the chroniclers and on popular legend. Dante found his "persons of importance" in the roll of the famous men of history, ancient and modern. The moral life, then, is set forth in the *Commedia* in the passions of *men of mark*—kings and princes, and men and women who have played great parts. And as in Italy and the world that Dante knew the greater part of such persons played their part in the field of government and politics, it follows that in the very portrayal of his moral doctrine we are constantly brought into contact with politics imperial or local. It must, of course, be remembered that in all the illustrations and references—whether of persons or cities—there is more than the mere temporary reference. Like the heroes of tragedy the great names of Dante have a universal meaning. City and person alike become symbols for the virtues or vices which they embody, never indeed losing their individuality, but, as Dante himself explains in the *Convivio*, bearing a sense beyond the immediate reference.[1] This gives to each incident, whether of city or person, a wider range of meaning—all are viewed, in a sense, "sub specie æternitatis."

In this great drama, or series of dramatic presentments, the cities become almost as vividly personal as the men and women. Virgil had shown the magic of Italian names, but even Virgil is surpassed by Dante in concentrated force:

"Siena mi fe', disfecemi Maremma."[2]

Here the effect is heightened by the mysterious brevity of the line. No one has ever used place names so remarkably to

[1] *Il Convivio*, ii. 1. [2] *Purgatorio*, v. 134.

emphasise a crisis or a passionate moment in a person's life. But more than this, Dante uses the names of cities as types of character. In this he may be compared with Demosthenes, when he uses Thebes as the type of stupidity and want of tact, Thessaly as the type of treachery and faithlessness, and so on. The modern nation is too vague a unity to be characterised with any subtlety, and the modern town has no deeply marked character. Nothing, then, in later literature can quite compare with Dante's typical use of city names, in which the associations of Hebrew literature—the echoes of Jerusalem and Babylon—are blended with the bitter contemporary passions of the contentious States of Italy. The cities stand out in Dante's pages like warning lights, terrible in the splendour of their wickedness.

Such concentrated personality can hardly be attributed to cities except in a period of the intenser life of city-states. The result is that in Dante's writings the characteristic sins of his age are incarnate in the names of the cities that he knew. His praise is for the past, for Athens and Sparta, for Republican Rome, or for early Florence, when manners were simple, and weights and measures were true; but in all cases of praise or blame, it is said or implied that the *polity* is responsible in large measure for the character of the citizens, and that personal conduct depends ultimately in no small degree on the guidance of laws and government, and on the influence of the rulers by example and by control.[1]

VI. This fact, to which we are constantly brought back, that the city and its organs tell powerfully on conduct, is only one aspect to Dante of the wider law that man is a social being, a principle which applies in the religious as in the political life. The cantos on St Francis and St Dominic are the expressions in the religious sphere of what personal influence can effect through organised societies, while his

[1] Among the most striking passages on this subject is the list of evil kings (*Paradiso*, xix. 112, etc.) beginning: "Che potran dir li Persi ai vostri regi?"

scathing sarcasms on these societies in their decadent form correspond to his denunciations of civic degeneracy.

This life in society finds expression in the "colleges" or "societies" of damned or repentant sinners. Even in Giudecca there is no "solitary confinement"; through all these realms men suffer, as they have lived, in society;[1] and among the blessed it is the same.[2]

In both spheres, secular and religious, the main ideas seem to be these: (1) the influence of personality—acting by stimulus and example; (2) the power of a living society; (3) the rapid degeneracy of an organisation when the personal influence disappears or is corrupted. In its widest aspect, the same principle appears in the sympathetic thrill which passes through purgatory at the conversion of Statius—the most moving instance of that force of common feeling, which finds its fullest realisation in the circle of the blessed in paradise, "the city where Christ is a Roman."[3] It seems not out of place to mention this wider aspect: for, just as in Plato's *Republic*, the soul mounts upward from "pig city" to the city of philosophers, so in the *Commedia* there is a perpetual ascent from the city of men's pilgrimage: the soul passes with the passage of the poet, and half unawares, while meditating on the weakness of human institutions, we are lifted into the citizenship of just men made perfect.

VII. One other aspect of the common life may be mentioned. Everyone will be struck by the large place which

[1] *Paradiso*, xix. 110: "Quando si partiranno i due collegi."
Inferno, xxiii. 91:
"Poi disser me: 'O Tosco, ch'al collegio
Degl' ipocriti tristi se' venuto.'"

[2] *Purgatorio*, xxvi. 127:
"Or se tu hai sì ampio privilegio,
Che licito ti sia l'andare al chiostro
Nel quale e Cristo abate del collegio."

[3] *Purgatorio*, xxxii. 101:
"E sarai meco senza fine cive
Di quella Roma onde Cristo è Romano."

"fame" and "ambition" occupy in the *Commedia.*[1] The spirits whom Dante meets in his journey are roused to tell their story by the desire for fame in their own world. Throughout, fame is appealed to as one of the strongest motives, and we are taught that it should be directed to good ends. Those who have lived with no name for good or evil, "Che visser senza infamia e senza lodo,"[2] are as though they had never been: "non ragioniam di lor, ma guarda e passa."[3] Nothing could better illustrate the power of life in society than this dependence of man on the public opinion of his fellows. To mould this opinion aright, to turn it to good purpose, is one of the great ends of government. And just as the love of honour may thus become the noblest of motives, it is never to be sacrificed if it means surrender of principle.[4]

Perverted, the influence of public opinion is disastrous and destructive. The strongest condemnation Dante can pronounce on Lombardy is that the evil-doer may walk *without shame*, for there he will not meet the good. The test of the soundness of a society is its public opinion.[5]

VIII. It remains to call attention to some of the qualifications which limit and modify this "political" view of ethics.

The political ideas, as already said, have a universal bearing. The lesson, even when branded on the walls of a particular town, or the forehead of a particular person, is one for all time. The judgments are not dictated by partisanship.

[1] *Inferno,* xxiv. 49:

"Senza la qual chi sua vita consuma,
Cotal vestigio in terra di sè lascia,
Qual fummo in aer ed in acqua la schiuma."

[2] *Inferno,* iii. 36. [3] *Ib.* 51.

[4] *Epistolæ,* ix. 40: "Non est haec via redeundi ad patriam, Pater mi; sed si alia per vos aut deinde per alios invenietur, quæ famæ Dantis atque honori non deroget, illam non lentis passibus acceptabo."

[5] *Purgatorio,* xvi. 118:

"Or può sicuramente indi passarsi
Per qualunque lasciasse per vergogna
Di ragionar coi buoni, o d'appressarsi."

Equal judgment is meted to Guelf and Ghibelline.[1] The corruptions of Church and Empire, Cæsar and Saladin, Florence and Pisa, Pistoia and Siena—all are weighed in one balance. If, now and again, the exile's feelings towards the town or tyrant who have treated him well or ill colour his attitude towards them, this never warps his austere and impartial judgments on the morality of their political conduct.

Though in the main Dante's views of the world's government are consistent, it is inevitable that in the vast field he covers, and in work written at different times, the point of view is not always the same. It has already been said that his persons, vividly realised as they are, are often like the characters in a parable—chosen to mark some single characteristic or some particular moment of action; and the judgment pronounced is passed not on the whole man, but on his attitude to the one thing or the one moment which Dante brings into relief. The inconsistencies which thus arise are natural.

This may explain how, for instance, on the one hand, Brutus is in lowest hell for the murder of Cæsar, while Cato is the honoured guardian of purgatory as the self-sacrificing lover of freedom. Again, the donation of Constantine is condemned for its result,[2] but Constantine himself appears in paradise.[3] Here the political end, with all its momentous issues (as Dante thinks them), is ignored in favour of Constantine's conversion and of his good motive, whereas, in the case of Brutus, the motive, the love of freedom, and the general good character are outweighed by the fact that he murdered his friend, who was also the founder of the Empire. In this case we find political and ethical considerations combined on both sides. Here the love of parallels must largely account for the treatment. The nethermost hell would lose its symmetry if Brutus and Cassius, murderers of the greatest

[1] *Paradiso*, vi. 100:

"L'uno al pubblico segno i gigli gialli
Oppone, e l'altro appropria quello a parte,
Si che forte a veder è chi piu falli."

[2] *Inferno*, xix. 115. [3] *Paradiso*, xx. 55.

of earthly rulers, were not brought in, to balance Judas—the betrayer of his Lord.

More interesting perhaps than cases of inconsistency are those where the political and the moral issues conflict, and the sinner is saved for a good deed which outweighs the political sin. Thus the sin of Provenzan Salvani of Siena, in trying to get the whole city under his power, was redeemed by his noble service to a friend in the "campo di Siena."[1] On the other hand, men of good repute in politics, such as Rusticucci and others, "che a ben far poser gl'ingegni,"[2] are condemned to punishment by reason of offences against personal morality.[3] Such instances may serve to remind us that, with all his intense belief in the value and influence of social and civic institutions, Dante never loses sight of personal character and personal responsibility.

These are but a few aspects of a subject which cannot be exhausted without going through the greater part of the *Commedia*. When all is said and done, it rises beyond our analysis and escapes us; but it seems true to say that in the play of human passions and punishments which it exhibits the political side of man's life comes into strong relief as in few other poems in the world.

To sum up briefly:—Man is a political animal. In society —in the laws and government of his city, in the directing control of the Empire—he finds the conditions of the free life which is in ideal the union of his will with God's. As the State provides the nurture of his character, it also provides the field for its exercise; city and citizen react upon each other, and in the conspicuous lives of cities and rulers are to be found the most striking illustrations of the forces which mould and influence human kind.

Yet to call the *Commedia* in any sense a political poem, or even to assert that the political aspect of ethics is pre-

[1] *Purgatorio*, xi. 121.
[2] *Inferno*, vi. 81.
[3] *Inferno*, vi. 86, xvi. 44 foll.

dominant, would be misleading for many reasons. In the first place, we must never forget Dante's own description of his subject in the letter to Can Grande: "Status animarum post mortem simpliciter sumptus,"[1] and allegorically, "Homo prout merendo et demerendo per arbitrii libertatem est justitiæ præmianti aut punienti obnoxius."[2] This is a wider subject than any city or State can compass, and so is the end at which it aims: "Removere viventes in hac vita de statu miseriæ, et perducere ad statum felicitatis."[3]

But even without this reminder, the qualities of the poem itself would prevent us from interpreting it in too narrowly political a sense. First, its strong individualism—its insistence on the personal will and on individual responsibility—make the reader feel that the saving of a man's soul is in the last resort his own affair—beyond the reach of the Emperor or the Law, or the examples and traditions of a City-state. Secondly, its religious and universal spirit lifts it so completely above the bounds of ordinary time and space, that the claims of civic society tend always to disappear in the wider appeal made to the individual soul by the glory of the universe and the ineffable goodness of God,

"L'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle."[4]

If we compare the *Commedia* with Aristotle and Aquinas, we must feel that in the poem the intellectual and the ethical are much more completely blended. The spiritual world and the world of affairs and human conduct are not two worlds apart. The spiritual is felt throughout behind the physical and moral; the stars are always shining through to guide the pilgrim on his way.[5] Or, again, if we compare it with Plato's Republic, where there is the same ascending progress, the inner relation of higher and lower is far more vividly realised. The great spiritual figures, Beatrice, Lucia, Matelda, move to

[1] *Epistolæ*, x. 170. [2] *Ib.* 172. [3] *Ib.* 268. [4] *Paradiso*, xxxiii. 145.

[5] *Epistolæ*, ix. 47: "Quod si per nullam talem Florentia introitur, nunquam Florentiam introibo. Quidni? nonne solis astrorumque specula ubique conspiciam?"

and fro as on a Jacob's ladder, ascending and descending, so that by their mediation the worlds are linked together and we are never far removed from the eternal city.

The *Commedia* is not to be read too literally. It must be judged, not from isolated lines or scenes, but as a whole, and in the light of the poet's own interpretation. The simplicity and directness of the poem have produced an illusion so complete that many readers, it would seem, see in its vivid presentment the very form and image of a world finally judged, where every award stands fast and pitiless for ever—so convincing is the poet's art. But we may doubt whether Dante himself, except in the moments when he is carried away by his own part in the drama, meant each detail to be taken in its literal sense. We know, indeed, that he did not. There are things in it which are eternal and immutable—the love and justice of God, the free will of man, the spiritual world as the foundation of the material and the moral, the momentous interaction of man and society,—but the incidents and the figures in which these great facts find expression are but relatively true; yet in the vast and varied pageant which moves before us, amid many images and symbols which give it colour and diversity, those of "city" and "empire," "citizenship," and "civility," are never far away; and their significance is heightened perpetually by the irony of contrast with a life in which citizenship has turned to exile, and high imperial hopes are doomed to disappointment. To the end it was Dante's lot to "sing the Lord's song in a strange land," but it was a song always of one who, in the dreams of his heavenly Jerusalem, could never forget the commanding claims of the cities of Italy and of the Roman Empire.

Six hundred years have passed, but our thoughts are still concerned with issues not unlike those of Dante's world. The ideal Emperor has never come, and meanwhile the world has grown too large for him to govern. It is no longer a question of crossing the Alps, or even of reconciling the interests of Europe: new continents and peoples have entered the society

of nations, and the Holy Roman Empire of Dante's dream has vanished into thin air. The frame of things has changed, but even in politics Dante's spirit has a message for our time, and his canons of political judgment have a meaning for the plain man. When Tolstoi, like Dante a noble and impatient prophet of the simple life, bids us find salvation in anarchy; when the Tsar of Russia tries to compensate for the lack of justice at home by dreams of universal justice at the Hague; when the name of Empire is lightly used as a synonym for material expansion; when finally, in the lesser world of municipal life, we see the battle still engaged between honesty and avarice, efficiency and ostentation—we feel that we are very near to the problems of civic life as Dante saw them. His conception of social life does not depend on its mediæval mechanism: its spirit still appeals to us; for it remains true that character, in the widest sense, is the test of polity, whether civil or religious, imperial or municipal; that no man can live for himself without roots in a common life, whose freedom is founded on self-surrender, and guided by a sense of common good; and that beyond the warring claims of competing cities and nations there is a wider ideal towards which the world is moving, of a divine peace and order in which the nations shall be reconciled. These, as we have seen, are the governing ideas of Dante's civil creed, and he has strengthened their hold on mankind. If we read his *Commedia*, in the first place, as we read Milton, for the beauty of his verse and the power of his imagination, this is not all that we get from him. Like Milton, he breathes an atmosphere of noble and austere if passionate citizenship, and from his writings, "like a healthful breeze from a purer region," we draw insensibly the bracing spirit of faith in a sound civic and social order as the indispensable source of

"Manners, virtue, freedom, power,"

the saving salt of human life.

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THE RELIGION OF THE PEOPLE.

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The people are not to be found in places of worship; "the great masses," as Mr Booth says, "remain apart from all forms of religious communion." This statement is admitted as true, but yet another statement is continually made and also admitted, that "the people are at heart religious." What is meant by this latter statement? The people are certainly not inclined to assert their irreligion. Mr Henderson, who as a labour leader speaks with authority, says, "I can find no evidence of a general desire among the workers to repudiate the principles of Christianity." And from my own experience in East London I can testify to the growth of greater tolerance and of greater respect for the representatives of religion. Processions with banners and symbols are now common, parsons are elected on public bodies, and religious organisations are enlisted in the army of reform. But this feature of modern conditions is no proof that men and women are at heart religious. It may only imply a more respectful indifference, a growth in manners rather than in spiritual life. Does the statement mean that the people are kind, and moved by the public spirit? This again is true. There is widely spread kindness: rough lads are generous—one I knew gave up his place to make room for a mate whose need was greater; weak and weary women watch all night by a neighbour's sick-bed; a poor family heartily welcomes an orphan child; workmen suffer and endure private loss for the sake of fellow-

workmen. The kindness is manifest; but kindness is no evidence of the presence of religion. Kindness may, indeed, be a deposit of religion, a habit inherited from forefathers who drew into themselves love from the Source of love, or it may be something learnt in the common endurance of hardships. Kindness, generosity, public spirit cannot certainly be identified with the religion which has made human beings feel joy in sacrifice and given them peace in the pains of death.

Before, however, we conclude that the non-church-going people are religious or not religious, it may be well to be clear as to what is meant by religion. I would suggest as a definition that religion is thought about the Higher than self worked through the emotions into the acts of daily life. This definition involves three constituents: (1) There must be use of thought —the power of mental concentration—so that the mind may break through the obvious and the conventional. (2) There must be a sense of a not-self which is higher than self—knowledge of a Most High whose presence convicts the self of shortcoming and draws it upward. (3) There must be such a realisation of this not-self—such a form, be it image, doctrine, book, or life—as will warm the emotions and so make the Higher than self tell on every act and experience of daily life. These constituents are, I think, to be found in all religions. The religious man is he who, knowing what is higher than himself, so worships this Most High that he is stirred to do His will in word and deed. The Mohammedan is he who, recognising the Highest to be power, worships the All-powerful of Mohammed, whom in fear he obeys, and with the sword forces others to obey. The Christian is he who, recognising the Most High to be love, worships Christ, and for love of Christ is loving to all mankind. Are these three constituents of religion to be found among the people?

1. They are using their powers of thought. There is a distinct disposition to think about unseen things. The press which circulates most widely has found copy in what it calls Mr Campbell's "New Theology." The *Clarion* newspaper

has published week after week letters and articles which deal with the meaning of God. There is increasing unrest under conditions which crib and cabin the mind; men and women are becoming conscious of more things in heaven and earth than they can see and feel and eat. They have a sense that the modern world has become really larger than the old world, and they resent the teaching which commits them to one position or calling. They have, too, become critical, so that, using their minds, they measure the professions of church-goers. Mr Haw has collected in his book, *Christianity and the Working Classes*, many workmen's opinions on this subject. Witness after witness shows that he has been thinking, comparing things heard and things professed with things done. It is not just indifference or self-indulgence which alienates the people from church or chapel or mission; it is the insincerity or inconsistency which they themselves have learnt to detect. Huxley said long ago that the greatest gift of science to the modern world was not to be found in the discoveries which had increased its power and its comfort, so much as in the habit of more scientific thinking which it had made common.

The people share this gift and have become critical. They criticise all professions, theological or political. They criticise the Bible, and the very children in the schools have become rationalists. They also construct, and there are few more interesting facts of the time than the strength of trades unions, co-operative and friendly societies, which they have organised. Even unskilled labour, ever since the great Dock strike, has shown its power to conceive methods of amelioration, and to combine for their execution. The first constituent of religion, the activity of thought, is thus present amid the non-church-going population.

2. This thought is, I think, directed towards a higher than self; it, that is to say, goes towards goodness. I would suggest a few instances. Universal homage is paid to the character of Christ. He, because of His goodness, is exalted above all other reformers, and writers who are bitter against Christianity

reverence His truth and good-will. Popular opinion respects a good man whatever be his creed or party; it may not always be instructed as to the contents of goodness, but at elections its votes incline to follow the lead of the one who seems good, and that is sometimes the neighbouring publican whose kindness and courtesy are experienced. In social and political thought the most significant and strongest mark is the ethical tendency. Few proposals have now a chance of a hearing if they do not appeal to a sense of justice. Right has won at any rate a verbal victory over might. In late revivals there has been much insistence on the need of better living, on temperance, on payment of debts and fulfilment of duty, and the reprints which publishers find it worth their while to publish are penny books of Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and other writers on morals.

People generally—unconsciously often—have a sense of goodness, or righteousness, as something which is higher than themselves. They are in a way dissatisfied with their own selfishness, and also with a state of society founded on selfishness. There is a widely spread expectation of a better time which will be swayed by dominant goodness. The people have thus, in some degree, the second constituent of religion, in that they have the thought that the High and Mighty which inhabits Eternity is good.

3. When, however, we come to the third constituent, we have at once to admit that the non-church-going population has no means of realising the Most High in a form which sustains and inspires its action. It has no close or personal touch or communion with this goodness; no form which, like a picture or like a common meal, by its associations of memory or hope rouses its feelings; nothing which, holding the thought, stirs the emotions and works the thought into daily life. The forms of religion, the churches, the doctrines, the ritual, the sacraments, which meant so much to their fathers and to some of their neighbours, mean nothing to them. They have lost touch with the forms of religious thought as they have not lost touch with the forms of political thought.

Forms are the clothes of thought. Forms are lifeless, and thought is living. Unless the forms are worn every day they cease to fit the thought, as left-off clothes cease to fit the body. English citizens who have gone on wearing the old forms of political thought can therefore go on talking and acting as if the King ruled to-day as Queen Elizabeth ruled three hundred years ago, but these non-church-going folk, who for generations have left off wearing the forms of religious thought, cannot use the words about the Most High which the churches and preachers use. They have breathed an atmosphere charged by science — they are rationalists, they have a vision of morality and goodness exceeding that advocated by many of the churches. They have themselves created great societies, and their votes have made and unmade governments. When, therefore, they regard the churches, the doctrines of preachers, and all the forms of religion, not as those to whom by use they are familiar or by history illuminated, but as strangers, they see what seem to them stiff services, irrational doctrine, disorganised and unbusinesslike systems, and the self-assertion of priests and ministers. They, with their yearnings to touch goodness, find nothing in these forms which makes them say, "There, that is what I mean," and go on stirred in their hearts. They who have learnt to think turn away sadly or scornfully from teaching such as that of the Salvation Army about blood and fire, where emotion is without thought. Those who manage their own affairs resent membership in religious organisations where all is managed for them. They want a name for the Most High of whom they think as above and around themselves, but somehow the doctrines about Christ, whom they respect for His work two thousand years ago, do not stir them up as if He were a present power. The working classes, says Dr Fairbairn in his *Religion in History and Modern Life*, are alienated because "the Church has lost adaptation to the environment in which it lives."

Perhaps, however, someone may say, "Forms are unim-

portant." This may be true so far as regards a few rarely constituted minds, but the mass of men are seldom moved except through some human or humanised form. The elector may have his principles, but it is the candidate he cheers, it is his photograph he carries, it is his presence which rouses enthusiasm, and it is politicians' names by which parties are called. The Russian peasant may say his prayers, but it is the ikon—the image dear to his fathers—which rouses him to do or to die. The Jews had no likeness of Jehovah, but the book of the law represented to them the thought and memories of their heart, and they bound its words to their foreheads, their poets were stirred to write psalms in its praise, and by the emotions it raised its teaching was worked into their daily acts. A non-religious writer in the *Clarion* bears witness to the same fact when he says, "All effective movements must have creeds. It is impossible to satisfy the needs of any human mind or heart without some form of belief." The Quaker who rejects so many forms has made a form of no-form, and his simple manner of speech, his custom of dress or worship, often moves him to his actions.

Mr Gladstone bears testimony to the place of form in religion. "The Church," he says, "presented to me Christianity under an aspect in which I had not yet known it, ... its ministry of symbols, its channels of grace, its unending line of teachers forming from the Head a sublime construction based throughout on historic fact, uplifting the idea of the community in which we live, and of the access which it enjoys through the living way to the presence of the Most High."

Mr Gladstone found in the Anglican Church a form of access to the Most High, and through this church the thoughts of the Most High were worked into his daily life. Others through the Bible, the sacraments, humanity, or through some doctrine of Christ have found like means of access. Forms are essential to religion. Forms, indeed, have often become the whole of religion, so that people who have honoured images or words or names have forgotten goodness and justice—they

wash the cup and platter and forget mercy and judgment; they say "Lord, Lord," and do not the will of the Lord. Forms have often become idols, but the point I urge is that for the majority of mankind forms are necessary to religion. "Tell me thy name," was the cry of Jacob, when all night he wrestled with an unknown power which condemned his life of selfish duplicity; and every crisis in Israelitish history is marked by the revelation of a new name for the Most High. The Samaritans do not know what they worship; the Jews know what they worship,—was the rebuke of Christ to a wayward and ineffective nation. Even those Athenians to whom God was the Unknown God had to erect an altar to that God.

The great mass of the people, because they have no form and stand apart from all religious communions, may have in them a religious sense, but their thought of God is not worked through their emotions into their daily lives. They do not know what they worship, and so do not say with the Psalmist, "My soul is athirst for the living God," or say with Joseph, "How can I do this wickedness, and sin against God?" They have much sentiment about brotherhood, and they talk of the rights of all men; but they are not driven as St Paul was driven to the service of their brothers, irrespective of class, or nation, or colour. They have not the zeal which says, "Woe is me if I preach not the Gospel." They endure suffering with patience and meet death with submission, but they do not say, "I shall awake after His likeness and be satisfied." The majority of English citizens would in an earthquake behave as brave men, but they have not the faith of the negroes who in the midst of such havoc sang songs of praise.

The three constituents I included in the definition are all, I submit, necessary. Thought without form does not rouse the emotions. Form without thought is idolatry, and is fatal to growth. Emotion without thought has no abiding or persistent force. Religion is the thought of a Higher than self worked through the emotions into daily life.

With this definition in mind I now sum up my impressions. The religion of the majority of the people is, I think, not such as enables them to say, "Here I take my stand. This course of life I can and will follow. This policy must overcome the world." It is not such either as keeps down pride and egotism, and leads them to say as Abram said to Lot, "If you go to the right, I will go to the left." It does not make men and women anxious to own themselves debtors and to give praise. It does not drive them to greater and greater experiments in love; it does not give them peace. It is not the spur to action or the solace in distress. It has little recognition in daily talk or in the press. One might, indeed, live many years, meet many men, and read many newspapers and not come into its contact or realise that England professes Christianity.

When I ask my friends, "How does religion show itself in the actions of daily life?" I get no answer. There seems to be no acknowledged force arising from the conception of the Most High which restrains, impels, or rests men and women in their politics, their business, or their homes. There are, I suggest, three infallible signs of the presence of religion—calm courage, joyful humility, and a sense of life stronger than death. These signs are not obvious among the people.

The condition is not satisfactory. It is not unlike that of Rome in the first century. The Roman had then forsaken his old worship of the gods in the temples, notwithstanding the official recognition of such worship and the many earnest attempts made for its revival. There was then, as now, something in the atmosphere of thought which was stronger than State or Church. There was then, as now, an interest in teachers of goodness who held up a course of conduct far above the conventional, and the thoughts of men played amid the new mysteries rising in the East. The Romans were restless, without anchorage or purpose. They were not satisfied with their bread and games; they walked in a dense shadow, and had no light from hope. Into their midst came Christianity, giving a new name to the Most High,

and stirring men's hearts to do as joyful service what the Stoics had taught as dull duty.

In the midst of the English people of to-day there are churches and societies of numerous denominations. Their numbers are legion. In one East-London district about a mile square there were, I think, at one time over twenty different religious agencies. Their activity is twofold. They work from without to within, or from within to without — from the environment to the soul, or from the soul to the environment.

1. The work from without to within, resolves itself into an endeavour to draw the people to join some religious communion. The environment which an organisation provides counts for much, and influences therefrom constantly pass into the inner life. Membership in a church or association with a mission often brings men and women into contact with a minister who offers an example of a life devoted to others' service. It opens to them ways of doing good, of teaching the children, of visiting the poor, and of joining in efforts for social reform. It affords a constant support in a definite course of conduct, and makes a regular call on the will to act up to the conventional standard, and it brings to bear on everyday action an insistent social pressure which is some safety against temptation. Sneers about the dishonesty of religious professors are common, but, as a matter of fact, the most honest and reputable members of the community are those connected with religious bodies.

Those bodies have various characters, with various forms of doctrine and of ritual. Human beings, if they are true to themselves, cannot all adopt like forms; there are some men and women who find a language for their souls in a ritual of colour and sound, there are others who can worship only in silence; there are some who are moved by one form of doctrine, and others who are moved by another form. Uniformity is unnatural to man, and the Act of Religious Uniformity has proved to be disastrous to growth of thought and goodwill. Progress through the ages is marked by the gradual

evolution of the individual, and the strongest society is that where there are the most vigorous individualities. If this be admitted, it must be admitted also that the growth of vigorous denominations, and not uniformity, is also the mark of progress.

But, it may be said, denominations are the cause of half the quarrels which divide society, and of half the wars which have decimated mankind. This is true enough. The denominations are now hindering the way of education, and it was as denominations that Catholics and Protestants drowned Europe in thirty years of bloodshed. It is, however, equally true to say that nationalities have been the cause of war, and that the way of peace is hard, because French, Germans, and British are so patriotically concerned for their own rights. Nationalities, however, become strong during the period of struggle, and they develop characteristics valuable for the whole human family; but the end to which the world is moving is not a universal empire under the dominance of the strongest, it is to a unity in which the strength of each nationality will make possible the federation of the world. In the same way denominations pass through a period of strife; they too develop their characteristics; and the hope of religion is not in the dominance of any one denomination, but in a unity to which each is necessary.

The world learnt slowly the lesson of toleration, and at last the strong are feeling more bound to bear with those who differ from themselves. There is, however, dawning on the horizon a greater lesson than that of toleration of differences: it is that of respect for differences. As that lesson prevails, each denomination will not cease to be keen for its own belief; it will also be keen to pay honour to every honest belief. The neighbourhood of another denomination will be as welcome as the discovery of another star to the astronomer, or as the finding of a new animal to the naturalist, or as is the presence of another strong personality in a company of friends. The Church of the future cannot be complete without many chapels. The flock of the Good Shepherd includes many folds.

The energy of innumerable churches and missions is daily strengthening denominations, and they seem to me likely to stand out more and more clearly in the community. One advantage I would emphasise. Each denomination may offer an example of a society of men and women living in reasonable accord with its own doctrine—not, I ask you to reflect, just a community of fellow-worshippers, but, like the Quakers, translating faith into matters of business and the home. Mediæval Christians sold all they had and lived as monks or nuns. Nineteenth-century Christians were kind to their poorer neighbours. Twentieth-century Christians might give an example of a society fitting a time which has learnt the value of knowledge and beauty, and has seen that justice to the poor is better than kindness. Every generation must have its own form of Christianity.

The earnest endeavour of so many active men and women to increase the strength of their own denomination has therefore much promise: provided always, let me say, they do not win recruits by self-assertion, by exaggeration, or by the subtle bribery of treats and blankets. Each denomination honestly strengthened by additional members is the better able to manifest some aspect of the Christian life, and, in response to the call of that life, more inclined to reform the doctrines and methods which tend to alienate a scientific and democratic generation.

Such denominations are, I submit, those most likely to reform themselves, and as they come to offer various examples of a Christian society, where wealth is without self-assertion, where poverty is without shame, where unemployment and ignorance are prevented by just views of human claims, and where joy is "in widest commonalty spread," all the members of the community will in such examples better find the name of the Most High, and feel the power of religion. "If," says Dr Fairbairn, "religion were truly interpreted in the lives of Christian men, there is no fear as to its being believed." "What is wanted is not more Christians but better Christians."

2. The activity of ministers and missionaries is, as I have

said, twofold. Besides working from without to within by building up denominations, it also works from within to without by converting individuals. Members of every church or mission are, in ordinary phrase, intent "to save souls." Their work is not for praise, and is sacred from any intrusion. Spirit wrestles with spirit, and power passes by unknown ways. Souls are only kindled by souls. Conversion opens blind eyes to see the Most High, but it is not in human power to direct the ways of conversion. 'The spirit bloweth where it listeth. There are, however, other means by which eyes may be opened at any rate to see, if only dimly, and some of these means are under human control. Such a means is that which is called higher education or university teaching, or the knowledge of the humanities.

I would therefore conclude by calling notice to the much or the little which is being done by this higher education. The people are to a large extent blind because of the overwhelming glory of the present. They see nothing beyond the marvellous revelations of science—its visions of possessions and of power, and its triumphs over the forces of nature. They are occupied in using the gigantic instruments which are placed at the command of the weakest, and they are driven on by some relentless pressure which allows no pause on the wayside of the road of life. They see power everywhere—power in the aggressive personalities which heap money in millions, power in the laboratory, power in the market-place, power in the Government; but they do not see anything which satisfies the human yearning for something higher and holier; they cannot see the God whose truth they feel and whose call they hear. Many of them look to the past and surround themselves with the forms of mediæval days, and some go to the country, where, in a land of tender shades and silences, they try to commune with the Most High.

But yet the words of John the Baptist rise eternally true, when he said to a people anxiously expectant, some with their eyes on the past, and some with their eyes on the future,

"There standeth one among you." The Most High, that is to say, is to be found, not in the past with its mysteries, its philosophies, and its dignity of phrase or ritual, and not in the future with its vague hopes of an earthly Paradise, but in the present with its hard facts, its scientific methods, its strong individualities, and the growing power of the State. The kingdom of heaven is at hand; the Highest which everyone seeks is in the present. It is standing among us, and the one thing wanted is the eye to see.

Mr Haldane, in the address to the students of Edinburgh University, has described the character of the higher teaching as a gospel of the wide outlook, as a means of giving a deeper sympathy and a keener insight, as offering a vision of the eternal which is here and now showing its students what is true in present realities, and inspiring them with a loyalty to the truth as devoted as that of tribesmen to their chief. This sort of teaching, he says, brings down from the present realities, or from a Sinai ever accompanying mankind, "the Higher command," with its eternal offer of life and blessing—that is to say, it opens men's eyes to see in the present the form of the Most High. Higher education is thus a part of religious activity.

I am glad to know that my conclusion is shared by Dr Fairbairn, who, speaking of the worker in our great cities, and of his alienation from religion, says, "The first thing to be done is to enrich and ennoble his soul, to beget in him purer tastes and evoke higher capacities."

I will conclude by calling notice to the much or the little which is being done to open the people's eyes by means of higher education. I fear it is "the little." There are many classes and many teachers for spreading skill, there are some which increase interest in nature; there are few—very few—which bring students into touch with the great minds and thoughts of all countries and all ages—very few, that is, classes for the humanities. For want of this the souls of the people are poor, and their capacities dwarfed; they cannot see that

modern knowledge has made the Bible a modern book, or how the bells of a new age have rung in the "Christ that is to be."

For thirty-four years my wife and I have been engaged in social experiments. Many ways have been tried, and always the recognised object has been the religion of the people—religion, that is, in the sense which I have defined as that faith in the Highest which is the impulse of human progress, man's spur to loving action, man's rest in the midst of sorrow, man's hope in death.

With the object of preparing the way to this religion, schools have been improved, houses have been built and open spaces secured. Holidays have been made more healthy, and the best in art has been made more common. But, viewing all these efforts of many reformers, I am prepared to say that the most pressing need is for higher education. Where such education is to begin, what is the meaning of religious education in elementary schools, and how it is to be extended, is part of another subject. It is enough now if, having as my subject the religion of the people, I state my opinion that there is no activity which more surely advances religion than the teaching which gives insight, far sight, and wide sight. The people, for want of religion, are unstable in their policy, joyless in their amusements, and uninspired by any sure and certain hope. They have not the sense of sin—in modern language, none of that consciousness of unreached ideals which makes men humble and earnest. They have not the grace of humility nor the force of a faith stronger than death. It may seem a far cry from a teacher's class-room to the peace and power of a Psalmist or of a St Paul; but, as Archbishop Benson said, "Christ is a present Christ, and all of us are His contemporaries." And my own belief is that the eye opened by higher education is on the way to find in the present the form of the Christ who will satisfy the human longing for the Higher than self.

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"WHAT ARE YOU?"—THE CHILD'S ANSWER.

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IT is in times of bitter strife that good men are stirred to deeper inquiry about fundamental principles, and it is something gained that a thinker of the eminence of Sir Oliver Lodge should have made his attempt to help the schools out of their distress. If in the following pages I differ from him as to the use which should be made of *The Substance of Faith*, he will see that I am none the less grateful to him for this piece of work. His catechism has, it appears, already secured a wide circulation, and the combination it offers of scientific skill, literary exposition, and genuine reverence will enable it to help the minds of many men and women who are ready to be taught. I say advisedly, "men and women," for I desire to show that the adaptation of this book to "parents and teachers" is the one grave error in the author's method of exposition. The grand theme of these short discourses concerns every adult mind, quite apart from any relationship to the young; and I shall hope to show that the best mode of handling *The Substance of Faith* is to forget all about children while perusing it.

Sir Oliver Lodge brings within range a whole galaxy of "sciences," but one he has forgotten—or perhaps he does not hold that its scanty contributions to truth should affect his

opinions. If I spoke of this science as Child-study, he would perhaps laugh that title to scorn, but under its more pretentious name of Genetic Psychology it is beginning to be respected; and whatever be the label attached to this study, and however small in volume are the positive results it can show, there are a few outstanding truths—recognised by wise teachers and parents in all ages—which may serve to sustain my criticism.

In *The Substance of Faith* there is no indication of the age of the scholars or children who are to be taught this "fundamental substratum," but from various references made to the young throughout the book I take it that the author would expect simple ideas about this creed to be imparted at any time after the age of eight or ten. How greatly I differ from him may be judged when I assert that I would not put this book into my children's hands at least before they are sixteen, and then *only if they asked for it, i.e.* if they showed by inquiry that they were seeking with troubled minds for an answer to the questions which this book thrusts upon them.

The outstanding fact about children's growth is that, although in a degree they share our adult life and interests, feed with us, play with us, exchange ideas with us on many topics, they are vastly removed from our range of feeling and thought, and in a few years pass through stages of mental development which cost the human race ages of toil and experience to achieve. Cultivated people find it difficult, even in this scientific age, to recognise the implications of genetic psychology; they were (sometimes to their lasting injury) precocious in childhood: their own offspring are usually the same. Hence they show impatience of any attempt to emphasise these cardinal distinctions between child and man. But science has nothing to do with impatience, and the truths relating to childish experience must be allowed their full weight.

There are many ways of dividing up the stages of a human life: for our present purpose it may suffice to separate the period of *childhood* from that of *adolescence*, which

begins at thirteen or fourteen, and this again from the later stage of adolescence, which we may put at four years later.

Childhood.—The child, broadly speaking, is neither moral nor immoral, religious nor irreligious: to him the language, the ceremony, the prayer, the sacrifice are just phenomena which he takes on trust as he takes his daily bread. God cannot be everywhere to him. Such a notion of immanence or "everywhereness" is outside of him, is mere words: his idea of God can only be anthropomorphic, and any affection for his God, for Jesus or a Holy Spirit must be akin to the affection for father, mother, and friends. In a Roman church he makes a sign of the cross, in a Methodist chapel he sings hymns and prayers, in the village church he recites a creed, all as a part of countless other experiences through which he lives, all as a part of a world which he takes for granted because his elders are in it and move him about in it. But Sir Oliver Lodge would have this little creature isolate the fundamental points of agreement in which this child's parents differ from that child's parents, and find some sense and satisfaction in a substratum! Whereas this child, this impulsive, thoughtless creature, takes exactly the opposite course: he is an idolater if he is religious at all. Listen to him at his bedside:

> "Gentle Jesus, meek and mild,
> Look upon a little child!"

Dear little fellow! if you let him kneel and say such words, he will believe them and will expect Gentle Jesus to look; if you begin to expound historical fact about someone who "lived and taught and suffered in Palestine 1900 years ago," your child will patter your phrases, and be as weary and bored by this as by other unsuitable instruction. If, as in rare cases, he does attend with care to what you say about historical truths of religion, he will lose his reverence and his trust in higher powers.

The child, then, has no creed, and requires no catechism. What have been provided for him under these titles are bodies of theology written in simple terms to suit the common people,

the uneducated *adult*—and handed on to the child not because he was expected to understand or meditate upon them, but simply because they were part and parcel of his environment. Indeed, it is only in comparatively recent times, since the seventeenth century, that the Christian churches began to concern themselves much with children. I have not been able to investigate the history of religion as concerned with children, but from superficial knowledge one may hazard the opinion that until the Reformation no one sought to get personally at the heart or mind of a child before the epoch of confirmation. Luther certainly wished the child to learn his letters in order that he might read the pure Word of God, but this Bible reading was to follow in a later course of study. And there is surely no New Testament warrant for bringing religion home as a personal matter to children. Jesus indeed blessed the little children, but he stopped at that: it would be well now if the churches could restrain their zeal and copy the great Teacher's way of handling the bairns.

But my point is chiefly this: that whatever sort of religion you present to the child, it must be personal, vivid, full of incident, fact, full of "the personal, living thing," which Sir Oliver Lodge expressly tries to exclude from the child.[1] He describes the cultured adult as building a foundation (points of agreement among many churches) with a superstructure of warm, vital religious conviction: he would have this common foundation imparted to the child, and reserve the more dogmatic, personal aspects of the Church's faith. Now, if the view I present of child-nature be the true one—and I believe it to be true not only in the light of my own observation, but as attested by the method of the churches in dealing with children,—then it follows that this substratum, this common ground *which is reached through the avenue of modern scientific meditation*, is just that part of religious experience which will fail to touch the child. I could illustrate from every page of this book: the first clause (p. 7) may serve as an example:—

[1] *Substance of Faith*, p. 3.

Earth, Life, Consciousness are not for the child material of thought in any sense: they are phenomena which he observes in fragmentary shape; and it is only during adolescence that he may piece the fragments together to an intellectual whole.

For fear of misconception, let me add that I do not underrate the effect of religious environment and impressions on the young. The Catholic Church, from its point of view, is right in fighting to the last ditch for children under twelve; priests have told me that, if they can gain influence up to ten years of age, they can trust the majority of their flock to remain faithful afterwards; and the converse is equally true. The force of ceremonial habits acquired in tender years is, with the average man or woman, stronger than any intellectual enlightenment that may be shed on the mind thereafter. But it is the outer form, the authority, the ceaseless repetition of mechanical acts of submission that hold the child: the terms of the creed may be anything you please.

Adolescence.—Childhood is at an end: not suddenly or willingly, indeed, but the eyes are getting opened, questions are asked, the horizon expands; and the type of religion that appeals to the adolescent differs radically from that which the child could follow. Religion may now become a personal possession; and the churches have always sought their enthusiastic converts in the adolescent from thirteen to twenty. These young folk are, as Arnold of Rugby described them, "barbarians"; they take to religion as Clovis the Frank took to it. The priest hears the throbbing beat of their young hearts in the confessional, and the public may witness their enthusiasm at the penitent form of a revival. Watch their faces as they sing in happy chorus, "O happy day, that fixed my choice!" I do not wish to criticise, least of all to sneer: no one who has a heart can fail to be stirred to sympathy by the outburst of emotion with which the young adolescent unfolds his spiritual nature in his first communion with the eternal. The churches may be right: from their point of view and with their mission they are right to enlist young

recruits in the first glow of ardour. My duty is the humbler task of noting the psychological type and inquiring whither it will tend. Is it in these years, when the inner life of feeling, in all finer souls, is wrought with excess of passion, that *The Substance of Faith* should be expounded?

Let us examine this adolescent more closely, and see how he reacts towards other realms of experience. His energy is not (or should not be) confined to religion; he seizes on, and is seized by, all sorts of new experience; literature, art, mathematics, physics, biology, travel, trade—one or all may seize him and help him in his search to explain himself and the world about him. The normal average type is, in fact, not primarily and by native desire drawn to the supernatural, but is rather drawn by excess of energy to master and own the things that come nearest to his grasp. He is still in the realm of the sensuous, as much as when he was a child, but he is now determined to assert himself. Subject and object have become sharply differentiated, and he will secure power over some of those realms of experience which stand without him.

Now, granting that, in course of time, this impulsive, barbarously acquisitive nature *should* come to understand the noble doctrines of *The Substance of Faith*: by what process shall this goal be reached? This creed is not an affair of the emotions: true, there is contained in it an element of the deepest feeling, of reverence, of submission to almighty power; but these feelings, as our author portrays them, are *intellectual* sentiments,[1] the fruit partly of meditation upon human story, upon the life of animals and plants, upon quantity and quality in matter and space. Every page of this book emphasises the need for knowledge, for first-hand acquaintance with the realm of nature, interpreted, as the eager, unfolding mind requires, in the language of modern science. Surely the conclusion as to method can hardly be questioned: this Substance of Faith which its author regards as the foundation for a religious structure may logically *be* that; but psychologically it is

[1] *E.g.* Clauses XIII., XVIII.

exactly the opposite. It is the top stone of a building, not its foundation; it is the crown of a system of thought, built tier on tier, of which the lowest, humblest floors are laid partly in terms of measurement, standard, matter and space, partly in terms of biography, story, literature; and these surmounted by ideas gained from biology, from history, sacred and profane, from anthropology, from physics and the solar system. Thus "by searching" our author has "found out God," and by this same "method of discovery" his readers must find God also.

Or, are we to suppose that the young will take this new gospel on trust, and accept it as the old creeds and catechisms were accepted at the hands of the prophet? That, surely, is what the author least of all desires. And yet this is precisely what will happen to his catechism unless parents and teachers are warned of the dangers attending its use.

The warning I desire to give is that the adolescent should be largely left alone by adults in the realms both of morals and of religion. And I am convinced that the wisest parents and teachers have always done so. The best fruit ripens most slowly. I talked of this the other day to a clergyman in my neighbourhood, and I asked him: "Do you speak personally to your own boy about conduct?" "No," he replied; "I leave that to Mr Paton" (the boy attends the Manchester Grammar School). Now, I am sure that Mr Paton does not personally interfere with this boy's moral experience, unless some incident of school discipline makes it necessary to exercise special personal influence. But the influence of this school and its High Master is none the less effective, although I suppose that morals and religion are not presented either in a personal way or in a formulated scheme or catechism. This spiritual seed grows in silence, and to force it is to sap its strength. Meanwhile, to all appearance the atmosphere is largely profane and secular: games, sports, lessons, the streets, the home life, all and sundry help to build up an experience which will—at a later stage—supply the concrete material out of which this boy can construct a substance of faith, and in

such construction our author, in days to come, may help him greatly.

Here again, as in the earlier situation of childhood, I admit fully the effect of religious environment and impressions. If, as in the instances mentioned above, definite propagandist effort is made to "win them for Christ," or the like, boys and girls readily yield when home and other environing influences favour the process; but even if they are brought up in a more secular atmosphere, by parents and teachers who stand aloof from religious movements, they will still note much that goes on; their desire to master their environment will lead them to get all the information they can about chapel and church, about clergy and pastor. And one here and there—the brilliant exception—may really begin to philosophise at fourteen and to preach at sixteen, just as one here and there may be a brilliant mathematician at sixteen. But the normal type, during the earlier years of adolescence, displays, *if left to himself*, a shrinking sense of modesty in relation to things which he has now begun to discern are awful and stupendous on the one hand, and are intimate and intensely personal on the other. He is just *beginning* to put away childish things, and, as a wholesome manifestation of a mind which hereafter may be profoundly religious, we witness a bearing which appears secular and godless, just because it is silent and awed in the presence of Majesty and Law—felt as such for the first time in the experience of this youngster. Nor do I deprecate, either in adolescence or in childhood, the effect of suggestion from companions, from parents and from teachers, and their responsibility in all matters of moral training: what I deprecate is the attempt to analyse these regions of moral and religious experience before the mind is ripe for such a grave undertaking.

I should like to quote from wiser folk than I who have pleaded for restraint in dealing with adolescents. There was a most impressive article entitled "Chastity in Knowledge"[1]

[1] *Journal of Education*, December 1883.

written many years ago by Mary E. Boole: the title indicates the parallel drawn between physical and spiritual development. Since that was written there has certainly been a good deal observed both in biology and psychology to confirm her arguments. The late Professor Palmer of Harvard [1] wrote an equally impressive warning, not as regards religion, but as regards morals, in the hope that so-called moral instruction might be excluded from the schools, and might be imparted in the universities at the one epoch in life when the mind is ready, if well trained in earlier years, to think and feel about creeds and codes. For, in the later years of adolescence, experience has ripened, and the intellect is ready to seek an answer to the question, "What are you?" I look forward to a time when our universities shall take up the task which in the Middle Ages they seem to have understood better than we understand it now—of helping our young men to philosophy, to wise thinking on the fundamental things in life, on conduct, God and immortality. Such a time may be far distant; and yet it is a hopeful sign that Professor Muirhead [2] has pleaded for teaching of this kind to young men and women under training as teachers. I should like him to extend his plea: this is not a professional matter for teachers or clergy only; it is of the essence of any liberal education worthy of the name. Young men and women, at any age after eighteen, are ready for manuals such as *The Substance of Faith*, and if they do not receive help from the university they will seek it elsewhere.

I am not formulating any new "scheme" for university studies: heaven forbid that I or anyone should seek to save the souls of university students through the medium of a new subject added to the regulations of a university degree! But here is the ground prepared for the seed which a book like *The Substance of Faith* would sow: the child has now put away childish things, and can speak as a man: his mind, if you will give him time to think, can match yours: the poetry

[1] *Forum*, January 1893.

[2] *Hibbert Journal*, October 1906, pp. 70, 71.

which means so much to our author, of Browning and Wordsworth, touches him also: the moral problems of evil and good, of endeavour and ideal, of self and society, are his problems. I say it is a hopeful sign that in one university there are two teachers living among these young people who are working at such problems in their presence: if the motive for the work is a mistaken one, if they are wrong, as I think they are, in hoping to get directly at children, no great harm is done; for the ultimate effect of a book like *The Substance of Faith* can only be to evoke an echo in the quarter where response is possible; from the hearts and minds of young men and women who have already passed through childhood and the earlier years of adolescence.

Thus to the great question with which this catechism opens, "What are you?" I reply on the child's behalf, "I will tell you when I am of age to answer."

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University of Manchester.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

AN ATTEMPT TO REALISE MR CAMPBELL'S PROPOSAL.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1907, p. 485.)

The Rev. R. J. Campbell, in the course of his article on "The Aim of the New Theology Movement" in the April *Hibbert Journal*, says that there is need of some means whereby liberal-minded Catholics, Anglicans, Evangelical Free Churchmen, Unitarians, men of science, ethical teachers, and pioneers of social reform, can get together on a common platform and help each other to a fuller mutual understanding. The carrying out of this suggestion in its comprehensiveness presents difficulties that possibly might prove for the present insuperable. Liberal-minded Roman Catholics have less freedom of action than of thought. They may find themselves restrained by men who are their inferiors in intellect and learning, their inferiors possibly also in spiritual development, but their superiors ecclesiastically. They may understand catholicity in a deeper sense than the Pope does; but to act their spiritual catholicity out would involve them in trouble which they do not yet feel themselves called upon to encounter. Such men, through their wide range of reading, are no doubt being powerfully influenced, as regards their theology, philosophy, and outlook on social evolution, by thinkers outside the pale of their organised communion; and, through their writing, however much it may be restrained, they are liberalising and spiritualising the thought of many minds, both clerical and lay, within the great and venerable organisation to which they belong. They are thus, perhaps, being prepared, and are preparing others, for some grand development which it is still beyond the power of any of us to imagine, but which will be expressive of the long-hidden underlying unity of Christendom, and unity even of the whole evolving race. Meanwhile, however, they are scarcely likely to feel themselves at liberty to meet men whom they are supposed to be in duty bound to regard as heretics and schismatics, to discuss matters of faith and morals, and methods of co-operation in a common spiritual cause. Some men who are

not Roman Catholics may have somewhat similar difficulties as to open conference and co-operation with certain other men with whom perhaps they do not really feel themselves quite out of accord.

Although Mr Campbell's suggestion may thus not be immediately feasible in its entirety, it may be capable of at least a partial realisation. And, in fact, without his knowing it, when he wrote the article above referred to, an attempt was already being made in the direction he was pleading for. The initiative had been taken by the late Mr Antony Canning Swinton, of Hindhead, who bequeathed £3000 to trustees for the purpose of "establishing an educational union on spiritual principles of life as, for example, shown in Dennys's *Alpha*."

Edward N. Dennys thus referred to was, as regards several important points, a precursor of *The New Theology*, by his daring book *The Alpha*, first published so long ago as 1851. The book is cast in the form of a romance, with a spiritistic turn in it; but its core is a series of powerful arguments against the confused and gloomy theology of the day, in favour of a more rational and joyous understanding of life, and against the social maladjustments under which "the many are degraded and miserable and the few miserable and luxurious," in favour of a humane and fraternal social order.

As to his philosophy, Dennys was a spiritual monist, though he did not use, and probably did not even know, the term. "Intelligence . . . gave birth to matter," he wrote; "willed its form, and shall again resolve it into its immaterial idea." Every soul is an individualised portion of the One Infinite Intelligence, and is essentially progressive for ever. Intelligence, which includes Love—the Divine nature—is the soul's true wealth, and is the one possession which can be disseminated infinitely and yet retained entire. "There are not two Principles in nature, each warring with the other; there is but one, and that is infinitely Good. What men call Evil is not Evil: it is the inconvenience caused by ignorance, warning them to be wise, and has within it the seeds of its own destruction." Society as at present constituted is the result of man's ignorance of his real nature and his spiritual relationships. Selfishness is the outcome of error. True understanding involves love. Inasmuch as ignorance is a negation, negations also are all the consequences of ignorance. The cure for all that men call evil is the development in them of a true intelligence, a sound understanding of who and what they are, and what the universe is in which they are living. Such, very briefly, was what Dennys taught. He believed that only by knowing the truth could men be set free from their sin and their sorrow into a life of love and joy.

He wanted a league to be formed of liberal-minded and earnest people to spread the education, the rational and spiritual religion, that would render the old order impossible and a new order inevitable. This is the idea which, after more than half a century, was revived by Dennys's friend, A. C. Swinton, on his death-bed, and to which the latter's trustees are now endeavouring to give effect. The effect may well include as much

of Mr Campbell's suggestion of a common platform as may be found feasible in the midst of ecclesiastical limitations and in the still low degree of human nature's unfoldment.

The name "Alpha Union" adopted at the outset will probably give place in course of time to some better and more obviously significant designation. What the Union shall become depends entirely upon the degree in which liberal-minded people rally to its invitation. Meanwhile two summer schools have been arranged for—one in Wales, the other at Letchworth (Garden City)—at which the problems, religious and social, raised by the "New Theology" controversy, will be faced, under the leadership of Mr Campbell and of other teachers who are working for a spiritual and economic reconstruction. A lending library is being formed at Letchworth, in which will be gathered books written from the most diverse standpoints, but likely to aid people who are seriously studying the spiritual nature of man and who take a practical interest in the human uplift. From this centre parcels of books will be sent out to circulate among groups of students over the country. Men and women in sympathy with the general aim of the Union, recognising unity in diversity, are being enrolled, with the intention of their being made acquainted with each other, and in the hope that there may result the formation of groups sorted out by special affinities, and such methods and degrees of co-operation as the members may severally find themselves ready for. This is about as far as the Alpha Union has got at present. For the rest, it is simply a nucleus of faith and "enthusiasm of humanity," sending out feelers for what faith and enthusiasm may be discoverable around.

What one may venture to hope for it is that it will help in bringing about a religious revival which shall be also the awakening of a social conscience and the dynamic of a peaceful social revolution; that it will thus on the one hand induce the Churches, in the realised presence of the indwelling harmonising Spirit, to think out and practise some scientific twentieth-century equivalent of the first-century communism, and will on the other hand contribute towards the spiritualising and sweetening of the rapidly advancing labour movement; that it will draw spiritually-minded people away from wasting strength on fighting over comparatively trivial speculative differences, and rally the forces of good-will to co-operate for establishing the "Kingdom of Heaven," the new order of mutual love and service, in the whole earth.

J. Bruce Wallace.

Letchworth.

OUR FINAL VENTURE.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1907, p. 241, April 1907, p. 660.)

In an article with the above title in the January number of this *Journal*, I argued that our scientific faith in the constancy of natural law, on which all inductive inferences depend, is not only consistent with, but that

it actually presupposes, faith in the fundamentally spiritual, ethical, or divine constitution of the universe: so that this divine faith is the *final* faith-venture on which human experience depends. In all this I took as granted that our concrete experience, being finite, must at last resolve into *faith* of some sort, and that Omniscience alone can dispense with an ultimate faith-venture.

In the April number Dr Callaway demurs to this, and advocates instead what he calls "the monistic supposition" of "one primal mystery" at the root of all; namely, the present "existence of a universe of Matter and Force." Faith in this—not in omnipotent, ethically perfect, immanent Spirit, called God, at the root of all—is *his* final faith-venture. He argues for this on the ground that the capricious activity of "a freely acting spirit," as the primary agent in the universe, is inconsistent with the faith in fixed order, on which inductive reasoning and science depend; besides involving more primary postulates, and therefore a more complex demand upon final faith, than the "monistic" or materialist supposition. The "spirit supposition" he rejects as a door of admission to the possibility of universal chaos, instead of the scientific cosmos. This chaos he seems to think that I advocate, as actual in some remote past, and as possible in some near or remote future; although, as he truly says, a chaotic universe is "an absurdity, for the possibility of which no thinker has ever offered the slightest evidence." "A spirit," he thinks, is apt to be capricious, while "no proof has ever been given that a natural law possesses the power of self-change."

In alleging that I advocate the possibility of this dethronement of order or active reason in the evolution of the universe, Dr Callaway curiously reverses my position. What is it but our common faith in the *impossibility* of universal chaos that is supposed by me to have at its root (consciously or unconsciously in individuals) a final absolute faith in the veracity or ethical trustworthiness of the universe in all its relations to the moral agents who inhabit it—with all that this means for them. A capricious universe would be morally untrustworthy, unfit to be confided in by the percipient and personally responsible reasoners and moral agents who have to do with it; through whose perceptions its phenomena become actual, instead of remaining potential only. For if percipient and conscious life did not exist, of what moment could it be whether a universe of eternally dead matter was wholly cosmic or wholly chaotic? Is it not percipient and self-conscious life that gives significance and actuality to Matter, and to the laws or modes of sequence to which its changes conform? I think of those laws as simply Divine methods of action. The progressive victories of science, instead of gradually excluding God from the universe, only disclose more of the divine laws or methods, more of the Active Reason immanent in the Whole.

The philosophical rationale of this scientific faith in the constancy of natural order, and in the consequent fitness of the physical universe to have reason in man applied to it, without risk of his reason being in the

end put to confusion by a physical chaos, is the chief subject of my article. If asked *why* the supposition of a fundamentally capricious universe *is* an impossible supposition, and what its scientific veracity ultimately involves; I reply, Is it not because our faith-venture is *finally* teleological faith in the perfect ethical or divine constitution of the Whole? And does not this mean (consciously or unconsciously) ethical trust in the absolute ethical veracity or trustworthiness, and therefore in the absolute Equitableness and Goodness, of the universal, infinite, immanent Spirit in whom we live and move and have our being: who may therefore be conceived as ever ready to co-operate in keeping finite persons (for whose sake the material or significant world may be supposed to exist) in the ways of veracity, equitableness, and goodness; or in restoring them to those ways when they forsake them in the exercise of their responsible freedom? Is it not by awakening consciousness of these divine implicates in our final faith, and by the fuller and more articulate satisfaction to them which it affords, that Christianity has its unique spiritual power, and that One who appeared as a Jewish peasant is the most memorable figure in the history of mankind? A diabolically or even a non-morally, and therefore undivinely, constituted universe of things and persons would be not only a wholly hopeless universe, for the persons contained in it, but it would leave them without reliable science or even intelligible experience, because without faith in the veracity of the language of nature. Without ethical faith in the Power universally at work, must not "reason" in man be totally paralysed? Is not this a *reductio ad absurdum* of the "monistic supposition" of a final faith in "Matter and Force"? which, besides, for reasons that seem to me sufficient, I cannot regard as monistic.

Habit alone, *blindly* formed by a *finite* experience of natural uniformity, is surely, *per se*, no sufficient guarantee for universal or necessary uniformity, in what might still be a diabolically, or at least an unethically, directed evolution; even although the uniformity has been maintained, as Dr Callaway supposes, "for fifty millions of years." And, by the way, does theistic faith necessarily imply that the universe ever had a beginning, or that God was ever unrevealed to persons in and through a universe of things dependent on persons? Moreover, the capricious "spirit," who (according to Dr Callaway) is the "God" of my final faith-venture, is surely not the Infinite Reason of true theistic faith, but only a magnified edition of the fallible human spirit. This is Atheism under the name of Theism. It would justify his own professed agreement with the child who thought the question "Who made God?" as fit to be raised as the question "Who made the universe?" If "law" in nature is simply the divine method of acting in nature—natural law, *per se*, having no efficiency or teleological causality—this Omnipotent Goodness or the Absolute Being, admits of no natural (so-called) cause. As to Evil in the universe of God, who is goodness impersonate, according to our highest and (so far as it goes) trustworthy conception of His "personality," I tried to show that the existence of morally disordered persons on this planet, and the

alleged inequitable distribution of happiness and suffering, are not *necessarily* inconsistent with fundamental righteousness in the constitution of the world, and therefore need not paralyse reason in man; whereas either a diabolically or an unethically constituted universe *is* necessarily subversive of reason. On the whole, it appears that the chief end of man, and of all other persons in existence, must be to live in harmony with the divine constitution of things, and thus in the enjoyment of the theistic faith and hope that is tacitly involved in man's "final venture."

A. Campbell Fraser.

THE FAILURE OF THE FRIARS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1907, p. 296, and April 1907, p. 663.)

Only one of my critics makes even an imperfect profession of supplying those original words which they accuse me of falsifying: they leave this burden to me in my defence.

My own words, which they attack as a falsification, ran thus: "[St Bonaventura] speaks of the idleness and viciousness of many, and the commercial spirit of the Order as a whole. Their importunate begging and legacy-hunting, the extravagance of their buildings and private expenses, their familiarities with women, are rapidly making them wearisome and contemptible in divers parts of the world." This is my brief summary of a passage from St Bonaventura's first circular letter, which I will here translate baldly and literally (ed. Mogunt., 1609, vol. vii. p. 433). The italics are, of course, my own; and (with the exception of the last passage, which marks a long omission by Father Stanislaus) they are designed to call attention to that critic's assertion that the Saint writes "always in qualified terms, which are conveniently omitted in Mr C.'s précis."

After a preamble setting forth the necessity of plain speech, the Saint writes: "But now, because the perils of the times and wounds of men's consciences are urgent, and likewise scandals of worldly folk, *to whom the Order, whereas it ought to be a mirror of all holiness, is being turned to weariness* (*or loathing*, tædium) *and contempt in divers parts of the world*, [therefore], neither altogether keeping silence, nor altogether expressing [what I think]—neither making new laws nor inflicting bonds [on the Brethren], nor binding and laying grievous burdens upon others,—but as an announcer of truth, I briefly explain (seeing that they ought by no means to be left unsaid) the things which seem to me, after consultation with the Representatives of the Order, to need correction. In truth, when I seek out the causes why the splendour of our Order is in a manner *eclipsed*,[1] *the Order is tainted without, and within the clearness of consciences*

[1] *Obscuratur*, ed. Mogunt.; but the ed. quoted by Father Stanislaus reads *obfuscatur*, which would mean only *overclouded*.

is defiled, there occurs to me (1) the multiplicity of [worldly] business, wherein money (the enemy above all things to the poverty of our Order) is greedily sought for, incautiously received, and more incautiously touched. (2) The idleness of *certain* (*quorundam*) Brethren, which is *a cesspool of all vices*, wherein *very many* (*plurimi*) being sunken in stupor, choosing some monstrous estate between contemplative and active life, not so much carnally as cruelly eat the blood of [men's] souls. (3) There occurs the wandering abroad (*evagatio*) of *very many*, who, for the solace of their own bodies, burdening those through whom they pass, leave behind them not examples of life, but rather scandals of souls. (4) There occurs importunate begging, whereby *all* who pass through the lands so abhor meeting *the Friars* that they fear to fall in with them as [to fall in] with robbers. (5) There occurs the sumptuous and curious construction of buildings, which troubles the peace *of the Brethren*, burdens their friends, and exposes us *in manifold ways* to the perverse judgments of men. (6) There occurs the multiplication of familiarities, which our Rule forbids, whereby arise *very many* (*plurima*) suspicions, evil reports (*infamationes*), and scandals." Then come complaints Nos. 7, 8, 9, and 10, which would have strengthened my case, but for which I had no room; and, lastly, a sentence which (according to Father Stanislaus) I dishonestly refrained from quoting, but of which he himself quotes only a fragment, breaking off at a comma, which I mark here by italics. "For though there are very many to be found who are not guilty in any of the aforesaid points, yet this curse involves all, unless those who do these things are resisted by those who do them not, *since it is clearer than daylight that all the aforesaid tend to the very great and in no wise to be concealed detriment of our Order: although to the lukewarm, to the indevout, to the worldly-wise, (who consider the custom* [*which has grown up*] *and allege the multitude* [*of those who do these things*]) *they appear easy and excusable, nay, even as irremediable.*"

The reader can now judge of Father Stanislaus's complaint that "the indictment . . . . is contained in Mr C.'s presentation of the evidence, and not (I submit) in St Bonaventura's." He may perhaps also understand why neither critic attempted to prove my alleged wholesale falsifications by the simple method of producing the Saint's full words.

But I must deal with one particular accusation at greater length, because it is their point of fiercest attack, and because here again they claim to possess documentary evidence which they make no pretence of producing. In my précis I spoke of "familiarities *with women*"; and, according to Father Cuthbert, my insertion of these two words constitutes a serious falsification. "If," he writes, "Mr C.'s acquaintance with Franciscan literature were wider than perhaps it is, he would know that the word *familiarities* signifies too much concern with the worldly affairs of secular men. So it is used in the Constitutions of the Order." This assertion, made as usual without a shred of actual quotation to back it up, is as false as it is absurd. I have taken the trouble to institute a search

through all the Constitutions, as published by Father Ehrle, S.J., until eighteen years after St Bonaventura's death; and I believe I am right in saying that the word *familiarities* occurs only once, where it refers primarily to women and secondarily to similarly suspicious intercourse with boys (*Archiv*, vol. vi. p. 115; *cf.* Bonav. *Reg. Novit.*, c. x., and *Epistola de xxv. mem.*, 14). Moreover, the Saint's own reference to "suspicions, evil reports, and scandals" (which Father Cuthbert suppresses) would be quite incomprehensible on his theory. Thirdly, he makes a more serious suppression still—St Bonaventura's direct reference to the prohibition of such "familiarities" in the Rule. It is not possible to believe that Father Cuthbert is so unfamiliar with his own Rule as not to know that the only prohibition of familiarities therein contained is in Chapter XI.: "I strictly enjoin upon all the Brethren that they have no suspicious intercourse (*consortia*) or counsels with women." My other critic, with these facts staring him in the face, admits freely that the Saint's reference *is* here to women, but contends that I have "misinterpreted" the phrase (though my only "interpretation" was to quote the corroborative words of other distinguished Friars); and that, in taking these *familiarities* for something serious, I showed ignorance of the Saint's other writings. Here again he gives no reference, but simply flings the random accusation on the chance that it may stick: I must therefore refer briefly to other words of the Saint. In his *Rule for Novices*, Sect. XI. is headed *De Familiaritate Mundi*, and deals mainly with the dangers of intercourse with women: "Flee from them as from serpents: never speak with any save under stress of urgent necessity, nor even look hard (*respicias*) in a woman's face; . . . . the holier they be, the more do they entice; and under pretext of sweet speech creeps in the slime of most impious lust. . . . . I have known cedars of Lebanon and bell-wethers of the flock ruined under this pretext, whose fall I should no more have suspected than St Jerome's or St Ambrose's." Almost equally emphatic are his *Sermo super Regulam* (§ 27), his 19th *Quæstio circa Regulam*, and his *Expositio sup. Reg.*, c. xi. The Saint's favourite secretary, and his friend David of Augsburg, both whose works were long ascribed to the Master himself, speak even more strongly than he. The *Pharetra*, a compilation also ascribed to the Saint, has a chapter headed simply *De Familiaritate*, and consisting of seventeen patristic passages on the terrible dangers of women to Religious. A whole book might be filled with similar extracts from the most obvious sources; and I wonder how my critics can find it in their conscience to browbeat me publicly with an assumption of knowledge of original documents which they do not possess.

Other inaccuracies as bad or worse—ignorance of elementary texts, and gross blunders about dates and historical events—I must reserve for my *Mediæval Study* No. 9, in which I reprint my original article and would have reprinted their criticisms if they had given me permission. But before closing I freely admit my own fault in inserting (on the strength of Mr Arnold's introduction to the Clarendon Press *Wiclif*,

vol. i. p. x.) an unverified quotation. It is my only sin of the kind, introduced as an afterthought; but it has justly found me out. I must, however, note (1) that the correct passage fully bears out my main contention as to persecution in England, though it modifies my inaccurate inference from the numbers; and (2) that the importance which Father Cuthbert attaches to my misquotation rests upon a blunder of his own: for, misled by the name of the Meaux Chronicle, he attempts to set it aside as a foreign production, and therefore of little authority for English affairs.

G. G. Coulton.

THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1907, p. 587).

The Dean of Clogher's argument concerning the forgiveness of sin is vitiated by the writer's failure to distinguish between the two radically different meanings of the word "law." He says that sin against God can from one point of view be regarded as "a breach of His moral law analogous to a violation of physical law." "We know for certain," he asserts, "that there is no such thing as forgiveness of an offence committed against physical law," and that "the only way to escape from the ruthless penalty exacted by physical law is to obey it scrupulously and implicitly," and he contends that "the moral law works out the dreadful consequences of sin with the same persistency as the physical law."

The whole argument is based on analogy, on the supposed similarity of moral law to physical law. But the analogy is an entirely false one. The word "law" is ambiguous in meaning. Between so-called physical law and moral law there is scarcely anything in common. On the one hand, a so-called physical law, such as the law of gravitation, the law of the conservation of energy, the law of motion, the law of chemical affinity, is a mere general statement, in the indicative mood, concerning observed phenomena. It is addressed to the intellect. The law of gravitation, for example, runs: "Every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force whose direction is that of the straight line joining the two, and whose magnitude is proportional directly in the product of their masses, and inversely as the square of their mutual distance." This "law" did not exist till Newton formulated it. It was by him derived inductively from observations. It is liable at any moment to be proved to be false by further observations. All other physical laws are in the same case. They are simply scientific generalisations, nothing more than provisional hypotheses. Dr Alexander Hill, from the side of the naturalist, expresses this fact when he says: "A law is nothing more than a docket into which we collect phenomena which have something in common."[1]

[1] *Introduction to Science*, p. 15.

From the side of the jurist Professor Erskine Holland reaffirms it when he defines the term "law," as used in the theoretical sciences, as "the abstract idea of the observed relations of phenomena," and adds that it is employed "by a mere metaphor to express" their method and order.[1]

A moral law, on the other hand, is a command; it is uttered in the imperative mood; it is addressed not to the intellect but to the will. What is there in common between the authoritative injunction, "Thou shalt not kill," and the dynamical theorem, "Action and reaction are equal and opposite"? Yet the one is a typical moral law; the other is a typical physical law. The Dean of Clogher seems to regard them as of one and the same order!

If, however, the fundamental difference just pointed out be borne in mind, if the conception be firmly grasped that a physical law is only a provisional hypothesis, it will be seen how misleading, or rather how utterly meaningless, are such expressions as "a violation of physical law," and "an offence committed against physical law," and "the ruthless penalty exacted by physical law." A "violation of"—a more or less probable general statement; an "offence committed against"—a doubtfully valid scientific proposition; the "ruthless penalty exacted by"—a temporarily convenient docket!

The Dean of Clogher may say that all this is a mere logomachy—a battle of words, not affecting essential issues. He may contend that when he speaks of invariable physical *law* he simply means the inevitable operation of physical *forces*. His illustrations suggest that he had this in his mind. He speaks of the water that drowns, of the dynamite that blasts, of the fire that consumes—all of them totally unaffected by the moral qualities of their victims, all of them passing from cause to effect with remorseless and unfailing certainty. He is, of course, on perfectly safe scientific ground if he is merely restating the familiar truth that, so far as our experience goes, the forces of nature act at all times and under all circumstances with unvarying uniformity. But if this is all that he states and means, what becomes of his analogical argument from physical law ("which gives no indication of any forgiveness of the slightest breach of its enactments") to moral law? If a person who cannot swim jumps into deep water, he is violating not a physical law but the dictates of common sense; if he inadvertently tumbles in, he is the victim not of a "ruthless penalty" but of an unfortunate accident. If a person who *can* swim gets into the same water, if he has his clothes on, he will experience an uncomfortable wetting; if he is undressed, he will (we may hope) enjoy a refreshing bath. The forces of nature, most happily, are not capricious; their operations are determinable. This fact renders it possible for man, on the one hand, to discover and formulate an increasing number of valuable generalisations or "laws," and on the other hand, to play off the forces of nature one against the other in the service of the race.

[1] Holland, *Jurisprudence*, pp. 17–18. Note also the interesting discussion on pp. 13 *et seq.* concerning the origin of the ambiguous use of the word "law."

But the Dean of Clogher wishes us to believe that in the moral sphere the breach of a command is followed by its penalty with the same inevitable certainty as in the physical sphere a cause is followed by its effect. He gives two groups of examples, neither of which, however, supports his contention. First he instances the cases of the drunkard and the libertine: "A man addicts himself to strong drink, and thereby ruins his health. . . . He repents of his sin and prays to God for forgiveness, but a doctor whom he consults tells him that his internal diseases, brought on by drink, are incurable"; and again: "Another gratifies his propensities to immorality," and "his subsequent repentance and reform are utterly powerless to undo the evil which he has wrought." Does not the Dean see that in dealing with the inevitable physical consequences of drunkenness and immorality he is still dealing with purely physical phenomena, with the unvarying sequence of cause and effect in the natural world? It is quite beside the point that the taking of large quantities of strong drink has been in modern times—mainly because of a recognition of its injurious physical effects—condemned by morality. These physical effects were the same before morality took cognisance of them, that is, before drunkenness was made a moral offence. They are the same still among the untutored savages who know no moral law of temperance; they are the same too in the cases of the non-moral monkeys and apes who have been known to fall victims to inebriety. In short, the physical consequences of intemperance and immorality can in no sense be regarded as penalties incurred by the breach of moral law. They existed anterior to moral law, and were probably the primary cause of its promulgation. They continue to exist wholly apart from it.

The second of the Dean's illustrations of the inevitability of the penalty of the breach of moral law is as unfortunately chosen as the first. "The magistrate sitting on the bench," it runs, "has no power to forgive and let off any prisoner who is brought before him and convicted of crime. The law must take its course, and all know that it is essential to the safety of the community that it should be so." Now the first and most obvious remark to make about this extraordinary statement is that it is notoriously untrue to fact. Even the magistrates sitting in petty sessions have wide discretionary powers in minor cases; and if the term magistrate be taken (as it must be taken if the argument is to be valid) to include not only subordinate officials, but also the supreme judicial authority of the realm, it is untrue in any case of crime whatsoever. The King, through the proper channels, can freely pardon every offender. The law need not in any single case "take its course." The second remark which may be ventured is that the Dean himself admits that his statement is not true to fact. In an amazing passage—which, let us hope, is as little in accord with reality as the one with which it conflicts—he says: "In an ordinary trial at the court of petty sessions, if a clergyman appears to say a word for a poor person who has been indicted, and offers to pay his fine, a very great change is felt to have taken place in the

court as regards the prisoner." If a word from the lips of a clergyman will modify the course of justice, the course of justice must surely be something very different from the course of nature. It *is*, indeed, very different;—as different as moral law is from physical law. But since that is the case, the whole of the Dean's argument falls to the ground, and it remains only to express regret that the Dean should have added confusion to the difficult problem with which he deals by making an attempt to follow the late Professor Drummond in efforts to find evidence of the operation of "Natural Law in the Spiritual World."

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REUNION.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1906, p. 42.)

I have received the following comment from a minister in Canada on the article on Reunion which appeared in the October number of the *Hibbert Journal*:—

"I have just finished reading your article on 'Reunion.' It is calculated to help the parties to the Canadian union greatly wherever read. I write to speak of one development in the Canadian case which, had you been informed of it (as I suppose you were not) at the time of writing, would have given your article even greater force,—I speak of the formal request of the Anglican body in Canada to be admitted to the union on the same footing as the others. This request was made last summer, and was made in all due form by the Supreme Court of the Anglican Church in Canada. The request was for the privilege of participating in discussion.

"This, it seems to me, is a remarkable thing, and should convince old-country students of the question of Church union, that even the most widely divergent doctrinal positions are capable of being embraced under one general organisation. As a result of this request, the Anglicans are now parties to the union movement in Canada."

It is interesting to remember the stage which the discussion reached when the subject was last alive in this country. The Lambeth articles laid down four propositions as the basis of union, known on the other side of the Atlantic as "the quadrilateral." These were—1. The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as containing all things necessary to salvation, and as being the rule and ultimate standard of faith; 2. The Apostles' Creed as the Baptismal symbol and the Nicene Creed as the sufficient statement of Christian faith; 3. The two Sacraments ordained by Christ—Baptism and the Supper of our Lord—administered

with unfailing use of the words of institution and of the elements ordained by Him; and 4. The historic episcopate locally adapted in the methods of its administration to the varying needs of the nations and peoples called of God into the unity of His Church.

The position taken by Free Churchmen in response to these articles was carefully defined by Dr Mackennal. The first three articles constituted a model eirenical affirmation, and deserved frank acknowledgment and approval. But Free Churchmen were bound to take exception to the position in which they found the fourth article placed. A matter which was subordinate to Bible, to Creed, and to Sacrament was made, by the position it occupied, co-ordinate with them. That was a position to which Nonconformists would never assent. They recognised that the article had been put in that position in order to conserve the doctrine of Apostolical Succession for those to whom that doctrine was dear.

It remains to be seen whether the Canadian Anglicans can work themselves sufficiently free from the standpoint of their brethren in England to admit that episcopacy does not belong to the *esse* of the Church, and put it in the rank of numerous other arrangements which may or may not belong to its *bene esse*. The conditions in Canada, where several Protestant Churches are facing the active and aggressive Roman propaganda, are exceptionally favourable to a satisfactory fusion of the Protestant Churches. If Canada succeeds, it will solve a problem for the whole Church of Christ.

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THE SINLESSNESS OF JESUS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1907, p. 600.)

Mr Rumball, in dealing with this subject, translates the absence of sin in Jesus into the absence of consciousness of sin, and he considers it one of His special functions to relieve mankind from the "sense of sin."

That Jesus was sinless he does not believe; he speaks of His blunders. Curiously enough, he makes no attempt to substantiate this position; on the contrary, he blames Pécaut and Renan for their "painful efforts" in this direction.

He is apparently bent on proving that sin is not the terrible thing theologians have thought. For himself, he is beginning to learn that "the less we have to do with our sins the better." To help others to learn this lesson, he assumes that Jesus was a sinner who was not troubled by His sins; and he makes some attempt to support the assumption by statements to the effect that Jesus was not troubled by the sins of others.

Here he affords an opportunity of joining issue. To challenge a mere assumption is profitless. It simply rests on the authority of the assumer, and this we assess as we please.

But it is different when we are confronted by a statement which depends on the truth or falsehood of such a reading of the Saviour's life as this :— "We never see Him make much ado over sin." It is open to anyone to test the value of this summary of our Lord's dealing with sinners.

The briefest glance at the Gospel story will suffice. The opening shows John the Baptist preaching "repentance unto remission of sins" (St Mark i. 4). Jesus' first message is "repent and believe." The Gospel records close as they began so far as sin is concerned; the mission given to the Apostles is to preach among all nations "repentance and remission of sins." What Jesus' real view was as to the absence of a sense of sin is seen in His picture of the Pharisee who thanked God that he was not as the rest of men. It was the publican who knew his sin that was justified. Look where we will, similar teaching meets us. Take but one more instance :— The whole of St Luke xv. is occupied with the relations between God and sinners. What God asks is sense of sin; when this is present there is joy in heaven. What the sinner offers is "I have sinned"; upon this he is received.

Mr Rumball's mistake appears to arise from confusing the sinner's sense of sin with God's sense of forgiveness. When sinners came to Jesus possessed with the sense of sin He straightway forgave them, and pointed onward, "go, sin no more." In such cases there was no need to dwell on the sin. But the indispensable preliminary for acceptance was the publican's attitude, "God be merciful to me, a sinner."

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REVIEWS

The New Theology.—By Rev. R. J. Campbell, M.A.—Chapman & Hall, 1907.

I.

THERE is no reason why a preacher should not be a theologian; but a born preacher could hardly be a born theologian, so far as "born" implies a certain constitutional aptitude. Mr Campbell is incontestably a born preacher, a mover of hearts, who addresses himself to audiences rather than to individuals. His interest in theology, as he tells us (p. 264), is secondary and subordinate. The gifts needed for pre-eminence in these two functions are diverse and not easily compatible. In theology, as in every science, imagination has its use; but the critical faculty must predominate. When the born preacher sits down to theology he is haunted by his audience. His concepts take flesh spontaneously in imagery. Their rhetorical, emotional, æsthetic values obtrude at every turn, and substitute a warm glow for the cold, dry light of theological judgment.

The New Theology, Mr Campbell tells us, is but the theoretical justification of a new moral and spiritual movement. As a preacher, his interest is primarily in that movement, and only secondarily in the theology of the movement. That is as it should be. His work should be criticised, not as pure theology, but as a preached theology; as addressed, not to the solitary student, but to the crowd. For this reason, the task of just criticism is exceedingly difficult; and it is hard to say when he is speaking rhetorically, and when theologically. For the nonce, however, his direct aim is a theological restatement of Christianity as demanded by the exigencies of a new spiritual movement and of recent advances in philosophy, science, and critico-historical research.

Now, while it is quite true that "religion is never found apart from a theology of some kind" (p. 1), it is not at all so evident that "theology is everyone's business." Every morality involves a metaphysic of some sort; but men can be moral without being metaphysicians, and men can be religious without being theologians. There is a theology implicit in every religion, and to make it explicit is the office of theological experts. But to demand such explicitness of everyone, and to make religion wait upon

the success of its analysis, would be to confound things so different as experience and theory, revelation and theology, faith and orthodoxy.

As far as the interests of religion, of the new "moral and spiritual movement," are concerned, there is something far more necessary even than theological restatement. If we have learnt anything from the past, it is the need of criticising the very notions of theology and revelation; of recognising them as generically distinct sources and forms of religious knowledge; of determining their several criteria; of fixing their relations of dependence and independence so as to deliver the latter from the fluctuations and uncertainties of a science in continual process of development. The Christian revelation is the subject-matter of Christian theology—the experience submitted to the theologian's understanding. That revelation is Christ, His words, His deeds, His personality; and, like Christ, it is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever, under all the developments of theology and Christology.

What we suffer from at present is the entanglement of these two heterogeneous modes of religious enlightenment in one system, which pretends to be at once theology and revelation, to be mutable and immutable, susceptible of development and insusceptible. That so close an alliance is fatal to both interests would be more apparent if half the attention were given to the definition of revelation which is devoted to that of theology. So far as religion is suffering precisely from this entanglement of revelation with theology, it will not be cured by the substitution of a New Theology for the old one. That particular ailment will not be remedied by exchanging Philo and Aristotle for Kant and Hegel, but by facing the problem raised, though surely not solved, by Matthew Arnold's *Literature and Dogma.*

But in the very secondary interests of theology and theologians, developments and restatements of our understanding of Christianity are undoubtedly required, and to this need Mr Campbell's book is addressed. There is the same obligation, not less yet not greater, to a correct scientific knowledge of our religious life as there is to a correct scientific knowledge of our bodily life. We may not be indifferent to any sort of truth. Again, there are analogous advantages to be gained, and disadvantages to be avoided. Yet we cannot say that these sciences are necessary to everyone under pain of spiritual and bodily death. Men can pray well without theology, and live well without physiology.

The question is, then, whether Mr Campbell's restatement is really a theological advance or development; whether it answers better than the Old Theology to the facts of Christian experience, life and revelation; whether it simplifies our conceptions without in any way impoverishing their content; whether the difficulties it removes are greater or more than those which it raises. Here I must own to grave doubts; and I speak as one who has at one time or other tried these various exits, at first hopefully, but with ever-lessening confidence. Against the difficulties of an over-emphasised transcendence, a restatement of religion in terms of

immanence offers an immediate and palpable relief—but only for a moment. For immanence too, like every theory of ultimate reality, has its own crop of antinomies which springs up as soon as we have settled down quite comfortably to the enjoyment of our new possession. At first we can think only of the advantages of the change; but our satisfaction is premature.

One would wish to find in the New Theology a greater sense of the eternal riddle of existence—of the irreducible, the irrational, with which finite reason is ever in conflict. As appears from his negative conception of evil, Mr Campbell is a disciple of the later and optimistic Browning rather than of the earlier. Yet if evil has reference solely to will, the whole process by which the Eternal Will works out its end in creation is surely a conflict with positive obstructions, and not with the mere shadow of good. Here is a tough, indigestible mystery recognised, though not solved, by Zoroastrian dualism, or by the belief in a devil and in spirits eternally outcast. Here immanentism, with its facile unification, explains away rather than explains that irrational fact of experience which we call evil.

Again, an elusive and uncritical use of the term "self" enables the New Theology to glide over certain insoluble problems equal to or greater than any that cumber the one-sided transcendentalism of traditional Christianity. If I am to God as the bay to the ocean, or as a part to the whole, who is the responsible self or subject of the deeds that are at once mine and His? How can I explain my moral and mystical experiences of union and alienation, of friendship and hostility, in regard to what I feel to be a Power not myself that makes for righteousness? Is not the monism demanded by reason as unthinkable as the dualism demanded by religious experience?

And has the Old Theology anything more difficult than the idea of an infinite God "whose every need is supplied before it can be felt," and yet who needs to "limit Himself" continually in order to become conscious of His endless possibilities? Man is limited by his environment, through conflict with which he learns his own latent possibilities; but this voluntary self-limitation on the part of the infinite in search of self-realisation suggests a wilful tying of knots for the sake of untying them, and in order to kill the *ennui* of eternal solitude. It is the old problem, "Why did God create?" in another, but hardly in a better, form.

It cannot be said that the New Theology belittles Christ, except so far as, by raising us all to the dignity of incarnate deity, it threatens His essential and eternal pre-eminence. If we are but organs or parts of the All, which is God; if He is as much the subject, the doer, of what I do, as I am the doer of what my hand does; if my self is identically the eternal Self,—then I seem to stand as high as the Old Theology placed Christ. And for the same reason the notion of sin requires (and indeed receives) a transformation that leaves a large and important part of man's deepest spiritual experience unexplained. The Christ of the old Christology could not sin because He was God; because His human will lacked personal

independence, and was simply the organ and possession of a Divine Personality. Far from evading, the New Theology seems to extend this mystery to the whole human race.

And though we are assured that Christ remains unique, it is very hard to understand this unicity. It can scarcely mean, without self-contradiction, that the indefinitely progressive, never final, ideal of human perfection reached finality in Him. If it means only that He attained relative perfection, the ideal that filled His state and circumstances, why should not this have been or be attained again and again? It is said that we are all potentially what He was actually, and shall one day attain as He attained. If we may possibly attain in this life, where is His unicity? If only in heaven, then the mystery of His earthly attainment is hardly less than that presented by the old Christology.

This Christ is certainly not the Christ of ordinary Christian feeling, life, and experience; He is not the God to which, as to its Centre and Rest, the finite spirit is drawn with a profound sense of dependence and awe mingled with trust and confidence. We could not regard were it the saintliest of our fellows as even potentially one to whom we might some day say:

> "Other refuge have I none;
> Hangs my helpless soul on Thee."

Here, then, is another most important tract of Christian experience which the New Theology does not explain or justify, while bringing no particular alleviation of the old mental problems.

Mr Campbell rightly and frequently insists that no belief which has endured long and spread widely should be rejected till it is sympathetically understood and transcended. But it is not a question of separating an obvious husk from an obvious kernel. Still less will it do to fix to the ancient words any modern meaning which they will bear. What we have to do is to find out that precise element of truth which enabled the belief to spread and survive, and the spiritual or religious need to which it ministered. We must, if possible, trace it back to its earliest form through all its stages of development. When we know what it is, we may be able to give it more serviceable expression. Historically, as is evident from Harnack's *Dogmengeschichte* or Krueger's *Die Dreieinigkeit Gottes*, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is in no sense the result of an effort to express certain cosmic conceptions which are to be found in Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*. To slip these meanings under the formula is not to restate the old doctrine, but to misinterpret the old statement.

So far, then, as the New Theology attempts to give us a synthesis without antinomies, it is not more successful than the old; while, as reckoning with and explaining the deepest and purest Christian experience, it seems distinctly less adequate in many ways.

We are perhaps constrained to assume the unity and rationality of the Whole. But to suppose that our little syntheses, based on an infinitesimal fraction of possible experience, should ever contain more than a pinch of

truth in a peck of error, is to be sanguine in the extreme. For our purposes of life and action they are sufficient; and one may be far truer than another. But however well-knit at the centre, they are all alike jagged at the edges, nor can the largest of them cover appreciably the infinite stretch of our ignorance.

One cannot but honour Mr Campbell for the courage and candour with which he has addressed himself to what he believes to be one of the crying needs of the Church of to-day, and has faced the *odium theologicum* of those whose attachment to the Old Theology is so largely that of supine self-complacency rather than that of living faith and intelligent conviction. As is their wont, these have represented him as a wantonly mischievous schoolboy flinging stones at a window for the sake of excitement. The real difficulties that have driven him and so many others from "orthodoxy" are either ignored or wrapt in a decorous and edifying silence. But even if Mr Campbell were to hold his peace, the very stones would cry out. The sooner facts are faced the better.

Still, I cannot but think that the root of the evil which he, as prophet and preacher, combats lies deeper than he realises—not in the insufficiencies of this or that theology, but in a mistaken estimate of the relation between theology and revelation or prophetic truth. And by this latter I mean that spontaneous self-expression of religious experience which is itself part of that experience, and as such is the production of divine inspiration and not of theological reflection.

G. Tyrrell.

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II.

Many of us have long desired to see a popular exposition of the considerable body of ideas which, in spite of many differences of opinion, are more or less common to the liberal wings of all the Churches. In spite of the enormous mass of theological literature of all schools and shades of opinion, and on all levels of thought, which issues from the press, it has been singularly difficult hitherto to point to any one book, capable of being read and understood in a few hours by any man of moderate education, which would really answer the constantly asked question, "What do liberal Christians believe?" What does Christianity mean to those who have given up the idea of infallible books, churches, or creeds; who disbelieve in many or (it may be) all of the so-called "miracles," or who attach little importance to them; who admit that they understand many of the traditional dogmas in a sense more or less decidedly different from that intended by those who originally formulated them? To a very considerable extent Mr Campbell's *New Theology* will meet the want that has long been felt. It was essential that such a book should be written by a practical working pastor, a minister of one of the so-called orthodox denominations, a man with a name and a following in the "religious world." Even could such a book be produced by an academic

professor or a man of letters (which is extremely improbable), it would not have found its way into the hands of those who most wanted it. Of course, the process of popularisation has its drawbacks. When questions hitherto debated among scholars and theologians pass into books for the railway bookstall, and become the subject of newspaper controversy, it is inevitable that they should be discussed in a way which will be distasteful to fastidious minds. A certain amount of confident assertion, an easy brushing aside of difficulties, a short way of dealing with profound philosophical problems, some substitution of rhetoric for argument—these are the usual notes of the book on great subjects which the man in the street will buy and read and understand. I will not say that critics could discover no trace of such defects in Mr Campbell's work. But those who believe that a revolution at least as considerable as that effected by the Reformation has got somehow to take place in popular religious ideas, if Christianity is to continue a really living force in modern life, will rejoice that the task should have been undertaken, and at its being accomplished as well as it has been; though, the more strongly anyone feels the need of such a book as Mr Campbell's, the more strongly he is likely to feel the defects which (from his own point of view) are likely to impair the value of its influence.

Personally, I disagree with much in the book: where I agree with the substance, I often dislike the mode of expression. I should have liked to see a book somewhat more conservative in thought, considerably more conservative in tone and emphasis, with fewer rhetorical flourishes of the kind which will strike the average religious reader as irreverent. But it cannot be denied that Mr Campbell possesses many qualifications for his task. He is a man of deep earnestness and strong human sympathies; he has a gift of terse and nervous eloquence only occasionally spoiled by exaggeration of language or over-vehemence of sentiment. Enough of a student and a thinker to be in touch with the most recent work of the professional theologians, he knows how to appeal both to the intelligence and the emotions of the average business man. It is just such an exponent that Liberal Theology has long needed.

For a more detailed appreciation of Mr Campbell's work it will be well to divide it into two sections. Every systematic exposition of Christian doctrine must consist of two portions: one must deal with the elements in Christian belief which are common to Christians and to Theists, the other with the specifically Christian beliefs, especially (to use the technical phrase) with the question of the Person and Office of Christ. I do not mean that these two sides of Christian doctrine are unconnected with one another: they are of course closely connected, for the whole value of Christian Revelation lies in the light which it sheds upon the nature of God: but there are certain questions about God and His relation to the world which may be dealt with apart from the historical facts of the Christian revelation, and to which the same answer may be given by Christians of different ecclesiastical opinions and by some Theists who would not call themselves

in any strict doctrinal sense Christians at all. Mr Campbell's treatment of the distinctly Christian doctrine seems to me much more successful than his treatment of Theism.

Mr Campbell's Theism is based upon a philosophy which is popularly known as Hegelian. There are, indeed, no traces in this book of the more esoteric doctrines of Hegel; and it is probable that the version of Hegelianism which Mr Campbell has before his mind is that of the late Professor T. H. Green and his school. Green was personally a man of strong Christian sympathies; and no one has a higher sense than myself of the value of his influence on English thought. But it is perhaps generally recognised now that Green's version of such Hegelian doctrines as he held was a very "right-wing" version; still more so the version of Green which has commended itself to his more theologically-minded disciples. Green himself hardly appreciated the real tendency even of that side of Hegelianism which he explicitly accepted. Later thinkers have not found it easy to connect Green's personal religious beliefs with his speculative system. I do not think Mr Campbell quite appreciates the difficulty of reconciling the formulæ which he adopts from Hegel or from Green with the theistic faith which he himself undoubtedly shares. "God is all," Mr Campbell tells us; "He is the universe, and infinitely more." He should have said "the world" or "Nature," for no being or sum of beings can be more than the universe—but that is only a technicality. I admit that on idealistic premisses (which I accept no less that Mr Campbell) there is no objection to treating Nature as the "self-expression of God," or to saying that the world is not outside the divine Mind. But when we come to the relation between God and other minds, I have never been able to understand how one mind can be said to include another mind, if by "mind" is meant actual consciousness. No doubt Mr Campbell heartily believes in a divine Mind who is more than the sum of human and similar finite minds; but the real logical outcome of the attempt to identify God with the All is to be found in the writings of such men as Dr M'Taggart, who explicitly identifies the ultimate Reality with the society of human selves, or Mr Bradley, who holds that men are but "appearances" of an Absolute which is described as an "it," and which has no existence except in its appearances. I will not attempt here to argue the question metaphysically. I will only say that Mr Campbell has done nothing to remove my strong conviction that Christian apologists are looking in the wrong direction when they attempt to base themselves on a more or less Hegelianising philosophy. There are, of course, ways in which every modern Idealist is indebted to Hegel, and to his more lucid British disciples; but the recognition that God and man, however complete the dependence of the latter upon the former, are different minds, seems to me an essential presupposition of Christian theology. "My God is my deeper Self, and yours too; He is the deeper Self of the universe, and knows all about it" (p. 35). Such language really negatives all that is meant by the term Self or Spirit, whether applied to a particular human being or to God.

Nor, if we could get over the difficulties connected with such a theology, does it seem to me a particularly edifying one. I could not worship or reverence a God of whom Cæsar Borgia or Napoleon Buonaparte was a portion. That every man is, in a way, a revelation of God—by his intellect if not by his ideal, by the ideal of his conscience if not by his character—I can understand; but if I say this, I must go on to say that one man reveals God much more truly and fully than another, the good man more than the bad man, Christ in a unique and paramount way as compared with other good men. Such a mode of speech recognises a difference as well as an identity between the Revealer and the Revealed. On the other hand, if I say, "Every man is a part of God," there is no room for degrees: Cæsar Borgia was just as much a part of God as any Christian saint. Difficult as the problem of evil must be on any view, I can understand that God may cause evil men—men on the whole evil, though, doubtless, not without the capacity for being better—to be born; but to say (as Mr Campbell would be bound to say) that all the bad qualities of Cæsar Borgia are so many qualities of God, is to destroy all possibility of looking upon God as a morally perfect Being.

I doubt whether Mr Campbell fully appreciates the extent to which recent thinkers have explicitly adopted the logical consequences of such assertions as his in their doctrine that God is "beyond good and evil," that moral predicates cannot be applied to Him, and that sin, to the full extent to which it actually exists, is not merely a means to good but is good—so that, to the man who "sees things steadily and sees them whole," sin and pain are so many additional perfections in the universe. I should be the last to accuse Mr Campbell of having personally a defective sense either of the moral perfection of God or of the "sinfulness of sin." I do not think he sees the natural and logical drift of the speculations with which he has allowed himself to play. But I do think that here and there they have betrayed him into language which would be better avoided. His belief in the "infinitude" of God makes him unwilling to admit that there are inherent limitations to God's power of creating good without evil; and so we find a certain tendency to explain the badness of the bad man as due to mere intellectual misunderstanding. "Sin itself is a quest for God—a blundering quest, but a quest for all that." It is possible to give innocent explanations of such sentences, but surely they are better avoided: at bottom they spring, I am persuaded, from a false psychology. It is not true that no one ever desires anything but what he believes to be his own true good on the whole; many good and bad desires are alike "disinterested." The same unwillingness to admit a real evil in the universe leads Mr Campbell to minimise it by the extraordinary assertion that "the world's woe, taken as a whole, is not greater than the amount borne by him whose consciousness of it is greatest" (p. 48). Why then should Mr Campbell make any effort to diminish the number of sufferers? If he cannot prevent the sufferings of the worse sufferer, a diminution in the sufferings of the rest would be no diminution of the world's evil. In practical life, Mr

Campbell, like every other sensible man, would always assume that it was better that fewer should suffer than that more should suffer. Why should not the laws of arithmetic be as valid from the point of view of the universe as from that of any human agent?

Another difficulty in which Mr Campbell is involved by his vague ideas about Personality is in regard to immortality. For all practical purposes Mr Campbell is evidently a believer in personal immortality. But the idea that the finite self is but a phase or part of an "eternal self-consciousness"—often associated (though here Mr Campbell is silent) with the notion that time is merely an "appearance"—nearly always leads to the abandonment of any real belief in personal immortality. Such a passage as this, if it stood by itself, would seem to me to amount to the assertion that God will survive, but that I shall not: "When our finite consciousness ceases to be finite, there will be no distinction whatever between ours and God's. The distinction between finite and infinite is not eternal" (p. 42). The idea of the finite Ego *becoming* "infinite" is surely indefensible. If I am now a part of an infinite Mind, how can I ever become any more so? And if the finite ceases to exist, the "I" surely must cease to exist too. And how can the anticipated continuance of a self which is not I (except in the sense in which every other self is even now identical with me) be any source of warning, of hope, of more deeply felt responsibility or heightened aspiration to that which I call "I"? All that Mr Campbell writes upon this subject seems to me to represent an impossible attempt to reconcile irreconcilable modes of thought.

When we turn from Mr Campbell's treatment of the relation between God and man to his presentation of the distinctively Christian doctrines, I feel myself in much greater sympathy with him. The keynote of his treatment of Christological doctrine is the idea that what is true of Christ in a high and unique degree is true in a smaller degree of humanity at large. That is the principle of his treatment of the Atonement. "What is it that is slowly winning the world from its selfishness to-day, and lifting it gradually into the higher, purer atmosphere of universal love? There is but one thing that is doing it, and that is the spirit of self-sacrifice. Wherever you see that, you see the true Atonement at work. . . . On the field of human history the death of Jesus is the focus and concentrated essence of this age-long atoning process, whereby selfishness is being overcome and the whole race lifted up to its home in God. Until Jesus came, no self-offering had been so consistent and so complete. No selfish desire could find lodgment in His pure soul. He showed man the ideal life by living it Himself—the life which was perfectly at one with God and man. In a selfish world that life was sure to end on a Calvary of some kind: just the very fact that it did so demonstrated the completeness of its victory over all considerations of self-interest. Selfishness lost the battle by seeming to gain it" (pp. 165–6). I should like to transcribe more of this admirable passage, but the sentences I have quoted will be enough to suggest the spirit of Mr Campbell's teaching. So with the doctrine of

Christ's Divinity: "So far we have seen that the personality of Jesus is central for Christian faith. We deny nothing about Him that Christian devotion has ever affirmed; but we affirm the same things of humanity as a whole in a differing degree" (p. 94). "Jesus expressed fully and completely, in so far as a finite consciousness ever could, that aspect of the nature of God which we have called the eternal Son, or Christ, or ideal man who is the Soul of the universe, and the 'light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world'; we are expressions of the same primordial being" (pp. 94–5). "Nothing can be higher than the highest, and the life of Jesus was the undimmed revelation of the highest. Faith to be effective must centre on a living person, and the highest objective it has ever found is Jesus" (p. 96).

There will, of course, be critics who will be ready to pronounce Mr Campbell's position pure Humanitarianism, Socinianism, mere Theism, and the like. I do not so regard it. At bottom I believe he is right in his way of representing the Divinity of Christ: he regards Christ as a full and in a sense finally sufficient Revelation of God, while asserting with equal strength that no less important Catholic doctrine—the necessity of development under the teaching of the Holy Spirit. Nor have I any quarrel with what he says about the possibility of others with His help becoming like Him. "God became man that we might become divine" is an old and quite orthodox formula. My divergence from Mr Campbell's teaching would be largely a matter of emphasis. It is not merely that I should myself (believing more strongly than Mr Campbell in the value of the visible Church) be more anxious than he is to establish a close continuity between this teaching and that of traditional Christianity, and to represent his way of understanding it as containing the heart of the ancient creeds. Both sides of the truth, as it seems to me, require to be asserted: all men are in some degree sons or revelations of God; Christ was so in a unique degree. But I should lay more stress than Mr Campbell on the uniqueness of degree. There are passages in the book (some of which I have quoted) which exactly express my own belief, and the belief, I am persuaded, of large numbers of persons who do not regard themselves as fundamentally unorthodox. But their force is lamentably weakened by passages which might easily be understood as putting Mr Keir Hardie and Mr Robert Blatchford very much on the same level as Christ, which suggest that average men and women may expect to find it quite easy to "become Christs" too, and ignore the extent to which, as a matter of simple experienced fact, sin has all but obliterated the traces of the divine image in many souls. I doubt whether ordinary men are likely to be impressed with the desirable sense of the difference between their own characters and Christ's—between what they are and what they ought to be—by being told that "faith in Jesus is faith in the Atonement and faith in our own Christhood." Mr Campbell has reprinted one of his sermons which has been most severely condemned by the orthodox press. It is possible, no doubt, to construct apologies for some of Mr Campbell's rhetorical utterances; but I confess it does not seem to me spiritually healthy on

the one hand, or conducive to clear thinking on the other, to tell people that "the man who got drunk last night and gratified his lower nature in that delirious hour would be surprised if you were to tell him, when you see the result, that he was really seeking God; but so it is." Of course I am taking the passage apart from the context. I do not for a moment accuse Mr Campbell of practically minimising the heinousness of sin, but I do venture to doubt whether he will make other people feel it by telling them that sin is after all merely a mistaken way of "seeking God." I see in such language not so much an expression of Mr Campbell's own moral and religious convictions as an effect of the semi-pantheistic philosophy which has happened to come in his way. Such a philosophy, even in the writings or teachings of professional metaphysicians, shows a dangerous tendency to ally itself with a rhetoric which sometimes fails to express definite thought. There are several passages in Mr Campbell's book, if such plain speaking may be pardoned, which remind me of the old advice, "When any sentence that you have written seems to you particularly fine, strike it out." I hasten to add that such passages are few and far between.

I will venture on one more piece of frankness. Tastes differ, but for my own part I do not quite like Mr Campbell's way of speaking of opponents. He is a little too ready to suppose that anyone who disagrees with him is guilty either of wilful hostility to truth or of inconceivable stupidity. His presentations of the orthodox case are sometimes the merest travesties of what educated opponents really hold; and a greater desire to see that case in its most favourable light would sometimes, I think, lead to the discovery that the difference between himself and them is less than he supposed. Sometimes he even gives as the orthodox position a popular idea which is quite unorthodox. Catholic theology does not hold that "Jesus . . . . existed before all ages." The Divine Logos existed from all eternity. The man Jesus began to exist at the Incarnation.[1]

The strength of Mr Campbell as a teacher of liberal theology lies in his enthusiastic belief in its practical value. I am not sure that "as a system of thought, it [Mr Campbell's system] has more claim to originality than some people have been willing to concede," or that what in it is original is the most valuable part of it. I am not sure even that "it will be recognised that this is the first connected and systematic statement of the New Theology which has yet been made"—unless by "the New Theology" be meant the exact shade of opinion or blend of opinions which are peculiar to Mr Campbell. I do not think it is any particular novelty of opinion that constitutes the importance of this book, but the strength of conviction, the absolute frankness and directness, the fervour and power of popular exposition which have brought liberal theology down from the schools into the market-place. The appearance of such a

[1] No doubt St Paul held otherwise (though probably without any very clear or definite view about the "personality" of the pre-existent Jesus); but later Theology has distinguished between the pre-existent Logos and the human Jesus in whom the Logos became incarnate.

book constitutes a call to those who dissent more or less strongly from the particular restatement of Christian doctrine which we find it its pages to state their objections, or (better still) to state their positive belief, in as straightforward and intelligible a way as he has done.

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Morals in Evolution: A Study in Comparative Ethics.—By L. T. Hobhouse, late Fellow and Assistant Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, formerly Fellow of Merton College.—London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1906.

Few writers on Ethics have come forward better equipped for a masterly treatment of their subject than Mr Hobhouse. He is a logician and metaphysician, and has already published a considerable work on the "Theory of Knowledge." He is a skilled psychologist, and has already given us what he modestly called a sketch in outline of the main phases of mental development in a volume entitled "Mind in Evolution," leaving, as he then said, all that "related to the higher development of the human mind in Society" to be filled in on a future occasion. Meantime Mr Hobhouse has studied many men and many things from many different points of view; and now he has worthily fulfilled his promise by the present two handsome volumes on "Morals in Evolution."

"Do not content yourself," Adimantus is made to say to Socrates in Plato's *Republic*, "with proving to us that justice is better than injustice; but show us what is that influence exerted by each on its possessor, by which, whether gods and men see it or not, the one is in itself a blessing, and the other a bane." "Never before or since," says Mr Hobhouse (ii. 189) in reference to that passage, "has the claim of the moral consciousness to override every other consideration been more uncompromisingly stated," and it may be taken as the motto of his whole work. To solve the problem, thus succinctly stated, Plato found it necessary, as everybody knows, to construct an ideal state, well aware that the true conception of the human good was to be found, if anywhere, only among men in society living in harmonious relation with all their surroundings. In fact, as he goes on, Plato shows himself discontented with any merely empirical solution of the problem, based on hasty generalizations as to the nature of the human soul and of the city state, and hints that a final answer can only be obtained after an exhaustive study of all the separate sciences and a synthesis of their results by an all-embracing philosophy, ending in a final deduction of the good, in Spencerian language, "from the laws of life and conditions of existence." So too Mr Hobhouse tells us (ii. 274) that it is the business of philosophical criticism "to trace ethical conceptions to their sources in human nature,

and re-model them in accordance with the principle that every rule of conduct must be based upon the demonstrable needs of human life." But while Plato, though dimly aware of the progress from the unconscious morality of the worthy but unreasoning Cephalus to the conscious morality of the philosopher Socrates, aims finally at an absolute system of ethics which shall be true and binding for all time and all existence, Mr Hobhouse's whole treatment is penetrated through and through with the modern notion of evolution and development. "The function of modern thought," he says (ii. 251), "appears to be to reduce ethical and social conceptions to the ultimate elements and conditions from which they have grown up, and working from this basis to build up a conception of a world order, conformity to which is conceived as a matter of national obligation. Permeated throughout by the idea of growth and the dependence of belief and custom on the phase which growth has reached, it carries the conceptions of Greek thought back further towards the elements from which they were derived, and conceives a larger synthesis—a movement throughout the vast variety of things that are good towards the realization of a comprehensive purpose—a synthesis resting on the totality of experience and utilizing it for the working out of a purpose comprehending the totality of human effort. The ideas of relativity and development are the distinctly modern contributions to thought." In other words, moral progress is to Mr Hobhouse, as to Plato, progress from unconscious to conscious morality; but he is not content merely to typify the difference by the portrayal of various individual characters, but seeks to trace the advance in the varying moral conceptions of human society from its earliest forms down to the present day. "If there is ethical progress," he says (i. 33), "it is to be found, not in the development of new instincts or impulses of mankind, or in the disappearance of instincts that are old and bad, but rather in the rationalization of the moral code which, as society advances, becomes more clearly thought out, and more consistently and comprehensively applied."

Starting from this point of view, Mr Hobhouse defines (i. 21) the subject of ethics as the inquiry into the Conception of the Good, and the business of comparative ethics as the determination of the generic character and principal specific variations of this conception as actually held by men in different places at different times; and for purposes of convenience, he divides his investigation into two parts: the first he somewhat unhappily calls the Standard, the second the Basis of Morals. By the first he means, as he subsequently explains, not so much the standard of conduct, or even the standards recognized by different societies at different times, as the history of those ethical conceptions which are recognized as rules of conduct. By the second he means the reasons which men give for doing what they are bidden to do by law and custom. The investigation of the Standard occupies the first volume, of the Basis the second. But the fundamental assumption of the whole is that man is a social animal, whose true nature can only be discovered by the study of his life in society.

Within the limits of this review we cannot follow Mr Hobhouse into

the details of his brilliant survey of the development of moral ideals. His guiding principle throughout is the evolution of mind from the humblest, almost instinctive "beginnings to an adult vigour in which it can conceive the idea of directing its own course, mastering the conditions external and internal of its exercise" (ii. 24). His gifts for orderly and logical classification enable him to produce order out of the veriest chaos of anthropological facts and theories as to the origin of society, mother-right and father-right, totemism and ancestor-worship, exogamy and endogamy; and as to the evolution of societies from the group or village community through monarchy, personal or feudal, and the international empire, formed by the aggregation of kingdoms, to the most civilised states, based on the principle of citizenship, where law is supreme over both government and governed.

Humanity, Mr Hobhouse tells us (i. 368), has two meanings: it means a certain quality in the person of every human being, man or woman, and it also serves us as an expression for the whole race of men. Human progress is to realise humanity in this double sense. From this point of view Mr Hobhouse next deals with the great human institutions of law and justice, marriage and property, and with the relations of different communities and of different classes within the same community with one another. What Maine called the progress from status to contract, Mr Hobhouse exhibits as a process wherein the individual, with no recognized personality of his own, gradually emerges from the primitive group as a responsible person, possessed of rights and liable to duties (i. 365), but at the same time is brought into close dependence on a wider society—the state as a whole—to which he finds himself bound by mutual obligations of duties and rights. This is his general conclusion: in support of it he carries us through the laws and customs of many races and peoples, ancient and modern. The practices of savages and barbarians, the early civilizations of Egypt, Babylonia, India, and China, the laws and moral ideas of the Hebrews, of the ancient Greeks and Romans, of the early Christians and Mohammedans, of Mediæval and Modern Europe, the practices of ancient and modern warfare, the institution of ancient and modern slavery, communism and private ownership, ancient and mediæval almsgiving and modern poor laws—all are passed under rapid review, and shown to confirm the general thesis.

Thus fortified by his wide survey of ethical facts, Mr Hobhouse goes on to his consideration of the basis of ethics, what reasons do men give to themselves for the feeling of obligation to obey customary and ethical rules. Their answer much depends on their conception of the erecting, sustaining and governing causes of things, their theories of human life and society (ii. 2).

In primitive society custom is enforced, not only by the social sanction, but by the fear of magic or the resentment of some spiritual agency. Such sanctions are as often non-moral, or even immoral, as moral. In the next stage of development, when some form of polytheism is the prevailing

religion, some of the gods are conceived as taking an interest in certain moral acts, and transgression involves the risk of their displeasure. But here again the divine wrath may but too often be appeased, not by heart-felt repentance, but by sacrifices, forms and ceremonies. At a later stage the awakening reason refuses to be satisfied with the patchwork schemes of polytheism and mythology, and demands a more comprehensive theory of the universe and of man's place in it. This tendency may lead to the monotheism of the Jews and Christians, or to the pantheism of Brahmanism, or to the mysticism of Taoism, or indeed to other developments; but all such spiritual religions have reached the stage of conceptual thinking, "rising above mere imagery, and handling as distinct objects of thought categories which at a lower stage are still wrapped up in the experiences in which they are given to the senses" (ii. 87).

Naturally Mr Hobhouse gives most space to his criticism of monotheism, wherein, at least in its highest forms, the religious and the ethical are fused. The philosophical difficulties of Christian theology are stated with great clearness. If God is omnipotent and at the same time the author of good only, what is the origin of evil? The two most obvious solutions have each a difficulty of their own. If evil is held to be apparent only and not real, why are men to be eternally punished for their evil conduct? If it be argued that the Creator has a right to do what he will with his own, then how is man responsible for his evil deeds? To escape these difficulties the modern Christian apologist has been driven to disregard the doctrine of eternal punishment and to fall back on the "educative" conception of evil, both physical and moral—an explanation which cannot be stated without conditioning the creative power of God.

What however is meant by man's moral responsibility? Mr Hobhouse does but little to clear up or even to state the difficulty (i. 117; ii. 136, 137). In three notes he defines it as "the capacity to be determined by an adequate motive," and explains that it implies (1) "continuous identity of character and (2) the determination of action by motives adopted in accordance with the character of the agent." But "since the self," he goes on to say, "does not arise out of nothing, its character and therefore its conduct must at the next remove be referable to the conditions out of which the self arose. Following this line of thought, we are forced to conceive of Reality as a single system of which all the parts are interconnected. . . . What kind of system it is, must be discovered from other sources." And there he leaves us to ponder on his meaning.

To return, however, to Mr Hobhouse's criticism of Christian philosophy. After somewhat summarily dealing with the doctrines of wrongdoing as sin, of faith, and of penance, he sums up by saying that Christianity, in applying its principles to life, has moved between two poles of difficulty (ii. 147). "To elaborate a system of rewards and punishments is to run the risk of degrading morals into a form of spiritual calculation. The opposite alternative of declaring that conduct follows truly and naturally from the convinced faith of a Christian tends to degrade the ethical side of

religion to a secondary place." Finally, Mr Hobhouse complains that Christianity has no political teaching to give us, and to its absence he traces the excesses of asceticism and celibacy—the tendency of Christians to withdraw themselves from the world. But this surely, so far from being a source of weakness, has been a great cause of its strength. It is just because Christianity is personal, and not political but moral, that it can inspire men of different times and places, living under very various circumstances, to the practice of "love, universal benevolence, forgiveness, humility, meekness, combined with the extreme of resolute endurance for conscience sake."

Mr Hobhouse has a most interesting chapter on the ethical idealism—with little or no reference to supernatural sanctions—of Confucius and his follower Mencius in China, which we can here barely mention. Then he turns to the Greek philosophers, who were the first to ask the why and wherefore of all moral rules.

As was to be expected from a thinker with an Oxford training, we get from Mr Hobhouse a clear and able statement of the Greek ethical doctrines. Not only did the Greeks trace the method, which all philosophy has followed, but they bequeathed, according to Mr Hobhouse, two great contributions to the solution of the ethical problem (ii. p. 205). First Plato and Aristotle founded moral obligation on the well-being of the individual, and taught that virtue was not an emptying but a fulfilment of the personality. They reconciled individual self-development with legal, law-abiding citizenship in a free state. Then the Stoics, when the old city life was breaking up and the problem taking new shape, laid the foundations of a universalist ethics by conceiving an ideal standard of conduct applicable to all mankind, not subordinate but superior to state law, an ideal to which social as well as individual custom shall be made to conform.

So too the modern philosopher has to find a satisfactory method of stating the theory of moral obligation in terms which do full justice at once to individual personality and to the spiritual unity which binds men to the service of the common good (ii. 215). But the problem for him is harder for two reasons: modern life is more complex, and the moral code is fuller and larger. In dealing with the modern philosophers, from Grotius and Hobbes to Bentham and Mill, from Kant to Hegel and Comte, Mr Hobhouse is at his best, and his statement of the rationalist position of Kant is particularly successful. Thus by his criticism of his predecessors he prepares us for his own view, which, to put it briefly, is the Aristotelian theory of the self-realization of the citizen in his state, *plus* the modern doctrines of personality and evolution. Moral obligation is made to rest on "the altruism of which the love relation is the perfect type, which presents itself as duty when our natures are imperfectly formed by it, and is justified by reason because its aims alone give harmonious and coherent meaning to our practical efforts and our conception of the good." The first principle of Ethics is the conception of Mind in Humanity developing towards a conscious realization of its own powers of growth. The supreme

end may indifferently be called "the expansion of human faculty, the perfecting of social unity, the ascendency of mind over the conditions of nature and its own existence" (ii. 257). Morals in Evolution is, in Mr Hobhouse's view, mind in evolution, starting from the almost unconscious adaptation of means to immediate ends, and tending towards conscious knowlege of its own nature and growth, and of the conditions by which it is surrounded. In Ethics therefore its ideal is the rational regulation of conduct in such a way that the individual citizen should realize in harmonious working all the elements of his nature, intellectual, moral and political.

Every page of Mr Hobhouse's book furnishes food for reflection. It is brimful of facts from beginning to end; but his facts are not the *disjecta membra* of a mutilated corpse, but the coherent parts of a living organism. In a modest footnote (ii. 239), Mr Hobhouse gives us the heart of the whole matter. "The Mind of Humanity," he says, "is the unity in process of formation of multitudinous minds of men. To call it 'mind' may be metaphorical and inadequate. But to call it a real agency is, I think, literal prose."

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An Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience.—By J. B. Baillie, M.A., D.Phil., Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy in Aberdeen, Author of "Hegel's Logic." Pp. x + 344.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1906.

Professor Baillie has set himself a task which idealistic thought in this country has, until recently, rather tended to neglect—that of giving to the doctrine of the "categories" an adequate, detailed statement. The very strenuousness of the battle which English idealism has had to fight to obtain recognition of its first principles has encouraged it to view the concrete filling up of its system as a more or less secondary matter. It has been so busy convincing its antagonists of the mind's right and power "to rise to God from an empirical view of the world," that it has neglected to show in the concrete by what steps the ascent is actually made. Herein lies the opportuneness of the present book.

The author endeavours to discover what are the various phases of experience through which Reality gradually reveals itself, and so to substantiate the general idealistic position in the concrete detail of sensitive, cognitive, moral and social life. The work is more, of course, than an idle "supplementary proof" of principles already taken as established. The author does not regard the assumptions of the idealistic monism which he advocates as beyond the reach of attack; he has recognised

rather that the way to defend them is to work them out. "The problem consists in finding out how these two factors [the activity of the knowing subject, and the end he seeks to reach] are related. What precisely is it that knowledge aims at? When does it reach its goal? How does it get to that end?" (p. 70). To enter upon such a field required some courage; but the author derives his equipment for it from the best of sources—an extensive critical study of Idealism in its German origins.

In his first chapter Dr Baillie finds it necessary to settle accounts with pragmatism. Since Kant, the problem of interpreting Experience has been that of reconciling the two aspects of it which the critical philosophy disclosed, but left side by side—its Universal and its Anthropocentric character. The solution is truly to be found, where Pragmatism finds it, in the idea of Teleology; but Pragmatism stultifies the immanent teleological movement of experience by treating it as if it were directed upon a finite end. The "satisfaction" at which spiritual function aims must not be identified with any particular state of the historical individual. The very fact that no "attainment" is finally satisfactory shows that all forms of success participate in a character which none completely expresses.

There is an absolute Unity implied in the very fragmentariness and temporary character of every "unification of experience" which individual effort achieves—a Unity which controls all experience, cognitive or conative, and imposes on it the "necessity" which makes it objective. The problem is to reconstruct this Unity—to show how, in it, all the forms of experience knit themselves up into a stable, self-necessitated whole. The extent to which a particular form of knowledge (perception, conception, etc.) is valid, will depend on how far it, as a form, is essential to experience in its complete unity. In fact, to deal with knowledge satisfactorily, it must be treated as coterminous with conscious experience. Psychology distinguishes, of course, between knowing, feeling and willing; but, in an ultimate account of them, these aspects of the mental life must be treated as they really are, *i.e.* all together.

The Ideal is complete Unity in experience; and it is already present and operative when the mind first distinguishes itself from itself at the dawn of its conscious existence. From the lowest sense life upwards, every successive level of the developing spirit expresses the ideal to some degree, and has validity up to that point—the only attitude ultimately valid being the highest, where the mind finds its own answering image in the world. There is properly no meaning in the question whether our experience "corresponds with the facts"; because it means taking some knowledge of "facts" as criterion, whose validity itself requires to be established. No phase of experience can thus be judged by another. The truth of every mode—sensation, perception, science, the moral or religious life—is measured by its capacity to contain an Ideal which transcends all phases but the highest.

The region of experience least completely unified is its beginning; and here the author handles a difficult point with considerable skill. He

holds—as would Professor Adamson, to whom he refers here with approval, —that in the early life of sense the distinction of self and not-self has only just arisen. Yet precisely here does the opposition between mind and its objects take its most uncompromising form. Evidence of the depth of the antagonism is found in "the familiar and everyday fact of the strangeness, the unpredictability, the elusiveness" of the world of sense, and all the religious and philosophic distrust of sense arising therefrom (p. 136, *cf.* p. 140). The difficulty reappears on its obverse side when the author comes to deal with the next grade of experience—Perception. If the rise from sense to Perception be an advance towards truth, the reason must be that the characteristic defect of sense—its opposition to the self—is somewhat overcome in Perception. Dr Baillie has to prove, that is, that the perceived world withstands or thwarts the self *less* than does the content of mere sense. The proof takes the form of a systematic denial of dualism. In Perception, it is stated, what was formerly the immediate continuum of Sensation has broken up into definite sense-universals which combine into "things." The process of combination is the process whereby the object comes to be. There are no two alien substances at whose point of contact Perception springs up. "It would be truer to say that perceptual experience by its very nature puts the object 'external to' the subject, than that the externality of subject and object gives rise to perception" (p. 159). Whatever "independence" things may have, they cannot be independent of mind.

The forward movement from grade to grade in experience arises from the mind's persistent demand for unity—a demand which always comes, so to speak, from above. Perception is not allowed to rest in its interpretation of the world as consisting of "things," because Understanding—a higher mode of experience—demands a stability and consistency which "things" cannot offer. But the higher function, having the power thus to create a problem, has the power to solve it; and its solution cannot be disturbed except by the demand of a function higher still. Ultimately, therefore, Mind is equal to the solution of every question it can raise. Understanding, piercing behind the "things" of perception, satisfies itself by discovering in them the manifestations or expressions of "Force" (184–190), which develops further into the world of Laws (190–199), and ultimately into Noumenal as distinct from Phenomenal reality (199–203). When at length Law is so carried back into things as to fully "explain" them, the subject has discovered in the object its own unity, and its Consciousness passes into Self-consciousness (203–208).

After the plane of Self-consciousness has been reached, the next three distinct steps towards ideal Unity are Desire, Recognition, and the explicit consciousness of Self as Universal.

In the process of "Explanation" just mentioned, *i.e.* in the successful penetration of the detail of the world by the Laws of Understanding, the self becomes implicitly aware that its world is itself. It becomes, so to say, duplicated. Thereupon there arises a certain tension between the

two factors, each claiming to possess the other. This "reciprocal tendency" of the self to its world, and *vice versa*, is Desire. What we deal with in Desire is always Self, never anything simply foreign—a statement which, if made about lower grades of experience such as perception, would not be strictly true. The result of Desire—considered here simply, like Understanding, as an attitude to the world,—is to exhibit explicitly what in Understanding was only implication, that the Object is the fulfilment of the Subject's own life. Desire proves imperfect inasmuch as reality, for it, has not yet a self of its own; it is but the objectivity in which the individual mind finds *his* self. When the Subject finds his identity in another conscious self, he has reached the higher level of "Recognition." This phase is further developed through such forms of it as are found in the relations of Master and Serf—the Master recognising his natural self in the Serf, the Serf recognising his rational self in his Master,—up to the full consciousness of the Universality of the Self; a type of consciousness which, though liable to be abstract, as in Stoicism, is yet the basis of all the highest human experience, Science, the moral order, Religion.

At this point—in Universal or "Free" Self-consciousness—the Unity implicit and operative throughout the whole life of mind emerges into determinate form. But the development is not yet complete. We have as yet only reached that unity of self-consciousness whose presence Kant had found indispensable to "possible experience." But self-consciousness is concrete; not, as Kant took it, an abstract formal principle. On the one hand, since it was the inner spirit of all the previous forms of experience, it must exhibit these afresh, as built into itself; on the other hand, all the remaining forms of higher experience must be shown to be a further development of it.

In Self-consciousness, Subject and Object are from the outset in explicit conscious unity with each other; and the author, following Hegel, traces the process whereby Reason "works up in its own special medium the stages formerly found in the sphere of Consciousness as such" (p. 273). On the one side there is "Scientific experience" (ch. viii.), where the three previous forms, Sensation, Perception, and Understanding, are represented on the higher level of Reason by the three forms of Conception, Judgment, and the "interconnection of different conceptions through that law or principle determining all as its elements," which is inferential Demonstration. On the other side, "Moral Experience" arises (ch. ix.) where, by a process essentially like the earlier passing of "Understanding" into "Desire," Reason itself undergoes a development. It unites its Universality with its Selfhood, and emerges as the self-conscious individuality of "Finite Spirit." This develops through the ethical forms of Custom and Convention, the Morality of Conscience, and the Social Life, and finally (ch. x.) comes to rest and completeness in the sphere of Absolute Spirit.

This comprehensive and ambitious scheme of thought, pursued with strenuous consistency of purpose and remarkable psychological skill

through three hundred and fifty pages of abstruse argument, seems to invite a single important criticism. It is obvious, from his courteous but quite definite rejection of Pragmatism, that Dr Baillie has no faith to put in an idealism which first burkes its task and then pleads its limited powers. Yet we believe that no one who had followed throughout, and with a comprehending mind, this clearly told story of the ascent of the Spirit, would escape the honest suspicion, were it suggested to him, that Dr Baillie's own idealism has realised its magnificent aims by compromising the independent "objectivity" of the real world. This impression arises most forcibly in the expository difficulties encountered in that treatment of "sense experience" and "perceptual experience," which sets the current of thought throughout the whole treatise. The difficulty is to show how sense can feasibly be regarded as the lower of the two in a scale where the ideal is Unity, or the reconciliation of the self and its world. It requires bold demonstration to convince one that the content of mere sense life presents a more pronounced opposition to the self than the world of perception does. One cannot but think that Dr Baillie would both have come nearer the truth and (here at least) have simplified his task had he ventured on a bolder paradox. Might it not be maintained that when we rise from Sensation to Perception we find both the unity and the opposition of the factors deepened? that in a bare sense-continuum mind fails to find its own unity just for *lack* of effective opposition? and, conversely, that it is the mutual independence of mind and things in perception which makes a deepened harmony between the two possible? There is, of course, no disguising the magnitude of the task of showing how this double movement advances, with progressive accentuation on both its sides, throughout the whole gamut of the categories. Yet such seems the only programme which in the end will really avoid tying the mind up to its own subjective states.

Dr Baillie has broken fertile ground. There is a curious but very real tribute to the value of the whole work in the impression it leaves on the mind of an unbiassed reader who tries to diagnose its leading purpose. Its debt to the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* is so avowedly extensive, and yet its hold upon modern problems—psychological, epistemological, social and religious,—is so vital, that the reader is hardly able to say whether the work is strongest as a fresh treatment of these problems or as an exposition of Hegel; the fact being that it is both things—the one because it is the other. It is significant, too, *apropos* of the attitude of our younger thinkers to Hegel, that the erstwhile vigorous critic of "Hegel's Logic" should have been able already, with four years' further study, to turn so much of the Phenomenology to positive account.

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Studies in Humanism.—By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., D.Sc., Fellow and Senior Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.—London: Macmillan & Co., Limited, 1907.

The essays contained in this volume constitute a valuable addition to the literature of the controversy with which they deal. Some of them are not new; and of others we may fairly say that in substance they are largely identical with parts of the author's previous book, *Humanism.* But certain aspects and bearings of Pragmatism are treated here for the first time with a fulness which one has desired to see; especially the question of the relation of logic to psychology is faced with characteristic boldness and honesty. We are once more impressed by Dr Schiller's merits as a writer on philosophical subjects: passages might be selected in many parts of the book as conspicuous examples of lucid and incisive exposition. He has, indeed, in a striking degree the defects of his qualities; and it would be easy to point to unworthy flippancies of thought and of phrase. But in these days of obscure and ambiguous writing one is willing to exchange much dignity of style for the clearness and directness which this volume displays.

The first chapter is important chiefly for its definite assurance that Pragmatism is not a metaphysic but an epistemology, and that its point of departure is the problem of error. We shall see later how far Dr Schiller adheres to this limitation. In the second essay he rewrites for us in an interesting way an early chapter in the history of Greek philosophy. The central figure of the period, he assures us, is really Protagoras—a sort of Humanist born out of due time: πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος is not the shallow catchword of a rhetorician, but the world-formula of a profound thinker: the Sophists were the true teachers of their age: Plato was not the pioneer of science, but its corrupter, who caricatured because he failed to understand the great thought of Protagoras.

I do not propose to enter into any criticism from the historical side of this extraordinary re-editing of Greek philosophy. I pass to more urgent questions than whether the Sophists were or were not Dr Schiller's legitimate forerunners. But one point is too striking to be left unnoticed. We read on page 46: "But to suppose that Aristotle misunderstood Plato's fundamental doctrine is a monstrous assumption. And, we may add, a futile one. For it makes out Aristotle to have been either a fool if he could not understand it, or a knave if he knowingly misrepresented it." Yet it seems to have been reserved for the Humanists of the present day to restore the true meaning of Protagoras, which the world, misled by Plato, had entirely missed. I do not know whether Dr Schiller regards Plato as a fool or as a knave, or whether he saves his intelligence and his honesty by supposing that Protagoras, while incomparably profound, was at the same time preternaturally obscure.

One of the most significant of the essays is that entitled "Faith, Reason,

and Religion." Here Dr Schiller has done his readers the service of contrasting his own view, not with those to which it is sharply opposed, but with those which it superficially resembles. It is not unusual to hear and to read that Pragmatists say nothing which has not been already said by Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, by Lotze, by Cardinal Newman, by Albrecht Ritschl. Dr Schiller recognises his affinity to all of these and to everyone else who has vindicated a voluntaristic epistemology. They are united in a common antipathy to Hegelian Absolutism. But he points out that there is a real novelty in the Pragmatist revival. The differentia of Dr Schiller's theory is that it does not set the knowledge and the method of metaphysics in opposition to the knowledge and the method of science.

Ritschl distinguished in kind between the theoretical judgment and the value judgment, between the organ of scientific and the organ of religious truth. Dr Schiller breaks down the distinction, not as the Hegelians, by assimilating the religious to the theoretical consciousness, but by attempting the reverse. Science is valid, he claims, not *in spite of* but solely *in virtue of* the postulates of faith. The greatest of these is the postulate of uniformity which lies at the basis of all thinking whatever. "No evidence will go to prove it in the least degree until the belief has been boldly assumed" (p. 361). Science, in short, stands or falls with the value judgment which, consistently followed, leads to religion.

To say that scientific reasoning rests throughout not on a coercive necessity of thought but on a process of value-judging, and to insist at the same time that such reasoning is "objectively valid," raises at once the whole question of the nature of truth. To this subject Dr Schiller devotes five chapters, emphasising four main points: (*a*) The intellectualist and absolutist philosophers from Plato to the present day have failed to give us any consistent account of truth and of the criterion by which it may be known. Correspondence, coherence, and all the other tests, when applied through and through, lead to a "debacle of the intellect." The agnosticism of Mr Bradley and the confession of failure of Mr Joachim are conspicuous illustrations. (*b*) The conclusion seems to be that knowledge is impossible. But while the logical theorists have said so, knowledge, as a matter of fact, has been extending on every side: the scientific, the ethical, the religious spirit have actually advanced and made conquests. Any theory of knowledge is self-condemned which represents as invalid the processes by which *de facto* knowledge is increased. (*c*) The failure of the philosophers arises not from lack of acuteness but from the inherent impossibility of their task. They ignore the psychological conditions of thinking. They attempt to theorise knowledge on the supposition that knowledge is a function of the "pure" intellect. But this is a false abstraction: reasoning is, like all other thinking, dependent on interest and satisfaction, suffused with emotion and volition, determined by reasons of the heart no less than of the head. (*d*) Yet logic is no mere department of psychology, though growing naturally out of it. For "truth" is

ambiguous. It may mean "claim" or it may mean "value." While psychology tabulates the claims, logic estimates the values. And this means not value for the mythical "pure" intellect, but for the concrete whole of man.

I do not propose to discuss whether the philosophers stigmatised as "intellectualist" have really fallen into the hopeless plight which Dr Schiller describes. It would not, I think, be very difficult to show that his constant threat, "Either this or Bradleian agnosticism," presents a false alternative. But my present concern is the criticism of Dr Schiller's epistemology, not the defence of another.

Is it really true that our belief in the uniformity of Nature is a sheer postulate of the "will to live"? If Dr Schiller is right here he has gone far to establish at least the negative part of his theory. It is easy to point to the futility of many so-called "proofs" of universal causation: and the Pragmatist exploits the mystery to the utmost. Yet this belief, for which no justification is forthcoming, is obviously vital to science. Dr Schiller will restore it to us if we accept it as a "postulate." Having emphasised the hopelessness of the problem, he offers a ready-made solution: drowning men will proverbially clutch at a straw. On this matter I offer two criticisms: (1) I dispute the existence of the alleged mystery. (2) If such mystery existed, I question the value of the Pragmatist solution.

He who denies the existence of a mystery gives his opponent a *prima facie* advantage: he is sure to find the controversy carried back stage by stage till he is confronted with the inscrutable origin of all things, and is triumphantly challenged to answer such questions as, "Who made Being?" or "Why was Being made?" Let me anticipate such a line of attack by saying that I regard the mystery of uniformity as simply identical with the mystery of the existence of the world, so that he who, in obedience to Carlyle's advice, accepts the universe because he had better, has no right to quarrel with that order which is of the universe's essence.

Speaking generally, the nature of reality has been conceived by metaphysicians in one or other of two ways—as an organic interrelated whole or as a mere aggregate—as one or as many. It is irrelevant to the present inquiry to enter into the controversy between the Monists and the Pluralists. The point of immediate interest in this: Granted that view of reality which is expounded, for example, in the first book of T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, there is no longer any mystery in the uniformity of Nature. That doctrine becomes simply the metaphysical correlate of the logical Law of Identity. It asserts no more than this—that since the universe is composed not of ταῦτα but of τοιαῦτα, it is as such τοιαῦτα that its elements must persist. If they cease to work in the same way they have lost the only basis of self-identity that they ever had or ever can have. The doctrine of uniformity, accurately expressed, is simply another way of saying that the elements of the universe are relational.

I select the system of T. H. Green merely to show that the school of writers called "intellectualist" is by no means bankrupt in face of the demand for a coherent account of uniformity. It has at least an intelligible theory to offer. But suppose Green's fundamental doctrine abandoned —what becomes of the pragmatist value-judgment? On what assumption can we trust any human postulate as objectively valid or even objectively probable? Surely only if we grant a harmony between the universe and the spirit of man. If the universe be not known to be spiritual, why may it not be our fate, in the inscrutable course of things, to go on for ever postulating the false? Why may not this be the dark climax of the eternal estrangement between Nature and Spirit? In short, the Neo-Hegelians may fairly reply to the Pragmatist attack that to them the uniformity of Nature presents no mystery, and that, if it did, the theory of postulation would furnish no solution.

Again—what does Dr Schiller mean by saying that logic "must take account of," and that it "may not abstract from," the psychological conditions of thinking? If he means that the reasoning process never in concrete life goes on in isolation, that it is always accompanied by the movements of feeling and the strivings of will, he is denying that which, so far as I know, has never been affirmed. But if he means that one cannot attend to and decide upon the logical aspect of a proposition or an argument without being determined to one side or another by practical necessity or feeling-tone, then he has announced a paradox. His evidence, so far as I have seen, goes to prove not dependence but only invariable concomitance between the intellectual and the non-intellectual. He has no difficulty in showing that the most rigid syllogising originates in interest, is permeated by purpose, that at every stage it has a psychic aspect. But what Dr Schiller has really to prove is that it has no aspect other than the psychic.

But even admitting that feeling and will are determinative of many beliefs, Dr Schiller's case is still far from proved. For the source of a belief may be wholly different from the ground of its justification. I suggest that Pragmatism derives much of its strength from the continuous confusion which it contrives to introduce between origin and validity. Was the belief in God ever reached by reflection on the theistic proofs? Dr Schiller may indeed say that neither can it thus be justified. But the two questions are perfectly distinct. Was the knowledge of right and wrong ever obtained through an ethical treatise? Yet the crucial question for moral philosophy is how the feeling of obligation already possessed may be explained and vindicated. If, as the Pragmatist must surely say, moral distinctions rest in the end on differences of feeling, then the supposed fact of obligation is an illusion psychologically explicable but logically invalid. For feelings *as such* cannot be binding. Finally, I may point out that the Pragmatist has no right to say that his opponent simply dismisses as irrelevant all those arguments for God, freedom, and immortality which are grounded on the feelings and the will. We merely

differ from Dr Schiller in that we insist that the data of the emotional and the conative life must be intellectually scrutinised. We protest against a *blind* worship. "The heart has its reasons," urges Dr Schiller; and we reply that the heart has indeed *causes*, but that it neither has nor can have any *reasons* whatever. Its phenomena supply, indeed, the material out of which a powerful apologetic may be constructed; for the possibility of such processes in the human mind implies the negation of Naturalism.

It has been said of mediæval speculation that the thinkers who attempted to prove by argument the validity of ecclesiastical dogmas thereby implicitly recognised a criterion of truth higher than the voice of the Church. One is tempted to say of Dr Schiller that in exhibiting the *reasonableness* of the Pragmatist doctrine he pays unwilling and perhaps unconscious homage to that very reason which he affects to despise. Probably the most usual criticism will be that, having taunted everyone else with failure to grapple with the problem of error, he has himself given us a cheap and easy way by the bold abolition of truth. But whatever we may think of Dr Schiller's theory, he has given us an attractive and stimulating book—marked by acuteness and lucidity.

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Lukas der Arzt.—Von A. Harnack.—Leipzig, 1906. ("Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Neue Testament," 1 Heft.)[1]

Summary of the argument:—

Chap. I. The third Gospel and the Acts were ascribed to Luke at least as early as 140–150 A.D.

If this is a false ascription, the name Luke must have been substituted for that of the real author of the Gospel. By "Luke" the tradition understood the companion of St Paul.

Arguments in favour of this ascription:—(*a*) Luke is never mentioned in the Acts; (*b*) Luke was a Greek, and the Gospel and Acts were certainly written by a Greek; (*c*) Luke was a physician, and so was the writer of these works; (*d*) Luke was a fellow-traveller with St Paul, and the author accompanied the Apostle on some of his travels (the "we" sections); (*e*) Luke was probably born at Antioch, and the Acts shows a special interest in that city.

Chap. II. On linguistic grounds it is impossible to separate the "we" sections from the rest of the book.

Chap. III. "But the contents of the book of the Acts show that it cannot have been written by a fellow-worker with St Paul." Consideration

[1] An English translation of this work has just been published by Messrs Williams & Norgate.

of this argument:—(*a*) Allowing that v. 36 contains an anachronism, there is no reason why infallibility should be claimed for a disciple of St Paul; (*b*) the material in the first few chapters is incomplete and sometimes unhistorical. But the Gospel also contains legendary material, and neither in Gospel nor Acts should this be a ground for denying the Lucan authorship. (*c*) The description of the growth of the Christian Church in chaps. i.–xv. may well have been written by a companion of St Paul; (*d*) the account of the Apostle given in chaps. xvii.–xix. is not at hopeless variance with St Paul's letters, and Luke's Paulinism is not the Paulinism of St Paul, but that of one who had known the Apostle.

Chap. IV. Luke, after the destruction of Jerusalem, lived in Achaia or in Asia (Ephesus?). There, about 80 A.D., he wrote the Gospel. His sources were Mark's Gospel, a source which the author of the first Gospel also used, and Palestinian traditions of a legendary character. Some of these, dealing with women and with Samaria, as well as the narratives in the first part of the Acts which deal with Philip and his work in Samaria, may have come originally from Philip the Evangelist and his daughters.

Appendix I. Linguistic evidence that the writer of the third Gospel and of the Acts was a physician.

Appendix II. An investigation of the language of Luke, chaps. i.–xi.

Appendix III. A discussion of Acts xv. 23–29. The letter is a compilation of Luke's.

Appendix IV. On the relationship between Luke and John.

The importance of this book is twofold. In the first place, it brings the support of its author's learning and reputation to a series of propositions which have long been maintained by English critics. That the writer of the "we" sections was also the writer of the whole book of the Acts, that this writer also composed the third Gospel, that his style proves him to have been a physician, and that there is no reason for rejecting the tradition which identified him with Luke, the companion of St Paul—these are conclusions which have long been maintained by the majority of English-writing critics, *e.g.* Hobart, Hawkins, Headlam, Sanday, Plummer, Chase, and Knowling. And these conclusions, if they are warranted, have an important bearing upon the historical value of the two writings. Of course, as Harnack says, no name can make credible an incredible story; but many critics will be prepared to believe that in the present case the authority of one who was a companion of St Paul is sufficient to throw the balance of probability on to the side of much that in itself might be regarded as difficult if it came from the pen of a later and unknown writer.

In the second place, the book is important as a corrective of methods of criticism which are the product of an exaggerated estimate of what must be expected from a New Testament writer. In this respect the work before us is a criticism alike of an extreme conservatism and of an extreme radicalism. The conservative critic who argues that any particular

statement in the Acts *must be*, or *probably is*, historically accurate because Luke penned it, inevitably provokes the answer of the radical that Luke cannot have written it because it is incredible. As Harnack says, critics demand from a companion of St Paul too much: they expect to find in him unfailing understanding of the Apostle, freedom from independent tendency, absolute trustworthiness, and a never-failing memory. Harnack's own treatment of the subject is refreshingly independent, and his chapter "On the Supposed Impossibility of ascribing the Third Gospel and the Acts to Luke," is one of the most interesting in the book. He seems to the present writer to be inclined to underrate St Luke's accuracy as a historian; but his main contention that Luke, in the Acts of the Apostles, is largely describing events for knowledge of which he is dependent upon others (Philip, Aristarchus), and that absolute accuracy and unfailing judgment cannot be expected from him, is both true in itself, and an answer to many of the arguments against the Lucan authorship.

With regard to the date of St Luke's work (Gospel and Acts), the author adheres to the judgment expressed in his *Chronologie* in favour of the period *circa* 80 A.D., and in view of Professor Burkitt's recently expressed opinion it is worth noticing that Harnack is not inclined to believe that St Luke had read Josephus. Here the English scholar seems to have the truer insight, unless, indeed, it could be made probable the text of Josephus, *Ant.* xx. 5, has suffered interpolation from the Gospel.

In conclusion, it may be noticed that Harnack acknowledges his debt to Hobart (*The Medical Language of St Luke*), who, in his judgment, tried to prove too much; and to Sir John Hawkins, to whose *Horæ Synopticæ* he makes constant reference.

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International Critical Commentary: The Book of Psalms.—By Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., D.Litt., Graduate Professor of Theological Encyclopædia and Symbolics, Union Theological Seminary, New York, and Emilie Grace Briggs, B.D. Vol. II. [Pss. LI.–CI.].—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1907.

READERS of the January number of this JOURNAL will remember that an absolute and final opinion of Dr Briggs' *Psalter* could not be given, because the first volume only went down to Ps. L. A hasty judgment seemed particularly undesirable because of Dr Briggs' long and persistent devotion to the cause of reconciliation between the Church (in America) and Biblical criticism; and considering that a friendly alliance exists between British and American scholarship, it was plainly unadvisable to offer unqualified or unsupported criticisms. Educationally, it was heartily admitted that Dr Briggs deserved our gratitude for breaking with the misleading popular

notion that David wrote all, or most, or at least many, of the Psalms, and that, holding what are called "strictly moderate" views, he might perhaps win the confidence of theological students better than those who have no concern with "moderation," and only care for thoroughness. At the same time, it appeared that Dr Briggs had not made the best use of his space. There was much in the closely printed notes that seemed like extracts from the Lexicon; much, too, that was superfluous in the introduction, and had kept out many things which even the average student ought to be permitted to know. And though the right of critical emendation was fully granted, yet the advanced student was not quite adequately trained. From a "scientific" point of view graver charges had to be brought against the author. The textual criticism of the first fifty psalms showed no brilliance. It seemed also that Dr Briggs was imperfectly acquainted with what other people had done. The glosses, too, on which he dwelt so much, often appeared highly questionable, and the metrical and strophic results seemed to hover in uncertainty, owing to the timidity and superficiality of many of the textual corrections. Still, the hard work put into the book deserved cordial recognition.

All these acknowledgments and criticisms may be repeated for the second volume. It is plain that Dr Briggs has had somewhat more success from an educational than from a scientific point of view. It is possible enough that his numerous pupils may object to this statement. The book may exactly represent the style of the teaching they have received, and their sense of indebtedness to a highly independent and thoroughly religious teacher may incline them to regard criticism as an offence. Now, I both know and appreciate the great work of Union Seminary, but I have also to consider the needs of other students, especially advanced students —students who ought to turn into researchers—both in this country and in America, and I am in duty bound to make these criticisms while repeating those recognitions which were heartily expressed in my first article. How, for instance, can an advanced student be satisfied with Dr Briggs' scanty and imperfect references to other scholars? He does, indeed (not without one striking omission), catalogue the commentators who take this or the other view, but where are the references to those who, though not commentators on the Psalms as a whole, have contributed largely to the discussion and elucidation of innumerable points connected with the book? I am bound to say that, putting aside references to Sievers on Metre, I can find very few indeed in the exegetical part of the work. In vol. ii. I have only been struck by one of the kind that I mean (p. 540); it makes laudatory mention of W. R. Smith's suggestion (*Religion of the Semites*, 2nd ed., p. 176) on the *tanninim* or "dragons" of Ps. cxlviii. 7. But why should Toy, Nestle, Gunkel, and other contemporaries be ignored? Or if some reason existed for such omissions, why was no reference given to any article or book which gave some fairly extensive catalogue of articles and monographs, and showed how to use this information in the interests of research?

Reviewers of works like the present are prone to look chiefly at results, omitting details. The opposite course seems to me preferable. If the details are faulty, the results cannot be satisfactory. For a testing psalm take lviii. According to Briggs, this was written in the early Hebrew monarchy; Duhm, however, places it in the beginning of the reign of Alexander Jannæus. The first couplet, according to Briggs, runs thus :—

> "But do ye indeed speak justice?
> In equity judge the sons of mankind?"

For the first line of which, however, Duhm gives, "Do ye indeed, O ye gods, speak justice?" What parallel for the former rendering can be produced, I do not know. Surely "O ye gods," or some other class-name, is absolutely required, and so much has been written in justification of "O ye gods" that a commentator is bound to take some notice of it. But the second half of the psalm is much more disappointingly done than the first. The text as it stands is indeed most trying, but would it not have been better to put asterisks than to risk such a hazardous translation as that given on p. 42, where, it is sad to see, no attempt is made to go behind the impossible *shabhlul* (snail)?

In fact, again and again I have been struck by the want of a keener textual criticism in this useful and meritorious book. There are indeed a considerable number of new interpretations, but what is the good of expending ingenuity on a doubtful text? I have only noticed three plausible or important emendations, though the text often calls loudly for such. One is in lxi. 8, where Dr Briggs gives (v. 8*b*), "Kindness and faithfulness on the right hand will preserve him"; another in cv. 30, where we read, "in the chambers of their king" (instead of "of their kings"). The third will be mentioned presently.

Many scholars, I think, would have been grateful if fresh light could have been thrown on Ps. lxviii. This is Dr Briggs' view of vv. 11–14 (12–15) :—

> "Word is given; the women are heralding war.
> The king doth strive; armies flee;
> And the beauty at home divideth the spoil.
> The dove on the wing is covered with silver,
> And his pinions flash with yellow gold.
> But when the vulture spreadeth her wings, it is like snow on Zalmon."

Here certainly is novelty of interpretation, helped out by emendations, one of which has the merit of great boldness, *i.e.* *shaddai* (an obscure divine name) becomes *dayyah*, "vulture." But can we say that the meaning is clear? Nor is there any discussion of "Zalmon," or reference to any books where some discussion might be found.

Whether that famous psalm (lxxiii.) which in our text begins, "Truly, God is good to Israel," but in Dr Briggs' restoration, "My feet were almost gone," is adequately treated, may be doubtful. Boldness reaches

its climax; the omission of "glosses" does not appear to me to make the psalm more primitive. No attempt has been made, however, to ascertain the text which underlies that called the Massoretic.

Passing along, I find a number of strange renderings, *e.g.* "my hand is extending without growing numb," "I do lay hold of the night watches with mine eyes," "then I said: 'I have begun with this, The years of the right hand of Elyon.'" These renderings are in Ps. lxxvii. Or take these from Ps. lxxx.,

> "Yahweh Sabaoth, how long
> Dost thou smoke during the prayer of thy people:
> Dost thou feed them with the bread of tears,
> And give them to drink a measure of wormwood?"

The last line is based on a very unfortunate emendation. Or turn to Psalm cx. This is one of the most thoroughly treated psalms. Yet how little fresh light is thrown upon it! The difficult words usually (and indeed by Dr Briggs) rendered "after the order of Melchizedek" are expunged as a mere gloss, and the unexpected words at the end become (by a most unplausible emendation), "an inheritance on the way he maketh it, therefore he is exalted." The psalm is regarded as pre-exilic, and probably earlier than Ps. iii.

I must not run the risk of wearying the reader. The Psalter is a fascinating study, but few critics fully realise the task before them. Dr Briggs is hardly critical enough, nor has he sufficient experience in the use of all the newest and best methods. If he were, how could he keep "in the name of Yahweh will I circumcise them" (*i.e.* the enemy) in Ps. cxviii. 12? How, too, could he confess himself baffled by "Hashmannim" in Ps. lxviii. 32? And venture to change the inconvenient "Asshur" in Ps. lxxxiii. 8 (9) into "Samaria," just because of a prejudice? And stumble, for the same reason, at the mention of "Cush" in Ps. lxxxvii. 4 (5)?

For all that, I heartily repeat the recommendation of the book already given. The second volume, equally with the first, will be useful both to elementary and to advanced students, even if some of the latter may find parts of the work more provocative than convincing.

T. K. Cheyne.

Oxford.

The Common Heritage.—By M. Catherine Albright.—Headley Bros.

"We have a share in the making of the world." This is the faith outlined and enforced in these thoughtful pages. It is reached through an analysis of personality, in which the organic connection of the self with the world is traced, and illuminated with much variety of illustration. George Herbert's lines,

> "O mighty Love! Man is one world, and hath
> Another to attend him,"

quoted in one of the essays, might well stand as the text of all. Man's share in the making of that second and attendant world is shown to rest upon the fact that he is himself part and parcel of it. He is able to contribute to the world outside him because it is of his own kindred, and his very consciousness of the world within has been won by its aid. "The world of which man is a part is not rigid, but gives back a different response to every varying call, and a different reaction to every separate touch. 'Ask, and ye shall receive,' 'Give, and it shall be given to you,' are not only authoritative promises, but declarations of the condition under which man lives in a world in which there is an Ear that listens to his calling and a Heart that responds to his aspirings."

The thoroughness with which this interdependence between man and his environment is accepted and insisted on is accompanied by an evident sense of difficulty in finding a basis for the power of choice, whose reality is maintained, and the statement that sin "is the necessary accompaniment of man's original nature" will not go unquestioned. Few, however, will quarrel with the following:—"He (man) cannot understand why it is that he seems at one time to be the irresponsible agent in a sequence of unchanging law, and at another to be a free man, working out his own purposes and will; but whichever he believes himself to be, it still remains for him to accept or reject the part that appears to be his. He can play the part of an enforced slave or a willing agent, he can be loyal or disloyal, he can glory in the eternal order in which he finds himself, or he can stand by indifferent and doubting."

The two essays, "The Significance of Beauty," and "Claimants for the Heritage," are specially attractive, the first for its interpretation of the irresistible force with which beauty makes its appeal as a call from the heart of all things, the Heart of Love, to the heart in us; and the second, for a very careful and sensible discussion of the limits of self-sacrifice. There is great freshness in the treatment of this last subject, and a happy use of examples.

The book is admirably written throughout, with much ease and charm of expression.

AMBROSE BENNETT.

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Warschauer (*J.*) The New Evangel. 224p. Clarke, 1907.
[An attempt "to restate fundamental beliefs from the point of view of what has come to be known as the New Theology."]

Walker (*W. L.*) What About the New Theology? 205p. T. & T. Clark, 1907.
[A criticism of Mr Campbell's teaching.]

Orr (*Prof. J.*), *and others.* Present-Day Theology. Homil. R., April 1907.
[A discussion of the question "What are the essential Articles of a Theology such as may be of use as a system of faith in the Church?"]

Stafford (*B. T.*) Dogma and Life. Bibliotheca Sacra, April 1907.
[Strongly maintaining the need and truth of creed-dogma.]

Anon. The Religion of a Layman: Studies of Various Subjects—the Serious Reflections of a Long Life. With a Review of the Westminster Confession of Faith. 230p. Waddie, 1907.

h *Girdlestone* (*R. B.*) Monotheism, Hebrew and Christian (Judaism and Christianity: Short Studies, vii.) 43p. Longmans, 1907.

Hyde (*James*) The Old Faith Restated. 116p. Warne, 1907.
[Written from the Swedenborgian point of view.]

Ritchie (*W. B.*) Revelation and Religious Certitude. 338p. Gardner Hitt, 1907.
[Review will follow.]

2 *Houtin* (*Albert*) La Crise du Clergé. 346p. Nourry, 1907.
[The special characteristic of the numerous present crises is that they come from the intelligence and not from character or customs. They are dramas of the head. Author believes that those who scorn the Church to-day will come to hold fast to the three true mysteries—God, free-will, and the immortality of the soul.]

Anon. For Truth or For Life. Dub. R., April 1907.
[The decrees are intended really to tolerate a wider view than their rhetoric suggests. But at the present time, when the conclusions of scholars are known to so many, methods suitable to an earlier time have serious drawbacks.]

Lilly (*W. S.*) The Newest View of Christ. Fort. R., June 1907.
[Examination of Pfleiderer's *Entstehung des Christenthums.*]

3 *Rosegger* (*Peter*) My Kingdom of Heaven. 330p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.
[A defence of orthodox belief.]

10 *Radford* (*L. B.*) Distinctions of External Function in the Holy Trinity. Expos., May 1907.

12 *Allen* (*Alexander V. C.*) Freedom in the Church, or The Doctrine of Christ as the Lord hath commanded, and as this Church hath received the same according to the Commandments of God. 223p. Macmillan, 1907.
[Virgin-birth accepted as the miraculous or supernatural mode by which God became incarnate in Christ.]

Orde-Ward (*F. W.*), *ed.* Lux Hominum. Studies of the Living Christ in the World of To-day. 424p. Griffiths, 1907.
[Review will follow.]

Mead (*C. M.*) What is meant by the Divinity of Man? Amer. J. Th., Apr. 1907.

Wright (*H. W.*) Can the Human Character of Jesus be called Divine? Amer. J. Th., April 1907.

20 *Brown* (*Alex.*) Jesus on His own Vocation. Cont. R., May 1907.

Ross (*G. A. J.*) The Universality of Jesus. 182p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

22 *Crannell* (*P. W.*) Christ's Person in the Twentieth Century. Bibliotheca Sacra, April 1907.

A Layman. Who was Jesus? or, The Virgin Birth and the New Theology. 32p. Elliot Stock, 1907.

26 *Dinsmore* (*C. A.*) Atonement in Literature and Life. 268p. Constable, 1907.

40 *Haldimann* (*Hector*) Le Fidéisme; Étude critique de la Doctrine du "Salut par la Foi, indépendamment des Croyances." 101p. Fischbacher, 1907.

Lelièvre (*C.*) Quelques remarques sur les idées de salut, de grâce et de foi. Rev. chrét., May 1907.

60 *Knopf-Marburg* (*Rudolf*) Die Zukunftshoffnungen des Urchristentums. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, 1, 13.) 64p. Mohr, 1907.
[Deals with the Jewish idea of the Future and with Christian and Greek Eschatology.]

65 *Metcalf* (*A.*) The Philosophy of the Future Life. Homil. R., April 1907.

Rice (*W. N.*), *and others.* Is Belief in Immortality dying out? Homil. Rev., Mar. 1907.
[A symposium.]

E ETHICS. 1–9 *Practical Theology, Christian Ethics, Transition to General Ethics,* 10 *Theories,* 20 *Applied Ethics, Sociology,* 28 *Economics,* 27 *Education.*

6 *Rashdall* (*Hastings*) The Theory of Good and Evil. A Treatise on Moral Philosophy. 2 Vols. 332+464p. Clarendon Press, 1907.
[Review will follow.]

Mellone (*S. H.*) The Present Crisis in Christian Morals. Cont. R., April 1907.

10 *Perry* (*R. Barton*) The Conception of Moral Goodness. Phil. R., March 1907.

Fauconnet (*P.*) "The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas," d'après Westermarck. Rev. Phil., April 1907.

French (*F. C.*) A Factor in the Evolution of Morals. J. of Phil., April 11, 1907.

Boucaud (*Ch.*) L'histoire du droit et la philosophie de l'action. Rev. de Phil., May 1907.

Deshumbert (*M.*) Morale de la Nature. 74p. Nutt, 1907.

Wright (*H. W.*) The Classification of the Virtues. J. of Phil., March 14, 1907.

Ewer (*Bernard C.*) Determinism and Indeterminism in Motives. Phil. R., May 1907.
[Determinism and Indeterminism are complementary and relative truths.]

Renauld (*L. v.*) Freiheit und Arbeit. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 2, 1907.
[Freedom and Work are not opposed to one another. The ideal of culture is an advance out of a condition of irrational physical and psychical

Unfreedom through rational material and spiritual work and rest to a condition of physical and psychical Freedom and self-activity.]

20 *MacCunn* (*John*) Six Radical Thinkers: Bentham, J. S. Mill, Cobden, Carlyle, Mazzini, T. H. Green. 268p. Longmans, 1907.

Armstrong (*A. C.*) Individual and Social Ethics. J. of Phil., Feb. 28, 1907.

Henderson (*C. R.*) Social Duties Relating to the Family. Bibl. World, Mar.–Apr. 1907. [Courtship, marriage, divorce.]

Kerby (*W. J.*) Human Nature and Social Questions. Catholic World, April 1907.

Ledermann (*E.*) Le Terrianisme. R. du christianisme social, Feb. 1907. [On the Workmen's Gardens movement in France.]

Gide (*C.*) Le devoir de l'impôt. R. du christianisme social, March 1907. [Discusses the nature of taxation and why the levying of it leads to irritation and evasion. Government needs should be regulated and met by voluntary offerings or by state-ownership profits.]

Monnier (*H.*) Le Paradis socialiste et le ciel chrétien. Rev. chrét., April 1907. [An ironic treatment of socialistic ideals.]

Slater (*T.*) The Ethical Aspect of Boycotting. Irish Th. Quar., April 1907.

Wagner (*Adolph*) The Rights and Wrongs of Socialism. Fort. R., April 1907.

Palante (*G.*) Anarchisme et Individualisme: Essai de Psychologie Sociale. Rev. Phil., April 1907. [Anarchism is essentially a social, economic, and political doctrine, which tries to realise in facts a certain ideal. Individualism is a state of soul, a certain intellectual and emotional attitude of the individual in regard to society.]

Anon. Proposals for a Voluntary Nobility. 31p. Samurai Press, 1907. [Founded to a large extent upon the writings of H. G. Wells.]

Sutter (*Julie*) Britain's Hope: An Open Letter Concerning the Pressing Social Problems to the Rt. Hon. J. Burns. 145p. Clarke, 1907.

Collingwood (*B.*) The Task before the Anti-vivisectionists. Dub. R., April 1907. [A careful analysis and refutation of the arguments of anti-vivisectionists.]

23 *Anet* (*H.*) Moralité commerciale. R. du christianisme social, Feb. 1907. [Some account of the Christian Social Union, with the reproduction of an article by Mr Carter and Canon Scott Holland.]

Anet (*H.*) Moralité commerciale. R. du christianisme social, May 1907. [Quotes the opinions of men in business, who seem to regard trickery as a regrettable necessity. Discusses also the morality of some common trade devices.]

Harty (*J. M.*) The Living Wage—its Ethical Basis. Irish Th. Quar., Apr. 1907.

Holmes (*T.*) London Home Industries and the Sweating of Women's Labour. Church Q. R., April 1907. [An account by the well-known former Police Court missionary of the conditions of life and work, of sweated women, and of practical schemes for their betterment.]

Kerby (*W. J.*) Human Nature and Property. Catholic World, May 1907.

Monod (*W.*) Le rôle de l'acheteur dans les conflits Économiques. R. du christianisme social, April 1907. [Sets forth the principles and practices recommended to buyers by the *Ligue sociale d'acheteurs*.]

Nègre (*Mlle. A.*) Le travail féminin à domicile. R. du christianisme social, April 1907.

Ryan (*J. A.*) Certain Problems of Industrial Justice. Irish Th. Quar., Apr. 1907. [Discusses, in the form of answers to criticisms, the justice of the demand for a living wage, what constitutes such wage, and the just means of obtaining it.]

27 *Wright* (*W. E. C.*) Education and Character. Bibliotheca Sacra, April 1907.

Barth (*Paul*) Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung, vi. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi. 1, 1907. [Relations of the classes of West European society in the second half of the Middle Ages. Origin of the universities. The theory of Vincenz von Beauvais as to education.]

Eucken (*R.*) Religion et Culture. La Liberté chrét., March 1907. [Setting forth their necessary inter-dependence.]

Airaudi (*J.*) Écoles normales et instituteurs. 1. L'École sans Dieu. L'École contre Dieu. R. du clergé français, Mar. 15, Apr. 15, and May 15, 1907. [In practice these schools are free-thought seminaries, more closely shut and barricaded than religious ones. Teachers trained there are a solid body of "anti-curés" and proclaim their free-thought mission. Socially and politically they are attached to revolutionary groups.]

Bishop of Limerick. Irish University Education. Dub. R., April 1907. [A plea for a modification of Bryce's scheme.]

Nicole (*R.*) L'Éducation religieuse et la question scolaire. La Liberté chret., Feb. 1907. [A Swiss pastor's plea for the exclusion of religious teaching from the public school, which is not the place for it.]

Sisson (*E. O.*) The Spirit and Value of Prussian Religious Education. Amer. J. Th., April 1907. [Religion is universally recognised in Germany as the necessary basis of morality, but the actual religious teaching in the schools gives general dissatisfaction. It is an "effort to bolster up a formal creed and an ecclesiastical establishment which are no longer in accord with the best thought and work of the time."]

F PASTORALIA. 2 *Sermons*.

De Molinos (*Michael*) The Spiritual Guide which Disentangles the Soul. With Intro. by Kathleen Lyttelton, and a Note by H. Scott Holland. (*Lib. of Devot.*) 203p. Methuen, 1907.

Tyrrell (*G.*) Oil and Wine. Reissue with New Pref. 362p. Longmans, 1907.

Schneider (*Édouard*) Les Raisons du Cœur. 288p. Sansot, 1907.

Congreve (*George*) A Day-Book of Short Readings for Use by Busy People: Trinity to Advent. 435p. Masters, 1907.

Currier (*A. H.*) The Value and Uses of the Imagination in Preaching. Bibliotheca Sacra, April 1907.

Durand-Pallot (*Ch.*) Introduction au problème moderne de la cure d'âme. R. du christianisme social, Mar., Apr. and May 1907. [Physiological and psychological knowledge indispensable. Mere exhortation a failure.]

Berle (*A. A.*) The Education of a Minister. Bibliotheca Sacra, April 1907.

[An incisive attack upon seminary education (Protestant), and a lament over the humiliating conditions of ministerial service in American congregations, which destroy independence.]

2 *Morgan* (*G. C.*) The Deceitfulness of Sin. Homilet. Rev., March 1907.

Vine (*C. H.*) The Old Faith and the New Theology. 266p. Sampson Low, 1907.

[Collection of sermons and essays by leading Congregationalist ministers.]

Matheson (*G.*) The Representative Women of the Bible. 300p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

[Last work completed by the great Scotch preacher.]

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 *English.*

Nundy (*A.*) Kali Charan Banurji: in Memoriam. Hindustan Rev., Mar. 1907.

[A Hindoo Christian convert, "the greatest man India produced in the 19th century," if greatness consists in the service a man renders to his country.]

1 *Ross* (*Janet*) Galileo in the Val D'Arno. Mont. R., April 1907.

Dimnet (*E.*) M. Clemenceau as Writer and Philosopher. 19th Cent., April 1907.

Arbousset (*B.*) Le docteur Constantin, un précurseur de la Réforme en Espagne. La Liberté chrét., Feb. 1907.

Cartier (*J.*) Brunetière apologiste. R. pratique d'Apologétique, Nos. 36–39, Mar. 15–May 1, 1907.

[Tracing the development of Bruntière's thought as it led him from Agnosticism to Catholicism.]

Godet (*P.*) Ch.-Jos. Hefele. R. du clergé français, May 15, 1907.

Klein (*F.*) Ferdinand Brunetière. Catholic World, April 1907.

Ledermann (*E.*) Fréderic Le Play. R. du christianisme social, May 1905.

Wintrebert (*L.*) Berthelot. R. du clergé français.

[A critical appreciation of his scientific work and the place of his scientific theories. His religious attitude is lamented, and is traced to his view that the *Explanation* of nature is the end of Science.]

2 *Staley* (*Vernon*) Richard Hooker. (The Great Churchmen Series.) 225p. Masters, 1907.

Russell (*G. W. E.*) Dr Pusey. (Leaders of the Church, 1800–1900.) 213p. Mowbray, 1907.

Masterman (*G. F. C.*) Frederick Denison Maurice. (Leaders of the Church, 1800–1900.) 237p. Mowbray, 1907.

Stephen (*Caroline E.*), *ed.* The First Sir James Stephen: Letters with Biographical Notes. 300p. Heffer, 1906.

[This book is printed for private circulation only. The compiler, Sir James Stephen's daughter, wishes to convey a glimpse of something less tangible, more lasting, than any opinion—namely, his religious experience, and profound and devout reverence.]

Pollock (*Sir F.*) Frederic William Maitland. Quar. R., April 1907.

[An appreciative account. The real monument to Maitland would be a school of the common law in England, worthy to stand beside that of Harvard.]

Mackintosh (*R.*) Principal Rainy. 136p. Melrose, 1907.

Durban (*W.*) John Watson, D.D. ("Ian Maclaren"). Homil. Rev., March 1905.

[A slight sketch, written before Watson's death, chiefly an appreciation of him as preacher.]

Monod (*L.*) Josephine Butler. Rev. chrét., March 1907.

H HISTORY. x *Persecutions* C *Christian* M *Mediæval* R *Modern* 2 *English.*

Ward (*A. W.*), *and others, eds.* The Cambridge Modern History. Vol. x. The Restoration. 964p. Clay, 1907.

[Contains *inter alia*:—The Papacy and the Catholic Church, by Lady Blennerhassett; Literature in Germany, by J. G. Robertson; Catholic Emancipation, by H. W. C. Davis; The Revolution in English Poetry and Fiction, by W. J. Courthope; The British Economists, by J. S. Nicholson.]

Anon. Lord Acton's Lecture on Modern History. Edin. R., April 1907.

Carnoy (*A.*) Éléments celtiques dans les noms de personnes des inscriptions d'Espagne. Le Muséon, vol. viii., Nos. 1–2, 1907.

C *Peritz* (*I. J.*) The Communism of the First Christian Society. Homil. R., April 1907.

Watson (*E. W.*) Palladius and Egyptian Monasticism. Church Q. R., April 1907.

Holmes (*W. Gordon*) The Age of Justinian and Theodora. A History of the Sixth Century A.D. Vol. ii. 400p. Bell, 1907.

[This completes a valuable and useful work.]

H *Krüger-Giessen* (*Gustav*) Das Papsttum: Seine Idee und ihre Träger (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, iv. 3–4). 160p. Mohr, 1907.

[A brief history of the Papacy.]

M *M'Caffrey* (*J.*) Irish Episcopal Elections in the Middle Ages. Irish Th. Quar., April 1907.

Moran (*Card. Abp.*) Some Strictures on Prof. Bury's "Life of St Patrick." Irish Th. Quar., April 1907.

Bruce (*H.*) The Age of Schism: An Outline of the History of the Church from A.D. 1304 to A.D. 1503. (The Church Universal, Vol. v.) 286p. Rivingtons, 1907.

R *Gasquet* (*Abbot*) Some Victims of the Great French Revolution. Catholic World, April and May 1907.

[The marytred Carmelite Nuns of Compiègne, and an English community of Benedictine nuns at Cambrai.]

Hoskins (*J. P.*) German Influence on Religious Life and Thought in America during the Colonial Period. Princeton Th. Rev., April 1907.

Kawerau (*G.*) Zwei Briefe aus den Tagen des Todes Luthers. Th. St. u. Krit., April 1907.

[One from Georg v. Amsdorf and one from Georg Major, addressed to Nicholas v. Amsdorf.]

Scott (*Mrs Maxwell*) The Nuns of the Visitation at Rouen, 1792–1807. Catholic World, Mar. 1907.

2 *Lindsay* (*Thomas M.*) A History of the Reformation. (Inter. Theo. Lib.) Vol. ii. 631p. Clark, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

Plummer (*Alfred*) English Church History from the Death of Charles I. to the Death of William III. 187p. Clark, 1907.

[Four lectures on (i) The Triumph and Failure of Puritanism; (ii) Restoration and Retaliation; (iii) The Struggle for Religious Toleration, and (iv) The Latitudinarian Failure and Success.]

Bulkeley (*H. J.*) The Religious Teaching of English History in Church and School. Pref. by the Bishop of Hereford. 24p. Elliot Stock, 1907.

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C *Fathers* 2 *R.C. Church* 3 *Anglican.*

Hyde (*J.*) Benedict Chastanier and the Illuminati of Avignon. New Church Rev., April 1907.
[The history of their connection with Swedenborgianism.]

Crafer (*T. W.*) Macarius Magnes, a neglected Apologist. J. Th. St., Apr. 1907.
[A defence of the *Apocritica*, which is dated in the first years of the 4th century.]

d'Alès (*A.*) and *Vacandard.* La réserve des trois cas et l'édit de Calliste. R. du clergé français, May 1, 1907.

Souter (*A.*) The Commentary of Pelagius on the Epistles of S. Paul. Expos., May 1907.
[The history of the transmission of the work.]

Vacandard (*E.*) Tertullien et les trois péchés irrémissibles. R. du clergé français, April 1, 1907.
[A contribution to recent controversy as to whether Tertullian held adultery, homicide and idolatry remissible or not. Writer believes T. held them to be irremissible.]

Feder (*A. Leonhard*) Justins des Märtyrers Lehre von Jesus Christus. 303p. Herder, 1907.

1 *Giraud* (*A.*) Chronique religieuse de Russie. R. du clergé français, Mar. 1, 1907.
[Dealing fully with the religious situation in Russia, as it affects the Orthodox, the Old Believers and the Roman Catholics. Information is given about the proposed Orthodox General Council and the preliminary steps already taken.]

2 *Baudrillart* (*A.*) Questions d'enseignement supérieur ecclésiastique. R. du clergé français, Mar. 15, 1907.
[In reference to the Church of France.]

Crouzil (*L.*) Cérémonies et manifestations extérieures du culte catholique. R. du clergé français, Feb. 15, 1907.
[Distinguishing those permissible and those forbidden by police regulation under the recent Separation Law.]

Crouzil (*L.*) Monuments, signes et emblèmes religieux sous la loi de séparation. R. du clergé français, April 1, 1907.

Dubois (*F.*) Le Temoignage des Martyrs. R. du clergé français, Mar. 15, 1907.
[Intervenes in the controversy between MM. Laberthonnière and Allard in the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, as to the nature and object of the testimony of martyrs. The conclusion is there can only be authentic martyrs "in the truth, *i.e.* in the Catholic Church."]

Dubois (*F.*) and *Laberthonnière* (*L.*) Le Temoignage des Martyrs. R. du clergé français, April 15, 1907.

De Franqueville (*Comtesse*) The Religious Crisis in France: Some Personal Impressions. Church Q. R., April 1907.
[The writer (formerly Lady Sophia Palmer) believes the people to be attached to the Church, and any contrary opinion based on the election results is mistaken as to their significance.]

Fox (*J. J.*) The Relations of Church and State. II. Catholic World, Mar. 1907.
[The Roman theory of Ecclesiastical Supremacy is absolute, but the conditions of its application are everywhere wanting. Those conditions require religious unity under the Papacy, and a Papal authority resting on common consent, as in the Middle Ages.]

Thompson (*J. W.*) On the Identity of Bernard of Cluny. J. Th. St., April 1907.
[Identifies him as coming from Murles, not Morlaix, and as belonging to the family of the Lords of Montpellier.]

Romanes (*Ethel*) The Story of Port Royal. 504p. Murray, 1907.
[Written from the Anglican point of view. The purpose has been to show what kind of people, what sort of Christians were the Port Royalists. Catholics they were; Ultramontanes they were not.]

de Pascal (*G.*) L'organisation intérieure de l'Église de France. R. du clergé français, Mar. 1 and April 15, 1907.
[Suggestions consequent upon the Separation Law. "It is in no way revolutionary to ask for France a treatment analogous to that which England and America enjoy."]

Mignot (*Mgr.*) Mgr. le Camus et la crise moderne. R. du clergé français, Feb. 15, 1907.
[A liberal recognition of modern difficulties and of the late Bishop of Rochelle's attitude toward them.]

Sabatier (*Paul*) The Bishops' Declaration of January 1907; A significant Episode in the struggle between France and the Holy See. Albany R., May 1907.

Vacandard (*E.*) Encore la question du pouvoir coercitif de l'Église. R. du clergé français, Feb. 15, 1907.
[Seeks to soften the rigour of Pius IX.'s condemnation of those who say the Church has not the right to repress by temporal penalties those who violate its laws. The Pope's declaration is held to imply no more than moral constraint.]

Bremond (*H.*) The Mystery of Newman. Trans. by H. C. Corrance. With Intro. by G. Tyrrell. 378p. Williams & Norgate, 1907.
[Review will follow.]

Anon. Newman and Manning. Quar. R., April 1907.
[Deals mainly with the ground covered by Thureau-Dangin, *La Renaissance Catholique en Angleterre au XIX^e Siècle* (Troisième Partie).]

Bremond (*H.*) Apologie pour les Newmanistes français. R. pratique d'Apologétique, Mar. 1, 1907.
[Maintains against Lebreton and Wilfrid Ward, his judgment of Newman's philosophy, as being opposed to scholastic orthodoxy.]

Lebreton (*J.*) Le primat de la conscience, d'après Newman. R. pratique d'Apologétique, March 1, 1907.
[Reply to Bremond's *Apology* in the same number.]

Anon. Anti-Clericalism in France. Dub. R., April 1907.
[By an English Protestant, a keen observer, who has resided in Paris upwards of a quarter of a century.]

Palmer (*Sophia M.*) The Church Difficulties in France from a French Point of View. 19th Cent., June 1907.

Anon. The Story of a Paris Convent. Dub. R., April 1907.

3 *MacCarthy* (*Desmond*) The Life and Works of Father Ignatius.
Albany R., June 1907.

Anon. Ecclesiastical Courts.
Church Q. R., April 1907.
[Condemns the suggestions on this head by the recent Commission, and favours a purely ecclesiastical court in spiritual causes, with a secular court of appeal in alleged cases of abuse or injustice.]

4 *Albrecht* (*O.*) Katechismusstudien.
Th. St. u. Krit., April 1907.
[An account of a manuscript (text is given) containing the catechism on the Ten Commandments from Luther's Little Catechism.]

Flöystrup (*C. E.*) The Church of Denmark. Church Q. R., April 1907.
[Finds historic relations and present similarities with the English Church; but the lack of apostolic succession makes union impossible.]

Mellon (*P.*) Les Universités protestantes et les Écossais (André Melvin).
Rev. chrét., Feb. 1907.
[An account of the Huguenot academies of France and their Scottish professors.]

Pöhlmann (*H.*) Die Erlanger Theologie. Ihre Geschichte und ihre Bedeutung.
Th. St. u. Krit., April 1907.
[A historic-dogmatic study of the theological teaching of Thomasius, Hoffman, and Frank.]

Roy (*G. G.*) and *Viénot* (*J.*) La Faculté libre de théologie protestante de Paris et sa reconstitution. Rev. chrét., May 1907.
[Address and report on the work, needs and prospects of this faculty.]

Szlupas (*J.*) Lithuania and its Ancient Calvinistic Churches.
Princeton Th. Rev., April 1907.

Thieme (*Dr*) Zur Rechtfertigungslehre der Apologie. Th. St. u. Krit., Apr. 1907.
[Discusses the interpreters and the interpretations of Melanchthon's teaching on Justification. Writer describes his paper as a cry, "Back to Eichhorn."]

Viénot (*J.*) M. Brunetière et Calvin.
Rev. chrét., Feb. 1907.
[Reply to Brunetière's criticisms.]

5 *Bosseley* (*Ira*) The Independent Church of Westminster Abbey (1650–1826). 320p.
Unwin, 1907.
[Attempts to trace the origin and study the history of the Independent Church *in* Westminster Abbey.]

M'Nabb (*Vincent*) The Future of the Free Churches. Dub. R., April 1907.
[There is no future for them, but all that is true and good in their thoughts will be taken up into the fuller synthesis of the Catholic movement.]

L LITERATURE. 2 *English* 3 *German* 5 *Italian* 9 *Classical.*

2 *Brégy* (*K.*) The Poetry of Aubrey de Vere. Catholic World, March 1907.

W *Prothero* (*G. W.*) The Life and Letters of Leslie Stephen. 19th Cent., April 1907.

Hankin (*St John*) Mr Bernard Shaw as Critic. Fort. R., June 1907.
[Chiefly devoted to Mr Shaw's observations on Ibsen.]

Garrett (*Lindsay S.*) The Essence of Hardyism. Mont. R., June 1907.
[An adverse estimate of Hardy's work.]

3 *Brown* (*P. Hume*) The Character of Goethe. Quar. R., April 1907.
[The mediæval conception of the Christian revelation with its mechanical deity and its ascetic ideal seemed to Goethe an outrage at once on nature and the human spirit. On the other hand, of a Christianity based on the graces and virtues that make for the elevation of life, on an understanding of the universe compatible with man's reason, he deemed himself the true friend and ally.]

4 *Anon.* Peasant Studies in French Fiction. Edin. R., April 1907.
[George Sand, Balzac, Flaubert, Zola, etc.]

9 *Verrall* (*A. W.*) The Birth of Virgil.
Albany R., June 1907.
[Discussion of Dante, *Inferno*, i. 70.]

Mayor (*J. B.*) Virgil and Isaiah: An Enquiry into the Sources of the Fourth Eclogue of Virgil. Expos., April 1907.

Ramsay (*W. M.*) The Divine Child in Virgil. A Sequel to Professor Mayor's Study. Expos., April 1907.
[First article. Writer supposes Virgil had a direct acquaintance with a Greek version of Isaiah.

Morshead (*E. D. A.*) Euripides and his Modern Interpreters.
Church Q. R., April 1907.

Paul (*Herbert*) The Greek Anthology.
19th Cent., April 1907.

Phillimore (*J. S.*) Asclepiades.
Dub. R., April 1907.

Traube (*Ludwig*), *ed.* Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters: Johannes Scottus, von Edward K. Rand. Band i., Heft ii. 116p.
Beck, 1906.

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4 *Hinduism.* 7 *Judaism.* 9 *Demonology.* 12 *Occultism.*

Beauvois (*E.*) Le Paradis de l'Atlantique d'après les traditions concordantes de l'ancien et du nouveau monde.
Le Muséon, vol. viii., Nos. 1–2, 1907.

Cart (*J.*) Une église gnostique à Paris.
Liberté chrét., May 15, 1907.

Girard (*D. M.*) Un Coin de l'Asie Mineure, le Djanik.
Le Muséon, vol. viii., Nos. 1–2, 1907.
[Geographical and historical study.]

Kellett (*E. E.*) Some Notes on Christian Dioscurism. Expos., April 1907.

Suhrvardy (*H. S.*) The Bab and Babism.
Hindustan R., April 1907.

Gaskell (*G. A.*) Some Aspects of the Zoroastrian Scriptures.
East and West, April 1907.
[Deals with the doctrine of the Future State of the Righteous.]

Saintyves (*P.*) Les Saints Successeurs des Dieux. (Essais de Mythologie Chrétienne.) 416p. Nourry, 1907.
[An important work, dealing with the origin of the Cult of the Saints, the sources of the hagiographic legends, and the mythology of proper names.]

1 *Farnell* (*L. R.*) The Cults of the Greek States, vols. iii., iv. 406–462p.
Frowde, 1907.
[Review will follow.]

2 *Bailey* (*Cyril*) Ancient Rome. (Religions Ancient and Modern.) 113p.
Constable, 1907.
[A valuable little work.]

4 "*Barhaspatyah.*" Jyotish Vedanga: Last Words. Hindustan Rev., Mar. 1907.

[Answers the criticisms made on the previous papers of the author, under the title *The Jyotisha Vedanga Explained.*]

Menant (*Mlle. D.*) The Influence of Max Müller's Hibbert Lectures in India. Amer. J. Th., April 1907.

Prasad (*M.*) Pataliputra: Its Place in Indian History. Hindustan R., Apr. 1907.

Singh (*Raja*) Social Gulf between Indians and Europeans. Hindustan Rev., Mar. 1907.

Zutshi (*M. L.*) Hindu Protestantism. IV. Hindustan Rev., Jan. 1907.

[On Raja Ram Mohan Roy and the Brahmo Somaj. The greatness of the leader is recognised, but the movement is regarded as a failure.]

Zutshi (*M. L.*) Hindu Protestantism. V. Hindustan Rev., Feb. 1907.

[An account of the Arya Samaj and its founder; this movement succeeded the Brahmo Samaj and has been much more successful.]

Zutshi (*M. L.*) Hindu Protestantism. VI. Mr Ranade and the Indian Social Conference. Hindustan Rev., Mar. 1907.

[Properly a Social Reform movement, not an intense but an all-pervading influence.]

7 *Foakes-Jackson* (*F. J.*) Israel and Persia. III. Interpreter, April 1907.

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Gottheil (*R.*) An Eleventh Century Document concerning a Cairo Synagogue. Jewish Q. R., April 1907.

[Arabic text, translation, and maps.]

Hersch (*I. H.*) The French Revolution and the Emancipation of the Jews. Jewish Q. R., April 1907.

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[I. Antiochus Epiphanes. To be followed by an article on the Maccabees.]

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[Eleven Essays on Jewish doctrine and literature.]

Eschelbacher (*Joseph*) Das Judentum im Urteile der modernen protestantischen Theologie. Ein Vortrag. 64p. Fock, 1907.

König (*Eduard*) The Wandering Jew. 19th Cent., June 1907.

[A study of ideas about Ahasuerus.]

8 *Becker-Heidelberg* (*C. H.*) Christentum und Islam. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, iii. 8.) 56p. Mohr, 1907.

12 Transactions of the 2nd Annual Congress of the Federation of European Sections of the Theosophical Society, held in London, July 1905. 461p. Theosoph. Pub. Soc., 1907.

Hyde (*James*) A Bibliography of the Works of Emanuel Swedenborg: Original and Translated. 742p. Swedenborg Soc., 1906.

Sageret (*J.*) De l'esprit magique a l'esprit scientifique. Rev. Phil., Mar., Apr., 1907.

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Ewald (*Oscar*) Contemporary Philosophy in Germany (1906). Phil. R., May 1907.

[There is a tendency towards a return to Post-Kantian idealism.]

10 *Bax* (*E. Belfort*) The Roots of Reality; Being Suggestions for a Philosophical Reconstruction. New Ed. 331p. Grant Richards, 1907.

Calkins (*Mary Whiton*) The Persistent Problems of Philosophy. 588p. Macmillan, 1907.

[Reviews, under the heading of "Numerical Pluralism," the systems of Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume; the system of Kant; and under the heading "Numerical Monism," Spinoza, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Hegel. Author herself supports "monistic personalism."]

11 *Boodin* (*John E.*) The Ultimate Attributes of Reality. J. of Phil., May 23, 1907.

12 *Farges* (*A.*) Le doute méthodique peut-il être universel? Rev. de Phil., April 1907.

13 *Weiss* (*Berthold*) Natürliche und sittliche Weltordnung. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 2, 1907.

[An attempt to make clear the laws of the natural and the commands of the moral world-order, to exhibit the opposition between them, and to show in how far such opposition can be overcome.]

Hinton (*C. H.*) An Episode of Flatland: or How a Plane Folk discovered the Third Dimension. To which is added, An Outline of the History of Unaea. 181p. Sonnenschein, 1907.

Rabagliati (*A.*) The Functions of Food in the Body: Does either Bodily Energy or Bodily Heat come from the Food? 46p. Elliot Stock, 1907.

Windle (*B. C. A.*) De Vries and the Theory of Mutations. Dub. R., April 1907.

Turner (*H. H.*) Man's Place in the Universe: A Further Note on the Views of Dr A. W. Wallace. Fort. R., April 1907.

14 *Spearman* (*C.*) An 'Economic' Theory of Spatial Perception. Mind, April 1907.

[Localisation shows itself to be exactly such as to produce the maximum mental economy.]

21 *Allara* (*Vincenzo*) Sulla Causa del Cretinismo, i. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 2, 1907.

Meinong (*A.*) Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften, iii. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxx. 1, 1907.

[An elaborate reply to E. Dürr's criticisms and a summary of the position of *Gegenstandstheorie* to Logic and Epistemology.]

Bradley (*F. H.*) On Truth and Copying. Mind, April 1907.

[The process of knowledge is not something apart and by itself. It is one aspect of the life of the undivided universe outside of which life there is no truth or reality. And to speak here of copying as in a mirror is absurd. The universe is nowhere but in the lives of individuals, and, whether as truth or otherwise, the universe realises itself not at all except in their differences.]

Sabine (*G. H.*) The Concreteness of Thought. Phil. R., March 1907.

[Reality lies not back at the beginning of experience, in an experience which has never suffered the contamination of thought, but forward in the ideal which we are trying progressively to realise.]

Groos (*Karl*) Beiträge zum Problem des "Gegebenen." Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxx. 1, 1907.

[First article. An important discussion of the

meaning of "the given." Author distinguishes the *Elementar*-Gegebene from the phenomenally given.]

M'Gilvary (*E. Bradley*) The Stream of Consciousness. J. of Phil., April 25, 1907.
[Criticism of James. The awareness of awareness never exists except in the one indissoluble awareness of something else. Self-consciousness, in the sense of consciousness of I, is not an independent entity.]

Dewey (*John*) The Control of Ideas by Facts, i., ii.
J. of Phil., April 11 and May 9, 1907.
[Every situation of reflective knowledge involves a discrimination and a reference of existence and meaning, of datum and ideatum. The significance to be assigned to these categories, as well as to their correspondence, is thoroughly instrumental, being relative to the problem of recognising a situation of disturbed values.]

Wernick (*Georg*) Der Wirklichkeitsgedanke, iv.
Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi. 1, 1907.
[Treats of negative judgments.]

Sabine (*G. H.*) The Material of Thought.
Phil. R., May 1907.
[In all knowledge we are able to distinguish two aspects, the categorical reference to reality which we may call fact, and the hypothetical or universalizing tendency which brings every so-called fact under a general principle.]

Moore (*G. E.*) Mr Joachim's *Nature of Truth*. Mind, April 1907.

25 *Meyer* (*Richard M.*) Der Ursprung des Kausalitätsbegriffes.
Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi. 1, 1907.
[The notion of causality arises when psychological experience of the immediate connexion of two events is generalised after the fashion of the time and space concept, and so soon as events arranged in a temporal order are apprehended after the analogy of space.]

Thilly (*Frank*) Causality.
Phil. R., March 1907.
[Attempts to answer three questions: (1) What does the notion of causality mean? (2) What is its origin? (3) What is its validity?]

28 *Bakewell* (*C. M.*) The Ugly Infinite and the Good-for-nothing Absolute.
Phil. R., March 1907.
[Belief in absolute truth does not imply the belief that one has found the absolute truth, or even that one ever will. The idealist too is a modest man, and does not "affect omniscience."]

Dessoulavy (*C.*) L'infini confus.
Rev. de Phil., March 1907.

30 *Sherrington* (*Charles S.*) The Integrative Action of the Nervous System. 427p.
Constable, 1907.
[An important work by the Professor of Physiology in the University of Liverpool.]

33 The Dialectical Society on Spiritualism.
Annals of Psy. Sc., March 1907.

Boulenger (*Herman*) Dreams of Premonitory Nature.
Annals of Psy. Sc., March 1907.

De Vesme (*Cæsar*) Ordeals.
Annals of Psy. Sc., April 1907.

Herlitzka (*A.*), *Foa* (*C.*), *Aggazzotti* (*A.*) Experiments with the Medium, E. Paladino.
Annals of Psy. Sc., May 1907.

Morselli (*Enrico*) Eusapia Paladino and the genuineness of her phenomena.
Annals of Psy. Sc., May 1907.

De Fursac (*Rogues*) Notes de psychologie religieuse: Les Conversions.
Rev. Phil., May 1907.
[Notes on the Welsh revival taken during a visit to Wales in 1906.]

Searle (*G. M.*) The Recent Results of Psychical Research.
Catholic World, Mar., Apr. and May 1907.

40 *Fargues* (*P.*) Les résultats de la psychophysiologie. Rev. chrét., Feb. 1907.

Hay (*H. C.*) Healing at Emmanuel Church, Boston.
New Church Rev., April 1907.
[Describing a scheme for ministering, with medical co-operation, to sick minds.]

Poulain (*A.*) Les stigmatisés et l'autosuggestion.
R. pratique d'Apologétique, May 1, 1907.
[Denying that auto-suggestion originated the stigmata.]

Wright (*T. F.*) The Subconscious Self.
New Church Rev., April 1907.
[The theory is said to be taught by Swedenborg in the *Arcana Cœlestia*.]

Carey (*A. A.*) The Training of the Will. New Church Rev., April 1907.

Duprat (*L.*) La spatialité des faits psychiques. Rev. Phil., May 1907.

Stout (*G. F.*) Mr Prichard's Criticism of Psychology. Mind, April 1907.

Brackenbury (*Laura*) A Primer of Psychology. 120p. Murray, 1907.
[A short and clear account of mental functions based mainly on the works of Professors Ward and Stout.]

43 *Bodkin* (*A. M.*) The Sub-conscious Factors of Mental Process considered in relation to Thought, i. Mind, April 1907.
[Deals with the distinction of feeling, or sentience, from the contents of thought or clear cognitive consciousness.]

48 *James* (*William*) Les Énergies humaines.
Rev. de Phil., April 1907.
[Translation of Address to the American Philosophical Association.]

49 *Vaschide* (*N.*) Recherches expérimentales sur la divination de l'avenir: Les prévisions chiromantiques. Rev. de Phil., Mar. 1907.

52 *Kidd* (*Walter*) The Sense of Touch in Mammals and Birds. With special reference to the Papillary Ridges. 164 Ills. 176p.
Black, 1907.

53 *Marie* (*Pierre*) Sur la fonction du langage. Rectifications a propos de l'article de M. Grasset. Rev. de Phil., Mar. 1907.

Bauer (*A.*) La Transformation des Idées et le public. Rev. Phil., April 1907.
[The ideas of the beautiful, the true, the good, do not come from a transcendent world. They are the slow, uncertain products of human intelligence. But they are not due to the caprices of individual fancy. They rest on the strong conviction of the public mind.]

Bourdon (*B.*) La perception du temps.
Rev. Phil., May 1907.

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J. of Phil., Mar. 28, 1907.

55 *Pillon* (*F.*) Sur l'imagination affective.
Rev. Phil., Mar. 1907.

56 *Piat* (*Clodius*) Valeur de la Raison humaine. Rev. Néo-Scol., Feb. 1907.

57 *Huit* (*C.*) Essai sur les passions par Th. Ribot. Rev. de Phil., March 1907.

Ribot (*T.*) Sur une forme d'illusion affective. Rev. Phil., May 1907.

Johnston (*C. Hughes*) Feeling, Analysis and Experimentation.
J. of Phil., April 11, 1907.

59 *Geissler* (*Kurt*) Das Willensproblem: Historische Uebersicht u. Darstellung durch Weitenbehaftungen.
Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi. 1, 1907.
[Lotze was certainly right when he said that we do not understand the influence of like things upon one another. We assume such influence, we think it,—why, then, should we not extend our thought?]

De Gomer (*A.*) Autonomie de l'activité voluntaire. Rev. de Phil., April, May, 1907.

De Ribaucourt (*Ph.*) La Nature du Dilettantisme. Rev. Néo-Scol., Feb. 1907.

60 *Lalande* (*A.*) Le mouvement logique: Analyse et critique de quelques ouvrages récents. Rev. Phil., March 1907.
[Reviews recent works of Wolf, Shearman, Baldwin, and others.]

61 *Marvin* (*W. T.*) The Nature of Explanation. J. of Phil., Feb. 28, 1907.

64 *De Pesloüan* (*C. Lucas*) Sur les fondements de l'arithmétique.
Rev. de Phil., April, May, 1907.

Baille (*Louis*) La question du mixte: La "permanence virtuelle" des éléments et le continu. Rev. de Phil., March 1907.

74 *M'Gilvary* (*G. B.*) Pure Experience and Reality. Phil. R., May 1907.
[Able criticism of Dewey. Because some of our knowledge is not representative, and because, if all our knowledge were representative, we should never have any criterion of truth, it does not follow that none of our knowledge is representative.]

Doan (*Frank C.*) Humanism and Absolute Subconsciousness.
J. of Phil., March 28, 1907.

James (*William*) Pragmatism's Conception of Truth. J. of Phil., Mar. 14, 1907.
[Truth is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them.]

Schiller (*F. C. S.*) The Pragmatic Cure of Doubt. J. of Phil., April 25, 1907.

Russell (*John E.*) A Reply to Dr Schiller.
J. of Phil., April 25, 1907.

James (*William*), *Russell* (*John E.*) Controversy about Truth.
J. of Phil., May 23, 1907.

Van Cauwelaert (*F.*) L'empirio-criticisme de Richard Avenarius.
Rev. Néo-Scol., Feb. 1907.

76 *Keay* (*C. F.*) Positivism.
Albany R., May 1907.

Harrison (*Frederic*) The Creed of a Layman. Apologia pro Fide mea. 411p.
Macmillan, 1907.
[In addition to the "Apologia," this volume contains a selection of Mr Harrison's review articles and addresses, *inter alia* the review of *Essays and Reviews* contributed to the *West. R.* for Oct. 1860, and the essay on Cosmic Emotion, suggested by one of Clifford's papers.]

Dürr (*F.*) Grundzüge einer realistischen Weltanschauung. 95p. Thomas, 1907.

Bode (*B. H.*) Realism and Objectivity.
J. of Phil., May 9, 1907.

85 *Fuller* (*B. A. G.*) The Theory of God in Book Λ of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.
Phil. R., March 1907.

86 *Davidson* (*W. L.*) The Stoic Creed. 297p. Clark, 1907.
[A contribution towards the exposition and just appreciation of Stoicism. Section A deals with Moulding Influences and Leaders of the School, B with Stoic Science and Speculation, C with Morality and Religion.]

90 *Sternheim* (*E.*) Spinoza: An Essay.
Mont. R., June 1907.

91 *Baruzi* (*Jean*) Leibniz et l'Organisation Religieuse de la Terre d'après des Documents Inédits. 524p. Alcan, 1907.
[Shows Leibniz describing a dream of *religious imperialism* in Egypt, Abyssinia, the Extreme-East, America. The mysterious sources of this "religious" desire are studied: Leibniz determined by the example of Pascal, planning an ideal Church. Author has drawn his conclusions from the texts themselves.]

94W *Sichler* (*Albert*) Über falsche Interpretation des kritischen Realismus Wundts und Beurteilung von O. Pfisters kritischem Transzendental-Realismus, ii.
Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 2, 1907.
[Contends that Pfister's assumption that conformity between thought and reality is not necessarily demanded is perfectly untenable.]

95 *Tufts* (*James H.*) Garman as a Teacher.
J. of Phil., May 9, 1907.

V ART. 83 *Sacred Music.*

Corwegh (*Robert*) Ästhetische Grundfragen. Ein Versuch zu ihrer Lösung.
Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 2, 1907.

Wernaer (*Robert M.*) Das ästhetische Symbol.
Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxx. 1, 1907.

Schapire (*Anna*) Zu Hebbels Anschauungen über Kunst und künstlerisches Schaffen.
Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 2, 1907.

Sybel (*Ludwig von*) Die klassische Archaeologie und die altchristliche Kunst. 18p. Elwert, 1906.
[Address as Rector of the University of Marburg.]

Clay (*Felix*) Art as a Factor in the Struggle for Existence.
Mont. R., June 1907.

1 *Robinson* (*Dean Armitage*) The Benedictine Abbey of Westminster.
Church Q. R., April 1907.

23 *Lethaby* (*W. R.*) Westminster Abbey and the King's Craftsmen: A Study of Mediæval Building. 398p.
Duckworth, 1907.

83 *Taunton* (*E. L.*) The Old Roman Chant.
Catholic World, May 1907.
[Attack on the Solermes method of Plain-song. The most pure and original (which are also the simplest) forms are to be sought for in English sources.]

Walpole (*G. H. S.*) The People's Psalter, containing the Psalms of David, together with the Litany and the Canticles and Hymns of the Church, with the Point of the Cathedral Psalter. 299p.
Elliot Stock, 1907
[Designed to help choirs in the intelligent rendering of the psalms.]

G. H. D. and J. H. W.

INDEX

ARTICLES

Atonement, The Christian Doctrine of, as influenced by Semitic Religious Ideas, 329.

Between Death and Life, 554.

Chance or Purpose? 384.

Christ in Education, 54.

Christ of the Fourth Gospel, The, 606.

Christian Deity, Who is the? 821.

Christianity, Do we need a Substitute for? 105.

Church and World, 1.

Church, The Living, 530.

Churchmen, A Grave Peril to the Liberty of, 343.

Crise Religieuse en France et en Italie, La, 277.

Dante, Character and Citizenship in, 856.

Divine Immanence, 745.

Divine Immanence and the Christian Purpose, 768.

Education Bill, Bishop of Birmingham and the, 64.

Eternal Punishment, A Dialogue on, 119.

Ethic, Christian, The Sufficiency of the, 784.

Final Venture, Our, 241.

Free Catholic Ideal, The, 797.

Friars, The Failure of the, 296.

Gassendi, Pierre, and the Atoms: An Episode in the Conflict between Theology and Early Science, 85.

Hindu God-Idea, The Vital Value in the, 74.

Idealists, A Peace Policy for, 407.

Immortality, 724.

Jesus the Prophet, 136.

Jesus, The Sinlessness of, 600.

Kant, What do Religious Thinkers owe to? 639.
Miracles of Healing, The Neurotic Theory of the, 572.
New Catholic Movement, The Aim of the, 494.
New Theology Movement, The Aim of the, 481.
Personality in God, Christ, Man, 558.
Psychical Research as bearing on Veracity in Religious Thought, 113.
Reformed Church as an Engine of Progress, A, 513.
Religion and Art, The Parallelism of, 397.
Religion and Citizenship in Early Rome, 839.
Religion and History, The Entangling Alliance of, 258.
Religion of the People, The, 879.
Religious Reconstruction in France and Germany, Phases of, 166.
Reunion, 42.
Sin, The Forgiveness of, 587.
Stoicism, The New, 541.
Theism, The New, 361.
Theology of "the Average Man," The, 624.
Theology, The "Eternal Now" in Anglican, 370.
Tract No. XCI., 808.
Union and Breadth: A Plea for Essential Unity amid Formal Difference in a National Church, 23.
Vergil, The Messianic Idea in, 309.
Watson, John, 721.
"What Are You?" The Child's Answer, 893.
Zoroastrian Messiah, The, 156.

Anon., Between Death and Life, 554.
Barnett, Canon S. A., The Religion of the People, 879.
Campbell, R. J., M.A., The Christian Doctrine of Atonement as influenced by Semitic Religious Ideas, 329. The Aim of the New Theology Movement, 481.
Collier, J., Phases of Religious Reconstruction in France and Germany, 166. Who is the Christian Deity? 821.
Conway, R. S., Prof., D.Litt., The Messianic Idea in Vergil, 309.
Coulton, G. G., M.A., The Failure of the Friars, 296.
D'Arcy, C. F., D.D., Bishop of Clogher, The Sufficiency of the Christian Ethic, 784.
Editor, Church and World, 1.
Ffrangcon-Davies, D., M.A., Christ in Education, 54.

Findlay, J. J., Prof., "What Are You?" The Child's Answer, 893.
Fowler, W. Warde, Religion and Citizenship in Early Rome, 839.
Fraser, Campbell, Prof., Our Final Venture, 241.
Galloway, G., D.Phil., What do Religious Thinkers owe to Kant? 639.
Garvie, A. E., M.A., D.D., Personality in God, Christ, Man, 558.
Gerard, J., S.J., A Dialogue on Eternal Punishment, 119.
Gibson, W. R. Boyce, M.A., A Peace Policy for Idealists, 407.
Grensted, F. F., M.A., The "Eternal Now" in Anglican Theology, 370.
Hill, J. A., Psychical Research as bearing on Veracity in Religious Thought, 113.
Huntington, W. R., D.D., Tract No. XCI., 808.
Jones, Henry, Prof., M.A., LL.D., Divine Immanence, 745.
Kennett, Canon R. H., B.D., Jesus the Prophet, 136.
Latinus, The Aim of the New Catholic Movement, 494.
Lodge, Sir Oliver, D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S., Union and Breadth: A Plea for Essential Unity amid Formal Difference in a National Church, 23. A Reformed Church as an Engine of Progress, 513.
Lovejoy, A. O., Prof., The Entangling Alliance of Religion and History, 258.
MacColl, H., Chance or Purpose? 384.
Macfadyen, D., M.A., Reunion, 42.
M'Giffert, A. C., Prof., Divine Immanence and the Christian Purpose, 768.
Masson, J., M.A., LL.D., Pierre Gassendi and the Atoms: An Episode in the Conflict between Theology and Early Science, 85.
Matheson, P. E., Character and Citizenship in Dante, 856.
Millard, B. A., The Theology of "the Average Man," 624.
Muirhead, J. H., Prof., The Bishop of Birmingham and the Education Bill, 64.
Ovenden, C. T., D.D., The Forgiveness of Sin, 587.
Palmer, A. S., D.D., The Zoroastrian Messiah, 156.
Palmer, F., The Christ of the Fourth Gospel, 606.
Paradise, F. I., The Living Church, 530.
Patton, C. S., The New Theism, 361.
Rashdall, H., D.Litt., A Grave Peril to the Liberty of Churchmen, 343.
Royce, J., Prof., Immortality, 724.
Rumball, E. A., The Sinlessness of Jesus, 600.
Russell, Sir Edward, John Watson, 721.
Ryle, R. J., M.A., M.D., The Neurotic Theory of the Miracles of Healing, 572.
Sabatier, Paul, La Crise Religieuse en France et en Italie, 277.
Seeger, W. T., The Vital Value in the Hindu God-Idea, 74.
Sélincourt, Basil de, M.A., The Parallelism of Religion and Art, 397.
Sonnenschein, E. A., Prof., The New Stoicism, 541.
Sturt, H., M.A., Do we need a Substitute for Christianity? 105.
Thomas, J. Lloyd, The Free Catholic Ideal, 797.

DISCUSSIONS

Anesaki, Prof., Professor Carpenter on Japanese Buddhism, 184.
Balsillie, D., M.A., The Entangling Alliance of Religion and History, 661.
Blacket, J., Mr Birrell's Choice, 189.
Callaway, C., M.A., D.Sc., Our Final Venture, 660.
Casartelli, L. C., Bishop of Salford, The Zoroastrian Messiah, 435.
Cater, G., The New Theism, 670.
Coulton, G. G., The Failure of the Friars, 908.
Cowland-Cooper, C., Church and World, 427.
Crosse, G., A Grave Peril to the Liberty of Churchmen, 671.
Cuthbert, Father, O.S.F.C., The Failure of the Friars, 663.
Fraser, C., Prof., Our Final Venture, 905.
Fremantle, W. H., Dean of Ripon, Church and World, 425.
Gerard, Father, Eternal Punishment, 672.
Gregory, J. C., Church and World, 428.
Hearnshaw, F. J. C., Prof., The Forgiveness of Sins, 911.
Lodge, Sir O., Christianity and Science, 193.
First Principles of Faith, 429.
Macaulay, J. H. C., The New Theism, 669.
Macfadyen, D., Reunion, 914.
Masterman, J. H. B., D.D., First Principles of Faith, 186.
Moore, H. K., D.D., The Sinlessness of Jesus, 915.
Palmer, A. S., D.D., The Zoroastrian Messiah, 674.
Roberts, W. W., A Dialogue on Eternal Punishment, 432.
Shields, F. R., A Dialogue on Eternal Punishment, 433.
Shuttleworth, G. S., M.A., Do we need a Substitute for Christianity? 436.
Stanislaus, Father, O.S.F.C., The Failure of the Friars, 665.
Stewart, W. C., M.A., The Separation of the Creeds from Worship, 192.
Stock, St G., M.A., A Dialogue on Eternal Punishment, 435.
Wallace, J. B., An Attempt to realise Mr Campbell's Proposal, 903.

REVIEWS

Allen, W. C., M.A.—A. Harnack, Lukas der Arzt, 942.
Bennett, A., M.A.—M. C. Albright, The Common Heritage, 947.
Campbell, L., Prof.—Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 439.

Cheyne, T. K., Prof.—C. Augustus Briggs, The Book of Psalms, vol. i., 453; vol. ii., 944.

Davies, W. Jones, Principal.—F. G. Peabody, Jesus Christ and the Christian Character; Jesus Christ and the Social Question, 219.

Drummond, J., LL.D.—H. Hilgenfeld, Verzeichnis der von Adolf Hilgenfeld verfassten Schriften, 225.

J. Hope Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek; and Edwin A. Abbott, Johannine Grammar, 459.

Drummond, W. H., B.A.—L'Abbé Rivière and G. B. Stevens, Redemption and Salvation, 691.

Duff, R. A., M.A.—Henry Melville Gwatkin, The Knowledge of God and its Historical Development, 675.

Farnell, L. R., Dr.—J. G. Frazer, Adonis, Attis, and Osiris, 687.

Gibson, W. R. Boyce, M.A.—A. L. Lilley, Adventus Regni, 699.

Haddon, A. C., Sc.D., F.R.S.—W. H. R. Rivers, The Todas, 680.

Harris, W., M.A.—W. Scott Palmer, An Agnostic's Progress; and Anon., A Modern Pilgrim's Progress, 448.

Herford, R. T., B.A.—Nathaniel Schmidt, The Prophet of Nazareth, 221.

Hill, J. A.—A. W. Verrall, On a Series of Automatic Writings, 466.

Jones, Miss C. C. E., Mistress of Girton College.—A. S. and E. M. S., Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir, 208.

Latta, R., Prof.—E. S. Haldane, Descartes, his Life and Times, 205.

Lilley, A. S., M.A.—Paul Sabatier, Â propos de la Séparation des Églises et de l'État, 217.

Marshall, N. H., M.A., Ph.D.—John Clifford, The Ultimate Problems of Christianity, 707.

Moffatt, J., D.D.—Rudolf Schmid, The Scientific Creed of a Theologian, 468.

Orde-Ward, F. W., M.A.—W. J. Williams, Newman, Pascal, Loisy and the Catholic Church, 462.

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